Scribd
Upload
160 views4 pages

No. 6 Panay Railways Versus Heva Management & Devt Corp

1) Panay Railways Inc. secured a loan from a bank but failed to pay, prompting the bank to foreclose on properties including some not covered by the mortgage. Panay Railways filed a complaint which was dismissed. 2) Panay Railways appealed the dismissal but did not pay required docket fees. The RTC dismissed the appeal for this reason. The CA initially ruled this was improper but later upheld the dismissal. 3) The Supreme Court ruled that procedural rules like paying docket fees can be applied retroactively. Failure to follow the rules is not enough justification to relax them. The dismissal of the appeal was therefore proper.

Uploaded by

Sam Lago
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
160 views4 pages

No. 6 Panay Railways Versus Heva Management & Devt Corp

1) Panay Railways Inc. secured a loan from a bank but failed to pay, prompting the bank to foreclose on properties including some not covered by the mortgage. Panay Railways filed a complaint which was dismissed. 2) Panay Railways appealed the dismissal but did not pay required docket fees. The RTC dismissed the appeal for this reason. The CA initially ruled this was improper but later upheld the dismissal. 3) The Supreme Court ruled that procedural rules like paying docket fees can be applied retroactively. Failure to follow the rules is not enough justification to relax them. The dismissal of the appeal was therefore proper.

Uploaded by

Sam Lago
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 4

Panay Railways Inc. v.

Heva Management and


Development Corporation, et al., G.R. No.
154061, January 25, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner Panay Railways Incorporated, a


government corporation, secured a loan to Traders Royal
Bank amounting to P20 million. Panay Railways Inc.
failed to pay its obligations which prompted the bank
to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage. In 1994,
petitioner noticed that the bank’s extra-judicial
foreclosure included some properties which were not
covered by the mortgage.

Panay Railways then filed a complaint for Partial


Annulment of the Contract to Sell and Deed of Absolute
Sale with Addendum, Cancellation of issued title, and
Declaration of Ownership of Real Property with
reconveyance and damages which prompted the respondents
to file a motion to dismiss.

The RTC issued an Order granting the motion to


dismiss which petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal
without paying the necessary docket fees and alleged
that its counsel was not yet familiar with the
revisions of the Rules of Court that became effective
only on 1 July 1997. Petitioner further contends that
the requirement for the payment of docket fees was not
mandatory and asked the RTC for a liberal
interpretation of the procedural rules.

The RTC issued an order dismissing the appeal


citing Sec. 4 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court
which the petitioner moved for a reconsideration but
was however denied. Petitioner then filed with the
Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
under Rule 65 alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction
to dismiss the Notice of Appeal, and that the trial
court had acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
strictly applied procedural rules.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC committed


grave abuse of discretion. Although the failure of the
petitioner to pay the docket fees and other lawful fees
was a ground for the dismissal of the appeal, the RTC
did have jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal, the same
lies within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.

The respondents filed their respective motion for


reconsideration which during the pendency of such
motion, the Supreme Court issued Administrative Matter
No. 00-2-10-SC which took effect on 1 May 2000,
amending Rule 4 Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of Rule 41 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court. The circular provides that
the trial courts may, motu proprio or upon motion,
dismiss an appeal for being filed out of time or for
non-payment of docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period.

Subsequently, Circular No. 48-200013 was issued on


29 August 2000 and was addressed to all lower courts.
By virtue of the amendment to Sec. 41, the CA upheld
the questioned Orders of the trial court by issuing the
assailed Amended Decision in the present Petition
granting respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration. The
CA’s action prompted petitioner to file a Motion for
Reconsideration alleging that SC Circular No. 48-2000
should not be given retroactive effect. Petitioner also
alleged that the CA should consider the case as
exceptionally meritorious. Petitioner’s counsel, Atty.
Alejano, explained that he was yet to familiarize
himself with the Revised Rules of Court, which became
effective a little over a month before he filed the
Notice of Appeal. He was thus not aware that the non-
payment of docket fees might lead to the dismissal of
the case. The CA issued the assailed Resolution denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals


committed an error in sustaining the RTC’s dismissal of
the Notice of Appeal.

HELD/RULING: The Court of Appeals did not erred in


sustaining the RTC’s dismissal of the Notice of Appeal.

The Supreme Court ruled that: Statutes and rules


regulating the procedure of courts are considered
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the
time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The
effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights
of a litigant may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. This retroactive
application does not violate any right of a person
adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule,
no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural
laws and rules. It has been held that "a person has no
vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant
cannot insist on the application to the trial of his
case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure." More so when, as in this
case, petitioner admits that it was not able to pay the
docket fees on time. Clearly, there were no substantive
rights to speak of when the RTC dismissed the Notice of
Appeal.

There is no merit in the argument that the CA had


the exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal. Since
the Supreme Court accordingly amended Sec. 13 of Rule
41 through A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, the RTC’s dismissal of
the action may be considered to have had the imprimatur
of the Court. Hence, the CA committed no reversible
error when it sustained the dismissal of the appeal.

In the case of Lazaro versus Endencia, 1932, the


Supreme Court held that the payment of docket fees is
an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal.
The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fees.

Moreover, the right to appeal is not a natural


right and is not part of due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege, which may be exercised only in
accordance with the law.

The Supreme Court stated that the term substantial


justice is not a magic wand that would automatically
compel this Court to suspend procedural rules.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed
simply because their non-observance may result in
prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all
other rules, they have are required to be followed,
except only the most persuasive of reasons when they
may be relaxed to relieve litigants of an injustice not
commensurate with degree of their thoughtlessness in
not complying with the procedure prescribed.
Hence, counsel’s failure to familiarized the
Revised Rules of Court as a persuasive reason to relax
the application of the Rules. It is well-settled that
the negligence of counsel binds the client. This
principle is based on the rule that any act performed
by lawyers within the scope of their general or implied
authority is regarded as an act of the client.
Consequently, the mistake or negligence of the counsel
of petitioner may result in the rendition of an
unfavorable judgment against it.

You might also like

pFad - Phonifier reborn

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.

Note: This service is not intended for secure transactions such as banking, social media, email, or purchasing. Use at your own risk. We assume no liability whatsoever for broken pages.


Alternative Proxies:

Alternative Proxy

pFad Proxy

pFad v3 Proxy

pFad v4 Proxy