Review: The Presocratics in Context

Reviewed Work(s): Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy: Hippolytus of Rome and the
Presocratics by Catherine Osborne
Review by: Jonathan Barnes
Source: Phronesis , 1988, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1988), pp. 327-344
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4182313

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 CRITICAL NOTICE

The Presocratics in Context

JONATHAN BARNES

"This book is intended to be the starting-point from which new work on the
Presocratics will derive impetus and inspiration" (p.vii). It "stands ... as
the beginning of a new programme of reading and interpretation of the
Presocratics" (p.13). It pretends "to justify a new method of approach to
the reading of the Presocratics" (p. 183).1
Audacious claims, iconoclastic and ambitious. The title is itself some-
thing of a boast. The argument is uncompromising. There is a swash-
buckling vigour of thought, and a willingness - an eagerness - to address
folly by its proper name.
And is there really room for a new approach to the Presocratics? Can we
really set about rethinking early Greek philosophy? "Humph", the scepti-
cal reader will mutter, "such pretensions can only puff themselves into
falsehoods - or else deflate into familiar truths".
Not so, not so. The boast is firmly grounded, the audacity a proper pride.
This is - to be blunt - the best book on the Presocratics I have seen for years.
I am minded to rank it alongside Reinhardt's Parmenides - and is there
higher praise? Dr Osborne says some new things. She says some true things.
She says some interesting things. She says some important things.
And therefore for most of this review I shall growl and grumble.2

' Catherine Osborne, Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy: Hippolytus of Rome and the
Presocratics. Duckworth, London, 1987. Pp.viii + 382. ? 35.
2 And why not take a pot-shot at the publisher? I have noticed a few misprints (e.g. p.9
1.18: for "we are" read "are we"; p.235 1.20: for "rest" read "root"; p.283 12 up: for
"illegitimate" read "legitimate"). But the Greek is vile. It comes in different forms: by
xerography from old texts, from 'camera ready' typescript, in transliteration, and (occa-
sionally) set anew. And yet with modem machinery Greek is as simple to set as English.

Phronesis 1988. Vol. XXXIII/3 327

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 II

There is an introductory chapter expounding the new methodology, and

preferring it to the traditional approach. The new method is to be tested on
Hippolytus' account of the Presocratics. The procedures and habits of
Hippolytus are first examined in the controllable cases of Aristotle and
Simon Magus. Then, at the heart of the book, come detailed analyses of
Hippolytus' discussions of the philosophies of Empedocles and Heraclitus.
Substantial appendixes deal with Book I of the Refutatio, and with the
Apophasis Megale of Simon, and offer an English translation of Ref utatio
IV-X opposite a reprint of Wendland's Greek text.3
I shall pass some comments first on the new methodology, then on Dr
Osborne's appreciation of Hippolytus, and finally on her interpretation of
Heraclitus. Many of her most interesting and challenging pages will per-
force be passed by.

III

The approach to the Presocratics which Dr Osborne regards as traditional

consists essentially in this injunction: Distinguish as carefully as you can the
ipsissima verba of the Presocratics (the fragments sensu stricto); base your
interpretation primarily upon them; call upon the other texts only when the
fragments do not suffice - and then with the greatest caution.
The new approach offers a new injunction: Read the 'fragmnents' if you
will, but read them in context; attend to the interpretations of those ancient
authors who quote the Presocratics; found your own interpretation on their
interpretations.
The orthodox say: Free the fragments from their false contexts. The
heretic says: Take the whole texts - fragments and contexts and all.
I discern three arguments against the traditional method.
(1) If we focus on the fragments, we blinker ourselves. For the selection
of those fragments which survive was determined by "the same interested
and biassed readings as the notorious doxography" (p.3); it is a foolish
optimism to believe, with Barnes, that "these fragnents preserve the most

3 A pity that she could not use the new text by Miroslav Marcovich: Hippolytus:
Refutatio Omnium Haeresium [Patristische Texte und Studien 251 (Berlin, 1986). This
edition, to which all students of the Presocratics must henceforth refer, marks a notable
advance. (Wendland's text, published posthumously, was the work of a dying man: for a
sharp judgement on it see Marcovich, p.7.)

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important and most interesting of their philosophical doctrines" - "it is
more often the case that the selection of fragments is governed by curious
and perverse personal preoccupations on the part of the doxographers"
(p.7).4 - No doubt Barnes was foolishly optimistic. Nonetheless, the tradi-
tionalists have a sound defence. They may hold, first, that interest and bias
may be recognized and trumpeted. ('Of Parmenides' Way of Opinion we
know little - for the ancient authors were more interested in the Way of
Truth. Hence I cannot pretend to offer you a rounded account of Parme-
nides' thought.') The traditionalists are not obliged by their method to be
optimists. And secondly, any view of the Presocratics is bound to be limited
in this very way. Telepathy apart, we know the Presocratics only through
later authors. We shall never remove the blinkers, do what we will.
(2) We cannot tell whether we are faced by ipsissima verba or not: the
modish search for 'fragments' presupposes a modern concern for scholarly
quotation which was foreign to ancient writers (see p. 4).
There are genuine difficulties here, which scholars often overlook. The
first question the traditionalists need to ask of a text is this: Does the author
purport to quote here? And sometimes the answer must be: Who knows?
But Dr Osborne greatly exaggerates the difficulties. I may be allowed a few
lines on the matter.
She illustrates her claim by adducing the four texts assembled by Diels-
Kranz under Heraclitus B36 and B76. "Are these one fragment", she asks,
"two fragments, or four fragments?" (p.5). The answer is plain: They are
no fragments.5 We can tell from these texts that their authors are not
purporting to quote: we have no reason to think that we are here dealing
with fragments; and a traditionalist will have no difficulty in discerning this
- or in discarding the texts from his primary evidence. (Which is not to say
that all traditionalists have discarded them.)
She justifies her claim by asserting that whereas modern editions can use
inverted commas to mark off quotations, "such devices were not available

4 On p.2 Dr Osborne introduces her view by criticisingcertain scholars who have made
deprecatory noises about the doxography; and she sometimes speaks as though her own
approach restored status to the doxographers. This is nisleading: Hippolytus - outside
Book I - is not being doxographical, in the normal sense of the word; and most ancient
authors who preserve Presocratic fragments do not do so in the course of a doxographical
exercise. Dr Osborne does not argue that we should take doxographical reports seriously
(I mean, that is not the thesis she defends in her book): she argues that we should take
seriously the interpretative context in which any fragment is quoted - and these contexts
will rarely be doxographical.
s As she herself states a little later: "in cases such as this we simply do not have the
philosopher's 'own words' " (p.7).

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to the writers who actually quoted them" (p.4). But the ancients had and
used unambiguous devices for marking off quotations. Galen frequently
quotes - and frequently with polemical intent. In his attack on Archigenes
in diff puls II, for example, he introduces verbatim citations by writing:
xad& ktwLv b6( 7we yFyQa.&tvnv (VIII 591K); tauqv -riv kXt1v (ibid);
Av ftlwv (592); 9t abTxi 'ri kX~ew; X?o5oni t6e (602); (v Talt mj
XiTEL (625); &v -rai'q r mi OoEL (626); n'i Tfl xEXeuijt Toi X6you (627);
naLQayQUpOw4V 4OaeLg (ibid); itLca ioLg (628); Iqotv ... alVTf kkeL
(640); aCaQayQd&VaL iv ToLv ai 'v (ibid). These examples are all plain.
They can be multiplied ad nauseam - and not only from Galen. The ancients
were as well equipped, typographically, as we are when it comes to
quotations.
(Dr Osborne knows this. Indeed, it matters to her at more than one
point. In Hippolytus she is sometimes concerned to recognize purported
quotations. She holds that the use of qro( with direct speech "clearly
suggests quotation" (p.17).7)
She has a supplementary argument: we should not suppose that the
ancients "were concerned to quote with the accuracy expected today"
(p.4); "the idea that these will be accurate 'quotations' in the modern sense
is anachronistic" (p.20). But the ancients certainly could, and certainly
sometimes did, concern themselves with accurate quotation: Galen, who
delighted in pedantry, shows again and again that he is concerned to quote
with literal fidelity; the Greek commentatorial tradition frequently displays
a sensitivity to precise quotation (witness their textual comments). Dr
Osborne ignores or misprises ancient scholarship.8 I do not claim that all
ancients were always scrupulously precise in their quotations - we know
that such a claim would be false. (Nor are the moderns such sticklers for
accuracy as Dr Osborne pretends.) But they could - and sometimes did -
quote with all the accuracy a modern scholar might demand.9

6 66( 3ro(or&kE xrw)iscommonlyusedforverbatimcitation: e.g. diffpulsVIII628K;

PHPV 516K (bis), 580,684 (bis), 801; Hippolytus, VII xxix 23; IX ix 2, x 2 (cf. of rw nwS:
VIII xii 1). Dr Osborne is wrong when she says of Clement that "his citation of Heraclitus
may be from memory since he introduces it vaguely ('something like this' - hode pos)"
(p.6). The phrase is a conventional mark of exactitude, not of vagueness.
7 Cf. pp.56n.44, 59,171 n.109. But I do not think she is right-in Hippolytus' account of
Heracitus see IX x 2 1345.8M], where qqa( + oratio recta marks a paraphrase. We
possess more subtle linguistic tests than this.
I For a nice illustration see E. Puglia, 'La filologia degli Epicurei', Cron Erc 12, 1982,
19-34.
9 I have referred exclusively to prose citations. Where an author cites a versifier, it is -
of course - always evident that he purports to quote.

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 (3) "Since the 'fragments' themselves represent the reading of those who
preserved them, the use of such material as if it were unbiassed cannot be
sound. It is thus the traditional use of the 'fragments' without their accom-
panying context which represents an uncritical approach based on poten-
tially misleading evidence" (p.9). - This is true and not trifling: if you snip a
fragnent out of its context, then you will overlook the fact that the quoting
author - from bias or indolence - may have changed or twisted the text to
suit his own ends. Indeed, if we want to establish the text of a fragment, then
we need the context; for the context may, in effect, indicate places where
the quoted text is or might be in error. (Either an error of the quoting
author or an error of a scribe who was influenced by the surrounding
context.)
But although this is true, and although the truth has been neglected - to
their shame - by some traditionalists, it is a truth easily accommodated
within the traditionalist position. And most good traditionalists have so
accommodated it.
There is thus less against the traditional method than Dr Osborne imag-
ines. What is to be said in favour of the new method? The fundament and
bottom of the matter is this: the ancients knew far more of the Presocratic
texts than we do. "In most cases the ancient writer was selecting from a
much more extensive body of material than he presents to us, and his
reading is likely to have been influenced by the context in which the text he
quotes occurred" (p.8). "Whereas our independent reading could not be
based on more of the text than we now possess, Hippolytus' reading can
claim that authority" (p.185).
There is evident and important truth in these remarks. Dr Osborne draws
a moral and adopts a hermeneutical stance. The moral is this: we cannot
possibly improve upon the ancient interpretations. Thus "when it comes to
the Presocratics scholars have no justification for asserting that what Hip-
polytus saw in the text was not there or was incorrect as a reading of that
text.... No subsequent reading based on the words <the ancient inter-
preters> quote can have greater validity than their own readings" (pp.22-
23). This is surely false. Sometimes, at least, we do have good reason for
rejecting an ancient interpretation. First, even if we do not possess more of,
say, Heraclitus than Hippolytus possessed, we do possess more than Hippo-
lytus quotes; and this additional material may allow us to correct his
interpretation. (In principle, we can correct Hippolytus' interpretation of
Heraclitus in exactly the same way as we can correct his interpretation of
Aristotle: we may not possess more Aristotle than Hippolytus possessed,10
but we possess more than he quotes - and hence we can correct him.)
10 But see below.
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Secondly, we can often spot anachronisms and biasses of one sort or
another. If the Neoplatonists interpret Heraclitus by way of their own
distinction between a world of perception and a world of intellection, we
can properly reject their exegesis and for obvious reasons. More tritely, we
can often establish that an ancient interpretation misreads - by accident or
design - some particular word or phrase in a Presocratic text. No doubt the
ancients were better placed than we are. It does not follow that we can
never correct or surpass them. And in point of fact we often can.
The hermeneutical stance has it that "the aim is not a single conclusive
reading but an exploration of the range of meanings brought out by the
creative use of the text" (p. lo). "Every different interpretative standpoint
will produce different insights, and this justifies the exploration of each
ancient interpretation as a legitimate reading of the text" (pp.11-12, my
italics). Thus, in the end, "Hippolytus' interpretation has served as a basis
for an exploration in the thought of Heraclitus and Empedocles. It has not
been set forth as the truth" (p. 186). And in general, "there is no way that
one can cut through the layers to some 'objective truth' about the meaning
of the 'fragnents' " (p.22). Rather, the ancient interpretations should be
taken simply as "the jumping-off point for our own explorations of possible
readings". We are explorers, mapping out readings. We are trappers,
setting gins for creative insights. And the truth? The correct interpretation?
How naive - how very Anglo-Saxon - to think that there is any such beast.
I think all this is wrong, and perniciously wrong. So, really, does Dr
Osborne. She is perfectly happy to say of Hippolytus that "the final picture
which he succeeds in conveying is highly tendentious and unorthodox
[anglice, false] as an interpretation of Aristotle" (p.62).1' I do not believe
that Dr Osborne wants to 'explore' possible readings. Certainly, I do not. I
want to find out what on earth the stuff really means. I want to discover the
truth - or at least to uncover some falsehoods. If that were a hopeless
venture, then I should give up the game and turn to tapestry-making.
The hermeneutic stance is to be exploded. And in any case, the new
method can do very well without it. But the method requires a moral, and I
have argued that the moral which Dr Osborne draws is false. Yet I suspect
that it was offered more as a piece of bravado than as a credo; for elsewhere
Dr Osborne is content with something more modest. Thus she says of
Hippolytus' reading of Heraclitus that it is "incomplete so far as our total

11 Yet on p.63 Hippolytus' account is also said to be "usually a justifiable reading of the
text", and "a strongly coloured but productive interpretation". Justifiable - how?
Productive - of what?

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knowledge of Heraclitus goes, but it is the first stage in the process of
reading the text" (p.143, my italics). We might agree that the study of
Hippolytus' account is "the first stage" - or at any rate, one possible first
stage - in the interpretation of Heraclitus. But should we admit, in general,
that the ancient interpretations must be "the jumping-off point for our own
explorations ... of the Presocratics" (p.10)? Surely not. There are good
ancient interpretations, and there are bad ones. If we do decide to start
from some ancient interpretation, then we must choose which one to start
from. No-one, for example, would seriously propose that the right starting-
point for a study of Parmenides is the Neoplatonic interpretation provided
by Simplicius. (Dr Osborne herself implicitly rejects the idea of using the
Neoplatonic interpretation of Empedocles: pp. 109-111.)
What, then, remains of Dr Osborne's thesis and of the new approach to
the Presocratics? This: in the case of some of the Presocratics (and notably
of Heraclitus), we shall not achieve any serious understanding if we extract
what we take to be ipsissima verba and throw away everything else. Rather,
we must print the fragments in the contexts in which they are quoted - for
these contexts may provide evidence without which the fragments them-
selves cannot be understood. And in addition, we should be prepared to
study the interpretations offered by the ancient authors who cite the frag-
ments - for they may well be relying on evidence no longer available to us.
Put thus, Dr Osborne's thesis is true.
Perhaps it is obviously true? Well, I think it is obviously true. (Most
important truths are.) But it is a truth which almost all students of Heracli-
tus have disregarded: it is, for example, ignored by Kahn and by Robinson
in their editions of Heraclitus - and as a result those editions are funda-
mentally flawed.12 More generally, it is a truth disregarded by that vast
multitude of scholars who study the Presocratics by way of the fragments
printed in Diels-Kranz.

IV

Dr Osbome says that "the justification lies in the results" (p.11). But the
method is self-justifying. She imagines a critic to say: "there is nothing in
these readings which could not have been derived from an imaginative

12 See my reviews of C.H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, in Mind 1982, and
of T.M. Robinson, Heraclitus - the Fragments, in Apeiron 1988. In my Early Greek
Philosophy (Harmondsworth, 1987) I have presented the fragments in their original
context. My decision to do so was influenced by Dr Osborne's doctoral thesis, on which
her book is based.

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reading of the context-free fragments" (p. 185). Even were the critic right,
Dr Osbome's method would still be the correct method. Nonetheless, we
want results. And to these I now turn.
Marcovich describes Hippolytus as "an unscrupulous and reckless plagia-
rist" (op.cit., p.36). He was a copyist, and a stupid copyist: "sometimes he
would copy his source so hastily or mechanically that he would not notice
even a major error in it. . ., or he would misunderstand his source and then
write down a nonsense" (p.50). Dr Osborne demurs. She allows that
Hippolytus sometimes copies, and that he is sometimes pretty careless in his
copying.13 But she holds that in the passages which matter - in the passages
where Hippolytus is presenting the pagan philosophies which prefigure the
Christian heresies - "his handling of the material is sensitive rather than
mindless and original rather than second-hand" (p.14).
The claim is tested on two cases in which we have a control, namely on
Hippolytus' accounts of Simon Magus and of Aristotle. I do not know what
to make of the curious account of Simon Magus. On the story of Apsethos,
Dr Osbome says that "the composition as it stands represents Hippolytus'
own creation" (p.73); but she also notes that "it is possible that he has
simply derived the whole story from another anti-heretical context now
lost" (p.73 n.4). The other main part of the account, the story of Helen, is
generally supposed to derive from Irenaeus - "the adherence is so close that
Hippolytus is used to provide the otherwise lost Greek text of Irenaeus"
(p.73). Even if Dr Osborne is right in suggesting that Hippolytus has used
his own genius in refashioning the material he took from Irenaeus, we shall
still see him as essentially a copyist.
And in any case, the account of Simon is not obviously pertinent to Dr
Osborne's project. It is a piece of biography (or rather, of anecdotage), not
of philosophy. Even if Hippolytus here proves himself an independent
operator (in the etiolated sense which Dr Osborne postulates), we may not
infer that he is also an independent - and an intelligent - operator in
philosophical matters.
Aristotle is a better test. Dr Osborne offers a sequence of arguments to
show that in VII xv-xix Hippolytus tackles the Peripatetic philosophy in a
scholarly and independent manner. I shall comment on a few of her more
contentious points.
(1) Aristotle is the pagan parallel to Basilides; and since the parallelism
is Hippolytus' own invention, the probability is that he has himself

3 See pp.14n.24, 21-22, on the passages in which Hippolytus appears tobe (mis)copying
Sexus Empiricus.

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deliberately shaped the Aristotelian material (p.36). This may seem plausi-
ble enough. But Marcovich infers the opposite conclusion from the same
data: he infers that Hippolytus gets his knowledge of Aristotle "from a
Basilidean reinterpretation of Aristotle" (p.38). This fits with Marcovich's
general estimate of Hippolytus' scholarly capacities. Hippolytus, "in his
eagerness to discover 'proof of the Gnostics being mere plagiarists of
Greek philosophers, often finds such a 'proof not very far: in the same
Gnostic scriptures he is quoting. Gnostic exegeses quote Greek poets and
philosophers in order to reinterpret them and present them as their witness-
es. In his turn, Hippolytus copies the passages of the Gnostic exegeses
dealing with the Greek philosophers, presents them as his own discovery,
and uses them as 'proof of the Gnostics plagiarizing Greek philosophy. A
plagiarist accuses a quoting writer of plagiarizing" (p.37, original italics).
Marcovich's particular thesis, that Hippolytus took his Aristotle from Bas-
ilides, relies on little direct evidence. But the evidence for Marcovich's
general thesis is considerable and persuasive - and the particular thesis then
derives some warrant from the general."4
(2) Hippolytus refers to a "debate" over the interpretation of Aristotle's
views on god and the soul, but he does not go into the matter. Hence he is
relying on something more than "a basic handbook" (p.39, cf. pp. 51, 64).15
The "hence" is questionable; and the premiss of the argument is dubious.
For I think that Dr Osborne may have misunderstood the text. Hippolytus
says that to explain Aristotle's definition of the soul k6ywv <rd6v noEXdv>
bEVCaL xai LMyadkg tfoaEwg, and that Aristotle's account of God is
even harder to understand xac <iv> RaaxQoTQzP X6yq fWwLof3vt (VII xix
6). The X6yoL here are interpreted by Dr Osborne as discussions or debates
about Aristotle; but I suspect that they are not exegetical debates, whether
historical or hypothetical: rather, the X6yoL are Aristotle's own works -
Hippolytus is referring to the three books of the deAnima (VII xix 5) and to
the "even longer account" in the Metaphysics.16

4 Hippolytus' general strategy against the heretics, which Dr Osborne lucidly analyses
(pp.15-17), loses its force if Marcovich is right. Hippolytus thinks it tells against a given
'heresy' that it shares doctrines with the pagans. But the heretics themselves were keen to
urge that their doctrines had been anticipated or adumbrated by the ancients. (E.g. the
Peratai, V xvi 4: o- u5vov bi TOi,ro, qqvov, ot nolaiaL kiyouvtv, &X' fjn xaic oi
ao(W'?aCOL U/w -EUA4vwv, 'Wv (IL xaiL 'iHXerog Fti, kywv . ).
' Dr Osborne notes various parallels between Hippolytus' discussion of Aristotle and
Sextus' discussions of similar topics (pp.36-40); and she suggests that "these arguments
may be Hippolytus' own, devised under the influence of his knowledge of Scepticism, or
may be more or less closely based on arguments he had read or heard elsewhere" (p.40).
Perhaps on arguments he had read in a Basilidean writing . . .?

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 (3) Hippolytus' arguments about otco(a are taken from Cat and Met
(p.44).17 Again, Dr Osbome misreads the text."8 She sees parallels where I
see only the vaguest of similarities (p.46). She indulges in some special
pleading (p.48).
(4) Hippolytus explicitly refers to Cat (p.51), which he actually quotes.
Alas, such references prove nothing: it is a familiar habit of ancient - and
modern - scholars that they refer to works which they have never even seen.
(5) He refers to Aristotle in his account of the views of Basilides. But
why should this make it "reasonable to suggest that Hippolytus shows some
immediate knowledge of Aristotle's works" (p.51)?
And against Dr Osborne's thesis? First, Hippolytus purports to present
la 'AQLoroXEL boxoi,vca (VII xiv), which - in the context - should
mean "Aristotle's philosophy".'9 But no-one who was acquainted with
Aristotle's works could possibly imagine that Hippolytus' paragraphs re-
presented the whole of Penrpatetic thought. More generally, the nature of
the material - partial, inaccurate, facile, jejune - might seem to exclude any
near acquaintance with Aristotle's own texts. (Yet an objection rears: by
the same token one might argue that Heidegger had never read a word of
Greek philosophy . . . Well then, the nature of the material shows this:
either Hippolytus had never read Aristotle, or else he read him with no
scholarly understanding.) Again, Dr Osborne does not consider the various
intermediate sources for Peripatetic philosophy, or the likelihood of their
use by Hippolytus. She does not go in for Quellenforschung of the sort
suggested by Wendland's critical apparatus or by Marcovich's introductory
comments. I confess that it seems to me overwhelmingly unlikely that
Hippolytus had read or used Aristotle, and virtually certain that he drew his
knowledge of the Peripatos from some late source or other. But this
requires further investigation.

16 )6yog occu nine times in VII xix 4-8, where Hippolytus is describing Aristotle's
oeuvre: all nine occurrences refer to Aristotle's writings.
17 They "imply a detailed knowledge of material from" Cat, Met Z, Phys A and/or Met
A. This is fanciful: the arguments are incompatible with any serious reading of these
texts.
18 She says that Hippolytus takes as a premise the thesis that "the genus is oude hen, not
a single thing". But in fact Hippolytus starts from the claim that the genus tpov is
TOYTQN oi6i lv, "no one of these things", i.e. neither man nor horse nor cow etc (VII
xix 1; cf. xvi 1, 2); and that has nothing to do with Aristotle's notions about the unity of
substances.
19 He also purports to give A 6Xq -roj IIlEurdrov wVQWa (VII xv 2); but this probably
means "the whole Peripatetic theory <of obo(a>" rather than "the entire philosophy of
the Peripatos" (as Dr Osborne translates it).

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 Dr Osborne concludes her discussion of Hippolytus' account of Aristotle
by ascribing to him "a close and intelligent reading of Aristotle's text"
(p.65). Had we lost Aristotle's works, she suggests, and were we obliged to
rely on Hippolytus, then we should be foolish to restrict our attention to the
'fragments' which he quotes - rather, we should look to Hippolytus' in-
terpretation of the texts he knew (cf. p.61).20 The interpretation is surely
interesting - for the light it may shed on Hippolytus and on the history of
Aristotelianism (cf. p.66). But in itself the interpretation is perfectly ludi-
crous as an account of Aristotle's views. Had Aristotle not survived, we
should welcome the small fragments which Hippolytus preserves; and we
should print the Hippolytan context in which they are embedded. But as for
Hippolytus' version of Aristotle's philosophy, we should toss it, with a light
laugh, into the nearest waste-paper basket.
In sum, I cannot agree with Dr Osborne's warm assessment of Hippoly-
tus. Marcovich, I fear, is nearer the truth. Despite this, I think that Dr
Osborne's pages on Hippolytus contain matter of the greatest value: she
reads Hippolytus' Refutatio as a text, and not simply as a matrix for
fragments; she is concerned to understand and to explain the general
structure of Hippolytus' attack on the heresies; and on numerous particular
points she is illuminating.2"

Heracitus is compared to Noetus: in order to understand what Hippolytus

wishes to say about Heraclitus, we must appreciate his attitude to Noetus.
Dr Osborne's remarks on this subject (pp. 134-142) are brimming with good
sense and sound judgement.

m The interpretation is "justifiable" and "productive" (p.63) and "well-supported"

(p.65), and it "merits attention" (p.66). On the other hand, it is "highly tendentious and
unorthodox" (p.62).
21 In a few places she seems to me to have misunderstood the text. I gather here one or
two miscellaneous examples. VI xxvii 4: for "rear a phoenix" read "plant a date-palm".
VII xxvii 5: for "the great seed" read "the great heap". VII xxx 1: for "Up till now
Marcion thought he had succeeded in stealing from Empedocles unnoticed and in
adapting the structure of his entire heresy to the gospel accounts from Sicily in the very
same words" read "He pillaged Empedocles and thought that up to now no-one had
noticed that he had transferred the structure, words and all, of the whole of Empedocles'
philosophy from Sicily to the gospel accounts". IX vi 1: for "Zephyrinus was, by custom,
running the church" read "Zephyrinus ... thought he was running the church". IX viii 1:
for "do not know . .. when they chance upon them" read "seem not to know" (better,
however, accept Marcovich's plausible emendation and read "have not come across
them, and do not know").

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 As for Hippolytus' account of Heraclitus, she finds a clear plan to the
text: Hippolytus first gives a programmatic summary of Heraclitus' views
("The all is divisible and indivisible, created and uncreated,. . . ": IX ix 1),
and then "proceeds to give a detailed account of the material on which he
based" this summary claim (p. 153). Dr Osborne makes Hippolytus neater
and more coherent than he is: even if her analysis of the section is correct
(p.145 n.35), the detailed account does not correspond to the programme.
Of course, the text is corrupt, and transpositions may well be required.
Even so, of two things one: either the text is more horribly mangled than
even Marcovich thinks, or else Hippolytus made a fist of the thing.
A few comments on individual fragments:
- Bi: Hippolytus introduces the fragment by saying 6X1 bi 6yog (adv
&d tO 6 7CT. ... Oiog XMyEL (IX ix 3). Hence (so Dr Osbome infers) he
found in the Heracitean phrase roO bi X6you 'roi,b' t6v'ro; ?Ew . . . a
reference to 'the all'. Hence we must have taken coi)6E to refer to 'the all'.
Hence his text of Heraclitus must have contained a sentence before cojbe
which made this reference clear. Perhaps his text of Heraclitus began: <9v
cb tiv6v>. 'roi, bi X6yov x'XA (pp.154155).
If Dr Osborne is right, then from the very start of Heraclitus' work, the
new method enriches our knowledge and understanding. But is Dr Osborne
right? She must suppose that Hippolytus chose to omit the crucial part of his
proof-text. An odd procedure. (And she must also suppose that no other
ancient author happened to preserve this indispensable first sentence.) I am
sceptical. I should guess that Hippolytus based his statement that 'the all is
k6yo;' on a later phrase in the fragment: yLvo.L&wv ya?Q nd6vtwv xana' 'c6v
%6yov stv&e...
- B54 (the hidden harmony): Hippolytus' text at IX ix 5 is certainly
corrupt. Dr Osborne proposes some changes which, she says, produce "a
clear argument" for Hippolytus (p.161). On her reconstruction, the train of
thought is this:
(1) The all is invisible [see B511
(2) and its non-visible aspect is superior [see B54J
(3) The all is visible [see B53]
(4) and its visible aspect is superior
(5) < . . . > [see B56].
I do not find this outstandingly neat: why interweave (2) and (4) among (1)
and (3)? Why is (4) not supported by any citation? What was the content of
(5) such that B56 (Homer and the lice) supported it? And the "clear
argument" is in any case patched together by means of extensive, and
textually implausible, surgery.

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 Marcovich's text gives the following train of thought:
(1) <(?) The all is divisible and indivisible> [see B511
(2) The all is invisible [see B54]
(3) The all is visible [see B55 - and also B56]
This train of thought is as clear as Dr Osborne's, and it requires much less in
the way of emendation. It is not wholly satisfactory: B54 and B55 refer to
the superiority of the invisible over the visible and vice versa, and so do not
obviously support claims (2) and (3); nor does B56 seem to offer evidence
for (3). Maybe Hippolytus stretched the texts he quoted. But I incline to
think that we must rest content with a non liquet: I doubt if we can
reconstruct Hippolytus' text at this point. Nevertheless, it is, I think, plain
that only the most daring of interventions could give Hippolytus the sem-
blance of a "clear argument".
- B56: "What the riddle demonstrates is that the seen and the unseen ...
are actually all the same and equally worthless" (p.163, my italics).22 In
fragments B56-61 Dr Osborne sees, on the basis of the Hippolytan context,
a concern to "deny the traditional distinctions of value" (p. 164), to "under-
mine the conventional distinctions of morality" (p. 168). I do not think that
the Hippolytan context requires - or even suggests - this interpretation. Dr
Osborne strains the sense of the Greek. Certainly, Hippolytus holds that,
according to Heraclitus, "good and bad are the same" (IX x 3 - cf.2). For
this he cites B58 (the tormenting doctors). Dr Osborne says that "similar
implications of value can be identified in the other opposites mentioned in
this passage" (p. 164). Well, they can be - but they need not be, and nothing
in the text indicates that they should be. She claims that "Hippolytus'
introductory comment makes explicit the association with good and evil" of
B57 (p.164). The introductory comment is this: "That is why' Heraclitus
says that neither light and darkness, nor evil and good, are different but one
and the same" (IX x 2). I cannot see that this implies a moral interpretation
for light and darkness. The emphasis is on the unity of opposites, not on the
rejection of values.

' Dr Osborne offers a fantastical interpretation of B56 (pp.162-163). Moreover, she

finds that "there is an initial impression that the second part of the quotation does not
belong with the first ... there remains the possibility that the two parts were un-
connected in their original context in Heraclitus" (pp. 162 n.87). But the two parts cannot
be severed - neither makes any sense isolated from the other. And the message of the
fragment seems fairly simple: Men miss the obvious - just as Homer missed the obvious
when he couldn't understand the little riddle of the lice.
23 toLyaLoOv: Dr Osborne's "for" inverts the order of the argument.

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- B57 (Hesiod on day and night):' "Heraclitus' point is that it is impossible
that day and night are two things, since it is impossible to envisage both
together.... it is in virtue of their being one and the same that night and
day are alternatives since this alone explains the logical impossibility of
their occurring as two together" (pp.166-167).This reads a lot into B57. No
doubt we must read something into B57 if we are to give it any sense. But
here Dr Osborne cannot call on Hippolytus to support her reading- and she
ascribes to Heraclitus a line of thought which is at once recherche and silly.
- B59 (the xoxX(agc): "Hippolytus' introduction, and his gloss on the pre-
cise instrument involved, both suggest a reading which identifies the
straight and crooked paths as a reference to 'straight' and 'crooked' uses of
the same machine in the fulling industry and in torture" (p. 168). There is no
evidence that one and the same machine had these two functions in antiqui-
ty. (The word xox(tag may indeed designate an instrument of torture - but
that is not the same point.) Hippolytus' introduction is short: "Straight and
crooked, he says, are <one and> the same" (IX x 4). This does not suggest
two uses of a machine, nor does it suggest anything to do with torture.
Hippolytus' gloss is this: "The turning of the instrument called xoXX(ag in
the fullery is straight and crooked - for it goes upwards and in a circle at the
same time" (ibid). This gloss makes it quite evident that Hippolytus is
thinking not of two machines and two functions but of one machine and one
function - a cylinder (I suppose) which revolves about its own axis while
simultaneously rising vertically in a straight line. Dr Osborne here ignores
or misreads the plain sense of Hippolytus' text. And ironically this is one of
those texts where her new method is of some considerable importance. For
without the Hippolytan context we could not even reconstruct Heraclitus'
text, let alone understand its reference.
- B66 (the fire next time):'5 Hippolytus takes this text to refer to "universal
judgement and consummation by fire"; but "it is quite possible that the
words were used in a very different context, with reference to the role of fire
in perception: 'Fire will attend to all things in turn, distinguish them and
comprehend' " (p.171). Possible, at a pinch.26 But how can Dr Osborne

24 At IXx 2 read <ot,x>, with all editors. Dr Osborne's defence of the MS text (p.164
n.92) will not wash.
25 Dr Osborne rejects Fraenkel's palmary transposition in IX x 7 (accepted by Marco-
vich), but she still refers to the "curious misplacement" of B66 in Hippolytus' text
(pp.170 n.106 and 171 n.107).
1' I do not think that the words bEOfteiv and xata-aLka6Lvav could have been used in
these senses by Heraclitus: see LSJ s.vv. (but note that at Hesiod, frag 278 M-W,
tn&tfte is a false reading).

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entertain the possibility? Her new method should sharply dismiss such
'modern' suggestions: we have the plain interpretation of Hippolytus; we
have no reason to reject it; so let us accept it. Here - and rumly - Dr
Osborne seems to defy her own precepts.
- B63 (the 'resurrection' fragment): Dr Osborne's discussion of this text is
the most elaborate application of the new method. She thinks that the
Hippolytan context will help us to produce a correct text of these puzzling
words; and, further, that the Hippolytan interpretation will help us to
understand what Heraclitus originally meant. As for the text, we should
read kyi(Q L t,ov-twv (tyEQTtL6v'cwv MS, ?yEQt lCovtwv Bernays, edd)
(pp.176-177). The sense is this:

The logos is here among them but foolish men rise in hostility against it and set
themselves as guards against an awakening of the living and the dead (p. 178).

We ordinary chaps resist the truth; what's more, we try to stop other chaps
from waking up to it. (Do we try to stop the dead too? Well, the living "are
like the dead or the sleeping in their ignorance" (p. 178).) If this is right, it is
a major contribution to Heraclitean scholarship - and a bright testimony to
the powers of the new method.
Hippolytus introduces the fragment thus: "He actually refers to a resur-
rection (&vdoTaL;g) of this visible flesh in which we were born, and he
knows that god is the cause of this resurrection, thus: . . ." (IX x 6). Dr
Osborne holds that Hippolytus must be referring specifically to the resur-
rection of Christ (p.174). Hence behind the corrupt tyeQTtl6v6wv we
should expect to find a reference to Christ's resurrection, and QEy(la; is
the word to welcome - for tycI'w is often used in connection with the
raising of Christ (p.176).27 Hence Hippolytus understood the fragment as
follows:

When god was here in this world men rose up against him and set themselves as
guards against him who was the awakening of the living and the dead (p.177).

To get the original Heraclitean sense from this, we need only replace Christ
by the k6yo;, and read EyF_La in an abstract rather than a personified
sense. Hey presto.
There are some queer things here. First, Hippolytus is not referring to the
resurrection of Christ but to the general resurrection. Dr Osborne allows
that the first reference to &vdvcnaaL in IX x 6 must be to the general
resurrection, but she holds that the second reference applies to Christ

27 For tyqxEQuJ of Christ's resurrection see Mt 27.53; but the normal word in the NT is
dVdOLTaELg.

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(p.174). But the second reference picks up the first (TAYTHI -fj; &va -
ox6o?ow) and therefore must also indicate the general resurrection. But
secondly, Dr Osborne's own interpretation of B63 does not in fact contain
any reference to the resurrection of Christ: the yeFotg in her text is Christ
himself ("I am the resurrection . . ")2, it is not the resurrection of Christ.
Dr Osborne's false understanding of Hippolytus' &vaYZTaOL is thus irrele-
vant to her interpretation of B63.
Thirdly, if we ask where in B63 Hippolytus saw a reference to the
resurrection, then the answer is plain: he saw it in the word brav(OtaaOaL.
It is true that 1yeQOLp is also used for "resurrection", but Hippolytus' text
leaves no doubt that his dv6doa(ug prefigures Heraclitus' baavtu?acoaL.
To translate the verb by "rise against" is, in this context, perverse. And thus
Dr Osborne's interpretation collapses.'
- B67 (God is night and day): at IX x 8 Hippolytus writes:

&v bi tovp -r xepaXa(q ntdvra 61&ofi sr&6wbv voiiv WOo, &iwa bi xav 16v Tn;
NoiitoO aEQOEWEw <8v> &t' 6M ywv 96ELUa oibx 6vta XQtotO1J dt&X 'HQax-
Xdrou tIOnav. (Text from Marcovich)

Scholars have worried about the 'chapter' to which Hippolytus apparently

refers.0' According to Dr Osborne, "in this chapter" refers not to any
chapter of Heraclitus, but to "the summary which Hippolytus has just given
of Heraclitus' doctrines" (p.179). How can that be? Well, first, we must
recognize that the subject of the verb tit}tro is not Heraclitus but rather
6iLoi, nvra (ibid). Next, the tbtog voig should be taken as the "particular
idea, common to Heraclitus and Noetus" (p. 180). Finally, instead of adding
<6v> with Marcovich and everyone else, we should correct the grammar
by excising tiahr 'v (ibid). Thus:
In this summary all things together have set forth his particular idea, and at the same
time I have briefly shown that the particular idea of the heresy of Noetus is not
Christ's idea but Heracitus' (ibid).

This will hardly command assent: will any reader imagine that 3dvtca 6toi
could be the subject of Jisto?31 Plainly the subject of the verb is

Jo 11.25 - but here the word is &vdoxauSt and not &yeyo;g.

2 In addition, I find it hard to construe qkaxa; kytQOEL as meaning "guards against
an awakening". Dr Osborne offers no parallels.
I The latest comment: Hippolytus "copies no less than nineteen different Heraclitean
sayinp . . . from a chapter (xE4pdXaLov, IX. 10.8) of a Hellenistic anthology with Stoic
comments" (Marcovich, p.39).
31 The verb occurs 65 times in the Refutatio: in no case does it have anythingother than a
personal subject. We would not be surprised to find e.g. "The Book" or "The Chapter"
as subject; but I cannot believe that Greek will allow ndcva 6Wto as a subject for this
verb.

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Heraclitus - the subject of the preceding xakti and the following X'yEL.32
That is beyond discussion.
It follows that we need the traditional <6v>.33 What, then, of the
notorious 'chapter'? There has been much fuss about nothing - for the
chapter does not exist. Although the word xcqpdkaLov may mean "chap-
ter", it has other senses. In one of these it refers to short sections or
excerpts.3 And that is most probably the sense which it bears in the present
text.35 Then 'o*rw looks forward, and the whole text says:

In the following passage [i.e. in B671 he has set down all of his own thought'- and at
the same time that of the sect of Noetus, whom I have briefly shown to be a disciple
not of Christ but of Heraclitus.

Everything fits neatly into place.37

VI

This has been a robust review. I believe that many of the things Dr Osborne
says in her book are false, and that a few of them are perverse. But I also
believe that much of the book - which in my curmudgeonly style I have kept
mum about - is true, and that much is importantly true. Moreover, even if

32 Dr Osborne finds difficulties with this X?yEL: it "must mean Heraclitus despite the
fact that it follows a reference to Noetus" (p. 159 n.79). There is no difficulty - the subject
of XtyeL is the same as the subject of the immediately preceding finite verb. Dr. Osborne
goes further: "The passage appears to be an afterthought.. . . It is conceivable that the
text is at fault and the passage has been transposed out of its proper context" (ibid). On
the contrary: far from being an afterthought, the text represents the sum and summit of
Hippolytus' account of Heraclitus; and any transposition would ruin the thing.
3 Marcovich makes many hundreds of such small supplements: the sole MS of Books
IV-X is pocked with minor lacunae.
3 See Lampe s.v. xFzp6.XaLov, D.4.c; note too D.4.d, where the word refers to the
Biblical bits we call 'verses' (to Lampe's references add Suda, s.v. vttko;).
's Dr Osborne's "summary" is also a possibility. But the reference will still be to
Heraclitus' summary, i.e. Hippolytus will be saying that B67 is a summary of Heraclitus'
views. In its other Hippolytan occurrences (V vii 1; VI xxix 1; IX xiii 6; X ix 3) the word is
used in the plural; the x&pdXata of e.g. the Naassenes are the mainpoints of their heresy.
' 'O EbLo; vois means "his own view" (cf. V vi 2, ix 7). There is no connexion with
oOro; 6 vovi5 in Hippolytus' gloss on B67 (pace Dr Osborne, p. 180). There vois means
"meaning": see LSJ s.v., III; Lampe s.v., II.
3' Not quite. The aorist, b6eLta is puzzling: Hippolytus has not yet "briefly shown"
the Heraciteanism of Noetus - he turns to do so in IX x 9-12. Perhaps we should read
b=L6(tLt for bW&Lez?

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everything in it were false, the book would still be a major achievement. For
the new method is the right method. Only one story of a path remains.
I end as I began - and not from politeness. This is the best book on the
Presocratics I have read for decades.

BaIIiol College, Oxford

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