1

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
[ARTICLE 14 AND 62 OF THE RPC]

PEOPLE V. LEGASPI

FACTS: At around 2:00 in the morning of February 11, 1997, complainant Honorata Ong, who was then sleeping inside
her house with her three daughters, was awakened by the sound of their door opening. She initially thought that it was
her husband coming home from work. When Honorata opened her eyes, however, she saw a man armed with a knife
standing by her feet. More terrifying, the man already had his pants and briefs down on his knees and he was pointing to
her eldest daughter. Alarmed, Honorata told the man not to touch her daughter. The man poked his knife at her and
told her to stand up and then was made to lie down on the adjacent sofa. Thereafter, the man removed Honorata's
panties and had sex with her. All this time, he had his knife at Honorata's neck. Honorata noticed that the man reeked of
alcohol. After slaking his lust, Honorata's assailant stood up then asked for money. Since the man still had his knife
pointed at her, Honorata could do nothing but comply. She gave him the only money she had, several bills amounting to
P500.00.

After threatening Honorata and her daughters with death if she reports the incident, the man left. Honorata, out of fear,
could do nothing but close the door. Later that day, however, Honorata mustered enough courage to narrate her
defilement to her sister-in-law and upon describing him, Honorata's sister-in-law exclaimed that she knew a person
living in Manapat Street fitting the description That afternoon, Honorata, together with her husband, reported the
incident to the barangay captain. Thereafter, the captain, along with two tanods patrolled the area and, on the next day,
they managed to nab a person who fits the description given by Honorata of her assailant. When the suspect was
brought to the barangay hall for confrontation, he was positively identified by Honorata as the rapist. This person, later
identified as accusedappellant Edgar Legaspi y Libao, was thus detained by the police. The next day, Honorata had
herself medically examined at the NBI but no evident signs of extra-genital physical injuries were found on her body. On
the other hand, all that accused-appellant could interpose as defenses were denial and alibi, stating that at the time of
the alleged incident, he was at his home in Manapat Street sleeping. Accused-appellant also testified that he had been
previously convicted of homicide and Roberto Eugenio, the victim therein, was a resident of the exact same address
where complainant Honorata was living. Accused-appellant hinted at the possibility that relatives of Roberto Eugenio
had conspired with complainant Honorata to get rid of him. Incidentally, Rivera Street where the alleged crime occurred
is only two streets away from Manapat. Moreover, aside from Honorata's address, accused-appellant did not present
proof that the relatives of Roberto Eugenio knew complainant Honorata.

Given the above circumstances, the trial court, as earlier mentioned, found accused appellant guilty of rape aggravated
by dwelling and nighttime, and of robbery aggravated by dwelling; and thereupon, imposed upon him the supreme
penalty of death for the rape, and an indeterminate penalty of six months to nine years for the robbery.

ISSUE: Accused-appellant's plea for reversal is founded on the arguments that his guilt was not shown beyond
reasonable doubt, and that complainant Honorata's testimony is replete with inconsistencies. He also insists on his alibi
and alleged insanity.

HELD:
In sum, we find that the trial court did not err:
The rape charge was committed in the victim's dwelling at nighttime. Dwelling and nighttime are aggravating
circumstances in rape (People vs. Padilla 242 SCRA 629). On the other hand, the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime cannot be appreciated in the robbery charge because of (sic) the notion to commit the crime was
conceived only shortly when the rape was committed at darkness. However, the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling is a different story and should be considered. Dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence against or
intimidation of person because this class of robbery can be committed without the necessity of trespassing the
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
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sanctity of the offended party's house. Entrance into the dwelling house of the offended party is not an element
of the offense (People vs. Cabato 160 SCRA 98). Finally, for sexually assaulting a married woman thereby
grievously wronged (sic) the institution of marriage, the imposition of exemplary damages by way of example to
deter others from committing the crime is just (sic) warranted.
Considering the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling, the trial court imposed the
supreme penalty of death on accused-appellant for the crime of rape. However, a cursory examination of the
Information filed against accused-appellant would show that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling
are not specified therein. Now, at the time the trial court rendered its decision, the non-allegation of generic aggravating
circumstances in the information was immaterial, since the rule then prevailing was that generic aggravating
circumstances duly proven in the course of the trial could be taken into account by the trial court in determining the
proper imposable penalty even if such circumstances were not alleged in the information ( P e o p le v s . D e b e r t o ,
205 SCRA 291 [1992]).

Nonetheless, it is to be noted that the appreciation by the trial court of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
nighttime, despite the non-allegation thereof in the Information, resulted in the imposition of the supreme penalty of
death upon accusedappellant. In P e o p le v . G alle g o (G.R. No. 130603, August 15, 2000), We had occasion to rule,
thus:
In P e o ple v . Alb e rt (251 SCRA 136 [1995]), we admonished courts to proceed with more care where the
possible punishment is in its severest form — death — because the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable.
Any decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible, hence it is the bounden duty of
the Court to exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties' evidence. Safeguards designed to reduce to a
minimum, if not eliminate, the grain of human fault ought not to be ignored in a case involving the imposition of
capital punishment for an erroneous conviction "will leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice." The
accused must thence be afforded every opportunity to present his defense on an aggravating circumstance that
would spell the difference between life and death in order for the Court to properly "exercise extreme caution in
reviewing the parties' evidence." This, the accused can do only if he is appraised of the aggravating circumstance
raising the penalty imposable upon him to death. S u c h a g g r a v a tin g cir c u m s t a n c e m u s t b e alle g e d
in t h e in f o r m a tio n, o t h e r wis e t h e C o u rt c a n n o t a p p r e cia t e it . The death sentence being
irrevocable, we cannot allow the decision to take away life to hinge on the inadvertence or keenness of the
accused in predicting what aggravating circumstance will be appreciated against him. In a series of cases under
the regime of Rep. Act No. 7659, the Court did not appreciate the aggravating circumstance of dwelling which
would have increased the imposable penalty to death when such circumstance was not alleged in the
information. In P e o ple v . G a s p a r , et al. (318 SCRA 649 [1999]), the Court found that apart from treachery,
dwelling also attended the killing of the victim. Despite this finding and the absence of any mitigating
circumstance, the Court nonetheless did not appreciate dwelling and-imposed the penalty of r e clu sio n p e r p
e t u a and not the greater penalty of death. Hence, in the case at bar, considering that the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling was not alleged in the information, we cannot appreciate it and raise the penalty
imposed upon Raul Gallego from r e clu sio n p e r p e t u a to death.

The principle above-enunciated is applicable to the case at bar. Consequently, we hold that due to their non-allegation
in the Information for rape filed against accused-appellant, the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling
cannot be considered in raising the penalty imposable upon accused-appellant from r e clu sio n p e r p e t u a to death.
Parenthetically, the above rule is inapplicable for the crime of robbery committed by accused-appellant, the same not
involving the imposition of the death penalty. For said crime, what remains applicable is the old rule that generic
aggravating circumstances if duly proven in the course of the trial could be taken into account by the trial court in
determining the proper imposable penalty, even if such circumstances were not alleged in the Information. Thus, for the
crime of robbery, the trial court correctly imposed an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of a r r e s t o m a y o r , as
minimum, to nine (9) years of p risio n m a y o r , as maximum. It is to be noted carefully that the rule on generic
aggravating circumstances has now been formalized in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on Sections 8 and 9,
which took effect on December 1, 2000. Thus, the Rules now require qualifying as well as a g g r a v a tin g cir c u m s t a
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
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n c e s to be expressly and specifically alleged in the Complaint or Information, otherwise the same will not be
considered by the court even if proved during the trial. And this principle is applicable in all criminal cases, not only in
cases were the aggravating circumstance would increase the penalty to death. With this, the Court gives fair warning to
prosecutors that henceforth, they must prepare well-crafted information that allege the circumstances qualifying and
aggravating the crimes charged, otherwise the same will not be considered by the court in determining the proper
imposable penalty. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision under review finding accused-appellant EDGAR
LEGASPI y LIBAO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 17640-MN is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that he is sentenced to suffer the reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua.

[TAKING ADVANTAGE OF PUBLIC OFFICE]

PEOPLE V. CAPALAC

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; PROOF REQUIRED. — As early as 1903, Justice Mapa, in United States v. Alvarez, (3
Phil. 24), made clear that an aggravating circumstance must be "as fully proven as the crime it self." He added: "Without
clear and evident proof of their presence, the penalty fixed by the law for the punishment of the crime cannot be
increased."

FACTS: It was not unexpected, considering the close family ties so traditional among Filipinos, that the stabbing,
apparently without provocation, of one Moises Capalac by Jimmy Magaso, would be attended with serious, if not tragic,
consequences. It happened on September 20, 1970 at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the scene of the gory
incident being a duly licensed cockpit in the City of Iligan. The aggressor, attempting to escape, was confronted by two
brothers of Moises, Jesus Capalac, originally included in the information but now deceased, and appellant Mario
Capalac. The attempt of Magaso to board a jeep was unsuccessful, he having alighted after two shots were fired in
succession. Knowing that he was completely at the mercy of the two brothers, he raised his hands as a sign of surrender,
but they were not to be appeased. He was pistol-whipped by appellant Mario Capalac, being dealt several blows on the
head and the face. After he had fallen to the ground, Jesus Capalac stabbed the deceased on the chest three or four
times. He was brought to the hospital where he died, the cause, according to the coroner's report, being "hemorrhagic
shock due to a wound of the heart."

ISSUE: The brief for the appellant prays for the reversal of the judgment and assigns four errors as having been
committed by the lower court. The first error speaks of the absence of conspiracy. The second and the third deny the
existence of the qualifying as well as the aggravating circumstances.

HELD: From the facts as narrated above, there can be no other conclusion except that the crime was one of murder, the
qualifying circumstance of treachery being present. The specific language of the Revised Final Code calls for application:
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make." 5Mag-aso's situation was hopeless. Any defense he could have
put up would be futile and unavailing. His hands were raised in surrender. That notwithstanding, he was pistol whipped.
When lying prostrate on the ground, he was stabbed. It must be remembered that, according to the testimonial
evidence, there were two other persons assisting the brothers Capalac. If they were not included in the information, the
explanation would appear to be that they managed to elude capture. There was no risk, therefore, to the aggressors, no
hope for the victim. The trial court committed no error then in appreciating the circumstance of treachery as being
present.
The lower court erred, however, in finding the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, of means being
employed or circumstances brought about to add ignominy to the natural effects of the act, and of the crime being
committed with the offender taking advantage of his official position as having attended the commission of the crime. As
early as 1903, Justice Mapa, in United States v. Alvares, made clear that an aggravating circumstance must be "as fully
proven as the crime itself." He added: "Without clear and evident proof of their presence, the penalty fixed by the law
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
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for the punishment of the crime cannot be increased." Moreover, insofar as evident premeditation is concerned, there is
this relevant excerpt from the same opinion: "The record contains no evidence showing that the defendant had, prior to
the moment of its execution, resolved to commit the crime, nor is there proof that this resolution was the result of
meditation, calculation and persistence. In People v. Mendova, it was emphasized that it should not be "premeditation"
merely; it is "evident" premeditation. A recent decision, People v. Anin, ruled that the perpetration of a criminal act
"evidently made in the heat of anger" did not call for a finding that there was evident premeditation. What is required is
that the offense was "the result of cool and serene reflection." What was done by the brothers of Capalac cannot be
categorized as falling within the norm of means being employed or circumstances being brought about to add ignominy
to the natural effects of the act. It is well to stress that they were prompted by their desire, to avenge their brother.
They went after Mag-aso, the victim. They assaulted him, relying on the weapons they carried with them. Jesus stabbed
him and appellant Mario pistol-whipped him. They did what they felt they had to do to redress a grievance. It cannot be
said, therefore, that they deliberately employed means to add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. It is quite
apparent that all they were interested in was to assure that there be retribution for what was done to their brother. The
mere fact that appellant Mario Capalac is a member of the police force certainly did not of itself justify that the
aggravating circumstance of advantage being taken by the offender of his public position be considered as present. He
acted like a brother, instinctively reacting to what was undoubtedly a vicious assault on his kin that could cause the
death of a loved one. It would be an affront to reason to state that at a time like that and reacting as he did, he
purposely relied on his being a policeman to commit the act. He pistol-whipped the deceased because he had his pistol
with him. It came in handy and he acted accordingly. That he was a policeman is of no relevance in assessing his criminal
responsibility.

[TAKING ADVANTAGE OF PUBLIC OFFICE]

PEOPLE V. GAPASIN

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVI, Isabela, finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder. According to prosecution witness Alberto Carrido, he and Rodrigo Ballad left the
house of Enteng Teppang at about 2:00 P.M. of October 6, 1979 after attending the "pamisa" for the deceased father of
Teppang. Jerry Calpito followed them. While they were walking along the barangay road, Calpito was shot by appellant
with an armalite rifle. When Calpito fell on the ground, appellant fired more shots at him. Thereafter, accused Amor
Saludares planted a .22 caliber revolver on the left hand of Calpito. Upon hearing the shots, Faustina Calpito ran to
succor her fallen husband. Accused Nicanor Saludares pointed his gun at Faustina while accused Soriano fired his gun
upwards. Saludares warned that he would kill any relative of Jerry Calpito who would come near him. Faustina and the
other relatives of the victim scampered away as the Saludares' group chased them. The body of Calpito was autopsied
by Dr. Bernardo Layugan, who found that the victim sustained four bullet wounds: (1) on the right lateral side of the arm
fracturing the humerus; (2) on the right lateral side of the thorax between the 7th and 8th ribs with exit wound at the
sternum; (3) on the left side of the thorax, anterior, between the 5th and 6th ribs; and (4) on the right fronto-parietal
portion of the head "severing the skull and brain tissues" (Exh. "F"). Dr. Layugan opined that the victim was in a standing
position when he was shot by someone positioned at his right. Appellant invoked self-defense. He testified that he was
issued a mission order on September 23, 1979 to investigate a report regarding the presence of unidentified armed men
in Barrio San Jose, Roxas, Isabela. The following day, he was instructed by Sgt. Dominador Ignacio to get in touch with
Nicanor Saludares who may be able to give him information on the identities of the persons with unlicensed fifirearms in
the place. When appellant met Nicanor Saludares on September 29, 1979, he was informed that Jerry Calpito had an
unlicensed firearm. LLphil On October 5, 1979, Nicanor Saludares went to the P.C. Headquarters in Roxas and told
appellant that it would be best for him to see Jerry Calpito the following day as a relative of the latter would be buried.
The next day, appellant went to Barangay San Jose, arriving there at 12 noon. Instead of going to the cemetery, he went
to the house of Nicanor Saludares. From there, they went to the house of Enteng Teppang to attend the "pamisa." While
they were having lunch, Nick Saludares advised appellant against confronting Calpito because it would create a
disturbance at the "pamisa." He also told appellant that Calpito would surely pass his (Saludares) house on his way
home.
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
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Appellant and Nicanor Saludares positioned themselves inside the yard of the latter. When appellant saw Calpito, he
went out of the yard into the barangay road. When Calpito was about three meters away from him, appellant asked him
what was bulging in his waist. Instead of answering, Calpito took a step backward, drew his firearm from the waist and
fired twice at appellant. He missed because appellant dropped to the ground simultaneously firing his armalite. After
fifteen minutes, the police arrived and took the body of the victim to the morgue. Appellant was brought to the P.C.
Headquarters in Roxas, where he was investigated.

HELD: Appellant contended that the crime committed is homicide. The trial court correctly ruled that the crime of
murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was indeed committed. Treachery attended the commission of the
crime. The two conditions to constitute treachery were present in the case at bench, to wit: (a) the employment of
means of execution that gives the person who is attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted ( P e o p le v. N a rit , 197 SCRA 334 [1991]). Appellant
deliberately executed the act in such a way that his quarry was unaware and helpless. This can be gleaned from his act
of waiting for the victim behind the hollow-block fence of Nicanor Saludares and shooting the victim from his right side.
Evident premeditation was indubitably proven by the evidence showing that the execution of the criminal case was
preceded by cool thought and reflection. Appellant's resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time
sufficient to arrive at a clear judgment was shown ( P e o p le v. C a s t o r , 216 SCRA 410 [1992]). In view of the presence
of treachery which qualified the killing as murder, the evident premeditation should be considered only as a generic
aggravating circumstance ( P e o p le v. F a b r o s , 214 SCRA 694 [1992]). The information alleged three other generic
aggravating circumstances: ignominy, abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of public position. The trial court
correctly ruled out ignominy on the strength of the autopsy conducted by the doctor who failed to find any other
injuries such as bruises and contusions which may indicate that the victim was kicked by his assailants. It also correctly
held that treachery absorbed abuse of superior strength ( P e o p le v. M o r al , 132 SCRA 474 [1984]). The trial court
properly appreciated taking advantage of public position as an aggravating circumstance. Appellant, a member of the
Philippine Constabulary, committed the crime with an armalite which was issued to him when he received the mission
order ( P e o p le v. M a d rid , 88 Phil. 1 [1951])

[INSULT TO PUBLIC AUTHORITY]

PEOPLE V. TIONGSION

FACTS: At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of October 26, 1971, the accused Rudy Tiongson escaped from the
Municipal Jail of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, together with George de la Cruz and Rolando Santiago, where they were
detained under the charge of Attempted Homicide. While in the act of escaping, the said Rudy Tiongson killed Pat.
Zosimo Gelera, a member of the police force of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, who was guarding the said accused, and PC
Constable Aurelio Canela of the PC Detachment stationed in Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, who went in pursuit of them.
Upon arraignment, the said accused, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to both informations. The trial court,
however, did not render judgment outright, but ordered the prosecution to present its evidence, after which, it
sentenced the said accused to suffer the death penalty.

HELD: Counsel contends that the evidence presented by the prosecution does not warrant, nor support, the finding that
the killing of Pat. Zosimo Gelera was qualified by treachery since the prosecution failed to present any eyewitness who
directly saw the killing of Pat. Gelera. The Solicitor General agrees with counsel for the accused. According to the
Revised Penal Code, "there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." In the instant case, it does not appear how
and in what position the victim was when he was killed so that it cannot be said for certain that the accused had
adopted a mode or means of attack tending directly to insure or facilitate the commission of the offense without risk to
himself arising from the defense or retaliation which the victim might put up. Pat. Nicandro Garcia of the Bulalacao
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
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police force merely declared that he was in his house, about 15 meters away from the municipal building when the
accused Rudy Tiongson and his companions escaped from prison, and he did not see the accused shoot Pat. Gelera.
Police Chief Edwardo Borwangga did not also see the accused Rudy Tiongson shoot Pat. Gelera. He declared that Pat.
Gelera was already dead when he arrived at the municipal building in the afternoon of October 26, 1971. PC Sgt.
Teotimo Saway, who led the pursuit of the escaped detainees, declared that he was in one of the stores in front of the
Bulalacao municipal building, about 60 meters away, when he heard two (2) gunshots coming from the direction of the
municipal building, and Pat. Gelera was already dead when he saw him. The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the
act of killing a human being must be proved in an evident and incontestable manner, mere presumptions or deductions
from hypothetical facts not being sufficient to consider them justified. Thus, in the case of U.S. v s . B a r b o s a, the
Court said that "since the case does not furnish any evidence to the effect that Barbosa had formed the deliberate,
premeditated intention to take the life of his wife, and there was no eyewitness as to the manner in which the deceased
was strangled; consequently there is no provision of law under which we can hold that the crime was committed with
treachery, and it must be borne in mind that the qualifying circumstances of a crime in its commission, in order to be
considered, must be established by competent evidence as well as the crime to which they relate."

We also agree with the parties that the aggravating circumstances of (1) evident premeditation, (2) in contempt of or
with insult to public authorities, (3) uninhabited place, and (4) abuse of superior strength were not present in the
commission of the crimes. Evident premeditation must be ruled out in view of the absence of sufficient proof that a plan
to kill the victims existed, the execution of which was preceded by deliberate thought and reflection. Besides, with
respect to the killing of PC Constable Canela, only ten minutes passed from the time the accused escaped from the
Municipal Jail up to the time he shot PC Constable Canela near the cemetery, so that there was no lapse of time during
which he could have deliberately planned the killing of the said PC Constable and meditated on the consequences of his
act. The aggravating circumstance that the crimes were committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities
cannot also be appreciated since Pat. Gelera and PC Constable Canela were the very ones against whom the crime were
committed. Besides, Pat. Gelera and PC Constable Canela are not persons in authority, but merely agents of a person in
authority.

The lower court also found that the killing of PC Constable Canela was committed in an uninhabited place, It has not
been shown, however, that the offense was committed in an isolated place, far from human habitation, In order that the
aggravating circumstance of the commission of a crime in an uninhabited place may be considered, it is necessary that
the place of occurrence be where there are no houses at all, a considerable distance from the village or town, or where
the houses are a great distance apart. Here, PC Sgt. Saway merely declared that the place where PC Constable Canela
was shot was about 700 meters away from the Municipal Building of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, which does not
satisfy the requirement. Besides, the record does not show that the place was intentionally sought by the accused to
facilitate the commission of the crime. The accused was trying to evade his pursuers, PC Constable Canela among them,
and their encounter was purely by chance. The lower court, therefore, erred in finding that the crime was committed in
an uninhabited place.

Finally, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength must also be ruled out since there is no direct
evidence that the accused employed superior strength in the killing of Pat. Gelera. The accused was then a detainee and
was unarmed while Pat. Gelera had his service pistol with him. With respect to PC Constable Canela, the accused was
alone against three armed pursuers, namely: PC Sgt. Saway, PC Constable Canela, and Pat Nicandro Garcia, and a civilian
by the name of Fred Barcelona.

[INSULT TO PUBLIC AUTHORITY]

PEOPLE V. MAGDUENO

FACTS: On October 15, 1980, a few minutes past 8:00 o'clock in the morning, as soon as the late Fiscal Fernando M. Dilig
had placed himself at the driver's seat inside his jeep parked near his house at the corner Roxas and D. Mendoza Streets,
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
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Puerto Princesa City, all of a sudden, two successive gunshots `burst into the air, as the gunman coming from his left side
aimed and poured said shots into his body, inflicting two fatal wounds that instantaneously caused his death.
Three witnesses positively identified the assailant as accused Hermogenes Magdueño. Magdueño also executed an
extra-judicial confession wherein he admitted that he killed Fiscal Dilig for a price or reward and implicated Leonardo
Senas and Mauricio de Leon to the commission of the crime. However, both Senas and de Leon were later dropped from
the amended information for lack of a prima facie case against them. All the other accused were acquitted for
insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE:
I THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR MURDER.

HELD: The appellant was a stranger in the town and was not known by the three eyewitnesses before the incident.
However, he was readily and positively identified by the three eyewitnesses upon confrontation. They could not have
mistaken the appellant's identity because they had a clear view of him at the time and the incident happened in broad
daylight. The appellant fired two successive shots at the defenseless Fiscal Dilig while the latter was still seated in his
jeep, hitting him at the neck and lumbar region. According to Dr. Rufino P . Yuzon, who performed the autopsy, on the
victim; both wounds were fatal and that "death will definitely occur." Immediately after the shooting, the appellant fled
still holding his fifirearm. The fact that the appellant called out, "Fiscal" before shooting the victim does not negate the
presence of treachery in the commission of the crime. Since the appellant was a hired killer, he wanted to insure that he
was shooting the correct person. When Dilig turned his face to find out who was calling him, the appellant fired
immediately rendering no opportunity for Dilig to defend himself. The attendant circumstance of treachery qualifies the
crime to murder. However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime with insult to public authority does
not seem to be borne by the records. For this aggravating circumstance to be considered it must not only be shown that
the crime was committed in the presence of the public authority but also that the crime was not committed against the
public authority himself. (U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150; People v. Rizal, 103 SCRA 282). In the instant case Fiscal Dilig,
the public authority involved in the crime, was the victim. Hence, the lower court, erred in including commission of the
crime with insult to public authority as an aggravating circumstance. Considering the presence of an aggravating
circumstance and the absence of any mitigating circumstance attending the offense, the lower court imposed the proper
penalty on the appellant. The crime in this case is a particularly heinous one. The appellant is shown by the records as a
heartless contract killer. Upon being paid for a job, he had no compunctions about traveling all the way to Palawan from
Manila, stalking and liquidating an unwary victim whose only fault was to perform his duties faithfully.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.

[INSULT TO PUBLIC AUTHORITY]

PEOPLE V. TAC-AN

FACTS: Appellant Renato Tac-an, then eighteen (18) years and seven (7) months of age, and the deceased Francis Ernest
Escaño III, fifteen (15) years old, were classmates in the third year of high school of the Divine Word College in
Tagbilaran City. They were close friends, being not only classmates but also members of the same gang, the Bronx gang.
Renato had been to the house where Francis and his parents lived, on one or two occasions. On those occasions, Francis'
mother noticed that Renato had a handgun with him. Francis was then advised by his mother to distance himself from
Renato. Francis withdrew from the Bronx gang. The relationship between Renato and Francis turned sour.

[Fights and quarrels between them were common after the estranged relationship.]

The Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas scheduled for 3:00 p.m. had just started in Room 15 when Renato
suddenly burst into the room, shut the door and with both hands raised, holding a revolver, shouted "Where is Francis?"
Upon sighting Francis seated behind and to the right of student Ruel Ungab, Renato fired at Francis, hitting a notebook,
a geometry book and the armrest of Ruel's chair. Francis and Ruel jumped up and with several of their classmates
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
 8

rushed forward towards the teacher's platform to seek protection from their teacher. Renato fired a second time, this
time hitting the blackboard in front of the class. Francis and the other students rushed back towards the rear of the
room. Renato walked towards the center of the classroom and fired a third time at Francis, hitting the concrete wall of
the classroom. Francis and a number of his classmates rushed towards the door, the only door to and from Room 15.
Renato proceeded to the teacher's platform nearest the door and for the fourth time fired at Francis as the latter was
rushing towards the door. This time, Francis was hit on the head and he fell on the back of Ruel and both fell to the floor.
Ruel was pulled out of the room by a friend; Francis remained sprawled on the floor bleeding profusely. Renato then
went out of Room 15, and paced between Rooms 14 and 15. A teacher, Mr. Pablo Baluma, apparently unaware that it
was Renato who had gunned down Francis, approached Renato and asked him to help Francis as the latter was still alive
inside the room. Renato thereupon re-entered Room 15, closed the door behind him, saying: "So, he is still alive. Where
is his chest?" Standing over Francis sprawled face down on the classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of Francis and
fired once more. The bullet entered Francis' back below the right shoulder, and exited on his front chest just above the
right nipple. Renato then left with two (2) remaining students and locked Francis alone inside Room 15. Renato
proceeded to the ground floor and entered the faculty room. There, he found some teachers and students and ordered
them to lock the door and close the windows, in effect holding them as hostages. He also reloaded his gun with five (5)
bullets. After some time, a team of Philippine Constabulary troopers led by Capt. Larino Lazo arrived and surrounded the
faculty room. With a hand-held public address device, Capt. Lazo called upon Renato to surrender himself. Renato did
not respond to this call. Renato's brother approached Capt. Lazo and volunteered to persuade his brother to give up.
Renato's father who, by this time had also arrived, pleaded with Renato to surrender himself. Renato then turned over
his gun to his brother through an opening in the balustrade of the faculty room. Capt. Lazo took the gun from Renato's
brother, went to the door of the faculty room, entered and placed Renato under arrest. Meantime, as soon as Renato
left Room 15, some teachers and students came to rescue Francis but could not open the door which Renato had locked
behind him. One of the students entered the room by climbing up the second floor on the outside and through the
window and opened the door from the inside. The teachers and students brought Francis down to the ground floor from
whence the PC soldiers rushed him to the Celestino Gallares Memorial Hospital. Francis died before reaching the
hospital.

HELD: After careful examination of the record, we find no reason to disagree with the conclusion of the trial court.

On Treachery
The trial court made a finding of treachery taking explicit account of the following factors: "1. Room 15 of the Divine
Word College, High School Department, Tagbilaran City, is situated in the second floor of the building. It is a corner room
and it has only one (1) door which is the only means of entry and exit; 2. At the time of the attack, the deceased was
seated on his chair inside his classroom and was writing on the armrest of his chair and also talking to Ruel Ungab and
while their teacher, Mr. Damaso Pasilbas was checking the attendance. The deceased was not aware of any impending
assault neither did he have any means to defend himself; 3. The accused used an airweight Smith & Wesson .38 caliber
revolver in shooting to death the defenseless and helpless Francis Ernest Escaño; 4. The attack was so sudden and so
unexpected. The accused consciously conceived that mode of attack; 5. The accused fired at Francis again and again and
did not give him a chance to defend himself. After the deceased was hit on the head and fell to the floor while he was
already sprawled and completely defenseless the accused fired at him again and the deceased was hit on the chest; 6.
The deceased was not armed. He was totally defenseless. He was absolutely not aware of any coming attack." The Court
also pointed out that Renato must have known that Francis while inside Room 15 had no means of escape there being
only one (1) door and Room 15 being on the second floor of the building. Renato in effect blocked the only exit open to
Francis as he stood on the teacher's platform closest to the door and fired as Francis and Ruel sought to dash through
the door.

On Evident Premeditation
The trial court also found the presence of evident premeditation and appreciated the same as a generic aggravating
circumstance. Here, it is the urging of the appellant that the requisites of evident premeditation had not been
sufficiently shown. In order that evident premeditation may be taken into account, there must be proof of (a) the time
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when the offender formed his intent to commit the crime; (b) an action manifestly indicating that the offender had clung
to his determination to commit the crime; and (c) of the passage of a sufficient interval of time between the
determination of the offender to commit the crime and the actual execution thereof, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. The defense pointed out that barely fifteen (15) minutes had elapsed from the time Renato left
his English III class and the time he returned with a gun. While there was testimony to the fact that before that fatal day
of 14 December 1984, anger and resentment had welled up between Francis and Renato, there was no evidence
adequately showing when Renato had formed the intention and determination to take the life of Francis. Accordingly,
we must discard evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance.

On the influence of drugs

The trial court found that Francis was killed by Renato while the later was under the influence of a dangerous drug,
specifically marijuana, and took that into account as a "special aggravating circumstance". No medical evidence had
been submitted by the prosecution to show that Renato had smoked marijuana before gunning down Francis. Fourteen
(14) days had elapsed after December 14,1984 before Renato was medically examined for possible traces of marijuana;
the results of the examination were negative. In the absence of medical evidence, the Court took into account certain
detailed factors as circumstantial evidence. The circumstances pointed to by the trial court may be indicative of
passionate anger on the part of Renato; we do not believe that they necessarily show that Renato had smoked
marijuana before entering his English III class. In the absence of competent medical or other direct evidence of ingestion
of a dangerous drug, courts may be wary and critical of indirect evidence, considering the severe consequences for the
accused of a finding that he had acted while under the influence of a prohibited drug. The Court considers that the
evidence presented on this point was simply inadequate to support the ruling of the trial court that Renato had shot and
killed Francis while under the influence of a prohibited drug.

On insult to public authority

The trial court held that the shooting to death of Francis had been done "in contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities: We believe the trial court erred in so finding the presence of a generic aggravating circumstance. Careful
reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private
school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such teacher or professor is so deemed only for purposes of application
of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person in authority
or the agents of such person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does not
identify specific articles of the Revised Penal Code for the application of which any person "directly vested with
jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in authority." Because a penal statute is not to be given a longer reach and
broader scope than is called for by the ordinary meaning of the ordinary words used by such statute, to the
disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe that a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school may
be regarded as a "public authority" within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, 31 31 the
provision the trial court applied in the case at bar.

[DISREGARD OF RANK, AGE, OR SEX AND DWELLING]

PEOPLE V. DIAZ

FACTS: At about two o'clock in the afternoon of September 4, 1963 Remegia Carasos, a fourteen-year old girl, and her
first cousin, Anita Pacaira (Pakaira), eleven years old, were gathering camotes in a farm located at a place fittingly called
Sitio Camotian, Barrio Perito, municipality of Sta. Margarita, Western Samar. In that peaceful, rustic scene, there
suddenly appeared Francisco Diaz (Ansing or Francing), a twenty-four year old unmarried farmer of that place, whom
Remegia and Anita had known for many years. Without any preliminaries, he embraced Remegia from behind and
against her will and held her breast. He knelt behind her while she was gathering camotes. She shouted for help, saying:
"Anita (Aning), help me because I am being embraced". Reacting to Remegia's cry for help, Anita, with the a bolo, struck
Francisco on the head and hands. Francisco released Remegia and fled. He suffered some injuries in consequence of
those blows. The injuries were treated at the puericulture center by the sanitary inspector. The two girls left the camote
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farm and hastened to the house of Quintin Tadia (Tadya), their grandfather, in Sitio Ilawod. They informed him that
Francisco Diaz had embraced and abused Remegia. Remegia had been brought up by her grandfather. She was then
staying with him. Anita was living with her parents in a house about six b r a z a s from Tadia's house. Tadia immediately
reported the incident to the barrio lieutenant. He gave Tadia a note for the municipal authorities so that the proper
complaint could be filed against Francisco Diaz. At around seven o'clock in the morning of the following day, September
5th, Tadia, accompanied by his teenage granddaughters, Remegia and Anita, was on his way to the p o b la cio n of Sta.
Margarita to file complaint. He was unarmed. He was carrying on his back a c a t o p is, an oblong basket about four by
two "palms' length" containing provisions of boiled camotes. He was walking ahead, followed by Remegia and Anita one
b r a z a behind him. While they were ascending the hill or cliff ( p a n g p a n g in Waray dialect) in Sitio Ilawod, Francisco
Diaz and his younger brother Gerardo (Adong), twenty-one years old, appeared on the crest of the hill. Both were
wearing denim pants and white shirts. Gerardo was armed with a locally made shotgun called b a r d o g , about fifty
inches long. He immediately fired sidewise at Tadia while about four meters from the latter, hitting him in the neck.
Tania rolled down the lower part of the cliff near the Alao Creek and lay there flat on his back with his c a t o p is . Then,
the brothers jumped to the lower part of the cliff. Gerardo told his brother: "Go ahead, Francisco, stab that fellow".
Francisco placed his foot on the prostrate body of Quintin Tadia, bent over him and repeatedly stabbed him in different
parts of his body. Francisco was armed with a bolo commonly called u t a k which is used in gathering firewood. After
witnessing the assault, Remegia Carasos ran in the direction of her house. Anita Pacairo hid herself among the bushes or
tall grasses "sitting, crouching and peeping" and "seeing all that was happening" (78 tsn). Tadia died on the spot where
he fell. Gerardo placed his b a r d o g on a moss-covered stone called p ala n a s about three b r a z a s from Tadia's body.
Remegia informed her father and the inhabitants of the barrio about the ambuscade and the killing of her grandfather.
Gerardo Diaz went home while Francisco surrendered to the authorities.

HELD: The appellants' defenses are untenable in their transparent flimsiness and fabricated character. It results that the
strong, clear and convincing evidence of the prosecution on the felonious killing perpetrated by the appellants may be
regarded as conclusive. Their guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
The crime committed by the appellants is murder qualified by treachery as alleged in the information. There was
treachery ( ale v o sia ) because the brothers made a deliberate surprise or unexpected assault on Tadia. They literally
ambushed him. They waited for him on the cliff, a high ground which rendered it difficult for him to flee or maneuver in
his defense. Tadia was shot sidewise while he was ascending the hill or cliff burdened by his c a t o p is or food basket.
That was another circumstance which handicapped him in resisting the assault. The initial attack was successful. Tadia
fell and rolled down the cliff and landed near the creek below. In that helpless state, he was ruthlessly stabbed by
Francisco Diaz. The appellants resorted to means of execution which directly and specially insured the killing without any
risk to themselves arising from any defense which the victim could have made. Actually, he was not able to make any
defense unarmed and attacked unawares as he was. The treacherous mode of attack is incontrovertible (Par. 16, Art. 14
and Art. 248, Revised Penal Code). The attack was also attended with abuse of superiority. Two armed young men
unexpectedly assaulted an unarmed sexagenarian. However, abuse of superior strength is merged with treachery. The
circumstance of old age cannot be considered aggravating. There was no evidence that the accused deliberately
intended to offend or insult the age of the victim. That circumstance may be absorbed in treachery (People vs. Gervacio,
L-21565, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 960; People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548; People vs. Limaco, 88 Phil. 35, 44).

Premeditation, which was alleged in the information as a qualifying circumstance, should be considered only as a generic
aggravating circumstance with respect to Francisco Diaz since treachery has already been used to qualify the killing as
murder (See People vs. Ubiña, 97 Phil. 515, 535). In his case, it is offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender to the authorities. The penalty for murder, which is r e clu sio n t e m p o r al maximum to death, should be
imposed in its medium period on Francisco Diaz. He should be sentenced to r e clu sio n p e r p e t u a (Arts. 64[4] and
248, Revised Penal Code)

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[DISREGARD OF RANK, AGE, OR SEX AND DWELLING]

PEOPLE V. ARIZOBAL

FACTS: On 12 August 1994 two (2) separate Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cataingnan,
Masbate, charging Clarito Arizobal, Erly Lignes, Rogelio Gemino and two (2) John Does with Robbery in Band with
Homicide for robbing and slaying Laurencio Gimenez and his son Jimmy Gimenez. After arraignment, the two (2) cases
were tried jointly. However, on 14 May 1997, upon motion of accused Rogelio Gimeno, without objection from the
prosecution, the two (2) Informations were d is mis s e d a s a g ain s t him for lack of evidence. But the same cases
remained as against accused Erly Lignes and Clarito Arizobal. Only accused Lignes appeared at the trial until its
termination as Arizobal escaped from detention and had to be tried in a b s e n tia . The two (2) John Does were never
apprehended as they were not sufficiently identified.

The prosecution presented, among others, Clementina Gimenez, wife of victim Laurencio Gimenez. She testified that on
24 March 1994 she together with her husband Laurencio Gimenez and a grandchild were sound asleep in their house in
Tuybo, Cataingan, Masbate. At around 9:30 in the evening, Laurencio roused her from sleep and told her to open the
door because there were persons outside the house. Since it was pitch-dark she lit a kerosene lamp and stood up to
open the door. She was suddenly confronted by three (3) armed men pointing their guns at her. She recognized two (2)
of them as Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes but failed to recognize the third person who was wearing a m a s k a r a . She
readily identified Clarito because she used to pass by his house in San Rafael while Erly was also a familiar face as he was
a regular habitué of the flea market.

According to Clementina, Clarito asked her husband, " T a y , where is your gun." But she promptly interjected, "We have
no gun, not even a b olo . If you want, you can look around for it." While the man in m a s k a r a stood guard at the door,
Clarito and Lignes barged into the master's bedroom and forcibly opened the a p a r a d o r . The terrified couple could
not raise a finger in protest but had to leave their fate to the whims of their assailants. The intruders ransacked their
cabinet and scattered everything on the floor until they found P8,000.00 among sheets of paper. Before leaving with
their loot they ordered Laurencio to go with them to Jimmy's house because "we have something to talk about." 5
Against his will, Laurencio went with them. Clementina recalled that shortly after the group left she heard a volley of
shots. Her grandchild, as if sensing what befell her grandfather, could only mutter in fear, " L olo is already dead!"

Erlinda Gimenez, wife of Jimmy Gimenez, narrated that on 24 March 1994, after she and her son had taken supper, her
husband Jimmy with one Francisco Gimenez arrived. Jimmy informed Erlinda that they had already bought a carabao.
After he handed her the certificate of large cattle, and while he was in the process of skinning a chicken for their supper,
three (3) men suddenly appeared and ordered them to lie face down. One of them pushed her to the ground while the
others tied Francisco and Jimmy as they whipped the latter with an armalite rifle. She noticed one of them wearing a
mask, another a hat, and still another, a bonnet.

Realizing the utter helplessness of their victims, the robbers took the liberty of consuming the food and cigarettes
Erlinda was selling in her s a ri- s a ri store. Finding no softdrinks to complete their snack, two (2) of the intruders
ordered Erlinda to buy coke for them at the neighboring store. But they warned her not to make any noise, much less
alert the vendor. When they returned to the house of Jimmy, the robbers proceeded to ransack the household in search
for valuables. They took around P1,000.00 from her s a ri- s a ri store and told them to produce P100,000.00 in exchange
for Jimmy's life. Since the couple could not produce such a big amount in so short a time, Erlinda offered to give their
certificate of large cattle. The culprits however would not fall for the ruse and threw the document back to her. Three (3)
masked men then dragged Jimmy outside the house and together with Laurencio brought them some fifty (50) meters
away while leaving behind Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes to guard Francisco and Erlinda's son. Moments later she heard
a burst of gunfire which reverberated through the stillness of the night. When the masked men returned to Jimmy's
house, one of them informed Erlinda that her husband and father-in-law had been killed for trying to escape. Upon
hearing this, Erlinda, as if the heavens had fallen on her, slowly lost consciousness.
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The post-mortem examination report prepared by Dr. Allen Ching showed that Jimmy Gimenez sustained injuries: (a) a
gunshot wound located at the victim's zygomatic area (right side near the ear) which may have caused brain
hemorrhage; (b) a non-serious gunshot wound at the upper back right side (armpit area); (c) a wound located at
themiddle side of the trunk — considered as exit of wound No. 2; (d) gunshot wound at the right fofirearm; and, (e) a
wound considered as a complication of the trajectory point of wound No. 4 that caused the fracturing of a bone and
exited as lacerated bone at the posterior.

The medico-legal examination conducted on Laurencio Gimenez also showed: (a) a chest wound penetrating the
pericardium; (b) gunshot wound at the right thigh exiting at the lumbar area, back; (c) gunshot wound at the left thigh
below the knee; and, (d) cause of death was respiratory arrest secondary to gunshot wounds.

HELD: The trial court is correct in appreciating dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. Generally, dwelling is considered
inherent in the crimes which can only be committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and robbery
in an inhabited place. However, in robbery with homicide the authors thereof can commit the heinous crime without
transgressing the sanctity of the victim's domicile. In the case at bar, the robbers demonstrated an impudent disregard
of the inviolability of the victims' abode when they forced their way in, looted their houses, intimidated and coerced
their inhabitants into submission, disabled Laurencio and Jimmy by tying their hands before dragging them out of the
house to be killed.

But treachery was incorrectly considered by the trial court. The accused stand charged with, tried and convicted of
robbery with homicide. This special complex crime is primarily classified in this jurisdiction as a crime against property,
and not against persons, homicide being merely an incident of robbery with the latter being the main purpose and
object of the criminals. As such, treachery cannot be validly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Art. 14 of
the Revised Penal Code.

We likewise hold that the aggravating circumstance of nighttime did not attend the commission of the crime. The fact
that the offense was committed at 9:30 in the evening does not suffice to sustain n o c t u r nid a d for, by itself,
nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. To be properly so considered, it must be shown that n o c t u r nid a d was
deliberately and intentionally sought by accused-appellants to help them realize their evil intentions. Nowhere can we
infer from the records that the malefactors sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the accomplishment of their
devious design. On the contrary, the lo c u s c riminis was well lighted and nighttime was merely an incidental element to
the whole drama. Fir s t . The houses of the victims were adequately lighted by kerosene lamps when the robbers
entered and went about their looting spree. In P e o p le v . P alla r c o this Court clarified this modifying circumstance
thus—
Nor can the aggravating circumstance of nighttime be appreciated, for the prosecution failed to demonstrate (a)
that the malefactor particularly sought or took advantage of the darkness to commit the offense, or (b) that
nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime. In any event, the prosecution presented no evidence to
establish the fact that n o c t u r nid a d attended the killing. Nighttime cannot be considered if it is shown that
the place was adequately lighted. In this case, it was established that the place was sufficiently illuminated by a
kerosene lamp.
S e c o n d . The robbers, particularly referring to accused-appellant and his co-accused, lingered in the lo c u s c riminis
and even conversed with their intended victims for an appreciable period of time inside the well-lit houses. As Erlinda
Gimenez testified, the place where the victims were gunned down was adequately illuminated by the moonlight,
although for undisclosed reasons she did not see the actual shooting. 26 All these taken together belie the assumption
that the culprits took advantage of the intrinsic impunity afforded by the cover of darkness and made the same as an ally
to accomplish their nefarious plan. N o c t u r nit y lures those who crave for blood to yield to their baser impulses with
the false courage borne out of the belief that their identity would not be brought in the open. We do not discern any
such intention in this case.

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[DISREGARD OF RANK, AGE, OR SEX AND DWELLING]

PEOPLE V. DANIEL

FACTS: This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Baguio City by virtue of a complaint filed by 13-year old
Margarita Paleng accusing Amado Daniel alias "Amado Ato" of rape. The offended party in this case is Margarita Paleng
who was born on November 20, 1952. She is a native of Balangabang, Tublay, Mountain Province. At the time of the
incident in question on September 20, 1965, complainant was temporarily boarding at a house located at Pinsao,
Guisad, Baguio City, as she was then a first year high school student at the Baguio Eastern High SchooL. On September
20, 1965, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, she had just arrived in the City from Tublay in a Dangwa bus. Because
it was then raining and the bus was parked several meters away from the bus station, she waited inside the bus. After
about three minutes of waiting, the accused came and started molesting her by inquiring her name and getting hold of
her bag. But she did not allow him to hold her bag. She called the attention of the bus driver and the conductor about
the actuation of the accused, but it seemed that the former were also afraid of him. Despite the rain, she left the bus
and went to ride in a jeep parked some 100 meters away. The accused closely followed her. When the jeep started to
go, the accused also rode and sat beside her. When the jeep reached Guisad, she alighted on the road but she still had
to negotiate a distance of ten meters. The accused also alighted and again he tried to carry her bag. Although he was not
allowed to carry her bag, he was adamant in following her. Reaching her boarding house, she opened the door and was
about to close it when the accused dashed in and closed the door behind him. When she entered her room, the accused
went in. He pulled a dagger eight inches long and threatened her: 'If you will talk, I will kill you'. Margarita was stunned
into silence because of her fear. Thereupon, the accused held her hair with his left hand and forced her to lie down in
bed. He also placed his left hand with a handkerchief in Margarita's mouth, at the same time holding the dagger and her
neck with his right hand. She was forcibly made to lie down and, at this moment, the accused removed the buttons of
his pants. He then put down the dagger on the bed . Her attempts to extricate herself from the accused was to no avail
as she was only 4 ft. and 8 inches tall and weighed about 95 to 100 pounds while the accused was 5 ft. and 7 inches tall
and weighed about 126 pounds. He then held his penis, used his thigh to separate the legs of Margarita tried, but failed,
to remove her panty. He nonetheless guided his penis and inserted it inside the vagina of the complainant after prying
open the part of her panty covering her private parts. Then he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the offended
party. Margarita lost consciousness. When she recovered, he was already gone. The following morning, her father came
to visit her. She confided to him the terrible misfortune which befell her. She was immediately brought to the Baguio
General Hospital where she was examined. Then they proceeded to the Police Department. The Chief of Police
accompanied them to the Health Center where she was again examined by Dr. Perfecto O. Micu who thereafter
submitted his medical report . Margarita and her father gave their respective statements before the police authorities .
She signed her criminal complaint prepared by the Fiscal's Office of Baguio.

The City Medico-Legal Officer concluded that "defloration was recent". He further declared that the condition of the
hymen revealed that Margarita Paleng was a virgin before the incident complained of, and that the number of
lacerations and contusions at the base of the hymen indicated the degree of force exerted to effect the sexual act.

HELD: All that is necessary is that the force used by the accused is sufficient for him to consummate his evil purpose. In
U.S. v. Villa r o s a, 1905, there was a similar situation. A 12 year old girl was sexually abused in the woods by a man of
superior physical strength. In holding the accused Villarosa guilty of rape the Court held:
"It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to consider the existence of the crime of rape it is not
necessary that the force employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted;
it is only necessary that the force used by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the purpose which he
had in view." (4 Phil. 434, 437 citing Judgment May 14, 1878, Supreme Court of Spain. The Villarosa doctrine has
been followed in numerous cases involving the crime of rape and one of the latest is People v. Equec, 1977, per
Justice Enrique Fernando, 70 SCRA 665.).

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Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits herself against her will
because of fear for her life and personal safety. In this case of Margarita Paleng, appellant was armed with a dagger and
with it threatened to kill the girl if she would talk or scream for help. Her fear naturally weakened whatever resistance
Margarita could muster at the time and as a result appellant was able to consummate his coitus on the victim.

To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a deadly weapon with the aggravating
circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party. Although Margarita was merely renting a
bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used in
Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the law, that the victim owns the place where he lives or
dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect
and uphold.

[DISREGARD OF RANK, AGE, OR SEX AND DWELLING]

PEOPLE V. APDUHAN

FACTS: This is an automatic review of the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bohol convicting Apolonio
Apduhan, Jr. of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to death.

Provincial Fiscal accuses Apolonio Apduhan, Jr., alias Junior, Rodulfo Huiso and Felipe Quimson of the crime of Robbery
With Homicide, committed as follows: "That on or about the 23rd day of May, 1961, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening,
in the municipality of Mabini, province of Bohol, Philippines, the above-named accused and five (5) other persons whose
true names are not yet known (they are presently known only with their aliases of Bernabe Miano, Rudy, Angel-Angi,
Romeo and Tony) and who are still at large (they will be charged in separate information or informations as soon as they
are arrested and preliminary proceedings in Crim. Case No. 176 completed before the Justice of the Peace Court), all of
them armed with different unlicensed firearms, daggers, and other deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter, by means of
violence, the dwelling house of the spouses Honorato Miano and Antonia Miano, which was also the dwelling house of
their children, the spouses Geronimo Miano and Herminigilda de Miano; and, once inside the said dwelling house, the
abovenamed accused with their five (5) other companions, did attack, hack and shoot Geronimo Miano and another
person by the name of Norberto Aton, who happened to be also in the said dwelling house, thereby inflicting upon the
said two (2) persons physical injuries which caused their death; and thereafter the same accused and their five (5) other
companions, did take and carry away from said dwelling house cash money amounting to Three Hundred Twenty-two
Pesos (P322.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to Honorato Miano and Geronimo Miano, to the damage and prejudice
of the said Honorato Miano and Geronimo Miano, and the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Miano in the sum of Three
Hundred Twenty-two Pesos (P322.00) with respect to the amount robbed, and also to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of deceased Geronimo Miano and Norberto Aton by reason of the death of these two persons.

ISSUE: While an unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it at the same time constitutes an admission of all the material
facts alleged in the information including the aggravating circumstances therein recited. The four aggravating
circumstances are (1) band; (2) dwelling; (3) nighttime; and (4) abuse of superior strength. The circumstance of abuse of
superiority was, however, withdrawn by the prosecution on the ground that since the offense of robbery with homicide
was committed by a band, the element of c u a d rilla necessarily absorbs the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. We believe that said withdrawal was ill-advised since the circumstances of band and abuse of superiority are
separate and distinct legal concepts. The element of band is appreciated when the offense is committed by more than
three armed malefactors regardless of the comparative strength of the victim or victims. Hence, the indispensable
components of c u a d rilla are (1) at least four malefactor and (2) all of the four malefactors are armed. On the other
hand, the gravamen of abuse of superiority is the taking advantage by the culprits of their collective strength to
overpower their relatively weaker victim or victims. Hence, in the latter aggravating factor, what is taken into account is

Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances

 15

not the number of aggressors nor the fact that they are armed, but their relative physical might vis - a- vis the offended
party.

HELD: Granting, however, that the withdrawal was valid, there still remain t h r e e aggravating circumstances which
render inutile the solitary extenuating circumstance of plea of guilty. The prosecution does not need to prove the said
three circumstances (all alleged in the second amended information) since the accused, by his plea of guilty, has
supplied the requisite proof. Hence, we will not belabor our discussion of the attendant aggravating circumstances. The
settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation of persons, like the offense at bar. The
rationale behind the pronouncement is that this class of robbery could be committed without the necessity of
transgressing the sanctity of the home. M o r a d a is inherent only in crimes which could be committed in no other place
than in the house of another, such as trespass and robbery in an inhabited house. This Court in People v s . Pinca, citing
People v s . Valdez, ruled that the "circumstances (of dwelling and scaling) were certainly not inherent in the crime
committed, because, the crime being robbery with violence or intimidation against persons (specifically, robbery with
homicide) the authors thereof could have committed it without the necessity of violating or scaling the domicile of their
victim." Cuello Calon opines that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity in the
accused and produces greater alarm. Nocturnity is aggravating when it is purposely and deliberately sought by the
accused to facilitate the commission of the crime or to prevent their being recognized or to insure unmolested escape.
N o c t u r nid a d must concur with the intent and design of the offender to capitalize on the intrinsic impunity afforded
by the darkness of night. In the case at bar, the affidavit (exh. 1-1) of the accused Apduhan shows that he and his
comalefactors took advantage of the nighttime in the perpetration of the offense as they waited until it was dark before
they came out of their hiding place to consummate their criminal designs.

[ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE OR OBVIOUS UNGRATEFULNESS]

PEOPLE V. MANDOLADO

FACTS: In the morning of October 3, 1977, Julian Ortillano, Martin Mandolado, Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon,
trainees/draftees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and assigned to the 3rd Infantry Battalion of the Philippine
Army, were passengers of a bus bound for Midsayap, North Cotabato. They alighted at the bus terminal in Midsayap.
Being all in uniform, armed and belonging to the same military outt, they got acquainted and decided to drink ESQ rum,
at the said bus terminal.

While drinking, Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon decided to join appellants in going to Pikit, North Cotabato, home
base of appellants. After drinking for about an hour, appellant Mandolado got drunk and went inside the public market.
Subsequently, he returned, grabbed his .30 caliber machine gun and started ring. His companions tried to dissuade him
but he nonetheless continued firing his gun. Sensing trouble, Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon ran away, hailed and
boarded a passing Ford Fiera with some passengers on board. Appellants followed and boarded also the vehicle. The
soldiers forced the driver of the Ford Fiera to bring them to the Midsayap crossing.

On their way, appellant Mandolado got his knife and tried to attack the driver . After appellants alighted at said
crossing, the Ford Fiera sped away. Appellant Mandolado red his .30 caliber machine gun at the speeding vehicle, hitting
the right side of the back of the driver's sister who was then on board said vehicle.

While waiting for a ride at the Midsayap crossing a privately owned jeep, driven by Herminigildo Tenorio, passed by. On
board said jeep which was bound for Cotabato City were Nolasco Mendoza and two (2) others, but the latter two
alighted at said crossing. Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon boarded the jeep. Thereafter, appellants ran after the
jeep, shouted at Herminigildo Tenorio, the driver thereof, to stop the vehicle and subsequently, both appellants
Mandolado and Ortillano boarded the jeep. On the way, both appellants kept ring their guns prompting Herminigildo
Tenorio to remark, "Kung hindi kayo tatahimik, ibabangga ko itong jeep"

Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances

 16

Upon learning that the jeep was bound for Cotabato City and not Pikit, North Cotabato, appellant Mandolado got angry,
"cocked" his gun and ordered the driver to stop. While the jeep was coming to a full stop, Conrado Simon and Anacleto
Erinada immediately jumped off the jeep and ran towards their detachment camp located some two hundred fty meters
away. Appellants also got off the jeep. Thereupon, appellant Mandolado red his .30 caliber machine gun at and hit the
occupants of the jeep. Appellant Ortillano likewise, red his armalite, not at the occupants of said jeep but downwards
hitting the ground. These bursts of gunre were heard by both Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon who were then
already about fty meters away from the jeep while running towards their detachment camp. Although it was then
raining torrentially, Anacleto Simon recognized the bursts of gunfire as those of a machine gun.

Appellants ran away from the scene and boarded another vehicle, alighting at Pinaring crossing. Appellant Mandolado
proceeded to a house where he left his belongings and changed his wet uniform. After about an hour, they rode in a
"Hino" passenger bus bound for Midsayap. On board said bus was a certain Mr. Leopoldo Jalandoni who was seated in
front of the appellants. Upon reaching a BPH building near Nuling, Sultan Kudarat, the passengers of said bus were
ordered to alight at the military check point but appellant Mandolado did not alight. As the bus was not proceeding to
Pikit, North Cotabato and upon advice of Mr. Jalandoni, appellants alighted at the Midsayap crossing and waited for a
bus bound for Pikit. Appellants were able to ride on a sand and gravel truck which took them to Pikit, North Cotabato,
arriving thereat at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At their camp, appellants returned their firearms, but did not
report the incident. In the evening, appellants attended a party at the Pikit Elementary School. The following day,
appellants proceeded to Davao City but stopped at Kavocan where they stayed overnight.

Arriving at Davao City, the following morning, appellants went to see a movie and afterwards proceeded to the Ofce of
Doña Ana, a shipping firm, where they saw a certain Sgt. Villanueva who was then leaving for Luzon. Sgt. Villanueva
informed the appellants that they were suspects in the Tenorio and Mendoza killings. Immediately thereafter, appellant
Mandolado purchased two passenger tickets for Manila. The other ticket was for appellant Ortillano. However, before
appellants could board the ship bound for Manila, they were apprehended by a team led by Lt. Licas. Appellants were
brought to Pikit, North Cotabato where they were investigated by Lts. Licas and Maburang about the aforesaid killings.

--

Silverio Balderosa, was on board a "Pinoy" jeep. On his way home to Midsayap, he passed a jeep parked along the
highway towards the direction of Cotabato City and about 250 meters away from the BPH building. The parked jeep was
surrounded by several persons. Alighting from the "pinoy" jeep, he went near the parked jeep to see what happened. He
saw the lifeless bodies of two persons, one sprawled along the highway whom he recognized as Nolasco Mendoza and
the other whom he recognized as Mr. Tenorio slumped on the wheel of the parked jeep.

--

Post mortem report:

HERMINIGILDO TENORIO
PROBABLE CAUSE OF DEATH. Hemorrhage severe secondary to multiple gunshot wounds.

NOLASCO MENDOZA
PROBABLE CAUSE OF DEATH Wounds, gunshot, multiple shock, secondary hemorrhage, external, internal,
intensive

ISSUE: Appellants submit only one assigned error and that is, that the trial court erred in convicting appellants Martin
Mandolado and Julian Ortillano beyond reasonable doubt as principal and accessory, respectively, of the crimes charged
on the strength of the prosecution's evidence totally disregarding the evidence of the defense. Appellants contend that
their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as the circumstantial evidence of the prosecution merely
proved the fact of the deaths of Tenorio and Mendoza and not as to the actual perpetrators of the crime; that the
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
 17

evidence of the prosecution being weak on its own, the only link of the appellant Mandolado to the killings is his
extrajudicial sworn confession.

HELD: The killing of the two victims in the case at bar is correctly qualified as murder, there being present the qualifying
circumstance of treachery which is alleged in the informations. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
(Art. 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code). The prosecution evidence is quite clear and explicit that when appellants
alighted from the jeep, the accused Mandolado immediately red his .30 caliber machine gun at the occupants of the
jeep, the victims Nolasco Mendoza and Herminigildo Tenorio, and both of them died instantaneously on the spot, and
from this sudden means or manner of attack, it can reasonably be concluded that it tended directly to insure its
execution without risk to the appellant-assailant and also deprive the victims of any chance or opportunity to defend
themselves. We also rule that the particular means or manner employed by the appellantassailant was consciously or
deliberately sought and not a mere accidental circumstance resorted to on the spur of the moment on the basis of the
evidence that the appellant had previously and repeatedly red his .30 caliber machine gun at the bus terminal in
Midsayap and had also red the machine gun at the Ford Fiera which took them to Midsayap junction and that appellants
waited for sometime riding on board the jeep driven by Tenorio before they ordered the jeep to stop, alight therefrom
and then shoot the occupants therein. While the informations allege as aggravating circumstances that of evident
premeditation and the use of superior strength, aside from treachery, We cannot agree with the nding of the trial court
that the aggravating circumstances of (1) advantage was taken of his being a Draftee in the Philippine Army, and (2)
abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness were present in the commission of the crime. While it may be true that a
soldier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines is deemed as one who holds public position (U.S. vs. Gimenea, 24 Phil.
464, where a constabulary soldier was held to be a public ofcer), there is no persuasive showing that herein appellants
being draftees of the Army, m full military uniform and carrying their high-powered firearms, facilitated the commission
of the crimes they were charged. It may be conceded that as draftees, the accused could easily hitchhike with private
vehicles, as in the case of the deceased Tenorio's owner-type jeep, but there is no evidence that when they stopped the
jeep the accused already intended to shoot the occupants of the vehicle. As it was held in P e o p le v s . P a n t oja SCRA
468, 471 which We reiterate that "There is nothing to show that the appellant took advantage of his being a sergeant in
the Philippine Army in order to commit the crimes. The mere fact that he was in fatigue uniform and had an army rie at
the time is not sufficient to establish that he misused his public position in the commission of the crimes . . ." There is
also merit in appellants' contention that there could be no abuse of confidence as the evidence on record showed the
lack of confidence by the victims to the appellants, that this confidence was abused, and that the abuse of the
confidence facilitated the commission of the crimes. In order that abuse of confidence be deemed as aggravating, it is
necessary that "there exists a relation of trust and confidence between the accused and one against whom the crime
was committed and the accused made use of such a relationship to commit the crime." (People vs. Comendador, 100
SCRA 155, 172). It is also essential that the confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal such as
would give that accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the crime; that such confidence was a
means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belief that the
former would not abuse said confidence (People vs. Hanasan, 29 SCRA 534). In the instant case, there is absolutely no
showing of any personal or immediate relationship upon which confidence might rest between the victims and the
assailants who had just met each other then, Consequently, no confidence and abuse thereof could have facilitated the
crimes.

Similarly, there could have been no obvious ungratefulness in the commission of the crime for the simple reason that
the requisite trust of the victims upon the accused prior to the criminal act and the breach thereof as contemplated
under Article 14, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code are manifestly lacking or non-existent. In all likelihood, the accused
Army men in their uniforms and holding their high-powered firearms cowed the victims into boarding their jeep for a
ride at machine gun point which certainly is no source of gratefulness or appreciation.

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 18

In resume, the crime committed by the accused-appellant Martin Mandolado is murder, qualified by treachery. There
being no aggravating circumstance but having found and appreciated drunkenness which is not habitual as a mitigating
circumstance, the penalty prescribed under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which is r e clu sio n t e m p o r al in its
maximum period to death shall be imposed in its minimum period.

As to the accused-appellant Julian Ortillano, convicted as an accomplice to the crime of murder, and appreciating in his
favor the mitigating circumstance of drunkenness which is not habitual, the penalty to be imposed upon him shall be
one degree lower than that imposed for murder (Article 52, Revised Penal Code), which will be in the minimum period.

[NIGHTTIME, UNINHABITED PLACE, OR BY A BAND]

PEOPLE V. GARCIA

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal, finding the accused guilty of
murder and sentencing them to the death penalty. The legal verdict hinges on the testimony of the lone eyewitness for
the prosecution, Mrs. Corazon Dioquino Paterno, sister of the deceased, Apolonio Dioquino, Jr. She testified that at the
time of the incident, she resided at Ventanilla Street, Pasay City. While residing at Pasay City, she conceived a child and
during this period, it was not unusual for her, accompanied by her husband, to step out of the house in the wee hours of
the morning. They set out on these irregular walks about five times.

During her residence at Pasay City, her brother Apolonio visited her family for about twenty times. Before the incident
which gave rise to this case, Corazon's husband informed her that he saw Apolonio engaged in a drinking spree with his
gang in front of an establishment known as Bill's Place in Pasay City. . Upon learning this information from her husband,
Corazon obtained permission to leave the house at 3:00 a.m. so she could fetch her brother. She went to fetch him
because she wanted him to escape the untoward influence of his gang. On her way, as she rounded the corner of P.C.
Santos Street, Corazon saw her brother fleeing a group of about seven persons, including the two accused, Antonio
Garcia and Reynaldo Arviso. She recognized the two accused because they were former gangmates of her brother; in
fact, she knew them before the incident by their aliases of "Tony Manok" and "Rene Bisugo," respectively. Corazon saw
that the chase was led by the two accused, with Antonio carrying a long sharp instrument. She exerted efforts to identify
the other group members, taking care to conceal herself as she did so. She heard a gunshot which caused her to seek
cover. When she ventured to look from where she was hiding, about 20 meters away, she saw the group catch up with
her brother and maltreat him. Some beat him with pieces of wood, while others boxed him. Immediately afterwards, the
group scampered away in different directions. Antonio was left behind. He was sitting astride the prostrate figure of
Apolonio, stabbing the latter in the back with his long knife. Corazon was not able to observe where Antonio later fled,
for she could hardly bear to witness the scene.

ISSUE: The lower court erred: in finding nighttime as an aggravating circumstance despite absolute absence of evidence
that nighttime was purposely sought to insure the execution of the crime; in finding superior strength as an aggravating
circumstance despite absence of evidence to sustain such a finding; and in finding treachery as an aggravating
circumstance despite absence of evidence to that effect.

HELD: Even in the absence of evident premeditation, the crime of murder in this case might still be qualified by
treachery, which is alleged in the information. But the defense argued that treachery was not present. We are so
convinced. It is an elementary axiom that treachery can in no way be presumed but must be fully proven. (US v. Asilo,
No. 1957, Jan. 30, 1905, 4 Phil. 175; US v. Arciga, No. 1129, April 6, 1903, 2 Phil. 110; PP v. Durante, No. 31101, Aug. 23,
1929, 53 Phil. 363; PP v. Pelago, L-24884, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1027). Where the manner of the attack was not
proven, the defendant should be given the benefit of the doubt, and the crime should be considered homicide only.
(Carpio, 83 Phil. 509; Amansec, 80 Phil. 424). In P e o p le v s . M e t r a n (L-4205, July 27, 1951, 89 Phil. 543). The
aggravating circumstances of aid of armed men, abuse of superiority, and nocturnity, were considered as constituting
treachery, which qualified the crime as murder, since there was no direct evidence as to the manner of the attack.
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
 19

However, in this case we believe that the correct qualifying circumstance is not treachery, but abuse of superiority. Here
we are confronted with a helpless victim killed by assailants superior to him in arms and in numbers. But the attack was
not sudden nor unexpected, and the element of surprise was lacking. The victim could have made a defense; hence, the
assault involved some risk to the assailants. There being no showing when the intent to kill was formed, it can not be
said that treachery has been proven. We believe the correct rule is found in P e o p le v s . P r o c e s o B u s t o s (No
17763, July 23, 1923, 45 Phil. 9), where ale v o sia was not appreciated because it was deemed included in abuse of
superiority. We find that abuse of superiority attended the offense, following a long line of cases which made this finding
on parallel facts. Our jurisprudence is exemplified by the holding that where four persons attacked an unarmed victim
but there was no proof as to how the attack commenced and treachery was not proven, the fact that there were four
assailants would constitute abuse of superiority. (People vs. Lasada, No. 6742, Jan. 26, 1912, 21 Phil. 287; US v.
Bañagale, No. 7870, Jan. 10, 1913, 24 Phil. 69). However, the information does not allege the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superiority; hence, this circumstance can only be treated as generic aggravating. (People v. Acusar, L-1798, Dec.
29, 1948, 82 Phil. 490; People v. Beje, L-8245, July 19, 1956, 99 Phil. 1052; People v. Bautista, L-23303, May 20, 1969, 28
SCRA 184). The offense took place at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. It may therefore be said that it was committed at
night, which covers the period from sunset to sunrise, according to the New Civil Code, Article 13. Is this basis for finding
that nocturnity is aggravating? The Revised Penal Code, Article 14, Provides that it is an aggravating circumstance when
the crime is committed in the nighttime, whenever nocturnity may facilitate the commission of the offense. There are
two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance: the o b je c tiv e t e s t under which nocturnity is aggravating
because it facilitates the commission of the offense; and the s u b je c tiv e t e s t, under which nocturnity is aggravating
because it was purposely sought by the offender. These two tests should be applied in the alternative. In this case, the
subjective test is not passed because there is no showing that the accused purposely sought the cover of nighttime.
Next, we proceed and apply the objective test, to determine whether nocturnity facilitated the killing of the victim. A
group of men were engaged in a drinking spree, in the course of which one of them fled, chased by seven others. The
criminal assault on the victim at 3:00 a.m. was invited by nocturnal cover, which handicapped the view of eyewitnesses
and encouraged impunity by persuading the malefactors that it would be difficult to determine their identity because of
the darkness and the relative scarcity of people in the streets. These circumstances combine to pass the objective test,
and we find that nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitated the commission of the offense. Nocturnity enticed those
with the lust to kill to follow their impulses with the false courage born out of the belief that they could not be readily
identified. The information alleges that the crime of murder was attended by the two qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation. Neither of these qualifying circumstances was proved; hence, the killing can not
be qualified into murder, and constitutes instead the crime of homicide, which is punished by r e clu sio n t e m p o r al.

[NIGHTTIME, UNINHABITED PLACE, OR BY A BAND]

PEOPLE V. RODAS

FACTS: On 9 August 1996, Titing Asenda, a resident of Boyos, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, was at Milaub,
Denoyan, Zamboanga del Norte, to help his brother, Danilo Asenda, in the harvesting of the latter's corn. On the same
day, at around 8:00 in the evening, a benefit dance at Milaub, which was sponsored by Boboy Raquilme, was being held.
Among those roaming in the vicinity of the dance hall were Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot. They stopped and hung
out near the fence to watch the affair. Titing Asenda was standing near them. They saw Charlito Rodas, Armando Rodas,
Jose Rodas, Jr., and Jose Rodas, Sr. surround Titing Asenda. Suddenly, without a word, Charlito Rodas, armed with a
hunting knife, stabbed Titing at the back. Armando Rodas then clubbed Titing with a c h a k o hitting him at the left side
of the nape causing him to fall. Thereafter, Jose Rodas, Sr. handed to Jose Rodas, Jr. a b olo which the latter used in
hacking Titing, hitting him on the left elbow. Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot tried to help Titing but Armando Rodas
prevented them by pointing a gun at them and firing it towards the sky. After the assailants left, Alberto Asonda and
Ernie Anggot approached Titing Asenda who was already dead. They informed Danilo Asenda that his brother was killed.
The police arrived the following day after being informed of the incident. On the part of the defense, accused-appellants
Armando Rodas and Jose Rodas, Sr., and Vilma Rodas, the former's wife, took the witness stand. The defense rested its
case without marking and offering any documentary evidence. Defense evidence showed that only Charlito Rodas and
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
 20

Jose Rodas, Jr. killed Titing Asenda. Appellant Jose Rodas, Sr. denied any participation in the killing of Titing Asenda
claiming he was not present in the benefit dance and that he was in his home with his wife and infant granddaughter
when the killing happened. He revealed that on the night of the killing, his son, Charlito Rodas, who was carrying a
hunting knife, arrived and told him he killed somebody. He then brought his son to the municipal building of Siayan to
surrender him to the police authorities. Appellant Armando Rodas likewise denied he was one of those who killed Titing
Asenda. He claimed that at the time of the killing, he was in his house sleeping with his children. He denied using a c h a
k o and firing a gun. He insisted it was his brothers, Charlito and Jose Jr., who killed Titing Asenda because they pleaded
guilty. To bolster the testimony of the appellants, Vilma Rodas testified that she was at the benefit dance when the
killing happened. Armando and Jose Sr., she claimed, did not participate in the killing. She said Charlito stabbed Titing
while Jose Jr. merely punched the victim. On 9 July 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision finding accused-
appellants Armando Rodas and Jose Rodas, Sr. guilty of the crime of Murder.

ISSUE: ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY, THEY ARE ONLY LIABLE FOR THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.

HELD: appellants argue that assuming a r g u e n d o they are guilty, they are liable only for the crime of homicide, not
murder. They contend that treachery was absent since they, together with Charlito and Jose Jr., met the victim casually
in the dance hall. The qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing. The essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part
of the victim. In P e o p le v. Villo n e z , we ruled that treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was
forewarned of danger to his person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim
to defend himself or to retaliate. In the case under review, the victim was completely unaware that he was going to be
attacked. He was not forewarned of any danger to himself as there was no altercation or disagreement between the
accused and the victim. If treachery may be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned, more so should it be
appreciated when the victim was not, as in the case at bar. The suddenness of the attack, the number of the accused
and their use of weapons against the unarmed victim prevent the possibility of any defense or retaliation by the victim.
The fact that the victim was already sprawled on the ground and still Jose Jr. hacked him with a bolo clearly constitutes
treachery.

The information also alleged that evident premeditation, nocturnity and abuse of superior strength attended the killing.

For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be established: (1) the time when the
accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and
(3) sufficient lapse of time between decision and execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his
act. Like any other circumstance that qualifies a killing as murder, evident premeditation must be established by clear
and positive proof; that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the
criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to show the presence of
any of these elements.

The aggravating circumstance of nocturnity cannot be considered against appellants. This circumstance is considered
aggravating only when it facilitated the commission of the crime, or was especially sought or taken advantage of by the
accused for the purpose of impunity. The essence of this aggravating circumstance is the o b s c u rid a d afforded by,
and not merely the chronological onset of, nighttime. Although the offense was committed at night, nocturnity does not
become a modifying factor when the place is adequately lighted and, thus, could no longer insure the offender's
immunity from identification or capture. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to show that nighttime facilitated the
commission of the crime, or was especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity.
The crime scene was sufficiently lighted by a P e t r o m a x which led to the identification of all the accused.

Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances

 21

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the killing. There was glaring disparity of strength
between the victim and the four accused. The victim was unarmed while the accused were armed with a hunting knife, c
h a k o and b olo . It is evident that the accused took advantage of their combined strength to consummate the offense.
This aggravating circumstance, though, cannot be separately appreciated because it is absorbed in treachery. In P e o p
le v. P a r r e n o , 51 51 we decreed:
As regards the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, what should be considered is not that
there were three, four, or more assailants as against one victim, but whether the aggressors took advantage of
their combined strength in order to consummate the offense. While it is true that superiority in number does
not p e r s e mean superiority in strength, the appellants in this case did not only enjoy superiority in number,
but were armed with a weapon, while the victim had no means with which to defend himself. Thus, there was
obvious physical disparity between the protagonists and abuse of superior strength on the part of the
appellants. Abuse of superior strength attended the killing when the offenders took advantage of their
combined strength in order to consummate the offense. However, the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength cannot be appreciated separately, it being necessarily absorbed in treachery.

As a final attempt to lower their conviction to Homicide, appellants, citing P e o p le v. Alb a , argue that although
treachery was alleged in the Information and proven according to the trial court, the same was not specified as a
qualifying circumstance. Such argument fails. In P e o p le v. A q uin o , 53 53 we have held that even after the recent
amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words
such as "qualifying" or "qualified by" to properly qualify an offense.

[NIGHTTIME, UNINHABITED PLACE, OR BY A BAND]

PEOPLE V. DAMASO

FACTS: Donata Rebolledo and her son-in-law, Victoriano de la Cruz were residents of Barrio Bangar, municipality of
Victoria, province of Tarlac. At about 9 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1959, Donata and Victoriano heard the
barkings of dogs outside their house. Shortly, two men armed with guns, entered, pointed their weapons at them, tied
up the hands of Victoriano, covered him with a blanket and asked Donata for the whereabouts of her daughter Catalina
Sabado. Stricken by fear, Donata kept silent and blocked the door leading to her daughter's room but was promptly
pushed aside. Donata was then ordered to open an "aparador" from which the two men took valuables like jewelry,
clothing, documents, and cutting instruments. All the while, Donata and Victoriano could hear the movements and
voices of some three to four other persons beneath the house. The two men brought Catalina Sabado down from the
house and then asked where they could find Susana Sabado, Donata's other daughter who was then in her store located
about five meters away in the same house. Thereafter, Donata heard the men opening the door to Susana's store. After
several minutes, feeling that the intruders had left, Donata untied the hands of Victoriano and asked him to go to the
store to see if her daughters were there. When the two women could not be found, Donata sent Victoriano to the barrio
lieutenant to report the incident. Accordingly, Victoriano went to the barrio lieutenant and the two later went to town
to inform the police of the occurrence. On the same night, Chief of Police Pedro Valdez with the aid of several policemen
and a handful of civilians went out in search for the Sabado sisters. It was only the following morning when the two
women were found already dead with wounds in several parts of their bodies. They were found in a sugar plantation
belonging to one Ignacio Fabros, located about one hundred meters from Donata Rebolledo's house. Municipal Health
Officer of Victoria performed the autopsy on the two bodies and reported that the deaths were caused by profuse
hemorrhage due to a fatal, big, wide, gaping and deep lacerated wound just above the Adam's apple. He also testified in
court that the death weapon must have been a sharp instrument with a pointed tip, like a scythe. A few days after the
incident, Donata Rebolledo singled out the accused Fausto Damaso from a police line-up as one of the men who went up
to her house on that evening. She and Victoriano had recognized Damaso because of the light coming from a kerosene
lamp placed on a small table near the "aparador." Damaso, however, initially denied ever having been to Donata's house
that night. Later, the PC rounded up four other suspects in the persons of co-accused Gregorio, Eugenio, Alviar and
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
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Espejo. As further evidence, the prosecution presented separate extrajudicial statements, sworn to before Municipal
Judge Conrado de Gracia of Paniqui, Tarlac, wherein all the five accused admitted having participated in the crime.

ISSUE: That the crime was not attended by the aggravating circumstances of armed band, treachery and uninhabited
place.

HELD: The aggravating circumstance of band exists whenever more than three armed malefactors act together in the
commission of an offense. Counsel concedes that at least three of the accused-appellants, namely Eugenio, Alviar, and
Gregorio, were armed during the commission of the crime. He doubts, however, whether accused Damaso carried any
weapon and whether the "two stones" carried by accused Espejo fall under the category of "arms." But even granting
that Espejo's stones do not constitute arms, the prosecution presented the following evidence to show that Damaso was
also armed and, as such, there were more than three of the accused who were armed: (1) that extrajudicial confession
of Damaso himself that he was carrying a caliber .22 paltik revolver; (2) the sworn statement of accused Eugenio that
Damaso had a caliber .22 paltik revolver; (3) the separate written confessions of Alviar, Gregorio and Espejo that Damaso
had a caliber .30 Springfield rifle; and (4) the testimonies of Donata Rebolledo and Victoriano de la Cruz that both men
who entered their house (one of whom they later identified as Damaso) were carrying firearms. It is clear from the
above, that Damaso was armed during the night of the commission of the crime, and it is immaterial what kind of
firearm he carried, the only important thing being that he was armed. In this case, the presence of an armed band is to
be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance under Article 14(6) of the Revised Penal Code inasmuch as the
crime committed was that provided for and penalized in Article 294, paragraph 1 and not under Article 295, Revised
Penal Code (see People v. Apduhan, Jr., per Justice, now Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, 24 SCRA 798). Treachery is
present if the victim is killed while bound in such a manner as to be deprived of the opportunity to repel the attack or
escape with any possibility of success. The fact that the bodies of Catalina and Susana were found dead with t h eir a r m
s tie d b e hin d t h eir b a c k s as well as the admission of Gregorio in his confession that he killed the sisters while their
arms were held by Eugenio and Damaso lead Us to conclude that the killing of the two women was done under
treacherous circumstances. Anent the circumstances of uninhabited place, counsel disclaims its existence by pointing to
the proximity of the sugarcane field where the victims were killed to the national highway as well as to certain houses in
the barrio. The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of the nearest house to the scene of the
crime, but whether or not in the place of commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help.
Considering that the killing was done during nighttime and the sugarcane in the field was tall enough to obstruct the
view of neighbors and passersby, there was no reasonable possibility for the victims to receive any assistance. That the
accused deliberately sought the solitude of the place is clearly shown by the fact that they brought the victims to the
sugarcane field although they could have disposed of them right in the house of Donata Rebolledo where they were
found. Thus, in P e o p le v . S a g uin g, the Court considered the crime as having been committed in an uninhabited
place because the killing was done in a secluded place at the foot of a hill, forested, and uninhabited.

[RECIDIVISM]

PEOPLE V. BALDERA

FACTS: about 4 a. m. on December 23, 1947, a Casa Manila bus loaded with passengers left Batangas, Batangas, bound
for Manila. On the highway in barrio Calansayan, municipality of San Jose, same province, it was held up by a group of ve
or six armed men. One of these, later identiFIed as herein appellant Pedro Baldera, who was then armed with a .45
caliber pistol, red a shot, and this was followed by a hail of bullets coming from different directions. As a result, several
passengers, among them Jose Cabrera, Jose Pastor and Francisco Mendoza, were wounded. After the ring had ceased,
appellant got on the bus and, threatening the passengers with his gun, took P90 from Jose Pastor and P34 from
Ponciana Villena. Another passenger named Francisco Mendoza was also relieved of his P3. Appellant then alighted and
ordered the bus to proceed, whereupon the driver headed for the municipal building of San Jose and there reported the
incident to the authorities. The wounded were taken to the hospital, where Jose Cabrera died from his wounds on the

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 23

following day. Jose Pastor, who was wounded in the left leg, was cured in two months, while Francisco Mendoza's
gunshot wound in the right shoulder healed in 15 days.

ISSUE: Counsel contends that the lower court erred in holding that the crime committed is robbery in band, alleging that
there was no sufficient proof that the perpetrators thereof numbered more than three armed men

HELD: The fact that there were more than three armed men in the group that held up the bus appears in appellant's
own confession and is also established by the uncontradicted testimony of one of the government witnesses. And the
point is really not material because in the crime of robbery with homicide it is not essential that the robbery be in band,
although that circumstance may be taken into account as an aggravation in the imposition of the penalty. And even if it
be not taken into account as such in this case, there would still remain the other aggravating circumstance that the
robbery was perpetrated by attacking a vehicle (art. 296, R. P . C.), which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance.
The lower court did, however, err in appreciating against the accused the circumstance of recidivism by reason of his
previous conviction for theft, it appearing that that crime was committed on or about December 30, 1947 while the
offense now charged took place seven days before that date. In conclusion, we find appellant guilty of the crime of
robbery with homicide and serious and less serious physical injuries with two aggravating circumstances. But there being
no sufficient vote to impose the extreme penalty, appellant can be sentenced to life imprisonment only.

[HABITUAL DELINQUENCY]

PEOPLE V. MELENDREZ

FACTS: That on or about the 15th day of June, 1933, in the municipality of Pasay, Province of Rizal, Ricardo Melendrez y
Nieto and Elias Martinez conspiring together and helping each other wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously forcibly broke
open the door of the store located at No. 85 Cementina, Pasay, an inhabited house belonging to and occupied by Tin
Bun Boc, and once inside the said store, with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, took, stole
and carried away therefrom the following personal properties of the said Tin Bun Boc:
Money amounting to P30.26
One (1) Elgin watch, gold plated and a gold-filled chain, valued at 25.00
One (1) Chinese ring, signet solid gold, valued at 13.50
One (1) buntal hat, valued at 4.50
Nine (9) small packages of "Camel" cigarettes 1.35
Nine (9) small packages of "Chesterfield" cigarettes 1.26
Three (3) cans of Milkmaid, valued at .81
Total 76.68

To the damage and prejudice of the said Tin Bun Boc in the total sum of seventy-six pesos and sixty-eight centavos
(P76.68).

On the date of the trial of this case, Elias Martinez had not yet been apprehended, for which reason only the other
defendant Ricardo Melendrez y Nieto, who pleaded guilty to the charge, was arraigned. Whereupon, the court found
him guilty of the crime charged in the information and sentenced him to eight years and one day of p risio n m a y o r,
and to serve an additional penalty of six years and one day of p risio n m a y o r for being a habitual delinquent. From
this judgment Ricardo Melendrez y Nieto appealed.

ISSUE: Fiscal contends that the aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into account against the
appellant. This claim of the fiscal is in accordance with the judgment rendered by this court in b a n c in the case of
People v s . Aguinaldo (47 Phil., 728) while the old Penal Code was in force. But the enforcement of the Revised Penal
Code has resulted in a difference of opinion regarding this point on the part of the members of this court.

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HELD: The aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into account in imposing the principal penalty in its
corresponding degree, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant is also sentenced to suffer an additional penalty as a
habitual delinquent. The facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of robbery committed without the use of
arms in an inhabited house, the value of the articles taken being less than P250. In accordance with article 299 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed for said crime is p risio n c o r r e c cio n al in its medium degree. Inasmuch as
there is a concurrence therein of one mitigating and one aggravating circumstance, this penalty should be imposed in its
medium degree. Wherefore, it being understood that the principal penalty imposed upon the appellant is two years,
eleven months and eleven days, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, in all other respects with costs. So
ordered.

[EVIDENT PREMEDITATION]

US V. MANALINDE

FACTS: Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1909, while Juan Igual, a Spaniard, was seated
on a chair in the doorway of Sousa's store in Cotabato, Moro Province, he suddenly received a wound on the head
delivered from behind and inflicted with a kris. Ricardo Doroteo, a clerk in the said store, who was standing behind the
counter, upon hearing the noise and the cry of the wounded man, ran to his assistance and found him lying on the
ground. Meanwhile the aggressor, the Moro Manalinde, approached a Chinaman named Choa, who was passing along
the street, and just as the latter was putting down his load in front of the door of a store and was about to enter,
attacked him with the same weapon, inflicting a severe wound in the left shoulder, on account of which he fell to the
ground. The Moro, who came from the rancheria of Dupit and had entered the town carrying his weapon wrapped up in
banana leaves, in the meantime escaped by running away from the town. Both wounded men, the Chinaman and the
Spaniard, were taken to the hospital, where the former died within an hour, the record not stating the result of the
wound inflicted on the Spaniard Juan Igual.

When Manalinde was arrested he pleaded guilty and confessed that he had perpetrated the crime herein mentioned,
stating that his wife had died about one hundred days before and that he had come from his home in Catumaldu by
order of the Datto Rajamudah Mupuck, who had directed him to go ju r a m e n t a d o in Cotabato in order to kill
somebody, because the said Mupuck had certain grievances to avenge against a lieutenant and a sergeant, the said
datto further stating that if he, Manalinde, was successful in the matter, he would give him a pretty woman on his
return, but that in case he was captured he was to say that he performed the killing by order of Maticayo, Datto Piang,
Tambal and Inug. In order to carry out his intention to kill two persons in the town of Cotabato he provided himself with
a kris, which he concealed in banana leaves, and, traveling for a day and a night from his home, upon reaching the town,
attacked from behind a Spaniard who was seated in front of a store and, wounding him, immediately after attacked a
Chinaman, who was close by, just as the latter was placing a tin that he was carrying on the ground and as he was about
to enter a store nearby, cutting him on the left shoulder and eeing at once; he further stated that he had no quarrel with
the assaulted persons.

HELD: From the statements made by the accused his culpability as the sole-confessed and self-convicted author of the
crime in question has been unquestionably established. The excuse that he went ju r a m e n t a d o by order of the datto
and on that account killed only two persons, whereas if he had taken the oath of his own volition he would have killed
many more, because it is the barbarous and savage custom of a ju r a m e n t a d o to kill anyone without any motive or
reason whatever, can not under any consideration be accepted or considered under the laws of civilized nations.

In the commission of the crime of murder the presence of aggravating circumstances should be taken into consideration
in that promise of reward and premeditation are present, which in the present case are held to be generic, since the
crime has already been qualified as committed with treachery because the accused confessed that he voluntarily obeyed
the order given him by Datto Mupuck to go ju r a m e n t a d o and kill someone in the town of Cotabato, with the
promise that if he escaped punishment he would be rewarded with a pretty woman. Upon complying with the order the
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
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accused undoubtedly acted of his own violation and with the knowledge that he would inflict irreparable injury on some
of his fellow-beings, depriving them of the life without any reason whatever, well knowing that he was about in commit
a most serious deed which the laws in force in this country and the constituted authorities could by no means permit.
As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused, upon accepting the order and undertaking the
journey in order to comply therewith, deliberately considered and carefully and thoughtfully meditated over the nature
and the consequences of the acts which, under orders received from the said datto, he was about to carry out, and to
that end provided himself with weapon, concealing it by wrapping it up, and started on a journey of a day and a night for
the sole purpose of taking the life of two unfortunate persons. Premeditation can not necessarily be considered as
included merely because an offer of money, reward or promise was made, for the latter might have existed without the
former, the one being independent of the other.

[EVIDENT PREMEDITATION]

PEOPLE V. ILAOA

FACTS: Pfc. Reynaldo P. Angeles was dispatched in the early morning to Sta. Maria, Angeles City, where the decapitated
body of a man, later identified through his voter's identification card as Nestor de Loyola, was found in a grassy portion..
Apart from the decapitation, the deceased bore forty-three (43) stab wounds in the chest as well as slight burns all over
the body. The head was found some two (2) feet away from the corpse.

Five persons, Ruben E. Ilaoa, Rogelio E. Ilaoa, Rodel E. Ilaoa, Julius Eliginio and Edwin Tapang, were charged for the
gruesome murder of Nestor de Loyola. However, only the brothers Ruben and Rogelio stood trial since the other
accused escaped and were never apprehended.

Regional Trial Court of Angeles City found Ruben and Rogelio guilty of murder with the attendant circumstances of
evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and cruelty, and imposed upon them the penalty of "life
imprisonment." Conviction was based on circumstantial evidence.

ISSUE: In this appeal, brothers Ruben and Rogelio Ilaoa argue for their acquittal. They contend that the circumstantial
evidence relied upon by the trial court for their conviction failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Specifically, they assail the finding of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and cruelty as totally
unwarranted.

HELD: We affirm Ruben Ilaoa's guilt having been satisfactorily established by the evidence on hand, albeit circumstantial.
However, we reverse the conviction of Rogelio as we find it patently baseless.

We hold appellant liable only for homicide, not murder, on the ground that the qualifying circumstances alleged in the
information, namely, abuse of superior strength, cruelty and evident premeditation, were not sufficiently proved to be
appreciated against appellant.

Abuse of superior strength cannot be considered because there was no evidence whatsoever that appellant was
physically superior to the deceased and that the former took advantage of such superior physical strength to overcome
the latter's resistance to consummate the offense. The fact that Nestor de Loyola's decapitated body bearing forty-three
(43) stab wounds, twenty-four (24) of which were fatal, was found dumped in the street is not sufficient for a finding of
cruelty where there is no showing that appellant for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused Nestor de Loyola to suffer
slowly and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain. Number of wounds alone is not the
criterion for the appreciation of cruelty as an aggravating circumstances. Neither can it be inferred from the mere fact
that the victim's dead body was dismembered. Evident premeditation cannot likewise be considered. There is nothing in
the records to show that appellant, prior to the night in question, resolved to kill Nestor de Loyola, nor is there proof to
show that such killing was the result of meditation, calculation or resolution on his part. On the contrary, the evidence
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
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tends to show that the series of circumstances which culminated in the killing constitutes an unbroken chain of events
with no interval of time separating them for calculation and meditation. Absent any qualifying circumstance, Ruben Ilaoa
should only be held liable for homicide
.
[EVIDENT PREMEDITATION]

PEOPLE V. BILBAT

FACTS: Accused Gari Bibat stabbed to death one Lloyd del Rosario on October 12, 1992 at around 1:30 p.m. along G.
Tuazon cor. Ma. Cristina Sts., Sampaloc, Manila. The victim was on his way to school waiting for a ride when he was
stabbed. Thereafter the suspect fled while the victim was brought to the United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) where
he was pronounced dead on arrival. The incident was witnessed by Nona Avila Cinco, a laundry woman, who testified
that on October 14, 1992, while she was at Funeraria Gloria waiting for her bettor, she saw a person about one meter
away talking to the accused. Said person told the accused "O pare, anduon na. Puntahan mo na. Siguruhin mo lang na
itumba mo na." to which the accused answered: "Oo ba. Ganito ba, ganito ba?". after hearing the accused, she (witness)
left towards Honrades Street to see another bettor. She first went inside a house and after a while, she went outside
where she saw the accused along Honrades Street, entering an alley. She walked along with the accused. She and the
accused were even able to look at each other. LLphil While the victim was going out of a gate, the accused hurried
towards the victim and took a pointed object from a notebook, then stabbed the victim in the left chest twice. She was
only about 4 to 5 meters away from the scene of the crime. Thereafter, the accused fled, the victim shouted for help.
Upon hearing the shouts of the victim, the accused returned and stabbed the victim again in the middle part of the
chest. She (witness) then left the scene of the crime after the accused ran away. She reported the matter to the
authorities only on July 20, 1993 because she was afraid.

ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.

HELD: We are of the irresistible conclusion that the attendance of evident premeditation to qualify the killing
complained of to murder is borne out by the evidence. The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the
criminal act is p r e c e d e d b y c o ol t h o u g h t and r e e c tio n upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent
during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a c alm ju d g m e n t .

Even without the testimony of Rogelio Robles, the presence of the first requisite of evident premeditation appears to
have been thoroughly and sufficiently established. The determination or conception of the plan to kill the victim could
be deduced from the outward circumstances that happened on the fateful day of October 14, 1992. Records show that
at 11:30 in the morning of October 14, 1992, prosecution witness Nona Cinco saw the accused with some companions at
Funeraria Gloria. She personally heard the plan to kill someone. Another prosecution witness, Florencio Castro, who
works at the Funeraria Gloria also saw the group of Gari Bibat in the said place. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, Nona
Cinco saw the appellant for the second time. She saw the appellant hurry towards the victim, take a pointed thing from a
notebook and with the use of such weapon, stab the victim on the chest. These overt acts clearly evinced that the
appellant clung to his resolution to kill the victim. From the time Nona Cinco heard the plan to kill someone at 11:30 up
to the killing incident at 1:30 in the afternoon of the same day, there was a sufficient lapse of time for appellant to
reflect on the consequences of his dastardly act.

As held in the case of People v. Dumdum "the killing of the deceased was aggravated by evident premeditation, because
the accused conceived of the assault at le a s t o n e h o u r before its perpetration." In the case under examination, two
hours had elapsed from the time appellant clung to his determination to kill the victim up to the actual perpetration of
the crime.

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[CRAFT, FRAUD, OR DISGUISE]

PEOPLE V. EMPACIS

FACTS: Regional Trial Court of Cebu City indicted five men: Crisologo Empacis, Romualdo Langomez, Zacarias Solis,
Carlito Antiga, and Bebe Antiga for the crime of robbery with homicide. All the accused, except Romualdo Langomez,
were thereafter taken into custody Langomez disappeared, and was never apprehended and brought to trial. In due
course, the other accused were arraigned and tried. Sometime during the trial, Carlito Antiga died from a gunshot
wound. The trial eventuated in a verdict of conviction against Crisologo Empacis, and of acquittal as regards Zacarias
Solis and Bebe Antiga.

At about 9 o'clock on the night of September 16, 1986, as Fidel Saromines and his wife, Camila, were about to close their
small store, located in their house at Kanguha, Dumanjug, Cebu, two men came and asked to buy some sardines and
rice. They were Romualdo (or Maldo) Langomez and Crisologo Empacis. Camila served them and they proceeded to
make a meal of the rice and sardines.

After they finished eating, Romualdo told Fidel to sell him cigarettes. As Fidel was handing over the cigarettes, Romualdo
announced a "hold-up" and commanded Fidel to give up his money. As it happened, Fidel then had P12,000.00 in his
house, wrapped in cellophane. This he started to give to Romualdo but as the latter was taking hold of the packet, Fidel
suddenly decided to fight to keep his money. A struggle followed in the, course of which Romualdo stabbed Fidel about
three times. Crisologo joined in and with his own knife also stabbed Fidel. At this time, gunshots were heard outside of
the house, and a neighbor of the Saromineses, Balbino Bulak, recognized one of those doing the shooting as a certain
Carlito Antiga. A voice was heard from below saying, "Stab him!" to which Langomez replied, "I already stabbed (him)”

From his little sister's room, Fidel's thirteen-year old son, Peter, saw his father fighting for his life. Heeding his father's
cry, Peter took hold of a " p in u ti" (a long bolo), and rushed to his father's defense. He struck out at Crisologo and
inflicted two wounds on him, one at the right shoulder, and the other, in the neck, Romualdo and Crisologo jumped out
of the house and fled, with the sound of Peter's defiant shout trailing them, "Come back, if you are brave!"

Peter then turned to his wounded father, but found him already dead from his injuries. The post-mortem examination
disclosed four (4) stab wounds on the deceased, all in the upper back. Two of these, which penetrated the lungs and
heart, were fatal.

Crisologo Empacis repaired to the clinic of Dr. Eustaquio Deiparine at the p o b la cio n of Sibonga, Cebu, for treatment of
the wounds. Police officers came to Dr. Deiparine's clinic the following morning, looking for a man who might have been
treated for wounds from a bladed weapon. They were directed to the public market where they came upon Crisologo,
taking breakfast. They arrested him and brought him to the Dumanjug INP Station.

The three (3) accused all took the witness stand in their defense, and gave stories different from that of the prosecution
witnesses.

HELD: The aggravating circumstance of craft or fraud was properly appreciated against Empacis. He and Romualdo
pretended to be b o n a fid e customers of the victim's store and on this pretext gained entry into the latter's store and
later, into another part of his dwelling. This Court has held stratagems and ruses of this sort to constitute the
aggravating circumstance of fraud or craft, e.g.: where the accused —

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a) pretended to be constabulary soldiers and by that ploy gained entry into the residence of their prey whom
they thereafter robbed and killed;
b) pretended to be needful of medical treatment, and through this artifice, entered the house of the victim
whom they thereupon robbed and killed;
c) pretended to be wayfarers who had lost their way and by this means gained entry into a house, in which they
then perpetrated the crime of robbery with homicide;
d) pretended to be a customer wanting to buy a bottle of wine;
e) pretended to be co-passengers of the victim in a public utility vehicle;
f) posed as customers wishing to buy cigarettes; and as being thirsty, asking for drink of water.

The Court also agrees that nighttime was properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against the accused. To
be sure, nighttime is not per se aggravating. It must be shown that nocturnity was deliberately and purposely sought to
facilitate, or that it actually facilitated, the commission of the crime. In the case at bar, the lateness of the hour no doubt
precluded the presence of other customers who could have deterred the felons, or come to the aid of the victim, All
things considered, there is adequate showing that nocturnity was deliberately sought by the robbers and did in reality
facilitate the perpetration of the felony.

For the aggravating circumstance of superior strength to be deemed present in a case, it does not suffice to prove
superiority in number on the part of the malefactors; it must appear that they purposely employed excessive force—
force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. In this case, the evidence shows that
Empacis helped his co-accused by also stabbing the victim; he and his companion took advantage of their combined
strength and their bladed weapons to overcome their unarmed victim and assure the success of their felonious design to
make off with his money.

That the crime was "committed in the dwelling of the offended party, . . . the latter . . . not (having) given provocation,"
was also correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.

[TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH, OR MEANS EMPLOYED TO WEAKEN THE DEFENSE]

PEOPLE V. BIGCAS

FACTS: The version of the prosecution revolved basically around the testimonies of the two eyewitnesses, Rosito Doydoy
and Jesus Calape, with corroborative and supplementary testimonies on other aspects furnished by Pfc. Ponciano Butron
of the Integrated National Police Station at Pilar, Bohol and Dr. Lourdes Atop-Tan, municipal health officer of the same
town.

Rosito Doydoy testified that after attending the last prayers of his uncle which ended at 8:30 in the evening of July 25,
1988, he went home with his son, Rodel, to his house some two kilometers away. On the way and at a distance of about
twelve meters, Doydoy saw three persons involved in a commotion. It was not so dark then as the moon was shining
brightly. From behind tall cogon grass, he saw appellant Butron strike Ambrocio Palapar two times with a piece of wood
on the latter's back. In his attempt to flee from his aggressor, Palapar passed beside witness Doydoy who was then trying
to hide himself and his son behind the bushes. Palapar was chased by appellant Bigcas who, upon catching up with the
former stabbed him twice with a bolo at the back. The chase continued until Bigcas was able to stab the victim again at
the back of the latter's right knee. The victim fell on the ground, after which he uttered, "Long, stop because I will die of
these wounds." Butron shouted at him saying, "I will kill you, Boyax." He then approached Palapar and hit him twice with
a piece of wood on the right jaw. Bigcas, on his part, stabbed the supine victim several times. Thereafter, both appellants
left the victim, with Butron telling Bigcas. "You own the killing and these two bolos and I will be with you anywhere."

Jesus Calape, testified on essentially the same facts.

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ISSUES: In convicting appellant Rodrigo Bigcas of murder despite the failure of the prosecution to establish the presence
of any of the qualifying circumstances; and in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity.

HELD: The trial court's holding that treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against appellants is
correct, since there is no evidence that in the commission of the crime they deliberately adopted means, methods or
forms considered in law as treacherous. Its acceptance of nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance, however, is
erroneous. Even the prosecution witnesses testified that, during the incident, the moon was shining brightly. The light
was bright enough to see what was going on and to recognize the assailants. Moreover, nocturnity neither facilitated the
commission of the crime nor was it purposely sought by appellants in order to afford impunity. It, therefore, does not
qualify as an aggravating circumstance under either the subjective or objective tests laid down by this Court for it to be
considered as such.

We are likewise not convinced that the crime was committed by appellants with abuse or by taking advantage of
superior strength. Regrettably, we can neither determine nor deduce from the prosecution's sketchy evidence thereon
what transpired before the "commotion" involving the victims and appellants. The two eyewitnesses, Doydoy and
Calape testified only on the fight when it was already in progress but not as to the actuations of the parties proximately
and immediately before the altercation. For this qualifying circumstance to be considered, it is not sufficient that there
be superiority in number or strength; it is necessary that the accused must have cooperated and intended to use or
secure advantage from such superior strength. As we also emphasized in P e o p le v s . C a b ilin g, abuse of superior
strength may be considered not only when there is an inequality of force between the victim and the aggressor but
there must be a situation of superiority of strength notoriously selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission
of the crime. We find that the prosecution has fallen short of proof that appellants had specifically contrived or
deliberately intended and prepared to take advantage of superior strength in a projected assault against the victim. This
requisite cannot be drawn from mere assumptions or conjectures, for qualifying circumstances must be proved as
conclusively as the crime itself.

[TREACHERY]

PEOPLE V. SANGALANG

FACTS: Around six o'clock in the morning of June 9, 1968 Ricardo Cortez left his nipa hut located at Sitio Adlas, Barrio
Biluso, Silang, Cavite to gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby. Flora Sarno, his wife, was left inside the hut. While he
was on top of the tree gathering tuba, he was struck by a volley of shots. He fell to the ground at the base of the coconut
tree. His wife Flora heard three successive shots coming south of the hut. She went outside. She saw five men, each
armed with a long firearm, firing at her husband. He was already wounded and was lying on the ground at the foot of
the coconut tree. She recognized Laureano Sangalang as one of the five armed men who were firing at her husband. She
and her brother Ricardo had known Sangalang since their childhood. She also recognized Conrado Gonzales, Irineo
Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the other malefactors. Flora ran towards the place where her husband
had fallen. She shouted, "Bakit ninyo pinagbabaril ang aking asawa". The five persons fired at her. She was then about
twenty meters away from them. She retreated to the hut for cover. She heard some more shots. After the lapse of about
five minutes, Laureano Sangalang and his companions left the place. When Flora returned to the spot where her
husband was prostrate, he was already dead.

On the occasion already described, Ricardo Sarno, twenty-seven years old, a brother of Flora, was inside his own nipa
hut which was about ten meters away from Flora's hut. Later, Sarno saw his sister Flora, sitting inside her hut. He
followed her after she left the hut and went to see her dead husband, who was lying on the ground, face up, at the base
of the coconut tree. When he noticed that his brother-in-law was already dead, he gathered his children and brought
them to Sitio Biga.. Ricardo reported the killing to the chief of police who went to the scene of the crime with some
policemen and Constabularymen.

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The necropsy report shows that the twenty-five-year-old Cortez sustained twenty-three gunshot wounds on the
different parts of the body. He died due to the multiple gunshot wounds.

HELD: The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree. He was unarmed and defenseless. He
was not expecting to be assaulted. He did not give any immediate provocation. The deliberate, surprise attack shows
that Sangalang and his companions employed a mode of execution which insured the killing without any risk to them
arising from any defense which the victim could have made. The qualifying circumstance of treachery ( ale v o sia ),
which was alleged in the information, was duly established (See art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). Hence, the killing can
be categorized as murder (See People vs. Sedenio, 94 Phil. 1046). Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of
band (U. S. vs. Abelinde, 1 Phil. 568). Evident premeditation, which was alleged in the information, was not proven. The
trial court correctly imposed the penalty of r e clu sio n p e r p e t u a on Sangalang (Arts. 64[1] and 248, Revised Penal
Code).

[TREACHERY]

PEOPLE V. SAN PEDRO

[TREACHERY]

PEOPLE V. CASTILLO

FACTS: On May 25, 1993, around one o'clock in the morning, Eulogio Velasco, floor manager of the Cola Pubhouse along
EDSA, Project 7, Veteran's Village, Quezon City, was sitting outside the Pubhouse talking with his coworker, Dorie. Soon,
Antonio "Tony" Dometita, one of their customers, came out of the pubhouse. As he passed by, he informed Eulogio that
he was going home. When Tony Dometita was about an armslength [sic] from Eulogio, however, appellant Robert
Castillo suddenly appeared and, without warning, stabbed Tony with a fan knife on his left chest. As Tony pleaded for
help, appellant stabbed him once more, hitting him on the left hand. Responding to Tony's cry for help, Eulogio placed a
chair between Tony and appellant to stop appellant from further attacking Tony. He also shouted at Tony to run away.
Tony ran towards the other side of EDSA, but appellant pursued him. Eulogio came to know later that Tony had died. His
body was found outside the fence of the Iglesia ni Cristo Compound, EDSA, Quezon City. Dr. Bienvenido Munoz, the
medico-legal officer who autopsied Tony's cadaver, testified that the proximate cause of Tony's death was the stab
wound on his left chest. Tony also suffered several incised wounds and abrasions, indicating that he tried to resist the
attack.

HELD: We hold that the killing was qualified by treachery. Treachery is committed when two conditions concur, namely,
that the means, methods, and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate[;] and that such means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by
the accused without danger to his person. These requisites were evidently present in this case when the accused
appeared from nowhere and swiftly and unexpectedly stabbed the victim just as he was bidding goodbye to his friend,
Witness Velasco. Said action rendered it difficult for the victim to defend himself. The presence of "defense wounds"
does not negate treachery because, as testified to by Velasco, the first stab, fatal as it was, was inflicted on the chest.
The incised wounds in the arms were inflicted when the victim was already rendered defenseless.

[TREACHERY]

PEOPLE V. ARIZOBAL [ALREADY PROVIDED]

[TREACHERY]

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PEOPLE V. ESCOTE

FACTS: On September 28, 1996 at past midnight, Rodolfo Cacatian, the regular driver of Five Star Passenger Bus bearing
Plate No. ABS-793, drove the bus from its terminal at Pasay City to its destination in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Also on board
was Romulo Digap, the regular conductor of the bus, as well as some passengers. At Camachile, Balintawak, six
passengers boarded the bus, including Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. who were wearing m a o n g pants,
rubber shoes, hats and jackets. Juan seated himself on the third seat near the aisle, in the middle row of the passengers'
seats, while Victor stood by the door in the mid-portion of the bus beside Romulo. Another passenger, SPO1 Jose C.
Manio, Jr., a resident of Angeles City, was seated at the rear portion of the bus on his way home to Angeles City. Tucked
on his waist was his service gun bearing Serial Number 769806. Every now and then, Rodolfo looked at the side view
mirror as well as the rear view and center mirrors installed atop the driver's seat to monitor any incoming and
overtaking vehicles and to observe the passengers of the bus.

The lights of the bus were on even as some of the passengers slept. When the bus was travelling along the highway in
Plaridel, Bulacan, Juan and Victor suddenly stood up, whipped out their handguns and announced a holdup. Petrified,
Rodolfo glanced at the center mirror towards the passengers' seat and saw Juan and Victor armed with handguns. Juan
fired his gun upward to awaken and scare off the passengers. Victor followed suit and fired his gun upward. Juan and
Victor then accosted the passengers and divested them of their money and valuables. Juan divested Romulo of the fares
he had collected from the passengers. The felons then went to the place Manio, Jr. was seated and demanded that he
show them his identification card and wallet. Manio, Jr. brought out his identification card bearing No. 00898. Juan and
Victor took the identification card of the police officer as well as his service gun and told him: " P a s e n s y a k a n a P a r
e, p a p a t a yin k a n a min, b a ril m o rin a n d p a p a t a y s a iy o ." The police officer pleaded for mercy: " P a r e m a a
w a k a s a a k in. M a y p a mily a a k o ." However, Victor and Juan ignored the plea of the police officer and shot him on
the mouth, right ear, chest and right side of his body. Manio, Jr. sustained six entrance wounds. He fell to the floor of the
bus. Victor and Juan then moved towards the driver Rodolfo, seated themselves beside him and ordered the latter to
maintain the speed of the bus. Rodolfo heard one of the felons saying: " G a n y a n la n g a n g p u m a t a y n g t a o . P a
r a n g p u m a p a t a y n g m a n o k ." The other said: " A y o s n a n a m a n t a y o p a r e. M ala k i-la k i it o ." Victor and
Juan further told Rodolfo that after they (Victor and Juan) shall have alighted from the bus, he (Rodolfo) should continue
driving the bus and not report the incident along the way. The robbers assured Rodolfo that if the latter will follow their
instructions, he will not be harmed. Victor and Juan ordered Rodolfo to stop the bus along the overpass in Mexico,
Pampanga where they alighted from the bus. The robbery was over in 25 minutes.

When the bus reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, Rodolfo and Romulo forthwith reported the incident to the police
authorities. The cadaver of SPO1 Manio, Jr. was brought to the funeral parlor. The doctor prepared and signed an
autopsy report detailing the wounds sustained by the police officer and the cause of his death. Cause of Death: Shock,
massive internal and external hemorrhage, complete brain destruction and injury to the heart and left lung caused by
multiple gunshot wounds.

The trial court rendered its Decision judgment finding Juan and Victor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with
Homicide, meted on each of them the penalty of death and ordered them to pay P300,000.00 as actual and moral
damages to the heirs of the victim and to pay the Five Star Bus Company the amount of P6,000.00 as actual damages.

ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE TWO (2) ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.

HELD: The Court finds that the trial court committed no error in convicting Juan and Victor of robbery with homicide.
The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life. In robbery with homicide, so long as the intention of the felons
was to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. Even if the victim of robbery is other than the
victim of the homicide committed on the occasion of or by reason of the robbery, nevertheless, there is only one single
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
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and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. All the crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery
are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. Case law has it that whenever
homicide has been committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the
robbery will also be held guilty as principals of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the homicide,
unless it appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. In this case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable
doubt that Juan and Victor conspired and confabulated together in robbing the passengers of the Five Star Bus of their
money and valuables and Romulo of his collections of the fares of the passengers and in killing SPO1 Manio, Jr. with
impunity on the occasion of the robbery. Hence, both Juan and Victor are guilty as principals by direct participation of
the felony of robbery with homicide under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659,
punishable by r e clu sio n p e r p e t u a to death.

The trial court imposed the supreme penalty of death on Juan and Victor for robbery with homicide, defined in Article
294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable with r e clu sio n p e r p e t u a . Under Article 63, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code, the felons should be meted the supreme penalty of death when the crime is committed with an
aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime absent any mitigating circumstance. The trial court
did not specify in the decretal portion of its decision the aggravating circumstances attendant in the commission of the
crime mandating the imposition of the death penalty. However, it is evident from the findings of facts contained in the
body of the decision of the trial court that it imposed the death penalty on Juan and Victor on its finding that they shot
SPO1 Manio, Jr. treacherously on the occasion of or by reason of the robbery.

The Court agrees with the trial court that treachery was attendant in the commission of the crime. There is treachery
when the following essential elements are present, viz : (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of
attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without
risk of himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life where he was
defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the c o u p d e g r a c e .

In the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1
Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as he pleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was
shot at close range, thus insuring his death. The victim was on his way to rejoin his family after a hard day's work.
Instead, he was mercilessly shot to death, leaving his family in grief for his untimely demise. The killing is a grim example
of the utter inhumanity of man to his fellowmen.

[ISSUES] The issues that now come to fore are (1) whether or not treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in
robbery with homicide; and if in the affirmative, (b) whether treachery may be appreciated against Juan and Victor. On
the first issue, we rule in the affirmative. This Court has ruled over the years that treachery is a generic aggravating
circumstance in the felony of robbery with homicide, a special complex crime ( u n d elit o e s p e cial c o m p lejo ) and at
the same time a single and indivisible offense ( u n o s olo in d ivisib le ). However, this Court in two cases has held that
robbery with homicide is a crime against property and hence treachery which is appreciated only to crimes against
persons should not be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. It held in another case that treachery is not
appreciated in robbery with rape precisely because robbery with rape is a crime against property. These rulings of the
Court find support in case law that in robbery with homicide or robbery with rape, homicide or rape are merely incidents
of the robbery, with robbery being the main purpose and object of the criminal. Indeed, in P e o p le v s . C a n d o , two
distinguished members of this Court advocated a review of the doctrine that treachery is a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide. They opined that treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. After all,
in P e o p le v s . B a riq uit , this Court in a p e r c u ria m decision promulgated in year 2000 declared that treachery is
applicable only to crimes against persons. However, this Court held in P e o p le v s . C a n d o that treachery is a generic
aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide, citing its prior rulings that in robbery with homicide, treachery is a

Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances

 33

generic aggravating circumstance when the victim of homicide is killed with treachery. This Court opted not to apply its
ruling earlier that year in P e o p le v s . B a riq uit.

Legal Luminaries in criminal law and eminent commentators of the Revised Penal Code are not in full accord either.
Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino (Retired) says that treachery is appreciated only in crimes against persons as defined in
Title 10, Book Two of the Code. Chief Justice Luis B. Reyes (Retired) also is of the opinion that treachery is applicable only
to crimes against persons. However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado (Retired) is of a different view. He says that treachery
cannot be considered in robbery but can be appreciated insofar as the killing is concerned, citing the decisions of this
Court in P e o p le v s . B ala g t a s for the purpose of determining the penalty to be meted on the felon when the victim
of homicide is killed with treachery.

Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code is a reproduction of the 1850 Penal Code of Spain and the C o d ig o P
e n al R e f o r m a d o d e 1 8 7 0 with a slight difference. In the latter law, the words "la s p e r s o n a s " (the persons)
are used, whereas in Article 14, paragraph 6, of the Revised Penal Code, the words "the person" are used. Going by the
letter of the law, treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons as enumerated in Title Eight, Chapters One and
Two, Book II of the Revised Penal Code. However, the Supreme Court of Spain has consistently applied treachery to
robbery with homicide, classified as a crime against property.

Viada also says that treachery is appreciated in crimes against persons ( d elit o s c o n t r a p e r s o n a s ) and also in
robbery with homicide ( r o b o c o n h o micid io ).

Thus, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is classified as a
crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery is not a qualifying circumstance because as ruled by
the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision dated September 11, 1878, the word "homicide" is used in its broadest and
most generic sense.

Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or increasing the penalty for a crime,
aggravating circumstances shall be taken into account. However, aggravating circumstances which in themselves
constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing a
penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. Under paragraph 2 of the law,
the same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that it
must of necessity accompany the commission thereof.

Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime specially punishable by law nor
is it included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with homicide and prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is
likewise not inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime.

In sum then, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide when the victim of homicide is
killed by treachery.

Although at the time the crime was committed, generic aggravating circumstance need not be alleged in the
Information, however, the general rule had been applied retroactively because if it is more favorable to the accused.
Even if treachery is proven but it is not alleged in the information, treachery cannot aggravate the penalty for the crime.
There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the felony of robbery with homicide, Juan and Victor
should each be meted the penalty of r e clu sio n p e r p e t u a conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE V. VILLONEZ

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FACTS: Accused-appellants REGANDO VILLONEZ, RUEL SANTOS, and EMERLITO SANTOS pray for a reversal of their
conviction for MURDER decreed in a Joint Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court.

The witnesses for the prosecution were Edgar Jimenez and Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, a Medico Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation; and the witnesses for the defense were the accused-appellants, as well as Arthur Aquino and
Conrado Gungon. Edgar Jimenez testified that on 3 May 1994, at around 9:00 p.m., while he was resting inside his store
at Hulo, Malabon, Metro Manila, a certain Tonton informed him that his close friend GERARDO LONGASA had a fistfight
with one "Rudy," alia s "Dede," at Liwayway Street, Baritan, Malabon. Edgar proceeded to the area to mediate, since
LONGASA and Rudy were both his friends. Edgar passed through Javier II Street in going to Liwayway Street. At Javier II
Street, a group of seven armed men, including accused-appellants, attacked Edgar. RUEL hit Edgar on his forehead and
back with a bottle. Edgar was able to escape from his attackers. While fleeing, he ran past LONGASA, who seemed drunk.
When Edgar called LONGASA, the attackers were already upon LONGASA. While he was about eight arms' length away
from LONGASA, Edgar saw EMERLITO hit LONGASA with a 2 x 2 inches piece of wood. Simultaneously, REGANDO and
RUEL struck LONGASA with bottles. Rudy Santos and Eddie Santos then stabbed LONGASA seven and eight times,
respectively, even as two other persons named Rey and Budda held LONGASA's arms. LONGASA fell to the ground. Edgar
saw all these because the scene of the incident was illuminated by a big fluorescent lamp located about three arms'
length away. Edgar rushed to LONGASA's house and reported the incident to the latter's parents.

Dr. Ronaldo Mendez conducted an autopsy on LONGASA's corpse. CAUSE OF DEATH: STAB WOUNDS. Dr. Mendez
explained that the abrasions were caused by hard, rough surface, possibly cement or a piece of wood. The contusions
and lacerations were caused by a blunt object, which could have been a piece of wood, a bottle, a pipe, or any other
hard object.

HELD: We do not share the assessment of the trial court that there was no treachery in this case because the victim had
engaged in a fight previous to the killing and was thus forewarned of an attack against him. Treachery may still be
appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of danger to his person. What is decisive is that the execution of the
attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. The overwhelming number of the accused,
their use of weapons against the unarmed victim, and the fact that the victim's hands were held behind him preclude
the possibility of any defense by the victim.

The other qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which the trial court appreciated, will no longer be
taken against accused-appellants, for it is absorbed in treachery.

[TREACHERY]

PEOPLE V. GUZMAN

FACTS: For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City finding accused-appellant Nicolas Guzman y Bocbosila guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of r e clu sio n p e r p e t u a.

Prosecution relied on the testimonies of its witnesses, namely: Ronald Santiago (Ronald), Edgardo Bauto (Edgardo),
Danilo Balber (Danilo), Police Inspector Alberto Malaza (Inspector Malaza), SPO3 Samuel Quinto (SPO3 Quinto), and Dr.
Francisco Supe, Jr. (Dr. Supe).

Ronald is a jeepney driver and resident of Barangay Commonwealth, Quezon City. He testified that on 25 November
1999, at about 9:00 in the evening, he stopped by and ate at a carinderia located at the corner of Sto. Nino Street and
Mactan Street, Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City. After eating, he sat on a bench just beside the carinderia and rested.
He noticed appellant and two other persons having a drinking spree in a nearby grocery store. He also saw Michael
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
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walking towards the direction of the same grocery store. When Michael was passing in front of the grocery store,
appellant and his two companions suddenly approached and surrounded Michael. Appellant positioned himself at the
back of Michael while his two companions stood in front of Michael. Suddenly, they grabbed the shoulders of Michael
and overpowered the latter. One of appellant's companions, whom he described as a male with long hair, drew out a
knife and repeatedly stabbed Michael at the stomach. Afterwards, the appellant's other companion, whom he described
as a male with at top hair, took the knife from the companion with long hair, and also stabbed Michael at the stomach.
Later, appellant went in front of Michael, took the knife from the companion with at top hair, and likewise stabbed
Michael at the stomach. Appellant also kicked Michael when the latter was already lying on the ground. He witnessed
this stabbing incident at a distance of five arms' length.

Afraid and confused, he immediately went home. The next day, however, he went to the house of Michael's family and
narrated the incident to Michael's father, Danilo. Subsequently, he was accompanied by Danilo to the Batasan Hills
Police Station 6 where he gave a statement about the incident.

Edgardo Bauto (Edgardo) is also a tricycle driver and resident of Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City. He narrated that on
25 November 1999, at around 9:00 in the evening, he was standing at the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street,
Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City, when he heard a female voice shouting "Sinasaksak!" When he glanced at the
direction of the said shouts, he saw, at a distance of about ve arms' length, appellant and the latter's two companions
taking turns in stabbing Michael. One of the appellant's companions, whom he described as a toothless male with a long
hair, was the rst one to stab Michael. Afterwards, the appellant's other companion, whom he described as a male with
at top hair, took the knife from the toothless male with a long hair and stabbed Michael. Subsequently, appellant also
took the knife from his companion with flat top hair and stabbed Michael too. Thereafter, he immediately ran and
proceeded to the house of Michael's family and informed Michael's parents about the incident. Michael's parents
rushed to the crime scene and took Michael to a hospital. The next day, he was accompanied by Danilo and a certain
Ramiro Alfaro to Batasan Hills Police Station 6 where he gave a statement about the incident.

Danilo, Michael's father, testified that on 25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the evening, he was walking on his way
home along the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street, Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City, when he saw Michael
lying along Sto. Nino Street. He also saw appellant and the latter's two male companions near Michael's body. When he
was about to approach them, they immediately ran away. He chased and threw stones at them. Appellant and his two
companions proceeded to the former's house and locked the door. He tried to follow them all the way to the house but
appellant's relatives blocked his way to the door and told him to leave. Thereafter, he went back to Michael and took the
latter to Fairview Hospital. He was later informed by the doctors that Michael was already dead. The next day, he went
to Batasan Hills Police Station 6 and gave a statement about the incident. In an effort to settle the instant case,
appellant's wife and daughter told Danilo that they would sell a bus which they owned and would turn over to him the
proceeds thereof. He also stated that Michael wanted to become a pilot so that, as the eldest of the children, he would
be the one to shoulder the education of his siblings.

Inspector Malaza is a member of the police force assigned at Police Community Precinct No. 1, Batasan Hills, Quezon
City. He testified that on 25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the evening, he was on his way home on board his owner
type jeep. Upon reaching the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street, Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City, he
noticed a commotion nearby. He slowed down his vehicle and saw, at a distance of five to ten meters, appellant
stabbing and kicking Michael. He also noticed that the appellant's two companions were armed with bladed weapons.
He alighted from his vehicle and approached appellant and his two companions. After introducing himself as a police
officer, appellant and his two companions scampered away. He ran after them but caught only appellant. The two other
companions of the appellant successfully escaped. Thereafter, he handcuffed appellant and brought him to Batasan Hills
Police Station 6. He turned him over to a police investigator therein and executed an affidavit of arrest.

SPO3 Quinto is a police investigator at the Batasan Hills Police Station 6. He was the one who investigated the incident.
After the incident was reported to his station on 26 November 1999, he immediately went to the crime scene upon the
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
 36

advice of the desk officer. Since Michael was already brought to Fairview Hospital at that time, he proceeded thereto.
Upon arriving at the Fairview Hospital, he was informed that Michael was already dead. He then went back to the
station and took the statements of the prosecution witnesses.
Dr. Supe, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City conducted the post mortem
examination on Michael's body. CONCLUSION: Cause of death is hemorrhage and shock secondary to multiple stab
wounds of the trunk.

ISSUE: ASSUMING A R G U E N D O THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE
VICTIM, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.

HELD: Appellant contends that even if he were held liable for the death of Michael, there was no treachery which will
qualify the killing as murder. According to him, there is no evidence to show that appellant and his two companions had
deliberately and consciously adopted their mode of attack to ensure its execution without risk to themselves. The
stabbing incident occurred in a place that was properly lighted. There were many people in the area then walking in
different directions. He claims that if he and his two companions wanted to ensure that no risk would come to them,
then they could have chosen another time and place to attack Michael.

Treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack under the circumstances that renders the victim unable and unprepared to
defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. It is an aggravating circumstance that qualies the
killing of a person to murder.

Two essential elements/conditions are required in order that treachery may be appreciated: (1) The employment of
means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender's safety from any retaliatory act on the part of
the offended party, who has, thus no opportunity for selfdefense or retaliation; (2) deliberate or conscious choice of
means, methods or manner of execution. Further, it must always be alleged in the information and proved in trial in
order that it may be validly considered.

In the instant case, treachery was alleged in the Information against appellant. Moreover, all the essential
elements/conditions of treachery were established and proven during the trial.

After attending a worship service at the Iglesia ni Kristo church in his barangay, Michael proceeded home. While Michael
was casually walking along the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street, appellant and his two companions, who
were drinking nearby, suddenly approached and surrounded Michael. Appellant positioned himself at the back of
Michael while his two companions stood in front of Michael. In an instant, they grabbed the shoulders of Michael and
overpowered the latter. One of the appellant's companions, whom the prosecution witnesses described as a male with
long hair, drew out a knife and repeatedly stabbed Michael on the stomach. Unsatisfied, the appellant's other
companion, whom the prosecution witnesses described as a male with at top hair, took the knife and stabbed Michael
on the stomach. As the finale, appellant went in front of Michael, took the knife and also stabbed Michael on the
stomach. When Michael fell on the ground, appellant kicked him at the body. Upon noticing that the bloodied Michael
was no longer moving, appellant and his two companions fled the scene.

As viewed from the foregoing, the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack of appellant and his two companions
rendered Michael defenseless, vulnerable and without means of escape. It appears that Michael was unarmed and alone
at the time of the attack. Further, he was merely seventeen years of age then. In such a helpless situation, it was
absolutely impossible for Michael to escape or to defend himself against the assault of appellant and his two
companions. Being young and weak, Michael is certainly no match against adult persons like appellant and his two
companions. Michael was also outnumbered since he had three assailants, and, was unarmed when he was stabbed to
death. Appellant and his two companions took advantage of their size, number, and weapon in killing Michael. They also
deliberately adopted means and methods in exacting the cruel death of Michael by first surrounding him, then grabbing
his shoulders and overpowering him. Afterwards, each of them repeatedly stabbed Michael with a knife at the stomach
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
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until the latter fell lifeless to the ground. The stab wounds sustained by Michael proved to be fatal as they severely
damaged the latter's large intestine.

The fact that the place where the incident occurred was lighted and many people were walking then in different
directions does not negate treachery. It should be made clear that the essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. This is even more true if the
assailant is an adult and the victim is a minor. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected
to put up a defense. Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists. As we earlier found, Michael
was peacefully walking and not provoking anyone to alight when he was stabbed to death by appellant and his two
companions. Further, Michael was a minor at the time of his death while appellant and his two companions were adult
persons.

With regard to the allegation in the Information that the killing of Michael was attended by an aggravating circumstance
of evident premeditation, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were correct in disregarding the same against appellant. The
essence of evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded
by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment. It implies a deliberate planning of the crime before executing it. It must also be shown how
and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out. Further, there must be proof that
the accused meditated and reflected on his intention between the time when the crime was conceived by him and the
time it was actually perpetrated. In the case at bar, there is no evidence to show that appellant and his two
companions had previously planned and reflected in killing Michael. When appellant and his two companions saw
Michael on that fateful night, they immediately pounced on him. The thought of killing Michael came into the minds of
appellant and his two companions only when they saw Michael walking on the road. Indeed, the killing of Michael was
sudden and unplanned.

We agree with the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code states that murder is
punishable by r e clu sio n p e r p e t u a to death. Article 63 of the same Code provides that if the penalty is composed of
two indivisible penalties, as in the instant case, and there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the lesser
penalty shall be applied. Since there is no mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the present case, and, treachery
cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance as it was already taken as a qualifying circumstance, the lesser
penalty of r e clu sio n p e r p e t u a should be imposed.

[IGNONIMY]

PEOPLE V. TORREFIEL

FACTS: Accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel; Hilario Masgong alias "Mark"; Casiano Masgong alias "Manny"; Saturnino
Suyod alias "Ka Eddie"; Jerry Delicano alias "Ka Cocoy"; Luciano Solanoy, Jr., alias "Ka Balot"; Noel Semira alias "Ka Nido";
Ricky David alias "Ka Macky"; and Alex Francisco alias "Ka Jing," were charged for Murder and for Robbery before the
Regional Trial Court. These cases were, upon agreement of the parties, jointly tried, since they arose from the same
incident and involved the same parties. The trial proceeded as against the accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel only, the rest
of the accused having remained at large.

On May 26, 1989 at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning at Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan, Realidad Mangilog woke up
early to prepare their breakfast. Her husband Leopoldo Mangilog and her son Reynaldo were about to join her
downstairs, when someone knocked at the kitchen backdoor.
It was Leonardo who opened the door. When the door was opened appellant Jose Torrefiel armed with a bolo and a
hand gun entered the house first followed by Masiano Masgong, Hilario Masgong, Alex Francisco, Saturnino Suyod and
Noel alias "Nido" in that order, who were all armed with long firearms.

Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances

 38

The group greeted Leopoldo as "How are you Tay?" to which the latter answered "as usual." Leopoldo even served the
newcomers with coffee, but because the coffee was not sufficient for them, Realidad asked Hermogenes Calizo, who was
then the errand boy of the Mangilog (sic), to buy coffee from the store. The group of appellant Torrefiel did not even
touch or taste the coffee served them by Leopoldo. Instead, appellant, Casiano Masgong and Satur Suyod aimed their
guns at Leopoldo and started shooting him to death. Simultaneous to the shooting of Leopoldo inside the house by the
group of appellant was the shooting and stabbing of Reynaldo who was then taking a bath inside the bathroom located
outside of the house by the other members of the group who did not enter the house. After the killing of Leopoldo and
Reynaldo, the accused ransacked the house and took P500.00 cash, wrist watch, kitchen wares, grocery items, chickens
and guitar. Before the accused left the house of the victims, they even fired their guns at random. They were blaming
the victims to be responsible to the incident why the military was running after them. They were also telling the people
along the road that the fish is okey and could be ready to be butchered.

ISSUE: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.

HELD: As alleged in the informations and as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the killing of the victims was
qualified by treachery. Leopoldo Mangilog was shot while he was serving the accused coffee or shortly thereafter.
Reynaldo Mangilog, on the other hand, was shot and stabbed to death while he was taking a bath. It may be added that
the victims were naturally unarmed at that time and their execution was done so early in the morning, that is, when
they had practically just awakened. Under the circumstances, the victims were clearly not in any position to defend
themselves from the sudden and unexpected attack of the accused. These circumstances are manifestly indicative of the
presence of the conditions under which treachery may be appreciated, i.e. , the employment of means of execution that
gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and that said means of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted.

The Court of Appeals appreciated abuse of superior strength, aid of armed men and evident premeditation as
aggravating circumstances. These findings are factual and the rule is that findings of the Court of Appeals upon factual
questions are conclusive and ought not to be disturbed unless shown to be contrary to the evidence on record, 26 26
and, in this case, there is no such showing. However, we believe, and so hold, that treachery absorbs the circumstances
of abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men, as it appears that the accused saw to it that they were armed and
far outnumbered the victims precisely to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal objective.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for murder is r e clu sio n t e m p o r al in its
maximum period to death. Since we find accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
qualified by treachery in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 and that the generic aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation was also attendant, the penalty of r e clu sio n p e r p e t u a should be imposed in each case, applying
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code and considering the proscription against the imposition of the death penalty at the
time the crimes were committed.

[IGNONIMY]

PEOPLE V. JOSE

FACTS: Complainant, Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva, was, at the time of the incident, 25 years old and single; she
graduated from high school in 1958 at Maryknoll College and finished the secretarial course in 1960 at St. Theresa's
College. Movie actress by profession, she was receiving P8,000.00 per picture. It was part of her work to perform in
radio broadcasts and television shows, where she was paid P800.00 per month in permanent shows, P300.00 per month
in live promotional shows, and from P100.00 to P200.00 per appearance as guest in other shows.

So it was that at about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva, homeward bound from the ABS
Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, was driving her bantam car accompanied by her maid Helen Calderon, who was also at
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
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the front seat. Her house was at No. 48, 12th Street, New Manila, Quezon City. She was already near her destination
when a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four men aboard (later identified as the four appellants) came abreast of
her car and tried to bump it. She stepped on her brakes to avoid a collision, and then pressed on the gas and swerved
her car to the left, at which moment she was already in front of her house gate; but because the driver of the other car
(Basilio Pineda, Jr.) also accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided for the second time. This prompted Miss De
la Riva, who was justifiably annoyed, to ask: "Ano ba?" Forthwith, Pineda stopped the car which he was driving, jumped
out of it and rushed towards her.

The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the horn of her car continuously. Undaunted, Pineda
opened the door of Miss De la Riva's car and grabbed the lady's left arm. The girl held on tenaciously to her car's steering
wheel and, together with her maid, started to scream. Her strength, however, proved no match to that of Pineda, who
succeeded in pulling her out of her car. Seeing her mistress' predicament, the maid jumped out of the car and took hold
of Miss De la Riva's right arm in an effort to free her from Pineda's grip. The latter, however, was able to drag Miss De la
Riva toward the Pontiac convertible car, whose motor was all the while running.

The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the horn of her car continuously. Undaunted, Pineda
opened the door of Miss De la Riva's car and grabbed the lady's left arm. The girl held on tenaciously to her car's steering
wheel and, together with her maid, started to scream. Her strength, however, proved no match to that of Pineda, who
succeeded in pulling her out of her car. Seeing her mistress' predicament, the maid jumped out of the car and took hold
of Miss De la Riva's right arm in an effort to free her from Pineda's grip. The latter, however, was able to drag Miss De la
Riva toward the Pontiac convertible car, whose motor was all the while running.

The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo Aquino at the back seat; Basilio Pineda, Jr. was at the
wheel, while Rogelio Cañal was seated beside him. Miss De la Riva entreated the appellants to release her; but all she
got in response were jeers, abusive and impolite language, and threats that the appellants would finish her with their
Thompson and throw acid at her face if she did not keep quiet. In the meantime, the two men seated on each side of
Miss De la Riva started to get busy with her body: Jose put one arm around the complainant and forced his lips upon
hers, while Aquino placed his arms on her thighs and lifted her skirt. The girl tried to resist them. She continuously
implored her captors to release her, telling them that she was the only breadwinner in the family and that her mother
was alone at home and needed her company because her father was already dead. Upon learning of the demise of Miss
De la Riva's father, Aquino remarked that the situation was much better than he thought since no one could take
revenge against them. By now Miss De la Riva was beginning to realize the futility of her pleas. She made the sign of the
cross and started to pray. The appellants became angry and cursed her. Every now and then Aquino would stand up and
talk in whispers with Pineda, after which the two would exchange knowing glances with Cañal and Jose.

The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed towards Victoria Street. Then the car
proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. When the
car reached Makati, Aquino took a handkerchief from his pocket and, with the help of Jose, blindfolded Miss De la Riva.
The latter was told not to shout or else she would be stabbed or shot with a Thompson. Not long after, the car came to a
stop at the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City. The blindfolded lady was led out of the car to one of the rooms on the second
floor of the hotel.

Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on bed. Her blindfold was removed. She saw Pineda and Aquino
standing in front of her, and Jose and Cañal sitting beside her, all of them smiling meaningfully. Pineda told the
complainant: "Magburlesque ka para sa amin." The other three expressed their approval and ordered Miss De la Riva to
disrobe. The complainant ignored the command. One of the appellants suggested putting off the light so that the
complainant would not be ashamed. The idea, however, was rejected by the others, who said that it would be more
pleasurable for them if the light was on. Miss De la Riva was told to remove her stockings, in order, according to them,
to make the proceedings more exciting. Reluctantly, she did as directed, but so slowly did she proceed with the assigned
task that the appellants cursed her and threatened her again with the Thompson and the acid. They started pushing
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
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Miss De la Riva around. One of them pulled down the zipper of her dress; another unhooked her brassiere. She held on
tightly to her dress to prevent it from being pulled down, but her efforts were in vain: her dress, together with her
brassiere, fell on the floor.

The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who were kneeling in front of her and feasting their
eyes on her private parts. This ordeal lasted for about ten minutes, during which the complainant, in all her nakedness,
was asked twice or thrice to turn around. Then Pineda picked up her clothes and left the room with his other
companions. The complainant tried to look for a blanket with which to cover herself, but she could not find one.

Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss De la Riva, who was sitting on the bed trying to
cover her bareness with her hands, implored him to ask his friends to release her. Instead of answering her, he pushed
her backward and pinned her down on the bed. Miss De la Riva and Jose struggled against each other; and because the
complainant was putting up stiff resistance, Jose cursed her and hit her several times on the stomach and other parts of
the body. The complainant crossed her legs tightly, but her attacker was able to force them open. Jose succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of the complainant. He then left the room.

The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle ensued between him and Miss De la Riva,
during which he hit her on different parts of the body. Like Jose, Aquino succeeded in abusing the complainant. The girl
was now in a state of shock. Aquino called the others into the room. They poured water on her face and slapped her to
revive her. Afterwards, three or the accused left the room, leaving Pineda and the complainant. After some struggle
during which Pineda hit her, the former succeeded in forcing his carnal desire on the latter. When the complainant went
into a state of shock for the second time, the three other men went into the room, again poured water on the
complainant's face and slapped her several times. The complainant heard them say that they had to revive her so she
would know what was happening. Jose, Aquino and Pineda then left the room. It was now appellant Cañal's turn. There
was a struggle between him and Miss De la Riva. Like the other three appellants before him, he hit the complainant on
different parts of the body and succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her.

Mention must be made of the fact that while each of the four appellants was struggling with the complainant, the other
three were outside the room, just behind the door, threatening the complainant with acid and telling her to give in
because she could not, after all, escape, what with their presence. After the appellants had been through with the sexual
carnage, they gave Miss De la Riva her clothes, told her to get dressed and put on her stockings, and to wash her face
and comb her hair, to give the impression that nothing had happened to her. They told her to tell her mother that she
was mistaken by a group of men for a hostess, and that when the group found out that she was a movie actress, she was
released without being harmed. She was warned not to inform the police; for if she did and they were apprehended,
they would simply post bail and later hunt her up and disfigure her face with acid. The appellant then blindfolded Miss
De la Riva again and led her down from the hotel room. Because she was stumbling, she had to be carried into the car.
Inside the car, appellant Jose held her head down on his lap, and kept it in that position during the trip, to prevent her
from being seen by others.

Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of where to drop Miss De la Riva. They finally decided on a
spot in front of the Free Press Building not far from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue near Channel 5 to make it appear,
according to them, that the complainant had just come from the studio. Pineda asked Jose to alight and call a taxicab,
but to choose one which did not come from a well-known company. Jose did as requested, letting several taxicabs pass
by before flagging a UBL taxicab. After they warned again Miss De la Riva not to inform anyone of what had happened to
her, appellant Cañal accompanied her to the taxicab. The time was a little past 6:00 o'clock. When Miss De la Riva was
already inside the cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke down and cried. She kept asking the driver
if a car was following them; and each time the driver answered her in the negative.

It was 6:30 o'clock — or some two hours after the abduction — when Miss De la Riva reached home. Her mother, her
brother-in-law Ben Suba, as well as several PC officers, policemen and reporters, were at the house. Upon seeing her
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
 41

mother, the complainant ran toward her and said, "Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me."
The mother brought her daughter upstairs. Upon her mother's instruction, the complainant immediately took a bath and
a douche. The older woman also instructed her daughter to douche herself two or three times daily with a strong
solution to prevent infection and pregnancy. The family doctor, who was afterwards summoned, treated the
complainant for external physical injuries. The doctor was not, however, told about the sexual assaults. Neither was Pat.
Pablo Pascual, the police officer who had been sent by the desk officer, Sgt. Dimla, to the De la Riva residence when the
latter received from a mobile patrol a report of the snatching. When Miss De la Riva arrived home from her harrowing
experience, Pat. Pascual attempted to question her, but Ben Suba requested him to postpone the interrogation until she
could be ready for it. At that time, mother and daughter were still undecided on what to do.

On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant's family gathered to discuss what steps, if any, should be taken.
After some agonizing moments, a decision was reached: the authorities had to be informed.

[Miss Dela Riva positively identified her assailants]

HELD: The complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes committed, the latter is definitely the
more serious; hence, pursuant to the provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed shall be
imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In this regard,
there is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter the
nature of the penalty to be imposed.

Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of determining the proper penalty to be
imposed in each of the other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us to make a definite finding in this connection to
the effect that the commission of said crimes was attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime,
appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior
strength, the crime having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another (Cf. People vs. De
Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her
complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the
effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to appellants Jose, Aquino and Cañal,
none of these aggravating circumstances has been offset by any mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should,
however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least
affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there would still be three aggravating
circumstances remaining. As a result, appellants should likewise be made to suffer the extreme, penalty of death in each
of these three simple crimes of rape. (Art. 63, par. 2, Revised Penal Code.)

In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses committed, the trial court applied by analogy Article
70 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the maximum duration of all the penalties therein imposed upon the
appellant shall not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties
imposed upon the appellant, which should not exceed forty years." The said court is of the opinion that since a man has
only one life to pay for a wrong, the ends of justice would be served, and society and the victim would be vindicated just
as well, if only one death penalty were imposed on each of the appellants.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants Jaime G. Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr., and
Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, and each and every one
of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is hereby
sentenced to four (4) death penalties.

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[IGNONIMY]

PEOPLE V. BUTLER

FACTS: This is an automatic review of the judgment of the Court of First Instance Finding the accused Michael J. Butler in
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, with the attendance of
aggravating circumstances of treachery and scoffing at the corpse of the deceased, without any mitigating circumstance
and sentencing the accused with the penalty of death.

On August 7, 1975, at about 10:30 p.m., accused-appellant Michael Butler and the victim, Enriquita Alipo alias Gina
Barrios were together at Colonial Restaurant in Olongapo City. They were seen together by Lilia Paz, an entertainer and
friend of the victim, who claimed to have had a small conversation with the accused, and by one Rosemarie Juarez, also
a friend of the victim. At about 1:00 of the same evening, the accused and the victim left the said restaurant, after the
latter invited Rosemarie Juarez to come to her house that night.

Emelita Pasco, the housemaid of the victim, testified that, at about 11:30 p.m. or so of August 7, 1975, her mistress
(Gina Barrios) came home with the accused-appellant. As soon as she opened the door for them, the victim and
accused-appellant immediately entered the victim's bedroom. Shortly thereafter, the victim left her bedroom holding an
ID card and a piece of paper, and on the piece of paper, the victim purportedly wrote the following words: MICHAEL J.
BUTLER, 44252-8519 USS HANCOCK. Said words were copied from the ID Card.

Pasco testified that the victim said she was copying the name of the accused because she knew he would not be going
back to her. Then she rushed back to her bedroom after instructing Pasco to wake her up the following morning. 2 2
Before retiring, however, the victim's friend, Rosemarie Juarez, came to the former's house and after having a small
conversation, also left.

The following day, August 8, 1975, at about 4:00 a.m., Pasco rose to wake her mistress as instructed. She knocked at the
door. She found that the victim was lying on her bed, facing downward, naked up to the waist, with legs spread apart,
with a broken figurine beside her head. Immediately, Pasco called the landlord and they called the authorities.

Patrolman Rudyard de los Reyes of the Olongapo Police Department arrived together with Fiscal Llamado and Corporal
Sobrepeña at about 6:00 a.m. of August 8, 1975. Pasco informed Patrolman de los Reyes that the accused Butler slept
with the victim the previous night, and the former gave the latter the piece of paper where the name of the accused was
written.

Sergeant Galindo of the Olongapo Police Department handed over to Jesus Bensales, a fingerprint technician of the
Police Department, a piece of cellophane together with the broken figurine for latent print examination. The latent print
examination report (Exh. E-4) showed that there were three (3) fragmentary latent prints that were lifted from the
cellophane wrapping of the figurine. But only one print was clear and distinguishable. This particular print was found
identical with the accused's left middle fingerprint on thirteen (13) points. Bensales later testified that the latent print
developed from the piece of cellophane belonged to the accused Butler.

On the same day, officers of the Olongapo Police Department informed the Naval Investigation Services Resident Agency
(NISRA) in Subic Bay that an American Negro by the name of Michael J. Butler on board the USS Hancock was a suspect
in a murder case. Jerry Witt and Timothy Watrous, both special agents of NISRA, went on board USS Hancock. Then the
accused was searched, handcuffed, and was brought to NISRA office.

Dr. Angeles Roxas, Medico Legal Officer of the Olongapo Police Department issued an autopsy report. CAUSE OF DEATH:
Asphyxia due to suffocation

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 43

Dr. Roxas later testied that anal intercourse was had with the victim after her death as indicated by the partly opened
anus and the presence of spermatozoa in it. He testied that the anus would have automatically and completely closed
had the intercourse occurred, while the victim was still alive. He also categorically testied that the victim died of
asphyxia due to suffocation when extreme pressure was exerted on her head pushing it downward, thereby pressing her
nose and mouth against the mattress.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder qualified by abuse of
superior strength, with aggravating circumstances of treachery and scoffing at the corpse of the victim.

HELD: The third issue is whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder qualied
by abuse of superior strength, with aggravating circumstances of treachery and scoffing at the corpse of the victim.

The prosecution maintains that there is abuse of superior strength as can be deduced from the fact that the victim was
slender, only 4'11" in height while the accused is about 6 feet tall and 155 lbs.; that the accused took advantage of this
unequal physical condition when he struck the victim with the figurine which made the victim unconscious, after which
he shoved and pressed the victim's mouth and nose against the bed mattress.

On the other hand, it is the defense counsel's contention that the court a q u o erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength because like treachery, nocturnity and evident premeditation, this
circumstance has to be deliberately and purposely utilized to assure the accomplishment of the criminal purpose
without risk to the offender which might arise from the defense that the victim might offer. The defense counsel further
maintains that there is no evidence to support that advantage was taken by the accused of his superior strength as,
contrary to what the court a q u o said in its decision, there was no evidence nor testimony on the part of the medico-
legal officer to the effect that when the victim was hit by a figurine, she went into a coma, then her head was pushed by
a pillow, causing her nose and mouth to be pressured against the bed mattress. In addition to this, the defense counsel
further maintains that the instrument used by the accused, which was a brittle porcelain statue of Jesus Christ, could not
produce physical injury nor render the victim unconscious as testified to at crossexamination by the medico-legal officer.

In P e o p le v s . B u s t o s , this Court held that to be properly appreciated, it must be shown that the accused is
physically stronger than the victim or the relative strength of the parties must be proved. In P e o p le v s . C a silla r , this
Court said that the essence of this circumstance is that advantage is taken by the offender of this physical strength which
is relatively superior to that of the offended party. The fact that the offender is strong does not of itself prove its
existence.

Still, in P e o p le v s . C a b ilin g, a guideline to determine whether or not there is abuse of superior strength has been
laid down. In that case this Court ruled:
"To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means
of defense available to the person attacked. This circumstance should always be considered whenever there is
notorious inequality of forces between aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. To
properly appreciate it, not only is it necessary to evaluate the p h y sic al c o n ditio n s of the protagonists or
opposing forces a n d t h e a r m s o r o bje c t s employed by both sides, but it is also necessary to analyze the in
cid e n t s a n d e pis o d e s constituting the total development of the event."

In the light of the above legal precepts and considering the evidence adduced, this Court holds that there was an abuse
of superior strength attending the commission of the crime. It is not only the notorious advantage of height that the
accused had over his helpless victim, he being 6 feet tall and weighing 155 lbs. while the girl was only 4 ft. 11 inches tall,
but also his strength which he wielded in striking her with the figurine on the head and in shoving her head and pressing
her mouth and nose against the bed mattress, which pressure must have been very strong and powerful to suffocate her
to death and without risk to himself in any manner or mode whatsoever that she may have taken to defend herself or
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
 44

retaliate since she was already struck and helpless on the bed, that convinced Us to nd and rule that the crime
committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

The evidence on record, however, is not sufficient to show clearly and prove distinctly that treachery attended the
commission of the crime since there was no eyewitness account of the killing. The extra-judicial confession of the
accused merely stated, thus: "I thought she was going to do something dangerous to me so I grabbed her, and we
started wrestling on the bed. She grabbed me by the throat and I picked up a statue of Jesus Christ that was sitting on
the bedside stand and I hit her in the head. She fell at on her face." Although the figurine was found broken beside her
head, the medical report, however, do not show any injury or fracture of the skull and no sign of intracranial
hemorrhage.

While We reject the presence of treachery, We, however, find and sustain the finding of the lower court that the
aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the deceased applies against the accused since it is
established that he mocked or outraged at the person or corpse of his victim by having an anal intercourse with her after
she was already dead. The fact that the muscles of the anus did not close and also the presence of spermatozoa in the
anal region as testified to by Dr. Angeles Roxas, the medico-legal officer, and confirmed to be positive in the Laboratory
Report, Exhibit "B-1", clearly established the coitus after death. This act of the accused in having anal intercourse with
the woman after killing her is, undoubtedly, an outrage at her corpse.

It is true as maintained by the defense that the aggravating circumstance of outraging at the corpse of the victim is not
alleged in the information and that the lower court found it had been proved but its contention that the said aggravating
circumstance should not have been appreciated against the accused is without merit. And this is so because the role is
that a generic aggravating circumstance not alleged in the information may be proven during the trial over the objection
of the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the penalty (People vs. Martinez Godinez, 106 Phil. 597).
Aggravating circumstances not alleged in the information but proven during the trial serve only to aid the court in fixing
the limits of the penalty but do not change the character of the offense. (People vs. Collado, 60 Phil. 610, 614; People vs.
Campo, 23 Phil. 368; People vs. Vega, 31 Phil. 450; People vs. Domondon, 64 Phil. 729).

[Charges against him were dismissed. Minor. 18 years old when he was charged. Was put under the care of Department
of Social Welfare for 6 years and has behaved accordingly.]

[IGNONIMY]

PEOPLE V. SAYLAN

FACTS: This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and the commission of the offense having been attended
by three aggravating without any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.

The complaining witness, Eutropia A. Agno, a married woman and a resident of Barrio Malinao, Gingoog City, was a
classroom teacher of the Malinao Elementary School.
In the afternoon of January 23, 1971, Eutropia went to the public market in Gingoog City to buy foodstuffs for her family
and thereafter, she proceeded to the store of her mother to fetch her five-year old daughter Nilsonita .On their way
home, Eutropia and Nilsonita boarded a passenger jeepney and while inside the vehicle she (Eutropia) noticed that the
other passengers were Rudy Gonzales, a grade I pupil of the Malinao Elementary School, the appellant, Rafael Saylan,
and a couple whom she did not know.The jeepney went only as far as Malinas citrus farm because the road to Barrio
Malinao was not passable by vehicles. It was almost 6:30 o'clock in the evening when the jeepney arrived at the Malinas
citrus farm and so all the passengers alighted and had to walk all the way to Barrio Malinao which was about three and a
half kilometers away. After walking some distance and upon reaching a junction, the couple separated from the group
and took the road leading to their house while Eutropia's group took the opposite road.
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
 45

The appellant, however, joined the group of Eutropia and when they reached the place where the road was plain,
appellant who was then walking side by side with Eutropia suddenly pulled out a dagger about eight inches long and
pointing it at the latter said, Do not shout, Nang, I will kill you!. At this juncture, appellant placed his right arm around
the neck of Eutropia with the dagger pointed at her left breast, after which he dragged Eutropia at some distance. When
they reached the junction of the trail for men and a trail for carabaos, he ordered everybody to stop and told the
children to stay behind and threatened to kill them if they persisted in following them.

Thereafter, appellant again dragged Eutropia by her hand and brought her towards a creek near a coconut tree which
was about five meters away from where Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales were. The appellant then ordered Eutropia to
remove her panty which she refused at first, but appellant threatened to kill her, so she removed her panty after which
appellant ordered her to lie down . Subsequently, appellant placed himself on top of the victim and inserted his penis
into her vagina and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her by moving his buttocks up and down.

After the first sexual act, appellant ordered Eutropia to standup which the latter helplessly and grudgingly followed.
Appellant again inserted his penis into her vagina and then performed a push and pull movement.Not satisfied with the
second intercourse, appellant ordered Eutropia to lie down again preparatory to a third intercourse. Appellant again
performed the sexual act with her.

After the third intercourse, appellant ordered Eutropia to stand up and then he bent her body downwards with her
hands and knees resting on the ground. When the latter was already in this position, appellant then placed himself
behind her, inserted his penis into her vagina and executed a push and pull movement in the dog's way of sexual
intercourse.

After performing this uncommon way of sexual intercourse, appellant ordered Eutropia to lie down again which the
latter reluctantly obeyed because appellant's dagger was always pointed at her and thereafter he had carnal knowledge
of her for the fifth time.

After the fifth intercourse, and after satisfying his sexual lust, appellant asked Eutropia if she will tell her husband what
he did to her and the latter answered, 'I will not tell" . But she only said this so that appellant would let her go home.

Afterwards, Eutropia and appellant returned to the place where the children were left and upon arriving thereat, they
found Nilsonita (Eutropia's daughter) asleep with Rudy seated dozing beside her. Nilsonita who was sleeping was carried
by the appellant and then they all proceeded to Malinao. "After walking some distance, Eutropia saw the house of her
friend "Ben" and upon approaching the said house, she shouted, 'Ben, Ben, please give me hot water'. Upon hearing her
voice, Ben, who was still awake at the time, opened the door of his house and allowed Eutropia to come up. Eutropia
immediately went upstairs and went straight to the room of Ben as she was feeling very bad. Appellant, who was then
carrying Nilsonita, and Rudy Gonzales, were also allowed to go upstairs. Meanwhile, Eutropia requested Ben to fetch her
husband. "When Eutropia woke up between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock that evening, her husband was already there. She
then asked him whether the appellant was still around, and in reply, he told her that appellant had already. Eutropia
then told her husband that she was raped by the appellant. Upon learning of the dastardly act committed by the
appellant, he advised his wife to submit herself to a medical examination.

HELD: The complaint alleges the following aggravating circumstances: abuse of superior strength, nocturnity, d e s p o b
la d o , ignominy, and r eit e r a cio n . The trial court disregarded superiority because it "is inherent in the crime of rape
or is absorbed in the element of force." It also did not consider nocturnity "there being no evidence that the accused
purposely sought it to facilitate the commission of this rape."

D e s p o b la d o was present according to the trial court because: "The accused dragged the offended party, at the point
of a dagger, to the carabao trail, about 10 meters from the junction, but 40 to 50 meters below to better attain his
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
 46

purpose without interference, and to better secure himself from detection and punishment. Even the junction where
the two children were left is already 400 meters from the nearest house. While there maybe occasional passersby, this
does not destroy its being an uninhabited place. We hold that the trial court for the reasons stated correctly held that
the crime was committed in an uninhabited place.

The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e. male
superior, female inferior, but also "The same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there was
no ignominy because "The studies of many experts in the matter have shown that this 'position' is not novel and has
repeatedly and often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation." This may well be if the sexual act is
performed by consenting partners but not otherwise.

The trial court also held that "there is no reiteracion because one of the offenses, namely Robbery in Band, for which the
accused has been penalized, was committed after the commission of this rape case, and the penalty imposed on the
other offense of Frustrated Homicide, is lighter than the penalty for rape."

Although not alleged in the complaint, the trial court stated that the offense was aggravated by disregard of rank
because it was a fact known to the appellant that Mrs. Agno was a school teacher. The appellant claims that this
circumstance cannot be assigned to him because there was no deliberate intent to offend or insult the rank of Mrs.
Agno. The Solicitor General agrees with the appellant for the same reason.

The judgment of the trial court is in accordance with the facts and the law but it cannot be affirmed completely because
of the lack of the necessary number of votes. WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is modified in the sense that the
appellant shall suffer the penalty of r e clu sio n p e r p e t u a instead of death.

[IGNONIMY]

PEOPLE V. SULTAN

FACTS: FERNANDO SULTAN y LATO appeals from the Decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the special complex
crime of robbery with rape, sentencing him to r e clu sio n p e r p e t u a.

The evidence for the prosecution was based principally on the testimony of complaining witness Juditha M. Bautista.
According to her, on 2 June 1997 at 9:00 o’clock in the evening she was on her way home from a visit to her cousin
Cristina Mansilongan in Novaliches, Quezon City; when she passed the dark alley in her cousin's compound she was
accosted by someone, later identied as accused-appellant Fernando L. Sultan, who pointed a sharp instrument at her
neck and announcing it was a "hold-up." He grabbed her and brought her to a house along the alley which turned out to
be his. Once inside the house, he made her sit down. He offered her a drink; she refused it. Then he started divesting her
of her watch, ring, earrings, and necklace the values of which are now reected in the Decision of the court a q u o , and
her cash of P130.00. After taking her valuables, he started kissing her on the lips and cheeks. As if to discourage him
from making further sexual advances, she told him that she was married with two (2) children but accused-appellant
was not dissuaded from pursuing his intentions. While pointing an ice pick at her he ordered her to undress. She
acceded for fear that he would kill her as she was under constant threat. After she had completely undressed,
accusedappellant ordered her to lie down on the oor. He then kissed her again from head down. Still she could not resist
him because of fear. He went on top of her, held her two (2) hands on the level of her head, spread her thighs and
inserted his penis into her vagina. The coital encounter lasted for ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes.

After satisfying his lust, he ordered her to put on her bra and panty, tied her hands and went out of the room to smoke.
After ten (10) to fteen (15) minutes, he came back, untied her, and once again with threat and intimidation sexually
abused her. Thereafter, he tied her hands to a protruding piece of wood in the room and held her in his arms. She cried.

Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances

 47

He told her that he loved her and that he would answer for what he had done to her. They talked until noon the
following day without sleeping.

In her effort to release herself from his clutches she "agreed" to elope with him. Perhaps convinced that she was going
to run away with him, he allowed her to go home at noon to get her things. She was then staying with her cousin Nita
del Rosario, at No. 9 Sta. Eleuteria Street, Gulod, Novaliches, Quezon City. He even accompanied her to the highway to
get a ride home.

When Juditha arrived home she saw her sister Antonette in the house. She was not actually residing there but went
there only that day. Juditha lost no time in narrating her harrowing experience to her sister. Immediately Antonette
called her brother SPO1 Fernando M. Bautista who resides in Bulacan. SPO1 Bautista arrived at around 3:00 or 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon and was told about what happened. He then advised Juditha to go back to the house of
accused-appellant for the "planned elopement" so that he and his two (2) companions could stage an arrest.

On their way to the house of accused-appellant, Juditha rode in a passenger jeep with her sister Antonette and cousin
Nita while her brother and his two (2) companions followed them on board an XLT Van. Juditha alighted near the house
of accusedappellant while her companions waited for her and accused-appellant along the highway. When she arrived
at accused-appellant's place, he was already waiting for her outside the store nearby. They went inside his house and
came out twenty (20) minutes later. They boarded a passenger bus while SPO1 Bautista and his companions trailed
them. When the bus reached the corner of Forest Hill Subdivision, Gulod, Novaliches, it slowed down because of the
trafc thus making it easier for SPO1 Bautista and his companions to board the bus. Upon seeing her brother and his
companions, Juditha motioned to them. They immediately approached accused-appellant and boxed him before they
could arrest him. The other passengers of the bus joined in hitting accused-appellant. This caused a commotion in the
bus. Some policemen who were in the b a r a n g a y hall across the street saw the disturbance. They boarded the bus to
nd out what happened. Then they assisted in facilitating the arrest of accused-appellant and brought him to the b a r a n
g a y hall. He was later on transferred to the police headquarters for further interrogation.

HELD: Complaining witness Juditha Bautista was raped twice on the occasion of the robbery. In this regard, this Court
had declared in some cases that the additional rapes committed on the same occasion of robbery would not increase
the penalty. There were also cases, however, where this Court ruled that the multiplicity of rapes committed could be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. Finally, in the recent case of P e o p le v . R e g ala the Court held that the
additional rapes committed should not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance despite a resultant "anomalous
situation" wherein robbery with rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes in terms of gravity. The
Court realized that there was no law providing for the additional rape/s or homicide/s for that matter to be considered
as aggravating circumstance. It further observed that the enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Art. 14 of the
Revised Penal Code is exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code which enumerates the mitigating circumstances
where analogous circumstances may be considered, hence, the remedy lies with the legislature. Consequently, unless
and until a law is passed providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s may be considered aggravating, the Court
must construe the penal law in favor of the offender as no person may be brought within its terms if he is not clearly
made so by the statute. Under this view, the additional rape committed by accused appellant is not considered an
aggravating circumstance. Applying Art. 63, par. (2), of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "(i) n all c a s e s in w
hic h t h e la w p r e s c rib e s a p e n alt y c o m p o s e d o f t w o in d ivisib le p e n altie s, t h e f ollo win g r ule s s h all b
e o b s e r v e d in t h e a p p lic a tio n t h e r e o f . . .
2 . ( w ) h e n t h e r e a r e n eit h e r mitig a tin g n o r a g g r a v a tin g cir c u m s t a n c e s in t h e c o m mis sio n o f t h
e d e e d, t h e le s s e r p e n alt y s h all b e a p p lie d," the lower penalty of r e clu sio n p e r p e t u a should be imposed
on accused-appellant.

[USE OF ILLEGAL FIREARMS OR EXPLOSIVES]

Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
 48

PEOPLE V. LADJAALAM

FACTS: Appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as "Warpan," appeals before us the September 17, 1998
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), which found him guilty of three out of the four
charges lodged against him. He was found guilty of the crimes of (1) Violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended; (2) Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294; (3) the crime of
Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide.

At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the issuance of a search warrant
against appellant, his wife and some John Does (Exh. C). After the search warrant was issued about 2:30 p.m. of the
same day, a briefing was conducted inside the office of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga City Police Office
in connection with the service of the search warrant. The briefing was conducted by SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Chief of the
AntiVice/Narcotics Unit. During the briefing, PO3 Renato Dela Peña was assigned as presentor of the warrant. SPO1
Ricardo Lacastesantos and PO3 Enrique Rivera were designated to conduct the search. Other policemen were assigned
as perimeter guards.

After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police Superintendent Edwin Soledad proceeded to the
house of appellant and his wife at Rio Hondo on board several police vehicles. Before they could reach appellant's
house, three (3) persons sitting at a nearby store ran towards the house shouting, '[P]olice, raid, raid' . When the
policemen were about ten (10) meters from the main gate of the house, they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire
coming from the second floor of the house. There was also gunfire at the back of the house. SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2
Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Peña who were with the first group of policemen saw appellant fire an M14
rifle towards them. They all knew appellant. When they were fired upon, the group, together with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3
Obut and Superintendent Soledad, sought cover at the concrete fence to observe the movements at the second floor of
the house while other policemen surrounded the house.

SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Peña who were with the first group of policemen saw
appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them. They all knew appellant. When they were fired upon, the group, together with
SPO2 Gaganting, PO3 Obut and Superintendent Soledad, sought cover at the concrete fence to observe the movements
at the second floor of the house while other policemen surrounded the house.

In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence. Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos,
Gregorio, and Obut entered the door of the extension building. Gaganting opened the main (steel) gate of the house.
The other members of the team then entered. Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered the house through the main door and
went inside the sala of the ground floor while other policemen surrounded the house. Two (2) old women were in the
sala together with a young girl and three (3) children. One of the old women took the children to the second floor while
the young girl remained seated at the corner.

Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing an M14 rifle at them
through the window. While they were going upstairs, appellant noticed their presence. He went inside the bedroom
and, after breaking and removing the jalousies, jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house. Seeing this,
Mirasol rushed downstairs and asked help from the other members of the raiding team to arrest appellant.
Lacastesantos went to the second floor and shouted to the policemen outside not to fire in the direction of the second
floor because there were children. Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar Rabuya arrested appellant at the back of his house after a
brief chase.

At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle with magazine on top of the sofa at the sala on the second He
removed the magazine from the rifle and the bullet inside the chamber of the rifle. He counted seventeen (17) live
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
 49

ammunition inside the magazine. He saw two (2) more M14 rifle magazines on that sofa, one with twenty (20) live
ammunition and another with twenty-one (21) live ammunition . He likewise saw three (3) M16 rifle magazines in a
corner at the second floor.

After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellant's house, Rivera, Dela Peña, Gregorio and Obut followed and entered
the house. After identifying themselves as members of the PNP Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to the old
women a copy of the search warrant. Dela Peña and Rivera then searched appellant's room on the ground floor in the
presence of Punong Barangay Elhano . On top of a table was a pencil case (Exh. J) with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils
inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or 'shabu'

Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different denominations , one (1) homemade .38
caliber revolver with five (5) live [ammunition], one (1) M79 single rifle with [a] pouch containing five (5) empty shells of
an M79 rifle, and one (1) empty shell of an M14 rifle.

Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga Police. [O]n the morning of
September 24, 1997, he was instructed by SPO2 Gaganting to go to appellant's house to buy 'shabu.' Locson knew
appellant as a seller of 'shabu' and had been to appellant's house about fifteen (15) times before. He went to Rio Hondo
and arrived at appellant's house at 3:20 p.m. He bought P300.00 worth of 'shabu' from appellant. The latter got three (3)
decks of shabu from his waist bag. Appellant instructed Locson to go behind the curtain where there was a table. There
were six (6) persons already smoking. There was a lighted kerosene lamp made of a medicine bottle placed on the table.
They asked Locson to smoke 'shabu' and Locson obliged. He placed the three (3) decks of 'shabu' he bought on the table.

While they were smoking 'shabu,' Locson heard gunfire coming from appellant's house. They all stood and entered
appellant's compound, but were instructed to pass [through] the other side. They met appellant at the back of his
house. Appellant told them to escape 'because the police are already here.' They scampered and 'ran away because
there were already shots.' Locson jumped over the fence and ran towards the seashore. Upon reaching a place near the
Fisheries School, he took a tricycle and went home.

The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed an affidavit narrating what
transpired at appellant's house [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997.

After the search and before returning to the police station, PO3 Dela Peña prepared a Receipt for Property Seized' listing
the properties seized during the search. The receipt was signed by Dela Peña as the seizure officer, and by Punong
Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano and radio reporter Jun Cayona as witnesses. A copy of the receipt was given to appellant
but he refused to acknowledge the properties seized.

The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and Explosive Section show that appellant
'had not applied/filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition or . . . been given authority to carry
[a] firearm outside of his residence'

HELD: Trial court posits that appellant should be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, in addition to direct assault
with multiple attempted homicide. It did not explain its ruling, however. Considering that it could not have been
ignorant of the p r o vis o in the second paragraph, it seemed to have construed "no other crime" as referring only to
homicide and murder, in both of which illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a
crime other than murder or homicide is committed, a person may still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms. In
this case, the other crime committed was direct assault with multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court found
appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearms. We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore
the plain language of the statute. A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission
of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the "other crime" is
murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense.
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
 50

Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable
for illegal possession of firearms. Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the
plain meaning of RA 8294's simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is
justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant
cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted
homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of
firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.

We reject the OSG's contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294, should be applied in this
case. When the crime was committed on September 24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866 had already been
expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took effect on July 6, 1997. In other words, no longer in existence was the
earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate from any other crime.
It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other amendments to PD 1866, contained the specific p r o vis o that "no
other crime was committed.

Furthermore, the OSG's reliance on P e o p le v. J a y s o n is misplaced. True, this Court sustained the conviction of
appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had also committed homicide. We explained however, that "the
criminal case for homicide [was] not before us for consideration.

Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for limiting the p r o vis o in the
second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of
firearms, provided that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second
paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph.
Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

Appellant is found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a
weapon, for which he is sentenced to 2 years and 4 months to 6 years of p risio n c o r r e c cio n al and (2) maintaining a
drug den, for which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court to r e clu sio n p e r p e t u a .

[USE OF ILLEGAL FIREARMS OR EXPLOSIVES]

CELINO V. CA

This petition for c e r tio r a ri under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the Court of Appeals' Decision dated April 18,
2005 affirming the trial court's denial of petitioner Angel Celino, Sr.'s Motion to Quash; and Resolution dated September
26, 2005 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision. The following facts are not disputed: Two
separate informations were led before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City charging petitioner with violation of Section
2 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6446 (gun ban), and Section 1, Paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8294 (illegal
possession of firearm), as follows:

C rimin al C a s e N o. C-1 3 7 -0 4
That on or about the 12th day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his
residence an armalite rie colt M16 with serial number 3210606 with two (2) long magazines each loaded with
thirty (30) live ammunitions of the same caliber during the election period — December 15, 2005 to June 9, 2004
— without rst having obtained the proper authority in writing from the Commission on Elections, Manila,
Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW

Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances

 51

C rimin al C a s e N o. C-1 3 8 -0 4
That on or about the 12th day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession
and control one (1) armalite rie colt M16 with serial number 3210606 with two (2) long magazines each loaded
with thirty (30) live ammunitions of the same caliber without rst having obtained the proper license or necessary
permit to possess the said firearm.
CONTRARY TO LAW

Upon arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-137-04, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the gun ban violation charge.

Prior to his arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-138-04, petitioner led a Motion to Quash 8 8 contending that he "cannot
be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms . . . if he was also charged of having committed another crime of [ sic ]
violating the Comelec gun ban under the same set of facts . . . ."

By Order of July 29, 2004, the trial court denied the Motion to Quash on the basis of this Court's affirmation in M a r g a r
ejo v. H o n. E s c o s e s of therein respondent judge's denial of a similar motion to quash on the ground that "the other
offense charged . . . is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294 . . . ." Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied by September 22, 2004 Resolution, hence, petitioner led a Petition for C e r tio r a ri before the Court of
Appeals.

By Decision dated April 18, 2005, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the Motion to Quash. Petitioner's
May 9, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of September 26, 2005, petitioner filed the
present petition.

The petition fails.

Petitioner's remedy to challenge the appellate court's decision and resolution was to le a petition for review on c e r tio r
a ri under Rule 45 on or before October 20, 2005 or 15 days after he received a copy of the appellate court's resolution
on October 5, 2005 denying his motion for reconsideration. Instead, petitioner chose to le the present petition under
Rule 65 only on December 2, 2005, a good 58 days after he received the said resolution.

C e r tio r a ri cannot be used as a substitute for lost appeal. C e r tio r a ri lies only when there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Why the question being raised by petitioner, i.e ., whether
the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion, could not have been raised on appeal, no reason therefor has
been advanced.

While this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, has the
discretion to treat a petition for c e r tio r a ri as having been led under Rule 45, especially if led within the reglementary
period under said Rule, it finds nothing in the present case to warrant a liberal application of the Rules, no justication
having been proffered, as just stated, why the petition was led beyond the reglementary period, especially considering
that it is substantially just a replication of the petition earlier filed before the appellate court.

Technicality aside, the petition fails just the same.

The relevant provision of R.A. 8294 reads:

SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:

Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances

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SECTION 1. U nla w f ul M a n u f a c t u r e, S ale, A c q uisitio n, D is p o sitio n o r P o s s e s sio n o f Fir e

a r m s o r A m m u nitio n o r In s tr u m e n t s U s e d o r In t e n d e d t o b e U s e d in t h e M a n u f a c
t u r e o f Fir e a r m s o r A m m u nitio n . — . . . .

The penalty of p risio n m a y o r in its minimum period and a ne of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall
be imposed if the firearm is classied as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in
diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered
firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-re magnum and other
firearms with ring capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: P r o vid e d, h o w e v e r, T h
a t n o o t h e r c rim e w a s c o m mitt e d b y t h e p e r s o n a rr e s t e d. "If homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered
as an aggravating circumstance. "If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted c o u p d'e t a t , such
violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or
attempted c o u p d'e t a t .

The crux of the controversy lies in the interpretation of the underscored proviso. Petitioner, citing A g o t e v. L o r e n z
o, P e o p le v. L a d ja ala m , and other similar cases, contends that the mere ling of an information for gun ban
violation against him necessarily bars his prosecution for illegal possession of firearm. The Solicitor General contends
otherwise on the basis of M a r g a r ejo v. H o n. E s c o s e s and P e o p le v. V ald e z .

In A g o t e ,this Court affirmed the accused's conviction for gun ban violation but exonerated him of the illegal
possession of firearm charge because it "cannot but set aside petitioner's conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for
illegal possession of firearm since another crime was committed at the same time, i.e. , violation of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2826 or the Gun Ban."

The law is indeed clear. The accused can be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, provided no other crime was
committed by the person arrested. The word "committed" taken in its ordinary sense, and in light of the Constitutional
presumption of innocence, necessarily implies a prior determination of guilt by final conviction resulting from successful
prosecution or voluntary admission.

Petitioner's reliance on A g o t e, L a d ja ala m, E v a n g elis t a, G a r cia, P a n g ilin a n, Alm eid a, a n d B e r n al is,

therefore, misplaced. In each one of these cases, the accused were exonerated of illegal possession of firearms
because of their commission, as shown by their conviction, of some other crime. In the present case, however,
petitioner has only been accused of committing a violation of the COMELEC gun ban. As accusation is not synonymous
with guilt, there is yet no showing that petitioner did in fact commit the other crime charged. Consequently, the
proviso does not yet apply.

More applicable is M a r g a r ejo where, as stated earlier, this Court afrmed the denial of a motion to quash an
information for illegal possession of firearm on the ground that "the other offense charged [ i.e. , violation of gun ban]
. . . is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294 . . . ." in consonance with the earlier pronouncement in V ald e z
that "all pending cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other
crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved . . . ."

In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, any information for illegal
possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together
with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, 40 40 or absorbed
as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted c o u p d'e t a t . 41 41 Conversely, when the other
offense involved is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of
firearm should continue to be prosecuted.
Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances
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Finally, as a general rule, the remedy of an accused from the denial of his motion to quash is for him to go to trial on the
merits, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Although the
special civil action for c e r tio r a ri may be availed of in case there is a grave abuse of discretion, the appellate court
correctly dismissed the petition as that vitiating error is not attendant in the present case.

The petition is DISMISSED.

Eloise Coleen S. Perez, 1E Criminal Law I Aggravating Circumstances