IMMIGRATION LAW | LIRAH ALORRA

OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL vs. JUDGE ANTONIO I. DE CASTRO

AM No. RTJ-06-2018 | August 3, 2007 | Second Division

J. Tinga

FACTS:

Philippine Immigration Officers arrested Gao Yuan and prevented her from boarding her flight to Canada.
The arrest was by virtue of an order issued by the Bureau of Immigration (BI) Commissioner. Such action
by the BI Commissioner was a response to a letter from Consul General of the People’s Republic of China
(PROC) which alleged Gao Yuan was a fugitive from justice and charged with embezzlement by Chinese
police and requested her arrest and deportation to China. Gao Yuan was detained at the BI Detention
Center.

James Mahshi, Gao Yuan’s husband, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Manila. It was alleged that Gao Yuan was illegally detained. He also filed an application for
TRO and writ of preliminary injunction praying to restrain Commissioner Fernandez from enforcing any
order of commitment of Gao Yuan and directing her immediate release.

The Executive Judge of RTC Manila issued a 72-hour TRO. Subsequently, the case was raffled to the sala of
Judge de Castro. Judge de Castro extended the 72-hour TRO by 17 days. He also granted the petition for
bail based on humanitarian consideration since Gao Yuan was a nursing mother to a 17-month-old child.
RTC clarified that it was only a provisional release subject to certain conditions. One of which was the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against her should she try to hide or fail to go to court at any given time
she is called.

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that Gao Yuan’s release on bail is illegal since such falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the BI and not in the regular courts pursuant to Sec. 37(e) of C.A. 613.
OSG cited, Commissioner Rodriguez v. Judge Bonifacio, that the RTC has no power to release the alien on
bail even in habeas corpus proceedings. Meaning, OSG argues that the respondent openly disregarded
prevailing law and jurisprudence.  

ISSUES:

1.       Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus filed by James Mahshi. (NO)

a.       Whether RTC has the power to release Gao Yuan on bail. (NO)

2.       Whether Judge de Castro should be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. (YES)

RULING:

1.      No, RTC had no jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus filed by James Mahshi.

Section 4, Rule 102 provides:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. —If it appears that the person to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
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virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

Thus, once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a
petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or
the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought
to be released had been charged before any court. The term "court" includes quasi-judicial bodies or
governmental agencies authorized to order the person's confinement, like the Deportation Board of the
Bureau of Immigration.

In the case at bar, the petition for habeas corpus was filed on 8 September 2005 and was raffled on the
same day to respondent's sala. The Return of the Writ was filed on 9 September 2004, accompanied by
the Charge Sheet dated 7 September 2005 and the Summary Deportation Order also dated 7 September
2005. When the petition was filed by James Mahshi, a charge sheet and deportation order had already
been filed against Gao Yuan. By then, the restraint of Gao Yuan's liberty was already by virtue of a lawful
process. Clearly, respondent's court no longer had jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus and it
was an error for respondent to order Gao Yuan's release upon the filing of a cash bond and take full
responsibility for the release and custody of Gao Yuan.

A.      No, RTC has no power to release Gao Yuan on bail.

Section 37 (9) (e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, provides that "[a]ny
alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such
other conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration." This provision
confers upon the Commissioner the power and discretion to grant bail in deportation
proceedings, but does not grant to aliens the right to be released on bail. The exercise by the
Commissioner of such power is discretionary. So too, the determination of the propriety of
allowing the temporary release on bail of the alien, subject to deportation under the
Immigration Act, as well as the conditions of such release falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Commissioner, not the courts of justice. The reason for this is that the courts do not
administer immigration laws. The power of the Commissioner to grant bail in deportation
proceedings should be exercised when the alien is still under investigation, and not after the
order of deportation has been issued by the BI. When an alien is detained by the BI for
deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the courts of first
instance, now RTCs, have no power to release such alien on bail, even in habeas corpus
proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.

2.      Yes, Judge de Castro should be held liable for gross ignorance of the law.

Ordinarily, to constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject decision, order, or actuation of the judge
in the performance of his official duties should be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, and most
importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. In the present case, there is
no finding of bad faith or malice, but this does not excuse the respondent. When the law is sufficiently
basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it, and anything less than that would be constitutive of
gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross
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ignorance of the law. While judges should not be held accountable for every erroneous judgment
rendered in good faith, such good faith is no defense where the basic issues are simple and the applicable
legal principle evident and basic as to be beyond permissible margins of error.

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Antonio I. De Castro of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
City of Manila, guilty of gross ignorance of the law and is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of THREE (3)
MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY without pay, with a WARNING that commission of a similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.

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