QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. What is the likelihood of Mrs. Juma’s success should she decide to proceed to court in order to
enforce the promise to pay?
2. Can Mrs. Juma revoke her agreement with Daisy Ltd whereby she agreed to accept reduced rental
payments?

BRIEF ANSWERS

1. There is a high probability of Mrs. Juma succeeding in her claims against her in-laws following
which she can enforce their promise to pay
2. No Mrs. Juma cannot revoke her agreement with Daisy Ltd and will have to accept reduced rental
payments

RELEVANT FACTS

Mrs. Juma is a housewife and has spent the past ten years living in her in-laws' home. Her in-laws had
stipulated that after their death, the house would belong to their children. Over the past ten years, since
2010, Mrs. Juma and her husband have spent a considerable amount of their money and carried out repairs
and renovations to the house. In September 2020 her husband’s siblings executed a document in which they
promised that after their father's estate was distributed between them, they would pay Mrs.Juma a certain
amount in consideration for the work she had already done on the house. The following month Mrs. Juma’s
father-in-law passed away. By 2021 his entire estate was divided amongst his children as per Pakistan’s
inheritance laws. Mrs.Juma subsequently sought payment of the promise made by her husband’s siblings
several times, however, they have not heeded. They are not responding to her phone calls and deny the
legality of the document that was executed. They contend that they are not legally bound to make any
payment.

Furthermore Mrs.Juma seeks advice with respect to her arrangement with Daisy’s Stitch and Style Co. Ltd.
Daisy’s Ltd. is a small tailoring business that has since September 2018 rented a portion of Mrs.Juma’s
apartment. Under the rental agreement Daisy Ltd. agreed to pay Mrs.Juma a monthly rent amount of Rs.
50,000. After Covid-19 began to grip the country Daisy Ltd’s business began to plummet, and they found
it hard to keep up with their rental payments. In July 2020 Mrs.Juma, feeling sorry for Daisy Ltd, allowed
them to continue renting her apartment and agreed that they could pay a 25% reduced rent amount in light
of rising Covid-19 in Pakistan. Mrs.Juma has now learnt that the owners of Daisy Ltd. have booked a
holiday to go to Thailand, they have also held an extravagant wedding for their son which was widely
featured in socialite pages.

DISCUSSION

1(a) Does the agreement that was executed between Mrs.Juma and her in-laws qualify as a legally binding
contract?

In order to determine Mrs.Juma’s likelihood of success it is important to first ascertain whether the
agreement that she is seeking to enforce even qualifies as a legally binding contract or not. Amongst the
necessary ingredients of a binding contract, intention is an important one as it is argued that parties to a
contract must have the intention to be legally bound by that contract. This is to ensure that courts do not
become overwhelmed by trifling domestic disputes. In Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 5711, for instance, a
husband who was posted abroad, leaving his wife to stay in England due to ill-health, was held not bound
to pay her a promised monthly allowance. The court confirmed that agreements of a domestic nature
between a husband and wife living together as one household are presumed not to be intended to be legally
binding, unless the agreement states to the contrary. This presumption also extends to agreements that are
between parents and children as was held in Jones v Padavatton [1969]2. This could henceforth be used to
argue that the agreement between Mrs.Juma and her in-laws was also one of a domestic nature, as it was
made between family members and hence cannot be enforced in court. It can be argued that the in-laws
perhaps promised to pay the amount to Mrs.Juma as a gesture of their goodwill or appreciation but did not
intend to be legally bound. There are instances, however, where this presumption does not apply. For
example, in the case of Meritt v Meritt [1970] EWCA Civ63 the court held that when parties are in the
process of separating, or are separated, the presumption of there being no intention to create legal relations
does not apply. This was applicable to an agreement made between a husband and wife whereas the case at
hand concerns an agreement that was made between a woman and her in-laws. Moreover, nothing in the
fact pattern suggests that the wife and in-laws previously lived together and were now separating as was
the case in Meritt v Meritt. The only relevant detail is that the estate was being divided amongst the parties
so it cannot be assumed that the parties were separating or that they weren't already separated before the
agreement was even executed. Hence it can be argued that the principle laid down by the court in the Meritt
case does not apply to Mrs.Juma’s case. While all the above-mentioned arguments reduce Mrs.Juma’s
chances of success in her claim against the in-laws the case of Simpkins v Pays [1955] 1 WLR 9754 can be

1
Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571

2
Jones v Padavatton [1969] 1 WLR 328
3
Meritt v Meritt [1970] EWCA Civ 6
4
Simpkins v Pays [1955] 1 WLR 975
used to argue otherwise. In this case the court held that regardless of the non-formal context and domestic
relations there was a sense of reciprocity between the parties so the agreement that was mutually entered
into, no matter how informal, constituted a legally binding contract. An important caveat, however, also
exists within this case whereby the actions of one party were not a voluntary service rather they were done
pursuant to the agreement that was collated between both parties which is why the court categorized their
agreement as a binding contract. Whereas in the case at hand the repairs done by Mrs.Juma were entirely
voluntary as suggested by the fact pattern and the agreement was only executed afterwards. Hence,
Mrs.Juma’s situation can be distinguished from the one in Simpkins v Pays. Therefore, using the relevant
judicial principles it can be asserted that in the agreement between Mrs.Juma and her in-laws, there was no
intention to create legal relations hence it does not qualify as a legally binding contract.

1(b) Can past consideration amount to valid consideration thereby making the promise of the in-laws legally
enforceable?

Consideration is another one of the fundamental elements of a contract. In the famous English case of Currie
v Misa (1874) LR 10 Ex 1535 it was held that consideration must “consist either in some right, interest,
profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility, given,
suffered, or undertaken by the other”. Applying this definition to the case at hand it can be inferred that
valid consideration was made by Mrs.Juma in the form of the repairs and renovations that were carried out
by her and her husband on the house. However, it is important to note that this consideration was made by
Mrs.Juma before the agreement between her and her in-laws was executed. To determine Mrs.Juma’s
position the case of Re McArdle [1951] Ch 6696 must be examined. The facts of this case are highly similar
to the case at hand whereby the plaintiff carried out certain repairs on a bungalow and expected to be paid
for those repairs by the siblings of her husband who had promised to pay her. The court, however, held that
the promise was made by the siblings after the repairs had already been done therefore the consideration
was in the past. The court, hence, laid down the principle that past consideration is not good consideration
as a result of which the agreement was not enforceable. This principle is subject to an important exception
which was laid down in Lampleigh v Braithwaite (1615) Hob 1057 whereby the court stated that past
consideration can be valid in cases where it is made at the request of the promisor in which case their
promise is enforceable. This important principle was also upheld in the Indian case of Husseinali Casam
Mahomed v Dinbai [1923] 25 BOMLR 2528. However, in the case at hand the repairs and renovations were
made by Mrs.Juma of her own accord and not at the request of her in-laws hence she cannot invoke their

5
Currie v Misa (1874) LR 10 Ex 153
6
Re McArdle [1951] Ch 669
7
Lampleigh v Braithwaite (1615) Hob 105
8
Husseinali Casam Mahomed v Dinbai [1923] 25 BOMLR 252
promise to pay. It is important to highlight, however, that this is the position with regards to consideration
under English law. The fact patterns suggests that Mrs.Juma’s case took place in Pakistan hence, it must be
analyzed accordingly. According to section 2(d) of The Contract Act 18729 consideration is defined as the
following, “When, at the desire of the promisor, the Promisee or any other person has done or abstained
from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act
or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise”. In Ghulam Rasool v Nusrat Rasool
[2008 PLD 146 (SC)] 10the Supreme Court highlighted how “The promise to perform a certain act without
any consideration neither creates a contractual obligation nor a legal right, and thus a promise in absence
of the essential terms of consideration, may have no binding force and legal effect”. Therefore, the basic
understanding of consideration as an elemental component of all binding contracts is the same in both
Pakistani and English law. The difference, however, arises when section 25 of the Contract Act is taken
into account. Under section 25(2) it is stated that, “An agreement made without consideration is void, unless
it is a promise to compensate, wholly or in part, a person who has already voluntarily done something for
the promisor, or something which the promisor was legally compellable to do”. This means that under
Pakistani law past consideration is considered valid without the requested performance exception which
exists in English law. The Contract Act removes the distinction between consideration provided before a
promise and consideration provided contemporaneously with a promise. Hence, the repairs and renovations
that were made by Mrs.Juma will amount to valid consideration in the eyes of the Pakistani court. As a
result of this her claim to invoke the promise made by her in-laws is highly likely to succeed.

2(a). Does the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel prevent Mrs.Juma from revoking her agreement with
Daisy’s Ltd?

The doctrine of promissory estoppel is one of the exceptions to the doctrine of consideration. Where the
requirements of promissory estoppel are fulfilled, a party will be stopped from going on a promise even if
the promise is not supported by consideration. In the case of Central London Property Trust Ltd v High
Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 13011 the defendants leased a block of flats from the plaintiff. Owing to the
breakout of war the occupancy rates of the flats fell so the plaintiffs agreed to reduce the rent by half. After
the war had ended the plaintiffs sued for the full rent and the court held that they were entitled to the full
payment. This was because although the plaintiffs had made a binding promise the evidence clearly showed
that this promise was only applicable during the time of the war hence the defendants were liable. The court
also stated that had the plaintiffs sought to enforce the full payments before the end of the war they would

9
The Contract Act 1872
10
Ghulam Rasool v Nusrat Rasool [2008 PLD 146 (SC)]
11
Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130
not have been able to do so. Applying this principle to the case at hand it is important to highlight that
Mrs.Juma reduced the rental payments for Daisy Ltd owing to the breakout of Covid-19. Hence, she made
a binding promise to the owners of the business which cannot now suddenly revoke regardless of their
personal expenditures. As in the aforementioned case the plaintiff’s promise was revocable after the
termination of the conditions owing to which it was made similarly in the given situation Mrs.Juma’s
promise can also only be revoked once the pandemic comes to a halt. Moreover, to solidify this argument
the case of Pakistan v Fecto Belarus Tractors Limited [2002 PLD 208 (SC.)]12 must be highlighted where
the same principle has been upheld. The Supreme Court applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to hold
that the plaintiff could not resile from its representation, on the basis that the plaintiff had made a clear and
lawful representation knowing that the petitioner would rely upon that representation, and the petitioner
had relied upon the representation. The court also laid down the following key requirements for the doctrine
of promissory estoppel to apply; 1) there must be a clear, unambiguous promise not to enforce strict legal
rights, 2) the Promisee acts in reliance of this promise, 3) It must be inequitable/unfair for the promisor to
go back on his promise and 4) the doctrine of promissory estoppel can also be used to commence a course
of action. An analysis of Mr. Juma’s case in line with these conditions reveals that all of them are satisfied
as Mrs. Juma did made a clear promise, of her own free will, to the owners of Daisy Ltd that they could pay
rent reduced by 25% of the original amount, the owners subsequently placed reliance on this promise and
acted accordingly so it would be entirely unfair for Mrs.Juma to now go back on her promise. Hence, the
doctrine of promissory estoppel does inhibit Mrs.Juma from revoking her promise.

CONCLUSION

In assessing the two primary questions of this case several issues have come to light as have been analyzed
above. With regards to the probability of the success of Mrs.Juma’s claims against her in-laws there were
two primary considerations, 1a) intention to create legal relations and 1b) the element of consideration.
Evidence suggests that there are strong arguments to support that the in-laws did not intend to create legal
relations with Mrs.Juma as a result of which the agreement that was executed between them is not
enforceable. However, when the same issue is analyzed from a lens focusing on the issue of consideration
cogent evidence emerges to suggest that Mrs.Juma’s actions amounted to valid consideration and under
Pakistani law even if that consideration was made in the past, it will be counted as good consideration.
Hence, valid consideration followed by a mutually executed agreement suggests the formation of a legally
binding contract. Therefore, Mrs.Juma has high chances of success in her claims against her in-laws.
Further, with regards to revocation of the promise that was made by Mrs. Juma to the owners of Daisy Ltd

12
Pakistan v Fecto Belarus Tractors Limited [2002 PLD 208 (SC.)]
it should be noted that owing to the previously established principles assessed from relevant case law
Mrs.Juma cannot revoke her agreement. Therefore, she will continue to have to accept reduced rental
payments at least until the end of the pandemic.