Legal and Judicial Ethics

attymlpg@yahoo.com

Reference: Agpalo 2020; Anciano, F, Pineda

Legal & Judicial Ethics Assignment:

I recommend SC website or Lawphil.

1. Compare Cayetano vs. Monsod with Vidaylin Yamon-Leach vs. Atty. Arturo Astorga Aug 28, 2019

FACTS:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Atty. Monsod has worked as a lawyer in the law office of his father (1960-1963); an operations officer
with the World Bank Group (1963-1970); Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank (1970-1986);
legal or economic consultant on various companies (1986); Secretary General of NAMFREL (1986);
member of Constitutional Commission (1986-1987); National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987); and
member of the quasi-judicial Davide Commission (1990).

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the COMELEC.On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent possesses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Monsod possessed the required qualification. In the case of
Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an
appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client
relationship, it is whether in or out of court. As such, the petition is dismissed.

VIDAYLIN YAMON-LEACH v. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA A.C. No. 5987, August 28, 2019 PER CURIAM:

DOCTRINE: Unlawful conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although the concept
is broad enough to include such element. To be dishonest means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
defraud, or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness, and
straightforwardness, while conduct that is deceitful means the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the
prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon.

In order to be deceitful, the person must either have knowledge of the falsity or acted in reckless and
conscious ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not on equal terms, and was done with the
intent that the aggrieved party act thereon, and the latter indeed acted in reliance of the false
statement or deed in the manner contemplated to his injury. Deceitful conduct involves moral turpitude
and includes anything done contrary to justice, modesty or good morals.

RULING: Yes, there is. Respondent's calculated acts of deceit, dishonesty, abuse of complainant's trust
and confidence as well as his misappropriation of the funds he received from complainant constitute
malfeasance and is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession but also
reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law. Good moral character is not only a
condition precedent relating to his admission into the practice of law, but is a continuing imposition in
order for him to maintain his membership in the Philippine Bar.

2. Oscar Pimentel vs. Legal Edu Board Sept 2019

FACTS: 

Petitioners in this case assail the unconstitutionality of R.A. 7662 or the Legal Education Reform Act of
1993 which creates the Legal Education Board. Petitioners particularly seek to declare as
unconstitutional the creation of LEB itself, LEB issuances and memorandums establishing law practice
internship as a requirement for taking the bar based on Sec. 7 (g) of RA 7662, adopting a system of
continuing legal education based on Sec. 2 (2) and Sec. 7 (h) of RA 7662, and establishing and
implementing the nationwide law school aptitude test known as the Philippine Law School Admission
Test or the PhilSAT pursuant to LEB’s power to “prescribe the minimum standards for law admission”
under Sec. 7 (e) of RA 7662. Petitioners principally grounded the petitions on LEB’s alleged
encroachment upon the rulemaking power of the Court concerning the practice of law, violation of
institutional academic freedom, and violation of law school aspirant’s right to education under the
Constitution.

US Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957),
widely acknowledged as having captured the essence of academic freedom, has found its way into
Philippine jurisprudence. Monsod, Mawis, and Te cited Frankfurter’s opinion that academic freedom
consists of the “four essential freedoms” of a university “to determine for itself on academic grounds
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”

ISSUES:

1. Whether the regulation and supervision of legal education belong to the Court.

2. Whether the requirement of internship for admission to Bar Examination embodied in LEB
Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(g) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.

3. Whether the adoption of system of continuing legal education embodied in LEB Memorandum
pursuant to Sec. 2(2) and Sec. 7(h) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.

4. Whether the establishment of PhilSAT embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(e) of RA
7662 is unconstitutional.

RULING: 

1. NO. Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and consistently exercised by
the political departments. The historical development of statutes on education unerringly reflects the
consistent exercise by the political departments of the power to supervise and regulate all levels and
areas of education, including legal education. Legal education is but a composite of the entire Philippine
education system. It is perhaps unique because it is a specialized area of study. This peculiarity,
however, is no reason in itself to demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the regulatory and
supervisory powers of the political branches. 

Two principal reasons militate against the proposition that the Court has the regulation and supervision
of legal education:

First, it assumes that the court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate legal education as
a necessary consequence of its power to regulate admission to the practice of law. This assumption,
apart from being manifestly contrary to the history of legal education in the Philippines, is likewise
devoid of legal anchorage.

Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not, arrogate upon itself a
power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. For the Court to void RA 7662 and thereafter, to form a body that regulates legal education and
place it under its supervision and control, as what petitioners suggest, is to demonstrate a highly
improper form of judicial activism. 

As it is held, the Court’s exclusive rule making power under the Constitution covers the practice of law
and not the study of law. The present rules embodied in the 1997 Rules of Court do not support the
argument that the Court directly and actually regulates legal education, it merely provides academic
competency requirements for those who would like to take the Bar. Furthermore, it is the State in the
exercise of its police power that has the authority to regulate and supervise the education of its citizens
and this includes legal education.
2. YES. This requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to promulgate
rules concerning the practice of law and admissions thereto. The jurisdiction to determine whether an
applicant may be allowed to take the bar examinations belongs to the Court. Under Sec. 7(g), the power
of the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of legal education but now dabbles on the
requisites for admissions to the bar. This is direct encroachment upon the Court’s exclusive authority to
promulgate rules concerning admissions to the bar and should, therefore, be struck down as
unconstitutional.

3. YES. By its plain language, the clause “continuing legal education” unduly give the LEB the power to
supervise the legal education of those who are already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is
authorized to compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration
as the LEB deems necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court’s power to promulgate rules
concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the education of Lawyer-professors as the teaching of law
is considered the practice of law.

4. YES. Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe minimum
standards for law admission. The PhilSAT, when administered as an aptitude test to guide law schools in
measuring the applicant’s aptness for legal education along with such other admissions policy that the
law school may consider, is such minimum standard. However, the PhilSAT presently operates not only
as a measure of an applicant’s aptitude for law school. The PhilSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon
law schools who among the examinees are to be admitted to any law program. When the PhilSAT is
used to exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its present design mandates, the
PhilSAT goes beyond mere supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom, becomes
unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional.

3. In re: Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law Dec 17, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

 On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to
the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

Issue:

 Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up
his Philippine citizenship

Ruling:
 The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission
to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to
engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.

 The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

 Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires
his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license
or permit to engage in such practice.

4. Cui vs. Cui 1964

Facts:

The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the, spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui,
now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and
helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation... and endowed with extensive
properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation

Don Pedro Gui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929.
Thereupon the administration passed to MauWcio Gui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May
1931 and the second, on 1 July 1031. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only... son of Mauricio Gui,
became the administrator.

Thereafter,... a series of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the position of
administrator,... Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of
Mariano Cui,... the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma.
Cui... pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document.

The next day,... Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of
either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.

Dr. Teodoro Cui died... the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned
over to him;

Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui,
another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the position
of administrator.

However,... the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews
therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado,... The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term
"titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo
Tomas... but is not a member of the Bar,... Antonio

Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar,... although disbarred by this Court... was reinstated
by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of
administrator of the

Hospicio de Barili.

The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado,"
taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that "as used in the deed of donation and
considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not... be given a strict interpretation
but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree pr diploma of Bachelor of Laws.

Issues:

the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws
but membership in the Bar

Ruling:

A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic
requirements,... does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession.

The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general
signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts,
empowered to... appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities are developed by law as a conseqeunce.

such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a
certificate from the Clerk of Court,... The academic degree of Bachetor of Laws in itself has little to do
with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirement that an applicant to
the examinations has "successfully completed all the... prescribed courses, in a law school or
university,... The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test
advisedly, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a
doctor or a- civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all... these, should be the one who
pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the
office of administrator.
His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for
his admission... to the Bar in the first place.

When the... defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from
his previous disbarment were wiped out.

5. CIR vs. La Flor Dela Isabela Jan 14, 2019

[G.R. No. 211289. January 14, 2019.] COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. LA FLOR DELA ISABELA,
INC. FACTS: La Flor dela Isabela, Inc. (La Flor), a domestic corporation, filed monthly returns for the
Expanded Withholding Tax (EWT) and Withholding Tax on Compensation (WTC) for calendar year 2005.
On September 3, 2008, La Flor, through its president, executed a Waiver of the Statute of Limitations for
tax liabilities for the calendar year ending December 31, 2005. On February 16, 2009, it executed
another Waiver to extend the period of assessment until December 31, 2009. On November 20, 2009, La
Flor received a copy of the Preliminary Assessment Notice for deficiency taxes for the taxable year 2005.
On December 2, 2009, it executed another Waiver. On January 7, 2010, La Flor received the a Formal
Letter of Demand and Final Assessment Notices covering the deficiency taxes for the taxable year 2005.
On January 15, 2010, La Flor filed its Letter of Protest contesting the assessment notices. On July 20,
2010, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued the Final Decision on Disputed
Assessment involving the alleged deficiency withholding taxes. Aggrieved, La Flor filed a petition for
review before the CTA Division which ruled in its favor. Upon denial by the CTA Division of its motion for
reconsideration, the CIR filed a Petition for Review before the CTA En Banc. The CTA En Banc affirmed
the Decision of the CTA Division and subsequently denied the CIR's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES: 1. Whether the prescriptive period under Sec. 203 of the NIRC applies to EWT and WTC
assessments 2. Whether La Flor's EWT and WTC assessments for 2005 were barred by prescription.

HELD: 1. Withholding tax assessments are not mere impositions of a penalty on the withholding agent,
and thus, outside the coverage of Section 203 of the NIRC. In National Development Company v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court did not equate withholding tax assessments to the
imposition of civil penalties imposed on tax deficiencies. The word "penalty" was used to underscore the
dynamics in the withholding tax system that it is the income of the payee being subjected to tax and not
of the withholding agent. It was never meant to mean that withholding taxes do not fall within the
definition of internal revenue taxes, especially considering that income taxes are the ones withheld by
the withholding agent. Withholding taxes do not cease to become income taxes just because it is
collected and paid by the withholding agent. 2. Waivers extending the prescriptive period of tax
assessments must be compliant with RMO No. 20-90 and must indicate the nature and amount of the
tax due. The September 3, 2008, February 16, 2009 and December 2, 2009 waivers did not indicate the
specific tax involved and the exact amount of the tax to be assessed or collected — material data
without which, there can be no true and valid agreement between the taxpayer and the CIR. Being
invalid, the waivers did not extend the prescriptive period under Section 203. The Decision and
Resolution of the CTA En Banc are affirmed.

6. De Roy vs. CA 1989

Facts:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop
occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death
of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.

Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the
weakened wall but the former failed to do so.

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision
promulgated on August 17, 1987, copy of... which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On
September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate
court in the

Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24,
1987, but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

Issues:

Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision

Ruling:

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for... the damage resulting from its total or
partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs."

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners' argument that private respondents had the "last clear
chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop and,
therefore, petitioners' prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine... of "last clear
chance", which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

7. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Llorente 2000

A.C. No. 4690. August 29, 2000

FACTS: 

Attys. Antonio Llorente and Ligaya Salayon were election officers of the COMELEC and held the position
of Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively for the Pasig City Board of Candidates. The respondents
helped conduct and oversee the 1995 elections.

Then Senatorial candidate Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. alleged that the respondents tampered with the votes
received by them by either adding more votes for particular candidates in their Statement of Votes (SoV)
or reducing the number of votes of particular candidates in their SoV. Pimentel filed an administrative
complaint for their disbarment.
Respondents argued that the discrepancies were due to honest mistake, oversight and fatigue.
Respondents also argued that the IBP Board of Governors had already exonerated them from any
offense and that the motion for reconsideration filed by Pimentel was not filed on time.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents are guilty of improper conduct as lawyers.

RULING:

Yes.

Respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing of the Pasig City
election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the same could be
due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the canvassing
committees who prepared the SoVs.

There is a limit, we believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue,
in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error renders the defense of honest
mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable.

Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per
precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or
two SoVs but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of
the petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns.

A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also
constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer’s oath or is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such
individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct.

Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule
1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.” By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the
government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to “do no
falsehood.”

The Court found the respondents guilty of misconduct and fined them PhP 10,000 each and issued a
stern warning that similar conduct in the future will be severely punished.

8. Marilu Turla vs Atty. Jose Caringal 2019

This administrative case arose from a verified Complaint 1 dated October 8, 2010 filed by Marilu C. Turla
(Turla) against the respondent, Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Caringal), before the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Turla is the petitioner in Special
Proceedings No. Q09-64479 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 222, wherein
Atty. Caringal is the counsel for the oppositor.

In July 2010, Turla discovered that Atty. Caringal 2 had not attended thf required Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) seminars for the Second (MCLE II) and Third (MCLE III) Compliance Periods,
which were from April 15, 2004 to April 14, 2007 and April 25, 2007 to April 14, 2010 respectively. Turla
confirmed such information when she received a Certification 3 dated August 2, 2010 issued by the MCLE
Office. Yet, Atty. Caringal signed the pleadings and motions in several cases on which he indicated the
following information after his signature and other personal details: "MCLE Exemption II & III Rec. No.
000659126 Pasig 8.10.10."4 These pleadings and motions are particularly identified, viz.:

A. In Special Proceedings No. Q09-644 79 (RTC Quezon City, Branch 222)

1) Motion to Remove Marilu Turla as Special Administratrix dated 2 September 2010;

2) Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Re-Schedule the Collection of Biological Sample dated 12 September
2010;
3) Motion to Issue Order Authorizing the National Bureau of Investigation to Examine the Birth
Certificate of Petitioner dated 11 October 2010;

B. In Civil Case No. Q09-64850 (RTC Quezon City, Branch 221)

 
1) Comment On/Opposition to Motion to Expunge Pleadings dated 15 August 2010;

C. In Civil Case No. 09-269 (RTC Makati, Branch 59)

 
1) Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated 16 July 2010 dated 10 August 2010; 5
2) Motion for Indefinite Suspension of Proceedings dated 17 July 2010;
3) Comment On/Opposition to Motion to Expunge Pleadings dated 15 August 2010;

D. In CA-G.R. SP No. 115847 (Court of Appeals)

 
1) Compliance dated 24 September 2010;
2) Comment On/Opposition to Petition for Certiorari dated 26 September 2010;

E. In CA-G.R. SR No. 117943 (Court of Appeals)

 
1) Petition for Certiorari dated 15 December 2010; and

F. In the Present Case

 
1) Answer to Complaint dated 13 November 2010. 6
Ultimately, the Investigating Commissioner made the following findings and recommendations:

1. Respondent failed to comply with the MCLE Requirements in a timely manner;

2. Respondent falsely asserted he had an exemption from the MCLE requirement; and

3. Respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that repetition of same or similar acts
or conduct shall be dealt with more severely. 21

Considering the foregoing, Atty. Caringal violated his sworn oath as a lawyer to "do no falsehood" 30 as
well as the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

When Atty. Caringal indicated that he was MCLE-exempt in the pleadings and motions he filed, although
in fact he was not, he engaged in dishonest conduct which was also disrespectful of the courts. He
undoubtedly placed his clients at risk, given that pleadings with such false information produce no legal
effect31 and can result in the expunction of the same. Undeniably, he did not stay true to the cause of his
clients and actually violated his duty to serve his clients with competence and diligence.

The Court had previously pronounced that "[t]he appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on
the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts." 32 Considering Atty. Caringal's
willful statement of false MCLE details in his pleadings to the prejudice of his clients, aggravate, by his
lack of diligence in fully and promptly complying with the MCLE requirements within the compliance
period, and his seemingly defiant and unremorseful attitude, the Court deems it apt to adopt the
recommendations of both the IBP Board of Governors and the OBC, and imposes upon Atty. Caringal the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three years.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) years.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
personal record of Atty. Jose M. Caringal as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their
guidance and information.

Lawyer's Oath

I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I will support
the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay
no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose
upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God.

Possible part of exams

1. Demand authorization letter

2. Special power of attorney
3. Notice of hearing Explanation they had to mail
4. Judicial Affidavit
5. Notarial Cert, jurat
6. Motions for extension of time,
7. Pleadings

TO practice

Rufina lim vs Mendoza 2019

Demand/Authorization Letters, SPA, Contracts, Notice of Hearing and Explaining, judicial affidavits,
notarial Certificate ju rat, Motions, Forum Shopping

Restrictive prohibition