May 2021

Good practice guide

 Acknowledgements
The development of this publication would not have Content contributors
been possible without the input and support of the A number of tailings experts and environment specialists
individuals below. ICMM gratefully acknowledges the in the ICMM membership provided substantial technical
following contributions: content for the writing team to integrate into the drafts.
They included the following:
Writing team
Unusually for an ICMM publication, no external consultant Caius Priscu (Anglo American), Chad LePoudre (BHP),
was contracted to support the report writing process. Ranjiv Gupta, David Jensen, Georgia Lysay and Brant Whiting
In practice, this meant that the writing team solely (Freeport McMoRan), Ian Gordon (Newcrest), Briana Gunn,
comprised representatives of member companies or John Lupo and Kim Morrison (Newmont), Imran Gillani
associations. Some of these individuals invested very (Rio Tinto), Greg Puro (Vale).
significant amounts of time and energy to ensuring the
delivery of a high-quality product that was responsive Member representatives
to the views and perspectives of other members. ICMM Representatives of the ICMM Council Tailings Subgroup
is indebted to them for their exceptional contributions and Tailings Working Group provided valuable direction and
and service. input to (as well as feedback on iterative drafts of) the guide.
They included: Nerine Botes, Pule Soaisa (African Rainbow
The report was drafted by a writing team led by Minerals), Matthew Cox, Roy Harvey, Paul Smithall (Alcoa),
Tamara Johndrow (Freeport-McMoRan) and Charles Caius Priscu (Anglo American), Roger Welff (AngloGold
Dumaresq (Mining Association of Canada (MAC)). Ashanti), Ivan Arriagada, Jorge Troncoso Boys (Antofagasta
Their commitment to this work represented a significant Minerals SA), Grant Beringer, Bassam El Husseini (Barrick),
investment on their part as well as a substantial in-kind Matthew Currie, Chad Le Poudre (BHP), Rene Orellana
contribution from their respective employers, which ICMM (Codelco), Ivan Glasenberg (Glencore), Richard Adkerson,
greatly appreciates. Thomas Calhoun, Sheila Deely, Kanyembo Katapa, Katie
Kruger, Teresa Speigl (Freeport McMoRan), Aaron Chapple
Extensive drafting and editing support was provided (Glencore), Johan Boshoff (Gold Fields), Breno de Matos
by Michael Davies (Teck) and David Machin (MMG). Castiho (Hydro), Shigeru Oi, Koichiro Tsuchiya (JX Nippon),
Mario Velasco (Minera San Cristobal), Nikisi Lesufi,
Special advisor Stephanie Mudau (Minerals Council South Africa), Harry
Professor Norbert Morgenstern provided invaluable Silva (Minsur), Veronica Shime (National Mining Association),
guidance throughout the drafting process providing Ian Gordon (Newcrest), John Lupo, Kim Morrison
content, collaborating closely with the writing team (Newmont), Philippe Crochon (Orano), Pavel Grachev, Pavel
and content contributors. Professor Morgenstern’s Shevelenko (Polyus), Imran Gillani, J.S. Jacques, Marnie
contributions to the tailings field has been immeasurable Pascoe, John Mulcahy (Rio Tinto), Ross Copper, Grant Stuart,
over the decades and ICMM deeply appreciates his views. Matt Wolfe (Sibanye Stillwater), Dave Luppnow, Rowena
His selfless contribution of expertise and time along with Smith (South32), Marcia Smith (Teck), Rafael Bittar, Luis
his patience throughout the development process was Cervantes, Greg Puro, (Vale).
crucial to the completion and quality of this Guide.
ICMM team
Aidan Davy and Diane Tang-Lee led the process to develop
this guide, with input and support from Hideo Aoyama,
Alice Evans and Kira Scharwey.

Alice and Will Beaven (Positive 2), Nic Benton and Ella Yarrow
(ICMM) provided creative design support.

The photographs provided in this document were compiled

by our members over many years and are used to illustrate
tailings facilities and related tailings management activities.
In the majority of cases, these images were taken prior
to the COVID-19 pandemic and therefore do not show
employees wearing masks.

2 International Council on Mining and Metals

CONTENTS Back to contents

Foreword5

Part 1: Overview 7
1.1 Introduction 8
1.2 Overview of the Guide 11
1.3 Relationship to the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management,
the ICMM Conformance Protocols and the ICMM Tailings Governance Framework 17

Part 2: Governance of Tailings Management 22

2.1 Overview 23
2.2 Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 24
2.3 Tailings Management Systems 36
2.4 Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 44
2.5 Managing Information 54
2.6 Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 57
2.7 Emergency Preparedness and Response 65

Part 3: Implementation of Good Engineering Practices for Tailings Management 70

3.1 Overview 71
3.2 Overarching Engineering Concepts 72
3.3 Project Conception 82
3.4 Design 88
3.5 Construction 105
3.6 Operations 109
3.7 Closure and Post-Closure 117

Glossary122

List of Acronyms 127

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 3

4 International Council on Mining and Metals
FOREWORD Professor (Emeritus)
Back to contents
Norbert R Morgenstern

‘Tailings dams are complex systems that have evolved over the years. They are
also unforgiving systems, in terms of the number of things that have to go right.
Their reliability is contingent on consistently flawless execution in planning,
in subsurface investigation, in analysis, in construction quality in operational
diligence, in monitoring, in regulatory action, and in risk management at every
level. All of these activities are subject to human error.’
Mount Polley Independent Expert Engineering Investigation and Review Panel (2015)

Assuring safety or otherwise is not achieved by a set of • In recognition of the phases associated with tailings
calculations alone or by observations alone, unless they reveal management, from Project Conception through to Design,
that performance as flawed, or by adopting a pre-conceived Construction, Operations, Closure and Post-Closure, ensure
list of safety indicators that reduces the confirmation of safety that tailings management is continually integrated within a
to checking the items off in a box. As revealed by the quotation sitewide integrated mine, tailings, water and closure plan.
above, the construction and operation of a tailings storage • Informed by the integrated planning, develop a tailings
facility incorporating a dam, is a highly dynamic process, more management system.
so than is common for water dams where there is usually
• Engage external Independent Review for technical matters
a clearer separation between the Design and Construction
early in the lifecycle and throughout all of its phases.
phases and the Operations phase. Therefore, reliable
confirmation of safety requires an equally dynamic process • Manage uncertainty through all phases of the lifecycle by
applied to the full lifecycle of the facility so that it can, in turn, risk-informed decision-making that assesses uncertainty,
reassure all stakeholders. conducts risk assessments at appropriate stages, and
carries a risk register throughout the lifecycle of the facility.
Progress in this regard has already been made by the • Adopt the technical recommendations put forward for the
publication of the Global Industry Standard on Tailings safe design, construction, operation, and closure of tailings
Management, and its recommendations will be integrated storage facilities. This should recognise the enhanced
into ICMM’s industry member commitments. The Standard responsibilities of the Engineer of Record for declaring
makes recommendations both with regard to Environmental, design criteria as opposed to relying on prescriptive
Social and Governance issues and technical issues. The values. Where conditions are complex, recognize the value
Standard might be regarded as requirements of what has to of adopting performance-based design. Always respect
be done. ICMM has developed this Guide, which is aligned with regulatory requirements as a minimum.
the Standard, but focuses primarily on technical issues and • Maintain comprehensive documentation of construction
recommends good practice for design, construction, operation and quality assurance through all phases of the lifecycle,
and closure. with special emphasis on confirming or adjusting the site
characterization model as new information is obtained.
From my perspective, this Guide is built upon the following
core elements: • As part of the Tailings Management System, determine
what documentation related to safety could enter the public
• Of overarching significance is the safety culture expressed domain in order to enhance transparency and trust.
by the Operator. It is common to declare a goal of zero
fatalities, occupational disease and catastrophic events. While the task of determining the cause of failure is simpler
Hence, a common denominator for all Operators that after the event, I have evaluated this Guide in terms of my
share this goal is that tailings facilities should be designed, experience with a significant number of tailings dam failures
constructed, operated and closed to such high standards and related serious incidents and concluded that had this
that ‘failure is not an option’. Guide been available and adopted, these incidents should not
• A governance framework to support the aspirational goals have occurred.
of the safety culture is recommended, incorporating roles
and responsibilities from the Board of Directors to the Norbert R Morgenstern
Engineer of Record and the Design Team. Distinguished University Professor (Emeritus),
University of Alberta (Canada) and Consulting Engineer

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 5

 FOREWORD Richard C Adkerson

The ICMM Tailings Management: Good Practice Guide represents the culmination
of years of work by ICMM member companies and external experts to develop
guidance for safely and responsibly constructing and managing mine tailings
facilities. Inspired by the pathbreaking work of Dr Norbert R Morgenstern, as
set forth in the Sixth Victor de Mello Lecture in 2018, ICMM embarked on an
undertaking to improve safety and management of tailings storage facilities.

ICMM served as the industry representative in the The Good Practice Guide is important in achieving the
development of the Global Industry Standard on Tailings aspirational goal of eliminating fatalities and catastrophic
Management, a multi-stakeholder effort designed to failures at tailings facilities. We strongly encourage all
elevate the standard of practice for tailings storage facilities mining companies worldwide, whether or not they are ICMM
worldwide. ICMM is committed to leading the mining industry members, to incorporate the Standard and Good Practice
in the safe and responsible design, construction, operation Guide into their practices to improve mine tailings facility
and closure of tailings facilities. This is a critical issue at every performance and to achieve these safety goals.
mine, which must be viewed as such by every mine operator.
Richard C Adkerson
In the Good Practice Guide, ICMM member company Chairman of the Board, and Chief Executive Officer
experts build on the Standard promulgated by the multi- Freeport-McMoRan and Chair of ICMM
stakeholder initiative. The Good Practice Guide supports the
requirements of the Standard and provides guidance on good
governance and engineering practices.

6 International Council on Mining and Metals

PART 1: OVERVIEW Back to contents

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 7

 1.1 INTRODUCTION

1.1.1 Context 1.1.2 Mining Industry Safety Culture

Tailings are a by-product of mining, consisting of the Protecting the health and safety of employees, contractors
processed rock or soil left over from the separation of the and communities has become ingrained in the mining
commodities of value from the rock or soil within which they industry’s culture. Mining operations, like all types of heavy
occur. If they are not managed in a safe, responsible manner, industry, can pose many health and safety hazards, and
tailings can pose risks to the environment, human health the adoption of a safety culture was in response to the high
and infrastructure. In cases where tailings are managed in numbers of fatalities and injuries.
purpose built (ie engineered) facilities, management of the
integrity of these facilities is critically important. The failures As stated on the ICMM website:
that have occurred over the last 30 to 40 years illustrate ‘Responsible mining companies have an unwavering
these potential risks. These failures have included fatalities, commitment to the health and safety of workers and their
displacement of communities, damage to infrastructure, and families, local communities and wider society. Health
loss of ecosystems and habitat. They have cost the mining and safety has to be at the heart of all operations and
industry billions of dollars. processes. Mining presents various hazards that can be
of significant consequence, but through effective risk
Most tailings facilities are planned, designed, constructed, management strategies neither safety incidents nor
operated and closed in a safe and responsible manner. the onset of occupational diseases are inevitable. ICMM
However, as recent failure incidents clearly indicate, the members are progressing towards a goal of zero fatalities,
physical stability of tailings facilities has not been universal. occupational disease and catastrophic events. People have a
Global performance needs to improve. right to go home safe and healthy to their families and their
communities at the end of every day.’
This guidance is intended to facilitate continual
improvement across the global mining sector, leading to However, the failures of tailings facilities around the world,
the safe, responsible management of tailings worldwide. resulting in hundreds of fatalities over the last three decades,
The guidance presents a comprehensive, holistic approach point to the imperative that the mining industry’s safety
to tailings management that describes good engineering culture be applied to tailings management.
practices and is informed by lessons learned from past
failures. It is intended to improve performance across Beyond driving improvements in practice, the guidance is
all the aspects that underpin safe tailings management. aimed at fostering and strengthening the safety culture
While no guidance document is perfect, this Guide is associated with tailings management and provides a
intended to be part of the continual improvement process roadmap to the continual improvement of tailings safety
of the mining industry. at both new and existing facilities. To be consistent with
this safety culture, tailings facilities should be designed,
The guidance is ultimately aimed at mitigating what can constructed, operated and closed to such high standards
perhaps be the greatest risk factor: the human element. that the goal of eliminating fatalities and catastrophic events
Individuals, however professional and qualified, make is achieved.
judgements and decisions based on their own experiences
and biases. Embedded ignorance, which we all have, results Although regulators, investors, communities and others
from a lack of knowledge, or a failure to recognise internal have a role in this cultural shift, the responsibility resides
weaknesses or limitations. Complacency, over-confidence, primarily with the Operators of mines and the associated
competing priorities and the loss of corporate knowledge tailings facilities.
over time can be compounding factors.
1.1.3 Objectives
A systematic, comprehensive approach to tailings
management, with checks and balances, helps to reduce This Guide is intended to support the safe and responsible
the risk that the human element can ultimately lead to management of tailings across the global mining industry,
ineffective tailings management, or worse, the failure with the ultimate goal of eliminating fatalities and
of a tailings facility. The implementation of a systematic catastrophic events.
approach will help to prevent human error.
It provides guidance on good governance and good
engineering practices that will support continual
improvement in the management of tailings facilities and
help to foster and strengthen a corporate safety culture.

8 International Council on Mining and Metals

 Back to contents

The Guide: While the objective is focused primarily on preventing

catastrophic failures, the guidance is equally applicable to
• Is informed by the requirements of the Global Industry
a wide range of other potential risks associated with the
Standard on Tailings Management (the Standard) and the
management of tailings facilities.
commitments in ICMM’s Tailings Governance Framework
Position Statement. It will help Operators work through
how to integrate these into their own programmes.
• Promotes good engineering practices for tailings
management, including a performance-based approach
where appropriate.
• Provides an overview of good practices and, as such, does In Detail
not generate additional requirements beyond those within
A tailings facility is a facility that is designed and
the Standard.
managed to contain the tailings produced by a mine.
• Should not be used to assess conformance against the A tailings facility includes the collective engineered
Standard, which is the purpose of the Conformance structures, components and equipment involved in
Protocols. Some examples in the Conformance Protocols the management of tailings solids, other mine waste
draw upon and refer to related sections of the Guide. managed with tailings (eg waste rock, water treatment
residues), and any water managed in the facility,
In keeping with these objectives, the Guide presents including pore fluid, any ponds, and surface water
recommendations, not requirements. The use of the word inflows and discharges.
‘should’ is intended to mean ‘recommended’ not ‘must’.
The guidance is applicable to tailings facilities as a
1.1.4 Scope of Application of the Guide whole, not just tailings embankments, excluding riverine
The Guide describes good governance and good engineering systems and other types of facilities such as fresh and
practices for tailings management and may be applied to: process water dams, stockpiles, etc. This distinction is
important because while the design, construction and
• The management of tailings facilities worldwide, including
operation of embankments is a very important factor
those operated or maintained by State agencies.
in influencing the safety of tailings facilities, it is not
• New and existing tailings facilities throughout all phases the only factor. For example, aspects related to water
and activities of the lifecycle (Section 1.2.1), from the management (eg seepage, surface water) can be very
Project Conception phase for future tailings facilities, to important in ensuring safe tailings management.
facilities that have been inactive for many years, and to
those which have been closed.

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 9

 1.1 INTRODUCTION

1.1.5 Intended Audience The Framework focuses on six elements of tailings

management and governance that are key to minimising
The audience for the Guide is broad, in keeping with
the likelihood of a catastrophic tailings failure happening:
the breadth of the objective and scope of application
of the Guide. 1. Accountability, Responsibility and Competency.
As a document prepared by ICMM, the primary audience of 2. Planning and Resourcing.
the Guide is ICMM member companies. However, this Guide 3. Risk Management.
is intended to facilitate safe tailings management worldwide. 4. Change Management.
Thus, it is intended to support all Operators in improving
5. Emergency Preparedness and Response.
their practices to meet the goal of eliminating fatalities and
catastrophic events. 6. Review and Assurance.

In addition to ICMM member companies, and consistent While this guidance builds upon the Framework it is more
with the Standard, the audience includes: comprehensive in scope and is intended to be applied site-
specifically. In developing this guidance, ICMM used existing,
• Operators of all tailings facilities, including non-ICMM
well-established external resources as a starting point.
Operators, and their employees and contractors across
Thus, while this Guide represents a new level of detail for
the organisation with roles and responsibilities related to
guidance prepared by ICMM, it reflects more than 20 years of
tailings management, from senior management/board level
experience in the development and implementation of other
leadership to personnel at the site level.
external resources to support tailings management (eg
• Consultants and others providing services (eg tailings Mining Association of Canada (MAC)).
facility design) to Operators related to tailings management.
• Investors, insurers and others with the ability to directly The Tailings Governance Framework and existing guidance
influence improved industry performance through access to from MAC are focused primarily on tailings management
funding or other means. governance and do not address design and other technical
elements related to tailings management. Technical
This Guide may also be of interest to community resources for tailings facilities are available from several
organisations, non-government organisations and other sources (eg International Commission on Large Dams,
stakeholders that may be affected by tailings management, Canadian Dam Association, Australian National Committee
providing them with information on leading practices in on Large Dams).
tailings management so that they are better informed in
their engagement with Operators. In delivering the Sixth Victor de Mello Lecture, in Brazil in
2018, Prof Norbert Morgenstern, a highly esteemed expert
This guidance does not replace professional expertise or on tailings facility safety, identified significant shortcomings
jurisdictionally specific legal requirements. Operators should in current practices related to tailings management. While
obtain qualified professional advice throughout the lifecycle he identified good practices related to the governance of
to be sure that each tailings facility’s specific conditions are tailings management (ie MAC guidance), he identified an
understood and addressed, and that the facility is planned, urgent need for improved technical and engineering practice,
designed, constructed, operated and closed in a safe and integrated with stronger governance, in order to improve
responsible manner. tailings safety across the industry. A key component of his
lecture was an outline of a tailings management system
1.1.6 Basis for the Guide (TMS) for Performance-Based Risk-Informed, Safe Design,
Construction, Operation and Closure of tailings facilities
In 2016, ICMM released a Position Statement on Preventing (PBRISD). He recommended that ‘ICMM support the tailings
Catastrophic Failure of Tailings Storage Facilities that management system based on PBRISD, as outlined here, and
included a Tailings Governance Framework (the Framework). fund the development and publication of a guidance document
The Position Statement committed ICMM members to that would facilitate its adoption in mining practice’.
implement practices consistent with the Framework.
 

10 International Council on Mining and Metals

1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE GUIDE Back to contents

1.2.1 Tailings Management Lifecycle Tailings management does not occur in isolation from the
other activities that occur at mine sites. Tailings production
Having a common understanding of the lifecycle of tailings
is ‘downstream’ of many steps in the mining process and a
management is important for applying this guidance and
wide range of decisions related to the overall process that
the requirements of the Standard. The lifecycle of a tailings
can impact tailings management are often made without
facility encompasses all the activities across the life of
sufficient consideration of those potential impacts. For
a tailings facility, from the earliest stages of the Project
example, decisions about waste rock management, ore
Conception phase through to the Closure and Post-Closure
processing and water management often have significant
phases. It is determined on a site-specific basis by a wide
implications for tailings management. Similarly, decisions
range of factors and is always subject to change. The
related to tailings management are sometimes taken
lifecycle consists of six phases or activities:
without adequate consideration of other plans. A failure to
recognise these relationships and potential impacts and
1. Project Conception1
to plan accordingly can compromise the objective of safe
2. Design tailings management.
3. Construction
4. Operations Throughout the lifecycle, an integrated approach to mine
planning is essential to safe tailings management. This
5. Closure
involves integrating the planning of all aspects of the mine
6. Post-Closure. that can impact tailings management (Section 3.2.2), such as
ore extraction and processing, sitewide water management
The relationship between these phases or activities is dynamic and the management of waste rock. For new tailings
and rarely linear. In addition, the lifecycle of a tailings facility facilities and proposed mine life extensions, this includes
can last for many decades to reach the end of the Operating integrating planning for tailings management into the
phase, and centuries beyond for the Post-Closure phase. development of Pre-Scoping, Scoping, Pre-Feasibility and
Feasibility Studies.
Throughout the lifecycle, change can be a key source of risk
for tailings facilities and needs to be effectively managed Such an integrated approach should be adopted for both
(Section 2.3.2). Consequently, it is important that Operators new facilities and existing facilities, to help to ensure that
recognise and plan for a dynamic lifecycle and implement a decisions are aligned with the short-, medium- and long-
TMS throughout the lifecycle (Sections 1.2.2.1 and 2.3). term objectives of tailings management.

In Detail
Project Conception: A recurring lifecycle activity that is the technologies to be applied) to select a preferred
first step in the planning and design of: alternative to advance to the Design phase. Lifecycle
• Construction and Operations phases of new tailings cost estimates are developed as per the Operator’s
facilities. corporate guidelines.
• Closure and Post-Closure phases of tailings facilities.
Design: A recurring lifecycle activity that builds upon
• Any material changes to the design or operation of the decisions made during the Project Conception
tailings facilities. phase. Once a preferred alternative has been selected,
• Re-commissioning of an existing tailings facility for a all aspects of that alternative are designed in detail,
mine re-opening. based on the design intent and defined performance
objectives. More detailed lifecycle cost estimates
Project Conception consists of the analysis of a range are developed as per the Operator’s corporate
of alternatives (eg location of a new tailings facility, guidelines.

1. For new tailings facilities, the Project Conception and Design phases encompass key steps in the mine planning process: Pre-Scoping Study, Scoping Study, Pre-
Feasibility Study, and Feasibility. Thus, just as conceptual mine planning begins at the pre-scoping and scoping steps, planning for tailings management should also
begin at these steps. However, for Project Conception and Design activities related to proposed material changes or closure planning, there may not be corresponding
Pre-Scoping, Scoping, Pre-Feasibility and Feasibility studies for the broader mine planning process.

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 11

 1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE GUIDE

Construction: A recurring lifecycle activity that includes: Closure: This lifecycle phase begins when deposition of
• Initial construction prior to the start-up of a new tailings tailings into the tailings facility ceases permanently and
facility (eg starter embankment, pipelines for tailings the closure plan is implemented, including:
transport, water management infrastructure). • Transitioning from the Operations phase to the Closure
• Ongoing construction through the Operations phase and the Post-Closure phase.
phase to increase the capacity of the tailings facility • Removal of infrastructure such as pipelines.
(eg facility raises). • Changes to water management or treatment.
• Construction of covers, recontouring or revegetation
Construction may also include:
of tailings and any embankments or other structural
• Construction for any material changes (eg increase elements.
capacity beyond original design intent, buttress to
• Other reclamation and decommissioning activities.
strengthen an embankment).
• Construction during the Closure phase (eg installation While Closure is a discrete lifecycle phase, closure
of covers, water management infrastructure). planning is part of an integrated approach to mine
planning. It is a lifecycle activity that should begin as early
Operations: The period in the lifecycle when tailings as possible and be conducted iteratively throughout the
are transported to and deposited in the tailings lifecycle. The project conception and design process should
facility, inclusive of any periods of inactivity prior to be used to develop the closure plan and an executable
the commencement of implementation of the closure design for closure.
plan. Construction is typically ongoing throughout the
Operations phase. In addition, progressive reclamation in Post-Closure: This lifecycle phase begins when the closure
preparation for closure and consistent with the closure plan has been implemented and the tailings facility has
plan may occur during the Operations phase. In some transitioned to long-term maintenance and surveillance.
cases, after the end of the active deposition of tailings, The Post-Closure phase has to address all the aspects of
tailings may be removed from the tailings facility for safety and environmental compliance related to long-term
reprocessing or other uses. Such activity would also be stability and legal requirements.
considered Operations.
During the Closure or Post-Closure phases, tailings
Temporary suspension of mine operations: A period in facilities could return to the Operations phase. In addition,
the lifecycle when mine operations have been suspended tailings could be removed for reprocessing to recover
and tailings are not being deposited into the tailings additional commodities of value, or to be used for other
facility. The suspension may be short-term (eg temporary purposes (eg construction material).
suspension due to wildfires, labour disruption) or of a longer,
indeterminate duration (eg due to low commodity prices). In some jurisdictions, during the Post-Closure phase,
responsibility for a tailings facility may transfer from the
During temporary suspension, maintenance and Operator to jurisdictional control.
surveillance continue and some operation activities (eg
active water management) may also continue. The closure The tailings management lifecycle is illustrated in
plan is not implemented. However, temporary suspension Figure 1.
may lead to closure in some cases.

12 International Council on Mining and Metals

 Back to contents

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management of tailings,

water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Temporary Suspension

Project
Design Construction Operations Closure Post-Closure
Conception

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The orange boxes and dotted lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

Figure 1: The tailings management lifecycle

1.2.2 Core Elements of Safe Tailings Management • Good engineering practices, including a risk-informed
approach throughout the lifecycle, are needed to
A comprehensive, holistic approach is needed across the
improve the safety of tailings facilities. In some cases,
lifecycle for the safe and responsible management of
improvement can be achieved through enhancing current
tailings. This encompasses two inter-related core elements:
practices. In other cases, the adoption of a performance-
• Governance of tailings management (further described based approach will provide a more rigorous technical
in Part 2). basis for decision-making across the lifecycle.
• Implementation of good engineering practices for tailings
management across the lifecycle (further described in Implementing these elements together helps to achieve
Part 3). the best outcomes for tailings management and helps to
ensure effective communication. Most importantly, this
These elements are equally vital to the safe and responsible approach helps to mitigate the human element in tailings
management of tailings and should be implemented management and reduce the likelihood that human error
together in a fully integrated manner throughout all the will lead to ineffective tailings management, or worse, the
phases of the lifecycle. They each fulfil a different but failure of a tailings facility.
essential role:
• Effective governance of tailings management ensures 1.2.2.1 Governance of Tailings Management
accountability for decisions, provides a management Governance of tailings management refers to the
structure with checks and balances for decision-making, organisational structures, processes, procedures and
provides the means to effectively manage tailings on a communication channels that a company puts in place
day-to-day basis, and provides input to mechanisms to to ensure the effective management, oversight and
respond effectively if an emergency occurs. accountability for tailings.

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 13

 1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE GUIDE

Effective governance provides an essential foundation for all • Provides a mechanism to systematically and rigorously
activities and decisions related to tailings management, and implement the other elements described in this guidance
ultimately for managing risk. to implement good engineering practice.

Governance of tailings management is inclusive of the Operation, maintenance and surveillance (OMS) activities
following elements: are essential to the day-to-day implementation of the TMS
and engineering practices for safe tailings management
Accountability and responsibility: Operators should assign (Section 2.4). Without OMS, an Operator has no effective
and deliver on accountability and responsibility for tailings control of tailings management.
management to provide the foundation for good governance
and decision-making (Section 2.2.2). The Operator should Managing information: Good information is essential
designate one or more Accountable Executive(s) who is/ to good governance and decision-making (Section 2.5).
are directly answerable to the Chief Executive Officer Preparing, maintaining and updating documentation of
(CEO), communicate(s) with the Board of Directors (BoD), information on all aspects of tailings management is
and who is/are accountable for the safety of tailings critical to providing a basis for current and future decisions,
facilities and for minimising the social and environmental managing change, and for fully understanding and effectively
consequences of a potential tailings facility failure. The managing risks. This includes documentation describing key
Accountable Executive(s) may delegate responsibilities but aspects related to:
not accountability. Conversely, delegation of responsibility • Tailings management governance.
to competent personnel is essential to the effective delivery
• Planning, design, construction, operation and closure
of all tasks and activities related to tailings management.
of a tailings facility.
Personnel with accountability, responsibility or authority
related to tailings management should have the necessary
Programme for reviewing tailings safety: Operators
competencies and experience, commensurate to their level
should implement a programme for reviewing the safety
of accountability and responsibility.
of tailings facilities that provides expert oversight of tailings
management activities and the safety of a tailings facility
Corporate policy on tailings management: Operators
(Section 2.6). Such a programme, including Independent
should develop a corporate policy on tailings management
Review, should be applied throughout the lifecycle.
that is aligned with the declaration of a corporate safety
culture, providing a basis and overall direction for safe
Emergency preparedness: Notwithstanding the obligation
tailings management (Section 2.2.3). Recognising that
to design and operate safe tailings facilities, Operators
safe tailings management is a core business function,
need to be prepared in the event that an emergency occurs
the planning of which should be closely integrated with
related to tailings management. As part of sitewide plans for
related activities such as ore extraction and processing,
emergency preparedness, Operators should develop and test
the corporate policy on tailings management should be
plans for potential emergencies related to tailings to help
recognised in the overall business case for the mine and
to ensure a timely and effective response if an emergency
integrated into sitewide policies, objectives and plans.
occurs (Section 2.7).
Tailings Management System (TMS): Operators should
develop and implement site-specific TMSs and apply
1.2.2.2 Implementation of Good Engineering
them across the lifecycle (Section 2.3). Based on the Plan- Practices for Tailings Management
Do-Check-Act cycle of management systems, a TMS There are many facets to engineering practices related
is a comprehensive framework to integrate the people, to tailings management, including:
resources, processes and practices related to tailings
• Recognising and managing uncertainty.
management to help Operators achieve their performance
objectives, manage risk and ensure safe, responsible • Project conception and design.
management of tailings. The TMS should be aligned and • Integrated mine planning.
integrated with other relevant site-level systems, such as • Designing and operating for closure.
a sitewide environmental and social management system
(ESMS) and systems related to water management. Recognising and Managing Uncertainty
Understanding and managing risk is fundamental to the
A TMS: safe management of tailings but subject to significant
• Encompasses governance and decision-making related to uncertainty.
tailings management.

14 International Council on Mining and Metals

 Back to contents

Risk is a frequently used but often misunderstood concept. uncertainty. Site-specific surveillance programmes
It is important to emphasise that assessing risk involves the should be designed and implemented (Section 2.4.3.4) to
consideration of both the potential consequences of an event provide the information (eg data, observations, results of
and the probability or likelihood of that event occurring. Risk inspections) needed to accurately assess on an ongoing
should not be confused with consequence, nor should these basis whether the risk management plan is effective.
terms be used interchangeably. Results from surveillance and input from reviews, together
with updates to the risk assessment process, should be
Risk assessment involves a process of risk identification, used to identify:
risk analysis and risk evaluation. Available information is first – Variances from performance criteria indicative of
used to identify and describe the risks (risk identification) potential upset or emergency conditions.
and estimate the magnitude of the risks to individuals or – Deficiencies in performance or practice that should be
populations, property or the environment (risk analysis). addressed.
The acceptability of the risks is then evaluated considering – Opportunities for continual improvement.
the potential consequences for health and safety, social,
environmental, financial and other factors that may occur A risk-informed approach may include the use of:
(risk evaluation). Once the risks have been assessed, risk • Surveillance results to verify whether the tailings facility is
management plans are developed to eliminate, reduce or behaving as per the design and adjusting accordingly.
mitigate, and communicate the risks.
• Numerical models of tailings facility performance based
on surveillance and site characterisation data to validate
Uncertainty is inherent in the analysis and evaluation of risks
assumptions about the facility design and predict future
related to tailings facilities. Uncertainty may be related to
performance. Outputs from these models can be used to
many factors, such as the natural variability of the foundation
inform changes to the design or operating practices to
and construction materials for a proposed tailings facility,
improve performance and reduce risk.
design parameters, the accuracy of predictions of future
climate conditions, and the challenge of estimating the
Project Conception and Design of Tailings Facilities
likelihood of highly improbable events. As tailings facilities
The project conception and design of new tailings facilities,
are reliant on natural materials and processes, uncertainty
material changes, and the closure of tailings facilities build
in risk assessment may be greater than in other sectors (eg
upon a risk-informed approach (Sections 3.3 and 3.4). For
chemical industry) for which the variability and uncertainty
new facilities, the Project Conception phase is the first stage
regarding feedstock materials may be significantly less.
in the lifecycle for the potential elimination of risks. Once a
tailings facility has been designed and built, it may be much
An essential characteristic of managing risk is recognising
more difficult to eliminate the risks that exist, than if they
and acknowledging uncertainty, managing risk within
had been avoided in the Project Conception phase.
the limitations of that uncertainty and working to reduce
uncertainty. Implementing a risk-informed approach is key
During the Project Conception phase, site characterisation
to managing this uncertainty.
(Section 3.3.2) and risk assessment are used to inform
a process of identifying potential alternatives for the
A risk-informed approach involves planning, designing,
conceptual design of a tailings facility, and rigorously
operating and closing tailings facilities in a manner that is:
evaluate those alternatives (eg using multiple accounts
• Informed by the results of the risk assessment. Potential analysis (MAA)) to select the preferred alternative (Section
risks and related uncertainties associated with tailings 3.3.4). For example, for new tailings facilities, this would
management are identified, analysed and evaluated during include the alternative locations for a tailings facility and the
the Project Conception phase, re-assessed during the alternative technologies to be used. Both the location and
Design phase, and re-assessed periodically throughout the technology selected can have a strong influence on the
the lifecycle. risks that will need to be managed. Thus, decisions made
• Intended to prevent or eliminate risks to the extent during the Project Conception phase may prove to be some
possible and to effectively manage those risks that remain of the most important in the entire lifecycle of a tailings
by developing a robust tailings facility design with less facility. The importance of this phase cannot be overstated.
uncertainty in design criteria.
• Informed by improved site characterisation, the The preferred alternative is then designed in detail, taking
results of surveillance, input from the programme for into account factors including:
reviewing facility safety (Section 2.6), and updates to the • Site-specifically appropriate design criteria (Section 3.4.3).
risk assessment process, all of which help to reduce

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 15

 1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE GUIDE

• Site-specific performance objectives and indicators Alternatively, designing tailings facilities with the objectives
(Section 3.3.3). of closure in mind from the outset, and incorporating those
• Credible failure modes identified through the risk objectives in the performance objectives for the tailings
assessment process and means to address those failure facility, can help to reduce long-term risks and reduce the
modes in the design (Section 3.4.3.10). liabilities associated with closure. This includes designing,
operating and closing tailings facilities in a manner
• Continued improvements in site characterisation
that results in them becoming engineered landforms –
information and models.
structures that mimic natural landforms – to increase their
• Where appropriate, the application of a performance- long-term stability and make them more resilient not only
based approach to design that uses the results of to the risk of failure, but also more resilient to gradual
numerical modelling of various aspects of the tailings deterioration due to erosion. An engineered landform also
facility performance to inform and refine the design has much lower long-term maintenance and surveillance
(Section 3.4.3.6). requirements.
• Refinements to the risk assessment, including reducing
uncertainty associated with the risk assessment Designing for closure builds upon integrated mine
(Section 3.4.2). planning, as a holistic approach to mine planning, design
and operation may be needed to achieve the objectives of
Designing and Operating for Closure designing for closure. This should be recognised early in the
Tailings facilities may continue to pose risks long after the Project Conception phase.
Operations phase has ended, and after the closure plan has
been implemented. The development and implementation of For existing tailings facilities that were not originally
closure plans is critical to mitigating these risks. However, designed with closure in mind, Operators may consider
relying solely on the implementation of the closure plan to changes to the design or practices that can be implemented
achieve closure objectives may limit the capacity to reduce during the Operations phase to reduce risk and better
long-term risks and liabilities in the Closure and Post- position the tailings facility for closure.
Closure phases.

16 International Council on Mining and Metals

1.3 RELATIONSHIP TO THE Back to contents

GLOBAL INDUSTRY STANDARD ON

TAILINGS MANAGEMENT, THE
CONFORMANCE PROTOCOLS & THE
TAILINGS GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK

1.3.1 Relationship to the Global Industry Standard peoples; and the establishment of effective grievance
on Tailings Management and ICMM Conformance mechanisms to address the complaints and grievances of
Protocols for the Global Industry Standard on project-affected people. All of these are adequately covered
by existing sources of ICMM guidance.
Tailings Management
As noted earlier (Section 1.1.3), this Guide has been Two principles from the Standard that require some
informed by the Standard and will help Operators to work further explanation are Principles 2 and 3 that deal with
through how to integrate the related requirements or the development and use of an integrated knowledge base.
commitments into their own programmes. The Guide should The concept of a ‘knowledge base’ is addressed in ICMM’s
not be used to assess conformance against the Standard, Integrated Mine Closure: Good Practice Guide, and the
which is the purpose of the ICMM Conformance Protocols for basic approach is transferrable to tailings management. It
the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management (The involves developing, documenting and periodically updating
Conformance Protocols). information about the social, environmental and local
economic context of the tailings facility, to support informed
The Conformance Protocols have been developed to enable
decision-making across the tailings facility lifecycle.
conformance to be assessed and to support the integration
This should be undertaken using approaches aligned
of the Standard into ICMM’s existing assurance processes
with international good practice and designed to capture
for its member commitments. The Conformance Protocols
uncertainties due to climate change. In terms of updating
support either self-assessments or independent third-
the knowledge base, this should be revisited at least every
party assessments of progress with implementing the
five years, and whenever there is a material change to the
Standard and ultimately conformance. It details clearly and
tailings facility or to the social, environmental and local
concisely criteria that assessors expect to see evidenced for
economic context.
conformance to be assessed, with illustrative examples of
evidence and explanatory notes as appropriate. It is available
Other aspects of the knowledge base such as developing,
to be used by company members (or non-members) or
documenting and updating detailed site characterisations
suitably qualified independent third parties and maps to the
of tailings facility sites for a range of criteria or the conduct
Standard and its 77 requirements.
and periodic updating of breach analysis are addressed in
this Guide.
The social and environmental requirements of the Standard
are referred to within this Guide, but the intention is that
these are largely addressed by reference to existing guidance
1.3.2 Implementation of the ICMM Tailings
from ICMM. Where appropriate, these other sources of Governance Framework
guidance are referred to within this Guide and within the This Guide builds upon the ICMM Tailings Governance
Conformance Protocols. Framework Position Statement (the Framework) and will
support implementation of the Framework. The Position
For example, Principle 1 of the Standard includes Statement commits members to implement practices
requirements relating to: respect for human rights and consistent with the Framework, which consists of six
related due diligence; working to obtain and maintain the elements of tailings management and governance. These
Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of indigenous or elements are described below, together with corresponding
tribal peoples; meaningful engagement of project-affected sections of the Guide that support implementation.

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 17

 1.3 RELATIONSHIP TO THE
GLOBAL INDUSTRY STANDARD
ON TAILINGS MANAGEMENT, THE
CONFORMANCE PROTOCOLS & THE
TAILINGS GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK

ICMM Tailings Governance Framework Corresponding Sections in the ICMM Good Practice Guide
Accountability, Responsibility and Competency: Section 2.2.2: Accountability and Responsibility
Accountabilities, responsibilities and associated Section 2.2.4: Competency and Promoting Continual
competencies are defined to support appropriate Learning
identification and management of tailings facility risks.
Section 2.2.6: Communication
• Accountability for the overall governance of tailings
Section 2.3: Tailings Management System
facilities resides with the owners and operators.*
Section 2.4: Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance
• Organisational structures and roles are established
to support management of tailings facility risks and
governance accountability.
• Communication processes are maintained to ensure that
personnel understand their responsibilities. Training is
conducted to maintain currency of knowledge and skills.
• Role competency and experience requirements
are defined for critical roles within the established
organisational structures.

* The ICMM Position Statement uses the terms owners and

operators. This Guide uses the term Operators. As defined
in the Glossary, Operators is inclusive of owners and
operators as described in the Position Statement.
Planning and Resourcing: Section 2.2.3: Corporate Policy on Tailings Management
The financial and human resources needed to support Section 2.3.2.3: Resources
continued tailings facility management and governance are
maintained throughout a facility’s lifecycle.
• Tailings facility operating and capital costs, and human
resource needs, are included in relevant business
planning processes.
• Resources necessary to implement and maintain
activities within this governance Framework are provided.
Risk Management: Section 1.2.2: Core Elements of Safe Tailings Management
Risk management associated with tailings facilities Section 2.2.2: Accountability and Responsibility
includes risk identification, an appropriate control regime
Section 2.2.4: Competency and Promoting Continual
and the verification of control performance.
Learning
• Risk controls and their associated verification activities
Section 2.3: Tailings Management System
are identified based on failure modes and their
associated consequences and evaluated on a tailings Section 2.4: Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance
facility-specific basis considering all phases of the Section 2.7.2: Assessing Credible Potential Consequences
tailings facility lifecycle. Section 3.2.4: Managing Uncertainty and Risk
• Suitably qualified and experienced experts are involved Section 3.3: Projection Conception
in tailings facility risk identification and analysis, as well
Section 3.4: Design
as in the development and review of effectiveness of the
associated controls. Section 3.6: Operations
• Performance criteria are established for risk controls Section 3.7: Closure and Post-Closure
and their associated monitoring, internal reporting and
verification activities.

18 International Council on Mining and Metals

 Back to contents

ICMM Tailings Governance Framework Corresponding Sections in the ICMM Good Practice Guide
Change Management: Section 2.2.2: Accountability and Responsibility
Risks associated with potential changes are assessed, Section 2.3: Tailings Management System
controlled and communicated to avoid inadvertently
Section 2.5: Managing Information
compromising tailings facility integrity.
Section 3.2.4: Managing Risk and Uncertainty
• Processes are applied that involve the identification,
assessment, control and communication of risks to Section 3.3: Projection Conception
tailings facility integrity arising from both internally- Section 3.4: Design
driven and externally-driven change, to avoid introducing Section 3.5: Construction
uncertain, unacceptable, and/or unmanaged risks.
Section 3.6: Operations
• Documents and records that support tailings facility
Section 3.7: Closure and Post-Closure
planning, design, construction, operation, surveillance,
management and governance are maintained and kept
suitably current and accessible.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Section 2.4: Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance
Processes are in place to recognise and respond to Section 2.7: Emergency Preparedness and Response
impending failure of tailings facilities and mitigate the
Section 3.6: Operations
potential impacts arising from a potentially catastrophic
failure.
• Action thresholds and their corresponding response to
early warning signs of potential catastrophic failure are
established.
• Emergency preparedness and response plans are
established commensurate with potential failure
consequences. Such plans specify roles, responsibilities
and communication procedures.
• Emergency preparedness and response plans are
periodically tested.
Review and Assurance: Section 2.3: Tailings Management System
Internal and external review and assurance processes are Section 2.4: Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance
in place so that controls for tailings facility risks can be
Section 2.6: Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety
comprehensively assessed and continually improved.
• Internal performance monitoring and inspections
and internal and external reviews and assurance are
conducted commensurate with consequences of tailings
facility failure to evaluate and to continually improve the
effectiveness of risk controls.
• Outcomes and actions arising from tailings facility review
and assurance processes are recorded, reviewed, closed-
out and communicated.
• Performance of risk management programmes for
tailings facilities is reported to executive management
on a regular basis.

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 19

 1.3 RELATIONSHIP TO THE
GLOBAL INDUSTRY STANDARD
ON TAILINGS MANAGEMENT, THE
CONFORMANCE PROTOCOLS & THE
TAILINGS GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK

1.3.3 Relationship between the Guide, the Standard, implementation of many requirements within the Standard.
the Conformance Protocols and the Tailings It also supports the implementation of the commitments
Governance Framework within the Tailings Governance Framework Position
Statement. In addition, the Guide also refers to other sources
The relationship between the Standard and ICMM’s tailings- of ICMM guidance that help to support implementation of
related documents (discussed in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2) is some of the environmental and social requirements of the
illustrated in Figure 2 and may be summarised as follows. Standard (primarily under Principles 1–3 of the Standard).

The two documents that include the commitments of Lastly, the ICMM Conformance Protocols (bottom left
membership are illustrated on the top of Figure 2. The six of Figure 2) support either self-assessments or
commitments in the Tailings Governance Framework Position independent third-party assessments of progress with
Statement on tailings management and governance (see top implementing the Standard (as described in Section 1.3.1
left of Figure 2) pre-date the requirements of the Standard above). Where appropriate, the Protocols refer to related
which adequately addresses them. More broadly, the Standard sections of the Guide.
(top right of Figure 2) outlines seventy-seven Requirements
for responsible tailings management, under fifteen Principles The relationship between the Standard, supporting guidance
that cover six Topic areas. The Standard has helped to inform from ICMM (and other authoritative sources of guidance
the development of this Guide (top right of Figure 2). by organisations such as MAC) and technical guidelines
produced by reputable technical organisations such as those
In turn, this Guide supports the interpretation and focused on dams is shown in Figure 3.

Outlines
commitments for 6
key elements of
1 Informed requirements
within the Standard
GLOBAL INDUSTRY
STANDARD ON
TAILINGS
MANAGEMENT
2 Outlines 77
requirements for
responsible tailings
tailings management
AUGUST 2020

management and
governance

Tailings Governance Framework i

Supports Enables Helped to Supports

implementation of the conformance with inform interpretation and
position statement the Standard to be development of implementation of
commitments assessed the Guide many requirements

Supports self-
4 3 Provides guidance on
May 2021 May 2021

assessments good governance and

and third-party engineering practices
assessments of for responsible tailings
progress with management
implementing Draws upon and refers to
Note: Also refers to other
relevant sources of ICMM
the Standard CONFORMANCE related sections of Guide TAILINGS
guidance that support
PROTOCOLS MANAGEMENT
Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management Good Practice Guide
implementation

Figure 2: Relationship between key documents

20 International Council on Mining and Metals

 Back to contents

GLOBAL INDUSTRY
STANDARD ON
TAILINGS
MANAGEMENT
AUGUST 2020

Tailings Governance Framework i

• Requirements of Standard
Specific • Commitments in ICMM position statement
Commitments  on Tailings Governance

• ICMM Tailings Management Good Practice

Supporting Guide and Conformance Protocols
Guidance • Other ICMM guides that deal with relevant
environmental and social requirements

• Technical guidelines from ICOLD,

ANCOLD, CDA, JCOLD, SANCOLD, etc.
Technical
Guidelines

Figure 3: Increasing levels of detail between specific commitments, supporting guidance and technical guidelines

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 21

 PART 2: GOVERNANCE OF
TAILINGS MANAGEMENT

22 International Council on Mining and Metals

2.1 OVERVIEW Back to contents

The governance of tailings management as described in this Guide is

consistent with the Standard and refers to the organisational structures.
Governance refers to the processes, procedures and communication
channels that a company puts in place to ensure the effective management,
oversight and accountability for tailings.

Effective governance is essential to safe and responsible • Programme for reviewing tailings safety
tailings management. Elements of governance include: • Emergency preparedness and response
• Accountability, a corporate policy and related elements: planning (EPRP).
– Competency and training
– Community engagement These governance elements provide an essential
– Communication framework within which all other activities related to
• Tailings management system (TMS) tailings management are conducted. To be effective,
the governance of tailings management must come first,
• Operation, maintenance, and surveillance (OMS) activities
with all other activities conducted within that framework.
• Managing information
 

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 23

 2.2 ACCOUNTABILITY, POLICY
& RELATED ELEMENTS

2.2.1 Introduction and for the completion of specified deliverables or tasks

in accordance with defined expectations. An accountable
Role clarity is critical to the safe management of tailings.
person may delegate responsibility for the completion of the
From defining policy at the corporate level to implementing
deliverable or task but not the accountability.
regular measurements in the field at the technician’s level,
and for every task in between, clear roles and responsibilities Responsibility: The duty or obligation of an individual
enhance individual ownership of assigned scope. or organisation to perform an assigned duty or task in
accordance with defined expectations, and which has a
Accountability, which cannot be delegated, should be
consequence if the expectations are not met. An individual or
underpinned by the Operator’s commitment to the safe
organisation with responsibility is accountable to the person
management of tailings, including providing the resources
that delegated that responsibility to them.
(eg financial, personnel) needed to support both the
short- and long-term objectives for safe and responsible Authority: The power to make decisions, assign
tailings management. responsibilities, or delegate some or all authority, as
appropriate. The ability to act on behalf of the Operator.
The circumstances of each Operator and tailings facility vary,
and the governance and organisational structure should be Personnel with accountability and responsibility for all
appropriately tailored to suit each facility. At a minimum, the decisions related to tailings management should be
Operator should: identified and in place. Decisions should be made by persons
• Define and document accountabilities and responsibilities who have clear accountability or responsibility and who are
related to tailings management for the: appropriately qualified and experienced. Those persons with
– BoD. defined accountability and responsibility should also have
– Accountable Executive. the authority to make decisions commensurate with their
– Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer (RTFE). level of responsibility. The Accountable Executive should
– Engineer of Record (EOR) and Design Team have clear authority commensurate with their accountability
(Section 2.2.2). and in cases where they need funding authorisations
• Establish and maintain a corporate policy on tailings beyond their authority, they should have access to and
management through the BoD. communication with those who can provide authorisation in
a timely manner.
• Understand the competencies required for tailings
management and ensure that relevant personnel Persons with accountability, responsibility and authority
(employees, contractors and consultants) have those for tailings management should have an understanding
competencies. – appropriate to their accountability, responsibility and
• Engage local communities on matters related to authority level – of how the tailings facility is planned,
tailings management, including potential risks to those designed, constructed and operated and how it will be
communities. closed. This includes the risks posed by the tailings, the risk
• Integrate activities and communicate effectively, both management process and operational constraints.
internally (eg between different business units) and
externally, on matters related to tailings management. For persons with accountability, responsibility and
authority for tailings management, incentive payments or
• Share information about tailings management
performance reviews should at least in part be based on
with regulators, communities, investors and other
public safety and the integrity of tailings facilities. Incentive
external parties.
payments should reflect the degree to which public safety
and the integrity of the tailings facility are part of the role.
2.2.2 Accountability and Responsibility Long-term incentives for relevant executive managers
Accountability, responsibility and authority are closely related should also take tailings management into account.
concepts. The difference between them is critical but is
sometimes not clearly understood. The usage of these terms To enhance clarity of roles and responsibilities, an Operator
in this Guide is defined as follows: may elect to use a tool such as a RACI (responsible,
accountable, consult and inform) matrix or a RASCI
Accountability: The answerability of an individual for their (responsible, accountable, support, consult and inform)
own performance and that of any personnel they direct, matrix to describe roles and relationships between

24 International Council on Mining and Metals

 Back to contents

employees and with contractors and consultants, including • Delegating responsibility and authority for tailings
the Engineer of Record (EOR) and the Design Team. management and defining the personnel responsibilities,
authority and reporting relationships to implement the
2.2.2.1 Board of Directors systems needed for safe, responsible tailings management
throughout the lifecycle.
While companies may be organised in different ways, this
Guide adopts the Standard’s definition of BoD. The ultimate • Delegating responsibility and authority for the development
governing body of the Operator is the BoD, which is typically of integrated closure plans to ensure facility integrity post-
elected by the shareholders of the Operator. The BoD is closure.
the entity with the final decision-making authority for the • Being aware of the key outcomes of tailings risk
Operator and holds the authority to, among other things, assessments and how these risks are being managed.
set the Operator’s policies, objectives and overall direction, • Being accountable for a programme of tailings
and oversee the firm’s executives. As the term is used management training and for emergency preparedness
here, it encompasses any individual or entity with control and response.
over the Operator, including, for example, the owner or
• Establishing a programme for reviewing tailings safety,
owners. Where the State serves as the Operator, the BoD is
including Independent Review.
understood to mean the government official with ultimate
responsibility for the final decisions of the Operator. • For new tailings facilities, approving that the design satisfies
the as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) principle
Accordingly, the Standard requires that the BoD adopt and approving additional steps to further reduce potential
and publish a policy on or commitment to the safety consequences to people and/or the environment, where
management of tailings facilities, to emergency appropriate.
preparedness and response, and to recovery after failure. • Having scheduled communication with the EOR.
• Encouraging open, transparent communication among
2.2.2.2 Accountable Executive all employees and contractors regarding concerns about
The BoD or CEO should designate one or more executive- tailings facility integrity, safety or compliance. Establishing
level person(s) to be the Accountable Executive(s), who is/ a formal, confidential and written process to receive,
are accountable for the safety of tailings facilities and for investigate and promptly address concerns from employees
minimising the social and environmental consequences of a and contractors about possible permit violations or other
potential tailings facility failure. The Accountable Executive(s) matters relating to regulatory compliance, public safety,
may delegate responsibilities for tailings management and tailings facility integrity or the environment.
the development and implementation of the systems needed
for safe, responsible tailings management but accountability
cannot be delegated. The Accountable Executive(s) is/are
directly answerable to the CEO (or to the BoD in the case that
a CEO is the Accountable Executive) on matters related to
tailings management and should have regular communication
with the BoD (initiated either by the BoD or the Accountable
Executive(s)). The mechanism for holding the Accountable
Executive(s) accountable should be documented. The role and
accountability of the BoD versus the Accountable Executive(s)
determined by the Operator and should also be documented.

Responsibilities of the Accountable Executive(s) include:

• Having accountability and responsibility for putting in place
an appropriate management structure.
• With authorisation from the BoD, ensures that the
necessary resources are in place for tailings management.
• Demonstrating to the BoD whether tailings are managed
responsibly and in accordance with applicable legal
requirements and standards.

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 25

 2.2 ACCOUNTABILITY, POLICY,
& RELATED ELEMENTS

The Accountable Executive(s) should embrace the use of Alternatively, there may be an RTFE at the corporate level, with
conservative external loading criteria as a guiding philosophy responsibility for more than one tailings facility.
for tailings facilities. Where appropriate, the Accountable
Executive(s) may decide to adopt lower design criteria if The RTFE liaises with the EOR and has regular
recommended by the EOR and endorsed by Independent communication with the Accountable Executive or their
Review, while maintaining the flexibility to upgrade the design delegate. The RTFE should also liaise with internal teams
for the highest consequence later in the facility’s lifecycle. with direct and indirect responsibilities related to tailings
management such as operations, planning, regulatory
The Accountable Executive(s) may be supported by a corporate affairs, social performance and the environment. The RTFE
expert(s) in tailings management to help oversee the should be familiar with the design, construction, operation
Operator’s portfolio of tailings facilities and to provide a bridge and performance of the tailings facility and have experience,
between the Accountable Executive(s) and the RTFE and EOR knowledge and competencies appropriate to the complexity of
for each tailings facility for which the Operator is responsible. the facility and the risks posed.

2.2.2.3 Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer The RTFE should have clearly defined, delegated
responsibilities for tailings management and should
As a minimum, the Operator should designate one RTFE for
have the appropriate competencies to carry out these
each tailings facility. The RTFE is accountable for the integrity
responsibilities. They should identify the scope of work and
of that tailings facility. During the Construction and Operations
budget requirements for all aspects of tailings management,
phases, an RTFE should be available at all times (although
including the EOR. The RTFE should delegate specific tasks
this person does not necessarily need to be located on site).
and responsibilities for aspects of tailings management to
qualified personnel.

In Detail
Examples of the responsibilities of a RTFE include: implementation of the closure plan at the end of the
• Coordinate their efforts through the Accountable Operations phase (Section 3.7).
Executive for an aligned approach to tailings governance • Maintain records related to design, construction and
for the Operator. OMS (Section 2.5).
• Implement the TMS (Section 2.3). • Ensure inspections (eg dam safety inspections or DSRs)
• Establish, with input from appropriate personnel, a budget are completed (Section 2.6).
for approval by the Accountable Executive or persons with • Review and update the OMS manual (Section 2.4).
delegated budget authority. • Ensure that emergency response plans are developed,
• With input from the Accountable Executive or persons maintained and tested, either as stand-alone plans or
with delegated responsibility, establish an organisational as components of sitewide emergency response plans
structure with roles and responsibilities that meets the directly related to tailings management (Section 2.7).
operational needs. • Implement measures to remedy variances from
• Establish a formal relationship with the EOR and Design performance objectives or criteria (Section 3.5, 3.6
Team to ensure that construction and operation meet the and 3.7).
design intent and are compliant with legal requirements • Implement a programme for reviewing tailings safety,
(Sections 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6). including Independent Review (Section 2.6).
• Ensure surveillance is undertaken in accordance with • Identify when/where contemplated operational changes
design intent, performance objectives and the risk are a potential deviation from the design intent and
management plan (Section 2.4). engage the EOR or Design Team as part of the process to
• Ensure the development of the tailings facility closure manage change (Sections 2.3, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7).
plan, implementation of progressive reclamation • Participate in or provide input to community engagement
as practicable during the Operations phase, and activities related to tailings management (Section 2.2.5).

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2.2.2.4 Engineer of Record and Design Team

The EOR is a fundamental role in the development and
management of safe tailings facilities. While this role can be
described using various terminology, at its core, the EOR role:
• Provides assurance to the Operator and relevant
regulatory authorities that the tailings facility design
conforms with and meets applicable regulations, statutes,
guidelines, codes and standards.
• Confirms that the facility has been constructed and is
being operated consistent with the design intent presented
in the design drawings, specifications and design basis
documentation.
• Provides critical, ongoing support during the Operations
phase and through the lifespan of the facility, confirming
that the facility is being safely operated and performing
as planned.

The purpose of the EOR role should be understood as a

means to ensure that business and operational decisions • Mechanisms to ensure that relevant personnel understand
made by the Operator are informed by an engineer who the role, responsibilities and authority of the EOR.
understands the design principles and technical limitations • Resources required for the EOR to fulfil the assigned role
of the tailings facility and the impact of changes on its safety and responsibilities, including financial resources, support
and performance. personnel required (and appropriate qualifications) and
other resources.
There are multiple models that can fulfil the role of EOR, and
• Specific deliverables to be provided by the EOR and
past practices for the engagement of an EOR have varied
associated schedules.
significantly in different countries and regions of the world.
This Guide recognises that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is
The EOR shares responsibility with the RTFE for assuring
impractical and acknowledges two basic models for fulfilling
to the Operator and other stakeholders that the facility
the role of EOR – an external EOR or an internal EOR – and
is constructed, operated, monitored and performing
that multiple variations of each model may exist.
according to the design criteria and intent, applicable design
standards, change management processes, risk controls,
It is up to each Operator to determine and document
relevant guidelines and accepted engineering practices.
the following:
All levels of the Operator’s organisation should understand
• EOR model best suited to their needs and their capacity. the responsibility and authority held by the EOR. The EOR
• Required qualifications and competencies for the EOR, should have regular, scheduled communication with the
and the process to ensure that these requirements are Accountable Executive or delegate. In addition, they should
met. have the ability to ultimately raise concerns directly with the
• Responsibility, authority and role of the EOR. Accountable Executive if necessary.
• Relationship between the EOR and the RTFE.
The EOR should have professional attributes aligned with
• Relationship between the EOR and the Design Team. the responsibilities required for the given tailings facility
• Relationship between the EOR and members of the inclusive of that facility’s complexity and precedence.
Operator’s technical and functional teams and contractors Selection of the appropriate person for the EOR role and
related to tailings management. ensuring this person has adequate support is fundamental
• Relationship between the EOR and the programme for to tailings facility safety.
reviewing tailings safety (eg role of the EOR in Independent
Review). Because the scope of an EOR for most tailings facilities is
so broad, implementation of the role typically requires the
• In cases where the Operator has more than one EOR with
combined expertise of an individual EOR and a supporting
responsibilities related to different embankments, the roles
multi-disciplinary team. This multi-disciplinary team
and responsibilities of each EOR should be clearly defined,
should be scaled according to the complexity of each facility.
together with the relationship between these EORs.
Regardless of how individual responsibilities are delegated

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 2.2 ACCOUNTABILITY, POLICY,
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among the various members of the team, the overarching Like the EOR, the Design Team members should have
responsibility for understanding the design concept and how professional attributes aligned with the responsibilities
it applies to the construction and successful operation of the required for the given tailings facility inclusive of that
facility resides with the individual appointed as EOR. facility’s complexity and precedence. The role of the EOR
with respect to design is further discussed in Section 3.4.
The Design Team develops the design of the tailings facility.
The work involved may include the initial design for a new Tailings facilities are long-lived structures that change
tailings facility, planned construction through the Operations throughout their lives and may require maintenance and
phase, and any material changes to the design of the tailings surveillance long after the original EOR has retired from
facility. The Operator should define and document the roles professional practice. Thus, managing change of the EOR
and responsibilities and relationship of the EOR relative is critical to the continuity of safe and responsible tailings
to the Design Team. As with the EOR, there are different management.
models for the Design Team. The Design Team may be
from the same firm as the EOR, which is helpful in terms Above all, the EOR needs to accept the commitment, be
of facilitating effective communication and collaboration. available when required, and communicate effectively with
In some instances, there may be a single or lead designer, the RTFE and Accountable Executive (or delegate). The EOR
sometimes referred to as the Designer of Record. In some needs to gain the confidence of the Independent Reviewer(s)
cases, the EOR may fulfil the design function. It is up to through demonstrated commitment and competent
the Operator, subject to any relevant legal requirements, responses to issues as they arise.
to determine the most appropriate approach.

In Detail
Examples of normal responsibilities carried by the EOR potential failure modes, and the identification of credible
include: failure modes.
• Documentation of information on the design, design • Participating in the development of the risk management
basis and design intent of the facility (Section 3.4.5). plan, including risk controls and critical controls and
• Providing guidance and oversight to the investigations associated surveillance.
and studies needed to adequately characterise the site • Overseeing or verifying quality management during
(Section 3.3.2). construction (Section 3.5).
• Identifying and providing oversight to the necessary • Preparing a periodic Deviance Accountability Report
design analyses as required to develop the design basis (DAR) (Section 3.5.3).
for the facility (Section 3.4.3). • Confirming that the tailings facility’s operation
• Providing responsible charge for reviewing and is compliant or identifying variances from
approving data analyses and deliverables prepared by performance criteria and advising the Operator with
Design Team, Operator or third parties. recommendations.
• Providing engineering analysis in support of the • Notifying the Accountable Executive (or delegate) in
development of the closure plan (Section 3.7). the event the EOR identifies any critical concerns or
• Providing input into the OMS manual and any significant outstanding concerns that have not
implementation of OMS activities (Section 2.4) in been adequately addressed by the RTFE or others with
accordance with the design. relevant responsibility and authority.
• Receiving and reviewing tailings facility performance • Advising on contemplated changes to the tailings
data at a frequency determined based on the risks. facility’s operation.
• Participating in periodic risk assessments (Sections 3.2 • Participating in inspections and Independent Review
and 3.4.2). (Section 2.6.4).
• Participating in the identification and evaluation of • Working with the RTFE, be responsible for preparation of

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or review of the Construction Records Report (CRR) Where procurement practices place a strong emphasis
(‘as-built’ report) and updates (Section 3.5.4). on competitive costs, this can result in breaking the
• Developing and maintaining relevant records related design into small segments for either economic or
to design, construction and operation, maintenance, other management objectives. This creates an
surveillance and closure (Section 2.5), and handing those unnecessary risk by not taking a holistic approach to
records over to the Operator. design. Thus, procurement policies that ensure experience
is adequately weighted in selecting the EOR and Design
With respect to managing a change of the EOR the Team are helpful to make sure that decisions are not being
following should be considered: driven unduly by economics.
• Succession planning for the EOR role is important
All tailings facilities evolve and change throughout
(Section 2.3.2.1).
their lifecycle. As such, the Operator should review
• Change for the sake of change should be avoided. the required qualifications of the EOR periodically (every
• Decisions to select, retain or change the EOR should three to five years for tailings facilities in the Operations,
never be based on cost alone. The selection of the EOR Closure and Post-Closure phases, even more frequently
should be decided by the Accountable Executive with as projects progress from the Project Conception phase
input from the RTFE and informed, but not decided by, through to the Design phase) to ensure the EOR has the
procurement personnel. experience, knowledge and competencies appropriate to
the tailings facility.

2.2.3 Corporate Policy on Tailings Management tailings facilities and associated risks will change with time,
the Operator should re-evaluate the adequacy of the policy
Establishing a corporate policy on tailings management
on a regular basis.
provides an important basis for establishing corporate
priorities and performance objectives (Section 3.3.3) related The corporate policy should demonstrate the Operator’s
to tailings management. A policy is an important tool to commitment to:
demonstrate, both internally and externally, the Operator’s
commitment to tailings management. • Protection of health and safety of employees, contractors
and the public.
The policy should be aligned with the Operator’s • Safe and responsible management of tailings with the
commitment to implementing a corporate safety culture: objective of zero fatalities and eliminating catastrophic
prioritising safe and responsible tailings management with failures.
the ultimate goal of zero fatalities and catastrophic events. • Allocation of appropriate resources to support tailings
management activities.
The policy should be integrated with corporate policies
• Implementing effective governance of tailings
related to sustainability, health and safety, business ethics
management through the actions of the Operator’s
and other related elements to ensure that:
employees, contractors and consultants.
• Corporate commitments and goals related to tailings
• An organisational culture that promotes learning,
management are integrated with and reflected in other
communication, early problem recognition and early
corporate commitments.
escalation of issues.
• Other corporate commitments and goals are reflected in
• Emergency preparedness and post-incident recovery if a
tailings management.
failure occurs.
Operators should develop a policy on tailings management • Implementing a programme for reviewing tailings safety,
that best meets their needs and corporate management including Independent Review.
approach while addressing their legal requirements and • Providing adequate resources (financial, personnel, etc) to
commitments to local communities. As their portfolio of manage tailings in accordance with the policy.

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 2.2 ACCOUNTABILITY, POLICY,
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The corporate policy should be: is important for effective performance. High level
• Reviewed and endorsed by the BoD. competencies for tailings management may be identified by
the Operator and should reflect the Operator’s values. Those
• Consistent with applicable legal requirements.
broader competencies are often supported by role specific
• Communicated to employees. competencies, performance indicators, knowledge/skills/
• Understood to a degree appropriate to their roles and abilities and current learning resources for the position.
responsibilities by personnel whose activities may affect
tailings management either directly or indirectly. As tailings personnel progress through their careers, they
• Publicly available. are naturally expected to gain competency in key practice
areas. A competency framework should be developed and
Tailings management is a core business function of the used in conjunction with a mentoring and training system
mining industry, and as described in Sections 1.2.2.2 and 3.2, to maximise learning and development. When assessing
planning for tailings management should be integrated into competency, consider such aspects as:
planning related to relevant aspects of mining operations, • Purpose of the position
such as ore extraction and processing, sitewide water • Nature of the work
management, management of waste rock and other mine
• Education/Experience
wastes, and sitewide closure planning. To facilitate this
integrated approach, it is essential that all business units • Level of interaction
understand the corporate policy on tailings management • Autonomy/decision-making capacity and authority
and their role in implementing the policy, including the • Budgetary responsibilities
importance of integrated mine planning. Furthermore, the
• Managerial responsibilities
corporate policy and site-specific performance objectives
for tailings management should be integrated into sitewide • Skill demonstration
policies, objectives and plans. • Understanding of and knowledge in relevant practice areas
• Understanding and application of relevant theory and
2.2.4 Competency and Promoting Continual practice
Learning • Execution of the TMS
Tailings management requires the Operator and personnel • Leadership skills and behaviours
involved in tailings management to have a level of
competence consistent with the requirements of the tailings Operators should identify appropriate qualifications and
facility and its risks. The key elements of developing experience requirements for all personnel who play safety-
and maintaining competence are qualifications, training critical roles related to tailings management, including,
and experience. but not limited to the RTFE, the EOR and the Accountable
Executive. Operators should ensure that incumbents of
Competency these roles have the identified qualifications and experience
Competencies comprise knowledge, skills and abilities and and develop succession plans for these personnel.
are typically demonstrated through behaviour. Competency

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In Detail
Attributes of Key Roles competence and reliability; and gain trust from clients and
Further information on competencies for key roles are peers in the tailings facility safety community.
discussed below.
RTFE
Accountable Executive The RTFE should understand the tailings facilities for
The Accountable Executive does not necessarily need to which they are responsible, the risks, and the manner
be an expert in tailings management but should have the in which those risks are being managed, including any
competency to: failures, deficiencies or opportunities for improvement.
• Understand the concepts of tailings management and They should be informed by evaluations of performance
the associated risks. and results of reviews conducted as part of the TMS
(Section 2.3), the results of the programme for reviewing
• Know what key questions to ask of their personnel
tailings safety (including Independent Review) (Section
relative to tailings management.
2.6) and be apprised of any significant developments in
• Articulate a clear, honest assessment of tailings risks to between these activities.
the BoD.
• Advocate for resources needed for tailings management. Independent Review
Independent Review is conducted by one or more
EOR appropriately qualified and experienced individuals who
The EOR should have education, experience, capabilities and have not been directly involved with the design or operation
knowledge commensurate with the complexity of the facility of the particular tailings facility. The qualifications and
and potential consequences of a failure in the areas of experience of reviewers should be aligned with the tailings
design, construction, operation and performance evaluation, facility’s complexity and risk profile. Similar to the EOR,
which are gained through directly related experience. This Independent Reviewers should have education, experience,
includes facility-specific knowledge to a sufficient level of capabilities and knowledge commensurate with the
detail that the EOR can demonstrate ‘responsible charge’ complexity of the facility and potential consequences of a
for the facility. The EOR should also have additional skills failure in the areas of design, construction, operation and
and characteristics that allow them to: effectively and performance evaluation, which are gained through directly-
respectfully communicate with a broad audience; convey related experience.

Promoting Continual Learning personnel with direct and indirect roles related to tailings
Training should build skills and expand job knowledge and management.
understanding. A training programme should be developed • Specific aspects (eg technical, communication,
and implemented that considers: management) related to the roles and responsibilities
• Training for new personnel. of personnel with direct roles related to tailings
• Refresher training at a frequency determined by the management.
Operator, considering the risk profile of the tailings facility.
Operators should aim to develop a corporate culture that
• Training associated with significant changes such
promotes continual learning, both formally and informally.
as updates to the OMS manual or emergency
Formal programmes and materials should be developed
preparedness plans.
to cover essential elements required under the training
• Training for competency development. programme. Additionally, informal learning happens
through experience and can be developed through reading
Training should address: relevant publications, engaging with subject matter experts,
• General aspects, such as the Operator’s policy and participation in inspections and reviews, interacting with an
commitments related to tailings management, and the industry network, internal knowledge sharing, and exposure
overall goals of safe, responsible tailings management for to new approaches or technologies.

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 2.2 ACCOUNTABILITY, POLICY,
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Promoting continual learning will help to ensure that Operators should establish mechanisms that incorporate
personnel have the competencies and qualifications workers’ experience-based knowledge into planning, design
necessary for tailings management and can also help to and operation for all phases of the tailings facility lifecycle.
ensure staff retention and reduce turnover by creating Operators should also establish mechanisms that promote
more opportunities for career advancement. Better cross-functional collaboration to ensure effective data and
trained personnel can help to facilitate improved tailings knowledge sharing, communication and implementation
management, and reducing turnover reduces risks of management measures to support public safety and the
associated with changes in personnel. integrity of the tailings facility.

In Detail
Providing appropriate training to those who are involved in if there is an opportunity to engage others involved with
tailings management, including employees, contractors, tailings management.
consultants and suppliers, will require different training at
different levels. For example, senior management should Training may be carried out using in-house resources
receive higher level, conceptual training about the risks of but there may be a need to involve external parties
tailings management, while mine managers and others such as the Design Team or EOR in development of the
working directly on specific aspects of tailings facilities training materials. Operators may consider some form of
through various lifecycle phases should receive detailed evaluation of personnel on their knowledge relative to their
and relevant training that corresponds to their work. role to demonstrate competency. A tracking mechanism
Tailings management may also be improved by better should be in place (eg training needs matrix) to ensure that
understanding the experiences of others in tailings-related all relevant personnel receive appropriate training.
roles. When planning a training programme, consider

2.2.5 Community Engagement • Co-developing community-focused emergency

preparedness measures (Section 2.7).
Community engagement helps to build trust and prevent the
potential for conflicts with communities. It can help to ensure Community engagement related to tailings management
that communities have an understanding of the risks to them should be integrated with broader community
associated with tailings facilities, and how the Operator is engagement activities, although engagement more
managing those risks, including the emergency preparedness specifically targeted to tailings management may
measures that are in place. It can also help to inform better be appropriate on some topics (eg community input
decisions about tailings management, including: during the Project Conception phase (Section 3.3)).
• Evaluating alternatives (Section 3.3.4) for a new tailings Engagement should be coordinated with and conducted
facility or extending the life of an existing facility. in collaboration with personnel with specific expertise in
• Reflecting community concerns and values in performance community engagement, but tailings specialists involved
objectives (Section 3.3.3). in community engagement should receive appropriate
• Identification of post-closure land-use objectives and the training.
development of the closure plan (Section 3.7.2).

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In Detail
The Standard has specific requirements related to Further Reading:
respecting the rights of project-affected people which are ICMM: Stakeholder Research Toolkit
outside the scope of this Guide and are addressed in other
ICMM: Community Development Toolkit
guidance from ICMM (Section 1.3.1).
ICMM: Understanding Company–Community
Community engagement may also extend to providing Relations Toolkit
a direct role in the development and implementation of ICMM: Indigenous Peoples and Mining: Good
some surveillance activities (eg downstream water quality Practice Guide
monitoring). This can help to: ICMM: Integrating human rights due diligence into
• Ensure that surveillance programmes include corporate risk management processes
parameters of concern to communities. ICMM: Handling and Resolving Local-Level Concerns
• Provide a direct mechanism for communities to share and Grievances
their unique knowledge and understanding of the area ICMM: International Finance Corporation and International
(eg traditional knowledge). Committee of the Red Cross: Voluntary Principles on
• Help to build trust through the direct involvement of Security and Human Rights: Implementation Guidance
trained community members in surveillance, including Tools
both data collection and analysis (eg involvement in MAC: Towards Sustainable Mining Indigenous and
downstream water quality monitoring). Community Relationships Protocol (2019)
• Help to build community capacity, developing
transferable skills and potentially providing a basis for
greater community involvement in surveillance during
the Post-Closure phase.

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 2.2 ACCOUNTABILITY, POLICY,
& RELATED ELEMENTS

2.2.6 Communication • Breakdowns in communication should be investigated to

learn from them and improve communication.
An Operator should describe expectations for
communication as well as lines of communication as • The effectiveness of communication should be assessed
they relate to tailings management and related activities. regularly, with the aim of identifying deficiencies and
Processes should be established and implemented for two- opportunities for improvement.
way communication for personnel who have accountability
or responsibility tailings management, including reporting of In addition, an Operator should establish mechanisms
significant information and decisions to senior management, that recognise, reward and protect from retaliation,
the EOR, regulators and communities, as appropriate. employees and contractors who report problems or identify
opportunities for improving tailings facility management.
While documenting and adhering to processes and lines An Operator should respond in a timely manner and
of communication are important, there are limits to what communicate actions taken and their outcomes.
can be achieved through written policies and procedures.
Effective communication is a skill that should be developed In accordance with international good practices for
and addressed as part of training activities, including whistleblower protection, an Operator should not discharge,
providing training on mechanisms for communication, and discriminate against or otherwise retaliate in any way
communication expectations commensurate with the roles against a whistleblower who, in good faith, has reported
of personnel. In addition, to help to improve communication: possible permit violations or other matters relating to
regulatory compliance, public safety, tailings facility integrity
or the environment.

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2.2.7 Sharing Information to safe tailings facility management, its governance

framework, and its policies, standard or approaches to the
There is a wide range of information about tailings
design, construction, monitoring and closure of tailings
management, including information about risks and how
facilities. The Standard also outlines specific elements for
the Operator is managing those risks, that Operators should
Operators to summarise for disclosure.
plan to share with communities and other stakeholders.
In addition, there may be a range of information that the An Operator may also be required to share a range of
Operator is required to provide to meet legal requirements. information with relevant jurisdictions to meet various legal
However, sharing information should be tailored to the needs requirements. An Operator should compile a list of all legal
and capacity of those with whom it is being shared. requirements relevant to tailings management, including
a description of the information required to meet each
Sharing information with communities about tailings
legal requirement. This list should also clarify whether the
management helps to build trust, increase transparency, and
information submitted to meet various legal requirements
provide evidence to demonstrate safe tailings management.
will be in the public domain. The Operator’s plan for
It builds upon community engagement (Section 2.2.5) and
managing conformance (Section 2.3.2.2) should include
communication (Section 2.2.6). Operators may consult with
this list, with a plan to ensure that all the relevant legal
communities to identify:
requirements are met.
• Information about tailings management that they want the
Operator to share with them. There is a wide range of information that an Operator
• Form in which the information should be provided by the needs to be able to safely manage tailings (Section 2.5).
Operator (eg language, level of detail). This information provides the basis for what is shared with
• Mechanisms for sharing information (eg Operator’s communities and other stakeholders, but it is up to the
website). Operator to put this information in a form (eg plain language
summaries) that is useful to communities and other
• Frequency of sharing of information. stakeholders, and constructively contributes to building
trust and transparency. In determining the information to be
The Operator should consider developing a plan for
shared and the form in which it will be shared, the Operator
sharing information with communities based on input
should be cognizant of any legal limitations on the sharing in
from consultations and refine how it shares information
information, specifically if related to securities-related limits
as engagement with communities evolves. In developing a
on sharing forward-looking information.
plan to share information with communities, an Operator
should be cognizant of the detailed requirements for public In addition, the Operator should respond in a systematic
disclosure in the Standard (see Requirement 15.1). and timely manner to requests from interested and affected
stakeholders for additional information material to the public
In addition to communities, there are other stakeholders
safety and integrity of a tailings facility. When the request
(eg shareholders, investors) with whom the Operator should
for information is denied, the Operator should provide an
consider sharing information about tailings management.
explanation to the requesting stakeholder.
The nature of the information shared and the mechanisms
for sharing this information may be different than for The Operator should also commit to cooperate in credible
information shared with communities, depending on the global transparency initiatives to create standardised,
needs and nature of the stakeholder. independent, industry-wide and publicly accessible
databases, inventories or other information repositories
Specifically, per the Standard, an Operator is required to
about the safety and integrity of tailings facilities.
publish and regularly update information on its commitment

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 2.3 TAILINGS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

2.3.1 Introduction (eg begin development of OMS activities during the Project
Conception phase, refine during the Design phase, and
The development and implementation of a TMS is essential implement, review and update as necessary during
to the effective governance of tailings management, which, subsequent phases).
as described in Section 1.2.2, is one of the foundations of
safe tailings management, together with the implementation 2) Do: Implementing the TMS. Systems and plans are
of good engineering practice. implemented as appropriate to the lifecycle phase.

A site-specific TMS integrates all of the Operator’s systems, 3) Check: Evaluating Performance. The performance of
information, plans, practices and processes related the tailings facility and the systems and plans in place
to the management of a given tailings facility into one to manage the facility are measured (eg surveillance,
comprehensive framework. It provides a: inspections, Independent Review, audits) to determine
• Governance structure with checks and balances on whether the performance objectives are being met and to
decision-making, including third-party oversight (eg identify potential problems. If the performance objectives
Independent Review). are not being met, the need for potential corrective
actions is identified. Similarly, opportunities for continual
• Mechanism to effectively implement good engineering
improvement are identified.
practices for tailings management.
• Means to facilitate effective communication to address 4) Act: Identifying Actions to Improve Performance:
risk and drive action, including communication between: The results of performance evaluations are reviewed by
– Senior management accountable for tailings senior management to understand whether the facility and
management and those responsible for tailings systems, and plans to manage the facility, are effective.
management. Action plans to address deficiencies or opportunities for
– Those with direct responsibilities for tailings continual improvement are developed.
management and those with indirect responsibilities for
tailings management (eg procurement, ore processing The cycle then repeats, beginning with reviews and updates,
operations). as appropriate, to all systems, information and plans to
• Mechanism to help to ensure that decisions are made: improve performance and in accordance with the lifecycle
phase. The revised plans are implemented, and performance
– Consistent with the corporate policy, performance
is evaluated.
objectives, the design intent and the risk management
plan.
The key to the success of implementing a TMS is
– Informed by risk.
ensuring that:
– Taking into account relevant information (eg surveillance
results, Independent Review, community perspectives). • The scope of the TMS is clearly defined.
– At the appropriate level within the organisation, • The relationships between the TMS and other sitewide
commensurate with the risks associated with the systems (eg sitewide ESMS, sitewide water management
decision. plan) are understood.
• Elements within the scope of the TMS are
Implementation of TMSs should align with the corporate deliberately managed within the framework of the
policy on tailings management and follow an iterative cycle management system.
throughout the lifecycle of a tailings facility (Figure 4):
For existing facilities, a TMS can be developed and
1) Plan: Developing Plans for Tailings Management. implemented at any phase of the lifecycle to provide
The Operator uses the corporate policy as a basis more effective integration and governance of tailings
for establishing all systems, information and plans management activities.
relevant to the current lifecycle phase and plans, at an
appropriate level of detail, for future lifecycle phases

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In Detail
A management system describes the set of procedures an TMSs as described in this Guide are aligned with the ISO
organisation needs to follow in order to meet its objectives. 14001 definition of an environmental management system
The objective of implementing management systems which includes: an organisational structure, planning
is to ‘help organisations improve their performance by activities, responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes
specifying repeatable steps that organisations consciously and resources for developing, implementing, achieving,
implement to achieve their goals and objectives, and to reviewing and maintaining policies.
create an organisational culture that reflexively engages
in a continuous cycle of self-evaluation, correction and Further Reading:
improvement of operations and processes through MAC (2019): A Guide to the Management of Tailings
heightened employee awareness and management Facilities, Version 3.1
leadership and commitment’ (International Organization ISO 14001 – Environmental Management
for Standardization (ISO)).

Act: Plan:
Review and develop Develop plans for
action plans Tailings Facility Lifecycle tailings management

Material Changes

Project
Design Operations Closure Post-Closure
Conception

Construction

Check: Do:
Evaluate Implement the tailings
performance management system

Figure 4: Elements of a tailings management system and application across the lifecycle

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 37

 2.3 TAILINGS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

2.3.2 Plan: Developing Plans for Tailings may already exist, while others may not. The objective of the
Management TMS is to bring all systems, information and plans related
to tailings management under a single umbrella to help to
Developing Plans for Tailings Management involves developing ensure a consistent, comprehensive, rigorous and systematic
information and plans related to tailings management and approach to tailings management. Operators of existing
updating the information and plans as appropriate throughout facilities developing a TMS should conduct a gap analysis
the lifecycle, in alignment with corporate policy. This includes and assess the adequacy of existing systems, information
developing and updating as appropriate the following systems, and plans. The gap analysis should also consider input from
information and plans: previous reviews (eg Independent Review), audits or other
• Site characterisation (Section 3.3.2) mechanisms to provide internal or external oversight or advice
• Risk assessment (Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4) on how the tailings facility is managed. An action plan should
be developed and implemented to address gaps, deficiencies
• Multi-criteria alternatives analysis (Section 3.3.4)
or inconsistencies/conflicts between these existing systems,
• Performance objectives, indicators and criteria (Sections 3.2 information and plans.
and 3.3)
• Risk management plan (Sections 3.2, 3.4 and 3.6) 2.3.2.1 Managing Change
• Documentation of the design of the tailings facility, including Managing change is critical to the safe and responsible
the design intent and basis (Section 3.4.5) management of tailings, and change may be a potential
• Water management plan (Section 3.2.3) source of risk. Tailings facilities are subject to change
• Tailings transportation and deposition plan (Section 3.4.4) throughout their lifecycle. This includes changes in a tailings
facility itself (eg increasing the size or height of the facility,
• Closure plan (Section 3.7.2)
implementing progressive reclamation) and changes in the
• OMS manual (Section 2.4) environment in which a tailings facility exists (eg mine plan
• Emergency preparedness and response plan (EPRP) changes such as a mine life extension, ownership, personnel,
(Section 2.7) legal requirements, communities, climate). In addition,
• Competencies for key roles related to tailings management changes to implement continual improvement, such as good
(Section 2.2.4) engineering practices, also need to be managed appropriately.
• Plans for managing:
Processes to manage change should be documented and
– Change
implemented to ensure that tailings continue to be managed
– Conformance
safely and responsibly.
– Information (Section 2.5)
– Quality (Section 3.4.5 and 3.5.2)
All potential changes should be carefully considered to ensure
– Construction (Section 3.5)
that there are no adverse or unintended consequences
• Resources for tailings management associated with changes. Further information is provided on
• Programme for reviewing tailings safety, including three types of changes:
Independent Review (Section 2.6). • Potential material changes (Section 3.6.3).
• Changes in personnel in key roles (internal and external)
Aspects to be addressed that are not addressed elsewhere in
(see below).
the Guide are described below.
• Changes in ownership of a tailings facility (see below).
Developing Plans for Tailings Management should be closely
integrated with sitewide mine planning (Section 3.2.2) and Changes that are beyond the Operator’s control such
should take into account anticipated transitions to different as changes in legal requirements or changes in nearby
lifecycle phases, anticipated changes and evolution of the communities (eg new downstream social or economic
tailings facility, and anticipated changes and evolution of the infrastructure) may also be very important but may be more
overall mine plan. challenging to manage as the Operator may have less latitude
for proactive actions. An important aspect of managing such
For new facilities, the development of the systems, changes is remaining alert to potential developments outside
information and plans for a TMS should begin as early the Operator’s control, in order to have as much advance
as possible in the Project Conception and Design phases of warning as possible of a potential change.
the lifecycle.
Processes for managing change should address identifying
For Operators of existing tailings facilities developing a TMS, and engaging internal and external stakeholders relevant to
many of the systems, information and plans items listed above the potential change.

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In Detail
Changes in Personnel in Key Roles • TMS
Succession plans should be in place for key roles related • OMS manual
to tailings management, including the EOR, RTFE,
• Closure plan
Accountable Executive and Independent Reviewers. The
focus of such planning is not on the staffing or human • Assignment of accountability and responsibility
resources aspects. Rather, it is to ensure that a plan is put • Competency of personnel in key positions
in place, proactively, to manage changes in such key roles, • Performance of the tailings facility
whether the changes are expected or unexpected.
• Record of conformance, including compliance with legal
requirements
Succession plans should include descriptions of the
roles and responsibilities, required qualifications, and the • Outcomes of the programme for reviewing tailings safety,
process for filling external roles in the event of change. including Independent Review.
With respect to a change in the EOR the succession
plan should also address the transfer of appropriate This review will also help to inform actions taken in the
documentation to the new EOR. event that the merger or acquisition proceeds.

Changes in Ownership Hand-over if a merger or acquisition occurs

There are two aspects to be considered as part of a change If a merger or acquisition occurs, then the new Operator
in ownership: should consider the importance of continuity, versus
the need for change to improve tailings management
Due diligence of the prospective new Operator in advance and reduce risks. If tailings are being managed in a
of a merger or acquisition safe, responsible manner by competent personnel with
A prospective new Operator should include a thorough appropriate systems and documentation in place, then it
review of all tailings facilities that may be included within may be best to avoid undue changes.
a merger or acquisition. A review of potential risks and
liabilities associated with tailings management is as Changes, such as changes in key personnel (eg RTFE,
important as a review of the potential assets, perhaps even EOR) are a risk, given the complexities of tailings
more so, to help to ensure that the prospective owner is management and the time it takes to properly understand
making an informed decision. how a particular tailings facility is designed and operated.

Such a review may be limited by the amount of information However, if through the review before the merger or
available to the prospective new Operator, but to the extent acquisition, or through further assessment after the
possible such a review should include (Section 2.5): merger or acquisition, the new Operator concludes that
changes are needed to address deficiencies and reduce
• Site characterisation
risks, then these changes should be made.
• Risk assessment
• Risk management plan It is important that the existing Operator ensures the
• Design basis report (DBR) transfer of all relevant information to the new Operator,
including:
• Construction versus Design Intent Verification (CDIV)
• Documentation related to all the information listed above
• Deviance Accountability Report (DAR)
for a review prior to a merger or acquisition.
• Construction Records Report (CRR)
• All relevant archival information.

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 39

 2.3 TAILINGS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

2.3.2.2 Managing Conformance The Operator should establish and document a budget for
tailings management, considering both short-term (eg one
The Operator should document and implement conformance
to two years) and long-term (eg including the Closure and
management processes to ensure that:
Post-Closure phases) needs for safe, responsible tailings
• Applicable legal requirements and commitments (including management throughout the lifecycle.
commitments/conditions associated with environmental
assessment and permitting) are identified, documented, The Operator should establish and document the associated
understood, effectively communicated and met. financial controls, obtain budget approval and track capital
• Operator’s policies, guidelines, standards and practices and operating costs against the budget. In addition, at a
are identified, documented, implemented and met, and are frequency documented and appropriate to the tailings facility
reviewed periodically. and its lifecycle phase, the Operator should re-evaluate the
• Those accountable and responsible for conformance decommissioning and reclamation provision for each facility
understand the conformance management plan and have commensurate with corporate policy, good practices and the
the necessary training and competence. applicable legal requirements and commitments.

• Procedures to assess the state of conformance, including Further Reading:

frequencies, have been established, implemented, ICMM: Financial Concepts for Mine Closure
documented and communicated as required for safe,
responsible tailings management. 2.3.3 Do: Implementing the Tailings Management
• Status of conformance is documented and reported System
internally and externally, as required (eg as required as per
legal requirements). When fully implemented, a TMS will facilitate continual
improvement in safe, responsible tailings management.
Documentation of conformance management processes The objective is to implement all the elements of the TMS in
should include processes to follow in cases of non- a manner appropriate to the lifecycle phase of the tailings
conformance, including: facility, to ensure that:
• Documenting and reporting the non-conformance, • Activities relevant to that lifecycle phase are effectively
internally and externally, as required. implemented.
• Initiating investigations to determine the causes of the • Performance objectives are met, risks are managed, and
non-conformance. the tailings facility is performing as expected and as per
the design intent for the lifecycle phase of the facility.
• Addressing consequences of the non-conformance.
• Surveillance programmes and decision-making
2.3.2.3 Resources mechanisms are in place to be able to respond in a
timely manner to variances from expected behaviour or
For effective implementation of a TMS, including eventual performance criteria.
decommissioning and closure, and sustained post-closure
• Conformance requirements relevant to that lifecycle phase
management, the Operator should identify, secure and
are met.
regularly review adequacy of:
• Change is managed effectively throughout the lifecycle.
• Human resources and external contractors
and consultants.
Implementing the TMS requires the implementation of
• Condition, function and suitability of equipment. relevant plans, including action plans developed in previous
• Financial resources needed to address both operating and iterations of the management system process (Section 2.3.5).
capital costs, including expected costs in the Closure and
Post-Closure phases. Integral to this for tailings facilities in the Operations,
• Schedules of activities that integrate the required Closure and Post-Closure phases of the lifecycle is the
resources related to tailings management. Examples implementation of OMS activities (Section 2.4). OMS activities
of activities to be scheduled include the timing of are essential to the day-to-day implementation of the TMS
construction, access to construction material, reviews, and all associated plans and operating in conformance with
inspections and any other item critical to successfully the performance objectives (Sections 3.2 and 3.3) and the
implementing the TMS. design intent of the facility (Section 3.4.5). The conceptual
development of OMS activities should begin during the
Measures should be in place for financial control as well as Project Conception phase and be refined during the
competency and training (Section 2.2.4) and communication Design phase.
(Section 2.2.6).

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The development and testing of the EPRP (Section 2.7)

should continue throughout the Operations, Closure, and
Post-Closure phases, and the Operator should maintain a
state of readiness to be able to implement the EPRP if an
emergency occurs.

During the Construction phase (Section 3.5), the

implementation of the TMS includes constructing in
accordance with the design (Section 3.4.5) and the Quality
Management Plan (Section 3.5.2). It also includes developing
and updating as appropriate the:
• Construction versus Design Intent Verification (CDIV)
• Deviance Accountability Report (DAR)
• Construction Records Report (CRR).

For tailings facilities in the Closure and Post-Closure

phases, implementing the TMS includes:
• Implementing the closure plan.
• Conducting long-term OMS activities, as necessary, in
accordance with the closure plan.

In cases where changes are made, those changes should be:

• Documented, including incorporation into design • Adequacy of the TMS and associated elements, including
or operational documents where relevant. the systems, information and plans listed in Section 2.3.2.
• Communicated to relevant personnel • Documentation associated with construction activities
(proactively when possible). (Section 3.5):
• Supported with appropriate training, depending – CDIV
on the nature of the change (Section 2.2.4). – DAR
– CRR.
2.3.4 Check: Evaluating Performance • Adequacy of resources for tailings management.

Evaluating Performance builds upon the results of Evaluating Performance should include the identification of
surveillance (Section 2.4.3) and the programme for reviewing deficiencies and opportunities for improvement.
tailings safety, including Independent Review (Section 2.6).
It occurs at a range of time scales and is intended to: Evaluating Performance is an ongoing, iterative process
• Assess whether performance objectives (Sections 3.2 and that involves two-way communication between a range of
3.3) are being met. personnel involved in tailings management. Through the
• Assess whether the design intent is being met (Section surveillance of performance criteria associated with risk
3.4.5). controls (Section 3.6.4), Evaluating Performance provides
essential short-term input to decision-making. The RTFE,
• Assess the effectiveness of risk management measures,
EOR and Independent Reviewers all have roles to play
including risk controls (Sections 3.2, 3.4 and 3.6).
including providing input to and receiving outputs from
• Establish a mechanism to conduct post-incident analyses. Evaluating Performance, depending on both the information
• Inform Identifying Actions to Improve Performance. and time scale involved.

Aspects of performance that should be evaluated include: Results of Evaluating Performance should be documented
• Performance of the tailings facility against performance in a performance review and reported to the RTFE, the
objectives and the design intent (Section 3.4.5). Accountable Executive and, as appropriate, the BoD, at a
frequency (at least annual) and level of detail documented
• Compliance with legal requirements and conformance
in the Operator’s policies and procedures. The results
with plans and commitments.
of Evaluating Performance may also be reflected in the
information provided to project-affected people (Section 2.2.7).

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 41

 2.3 TAILINGS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

In Detail
As part of Evaluating Performance, the Operator should • Were any mistakes made that led to the incident, or
establish a mechanism to conduct post-incident analyses in responding to the incident? If so, how can those
for incidents related to tailings management that may mistakes be avoided in the future?
occur, such as cases of non-conformance, unanticipated • What can be done to improve response if a similar
upset conditions, or an emergency. This is particularly incident occurs in the future?
important for incidents with material impacts (eg business
• Are there any recommendations for changes to the
disruption, release of material, non-compliance with legal
TMS, EPRP or OMS manual as an outcome of the post-
requirements) and in such cases, post-incident analyses
incident analysis?
may be conducted in more detail and with more intense
scrutiny. It is important to learn from such analyses to
If an incident occurs, a post-incident analysis should
help prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future.
be initiated as soon as possible afterwards, while the
Post-incident analyses should consider both the technical
memories of the personnel involved remain fresh.
and governance aspects that potentially contributed to the
The results of the analysis should be documented and
incident and the Operator’s response to the incident. They
reported to the RTFE, Accountable Executive and BoD,
could also consider a range of questions such as:
as appropriate. Operators are encouraged to share their
• What was the root cause of the incident, and what were analyses and outcomes with the industry more broadly,
the contributing factors? so that others may learn and subsequently improve their
• How can a similar event be prevented from happening tailings management practices.
in the future?

including the outcomes of Evaluating Performance and

inputs, advice and recommendations from a programme
for reviewing tailings safety, including Independent Review
(Section 2.6).

Conducted by the RTFE, EOR and other personnel

involved in tailings management, this element of the
TMS should evaluate:
• Suitability, effectiveness and the need for changes to:
– The TMS and all associated elements, including the
systems, information and plans listed in Section 2.3.2.
– Controls related to construction (Section 3.5).
• Adequacy of resources committed to tailings
management, including adequacy of human resources and
competencies required.
2.3.5 Act: Identifying Actions to Improve
If deficiencies or opportunities for continual improvement
Performance
are identified, then action plans should be developed with
Identifying Actions to Improve Performance should be input from the EOR and mechanisms implemented as part of
conducted on a regular basis. The objective is to review a programme for reviewing tailings safety.
current performance and future plans, and to drive
improvement in tailings facility performance by developing Identifying Actions to Improve Performance should also
action plans to address deficiencies and opportunities for provide an update on the status of the implementation of
continual improvement. This element of the TMS integrates previously developed and approved action plans, including
and is informed by all available, relevant information any deviations from approved action plans.

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As part of Identifying Actions to Improve Performance, in a safe, responsible manner, the results and action plans
the Operator should also consider future plans, such as developed should be reported, at an appropriate level of
planned future construction, facility expansions or other detail to:
relevant planned changes. Action plans should be developed
• RTFE
accordingly to ensure that the systems, information and
plans developed as part of Developing Plans for Tailings • EOR
Management are revised as needed. This effectively • Accountable Executive (or delegate)
completes the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle of the TMS, in that • BoD, where appropriate
the Act stage informs the subsequent Plan stage.
These reports can also be provided to other business units
The frequency of Identifying Actions to Improve Performance (eg management responsible for ore processing) to help
varies, but is typically annual except during the Post-Closure ensure the continued coordination of activities directly and
phase, when a lower frequency may be appropriate. indirectly related to tailings management.

To ensure that information is communicated to allow the In addition, these reports can help to form the basis for the
Operator to understand whether tailings are being managed public disclosure of information (Section 2.2.7 and 2.6).

In Detail
Identifying Actions to Improve Performance provides • Conformance with the performance objectives and
an opportunity for the RTFE, EOR and other personnel design intent.
involved in tailings management to: • Compliance with legal requirements, conformance with
• Reconfirm alignment between design intent, risk standards, policies and commitments, and status of
management plan, and OMS activities. corrective actions.
• Discuss realised or anticipated changes and their • Tailings facility maintenance and surveillance.
implications/management. • Input from the programme for reviewing tailings safety
• Identify opportunities for improvement. ().

As part of Identifying Actions for Improving Performance, The outcomes of Identifying Actions to Improve
changes since the previous review that are relevant to Performance should be documented and reported to the
tailings management should be identified and their Accountable Executive, including:
significance should be evaluated, such as: • Conclusions regarding the performance of the tailings
• Changes to legal requirements, standards and facility, the TMS and associated plans, OMS manual and
guidance, industry best practice and commitments to EPRP.
communities. • If needed, action plans to:
• Changes in mine operating conditions (eg production • Ensure that performance objectives are met.
rate) or site environmental conditions.
• Address non-conformance with requirements,
• Changes outside the mine property that may influence standards, policy or commitments.
the nature and significance of potential impacts resulting
• Implement recommendations for continual
from the tailings facility on the external environment or
improvement.
vice versa.
• Any recommendations for modifications to the TMS,
• Changes in the risk profile of the tailings facility.
OMS manual or EPRP.
Identifying Actions to Improve Performance should also • Any recommendations for additional resources for
provide a summary of any significant issues related to the tailings management.
performance of the tailings facility and TMS, including:

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 43

 2.4 OPERATION, MAINTENANCE
& SURVEILLANCE

2.4.1 Introduction Operations phase of the lifecycle. It also includes activities

related to water management, reclamation and, where
OMS activities are fundamental to the day-to-day
applicable, the management of other materials (eg residues
management of tailings facilities. The TMS, performance
from water treatment such as lime treatment sludge) that
objectives, risk management plan and design intent provide
may continue to be deposited into the tailings facility after
a framework for safe, responsible tailings management, but
the end of the Operations phase. Thus, in most cases,
OMS activities are needed to implement them on a day-
operation activities will be necessary in the Closure phase
to-day basis. Operators that do not effectively implement
and may also be necessary in the Post-Closure phase.
OMS activities cannot adequately understand their risks,
proactively manage tailings, make informed decisions or While the need for operation activities may cease at
have any confidence that tailings and associated risks are some point (eg reclamation is complete and there is no
being effectively managed. longer a need for active water management), the need for
maintenance and surveillance activities continues until the
OMS activities should be documented in an OMS manual,
tailings facility reaches a point where ongoing maintenance
and should be aligned with:
and surveillance are no longer needed to ensure that the
• TMS (Section 2.3) and overall governance structures for facility is safe and that the performance objectives for
tailings management. closure continue to be met.
• Lifecycle phase of the facility (Section 1.2.1).
• Performance objectives, criteria and indicators to be Further Reading:
included in the design of the surveillance programmes MAC (2019): Developing an Operation, Maintenance, and
that measure performance throughout the tailings facility Surveillance Manual for Tailings and Water Management
lifecycle (Section 3.3.3). Facilities
• Closure plan and objectives.
2.4.2 Development of an OMS Manual
• Risk management plan including risks controls and
associated performance criteria (Sections 3.6.4 and 3.2.4). An OMS manual is intended to be a practical, ‘hands on’
document describing plans and procedures for all aspects
• Design intent (Section 3.4.3).
of operation, maintenance, and surveillance activities
• Conformance management plan (Section 2.3.2.2). associated with a tailings facility. It can be seen as the
‘owner’s manual’ for a tailings facility.
The OMS manual should also describe the linkages with
emergency preparedness and response (Sections 2.4.5 An OMS manual should be aligned with the performance
and 2.7). objectives and risk management plan for the tailings facility
to which it is applied, including the closure plan. Linking the
OMS is applicable across the lifecycle. It is important to facility’s risk management plan with OMS activities is at the
emphasise the operation does not just include activities core of an effective OMS manual. This includes specifying
related to the active placement of tailings during the actions to be taken if performance is outside the expected
range, indicating upset or potential emergency situations,
but also ensuring that OMS activities are planned and
implemented in a manner consistent with the design intent,
the risk management plan and the closure plan.

To be effective, an OMS manual should:

• Be site specific, not ‘off-the-shelf’ and should:
– Address the specific conditions and circumstances
of the site.
– Contain or link to all information needed to conduct
OMS activities.
– Integrate the knowledge and experience of personnel
who have worked on the site.
• Define roles, responsibilities and levels of authority for
personnel involved in tailings management.

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• Be integrated with overall site plans and procedures. potential for the temporary suspension of mine operations
• Be written: (Section 3.6.5), including a short-term, emergency
– By personnel with specific and detailed knowledge of the suspension or a longer-term suspension of unknown
tailings facility, with input from consultants or other third duration. Having an OMS plan for a temporary suspension
parties as appropriate. helps to ensure that risks are appropriately managed during
– For personnel directly involved in tailings management, the transition to suspension and during the period of the
and not for other audiences such as regulators, senior suspension. OMS activities associated with a transition back
management or communities. to operations should also be described.
– In a clear, concise, easily understandable manner,
and include information regarding how more detailed The development of OMS activities for the Closure and
information can be accessed. Post-Closure phases should happen in concert with the
development of the closure plan (Section 3.7.2). This
• Be improved over time, reflecting feedback from
is important to ensure that OMS activities during the
Performance Evaluation (Section 2.3.4), action plans
Operations phase are consistent with the closure plan,
to address deficiencies or for continual improvement
lay the foundation for the implementation of the closure
(Section 2.3.5), and lessons learned by personnel involved
plan, and address progressive reclamation activities to be
in tailings management.
implemented prior to transition to the Closure phase. For
existing tailings facilities that do not have an OMS manual,
An OMS manual should describe the boundaries of its scope
the Operator should develop a manual, informed by:
of application. The scope should include all operational
controls that can influence the performance and risk • Conducting a gap analysis.
management of the tailings facility (eg tailings transport, • Assessing current OMS activities and the degree to which
placement of tailings, physical containment of the tailings, they are aligned with the performance objectives and risk
water management and seepage management, reclamation management plan.
activities). The scope is defined on a site-specific basis,
taking into account the characteristics and lifecycle stage OMS manuals should be regularly reviewed and updated
of the tailings facility and linkages with other relevant plans as appropriate to ensure that they are up to date. An out-
and procedures. of-date OMS manual may pose a risk to the safety of the
tailings facility.
For new tailings facilities or for material changes such
as a mine life extension, planning and development of There are many potential drivers for the need for a review
OMS activities should begin during the Project Conception and update of an OMS manual, including:
and Design phases, and some surveillance activities • Updates to the risk assessment and the risk management
(eg monitoring of meteorological conditions) may begin plan.
during these phases. By the end of the Design phase, the
• Planned changes as the tailing facility evolves throughout
surveillance programme should be designed so that relevant
the Operations phase (eg raising embankment structures
instrumentation can be installed during construction. The
to increase capacity).
OMS manual should be refined during the Construction
phase so that it is ready for implementation at the beginning • Material changes to the design.
of the Operations phase, and reflects the as-built conditions • Adoption of new technologies (eg surveillance technology).
(eg final configuration of the tailings pipeline and pumping • Transitions in the lifecycle phase of the facility.
system) and any deviations from the design that were
• Changes in personnel.
implemented during the Construction phase (Section 3.5).
The OMS manual also should be updated to reflect the final • Changes in relevant infrastructure (eg pumping systems
as-built conditions of the ore processing facility as they for tailings or water).
relate to characteristics of the tailings that will be produced
(eg solids content of the tailings). In conducting reviews, a wide range of information should be
considered, including:
The OMS manual should be ready for implementation at the • Performance of the facility, including any deficiencies in
beginning of the Operations phase and should continue to be performance.
reviewed and updated as needed throughout the Operations • Tailings facility design and any deviations from the design.
phase. In addition, the OMS manual should address the

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 45

 2.4 OPERATION, MAINTENANCE,
& SURVEILLANCE

• Current constructed conditions (Section 3.5) and • Describe surveillance activities (inspection and monitoring)
construction history. associated with the tailings infrastructure including the
• Current lifecycle phase of the facility. documentation, analysis and communication of results.
• Status of progressive reclamation activities.
2.4.3.1 OMS Governance
• Relevant advice and recommendations from site
inspections, and the programme for reviewing tailings An OMS manual should describe:
safety, including Independent Review. • Tasks and functions related to OMS activities.
• Changes since the last review of the OMS manual, such as • Roles, responsibilities and level of authority of personnel or
changes in: groups that assume these tasks and functions, including
– Characteristics of the tailings facility (eg increased the RTFE(s) and the EOR (Section 2.2.2) and other key
embankment height since the last review). personnel involved in tailings management.
– Performance objectives and indicators. • Competencies required for various roles.
– Risk assessment and the risk management plan. • Functional relationships and lines of communication:
– Personnel or organisational structure. – Between personnel and groups involved in OMS activities.
– Legal requirements. – With groups outside the scope of the OMS manual
– Closure plan. and involved in activities that may affect tailings
• Plans to address any gaps or deficiencies in performance. management.
• Plans for continual improvement. – With external parties, including reviewers, regulators
and communities.
• Future plans for the tailings facility.
An OMS manual should also describe:
As described further in Section 2.5, an OMS manual
should be a controlled document. Since OMS manuals are • Reporting relationships between different individuals and
accessible to many people involved in tailings management business units with direct and indirect roles related to
and are updated frequently, effective document control for tailings management.
the OMS manual is particularly important. The Operator • How information related to specific OMS activities
should define mechanisms for: should flow.
• Review of the draft OMS manual and proposed updates, • Processes and procedures for reporting outcomes
including input from the EOR. of OMS activities.
• Approval of the OMS manual and subsequent updates,
including clarifying who has the authority to approve major In describing roles, responsibilities, levels of authority
revisions (eg new procedures) versus minor revisions and relationships, an OMS manual development team
(eg updating personnel contact information, reflecting should focus on functional relationships, rather than
changes in personnel). organisational relationships. This approach may be useful for
overcoming functional and communication silos that may be
• Ensuring that all personnel have access to and are
unintentionally reinforced by organisational structures.
working with the most up-to-date version.
An OMS manual should describe reporting procedures for
2.4.3 Contents of an OMS Manual any surveillance results that are outside the expected range
An OMS manual should: of observations or performance, as these results may be
• Address site-specific aspects of OMS governance, building indicative of upset conditions or a potential emergency. Any
on overall accountability and responsibility for tailings such results should be communicated in a timely manner
management (Section 2.2.2), and should document site- so that appropriate decisions can be taken by those with the
specific OMS activities. responsibility and authority to act under the circumstances.

• Define and describe plans and procedures for An OMS manual should clearly describe the roles,
implementing activities related to the transport, responsibilities and authority of the RTFE and other
placement and permanent storage of tailings and, where employees, the EOR, and the contractors or consultants
applicable, water and the recycling of water. involved in surveillance. This is particularly important with
• Define and describe plans for the preventative, predictive respect to surveillance linked to critical controls. An OMS
and corrective maintenance of tailings infrastructure and manual should describe:
all equipment associated with the tailings infrastructure. • Who is responsible for surveillance data acquisition
and analysis?

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• What are the lines of communication for reporting in the This component of an OMS manual should define and
event that results are outside the range specified for the describe the plans and procedures for implementing
critical control performance criteria? operating controls that enable the tailings facility to be
• If critical control performance criteria are exceeded: operated in accordance with the design intent, performance
– What actions are the RTFE(s) and other employees objectives, risk management plan and closure plan. Plans
expected to take? and procedures are typically documented in standard
– What actions are contractors or consultants expected operating procedures (SOPs).
to take?
The management of every tailings facility should follow a
Actions to be taken should be clearly described so that range of SOPs that best reflect the characteristics of that
appropriate action can be taken in a timely manner. facility and support the performance objectives and risk
management plan. A typical approach is to develop a suite of
2.4.3.2 Operation SOPs that serve as the foundation of a well-managed facility.
The SOPs described in an OMS manual will be dependent on
Operation refers to the operation of the tailings facility and the lifecycle phase of the tailings facility.
associated activities, including:
• Transport and deposition of tailings (Section 3.4.4). SOPs describe performance indicators and pre-defined
• Construction during the Operations and Closure phases actions (eg TARPs) to be taken if associated performance
(Section 3.5). criteria deviate from defined ranges. SOPs include a
description of the potential ramifications of not responding to
• Management of water and seepage during the Operations
a deviation.
and Closure phases, and potentially also in the Post-
Closure phase (Section 3.2.3). SOPs should be reviewed at an established frequency and
• Reclamation activities during the Operations and Closure updated as appropriate, and any changes in procedures
phases (Section 3.7). should be documented.
• In some cases, operation may also include:
– Deposition of non-tailings materials in the tailings 2.4.3.3 Maintenance
facility (eg waste rock or lime treatment sludge) during The objective of maintenance is to provide preventative and
the Operations and Closure phases, and potentially also corrective means to achieve performance objectives and
in the Post-Closure phase. manage risk throughout the lifecycle of a tailings facility.
– Removal of tailings for reprocessing or other purposes Maintenance includes preventative, predictive and corrective
during the Closure or Post-Closure phases. activities carried out to provide continued proper operation
of all infrastructure related to tailings management, or to
Thus, operation applies not just to the Operations phase of
adjust infrastructure to ensure operation in conformance with
the lifecycle but also to the Closure phase and in many cases
performance objectives.
the Post-Closure phase.

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 2.4 OPERATION, MAINTENANCE,
& SURVEILLANCE

The maintenance component of an OMS manual identifies activities that measure the condition of a specific component
and describes: against performance criteria. Examples include:
• All infrastructure (eg embankments, associated water • Replacement of a section of tailings pipeline based on
management infrastructure, mechanical systems, monitoring of the pipe thickness.
electrical systems, instrumentation, etc) within the scope • Removal of debris from a spillway based on debris
of the OMS manual that has maintenance requirements. accumulation.
• Preventative, predictive and corrective maintenance • Removal of trees growing on embankments.
activities.
Corrective maintenance: The repair of tailings facility
There are three categories of maintenance activities: components to prevent further deterioration and ensure their
operation in conformance with performance objectives. The
Preventative maintenance: Planned, recurring maintenance need for corrective maintenance is based on surveillance
activities conducted at a fixed or approximate frequency and activities, with surveillance results identifying the need and
not typically arising from results of surveillance activities. urgency of maintenance. Pre-defined actions based on
Examples include: surveillance results and performance criteria (eg TARPs)
• Regularly scheduled oil change on a pump, as per may include specific maintenance activities. Examples
manufacturers specifications. include:
• Calibration and maintenance of surveillance instruments. • Repair of erosion gullies.
• Unplugging of toe drains.
Predictive maintenance: Pre-defined maintenance
conducted in response to the results of surveillance • Replacement of a broken pump or failed
section of pipeline.

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In Detail
For all categories of maintenance activities, an OMS • Items described above for preventative maintenance.
manual should describe (or link to relevant references): • Pre-defined maintenance activities that are conducted
• The nature of the activity and the specific maintenance based on results of surveillance activities (eg clearing of
requirements (eg refer to manufacturers maintenance snow, clearing of debris from spillways).
specifications, SOPs). • Linkages with surveillance activities, including:
• Location of the infrastructure requiring maintenance. – Associated surveillance parameters.
• Qualifications or competencies required to conduct the –P  erformance criteria linked to the need to carry out
maintenance (eg must be an electrician, must be certified the maintenance.
to work in enclosed spaces). – Communication procedures to ensure that results
of surveillance activities, and recommendations for
• Safety hazards and procedures.
maintenance, are documented and reported in a timely
• Personnel or groups responsible for carrying out the manner so that the maintenance activity can be carried
maintenance. out.
• Resources required to conduct the maintenance (eg
equipment, materials, personnel): For corrective maintenance, an OMS manual should also
• Communication procedures associated with maintenance describe:
activities that potentially affect other activities, eg for • Items described above for preventative and predictive
maintenance that requires that power be disrupted, maintenance.
what other infrastructure will be affected, when will it be • Credible failure mode based on risk analysis and risk
affected, for how long, when will power be restored, and controls.
who will need to know this.
• For each event, the pre-defined corrective maintenance
• Tracking and documentation requirements, such as: activities.
– Tracking to ensure activity was completed in a timely
• Surveillance activities associated with those events.
manner.
– Documentation of the condition of the equipment • Communication procedures to ensure that:
or other observations made by personnel doing the – Results of surveillance activities are documented and
maintenance. reported in a timely manner.
– Documentation to demonstrate the activity was carried – Necessary resources are mobilised.
out appropriately. – Corrective maintenance is carried out.
– Recommendations from personnel doing the • Procedures to return to normal operation (if applicable).
maintenance.
• Reporting requirements: While predictive and corrective maintenance are linked
to surveillance results, these maintenance activities
– Information to be reported.
could include maintenance of surveillance instruments
– How information should be reported. if surveillance results indicate that an instrument is no
– To whom information needs to be reported. longer functioning or is not functioning reliably.
– Reporting timelines.
An OMS manual should identify materials (eg parts, filter
For preventative maintenance, an OMS manual should also material, rip rap) that should be kept in inventory on site
describe the frequency at which the maintenance activity is to prevent delay in the maintenance of components tied to
to be conducted. risk controls. In addition, resources identified in the EPRP
should be kept in inventory on site, in the event that an
For predictive maintenance, an OMS manual should emergency occurs.
also describe:

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 2.4 OPERATION, MAINTENANCE,
& SURVEILLANCE

2.4.3.4 Surveillance For surveillance to be effective in risk management

and a risk-informed approach, the results should be
Surveillance involves the inspection and monitoring (ie
collated, examined, analysed and reported in a timely
collection of qualitative and quantitative observations and
and effective manner.
data) of activities and infrastructure related to tailings
management. Surveillance also includes the timely An effective surveillance programme is:
documentation, analysis and communication of surveillance
results, to inform decision-making and verify whether • Conducted by a range of personnel with direct and indirect
performance objectives (Sections 3.2 and 3.3), the risk responsibilities related to tailings management.
management plan (Sections 3.2 and 3.4), and the design • Applied across the lifecycle of a tailings facility, while
intent (Section 3.4.5), are being met. Surveillance results are adapting to the specific surveillance needs of each
used to identify trends and behaviours that are indicative of lifecycle phase and changing site conditions.
the tailings facility’s actual performance. • Based on site-specific performance objectives and the risk
management plan.
An OMS manual should describe two types of surveillance
• Used to inform decision-making related to tailings
activities: site observation and inspections, and instrument
management, based on the clear, timely reporting of
monitoring. The different activities are complementary, and are
surveillance results.
equally important to safe, responsible tailings management.

In Detail
Surveillance activities should be aligned with the design For site observation an OMS manual should describe:
intent (Section 3.4.5), performance objectives (Sections • Processes and procedures for documenting observations
3.2 and 3.3) and the risk management plan (Sections 3.2 (eg a checklist may be provided to personnel with
and 3.4). A failure to conduct surveillance of the necessary instructions for written and photographic documentation
parameters or conducting surveillance at an inadequate of observed conditions).
frequency could result in a failure to identify instances where
• Processes for reporting any observations that have
action needs to be taken. Similarly, a failure to analyse and
been documented.
report results in a timely manner could result in actions
being taken too late, if at all, leading to a loss of control.
For inspections, an OMS manual should describe the:
Site Observation and Inspections • Scope and objective of the inspection.
Site observation and inspections are used to identify • Frequency for conducting the inspection (eg could be
and track visible changes in the condition of the tailings once or more per shift for some types of inspections,
facility. Site observation and inspections include the weekly, monthly or quarterly for others).
direct observations by personnel on or adjacent to • Circumstances that would trigger the need for
tailings facilities and may also include observations from unscheduled inspections.
helicopters, and photos/videos taken from unmanned
• Conditions or aspects to be observed as part
airborne vehicles (UAVs/drones and satellites) or
of the inspection.
surveillance cameras.
• Processes and procedures for documenting and
Site observation and inspections are an integral part of reporting results of inspections.
the surveillance programme and may provide the first
indication of changing or adverse conditions, particularly Instrument Monitoring
where instrument monitoring is scarce or absent, or where Instrument monitoring provides information on parameters
adverse conditions develop outside the area of sensitivity of or characteristics that cannot be detected through site
the instruments present. observation or inspections (eg groundwater movement,
water quality), cannot be observed with sufficient precision
and accuracy (eg movement or settling of a tailings facility),

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or need to be monitored at high frequency or continuously including comparisons with expected performance
(eg bird monitoring to activate deterrent systems). and risk controls.
• Who is responsible for data analysis for each parameter.
The objective of instrument monitoring is to collect data to
• Form in which surveillance results and analysis need to
be used to assess the performance of the tailings facility
be reported (eg written report, graph, table).
against the performance objectives and indicators, and
the risk management plan. Instrument monitoring and • Timeframes for data analysis and reporting.
site observation and inspections function together as a • Procedures for reporting results if:
comprehensive data set to enable the assessment of facility – Observations and performance are within the expected
performance and provide a basis for informed decisions. range.
All are essential, and none of these forms of surveillance – Any observations or performance are outside the
can be neglected if performance objectives are to be met expected range.
and risks are to be managed. • Who is responsible for reporting.
• To whom the reports are to be provided.
For instrument monitoring, an OMS manual should
describe: Considerations for the Design of a Surveillance
• Parameters to be included as part of instrument Programme
monitoring, including those not directly related to There is no ‘one-size-fits all’ approach to surveillance.
the tailings facility (eg meteorological data, seismic Each surveillance programme should be designed on a
monitoring). site-specific basis to be able to provide accurate, meaningful
• The frequency of data acquisition for each parameter. information about the performance of the tailings facility.

• Instrument(s) to be used for each parameter. When designing or reviewing a surveillance programme, the
• Who is responsible for data acquisition for each following questions should be considered:
parameter. • What do you need to know? Why do you need to know it?
• Locations of instruments, or locations where samples What will this information or data tell you?
are to be collected (eg sampling of pore water quality). – What information do you need to understand the
• Methodology and procedures for data acquisition, performance of the tailings facility?
including those related to quality management (eg – What is the risk management plan and what are the
instrument calibration). surveillance requirements stemming from it?
– What are the performance objectives, criteria and
• Processes and procedures for documenting the results indicators for the risk controls for the tailings facility?
of instrument surveillance, and the interpretation
of results. • Who needs to know it, and why?

• Who is responsible for documenting the results. • What types of information do you need that can be
acquired through direct, visual observation of the tailings
Analysis of Surveillance Results facility? For this type of information:
For the effective use of surveillance results in tailings – How often should visual observations or inspections be
management and decision-making, results should be made to give you the information you need?
collated, examined, analysed and reported in a timely and – What should the person(s) observing or inspecting be
effective manner. looking for?
– Who should they tell if they see something of potential
For all surveillance activities, an OMS manual should concern?
describe: • What types of information do you need that can only be
• The expected range of observations or performance of acquired indirectly, through measurement of associated
surveillance parameters, so any results outside that parameters or analysis of samples?
range can be identified and reported. – What methodologies can be used to collect the data
• Methodology and procedures for data analysis, needed to provide this information?

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 2.4 OPERATION, MAINTENANCE,
AND SURVEILLANCE

– How frequently does this data need to be collected to risk management plan? For example, a given degree
provide the information you need? of movement detected in an embankment structure
– Is real-time or continuous monitoring possible? may be normal and consistent with the design for
If so, is it appropriate? one tailings facility but may be cause for concern at a
• How can surveillance results be verified and calibrated? different facility.
For example: • How does this data need to be analysed? How frequently
– How can results from remote sensing methods does it need to be analysed to provide the information
such as satellite observations be verified or you need?
‘ground-truthed’? • What form do the results need to be presented in to
– How can results be calibrated to understand what allow you to understand what the information is telling
they mean in the context of a specific tailings facility you, how it relates to other information, and what it is
and the performance objectives, design intent and telling about the performance of the tailings facility?

2.4.4 Implementation of an OMS Manual • Have the knowledge and competence to fulfil their roles
and responsibilities.
An OMS manual is only effective if it is properly and
consistently implemented. This requires that the manual • Understand the OMS activities they are engaged in.
be accessible and that all personnel expected to use the
manual: The Operator should consider providing training (internal or
external) to help ensure that personnel have the necessary
• Are aware of its purpose and importance. knowledge and competence. As part of training, personnel
• Know how to access the current version of the should understand how to recognise problems, upset or
OMS manual. unusual conditions, and understand the importance of
• Understand their roles, responsibilities and level of reporting those to the appropriate person in a prompt
authority related to tailings management. manner. Training should emphasise the importance of this

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and make it clear that personnel are strongly encouraged to 2.4.5 Linkages with Emergency Preparedness
do so. Furthermore, it should be made clear that reporting and Response
problems, upset, or unusual conditions will not result
in negative implications for the personnel reporting (eg It is important to understand the relationship between
disciplinary measures, termination of employment). This emergency preparedness and response (Section 2.7) and
is key to the effective early recognition of problems so that OMS activities. Typically, OMS activities are conducted under
timely action can be taken. normal, and upset or unusual conditions, while the EPRP
functions when there is an emergency. While different
The Operator should have a roll-out strategy, including Operators may establish the boundary between upset and
a training component, for a new OMS manual or any emergency conditions differently, it is important to define this
significant revisions to the OMS manual. boundary, and thus define the boundary between the scope
of OMS, and the scope of emergency response.
Beyond training for new versions of the OMS manual,
regular refresher activities should be provided (eg annual), The OMS manual and EPRP for a given tailings facility
and new personnel should receive training specific to their should be aligned, such that there are no functional gaps
roles in OMS. The Operator may also consider mentoring between normal operation and emergency response, and
programmes or other activities to help encourage the that procedures are in place to transition from normal
retention and advancement of personnel with roles related to conditions to an emergency situation that may arise.
tailings management. This will help to ensure a higher level
of competency, lower staff turnover and provide a basis for A mine can have many types of potential emergency
succession planning. situations, although it should be noted that credible failure
modes with negligible likelihood may not necessarily need
As part of implementation of the OMS manual, and as emergency plans. In terms of tailings facilities specifically,
further described in Section 2.5.4, the Operator should for each potential emergency associated with a credible
develop systems for the control of information (eg failure mode, an OMS manual should describe:
maintenance records) generated by OMS activities, to ensure
that all necessary information is appropriately recorded and • The performance, occurrences or observations that
is stored in a secure, retrievable manner. would result in an emergency being declared (eg based
on risk controls and associated performance criteria)
(Section 3.6.4).
• Roles and responsibilities of key personnel in transition
from normal or upset conditions to an emergency.
• Actions to be taken to transition from normal or upset
conditions to an emergency situation.

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 2.5 MANAGING INFORMATION

2.5.1 Introduction • Schedules for implementation and reviews/updates.

The Operator’s access to and use of up-to-date, accurate • Status of implementation.
information is critical to enabling safe, responsible tailings • Mechanisms and reporting for documenting outcomes.
management. Preparing and updating documentation on
information on all aspects of tailings management is critical 2.5.2 Information Related to Governance of Tailings
to providing a basis for: Management
• Safe design, construction, operation and closure of tailings The Operator should appropriately document and maintain
facilities. information related to all aspects of governance of tailings
• Decision-making to ensure safe tailings management. management and ensure that documentation is up to date.
• Managing change. This includes the following elements:
• Developing and implementing a closure plan. • Accountability and responsibility for key positions (Section
2.2.2), including documentation on:
• Fully understanding and effectively managing risks.
– Lines of communication and associated expectations.
In addition, it is important to identify and retain key – Succession process and information transfer for
information for future reference, including in the long-term succession.
through the Closure and Post-Closure phases. • Corporate policy on tailings management (Section 2.2.3).
• Documentation related to the implementation of the TMS,
This includes documentation describing key aspects including (Section 2.3):
related to: – Mechanisms for implementing the TMS.
• Governance of tailings management. – Outcomes of Identifying Actions to Improve
• Planning, design, construction, operation and OMS Performance, including action plans developed.
activities, and closure of tailings facilities. • OMS manual (Section 2.4) and outcomes of OMS activities
(eg surveillance results).
This also includes all documents developed by the Operator • Documentation related to the programme for reviewing
in response to legal requirements and commitments to tailings safety, including (Section 2.6):
communities, including commitments to public disclosure. – Mechanisms for reporting results internally and
externally.
First and foremost, this information is critical to the – Outcomes of reviews and the Operator’s responses to
Operator. However, it may also provide the basis for outcomes (eg actions to implement recommendations).
information that is disclosed to regulators, potentially
• EPRP, including results of testing (Section 2.7).
affected communities, other stakeholders and the public
(Section 2.2.7).
2.5.3 Information Related to the Project
In describing the information listed in the sections below, it Conception, Design, Construction, Operation and
is important to emphasise that it is the concepts and content Closure of Tailings Facilities
that are important. It is up to the discretion of the Operator
Information related to the project conception, design,
to determine how best to structure and organise this
construction, operation and closure of tailings facilities
information, including what to call different documents. The
should be appropriately documented and maintained to
sections below are not intended to be a ‘table of contents’
ensure that documentation is up to date.
but rather an identification of the information that Operators
should have to enable safe tailings management. It is important to note that Operators may not have all of
this information for all of their tailings facilities, particularly
For information and documents identified in Sections
older facilities that were designed and constructed
2.5.2 and 2.5.3, Operators should also document, where
many decades ago. Such information may not have been
applicable:
produced (eg multi-criteria alternatives analyses were not
• Resources required (eg budget, human resources, conducted) or may be inadequate compared to current good
equipment, and material). practice (eg site characterisation information) or may have
• Specific accountabilities and responsibilities. been lost or destroyed over time (eg original drawings). In
• Competencies required of personnel with various roles some cases, it will be impossible to fill such gaps (eg an
and responsibilities. Operator cannot retroactively do an alternatives analysis).

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In other cases, Operators may undertake studies to improve – A description of risk controls, associated performance
information (eg to improve site characterisation). It is criteria and surveillance requirements, and pre-defined
important to recognise that gaps, such as a lack of detailed actions to be taken if performance is outside expected
site characterisation, may increase uncertainty about the ranges.
future performance of a tailings facility. • Information on the design of the tailings facility, including
(Section 3.4.5):
Types of information that should be documented and – The design basis and approach.
maintained include: – Design of all stages of the facility, including
• Site characterisation, including plans for updating and construction drawings.
improving the site characterisation (Section 3.3.2). • Quality management plan (Section 3.5.2).
• Risk assessment, including (Section 3.2.4): • Tailings transportation and deposition plan (Section 3.4.4).
– Outcomes and key conclusions.
• Water management plan (Section 3.2.3).
– A summary for senior management (eg Accountable
Executive). • Information on the construction of the tailings facility
– Schedule for periodic reviews. (initial construction and construction activities through the
– Factors that would trigger an unscheduled review. balance of the lifecycle) (Section 3.5).
• Multi-criteria alternatives analysis, including a summary • Closure plan including:
for senior management of (Section 3.3.4): – Closure objectives and post-closure land use.
– Alternatives considered. – Status of development of the closure plan.
– Factors considered in the decision-making process. – Community engagement activities related to closure
– Key factors leading to the selection of the preferred plan development and implementation.
alternative. – Schedule for review and updates to the closure plan.
– During the Closure phase, the status of implementation
• Performance objectives, indicators and criteria, including
of the plan.
(Section 3.3.3):
– During the Post-Closure phase:
– Schedule for periodic reviews.
◊ Status of performance against the closure plan and
– Factors that would trigger an unscheduled review.
objective.
• Risk management plan including (Section 3.2.4): ◊ Status of achieving the intended post-closure land use.
– Status of development and implementation. – A summary for senior management, appropriate to
– A summary for senior management. the lifecycle phase and the status of development/
implementation of the closure plan.

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 2.5 MANAGING INFORMATION

2.5.4 Control of Information Control of information includes establishing and implementing

a process to ensure necessary information is documented,
The use of inaccurate, incomplete or out-of-date information
and that key documents and information are maintained,
can increase uncertainty and pose a risk, as can the loss of
retained and archived. There are two aspects to the control
records of essential information (eg reports, SOPs, photos,
of information:
maps, drawings, surveillance results).
• Access to, and use of, up-to-date, accurate information.
Information that is identified by the Operator as necessary • Identification and retention of records that are potentially
to safe tailings management, throughout the lifecycle of the useful to the future management of the tailings facility.
tailings facility, should be controlled.

In Detail
The information described in Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 particularly in the case of documents that are accessed
should be managed within controlled documents, electronically.
including:
• Providing a procedure for the systematic identification of There may be certain documents or content that should
be accessible as a paper copy in the event that electronic
documents (eg numbering system consistently applied).
versions are not accessible. For example, a loss of power
• Defining the process for reviewing and updating the restricting access to electronic versions may be linked to
document, including both major and minor updates. certain risk controls (eg loss of ability to operate pumps) and
• Identifying persons with authority to revise the document, having access to a paper copy of the OMS manual (Section
and the scope of their authority (eg some may only have 2.4) during such periods may be necessary for the effective
the authority to amend certain sections). response to the situation. Similarly, having access to paper
• Describing mechanisms for the approval of revisions to copies of an EPRP may be essential in some potential
the document. emergencies.
• For electronic documents, developing and implementing
Specific risks and vulnerabilities associated with the
measures to prevent unintended changes, or to prevent
potential loss of access to documents should be identified
any changes by personnel without the appropriate
and contingency plans and information technology security
authority.
plans should be developed, including:
In addition, there should be defined procedures for: • Procedures for the backup and recovery of paper and
electronic copies.
• Providing relevant personnel with access to the
document and any supporting documents (ie distributing • Plans to prevent unauthorised access, including access
paper copies or providing access to electronic versions). to documentation, as well as access to instruments (eg
surveillance instruments) and other technologies that may
• Informing personnel of changes to the document relevant
be connected to mobile networks or wireless internet.
to their roles and responsibilities.
• Retention of paper copies of critical sections of documents
• Control of reference information used to develop and
that can be used in the event of a loss of access to
update the document or referred to in the document.
electronic documents.
• Restricting access to out-of-date versions and clearly
labelling those versions as out of date. Another consideration for the control of documented
• Identifying out-of-date materials that should be retained. information is the management of legacy electronic formats.
• Archiving or disposing of out-of-date materials, A plan should be developed, with input from information
as appropriate. technology and management experts, to address the
management of legacy electronic formats to ensure that
Access to these documents may be interrupted (eg loss records potentially useful to tailings management are not
of paper copies due to fire, temporary loss of access to lost or made impossible to access in the future as a result of
electronic copies due to loss of power). The risks associated the obsolescence of software, electronic file formats or data
with the loss of access of documents should be assessed, storage media.

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2.6 PROGRAMME FOR Back to contents

REVIEWING TAILINGS SAFETY

2.6.1 Introduction Responding to this challenge requires a well-designed

review programme with multiple levels of safety assessment.
A strong emphasis on the review of safety of tailings facilities
Understanding safety cannot be simplified to a verification
is essential to provide oversight of all the factors that
of performance against a few key technical parameters or
influence safety.
criteria, unless they reveal that a failure is imminent.
A review programme providing oversight needs to address
A significant challenge in reviewing and assessing the
a range of questions related to a tailings facility and how
safety of tailings facilities is that they are in a near constant
it is being managed.
state of change from their initial construction, throughout
the Operations phase as the size of the facility increases,
Responding to this range of questions requires a range
and throughout the Closure phase when the closure plan
of competencies in reviewers. In addition, there is no
is implemented. Given the complex, dynamic nature of
single review mechanism that can answer such a range of
tailings facilities and the mining operations within which they
questions, nor would it be desirable or effective to rely on a
exist, and the nature of the governance structures needed
single review mechanism and single team of people to provide
to ensure safe tailings management, the programme for
oversight of all aspects of tailings management. A review
reviewing the safety of tailings facilities should be multi-
programme consisting of several different mechanisms,
faceted and comprehensive if it is to be effective. This is
implemented in an integrated manner, is needed.
imperative given the potential for human error in so many
different aspects of tailings management.

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 57

 2.6 PROGRAMME FOR
REVIEWING TAILINGS SAFETY

In Detail
Questions that may be addressed by a review • Has the Operator developed a tailings facility design
programme include: that is consistent with the objectives of safe, responsible
• Are governance structures and systems appropriate tailings management (Section 3.4)?
and are they being implemented effectively? Do these • Has the Operator developed a risk management plan
structures and systems include adequate mechanisms that eliminates risk where possible, and describes
to manage change, and are these mechanisms being measures to reduce or mitigate remaining risks
implemented effectively (Section 2.3.2.1)? (Section 3.2.4.3)? Is the risk management plan being
• Do personnel with accountability, responsibility and implemented effectively?
authority related to tailings management have the • Has the tailings facility been constructed in a manner
necessary competencies? consistent with the design intent? Have deviations
• Are lines of communication clear and adequate, and is (Section 3.5.3) and as-built conditions (Section 3.5.4)
communication effective? been adequately documented?
• Are personnel encouraged to report problems, errors • Has the Operator developed OMS activities that
or concerns in a prompt manner, and are they free from are aligned with the performance objectives, risk
potential negative repercussions if they do so? management plan and design intent (Section 2.4)? Are
these OMS activities being implemented effectively?
• Does the Operator have information on the site
characteristics necessary to inform decisions throughout • Is the tailings facility performing in accordance with
the lifecycle (Section 3.3.2)? the performance objectives, risk management plan
and design intent (Section 2.3.4)? Is the tailings facility
• Does the Operator understand the risk to the degree
expected to continue to perform in this manner?
necessary to inform decisions through the lifecycle
(Section 3.2.4)? • Has the Operator identified closure objectives and a
post-closure land use (Sections 3.3.3 and 3.7)?
• Does the Operator recognise and understand
uncertainties associated with risk? Has the Operator • Has the tailings facility been planned, designed,
taken steps to reduce uncertainty (Section 3.2.4)? constructed and operated in a manner consistent with
the closure objectives and post-closure land use?
• Has the Operator developed performance objectives,
indicators and criteria that are consistent with the • Are there deficiencies in the responses to any of the
objectives of safe, responsible tailings management above questions?
(Section 3.3.3)? • Are there opportunities for continual improvement?

2.6.2 Designing a Programme for Reviewing site-specific design of such a programme, including factors
Tailings Safety such as:
• What are the objectives of the overall review programme
There are several different review mechanisms that can
and what are the topics or questions to be addressed?
be implemented to provide a programme for reviewing the
safety of tailings facilities, including: • What is the lifecycle phase of the tailings facility?
• Independent Review • How complex is the tailings facility and what are the risks?
• Dam safety reviews (DSRs) • What will be the relationship between reviewers and the
Operator’s employees and consultants, including the
• Tailings stewardship reviews
Accountable Executive, the RTFE and the EOR?
• Reviews of the TMS
• How frequently is review needed to reflect the state of
• Audits or verifications. change of the tailings facility?

To ensure that the review programme is effective for the • Are there relevant legal requirements or other
tailings facility in question, the Operator should consider the requirements or commitments that need to be considered
in the design of the programme?

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The design of a review programme should describe: independence of reviewers with the need for familiarity with
• Review mechanisms to be used. the tailings facility and how it is managed.
• Mandate, objectives and scope of each mechanisms.
Regardless of who is involved in conducting a review, it is
• Frequency of application of each mechanism. essential that they undertake the review in an impartial and
• Competencies required for reviewers for each mechanism, objective manner. Reviewers must be empowered to bring
taking into account the mandate and objectives, and the forward observations, advice and recommendations for safe,
complexity and risks associated with the tailings facility. responsible tailings management, including constructive
• The degree of independence expected. criticism of the Operator. Reviewers must be able to conduct the
review free of the risk of negative repercussions, particularly in
The Operator should also consider and describe the the case of employees who are involved in reviews.
relationship between different review mechanisms within the
programme, how each mechanism is intended to address Reviewers would be considered independent if they
the overall objectives of the review programme, and how have not been directly involved with the design or
these mechanisms will be integrated with each other. operation of the particular tailings facility. Independence
Different Operators may, for example, define the scope of is important because an independent reviewer can bring a
Independent Review versus a tailings stewardship review fresh, outside perspective. They may recognise deficiencies
differently. There is no ‘right’ definition of the scope of these or opportunities that someone more familiar with the tailings
mechanisms. However, when designing a review programme facility may overlook or fail to recognise. Independence also
the scope of these mechanisms should be made clear to lends credibility.
avoid confusion.
However, as noted above, tailings facilities and the associated
The review programme should be designed to be integrated systems to manage them are complex. It can take a long time
with the TMS to ensure that reviews are fully informed by, to fully understand this complexity. The more independent a
and in turn inform, the ongoing Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle reviewer is, the less familiar they may be. As a result, there
of the TMS, including developing and implementing action is a potential for their observations or recommendations
plans to address deficiencies and opportunities for continual to be based on an incomplete understanding of the tailings
improvement. This is illustrated in Figure 5. facility and associated systems. On the other hand, this lack of
familiarity may lead them to identify concerns not necessarily
A further consideration for an Operator in developing evident to those more familiar with the facility. There is an
a review programme is balancing the need for the important role to play in the review programme both for
reviewers with:
• Greater familiarity and a more complete understanding
of the tailings facility in question.

Act: Plan:
• Less familiarity with the tailings facility in question,
Review and Develop plans but a greater degree of independence.
develop action for tailings
plans management
2.6.3 Template for a Programme for Reviewing
Tailings Safety
Recognising the importance of designing a review programme
Programme on a site-specific basis, this section proposes a template
to review for an effective programme for reviewing tailings safety.
tailings
safety This proposed review programme consists of the following
elements, implemented in an integrated manner:
• As described in Section 2.3.4, the Performance Evaluation
Do:
element of the TMS should include the preparation of an
Check: Implement the annual performance review by the EOR, addressing whether
Evaluate tailings the tailings facility is performing as intended.
performance management
system – This report is provided to those involved in tailings safety
review for information.
– The design of the programme should specify which review
Figure 5: Integration of a programme for tailings safety review mechanism is responsible for reviewing this annual report
into the tailings management system and assessing its conclusions.

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 2.6 PROGRAMME FOR
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• Independent Review is conducted periodically to review should be sought from the Project Conception (Section
plans and engineering practices throughout the lifecycle. 3.3) and Design (Section 3.4) phases, through to reviewing
• Tailings stewardship reviews are conducted periodically to performance during the Post-Closure phase (Section 3.7).
provide detailed reviews of operational practices. This includes seeking input from Independent Review
on the development of the closure plan (Section 3.7.2)
• The TMS and associated governance mechanisms are
and consideration of potential material changes (Section
reviewed periodically.
3.6.3). However, over the lifecycle the scope and focus of
• Results of Independent Review, tailings stewardship Independent Review should be re-adjusted to ensure it
reviews, and reviews of the TMS are considered by the remains relevant and effective.
Operator in Identifying Action to Improve Performance
(Section 2.3.5), and action plans should be developed and Independent Review typically provides an assessment of
implemented to address deficiencies and opportunities for the underlying drivers of tailings safety, such as the site
continual improvement. characterisation and models (Section 3.3.2), design intent
and assumptions, performance against the design intent,
A review programme rigorously implemented following this and models used to verify design assumptions and to
template, with close coordination between the Independent predict future performance. More specific consideration
Review and the tailings stewardship review, would provide of current performance is also typically included, based
effective oversight to help ensure safety. Furthermore, it on consideration of surveillance data, input from a tailings
would meet or exceed the level of assurance that is typically stewardship review, and site inspection.
provided by the use of dam safety reviews (Section 2.6.5).
Independent Review is conducted by one or more
2.6.4 Independent Review appropriately qualified and experienced individuals.
Independent Review provides periodic review of the Mechanisms for Independent Review can include a multi-
Operator’s engineering practices throughout the lifecycle person board, commonly referred to as an Independent
and provides the Operator with objective opinions and Tailings Review Board (ITRB) or an individual reviewer,
advice, and potentially recommendations regarding the risks referred to in the Standard as a Senior Independent
and the state of tailings management, independent of the Technical Reviewer.
personnel responsible for tailings management.
The Independent Reviewers do not have decision-making
Independent Review is applicable throughout the lifecycle authority and do not replace the role of the EOR for
of a tailings facility. The input of Independent Review assessing tailings facility safety.

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In Detail
Independent Review provides input to the Accountable • Effectiveness of plans and processes for tailings
Executive and RTFE on a range of aspects related tailings management, such as the surveillance programme.
management, such as: • Development and implementation of the closure plan.
• Adequacy of site characterisation. • Opportunities for continual improvement.
• Design and conduct of the multi-criteria alternatives
analysis, and the conclusions of the analysis. To be effective, Independent Review should consider
• Completeness/appropriateness of: plans for future mine development and associated tailings
– The Operator’s understanding of the risks posed by management. This may include considering information
tailings management and the need to conduct an up- such as the anticipated life-of-mine based on current
to-date or more thorough risk assessment. exploration results, as opposed to the expected life-of-
– The planned or existing risk management plan. mine based on proven reserves and resources. A difference
of several years in life-of-mine may have significant
• Design of the tailings facility and the adequacy of
implications for tailings management. However, this may
associated documentation.
require disclosure to Independent Reviewers of forward-
• Whether the design criteria and performance objectives looking information. Public disclosure of information of
for tailings management are consistent with legal this nature may be limited by securities law, depending
requirements, industry guidelines and best practices, on the relevant jurisdiction. As a result, in such cases,
and current theory, methodologies and experience. it is important that the meetings and detailed reports of
• Current or anticipated performance of tailings Independent Review be confidential. However, an Operator
management including whether: may prepare a summary that does not reveal forward
– Performance objectives and the design intent are looking information that may be provided to regulators,
being met. investors, communities or other stakeholders.
– The facility is predicted to continue to perform as
intended.

2.6.5 Dam Safety Reviews DSRs consistent with the above description have
certain advantages when conducted in a multi-disciplinary
Dam safety reviews (DSRs) are a review mechanism adapted
manner, notably:
from practices for water dams and are commonly applied
to tailings embankments. DSRs are required under legal • Recognition and acceptance by regulators and other
requirements in some jurisdictions and are required in stakeholders.
the Standard. • Potentially, a higher degree of independence compared to
other review mechanisms described in this section.
Ideally, a DSR is a review mechanism that is conducted
in a systematic manner by an independent qualified However, particularly given the widespread recognition and
review engineer to assess and evaluate the safety of an acceptance of DSRs, there is a risk of placing too much
embankment or tailings facility against failure modes, reliance on and confidence in them. This confidence should
in order to make a statement on the safety of the facility, be tempered by understanding the limitations of DSRs and,
including whether or not it meets the design intent as described in Section 2.6.1, Operators should implement
and applicable safety criteria, and whether it poses any a review programme consisting of several different
unacceptable risks. A DSR may include the consideration mechanisms to reduce reliance on any one mechanism.
of technical, operational and governance aspects. An
equivalence to this ideal DSR may exist, such as that DSRs also have important limitations, in part based on their
described in Section 2.6.3. origins in practices for water dams:

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 2.6 PROGRAMME FOR
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• They are often not conducted at an adequate frequency Given the more detailed focus of a tailings stewardship
to reflect the dynamic nature of tailings facilities. For review compared to Independent Review, those conducting
example, conducting a DSR every five years may be tailings stewardship reviews need a greater degree of
adequate for a water dam that has been operating for 10– familiarity with the tailings facility and the Operator’s
15 years or more after construction is complete. However, plans and practices. As such, a tailings stewardship review
in a five-year period a tailings facility may have changed should consider the outcomes of a review of the tailings
quite considerably. management system.
• Methodologies for DSRs often focus on the embankments.
However, the safety of an tailings facility embankment The key activities of a tailings stewardship review include:
cannot be appropriately assessed in isolation from • Reviewing a detailed summary of information provided by
consideration of the facility as a whole. Thus, a more the Operator, including:
holistic approach is needed when assessing the safety of – Current and planned operations.
tailings facilities. – Surveillance results.
• The high degree of independence of DSRs, as noted –S  tatus of implementation of recommendations of
above, can also be a limitation. Persons performing a DSR previous reviews.
may lack the familiarity and knowledge needed to fully • Conducting a detailed inspection of the tailings facility.
understand a tailings facility and its management. • Reviewing operational plans, practices and procedures to
assess the effectiveness of implementation in supporting
It is important that Operators, regulators, and other the achievement of the performance objectives and design
stakeholders recognise the limitations of DSRs and intent of the tailings facility. The plans, practices and
recognise the importance of considering the outputs of a procedures reviewed may include:
range of review mechanisms for tailings safety. In addition, – OMS manual
Operators should consider measures to address these – EPRP
limitations, such as modifying the DSR methodology to take – Tailings transport and deposition plan.
a more holistic view of the entire tailings facility. – Water management plan, including seepage control and
collection, as they relate to stability of the tailings facility.
2.6.6 Tailings Stewardship Reviews
There is a review mechanism, sometimes referred to as Tailings stewardship reviews may be conducted annually for
a tailings stewardship review, that is complementary but tailings facilities in the Operations and Closure phases of
different than Independent Review. the lifecycle. They may be conducted less frequently in the
Post-Closure phase, depending on the risks posed, the state
• It is more operationally focused than Independent Review:
of reclamation, the performance of the facility and predicted
– It may go into a greater degree of detail on operational
future performance.
performance, plans and practices (eg OMS activities)
related to the safety of the tailings facility and may The results of the inspection should be documented,
highlight areas of focus for Independent Review. including supporting inspection checklists and photographs.
– It would not typically include elements such as reviewing A report of the tailings stewardship review is then
and providing input to the multi-criteria alternatives prepared by the independent engineer, including any
analysis (Section 3.3.4), the development of the design of recommendations regarding:
the tailings facility (Section 3.4.3), or the development of
• Significant tailings facility safety concerns and/or concerns
the closure plan (Section 3.7.2).
requiring immediate or time-sensitive actions.
• It is conducted by an independent engineer,
• Tailings facility safety concerns or conditions
supported by the EOR, personnel from the site, and
requiring time-sensitive action by a date recommended
potentially personnel from other sites or the Operator’s
in the review.
corporate team.
• Improvements to plans, practices and procedures.

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In Detail
A tailings stewardship review considers a wide range of • Surveillance programme, including parameters,
information, such as: frequency of data collection and instrumentation.
• Current status and future plans regarding the • Results of surveillance and inspections since the last
tailings facility. tailings stewardship review.
• History of the tailings facility, including: • Results of Independent Review.
– The design intent and the design basis. • Status of site characterisation and the site
– The evolution of the facility from the Construction characterisation model.
phase onwards.
• Results of modelling of current and future tailings
– Deviations from the design intent and design basis.
facility performance.
– Material changes that have been implemented since
the last stewardship review. • Status of the OMS manual, EPRP, and related
documents.
• Risk assessment.
• Status of training for personnel with direct roles related
• Closure plan.
to tailings management.
• Status of actions taken on recommendations from
• Current and future operational or technical challenges.
previous tailings stewardship reviews.

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2.6.7 Review of the Tailings Management System make recommendations for actions to be taken to address
any deficiencies or opportunities for improvement.
The TMS and associated governance mechanisms should
be reviewed periodically to assess whether they are effective These reviews may be undertaken internally or externally.
and fit for purpose for achieving the objective of safe tailings However, an external perspective may be particularly
management. effective in identifying underlying deficiencies, particularly
those related to the overall corporate culture of the Operator.
The scope of a review of the TMS, also referred to as
a governance review, should include a review of the The results of the review of the TMS should be considered by
completeness and effectiveness of: the Operator in Identifying Actions to Improve Performance
• Assignment of accountability and responsibility, including (Section 2.3.5). Results help to facilitate informed decisions
the effectiveness of the Accountable Executive in decision- regarding tailings management so that tailings-related risks
making related to tailings management (Section 2.2.2). are managed safely and responsibly.
• Corporate policy of tailings management (Section 2.2.3).
• Implementation of the TMS (Section 2.3). 2.6.8 Audits
• Management of information (Section 2.5). Audits (also referred to as verifications or validations) are
• Functional and organisational structure. formal, systematic, documented examinations of a tailings
facility’s conformance with explicit, agreed, prescribed
• Lines of communication and effectiveness of
criteria, including legal requirements, the Operator’s policy
communication (Section 2.2.6).
and commitments, applicable standards, or performance
• Relationships with business units with indirect roles expectations. Audits evaluate and report on the degree
related to tailings management. of conformance with stipulated criteria, based on the
• Ongoing integrated mine planning (Section 3.2.2). systematic collection and documentation of relevant
• Integration with sitewide systems, such as a sitewide evidence. These review mechanisms involve some degree of
ESMS. judgement but are not designed to determine root cause of
deficiencies, or to evaluate effectiveness.
• Conformance with legal requirements, corporate policies
and practices, and commitments to communities (Section Audits can be conducted both internally (eg by employees
2.3.2.2). with appropriate knowledge and competencies who are
• Effectiveness of response to any non-conformances, independent, impartial and objective with respect to the
incidents, or complaints. management of the tailings facility being audited) or
externally. The frequency would depend on several factors,
A review of the TMS should identify deficiencies and including the objective and scope of the audit.
opportunities for continual improvement related to the tailing
management system and governance mechanisms and  

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PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE

2.7.1 Introduction nature of the response that would be required.

This may assist in describing the measures to be
Recognising that the ultimate goal of this Guide is to eliminate
taken if an emergency occurs.
fatalities and catastrophic events, it is nonetheless important
to be prepared for a potential emergency. – Describe measures to be taken if an emergency occurs.
– Identify
 resources needed to respond to an emergency.
There is a wide range of potential emergencies that may – Address any necessary coordination with off-site
occur associated with tailings facilities, and it is essential emergency responders, local communities, public
for Operators to be prepared to effectively respond if an sector agencies and other parties that may be involved in
emergency occurs. Such potential emergency scenarios may emergency response (eg other businesses).
include: structural failure of a facility, rising water levels within – Describe mechanisms to implement the plan if an
a facility, unusual and excessive cracking of an embankment, emergency occurs.
a sudden loss of environmental containment of a facility, or • Provide information to off-site emergency responders,
other events. There are also other types of emergencies that communities2 and public sector agencies to assist in the
may affect a mine site more generally, including a tailings development of their emergency response measures and
facility, such as a loss of power, or extreme conditions such as collaborate with them in that development.
an earthquake, wildfire, landslide or avalanche. • Provide information to other parties that may be impacted if
an emergency occurs.
Operators should develop and be prepared to implement a
• Align with the OMS manual, as discussed in Section 2.4.5.
site-specific EPRP for credible failure modes that could lead
to emergencies. This includes credible failure modes that
Operators should engage off-site emergency responders,
could lead to catastrophic failures.
communities, public sector agencies, and where relevant,
other parties that may be involved in emergency response,
Emergency planning related to tailings facilities should be
in the development of relevant components of the EPRP (ie
integrated into broader, sitewide emergency planning so that
components related to potential emergencies that could
the Operator has a comprehensive EPRP to address the full
have off-site impacts, or for which the Operator may require
range of potential emergencies that could occur.
external support to respond to the emergency). This process
should include supporting communities and public sector
Note that, as described in Section 2.4.5, different Operators
agencies to develop their own EPRPs. It is up to the Operator, in
may establish the boundary between upset and emergency
consultation with off-site emergency responders, communities
conditions differently. Operator’s should clearly define this
and public sector agencies, to determine how best to organise
boundary, and this defines the scope of potential events to
information related to emergency preparedness.
be addressed in the EPRP. The surveillance programme
(Section 2.4.3.4) should include surveillance activities capable
The EPRP should be tested throughout all phases of the
of identifying the performance, occurrences or observations
lifecycle at a frequency established in the plan, or more
that would result in an emergency being declared (eg based
frequently if triggered by a material change either to the
on risk controls and associated performance criteria)
tailings facility or to the social, environmental and local
(Section 3.6.4).
economic context. Testing should involve communities
and public sector agencies, including off-site emergency
The objective of the EPRP is to prevent, mitigate or reduce
responders, who would be involved in responding to an
impacts (eg injury or loss of life) in the event an emergency
emergency. Operators should meaningfully engage with
occurs.
employees and contractors to inform the development and
testing of the EPRP and co-develop community-focused
The EPRP should:
emergency preparedness measures with project-affected
• Describe measures the Operator will take to prepare for people. The EPRP should be revised, as appropriate, to reflect
an emergency and to respond if an emergency occurs. This outcomes and lessons learned from testing.
detailed description is primarily for use by the Operator and
should be integrated into the sitewide emergency plan. This The EPRP should also be reviewed and updated as appropriate:
description should:
• After updates to the risk assessment (Section 3.2.4) if those
– Identify potential emergencies that could occur.
updates lead to changes in the understanding of credible
◊ Potential emergencies may be categorised based
failure modes or potential consequences of a failure.
on the nature of the potential emergency or the

2. In the context of emergency preparedness, communities include places where people reside permanently or temporarily, including individual residences and
recreational sites such as campgrounds.

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 2.7 EMERGENCY
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• In response to material changes to the tailings facility Credible failure scenario = credible failure mode + credible
(Section 3.6.3). consequences (each element needs to be credible for the failure
• When the lifecycle transitions to a different phase (eg scenario to be credible).
transition from Operations to Closure phase).
For credible failure scenarios that would not have catastrophic
• To reflect relevant changes in:
consequences, the EPRP may be developed on the basis of this
– Personnel or organisational structures related to
preliminary analysis.
emergency response and referred to in the EPRP.
– Sources or contact information related to off-site support,
For credible failure scenarios that could have catastrophic
such as suppliers of material or equipment that would be
consequences, more detailed analysis of potential
used for emergency response.
consequences should be conducted to inform development
– Practices or technology related to emergency response
of the EPRP. The purpose of more detailed analysis is to identify
(eg warning systems).
communities, infrastructure, residences, farms, recreational
– Legal requirements.
facilities, wildlife habitat and other features
• Other changes on or off-site relevant to emergency that could be impacted in the event that an emergency occurs.
response, such as changes to road access, communication This information is needed to help develop emergency response
or other infrastructure. measures.

Further Reading: Such credible failure scenarios fall into two basic categories,
ICMM and UNEP: Good practice in emergency preparedness based on behaviour of the material if a failure occurs, and thus
and response the methods used to conduct more detailed analysis of potential
UNEP: Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at consequences:
Local Level (APELL) • Credible failure scenarios that would include a flow of
materials – water alone or water and solids (ie tailings and
2.7.2 Assessing Credible Potential Consequences other entrained solids such as soil) – into the downstream
environment.
The starting point for developing an EPRP is the identification
of potential failure modes and determining whether those • Credible failure scenarios with potentially catastrophic
potential failure modes are credible. Credible failure modes, consequences but not related to a flow of materials into the
discussed further in Section 3.4.3, are failure mechanisms downstream environment (eg a slump of tailings solids with
that are technically feasible given the materials present in limited water).
the tailings facility and its foundation, the properties of these
materials, the configuration of the tailings facility, drainage Flow failures are the failure mode most often associated with
conditions and surface water control at the tailings facility, catastrophic consequences when failures occur.
throughout its lifecycle under the static and transient loading
conditions the facility may be subject to over that lifecycle. For credible failure scenarios that would include a flow of
Credible failure modes are identified through the risk material, a breach analysis should be conducted to estimate:
assessment process (Section 3.2.4). • The physical area that would be impacted by a potential
failure.
Once credible failure modes have been identified, a • Flow arrival times at various downstream locations (eg
preliminary analysis should be conducted to identify and communities, bridges).
assess the scenarios that could develop and the potential
• Flow depth and velocities at various downstream locations.
consequences of those scenarios, including impacts on
human health and safety, the environment and infrastructure. • Duration of flooding.
This provides the basis for identifying and describing credible • Depth of material deposition.
failure scenarios to be addressed in the EPRP.
For credible failure scenarios which are not related to a flow of
A credible failure mode and a credible failure scenario are material, the Operator should conduct an appropriate analysis
related, but different. A simplified explanation of the difference (eg simplified deformation analysis) to estimate in more detail
is as follows: the potential consequences if a failure were to occur.

Credible failure mode = credible mechanism + credible The decision tree provided in Figure 6 illustrates this process.
initiating event + credible failure process (each element needs
to be credible for the failure mode to be credible). Further Reading:
APEGBC: Flood Mapping in BC: Professional Practice
Guidelines.

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In Detail
Failure modes may be geotechnical in nature, as described Figure 6 is focused on decision-making for EPRP
in Section 3.4.3.10. For the purpose of emergency development, recognising that risk controls would be
planning, the following types of geotechnical failure modes developed and implemented, and surveillance measures
should be considered: would be in place to reduce the likelihood of failures
• Tailings are sufficiently saturated that they are (Sections 2.4, 3.2.4.3 and 3.6.4).
potentially able to flow and could become mobile in the
event of a failure (ie credible flow failure scenario).
• Tailings that are sufficiently unsaturated that they could No, or with
negligible Facility has one or more
not flow in the event of a failure, but could become credible failure scenarios?
likelihood
mobile (eg credible failure modes could lead to a slump).
Yes
However, not all credible failure modes are geotechnical in
No, or with If a failure occurs could
nature. For example, the EPRP for tailings management
negligible tailings and water flow
may address credible failures associated with tailings likelihood impactfully?
transportation such as a break of a tailings pipeline. In
addition, sitewide emergencies such as wildfire could also Yes
lead to credible failure modes related to tailings under Conduct a breach analysis
some circumstances. Thus, it is important that Operators
consider geotechnical as well as non-geotechnical failure
modes when developing EPRPs.
Analysis of potential
impacts informs
Some credible failure modes may or may not have the development of EPRP
potential to be catastrophic, depending on the layers
of controls in place. For example, a break in a tailings Note: The process of evaluating risks and informing/updating
pipeline could result in minimal spilled volume and the EPRP occurs throughout the life of the facility. For operating
associated impact either due to where it is placed relative facilities, Figure 8 explains the process of reviewing credible
failure modes, risk and uncertainty on an ongoing basis.
to the embankment and/or where pressure sensors and
auto shut-off valves coupled with visual observations and Figure 6: Decision tree for evaluating potential consequences
actions are in place. Alternatively, depending upon where of credible failure modes to inform development of EPRPs
a tailings pipeline is located, a break in that pipeline could
result in a catastrophic failure if the pressure sensors and
the auto shut-off valves fail and if the facility is remote with
infrequent observations.

2.7.3 Description of Measures the Operator An EPRP for a tailings facility in the Closure or Post-Closure
Should Take phases of the lifecycle should be adapted to those phases,
when there may be fewer personnel and less equipment
The EPRP should include a description of the measures on site, and thus fewer resources on hand to be able to
the Operator will take to prepare for emergencies, and to respond to an emergency. The EPRP may need to involve
respond if an emergency occurs. Although some aspects of local contractors who could provide heavy equipment and
this element of the EPRP may involve external parties, it is operators, as well as measures to ensure that equipment,
intended to be an internal document. Elements of an EPRP fuel and personnel can be transported to the site.
that would be implemented by external parties should be Contingency plans may be needed for power generation on
developed cooperatively and be provided to them. site and communication infrastructure.

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In Detail
An EPRP should describe the following, regarding • Procedures to activate the EPRP, including internal
the measures the Operator will take to prepare for an and external notification and communication plans
emergency, and to respond if an emergency occurs: for emergency response, including up-to-date contact
• Credible failure scenarios that may occur and the information (eg phone numbers and email addresses)
conditions that would trigger implementation of the for relevant personnel, both internal and external.
EPRP. • Training requirements and plans for relevant personnel,
• Potential impacts of credible failure scenarios, and the including external parties such as off-site emergency
likelihood of those scenarios. responders.
• Resources (people, equipment, materials) required to • Procedures or actions to be taken to:
respond to an emergency, including identifying resources – Prevent an upset or unusual condition from becoming
that need to be retained on site (eg equipment, an emergency.
stockpiles of rip rap or other materials). – Mitigate on and off-site safety, environmental, and
infrastructure impacts associated with emergency
• Roles and responsibilities of the Operator’s employees,
situations.
contractors, and consultants, and relevant external
– Mitigate consequences if an emergency occurs (eg
parties (eg public sector agencies, off-site emergency
through the development of evacuation and rescue
responders) and the overall command structure (who
plans).
is in charge of response and associated reporting
relationships) in the event of an emergency. • Mechanisms to alert potentially affected parties of an
imminent or developing emergency situation (eg alarms
• Any mutual aid agreements with external parties, such
to notify downstream communities in the event of a
as public sector agencies, other industrial facilities (eg
tailings facility failure).
nearby mines) or contractors (eg heavy machinery).
• Measures to provide humanitarian aid, if necessary.
• Description of features and characteristics on and off-
site relevant to emergency response, including: • Surveillance requirements to be described in OMS
– Access, including primary and secondary means to manual (Section 2.4), to be able to identify the onset of
access the mine site, tailings facility and potentially an emergency.
impacted areas, and means of reaching the site of a • Procedures and frequencies to test the EPRP.
potential emergency under various conditions (eg foot, • Procedures for the administration and update of the
boat, helicopter, all-terrain vehicle etc.). EPRP.
– Communication systems, equipment and materials.

2.7.4 Provision of Information to External Parties potential impacts, including potential impacts if flow of
material occurs.
For tailings facilities with credible failure scenarios that
could lead to off-site impacts, the Operator should provide • Roles and responsibilities of the Operator and external
information to off-site emergency responders, communities parties (eg off-site emergency responders, regulatory
and public sector agencies to assist in the development agencies) and the overall command structure (who is in
of their emergency response measures and collaborate charge of response, associated reporting relationships,
with them in that development. The information provided is and relationship between the Operator and other parties)
typically similar to but less detailed than the information in in the event of an emergency.
the Operator’s EPRP. This information should be tailored to • Notification procedures to be followed if an emergency
the needs of off-site emergency responders, communities occurs or is imminent.
and public sector agencies and developed with their input. It • Mechanisms to alert potentially affected parties of an
typically includes descriptions of: imminent or developing emergency situation (eg alarms to
• The tailings facility, the credible failure scenarios and the notify downstream communities in the event of a tailings
facility failure).

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2.7.5 EPRP Development, Readiness and Response occurs. However, in identifying stakeholders to be
engaged, the Operator should consider the engagement of
All relevant personnel, including external parties, should be
stakeholders beyond those that would be directly impacted
familiar with the EPRP and their roles and responsibilities if
by an emergency. In addition, there may be stakeholders
an emergency occurs. They should also know how to access
who have important response capacity that could assist in
relevant portions of the EPRP, recognising the external
responding if an emergency occurs (eg a larger community
parties may not be provided access portions of the EPRP
more distant from the mine site, but with more response
related to any emergencies that would not have off-site
capacity than closer communities).
impacts, or any portions containing confidential information.
Considering community-focused measures and public
Procedures should be established and implemented for
sector capacity, an Operator should take all reasonable steps
regularly scheduled review and testing of the EPRP to
to maintain a shared state of readiness for tailings facility
ensure that the plan is up to date and adequate. The results
credible flow failure scenarios by securing resources and
of tests should be evaluated to identify any deficiencies or
carrying out annual training and exercises. An Operator
opportunities for improving the EPRP and the plan should be
should conduct emergency response simulations at a
updated accordingly.
frequency established in the EPRP (at least every three
years) for tailings facilities with potential loss of life.
Review and testing of the EPRP should involve communities
Simulations can range from tabletop exercises to field
and public sector agencies, including off-site emergency
exercises of an emergency and can include the testing
responders, with roles or responsibilities related to
of multiple failure scenarios.
emergency response.
In the case of an actual catastrophic tailings facility
The potential off-site consequences of a failure should be
failure, an operator should provide immediate response
a key consideration in identifying communities and public
to save lives, supply humanitarian aid and minimise
sector agencies to be engaged in EPRP development and
environmental harm.
testing, and implementation in the event that an emergency
 

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PART 3: IMPLEMENTATION OF
GOOD ENGINEERING PRACTICES
FOR TAILINGS MANAGEMENT
3.1 OVERVIEW Back to contents

Sufficiently robust engineering practices, coupled with governance described

in Part 2, are essential to safe, responsible tailings management. Elements
described in Part 3 of this Guide include:

• Overarching engineering concepts: catastrophic failures. Governance described in Part 2 of

– Integrated mine planning this Guide provides the framework to be sure rigorous
– Integrated tailings and water management implementation of Part 3 occurs.
– Managing risk and uncertainty.
This Guide encourages integrated procedures that may help
• Engineering activities throughout the lifecycle: to prevent catastrophic failures. This may be realised by
– Project Conception implementing full application of the precautionary approach
– Design or a performance-based risk-informed approach to tailings
– Construction facility lifecycle management depending upon the nature
– Operations of the tailings facility. Comprehensive documentation,
– Closure and Post-Closure. such as the Design Basis Report (DBR), Design Report
and the Construction Records Report (CRR), irrespective
While inadequate engineering has been a major factor in of the design approach, are important to tailings facility
many tailings facility failures, rigorous application of this lifecycle management. To underscore this point, of the
Guide across the lifecycle at all tailings facilities, new and tailings failures reviewed by Morgenstern (2018), inadequate
existing, will lead to improved engineering practice and characterisation of foundation conditions, both geological
safer tailings facilities. The primary basis for the following and geotechnical, was a contributing factor in about 40% of
content is to establish integrated procedures that prevent the cases.

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 3.2 OVERARCHING
ENGINEERING CONCEPTS

3.2.1 Introduction An integrated approach to mine planning is particularly

important for:
Mines and their multiple work areas, facilities, and
personnel are complex systems. The mines are only able • Integration of water management (Section 3.2.3).
to function optimally and in a risk-informed manner by • Development, analysis, and selection of alternatives during
integrating the various components and workflows within the Project Conception phase (Section 3.3.5).
the mine site. • Design of tailings facilities (Section 3.4).
• Development of the closure plan (Section 3.7.2).
Through studying lessons learned in case histories,
Operators now understand the need to consider all
Examples of integration aspects include:
material aspects of the mine site when conducting
‘mine planning’. Likewise, Operators increasingly • The life of the mine reserve and resource should be integral
recognise the interdependence of sitewide water in determining tailings capacity requirements.
management on the integrated understanding and • Ore processing approaches and anticipated ore variability.
management of tailings facilities. • Tailings technology selection requires consideration of
production rate and material properties, climate and water
Once systems and personnel (operators, engineers, balance, power and closure objectives.
managers from relevant disciplines) are integrated, it is
• Consideration of availability and quality of construction
possible to ascertain and manage risk and uncertainty, in
materials for components of the tailings facility, such as
particular for tailings facilities, more fully. Managing risk and
embankment fill, drainage features and seepage control
uncertainty is part of the core culture of mining Operators
features.
and this Guide expresses how to apply available tools to
improve risk-informed decision-making throughout the • Environmental objectives and controls considering local
tailings facility lifecycle. conditions and broader operations and closure.
• Closure considerations such as plans, design, cover
3.2.2 Integrated Mine Planning Across the Lifecycle materials, progressive reclamation and post-mining land use.
As described in Section 1.2.2, an integrated approach to • Planning of mine economics should consider all aspects of
mine planning is essential to safe tailings management. tailings management.
Integrated mine planning involves the full integration of
planning across the lifecycle of all aspects that can impact Integrated mine planning is also important to optimising
the project conception, design, construction, operation, and decisions during the Operations phase (Section 3.6) and
closure of tailings facilities, including: should be considered on the context of potential material
changes. As described in Sections 1.2.1 and 2.2.3, integration
• Commitments to stakeholders begins with the corporate policy and the Operator’s executives
• Ore extraction conveying the importance of and coordination of implementing
• Ore processing integrated practices.
• Sitewide water management
Change management is integral to integrated mine planning
• Management of other mine wastes such as waste rock as well, as described in Section 2.3.1.
• Mine closure.
Figure 7 illustrates the lifecycle phases, the key tailings
management outcomes of each phase, and the linkages
with integrated mine planning across the lifecycle, including
closure plan development and implementation.

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Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management of tailings,

water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Temporary Suspension

Operations Closure Post-Closure

Project Design Construction Operate in Implement Implement
Conception accordance with closure in post-closure in
Finalise detailed Construct in
performance accordance with accordance with
Select preferred design and obtain accordance with
objectives, design the closure plan the closure plan
alternative to necessary the detailed
intent and closure and final closure and final closure
advance to design approvals. design and
plan. Address design. Address design. Address
and obtain document
deficiencies and deficiencies and deficiencies and
necessary deviations and
implement implement implement
approvals. as-built
measures for measures for measures for
conditions.
continual continual continual
improvement. improvement. improvement.

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The orange boxes and dotted lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

Figure 7: Tailings management lifecycle, key outcomes of each phase of the lifecycle, and the linkages with integrated mine planning
across the lifecycle, including closure plan development and implementation

3.2.3 Integration of Tailings and Water Management This inextricable linkage between tailings and water
management necessitates a good understanding of all water
Water management is an important aspect in safety and
inflows and outflows to a tailings facility, including variations
stability considerations for all surface disposal tailings
over time and uncertainties in those variations. Many
facilities. This is true even for facilities where the tailings
credible failure modes for tailings facilities are rooted in
have been filtered and are unsaturated, with the tailings
water management and the presence of water exacerbates
stacked and no water storage pond associated with the
the consequences of a potential failure even if water is not
tailings facility. It is important to evaluate efficient measures
an initial failure trigger.
to minimise the water in or on the tailings facility as part of
the site water management plan. That said, in some cases, There are two concepts fundamental to water management:
storage of water in a tailings facility is integral to the design
intent, as an environmental control or to manage seasonal • When practicable, keep water that has not come in contact
fluctuations at a mine site. Another driver in sitewide water with the mine site from coming into contact with the
management is to ensure adequate supply of water is always tailings and other parts of the mine site by diversion of
available to the ore processing facility while minimising surface water or other means.
impacts on water supply for the surrounding area and • For the water that does enter the site, establish
communities. While these drivers are valid, safety of the engineering controls to mitigate geotechnical and
facility must always be paramount. geochemical risks across the mine site.

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ENGINEERING CONCEPTS

Management of water needs to be carefully considered Further, the water management plan should incorporate
throughout the lifecycle of tailings facilities, and an the assessment of diversions, discharges, and strategies
integrated approach to sitewide water management is for any water storage inventories. The plan should also
needed to ensure effective water management (Sections address seepage and managing impacts to groundwater
1.2.2 and 3.2.3). Water management is an integral (ie ponds, interceptor systems, hydrologic sinks, liners).
component of the Project Conception and Design phases. Other important plan components include reuse pumping
Fresh water demand for ore processing is typically tied to the systems and treatment systems for recycling or discharge.
tailings technology as well as site tailings characteristics. The plan should begin by defining a conceptual flow
Beyond the tailings facility and the mine site, water schematic, operational rules for given facilities and
management should consider the broader watershed level performance indicators. With the inclusion of the mine
and potential impacts to the watershed. In this regard, plan and associated sitewide water needs (sources, types,
ICMM’s Position Statement on Water Stewardship (2017) reliability), water management should be an ongoing process
and A Practical Guide to Consistent Water Reporting apply underpinned by a regularly updated water balance model.
sitewide, including at tailings facilities.
A water balance for the mine site as a whole, and the
When developing a water management plan for a tailings tailings facility in particular, should consider quantifying
facility (within the context of a sitewide water management inflows and outflows of water to the site and flows within
plan), the plan should clearly define sitewide strategies and the site. A surveillance programme should be developed
objectives for water management, including relevant legal and implemented to measure flows and calibrate the water
requirements and any additional social and environmental balance. The water balance should consider the need for
commitments the Operator has made such as protecting reused / recycled water and fresh water and maximum pond
against unintentional releases. storage (where applicable) to ensure that the design intent is
met. In line with this Guide’s overarching theme of integrated
Hydrology and hydrogeology data, including the delineation mine planning that considers the tailings facility lifecycle,
of the mine site and tailings facility catchment area(s) and all closure considerations should be included in long-term
potential water sources (process and non-process), should water modelling scenarios and planning.
be considered in the development of a water management
plan and the design of the tailings facility. Throughout the Forecast scenarios should also include potential future
lifecycle, it is helpful to identify plausible changes and changes in climate conditions, including changes in both
challenges considering operational and natural system mean annual conditions (eg mean annual precipitation) and
variability and uncertainties. For example, depending on changes in return period and intensity of extreme events.
site-specific conditions, an active mining operation may Operators should use projections to:
lower groundwater levels under a tailings facility, but post- • Identify vulnerabilities and assess risks associated with
closure, groundwater levels may rise. Similarly, it is helpful climate change.
to consider regional hydrogeology during the development
• Seek to understand the vulnerability of their site design
of facility-specific models. Design parameters should be
criteria in the face of a range of incremental risks
established and documented, then monitored to identify
associated with climate change.
variances, validate projections and anticipate potential
problems. • Ultimately develop a path forward to implement
appropriate mitigation measures.
The appropriate design flood(s) should be identified, with
reference to good design practices, input from the EOR and Building on the results of the water balance model, the plan
Independent Review, and consistent with legal requirements. should outline key risks and opportunities for a site (and
Design flood considerations should be consistently applied given tailings facility) with respect to water management,
throughout all phases of the lifecycle. Water storage as identified and explained using the water balance model
requirements, operating freeboard of the tailings facility, for critical facilities and consideration of regulatory, social
and spillway design should be based on the hydrology of and environmental aspects of the broader catchment.
the watershed and reviewed periodically to assess drying Risks should be considered and integrated with broader
or wetting trends in the climate. Ideally, excess water from risk processes and an action plan should be developed and
storms or run-off volumes would be drawn down from the executed. Water modelling and management plans should
tailings facility in a relatively short period of time; regardless, recognise and evaluate potential implications of uncertainty
post-flood event conditions should be considered in facility with the complexities of tailings facilities. Water balance
stability analyses. modelling and planning should be a continual improvement
process with regular updates to the calibration and validation

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The water management plan should clarify the personnel the water balance and water management plans should be
who are assigned responsibility for water management incorporated into overall construction, operation, and closure
for specific facilities, description of the facilities and their management planning of the tailings facility and coordinated
context within the broader mine plan. The plan should with broader sitewide planning, such that they guide
also clarify who has responsibility to manage the water decision-making and are updated accordingly.
balance model and update it regularly. Most importantly,

In Detail
Water Balance Modelling associated modelling inclusive of depositional
Water balance models are tools for helping make informed geometries.
water management decisions. In addition to providing • Tailings deposit density and voids entrainment.
a historical accounting of the system flows and an
• Infiltration and seepage, and interaction of groundwater
understanding of makeup water needs, they can simulate
with tailings facility.
the future behaviour of a site's water management system
(if properly calibrated) and compare options for improving • Evaporation.
performance. Models should also be forward thinking to • Metered and unmetered inflows and outflows including
assess and adapt to climate change needs. Water balance contributions from precipitation run-off.
models are used to: • Uncertainties and sensitivities of physical system such
• Assess the system’s past performance. as difficult to measure parameters, error, operational
• Optimise short- to medium-term operational decisions. change and trends in climate.
• Assess the performance of future water management
By integrating the water balance with sitewide activities,
improvements through evaluation of scenarios.
consideration of sitewide mass balance can be better
• Support water reporting requirements on water inflows/ coordinated, as well. Sitewide mass balance (solids and
outflows, water use and reuse / recycle, and other water liquids) is helpful for evaluating impacts to tailings facility
metrics. operation due to changes in ore body, mining rate, ore
• Identify flow monitoring requirements. processing technology or performance, ore mineralogy,
• Provide estimates of future flows for closure planning. water chemistry and integrated closure plans.

An effective approach to water balance modelling is to Flow Diagrams

consider the whole lifecycle of the site, from current A flow diagram is a visual representation of the water
conditions through to the Closure and Post-Closure balance model and site water management. Developing
phases. Useful deliverables from a successful water flow diagrams is the first step in the development of a
balance model are the model itself, flow diagrams and the water balance model and they provide a conceptual model
associated list of flow components, and a water balance for model development. Flow diagrams show the water
report or user manual that details the assumptions and infrastructure, key site features (pits, ponds, dumps, plants,
input parameters used to develop the model. Model tailings facilities, etc.) and the links, or flow components,
development typically starts simply, and complexity is between the features and which flows have reliable
added carefully, if and when required, until the modelling measurements. Flow diagrams are complemented by
objectives are met. descriptions of each flow component. A set of flow diagrams
and associated descriptions of flow components may be
Key considerations in tailings facility water balance used to represent the evolution of the site through time.
modelling:
Attributes of good flow diagrams include:
• Flow diagram and operational rules including
connectivity with surrounding mine and/or downstream • The flow diagram elements are superimposed on a site
environment where appropriate. layout drawing/map, or an aerial photo or satellite image
is used as the background.
• Tailings deposition method, history, plans, and

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 3.2 OVERARCHING
ENGINEERING CONCEPTS

• Intuitive symbols are used to represent key features and • The model is developed to a level of detail necessary to:
are positioned where they are physically located on the – Meet the specific objectives decided upon by the
site layout map. development stakeholders.
• Where possible, flow components (the links between the – Inform and improve a site’s current and future water
various water features) follow their physical alignment. management practices.
– Provide data to report on water metrics.
• The flow diagram and list of flow components is
– Assess water performance against pre-defined targets.
comprehensive to include all flows (metered and non-
metered) that will be modelled and those necessary to • Model complexity and detail is supported by available data
meet the objectives of the model. and specific purpose to meet the objective.
• The list of flow components contains a clear and concise • The assumptions and uncertainties associated with the
description for each flow component and the location model are considered:
surveillance instrumentation. – Calibration is regularly reviewed and validated or
adjusted as needed to improve forecasts.
• The flow components naming convention is consistent
– Sensitivity analyses and/or probabilistic analyses
with the water balance model.
are conducted to help to improve understanding and
confidence in decisions.
The flow diagrams and the associated list of flow
components should be reviewed and updated periodically • The water balance time step selected is granular
or following changes to site water management practices. enough to represent the variability of flow conditions.
During the water balance review process, input should be Recommended minimum model time steps are:
gathered from site personnel responsible for managing the – Daily time step for the model runs (recognising that
water aspects of the site such as mining, ore processing, some input parameters could vary hourly, daily, monthly,
engineering, environment, tailings and water management. seasonally or annually).
– Monthly results reporting.
Attributes of Good Water Balance Models • The water balance model includes three types of climate
Water balance model development is site-specific and scenarios:
attributes of a good water balance model include: – Historical scenario with historical climate inputs to
• The water balance model includes a clear definition of the calibrate and validate the model.
tailings facility and its associated storage capacity – Deterministic forecasting scenarios, including average
and other relevant water management facilities within climate conditions, relevant wet/dry climate conditions,
a site’s footprint, accounting for inflows, outflows and and user-defined climate conditions, typically a mixture
storage and incorporate the site’s mine plan and water of wet/dry and average climate conditions.
management plan. – Stochastic forecasting to provide an understanding of
• The model is easy to understand, review and update climate/hydrologic variability including potential for
including the use of notes and comments within the model. climate change and the risks to current and planned
water management scenarios.
• There is comprehensive documentation on the input
parameters and assumptions as well as the calculations • Results include graphs comparing modelled versus
used in the model. monitored data to allow for model validation at each
update.
• Model logic is simple and clean with easily identifiable
input data. Examples of logic include operational rules/ Further Reading:
procedures such as hierarchy of water use and variability ICMM: A Practical Guide to Consistent Water Reporting
of recycled versus fresh water during wet and dry periods
ICMM: Adapting to a Changing Climate: Building resilience
and after rain events, management pond levels under
in the mining and metals industry
various conditions, etc.
ICMM: Mining Climate Assessment (MiCA) Tool (accessible
• Model components naming convention is deliberate and
to members at the following link)
consistent throughout.

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3.2.4 Managing Uncertainty and Risk as appropriate. The team should challenge themselves to
ensure that the risk process remains unbiased and that it
3.2.4.1 Introduction reflects actual credible risks. As such, the risk process and
Requirement 10.1 of the Standard states, ‘Conduct and outcomes should be reviewed and updated throughout the
update risk assessments with a qualified multi-disciplinary lifecycle (regularly and when potential material changes are
team using good practice methodologies at a minimum being considered), and the resulting risk management plan
every three years and more frequently whenever there is should be updated accordingly. Implementing a TMS, which
a material change either to the tailings facility or to the includes Evaluating Performance and Identifying Actions to
social, environmental and local economic context. Transmit Improve Performance (Section 2.3), provides a structured
risk assessments to the ITRB or senior independent approached to reviewing and updating the risk assessment
technical reviewer for review, and address with urgency all and the risk management plan.
unacceptable tailings facility risks.’

Historically, there have been two approaches in dam safety

risk assessment and management; a prescriptive approach Risk Assessment
and risk-informed decision-making. Risk-informed decision- Risk Identification
making builds upon prescriptive approaches which are
reliant on prescribed criteria. These criteria are traditionally Risk Analysis
established through risk-based approaches such as the use
Risk Evaluation
of consequence classification during the Design phase.

Risk-informed decision-making is underpinned by risk

assessment, which comprises a series of steps: risk Surveillance and Review Risk Management
identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation. In turn, Surveillance Risk Mitigation
risk-informed decision-making improves and informs risk
Performance Evaluation Risk Communication
management (risk reduction) activities. Risk management
includes implementation of risk reduction measures,
surveillance and review, risk communication, and risk
recording and reporting. The inter-related nature of these
components is shown in Figure 8. Figure 8: Framework for a risk-informed approach for
tailings management
Risk management considers all types and severities of
risks: this Guide primarily focuses on those risks that have
the potential to result in a catastrophic failure. As described
below, assessing risk involves consideration of both the
3.2.4.2 Elements of Risk Assessment
potential consequences of an event and the likelihood of Safety is improved by first understanding a tailings facility’s
that event occurring and an adverse structural response to potential failure modes, the likelihood of these hazards
the event. occurring, and then using that information to develop and
implement measures to mitigate, prevent, and/or reduce
There are several tools to support Operators in identifying, risk, where warranted. These safety improvements can be
analysing and evaluating risk, ranging from simple accomplished through effective risk assessment and risk
experience-based ones to more complex quantitative tools. management. The following outlines the components of risk
Qualitative or semi-quantitative risk assessment tools using assessment and management. As stated, risk assessment
the concept of event trees are typically the most helpful includes the steps of risk identification, risk analysis, and
for aiding the understanding of tailings facility risks. risk evaluation. The EOR should be a key contributor to this
Typically, fully quantitative approaches are only appropriate assessment and the Independent Reviewer should review
to consider for specific risk drivers. Fully quantitative the assessment.
processes may also inadvertently lead to a false sense of
certainty with results. Risk Identification
The first step of risk identification is to identify site-specific
Risk-informed decision-making steps should be conducted potential failure modes. A potential failure mode is a cause
by an experienced team comprising the Operator’s staff, of failure, chain of events (event tree), or one possible way a
the EOR and potentially other multi-disciplinary experts system can fail. In the context of tailings management failure
modes may include a range of hazards or threats such as:

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 3.2 OVERARCHING
ENGINEERING CONCEPTS

• Natural hazards (eg earthquake, landslide, extreme sequencing and the flood volume is ponded against
weather event). the embankment until overtopping occurs at the low
• Events related to an engineered structure (eg piping of section. This overtopping erodes the embankment in an
water through a tailings facility embankment). uncontrolled manner, ultimately breaching the tailings
facility and allowing flood waters and tailings slurry to
• Operational events (eg failure of a tailings pipeline).
leave the facility.
Once site-specific potential failure modes have been
In the first case, the events that occurred did not lead to
identified they should be characterised, first to determine
failure. However, in the second case, the unwanted events
if they are credible and then to determine the likelihood
compounded, ultimately leading to a failure. Consideration
of occurrence if they are credible. Credible failure modes
of compounding factors is important, and brainstorming
are defined per the Standard. A potential failure mode
sessions to identify such combinations of events are
may be non-credible if ruled out categorically during initial
vital to the efficacy of the risk analysis and assessment
screening. For example, overtopping by a flood event
process. Some credible failure modes may be catastrophic
typically would not be considered a credible failure mode
failure modes (and may involve flow failures) and these
if the facility has a confirmed catchment and storage for
are addressed in Section 2.7. Some tailings facilities have
multiple maximum credible inflow events, and geotechnical
credible failure modes, but these may not have potential
analyses have demonstrated that storing this excess water
catastrophic consequences. An Operator’s thorough
(even if extended duration is necessary) would not create
evaluation of each of their tailings facilities can be used to
a stability concern. Further, investigations and analyses
identify the subset of facilities that do have catastrophic
may be sufficient to determine from a practical perspective
credible failure modes. This subset becomes the focus
that a failure mode is non-credible. For example, it may be
of the Operator for the application of appropriate levels
determined that the tailings facility has design features that
of risk management to prevent any of these modes from
fully mitigate a potential failure mode and that confidence
manifesting into an actual event.
in the design, as-built condition, and rigorous operating
controls render a failure mode as non-credible. This
Risk Analysis
assessment of credibility should be repeated through the life
Risk analysis involves the characterisation of what is
of the facility, particularly if there are material changes. As
known and what is uncertain about the present and future
described in Section 3.4.3 and in the Standard, for closure
performance of an existing or planned tailings facility.
design, an appropriate design criterion to consider in the
During risk analysis, the likelihood of the specific potential
analysis of credible failure modes relative to non-credible
failure mode loading condition, the likelihood of an adverse
failure modes may be on the order of 1:10,000 with the
structural response, and the magnitude of the consequences
provisos outlined in the Standard and this Guide regarding
are estimated for each potential failure mode. As discussed
deterministic alternatives. This design criterion should not
in Section 2.7, there are various techniques for determining
be confused with likelihood of occurrence of a given failure
potential consequences and the appropriate tool should
mode, though.
be selected when considering specific failure modes. Risk
analysis is often facilitated by someone with significant risk
For each credible failure mode that still exists, the likelihood
analysis experience, which can help to prevent bias in the
of the event leading to specific consequences should be
process.
estimated, which includes the likelihood of the specific
loading condition and the likelihood of an adverse structural
The nature of the decisions that the risk analysis will inform
response to the event. Event trees help to illuminate the
determines the level of detail needed and the degree of
likelihood of an event occurring (along with an adverse
acceptable uncertainty. Typically, a lower level of detail
structural response).
and a higher degree of uncertainty is appropriate for the
Project Conception phase (Section 3.3) or for developing a
For example, for a tailings facility embankment to breach
conceptual closure plan (Section 3.7.2). Potential Problem
and tailings to be discharged, a series of events must
Analysis is a tool that works well in the Project Conception
typically occur in sequence. Potential scenarios include:
phase. As the design of a tailings facility or closure plan
• The design flood occurs but the facility has been then advances to final, executable form, more detail and
constructed and operated as expected and there is no less uncertainty in risk analysis is needed. Potential Failure
adverse structural response. Mode Analysis or Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
• The design flood occurs but there is a defect in the or Semi-Quantitative Risk Analysis with Event Tree Analysis
crest height for a measurable distance along the are tools that typically work well as design progresses
embankment crest due to Operator error in construction and a facility moves into the Construction and Operations

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phases. Regardless of the tool selected, it is important follow • Developing a robust tailings facility design with less
a consistent approach and to assume that one does not uncertainty in design criteria (Section 3.4).
know the answer to the questions that arise unless specific • Accurately documenting constructed conditions to reduce
information, data and/or analyses are available to support uncertainty about the characteristics of the tailings facility
assumptions. and associated embankments (Section 3.5.4).
• Using the results of Evaluating Performance (Section
Uncertainty is the result of imperfect knowledge about
2.3.4) including surveillance (Section 2.4.3) and the
the present or future state of a system, event, situation or
programme for reviewing tailing safety, including
population under consideration. To manage risk, uncertainty
Independent Review (Section 2.6) to review and update
should be acknowledged, assessed and considered. In
the risk assessment and validate the design basis of the
tailings management, uncertainty may be due to:
tailings facility throughout the lifecycle.
• Gaps in knowledge about hazards and potential failure
modes (site characterisation, Section 3.3.2). For example: As uncertainty is reduced, input parameters and analyses
– Uncertainty in the results of models used to assess become more realistic as they are based on facts rather
hazards such as hydrogeological models, stability than assumptions.
models or climate change models.
– Lack of complete understanding of foundation Risk Evaluation
conditions, including surficial and bedrock geology. Risk evaluation compares the outcomes of risk analysis
• Natural variability in any given process or event. The for existing conditions to determine if risks are within
conservative nature of engineering analysis could mute acceptable limits, whether present risk measures and
the range of this potential variability. controls are adequate, and what additional alternative risk
• An incomplete understanding of the potential reduction measures could be considered.
consequences of an event. For example, uncertainties in
breach analyses (Section 2.7.2). The process typically considers the following, among other
aspects: robustness of design, past and future performance
• The challenging nature of accurately estimating likelihood. monitoring, site context, and practicality of any remediation
• The effectiveness of risk management measures in considered. Guidelines from regulatory agencies, governing
reducing likelihood, consequence, or both. bodies, other industries associated with tailings facility
• The changing nature of some risks (hazard creep) for safety, and corporate governance should all be reviewed to
which likelihood or consequence may change over determine what risks are within normal operating limits.
time (site characterisation, Section 3.3.2). This includes Understanding environmental, social, cultural, ethical,
changes in climate, downstream conditions (eg new political, and legal considerations should also be included
communities or infrastructure) or legal requirements. in risk evaluation.

Risk estimates will have a degree of uncertainty that should The team typically considers risk mitigation alternatives at
be characterised. This includes acknowledging that there is this stage. The outcome of the risk assessment includes
a degree of subjectivity in estimating risk, reflecting various recommendations for actions deemed justified by the team.
factors such as the experience and expertise of those
involved in developing the estimate, the models used, and 3.2.4.3 Risk Management
the comprehensiveness of available site characterisation
Risk management includes assessing effects due to changes
information. Uncertainty may be represented by assigning
or deviations both in isolation and as a compounding
ranges to estimates of both likelihood and consequence.
effect. Risk management builds upon the results of risk
assessment as well as uncertainty analysis and involves the
When uncertainty is high, it is important to consider
systematic development and implementation of strategies to
applying conservative assumptions in the selection of input
eliminate or reduce risks. These strategies include potential
parameters and the analysis of the likelihood or potential
actions to reduce the likelihood of occurrence and/or the
consequences of an event. Steps should also be taken to
magnitude of consequences of credible failure modes that
reduce uncertainty, such as:
were evaluated to have a higher risk.
• Improving the understanding of the tailings facility
and factors influencing it through improved site Typical strategies may include recurring and monitoring
characterisation (Section 3.3.3). activities such as routine and special inspections,
• Refined modelling of potential consequences instrumentation and its evaluation, structural analyses,
(Section 2.7.2). site investigations, development and testing of EPRPs,

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 3.2 OVERARCHING
ENGINEERING CONCEPTS

Independent Review and regulatory reviews, and/or actions implemented by peers in the industry. If the costs
implementation of constructed risk reduction measures, to achieve an additional level of risk reduction are grossly
projects or improved operational controls. disproportional to achieving the same magnitude of risk
reduction at other tailings facilities, the current risk may
Risk management should also consider and document be considered ALARP. This comes with the caveat that
estimated risk after a remedial action and/or enhanced operating contexts differ and that this will have a bearing on
operational practices or surveillance have been the determination of ALARP. There are many factors that can
implemented. Credible failure scenarios that that have contribute to the decision that ALARP has been satisfied and
elevated levels of risk may require mitigation measures to no further action is justified. There may be some instances
reduce risk. The level of acceptable risk is defined by each when ALARP is achieved that an Operator may wish to
Operator using ALARP or by local regulatory requirements, consider other alternatives at their discretion to further
as applicable. lower risk. This is indicated in Requirement 5.7 whereby
Operators identify additional reasonable steps to reduce
For those risks that cannot be eliminated or avoided, a potential consequences (ie by re-evaluating alternatives for
key concept in risk-informed decision-making is reducing new facilities or considering various engineering solutions
identified risks (likelihood and/or consequence) to levels that for existing facilities).
are ALARP. As defined in the Standard, ALARP requires that
all reasonable measures be taken with respect to ‘tolerable’ The Standard states that the Accountable Executive must
or acceptable risks to reduce them even further until the confirm and document that specific tailings facilities meet
cost and other impacts of additional risk reduction are ALARP (Requirement 4.7, 5.7). The RTFE should, with
grossly disproportionate to the benefit. input from the EOR and the Operator’s site leadership,
present the Accountable Executive with risk management
Factors involved in applying ALARP include: measure to achieve ALARP, ideally after seeking advice
• Application of relevant good practice. from Independent Review. It is good practice to provide more
• The level of incremental risk in relation to the established than one option for consideration such that risk levels and
risk guidelines. resource requirements are understood and aligned with the
Operator’s policy.
• The cost-effectiveness of the risk reduction measures in
relation to likelihood and/or consequence. The urgency of completing safety actions should be
• Remaining life of the facility and potential alignment with commensurate with risk. Prioritisation of risk reduction
closure planning which may reduce likelihood and/or measures should be based on prioritisation of safety, while
consequence. allowing for second-order factors as appropriate.
• Societal concerns as revealed by consultation with the
community and other stakeholders. Risk management plans may be used to describe risk
controls to reduced risks identified through risk assessment,
• Other factors such as consideration of standards-
as well as actions, persons responsible for completing the
based approaches, benchmarking, direct business
actions, and timelines for action completion. Risk controls
impacts, constructability, implementation schedule and
environmental consequences.

The concept of ALARP is illustrated in Figure 9. The

‘Resources, effort’ line in this graph represents a multiple
of potential factors whereby the sharp rise in resources
Resources

to reduce risks would be grossly disproportionate to the

Risk

benefit realised. Each Operator will have its own processes Le

vel
to address such factors including use of good practice of risk
ALARP
guidance and jurisdictional requirements on risk evaluations
and management. Resources, effort

When a judgement is made that risks are ALARP, this

Cost / Benefit
is often determined by comparing the effectiveness of
reducing risk further (evaluated by considering the cost
to further reduce risk and the amount of risk reduction Figure 9: The concept of assessing benefit of mitigation effort
achieved) and then comparing it to other risk reduction to residual risks with ALARP

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may include operating rules with ongoing surveillance and that they are. It is vital that risk management plans be
validation or discrete implementation of new mitigation effectively implemented. This includes integrating risk
measures. Typically, a conceptual risk management plan management into the TMS (Section 2.3) and ensuring
is developed during the Project Conception phase (Section that risk management plans are integrated into and
3.3) and is refined and developed in greater detail during implemented through OMS activities (Section 2.4) with clear
the Design phase (Section 3.4). A risk register, including the accountability and responsibility (Section 2.2.2), and input
associated prioritised risk controls, should be developed, from a programme for reviewing tailings safety, including
and it should be reviewed and updated throughout the life of Independent Review (Section 2.6).
the facility.
Risk communication is an important element of managing
The risk processes and outcomes should be reassessed, risk and includes open, two-way exchange of information
updated and reviewed regularly as appropriate through and opinion about hazards and risks leading to a
the lifecycle of the facility, particularly in the event of better understanding of risk management decisions. It
material changes. encompasses both internal communication (eg between the
EOR, RTFE, Accountable Executive and BoD) and external
The key to effective risk management is avoiding communication (eg between the Operator and regulatory
complacency. Having a plan does not mean that risks agencies or communities as appropriate).
are being properly managed, but it can give the illusion
 

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 3.3 PROJECT CONCEPTION

3.3.1 Introduction – Modification to the design of a tailings facility, such

as the strengthening of embankments or reductions
Project Conception consists of the development and analysis
in water levels.
of a range of alternatives (eg the location of a new tailings
facility, technologies to be applied). The primary output is • Re-activation of an existing tailings facility for mine re-opening.
the final, approved selection of the preferred alternative and • Closure and Post-Closure phases.
associated costing estimates in accordance with corporate
requirements. Key activities in the Project Conception phase are:
• Risk identification and analysis which begins with Potential
The Project Conception phase is a process of making some Problem Analysis (Section 3.2.4).
of the most important decisions about tailings management,
• Site characterisation.
some of which will be difficult or impossible to reverse once
the Design phase has been completed and executed. Thus, • Definition of performance objectives and design criteria.
Operators should carefully consider the Project Conception • Identification of alternatives, development of preliminary
phase before the Design phase is initiated. designs, and multi-criteria alternatives analysis to select the
preferred alternative.
It is important to emphasise that Project Conception is not
relevant only to new tailings facilities. It is a recurring activity As described in Section 3.2.2, an integrated approach to mine
through the lifecycle and can also be applied to planning for: planning is essential to safe tailings management and involves
• Potential material changes in design (depending on the full integration of planning across the lifecycle of all aspects
complexity), such as: that can impact tailings management. An integrated approach
– Extensions to the life of an existing tailings facility, is particularly invaluable in the Project Conception phase.
beyond its initial design capacity.

In Detail
Operators may consider the following: – Design and conduct of the multi-criteria alternatives
• Appoint the EOR and engage the Design Team (ideally analysis.
from the same firm, but other models can work as • Independent Reviewer(s) can be a sounding board to
well). Ideally, the EOR would follow the project through test ideas: their experience with other projects may be
to the Design, Construction, and Operations phases invaluable to the Operator.
(recognising that changing the EOR is a significant effort • Initiate risk analysis and evaluation (Section 3.2.4).
at any phase). Risk analysis is used in the Project Conception phase
• Appoint Independent Reviewer(s) (or a Senior to inform development of preliminary designs and the
Technical Reviewer) and determine the initiation of and multi-criteria alternatives analysis. Potential Problem
mechanism for Independent Review moving into the Analysis, including identification of hazards and potential
Design phase (Section 2.6.2). The reviewer(s) at this state failure modes, is particularly important during the
may follow the project through the next phases of the Project Conception phase.
lifecycle, recognising that changes may be appropriate • Uncertainty Analysis to assess and recognise uncertainty
or necessary if the project needs change from one in the risk analysis. This analysis will inform the multi-
phase to the next. Independent Review provides input criteria alternatives analysis as well as further site
to the Operator on a range of aspects related to Project characterisation work aimed at reducing uncertainty.
Conception, such as: This uncertainty analysis includes broad topics, such as
– Design of site characterisation, to help ensure that climate change and foundation conditions.
the right information is collected and to help eliminate
• Undertake preliminary site characterisation studies
gaps and reduce uncertainty.
and develop preliminary site characterisation models
– Conduct of the risk analysis, including the uncertainty
(Section 3.3.2).
assessment.

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• Consider the operating strategy including the Operator’s to advance to the Design phase (Section 3.4).
forecast of ability to implement controls, especially • Develop and submit documentation to support the
administrative controls (often found in a project’s future approval of the preferred alternative, both internally by
OMS), and a clear definition of the inherent risk posed by the senior management/Accountable Executive and, if
each option. applicable, by government authorities.
• Identify alternatives and develop a preliminary design
for each alternative consistent with the guidance in During this phase, an Operator may wish to initiate
Section 3.3.4, including a preliminary selection of community engagement (Section 2.2.5). Input from
design criteria (Section 3.4.3) and the development of a community engagement is helpful in identifying community
preliminary design, which will be refined moving into the values to be considered in the Project Conception phase
Design phase (Section 3.4). This stage would consider and gathering information about community knowledge
the options for siting and technology management and understanding of the area. This input helps to inform
technology (alternative processing, dewatering, blending the multi-criteria alternatives analysis.
and/or comingling, transport, storage, construction
materials). Figure 10 highlights the key activities of the Project
• Evaluate alternatives to select the preferred alternative Conception phase of the lifecycle.

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management of tailings,

water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Project Conception
Select preferred alternative to
advance to design, informed by:
• Site characterisation models Temporary Suspension
• Performance objectives
• Conceptual closure plan
• Risk identification and analysis
Prepare:
• Site characterisation models
• Evaluation of Alternatives
• Design Basis Report (DBR) Design Construction Operations Closure Post-Closure

Potential material
changes go to either
Project Conception or
Design, depending on
complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The orange and dotted lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

Figure 10: Key activities of the Project Conception phase of the lifecycle

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 83

 3.3 PROJECT CONCEPTION

3.3.2 Site Characterisation • Development of the closure plan (Section 3.7.2).

Site characterisation is an iterative process that is • Informing the knowledge base for the site, which focuses
initiated during the Project Conception phase and on the holistic consideration for social and economic
continues throughout the lifecycle of the tailings facility. factors as well as environmental and infrastructure factors
It involves the collection and compilation of a wide range (Section 1.3.1).
of information about a site and the adjacent environment,
and the development of a site characterisation model. The information collected through site characterisation
Site characterisation typically begins as a desktop informs a range of models that are aggregated to create an
assessment and field reconnaissance. It is refined with overall site characterisation model such as:
field investigations as alternatives are narrowed and the • Climate including predictions of potential changes
project proceeds to the Design phase. (Section 3.4). Site • Geology
characterisation is critical to the long-term stability of the • Hydrogeology and hydrology
tailings facility and it requires substantial field investigations
and analyses. • Tailings characteristics (geotechnical and geochemical)
• Foundation characteristics
The information collected as part of the site characterisation • Seismic conditions.
studies is used to inform integrated mine planning (Section
3.2.2), the Project Conception and Design phases (Section During the Project Conception phase, at least preliminary
3.4), and closure plan development (Section 3.7.2). The site site characterisation is conducted for each alternative
characterisation also serves as an input for: developed and evaluated. For preliminary screening of
• Conducting and updating the risk assessment alternatives, this may focus on a few specific parameters
(Section 3.2.4). with a higher degree of uncertainty. As alternatives
• Developing and updating the risk management plan are eliminated through pre-screening and remaining
(Section 3.2.4). alternatives are designed in more detail and are then
evaluated more rigorously, site characterisation information
• Identifying alternatives and developing preliminary designs and models for those alternatives should be refined to
for alternatives and evaluating alternatives and developing increase detail and reduce uncertainty.
the detailed design (Section 3.3.4).
• Developing and updating the DBR (Section 3.4.5) and Once the preferred alternative is selected and the Operator
helping to validate the design intent. proceeds to more detailed studies, and ultimately the
executable design for construction, the level of detail should
increase further, and models should be refined to further
reduce uncertainty.

The collection of site characterisation information should

continue throughout the lifecycle. The site characterisation
model should be refined and updated based on updated
site characterisation information, constructed conditions
(Section 3.5.4) and surveillance results (Section 2.4).

Site characterisation information and the level of detail

required changes and expands through the project lifecycle.

Site characterisation should also address the information

requirements identified through community engagement and
Independent Review, as well as the collection of information
related to relevant legal requirements.

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In Detail
Site characterisation involves the collection and • Closure considerations and closure plan.
consideration of potential future changes with a wide range • Site topography and other geographical information.
of information such as:
• Bedrock and surficial geology, and hydrogeology.
• Characteristics of the proposed mine.
• Site geotechnical characterisation.
• Characteristics and anticipated behaviour (geotechnical
• Seismicity.
and geochemical) of the tailings. It is especially critical
for tailings facilities having embankments or other • Hydrology.
structural elements constructed of tailings. • Natural hazards (eg landslides, avalanches, tsunami
• Characteristics of other materials intended to be used in impact zones, etc).
construction. • Terrestrial environment, aquatic environment,
• Availability and characteristics of impoundment archaeology, socio-economic factors, indigenous and
construction materials. other considerations within the footprint of the planned
tailings facility, and in upstream and downstream areas.
• Basic information about potential alternatives.
• Climate trend considerations.
• Existing and planned infrastructure.
• Air and water management related studies.
• Features that could preclude a tailings facility at that
location (eg flora and fauna, hazards, social or cultural
features).

3.3.3 Performance Objectives Performance objectives should then be refined and

developed in more detail, particularly during the Design
Setting performance objectives underpins safe tailings
phase (Section 3.4) (eg more specific performance
management. Performance objectives should be aligned
objectives for water management or geotechnical aspects
with and translate the corporate policy on tailings
of design and operation). Going into the Construction and
management into specific performance expectations for a
Operations phases, performance objectives should be
tailings facility throughout its lifecycle, including the Closure
quantifiable for a given tailings facility.
and Post-Closure phases (Section 3.7).
The tailings facility should be constructed, operated, and
Performance objectives and associated performance
closed in accordance with the performance objectives,
indicators and performance criteria should address:
while recognising that those objectives should be
• Protection of employee and public health and safety. reviewed and updated, as appropriate, during these
• Design objectives and criteria, including geotechnical, lifecycle phases.
geochemical, operational, community and environmental
performance objectives that the tailings facility is expected 3.3.4 Multi-Criteria Alternatives Analysis
to achieve.
Multi-criteria alternatives analysis (also known as
• Mitigation of negative environmental impacts by ensuring evaluation of alternatives or options assessment) is a
the continued physical and chemical stability of the rigorous, multi-step process to inform decisions. In a
tailings facility. tailings management context, this process should be
• Acceptable post-closure use within a feasible technical used to inform decisions during the Project Conception
and economic framework. phase. Per the Standard, the primary goal of evaluating
alternatives for an overall development project is to: (i)
Setting performance objectives begins during the Project select an alternative that minimises risks to people and
Conception phase. Although performance objectives set at the environment throughout the tailings facility lifecycle;
this phase may be high level, they are crucial to providing a and (ii) minimise the volume of tailings and water placed
basis for the multi-criteria alternatives analysis. in external tailings facilities.

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 85

 3.3 PROJECT CONCEPTION

From an Operator’s perspective the evaluation of alternatives • Be appropriately scaled and scoped to the planning
for a tailings facility, including a multi-criteria analysis such decision to be made.
as multiple accounts analysis (MAA), provides a structured • Have input from potentially affected communities as
approach to assessing and weighing various ‘musts’ and appropriate (eg new tailings facilities, closure planning).
‘wants.’ As such, an effective evaluation is an invaluable tool
• Consider the performance objectives and risk analysis
during Project Conception. It provides a means of integrating
and integrate those into decision criteria in the evaluation
a wide range of relevant information into the decision-
of alternatives.
making process, and provides a basis for documenting
outcomes that can then be used to demonstrate the basis for • Consider all aspects of the project, direct or indirect, that
decisions to: may contribute to the evaluation of each alternative (eg
design of the mine and ore processing to the extent that
• Senior management
they would impact tailings production, water management
• Regulatory agencies and treatment).
• Investors and insurance providers • Consider and integrate a wide range of information about
• Potentially affected communities. the characteristics of each alternative being evaluated,
and relevant to the planning decision to be made, such as:
The process allows for the consideration of environmental, – Technical considerations (eg geotechnical, geochemical,
technical, socio-economic and project economics factors in a mine operations).
transparent manner and allows the testing of the outcomes – Environmental considerations (eg potential impacts on
under different assumptions. terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems).
– Socio-economic consideration (eg potential impacts on
The evaluation of alternatives can be used to inform communities and other economic, recreational, spiritual
a range of decisions such as the selection of the preferred or subsistence activities).
options for: – Project economics (eg short- and long-term capital and
• Locations to be used for new tailings facilities. operating costs).
• Tailings management technology. • Consider the uncertainty of assumptions and design
• Increasing the capacity of existing tailings facilities. parameters and their potential implications of outcomes
of the analysis process. An example of managing these
• A material change in tailings facility design. uncertainties includes use of sensitivity analysis.
• Re-activation of an existing tailings facility. • Consider each alternative across the relevant phases
• Closure design. of the lifecycle of the tailings facility (eg for new tailings
facilities, consider the lifecycle implications of each
To be effective, it is essential that the evaluation alternative from the Construction phase through to the
of alternatives: Closure and Post-Closure phases).
• Be conducted by a multi-disciplinary team, in order to be
able to interpret and assess the full range of information One of the strengths of the methodology is that it provides
considered in the process. a mechanism to be transparent about biases and
• Be informed by the work on site characterisation and the assumptions, and to test outcomes against those biases
knowledge base for the site, which focuses on the holistic and assumptions in a robust and rigorous manner. No
consideration of social and economic factors as well as decision is entirely objective and there is always an element
environmental and infrastructure factors (Section 3.3.2). of subjectively. Rather than trying to remove that subjectivity,
the methodology recognises it and allows that subjectivity to
• Have technical input from Independent Review during the be tested.
design of the evaluation of alternatives and through the
steps in the process.

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In Detail
Decisions made based on the evaluation of alternatives further consideration any that would have characteristics
require an understanding of the potential positive and that would be ‘show-stoppers’.
negative impacts of each alternative evaluated across a 5. Characterise remaining alternatives.
range of aspects encompassing technical, environmental
6. Assess remaining alternatives using MAA or a similar
and socio-economic considerations, and project
decision-making tool. MAA can be broken down into two
economics. Evaluating and balancing these potential
sub-steps:
positive and negative impacts is important in making
the optimum decision, but it is challenging to evaluate a. Describe all factors that will be considered in the
such disparate aspects. An evaluation of alternatives analysis by establishing accounts (eg environmental,
methodology, including MAA, provides a tool to do this, technical, and socio-economic considerations), sub-
while allowing inputs to and outcomes of the decision- accounts within each account, and indicators for each
making process to be communicated internally and sub-account.
externally in a transparent manner. b. Conduct a value-based decision process to assess
the combined benefits and impacts (advantages and
Evaluation of alternatives should be conducted as a disadvantages) for each of the alternatives assessed.
multi-step process: 7. Conduct a sensitivity analysis to test the robustness
and validity of the outcomes of the MAA against various
1. Identify the objective and scope – the decision that is to biases and assumptions.
be informed by the evaluation of alternatives process
and factors that will be considered. MAA provides a method of integrated assessment of
2. Develop a plan for conducting the evaluation of different characteristics of alternatives (eg for comparing
alternatives, including who will be involved. potential impacts on wildlife with capital costs). In effect,
3. Identify possible alternatives. these tools provide a rigorous, semi-quantitative means of
comparing apples and oranges.
4. Pre-screen possible alternatives to eliminate from

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 87

 3.4 DESIGN

3.4.1 Introduction • Defining the roles and responsibilities of the EOR and
The design process is iterative, starting during the Project Design Team and their relationship through the design
Conception phase when conceptual designs are developed process.
for alternatives to be evaluated (Section 3.3.4). Those • Engaging Independent Reviewers in the design process.
conceptual designs are further refined to preliminary • Developing a formal change management system.
designs for the detailed analysis leading to the selection
• Refining site characterisation information and the site
of the preferred alternative. During the Design phase, the
characterisation model to a degree where residual
preliminary design for the preferred alternative is developed
uncertainties are acceptable.
to the stage of a detailed design for approval, and ultimately
to an executable design for construction. • Refining the risk assessment to reduce uncertainties and
addressing residual uncertainties in the design and risk
The objective for this design process throughout the management plan.
lifecycle of the tailings facility should be to limit credible • Developing the tailings facility design:
failure modes, either to having no credible failure modes or, – Develop the design initially using the precautionary-
where credible modes cannot be eliminated, ensuring that based approach.
potentially catastrophic credible failure modes are managed – Enhance the design based on adoption of the
using the ALARP approach through the phase(s) of the performance-based approach or define why this
facility’s lifecycle where they are present (Section 3.2.4). is not necessary.
• Establishing quality management specifications including
The main activities for the Design phase are: requirements for consideration and documentation of
• Appointing an EOR for the Design phase if the EOR from deviations and documentation of constructed conditions.
the Project Conception phase is not retained. This EOR will • Documenting the design criteria and intent in the Design
likely have a longer-term responsibility. Basis Report (DBR).
• Establishing the Design Team , including engineering • Developing the tailings transportation and deposition plan.
consultants (typically from the same firm as the EOR,
• Complete design verification.
recognising that other models may exist) including the
Operator’s representatives who engage in the design
The steps are similar, although they may be simplified when
process (typically includes the RTFE and other experienced
the Design phase is being applied to other decisions such as
operational experts).
closure design or design for material changes.

The outcome of the Design phase is an executable

engineering design with detailed specifications, including
quality management, to be used for the subsequent
Construction, Operations and Closure phases, as well as any
other documents required for final approval and initiation of
construction. The design should be reviewed and updated as
performance and site data become available and in response
to material changes to the tailings facility or its performance.

In parallel, a full assessment of the potential social,

environmental and local economic impacts of the tailings
facility and of any credible failure modes throughout its
lifecycle should be undertaken, to inform the design process.
Where impact assessments predict material acute or
chronic impacts, the Operator should develop, document
and implement impact mitigation and management plans
using the mitigation hierarchy. The conduct of social,
environmental and local economic impact assessments is
not addressed in this Guide.

Figure 11 illustrates the key activities of the Design phase

of the lifecycle.

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Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management of tailings,

water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Design
Finalise detailed design,
informed by:
• Site characterisation models Temporary Suspension
• Performance objectives
• Conceptual closure plan
• Risk assessment
Prepare:
• Updated site characterisation
Project models
Construction Operations Closure Post-Closure
Conception • Updated DBR

Potential material
changes go to either
Project Conception or
Design, depending on
complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The orange and dotted lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

Figure 11: Key activities of the Design phase of the lifecycle

3.4.2 Managing Uncertainty and Assessing Risk

in Design
Risk assessment during the Design phase continues the
work done during the Project Conception phase but is
focused on supporting the design process.

The objectives are to:

• Reduce the uncertainty associated with key design
elements and design the tailings facility to reduce
or eliminate specific risks, to the extent feasible.
• Develop a risk management plan to limit the impact
of residual risks.
• Develop a surveillance plan to sufficiently inform
implementation of the risk management plan.

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 89

 3.4 DESIGN

3.4.3 Tailings Facility Design

3.4.3.1 Overview
Failure of a tailings facility is unacceptable, particularly
any failure that leads to fatalities or otherwise catastrophic
In Detail outcomes. Thus, designing, constructing, operating and
Reduce Uncertainty and Refine Risk Estimates closing facilities to reduce or eliminate credible failure
Reducing uncertainty may often be facilitated by modes is of paramount importance.
additional site characterisation and more relevant
modelling that targets key design elements. Conventional tailings facility design philosophy over the
past decades can generally be grouped into the approaches
Risk estimates should be refined, based on a better depicted on Figure 12, all of which are best implemented
understanding of both the likelihood and potential when risk-informed. The more layers that are applied, the
consequences of various unwanted events. This guidance better risk informed the approach becomes.
recommends semi-quantitative risk assessment
supported by event tree analyses where such detail is
appropriate, supported by the ALARP principle.

A risk management plan should be developed in

detail as part of the Design phase, with components of
the risk management plan incorporated into the design
of the tailings facility, where applicable (eg seepage
control features).

To support the implementation of the risk management

plan, a surveillance plan should be developed and
integrated into the OMS manual (Section 2.4). OMS
requirements should be considered in the final design,
particularly for any instrumentation that would need to
be installed during the Construction phase, and for any
surveillance activities that would need to be initiated
during Construction.

Considers the management of uncertainty and risk in

Risk Informed material decisions regardless of approach.

Extends problem interrogation beyond the Precautionary

approach, establishing flexible, meaningful and measurable
Performance-Based performance objectives throughout Construction, Operations
and Closure, and enhances the assessment of safety in a
more comprehensive manner.
Precautionary
Extends the Prescriptive approach using the Observational
Method to monitor for performance that is indicative of
assumed potential failure modes to validate the design basis,
and to mitigate if not.

Prescriptive Applies prescribed criteria, such as Factor of Safety, to

assess the margin of safety against shear failure but is not
able to address complex or dynamic design considerations,
such as the risk of brittle failure and the magnitude of
seismic deformations.

Figure 12: Management of uncertainty in design approaches

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The following sub-sections explain each approach: of appropriate parameters and access to reliable data
prescriptive, precautionary and performance-based, with (eg extensive field and laboratory studies as part of site
risk-informed decision-making as an overarching theme. characterisation (Section 3.3.3)). It is also dependent upon the
competency and experience of those involved. If the FoS has
3.4.3.2 Prescriptive Approach to Tailings been erroneously calculated to be above a prescribed value,
Facility Design but the actual FoS is really below that value, then the tailings
facility may be less safe than assumed by the Operator.
The prescriptive approach to designing tailings facilities
Additionally, since the FoS is calculated for an embankment
came to prominence in the 1970s as an adaptation from
as a whole, it may not adequately account for zones of local
design practices for water dams. In its basic form, the
resistance and/or weakness within an embankment, thus
approach often uses a prescribed Factor of Safety (FoS)
potentially overlooking or not recognising the significance of
as a criterion that is perceived by some to denote whether
the ‘weakest link’ in an embankment. Solutions to addressing
or not a tailings facility is safe. Due to the seemingly
these limitations are outlined in the following sub-sections.
straightforward application of FoS, it has broad appeal.

3.4.3.3 Limitations of Prescriptive Approach 3.4.3.4 Precautionary Approach to Tailings

Facility Design
A FoS is often misinterpreted as a sole measure of safety. It is
Despite the limitations regarding FoS, many tailings facilities
based on the premise that a higher FoS reduces the likelihood
have been safely constructed and operated by combining a
of failure. However, a FoS is not a measurable value; it is an
prescriptive approach with the oObservational method, which
outcome based on inputs which are derived by the designer
is referred to in this Guide as the ‘precautionary approach’.
based on site data, laboratory testing and modelling. Natural
Performance that is indicative of a potential failure mode
variations in site and laboratory data give rise to uncertainty
is identified and monitored in order to validate whether the
around the calculated FoS. However, FoS values are rarely
design basis remains sound and if not, to initiate mitigation
reported with uncertainty limits. Further, a given value of FoS
measures. The amount by which variances from expected
has an entirely different meaning if an identical value exists
performance can be tolerated is often then supported by
for both a site with a brittle credible failure mode and one with
additional design calculations and judgement. During the
only non-brittle credible failure modes.
Construction, Operations, and Closure phases, performance
An over-reliance on FoS can lead to complacency – a behaviour surveillance is conducted in accordance with the
sense that if the design FoS is met then the facility is safe. design criteria and expected ranges such that appropriate
Complacency can also lead to an inadequate standard of care corrective action can be taken when exceedances are
regarding other factors that may be just as important, if not encountered. The precautionary approach also requires
more so, to the safety of a given tailings facility, such as using a contingency design to be implementable when and if
engineering analysis methodology that may not be applicable observations require that mitigation is necessary.
to a specific situation, just because the method is convenient
Currently, the use of the precautionary approach is
or familiar, or a lack of urgency to act in response to specific
widespread across the mining industry, and in many
problematic observations in the field.
cases the continued use of this approach is appropriate
As noted, the concept of FoS was originally developed for and effective in ensuring safe tailings management. The
water dams and has been adapted to tailings facilities. One precautionary approach is applicable and effective in many
significant difference between water dams and tailings circumstances because:
facilities is that water dams are typically built to final height at • There are existing tailings facilities that have been safely
the outset, whereas tailings facility embankments are typically designed, constructed and operated using this approach.
constructed in stages, with a starter embankment before If properly understood and calibrated with relevant
deposition of tailings commences, and raises to increase experience, the precautionary approach can continue to be
capacity through the Operations phase of the lifecycle. There used for such facilities.
may be further modifications during the Closure phase. As • The application of the precautionary approach can be
a result, the approach commonly used for water dams to validated by precedence and by confirmation that neither
apply a lower FoS for construction than in operations is not the foundation materials nor the foundations themselves
transferable to tailings facilities since construction is often or other structural components of the tailings facility are
ongoing together with tailings facility operation. Despite this, susceptible to strain weakening failure under the design
the approach is still used too frequently for tailings facilities. criteria or other elements of non-homogeneous straining.
• It provides an initial Design phase as a first step to
A further limitation of the FoS is that formulating a valid FoS a performance-based design which in turn leads to
for a given tailings facility is dependent upon the selection
improved safety and reliability of performance.

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 3.4 DESIGN

An illustration of the precautionary approach for design, It should be noted that most of the recent high-profile
construction, operation, and closure is presented in failures of tailings facilities had an acceptable FoS within
Figure 13. As illustrated, this approach relies on defining the context of the precautionary approach, although there
the acceptance criteria for the facility, which is often the were challenges with its application and understanding.
minimum acceptable FoS, either prescribed by regulation The precautionary approach is not appropriate when
or defined by the EOR or Design Team (recognising that brittle failure modes are present, especially if they are
separate FoS values may be adopted for the Construction, not recognised and eliminated. Appropriate material
Operations, and Closure phases). During the life of the characterisation with appropriate representation of pore
tailings facility observations are made via surveillance to pressure conditions and external loading conditions, along
assess whether the facility is meeting the intent of the with appropriate surveillance for all credible failure modes is
design, and hence consistent with the required FoS. necessary with the precautionary approach.

Select Design
Acceptance Criteria Geotechnical model
Hydrogeological model
Geologic model
Develop Design Meeting Seismic Hazard model
Acceptance Criteria for Climate
the most likely case and Geomorphology
worst case Experience and case
studies
Define Trigger Levels
for Monitoring

Establish Surveillance
Programme to address
Credible Failure Modes

Apply Remedial Collect and Interpret

Measures Surveillance Data

Adopt reasonable
No Intent Yes
worst-case contingency Continue Construction/
of Design
design or modify Operation/Closure
being met?
accordingly

Figure 13: Precautionary-Based Approach to Design, Construction, Operations and Closure

A key point of the precautionary approach is that the tailings • The sensitivities of safe design to material
facility response (via surveillance) is always reactive, based characterisation and site characterisation should be
on what has been observed. recognised by the EOR and the Design Team and their
evaluations should be endorsed by Independent Review.
For the application of the precautionary approach to design Significant consideration should be given to selecting
for static failure modes, this Guide recommends that: appropriately conservative material strength parameters
• Design FoS are not prescribed but should be determined for deterministic analysis of the FoS.
by the EOR and the Design Team and should be endorsed • The reliance on and limitations of the observational
by Independent Review. method should be recognised (see below).

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Regarding the application of precautionary-based design in risk of reaching an incorrect conclusion regarding the
practice for dynamic (seismic) failure modes, appropriate performance of the facility if the surveillance programme
methods for assessing both potential seismic deformations is not designed or interpreted appropriately.
and post-earthquake stability should be selected by the • It is not readily applicable in cases where the failure
EOR and the Design Team and reviewed by the Independent mechanism is predominantly brittle, which might occur
Reviewer(s). There may also be occasions when using a in tailings prone to liquefaction or in cases of strain
FoS approach or simplified deformation analysis can be a weakening foundations. Such mechanisms typically evolve
preliminary screening tool, but screening should not replace more rapidly than could be observed or responded to
the need for more rigorous seismic deformation analyses with contingency measures, or where other constraints
in highly seismic areas or with designs that contain fragile preclude the timely and effective application of such
elements (eg a low permeability core prone to cracking, measures. Brittle failure mechanisms have been involved
drains prone to clogging). The design criteria to be adopted in many of the historical catastrophic failures of tailings
for these cases are: facilities.
• There should be no loss of containment. • It is only effective for variances in performance that were
• There should be no secondary failure modes (eg cracking, foreseen, and for which remedial measures/actions have
shear of filters, disruption of drains) that can lead to collapse. been identified in advance. If a variance occurs that was
not foreseen and monitored, the method will not detect the
Experience indicates that a specified post-earthquake FoS variance and often remediation cannot be applied.
can be useful to ensure that runaway displacements are • Implementation of remedial measures/actions requires
precluded early in the design process. that the initiation mechanism be well-understood among
the Operator’s team working on the tailings facility (ie
Finally, as noted above, for the precautionary approach, operators, managers, RTFE, EOR).
the tailings facility design should be developed in terms
of two cases: i) the recommended design case; and ii) the • If contingency measures are not planned at the outset the
reasonable worst case. This distinction has the following value of the observational method is seriously impaired.
strengths: For example, if an initiation mechanism is observed
that could be addressed by constructing a downstream
• The recommended design case provides guidance on how buttress on the embankment, but the construction of an
to interpret variability in material properties based on embankment as a contingency measure was not foreseen,
detailed field and laboratory characterisation as well as then construction may not be possible due to a lack of
providing a first step towards the adoption of performance- adequate space to construct the buttress and/or a lack of
based design. construction materials.
• The reasonable worst case considers what might occur • For more complex tailings facilities, there is an increased
in a worst-case scenario and how it might be mitigated. It risk of reaching an incorrect conclusion regarding the
is not intended to be an operational target but facilitates performance of the facility if the surveillance programme
the proactive consideration of potential challenges is not designed or interpreted appropriately.
leading to potential design modification. The provision of a
constructible contingency design is an integral part of the
3.4.3.6 Performance-Based Approach to Tailings
reasonably worst-case design.
Facility Design
3.4.3.5 Limitations of the Precautionary Approach For some tailings facilities, including those with credible
brittle failure modes, the precautionary approach has
The precautionary approach has important limitations,
important limitations that can render it inappropriate.
related to shortcomings inherent in the application of the
In these cases, the application of a performance-based
observational method:
approach to tailings facility design, operation and closure
• It is a reactive method. Once an observation is made that serves to reduce risk and improve safe tailings management,
appears to be contrary to the intent of the design, remedial consistent with the ultimate goal of eliminating catastrophic
actions may be required. Determining the appropriate events and fatalities. The performance-based approach
remedial measures may be complicated by a lack of data, moves toward adopting a proactive procedure for managing
poor interpretation of the surveillance data, and/or a lack tailings facility performance data. This is accomplished by
of understanding of the origin or cause of the observation. defining performance objectives using sequential forecasts
In some cases, the lack of understanding could lead of the tailings facility behaviour through all phases of the
to the adoption of an incorrect remedial measure. For lifecycle and verifying that the performance is behaving as
more complex tailings facilities, there is an increased intended throughout the lifecycle.

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 3.4 DESIGN

The performance-based approach is made possible by some provides increased confidence that the facility is behaving
of the major developments in tailings management that have as intended and that safety is being ensured.
occurred, notably the expansion of surveillance capacity,
including remote data gathering and automated processing, As an example, a performance objective of limiting the
together with numerical simulation tools to forecast tailings amount of strain/deformation within the foundation or
facility performance and behaviour in a timely manner. The a layer within the foundation may be adopted in order
communication technology with sometimes remote facilities to prevent the material from reaching residual strength
and increased computational speeds enable real- or close- by realising its brittle behaviour potential. Monitoring
to-real-time ability to evaluate actual performance relative the strain within this layer relative is a key performance
to predictive tools and to continually improve those predictive indicator; results are used to calibrate and forecast strain
tools to better inform future behaviour. (performance criteria) through modelling.

This performance focuses on all observable, relevant An illustration of the application of the performance-based
parameters and characteristics such as deformations, approach in design, construction, operation, and closure is
piezometric pressures, seepage flows and cracking. The presented in Figure 14.
validation of performance in this comprehensive manner

Select performance
objectives Geotechnical model
Hydrogeological model
Geologic model
Develop preliminary Seismic Hazard model
design Climate
Geomorphology
Experience and case
Predict performance
studies
outcomes

Does
predicted Develop surveillance
Revise design No performance Yes
programme
and/or objectives meet and complete design
objectives?

Collect and interpret

performance data

Analyse data and predict

No performance

Analyse and predict

performance outcome
Does
Yes Is design Performance Yes Continue Construction/
Revise design change Meet Operations/Closure
required? Forecast?

No

Recalibrate model and

reforecast performance

Figure 14: Performance-Based Approach to Design, Construction, Operations and Closure

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The following are key to this approach:

During the design process:

• Use site characterisation data (geotechnical, geologic,
hydrogeologic, seismic, climate) to establish performance
objectives for the tailings facility. These objectives should
focus on the critical elements that would affect safe
construction, operation, and closure.
• Forecast behaviour as part of the design process to inform
the evolution and finalisation of the design to meet the
performance objectives. Forecasting tools are selected
dependant on the complexity of the challenges and the
questions that need to be answered. The tools may be
relatively simple analytical models but, where appropriate,
forecasting may utilise advanced numerical techniques
such as finite element or finite difference models. These
tools are often initially constructed using case study inputs
and the somewhat limited site characterisation data
that are available during the Design phase. The ability to
provides a more authoritative record that the overall
calibrate many of these models during the Design phase is
response of the facility based on constructed conditions is
limited.
in accordance with the design intent.
During the Construction, Operations, Closure, and Post- • Seismic resistant design relies on the approach to assess
Closure phases: potential deformations.
• Assess current behaviour. • The onset of localisation of deformations and progressive
failure can be determined.
• Calibrate and re-forecast the performance of the facility,
comparing against the performance objectives. If the • Experience indicates that regulators benefit from more
re-forecast does not meet the performance objectives, observable performance objectives to meet their needs
changes to the design and/or performance objectives may and this is facilitated by the performance-based approach.
be required, as indicated by the EOR.
The performance-based approach can be applied to all
• Inform the need for potential changes to the design to
tailings facilities, but based upon the analysis of past
improve facility safety and test proposed changes to the
failures, it can be particularly valuable to achieve robust
design by predicting future behaviour if the proposed
design and maintain integrity to prevent the failure of tailings
changes are implemented.
facilities that:
The advantages of applying the performance-based • Are spatially complex and variable, including having issues
approach include: of strain compatibility and interaction of material within
the facility and foundation zones.
• It provides a reliable and proactive basis for interpreting
all of the significant aspects and observations of tailings • Exhibit the potential for strain weakening (brittle).
facility performance related to evaluating safety. • Are susceptible to liquefaction leading to potential
• Design assumptions are continually challenged and flow failure.
subject to validation in a comprehensive manner. • Include a need to assess deformations resulting from
• The staged simulation of behaviour and incremental earthquakes.
forward projection strengthens the confirmation of safety. • Are potentially unstable due to high pore pressure due
• Its adoption (including use of specific/specialised to loading from the tailings facility.
monitoring instruments for collecting data for updating
analyses) overcomes some of the limitations associated The EOR is responsible for recommending detailed design
with the definition of FoS to shear failure modes as often criteria and for utilising a Design Team with adequate
defined in practice. (The FoS may not adequately highlight relevant experience compatible with the complexity of the
zones of local resistance and/or weakness.) assignment. In addition, the EOR and the Operator must
always recognise legal requirements applicable to the design
• The improved simulation and calibration with time also
process and the selection of design criteria.

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 3.4 DESIGN

The EOR and the Design Team are expected to formulate 3.4.3.8 Risk-Informed Decision-making in Design
the procedures and the material property characterisation
Regardless of the design approach, designs should be
required to initiate the design process. Relative to a
informed by an appropriate assessment of the risks and
precautionary approach, the required instrumentation
uncertainties associated with the proposed or existing
is expanded in order to maximise the validation of
tailings facilities. An overview of a range of risk management
performance to the degree considered to be of value. The
tools available to inform design was presented in Section 3.2.
EOR is responsible for determining whether the facility’s
embankment and foundation are adequately robust to meet
A design appropriately informed by risk applies the
the performance objectives.
evaluation of uncertainty in material properties, external
loadings, analytical models and interpretations. It also
This Guide recommends the adoption of performance-based
requires an appropriately informed level of independent
design utilising the forecast of deformation, pore pressures
review; to do otherwise is in itself a risk to the design.
and seepage for all phases of the lifecycle of a tailings facility
A risk-informed design takes the input from the risk
where conditions such as those outlined apply.
assessment at any level of sophistication, as sophistication
Furthermore, the adoption of the principles of risk-informed should be commensurate with the design stage of the
decision-making enhances the capacity to convey safety facility (Section 3.2), and uses that information in setting
assessments to multiple stakeholders. performance criteria and analytical methodology, and the
bounds of sensitivity applied to both.
3.4.3.7 Limitations of the Performance-Based
The ALARP concept is fully compatible with the principles
Approach of risk-informed design. As discussed in Section 3.2, while
The performance-based approach is a natural extension there are descriptions of the ALARP process in the public
of the observational method that is established good domain, the application of ALARP can be quite robust.
practice within the precautionary approach. It extends to ALARP can be implemented using a range of semi-
the evaluation of total performance of the tailings facility quantitative, qualitative or experiential methods, depending
throughout its lifecycle from construction to closure. By on the project conditions (eg geographic location, social
validating total performance of the tailings facility, the considerations/constraints, environment considerations,
evaluation of safety is enhanced. Total performance includes etc) and complexity. Regardless of the method(s) used to
deformations, pore pressures, and other aspects such as implement ALARP, the process itself is a powerful tool to
drain performance and cracking (if tolerable). The capacity document the decisions and approaches that were adopted
to undertake performance-based design requires the to reduce risk during the lifecycle of the tailings facility.
knowledge of current advances in deformation and pore
pressure modelling as well as advances in surveillance 3.4.3.9 External Loading Criteria for Design
technology and methodology needed to be able to apply the
Recognising that Operators can follow the Standard
performance-based approach to validate performance. This
directly, as an alternative, this Guide proposes beginning
relies on the EOR and Design Team having the necessary
the design process for new tailings facilities by assuming
competency to undertake design on this basis, and to
the need for extreme loading design criteria because, while
determine adequate deformation and resistance limits to
not the only factor involved, robust design with conservative
ensure safety. Broad application of the performance-based
criteria is supportive of preventing catastrophic failures.
approach will therefore require a focused building of capacity
Selecting conservative criteria is consistent with the safety
in the industry and sharing of case history examples, of
culture of the mining industry and the ultimate goal of
which a number already exist.
preventing catastrophic failures. By beginning with extreme
loading criteria, consequence classification of a credible
Further, the Operator’s tailings engineers, operators and
failure is not necessary for the purposes of establishing
management team need to understand what is required
design criteria.
to use this approach. Because design assumptions are
continually challenged and subject to validation, the
Although this Guide enters the design process assuming
successful application hinges on an Operator’s adaptability,
extreme criteria, it provides the flexibility that the EOR may
planning and ability to embrace new technology (software
recommend alternative criteria if appropriate, based on
and hardware).
site-specific considerations, a risk assessment that justifies
a different approach as appropriately protective against
catastrophic risk, and endorsement by Independent Review.
ALARP applies to existing facilities as well.

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The extreme loading design criteria proposed by or legal requirements may be applied. The external loading
the Guide are: criteria for the Operations and Closure phases vary based
on the consequence classification. The external loading
 esign flood: A maximum design flood (MDF) with a return
D criteria for the Post-Closure phase are associated with
period of 1 in 10,000 years should be considered for new extreme consequence for tailings facilities Closure phases.
facilities and for the screening of facilities already under During the Operations phase, the design may be based
construction (in operation) or already closed. In the latter on extreme loading criteria or the current consequence
cases, a reduction in the MDF can be considered based classification criteria. If the current criteria are used, the
on a recommendation from the EOR, endorsement by Operator must maintain the ability to upgrade to extreme
Independent Review and approval by the Operator. This external loading criteria throughout the facility lifecycle and
should be supported by a risk evaluation using the check at least every five years whether there is a material
ALARP principle. change that requires upgrade of the facility. If so, upgrade
must be completed within three years. Regardless, the
This Guidance also recognises that more extreme floods design for closure should ultimately use appropriate design
(probable maximum flood (PMF)) may be recommended by criteria, such as those included in Annex 3 of the Standard or
the EOR or they may be required under legal requirements should justify using lower criteria through use of the ALARP
in some jurisdictions. In such cases, the judgement of the principle for existing facilities per Requirement 4.7.
EOR and/or legal requirements take precedence. Recent
developments in estimating extreme floods increases the The Guide recognises that consequences will need to be
confidence in estimates of PMF and should be recognised. considered in the risk assessment process and EPRP if
catastrophic credible failures are present, even if using
Design earthquake: A maximum design earthquake (MDE) extreme loadings for the design process.
with a return period from a probabilistic seismic hazard
analysis (PSHA) of 1 in 10,000 years should be considered for 3.4.3.10 Failure Modes
new facilities and for the screening of facilities already under
construction (in operation) or already closed. Beyond establishing external loading criteria, many other
factors are critical to preventing catastrophic failures. The
Alternatively, where appropriate for the seismological next piece of design is assessing potential failure modes and
setting, a deterministic maximum credible earthquake the development of a design that minimises or eliminates
(MCE) may be adopted as MDE for new facilities and for the credible failure modes and thus sets a tailings facility up for
screening of facilities already under construction or already success in the prevention of catastrophic outcomes from
closed. In either case, the selection of probabilistic or credible failure modes.
deterministic methodologies and their associated loadings
and a reduction in the MDE from those outlined above can As described in Section 2.7.2 and 3.7.4 and consistent with
be accepted based on a recommendation from the EOR, the goal of eliminating fatalities and catastrophic failures,
endorsement by Independent Review and approval by ideally each tailings facility would have limited or no credible
the Operator. catastrophic failure modes. However, some facilities do
have credible failure modes that can lead to catastrophic
There are nuances between this Guide and the Standard, outcomes and these should be addressed by appropriate
with the common objective of selecting external loading design measures.
criteria to support the safe design of a given tailings facility.
While the Guide provides a design process that does not Every historic catastrophic failure has resulted from one or
require the use of a prescriptive consequence classification more of the following failure modes:
process, the Standard enters the design process for new • Overtopping (ie loss of containment through a breach).
facilities by formally determining the consequence of failure • Seepage and erosion (eg piping, decant structure failure
classification of a tailings facility by assessing downstream and any other failure related to water movement).
conditions and consideration of credible failure modes as
• Instability both due to excessive deformations within the
described in Requirement 4.1.
embankment and/or its abutments/foundations.
Further, the Standard provides a consequence classification
The following sections highlight some special considerations
(Annex 2, Table 1) as well as external loading criteria (Annex
associated with each potential failure mode.
2, Tables 2 and 3) applicable for the safe design of new
tailings facilities while recognising that other guidelines and/

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 3.4 DESIGN

In Detail
Overtopping • Restriction on the migration of the reclaim pond(s)
Tailings facilities are not typically designed to within the tailings facility.
accommodate overtopping. Exceptions can exist when • Recognition of competing water utilisation
the embankment(s) is composed of sufficiently coarse objectives such as management of geochemical risks
rockfill or other erosion-resistant material and is designed or fugitive dust.
to act as a flow-through embankment. In general, safety
• Ice formation that may interrupt/impact the water
with respect to overtopping is ensured by the provision
reclaim system.
of adequate freeboard that can include a sufficiently
sized and operating spillway. This design consideration is • Presence of upstream hazards or structures that could
incorporated in the water balance (Section 3.2.3) around fail and cause a cascading failure of the tailings facility.
the tailings facility as an element that reflects
the construction schedule of the facility. Seepage and Internal Erosion
Design and construction to control seepage and prevent
The construction plan should incorporate the consideration internal erosion that may result in the failure of a tailings
of the ore processing facility’s tailings production plan as facility falls into two classes of problems:
well as the tailings transport and deposition plan, water • Physical aspects of seepage control.
management requirements, tailings deposit density, • Chemical aspects of seepage control.
associated contingencies, and adequate freeboard to
safely manage the extreme design flood event. Maintaining Piping is a form of internal erosion in a tailings facility,
freeboard requirements is a critical performance objective embankment, or foundation resulting from seepage that
of any tailings facility where overtopping is a credible causes progressive erosion and formation of a cavity or
failure mode. Violating this requirement has been known to ‘pipe’ which may progress. Piping failures typically occur
aggravate consequences even if initial overtopping was not rapidly and Fell et al. (2003) noted that in the majority
the cause of a failure. of cases there were less than 6–12 hours between the
first observation of a concentrated leak and a breach of
Some design considerations related to freeboard the tailings facility. While piping may occur during the
requirements are: Construction and Operations phases, given the usual
• The implications of wind-generated waves and composition of tailings, the occurrence of catastrophic
reservoir setup. failure from this mode is not common. However, it is noted
• The storage of the MDF event, or a portion thereof, that decant towers and/or other engineered conduits
that results in temporary wetting and restoration (pipelines) in tailings facilities may fail structurally and
of the beach. may also lead to piping. The rate of filling of a tailings
facility of any significant size is generally low enough to
• Use of good practices for estimating the design flood,
allow time to intervene and modify the design if piping
considering climate trends and the potential for a series
due to filter incompatibility is observed (finer material is
of events to occur consecutively (wet season or year, as
able to migrate into coarser material). Nevertheless, the
is appropriate for local conditions).
significance of controlling seepage in tailings facilities and
• Where present, the malfunction of spillways that may be the prevention of piping is a paramount consideration in
relied upon to manage the extreme design flood event. tailings facility engineering and the principles follow those
• Long-term settlement of tailings and embankments. in use for water dam design.
• Earthquake-related settlement of tailings and
embankments. The physics governing seepage through both saturated
and unsaturated materials are well established. With the
• The potential for cracking due to desiccation in the upper
determination of the controlling hydraulic conductivity
portion of the beach.
properties at a given tailings facility, for both the foundation
• The operational beach length that would be a and tailings embankment section(s), the calculation
performance requirement under normal operating of seepage discharges and associated piezometric
conditions. distributions are readily computed. The critical hydraulic

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gradient at which upward directed flow reduces the including those anticipated by design earthquake ground
effective stress to zero is also determined by the porosity motions and should be robust enough to continue
and density of the local porous material. However, it is well functioning following such events.
established that the gradient at which particles begin to • If the closure plan includes a functional water body on
move is less than the critical gradient at which effective the surface of the tailings facility and if there would
stress is zero, but there is no clear limit regarding the rate be active seepage as a result, consideration should be
of particle migration at these reduced hydraulic gradients. given to reducing the allowable hydraulic gradient in the
A variety of tests have been developed to aid in determining tailings facility.
this limit. This is made more complex by the occurrence of
• In addition to piezometric and discharge monitoring,
suffusion which is the selected transportation and washing
considerations should be given to methods that can
out of fines from a coarse material. The uniformity of the
be invoked to locate zones of excessive seepage if they
tailings and/or foundation materials under consideration
are threatening safe performance. Techniques based
affect the hydraulic gradient at which suffusion becomes
on self-potential measurements (passive electrical
significant and the issue of internal stability needs to be
geophysical method) and differential temperature
considered. Critical hydraulic gradients are very sensitive
measurements have proved successful in practice.
to the degree of internal stability of a granular material.
The development of powerful and effective numerical
Simple prescriptive design measures are not well-suited
modelling software to forecast piezometric distributions
to accommodate the variations of materials that commonly
and seepage discharges is an integral component of
occur in tailings facility embankments. The EOR should be
performance-based design. While accurate prediction of
responsible for:
both piezometric distributions and seepage discharges
• Establishing the parameters required for the evaluation of tailings facilities is challenging and often not reliable,
of seepage-induced flows in both the tailings facility and predictions can be improved by means of history-matching
the foundation. Unsaturated flow needs to be considered of model behaviour to historic data and incremental
where appropriate. forward projections conducted in a systematic manner.
• Establishing critical hydraulic gradients to control The net result is an increased confidence in safe operation
internal erosion. and the development of an insightful tool for final closure
• Establishing the capacity/demand ratio (FoS for drains) design.
for all drainage elements.
Chemical aspects of seepage are typically thought of in
• Providing capacity for seepage modelling in both
relation to the water quality of the process-affected water
two- and three-dimensions, where appropriate.
and the composition of the groundwater (which may be
• Providing specifications for all drainage control influenced by the construction and operation of the tailings
measures. facility). These considerations are important throughout
• Design of the surveillance programme for seepage. the facility lifecycle to ensure Design and Operations are
in compliance with the permit / regulatory requirements
Some design considerations associated with seepage and for the facility. Seepage considerations should also include
internal erosion of tailings facilities include the following: potential geochemical changes to materials in the tailings
• The capacity/demand ratio should be large enough facility and the foundation to assess whether such changes
to accommodate the uncertainties associated with could affect the physical stability of the tailings facility.
estimating seepage flows. For example:
• Care should be taken to avoid utilising materials in • Consideration of whether geochemical changes could
seepage control elements that can degrade with time. affect the strength of tailings (if used as a structural
element in the facility), other embankment materials
• Design of control elements such as filters should
and/or foundation materials.
consider the ease of construction and related quality
control to enhance reliable performance. Design should • Whether precipitates or other geochemical changes
also should recognise tailings facility deformations could reduce the permeability of structural elements
such as drainage features or embankment fill.

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 3.4 DESIGN

• Whether seepage water could increase or decrease fabric (including grain angularity) and bulk density be
permeability in the foundation due to geochemical determined.
reactions.
Where tailings are used as a construction material
Tailings Embankment Stability or are present in the embankment foundation, likely
The stability of the tailings embankments and abutments pore pressure conditions should be modelled during
may be impacted by: the Design phase and during construction they should
• The presence of brittle materials, either within be appropriately measured and interpreted. A proper
the embankment, abutment, or foundation of the combination of pore pressures and bulk density is required
embankment, that could lead to the rapid loss of shear to correctly estimate in-situ stresses and, hence, in-
strength. situ state. There can be considerable non-conservatism
involved in using incorrect values.
• The development of static liquefaction due to
rapid construction loading or the development of
Tailings facility embankments are commonly classified
undrained loading conditions in brittle materials
according to their geometry (ie upstream, centreline,
at the onset of yield.
downstream). There are variations of this classification, but
• The development of dynamic liquefaction due it is adequate for the purposes of this Guide. Experience
to seismicity or blasting. indicates that failures have occurred at a small percentage
• Excessive differential settlement of soft zones. of each type of tailing facility embankment geometry, but
that instances of catastrophic failure have been relatively
Many of these issues can be identified during site more common at upstream-type embankments, for
characterisation (Section 3.3.2), however others, such example due to static or dynamic liquefaction conditions.
as construction loading, will need to be addressed as While failures have occurred with upstream construction,
part of the construction documentation and the quality there have also been numerous successes.
management process.
Setting aside failure associated with foundation conditions,
The driving forces of the tailings facility behind an this Guide considers that upstream construction
embankment and, in turn, on the foundations for the embankments can be safely constructed, operated and
embankment, need to be sufficiently met by the resisting closed provided they are supported at the downstream
forces of the embankment at all phases of the facility’s embankment zone by a dilative and/or unsaturated
lifecycle. The driving forces can and will vary due to buttress that can be monitored and that provides adequate
construction activities, external loads (ie seismic events) resistance if the upstream contents liquefy. This resistance
and the size and shape of the facility as it evolves. The does not preclude deformations associated with seismic
nature of the foundation materials and the embankment loading provided there is no loss of containment and that
materials need to work in tandem to create a stable mass. no secondary failure modes develop. Examples of physical
As above, brittle materials in either the embankment or features that are often helpful in achieving upstream
the foundation require special consideration inclusive embankment stability include:
of design and construction based upon either lower • Having a relatively low rate of increases in
bound strengths (eg assume the brittleness is triggered) embankment height.
or sufficient robustness to prevent the sudden loss of
• Using relatively coarse tailings with low clay content
strength from ever occurring.
for the construction of the embankment.
Many tailings facilities have embankments constructed • Having a well-drained foundation
using tailings. This is a widespread, safe and logical • Being located in an area with a relatively arid climate
approach as it does not involve the use of other natural • Being located in an area with relatively low seismicity
materials and minimises disturbance outside the tailings
• Having a relatively small ponded water on tailings
facility footprint. However, tailings material varies in
facility surface.
mechanical behaviour and it is essential that the gradation,
• Compaction of the downstream embankment zone

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• Having relatively flat embankment side slopes. • Variable construction and operating conditions that may
affect in-place properties and stability of the tailings
In addition, upstream facilities require rigorous TMS facility and embankments.
implementation. • Response of unconsolidated materials in the foundation
and variations in response under different confining
Recent experience has highlighted the challenges stresses and stress levels.
associated with selecting the appropriate FoS to prevent
failure in a variety of facility configurations. Instead of • Time-dependent, deformation-dependent and stress
specifying fixed values, this Guide favours the selection path-dependent processes that may affect the critical
of site-specific design criteria based on the evaluation of material processes such as the operational pore
site complexity by means of the EOR (in accordance with pressures and shear strengths.
applicable legal requirements) and notes that the following • Potential for brittle failure.
particularly complex circumstances should be recognised: • Susceptibility to static and dynamic liquefaction that
• Accumulated experience with a particular soil may include strain weakening.
or rock mass.

3.4.4 Tailings Transportation and Deposition Plan • Potential impacts on the implementation of the
closure plan.
The tailings transportation and deposition plan is
initially developed during the Project Conception phase and In developing the tailings transportation and deposition plan,
refined during the Design phase. It should be integrated with a range of site characterisation (Section 3.3.2) information
the design approach for the tailings facility and the overall should be considered. These characteristics should be
plan for ore extraction and processing. It should describe validated and updated on a periodic basis throughout the
how tailings will be transported to and deposited in the lifecycle. If some characteristics do not meet the design
tailings facility, and how the capacity of the tailings facility specifications or intent, then the potential impacts and risks
will be increased over the life of the mine. It is crucial to of these deviations should be assessed, and appropriate
successfully operating the facility from construction actions taken to address them.
to closure.
Depending on how water will be managed, and whether
The tailings transportation and deposition plan should water will be stored in the tailings facility, the tailings
be integrated into the OMS manual (Section 2.4) and transportation and deposition plan should be integrated
implemented and regularly reviewed and updated during the with the water management plan.
Operations phase of the lifecycle (Section 3.6).
Deposition plans typically allow for the expansion of the
The plan should be developed, implemented and updated tailings facility over the life-of-mine to accommodate
in a manner that is aligned with the closure concept and increasing amounts of tailings solids. This could include
closure plan (Section 3.7.2), to ensure that the final tailings staged lifts to increase the height of embankments to
surface topography at the end of the Operations phase accommodate additional tailings, or planned lateral
facilitates the implementation of the closure plan and post- expansions into new cells of the tailings facility. Depending
closure land use. on the water content of the tailings, and the relationship
between tailings management and water management,
Proposed changes to the tailings transportation and
such expansions may also increase the capacity to store
deposition plan should be carefully considered taking
water and increase the retention time of water within the
into account:
tailings facility.
• Potential operational impacts.
• Potential impacts on risks.

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 3.4 DESIGN

In Detail
The tailings transportation and deposition plan is integral Will tailings be split based on particle size distribution
to the selection of the tailings management technology and or other physical factors? If separated, how will these
the site-specific conditions of the tailings facility. Examples different types of tailings be managed?
of aspects to consider include: • Consideration of whether alternative deposition
• Whether the tailings will be managed as slurry, or approaches might be feasible approaching the end of the
whether they will be dewatered to some degree and Operations phase to achieve closure objectives.
managed as thickened, paste or filtered tailings. • Whether any other materials, such as waste rock or
The planned moisture content and the physical treatment sludge, will be managed with the tailings. For
characteristics of the tailings are essential to the plan. example: Will potentially acid-generating waste rock be
• What types of embankments, if any, will be constructed? managed with the tailings to prevent or control acidic
What will the construction method be? What materials drainage? What quantities of these materials will be
are to be used? What will be the method of raising those placed in the tailings facility, compared with the quantity
embankments during the Operations phase? of tailings?
• Overall sitewide mass balance considerations for • How will the tailings be transported from the ore
operation and closure and integration of deposition processing facility to the tailings facility? Options include
planning with the water balance and management plans. a pipeline in the cases of slurry, thickened or paste
• Consideration of the potential range of tailings index tailings, and truck or conveyor belt in the case of filtered
properties, moisture content, rheology, swelling clays, tailings.
etc, as relevant for project-specific conditions. • In colder climates, whether ice lenses could form in
• Material placement/approaches planned. deposit and how to manage them.
• Methods, if any, to control seepage from the tailings • Methods to prevent the release of tailings into the
facility, such as the use of liners, water retaining environment during transportation to the tailings facility.
embankments or underdrains. This should also consider • How will the tailings and any other materials be placed
the potential implications of the inclusion of liner or deposited within the tailings facility?
materials on the geotechnical stability of a facility. • How much water will be retained in the tailings facility?
• Whether there will be a single type of tailings, or What measures are in place to deal with excess water,
whether there will be different types. For example: Will such as due to high intensity precipitation, extreme
there be separate ‘clean’ tailings and potentially acid- snowpack/melt, extended periods of wet weather,
generating tailings, which would be managed differently? extended periods of water retention, etc?

3.4.5 Documentation of Design The DBR is a foundational document that records the design
basis and the outcomes from the design process. It also
The Standard refers to a Design Basis Report (DBR) and a
incorporates updates throughout the lifecycle of a tailings
Design Report. Some Operators may wish to combine all
facility. The site characterisation studies (Section 3.3.2) inform
this information into a single report, others will prefer to
the DBR. The models and information described in the DBR
spread it out over a few reports. Regardless of format, it is
underpin the decisions that the EOR (with the support of the
important to document the design basis as well as issued
Design Team) makes in setting design criteria for the facility.
for construction drawings, specifications, and construction
Development of the DBR should begin during the Project
quality management planning as key elements of the Design
Conception phase (Section 3.3) to include the alternatives
phase. This Guide refers to the important components to
evaluated (Section 3.3.4), and should be refined during the
be considered in developing documentation and refers to
design of the selected alternative to provide the basis for
documents where information might be housed, for ease of
construction, operation, and closure of the tailings facility.
writing this text; however, it is not intended to be prescriptive.
The DBR should be further updated throughout the lifecycle
of the facility, with each phase informing subsequent phases.

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The DBR should include the following: It is important to keep the DBR-related information up
• Design criteria considering site-specific conditions to date and integrated. For example, it is valuable to
that underpin tailings facility designs through field incorporate data and analyses from periodic material
investigation, laboratory work and modelling and analyses. characterisation programmes with previous design/
Where assumptions are made early in the lifecycle, this material characterisation data to validate interpretation
should also be clearly defined until data is available to and to document any in-situ changes. Likewise, if there
confirm criteria. are known changes to construction material/methods (eg
to seismic loading models, input data, etc) these should
• Performance objectives which will be met by TARPs (eg
be incorporated with DBR information. Similarly, designs
seepage stability, allowable deformation) and the tailings
may change due to the permitting process and approvals.
facility design components.
Important changes should be managed and integrated into
• Summary of supporting information used to demonstrate the documentation.
that the tailings facility, as designed, will meet the design
criteria and performance objectives. Independent Review is critical for the DBR due to its
foundational nature in tailings management. The DBR
Facets of a DBR typically include site conditions, should also address the information requirements identified
geotechnical properties of and criteria used for foundation through community engagement and Independent Review,
and tailings material, starter facility and embankment as well as provide information related to the relevant legal
characteristics, tailings transport (distribution) and requirements and risk management plan.
deposition system, reclaim water system, water
management, environmental components, supporting The DBR or other documents further include detailed
infrastructure, and a description of battery limits (boundary construction drawings and construction specifications.
for area of responsibility). These are used together with the construction quality
management plan for the basis for execution of the design.
The DBR should be updated throughout the design process
to include increasing detail and complexity reflective of the
design decisions and site-specific data that are collected as
progress is made on the project design studies. Early design
stages often include assumptions or estimates for certain
parameters until site-specific data become available as the
design of the tailings facility advances. It is important to note
the status of information in the DBR (assumed or estimated
from similar projects versus site specific) with the goal of
ultimately transitioning to ensure that the DBR is reflective
of site-specific investigations and studies.

The DBR should describe the risk controls and associated

performance criteria (Section 3.6.4) that are used in the
design and implementation of the surveillance programme
(Section 2.4.3.4). The EOR should review and update the DBR
throughout the lifecycle of the facility to ensure the DBR
reflects the current status of the tailings facility and future
plans. A DBR should contain enough detail to provide a basis
for comparison of:
• Constructed conditions (clarifying any deviations from
the original design).
• Any changes to the original design intent.
• Actual performance against performance objectives,
indicators, and criteria described in the DBR.
• Updates to the closure plan.
• Any extensions to the capacity of the tailings facility
beyond the original design intent.

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 103

 3.4 DESIGN

In Detail
A typical DBR includes the following sections with • Discharge and seepage controls
reference to the relevant technical references and reports: • Breach analysis and inundation studies (if appropriate
• Tailing facility general information based on risk assessment)
• Mine production plan • Tailings distribution and reclaim water system
• Battery limits • Tailings deposition
• Topographic survey methodology, datum/coordinate • Earthworks and constructability
system • Structural design criteria
• Climate and meteorology • Design criteria for electrical infrastructure (eg pumps,
• Geology (including structural geology and presence of surveillance instruments, etc.)
faults) and hydrogeology • Closure design criteria
• Geological and hydrogeological characterisation • Costing basis and drawing standards.
• Site geotechnical characterisation – including foundation
and borrow materials Beyond integrating the underpinning models, the DBR
• Seismicity and seismic design requirements defines whether the tailings facility approach will use
precautionary design or performance-based design
• Surface water management
and provides important design criteria such as FoS and
• Geochemical considerations allowable deformations, potential for strain weakening, etc.
• Tailings characteristics and rheology It describes the scope and level of detail of information and
• Water balance analyses used to make decisions, along with applicable
legal requirements and guidelines, demonstrating the
• Embankment characteristics
  validity of those decisions.
• Slope stability

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3.5 CONSTRUCTION Back to contents

3.5.1 Introduction • Establishing the construction team, including defining the

roles and responsibilities of the EOR and the construction
Construction is a recurring lifecycle activity that progresses
team and their relationship through the design process.
the Design phase outputs of a construction design including
drawings, technical specifications and quality management • Execution of the QA/QC programme based on the plans
into a commissioned facility that is received by the Operator developed during the Design phase.
for ongoing operations. The initial stage of a tailings • Developing and maintaining a construction risk register to
facility is commonly constructed by a contractor with track risks to project schedule and cost. The construction
subsequent stages either continuing to be contractor built risk register is one piece of the broader risk assessment
or alternatively built by the Operator’s site team. Sometimes and risk management process for the tailings facility
at existing mine sites, the Operator’s team may have the which should also be considered through the Construction
capacity to perform some of the initial stage construction phase, particularly when considering changes to the
of a new tailings facility. Regardless of who performs the design (Section 3.2.4).
construction, a strong quality assurance (QA) and quality • Initiating the tender process and procurement with
control (QC) programme is important. clarity around required qualifications and experience in
establishing potential bidders and the assessment of bids.
Construction implementation should incorporate the
• Developing a construction health, safety and
consideration of the ore processing facility’s tailings
environmental plan.
production plan, as well as the tailings transport and
deposition plan, water management requirements, • Advancing construction activities.
associated contingencies, and adequate freeboard to safely • Commissioning the constructed facility.
manage the design flood event. • Developing accurate documentation including the
Deviance Accountability Report (DAR) and the Construction
The main activities for the Construction phase are: Records Report (CRR).
• If the EOR from the Design phase is not retained,
appointing an EOR for the Construction phase through a The outcome of the initial Construction phase is a
change management process. This EOR is likely to have a commissioned facility constructed in accordance with the
longer-term responsibility. design intent, detailed specifications, quality management
• Developing a construction management plan. programme for subsequent use in the Operations and
Closure phases, as well as any other documents required
• Developing a project execution plan.
for final approval and initiation of the Operations phase.

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 105

 3.5 CONSTRUCTION

Subsequent Construction phase activities use similar Figure 15 illustrates the key activities of the Construction
elements to progress the tailings facility through its lifecycle, phase of the lifecycle.
as required per the Design, Operations, and Closure phases
and/or if mitigation is required.

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management of tailings,

water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Construction
Construct in accordance with
the DBR.
Prepare and update across the
life cycle:
• Construction vs Design
Intent Verification Temporary Suspension
• Deviance Accountability
Report
• Construction Records Report
Prepare:
• Updated site characterisation
Project models
Design • Updated DBR Operations Closure Post-Closure
Conception

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The orange boxes and dotted lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

Figure 15: Key activities of the Construction phase of the lifecycle

3.5.2 Construction Management Plan The construction management plan typically includes
several elements that may be packaged in a variety of
The execution of the engineering design requires a formats at the preference of the Operator. The planning
well-developed management framework to ensure its process and clarity of outcomes is the important aspect
successful implementation. The management framework of the following, not the specific nomenclature or how the
encompasses the development of a construction outcomes are packaged:
management plan to establish uniform policies and
procedures that ensure facility construction is conducted Project execution plan:
safely in accordance with the construction drawings, • Describes how the construction is to be undertaken.
technical specifications and the QA/QC programme. The It provides specific requirements for the activities,
construction management plan is an overarching plan and schedules (including key milestone dates), and
is intended to be flexible in its application, and revised and organisational framework.
improved as warranted. It is not intended to be a step-by-
step procedure for each activity. Typically, it is a document Construction execution plan:
that outlines general activities, procedures, requirements • Details how and when the construction activities are
and schedules for successful completion. to be undertaken.

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Risk management plan: Haphazard or undocumented deviations should be avoided.

• Details results of facility risk assessment activities A clear process should be established in advance of
conducted during the Design phase. This information commencing construction for the consideration and potential
should be referenced carefully when design changes approval of deviations, including delegating responsibility and
are proposed. Risk ownership and continuity from authority for such decisions. This process should be aligned
the Design phase across Construction and into the with tailings management governance and involve the entire
Operations phase is critical in managing change during breadth of the team responsible for safe management of
this transition period. tailings (Accountable Executive, RTFE, EOR, Design Team and
Independent Review).
• Facility risk assessments are updated to reflect
constructed conditions and any additional information
The potential impacts of the proposed deviations on the
relevant to risk (eg hazards) collected during construction
design intent, expected performance, and risk profile of the
(new information, new developments, changes required
tailings facility should be assessed and understood before any
in design due to geomorphology, water management,
deviation is approved.
climatic changes, or unforeseen major events or
topographic conditions). It is important to be aware of the potential cumulative effects
• Project-level risk (risks to schedule and cost) may of multiple minor deviations which may not be of consequence
also be captured in a construction risk register. on their own. In assessing proposed deviations, previous
deviations should be considered and the potential for a
Quality management plan: cumulative effect should be evaluated.
• Describes both the QA and QC requirements determined
by the EOR for construction, where: Construction QA processes may identify non-conformances
• QA is the implementation of a system to ensure design and with design specifications from time to time. If not immediately
construction activities will deliver the project requirements resolved, a non-conformance report should be issued and
in accordance with the design intent. tracked until it is resolved. The intent is to eliminate these, and
• QC is the inspection of the construction works and this is the typical outcome. However, some non-conformances
material verification, via testing, to ensure compliance may be disputed and unreasonable to resolve due to costs
with the requirements of the drawings and technical and/or schedule implications. Under these few circumstances,
specifications. the non-conformances can be considered deviations from the
design.
Water management plan:
• Details how water will be managed during construction, A CDIV process should be conducted by the Operator with
outlines start-up water requirements, and references support from the EOR to ensure:
overall objectives for safe water management for the • The design intent, as per the DBR, has been implemented
completed tailings facility and is tied to the sitewide and and is still being met if the site conditions encountered
tailings facility-specific water balance model and plan during construction varied from the design assumptions.
(Section 3.2.3). • Any discrepancies between the field conditions encountered
during construction and the design assumptions are
3.5.3 Deviations from Design clearly identified and reviewed, such that the design can be
reviewed and adjusted as required to account for the actual
It is not uncommon for situations to arise during
field conditions. This information is critical for the design of
construction that necessitate a deviation from the design or
subsequent facility stages.
construction specifications. Such deviations do not create
any facility safety concerns provided they are assessed,
The results of the CDIV should be included in a CRR for new
reviewed and documented as part of the overall construction
tailings facilities or other relevant documents such as an
management process. These deviations can range from very
annual report for operating tailings facilities.
minor to material changes requiring a design modification.
Deviations are a normal part of the construction process, as
actual conditions (eg foundation conditions or characteristics 3.5.4 Documentation of Constructed Conditions
of construction materials) will never be exactly the same as Accurate documentation of as-constructed conditions
those anticipated based on the information available during is critical. Such documentation provides the information
the Project Conception and Design phases. Deviations may needed to:
also occur due to permitting requirements. • Continue construction of the tailings facility during the
Operations phase.
Proposed deviations should be carefully considered.

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 107

 3.5 CONSTRUCTION

• Inform any future consideration of changes in the design • Ongoing construction through the Operations phase
of the tailings facility. to increase the capacity of the tailings facility.
• Understand and remedy problems that may arise • Construction for any material changes.
in the future. • Design modifications and implementation of the
closure plan.
Constructed conditions should be documented in a CRR
signed by the EOR and RTFE per Requirement 6.3 of the Construction records, including QA/QC documentation,
Standard. Through the CDIV and Independent Review, this construction surveys and as-built drawings, and
includes verification of whether the constructed conditions commissioning documentation should be retained to provide
meet the design intent and specifications. the documentation that the construction was in accordance
with the construction drawings and technical specifications.
The CRR should also summarise the results of the CDIV These may be consolidated in the CRR. These records are
to ensure that all changes to the design or any aspect important for the ongoing management of the tailings facility
of construction are documented, together with any non- and provide a critical database for ongoing construction
conformances and their resolution. and geotechnical assessments. If construction is conducted
in multiple stages, it is helpful to consolidate the CRR and
Any unresolved deviations identified in the CRR can be drawings as a complete reference of the cumulative facility
carried into the DAR process. The DAR process can be used construction or develop another equivalent approach to
throughout the lifecycle of the tailings facility, identifying and integrating information.
reviewing potential implications of changes to the facility and
evaluating their acceptability. The DAR is discussed further To facilitate ease of access and the analysis of constructed
in Section 3.6.3. conditions this information may include detailed geo-
location data and be compiled in a comprehensive GIS-based
The CRR should document the initial construction of a retrievable system. This may not be possible for existing
new tailings facility and should be updated to reflect other sites with incomplete construction records.
construction activities when they occur throughout the
lifecycle, including:

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3.6 OPERATIONS Back to contents

3.6.1 Introduction • Construction activities continue to increase the capacity

of a tailings facility and the volume of stored tailings as
The Operations phase is the period in the lifecycle when
mining and ore processing operations proceed (Section
tailings are transported to, and placed in, the tailings facility.
3.5). Constructed conditions are accurately documented,
It may also include the temporary suspension of mine
including deviations from the design intent and design
operations (Section 3.6.5).
basis. Deviations are assessed through the change
management system (Section 2.3.2.1).
The full range of concepts, principles and practices for
tailings management are deployed during the Operations • A programme for reviewing tailings safety is implemented
phase to ensure safe, responsible tailings management. (Section 2.6).
• Tailings are managed in accordance with overall • Community engagement continues (Section 2.2.5).
governance for tailings management, with accountability • TMS and OMS manual are reviewed and updated as
and responsibility appropriately assigned (Section 2.2). appropriate (Sections 2.3 and 2.4).
• TMS is implemented (Section 2.3). • EPRP is tested and updated as appropriate (Section 2.7).
– Evaluating Performance is ongoing. • Development of the closure plan continues (Section 3.7.2).
– Identifying Actions to Improve Performance includes the • Site characterisation information is updated and improved
reporting of performance to the Accountable Executive. through sample and data collection, testing and analyses
– Action plans are developed and implemented to address to identify any changes that could affect the design or
deficiencies or opportunities for continual improvement. operation of the tailings facility. This information is used to
confirm site characterisation models (eg tailings material
• Risk management plan is implemented and is reviewed
characterisation) and the DBR is updated accordingly
and updated regularly (Sections 3.2.4 and 3.4).
(Section 3.3.2).
• OMS activities are implemented to operationalise the TMS
• All updates and operational changes are assessed through
and risk management plan (Section 2.4).
the change management system (Section 2.3.2.1).
• Tailings transportation and deposition plan is
implemented, reviewed and updated regularly During the Operations phase, the Operator should plan for
(Section 3.4.4). the possible temporary suspension of mine operations. The
• Risk assessment is updated periodically (Section 3.2.4). Operator may also implement progressive reclamation,
depending on the nature of the closure plan.

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 109

 3.6 OPERATIONS

Figure 16 illustrates the key activities of the Operations phase of the lifecycle.

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management of tailings,

water, and other waste, and closure planning

TMS

Operations
Conduct OMS activities in
accordance with:
• Performance objectives
• Risk management plan
• Design intent
• Closure plan
Evaluate performance of tailings
facility and tailings management
governance:
• Address deficiencies
• Implement measures for
continual improvement Temporary Suspension
Review/update:
• DBR
• Tailings management system
• OMS manual
• EPRP
Project • Site characterisation models
Design Construction • Risk assessment Closure Post-Closure
Conception

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The orange boxes and dotted lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur. 

Figure 16: Key activities of the Operations phase of the lifecycle

3.6.2 Applying to Existing Tailings Facilities • Application of the TMS (Section 2.3) and its integration
in sitewide integrated mine planning (Sections 1.2.1 and
This Guide is intended to support the management of both
3.2.2).
new and existing tailings facilities. However, determining
how to apply the Guide to an existing facility can be • Risk assessment (Section 3.2).
challenging and a site-specific approach should be taken. • Documentation related to tailings facility engineering
and management, if available, even if under different
The first step should be to conduct a gap analysis against name/format:
the elements related to governance of tailings management – Site characterisation information and models
(Part 2) and the implementation of good engineering (Section 3.3.2).
practices described in Part 3. Depending on the Operator, – Design information including the design, the design
conducting a gap analysis may require external expertise intent and design basis (Design Report and DBR, Section
and input. This analysis should include inspection and 3.4.5).
identification of any immediate concerns followed by a more – Information on the construction of the tailings facility,
detailed analysis that includes review of the: including as-built conditions (CRR, Section 3.5.4), and

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deviations from the design (DAR, Section 3.5.3).

– OMS activities (OMS manual, Section 2.4).
–C  losure plan (Section 3.7.2).
• Current and historical performance of the tailings facility,
including conformance with the design intent, corporate
policy on tailings management, legal requirements and
commitments to communities (Section 2.3.4).
• EPRP and results of any tests conducted (Section 2.7).
• Reports from a programme for reviewing tailings safety
(eg Independent Review) (Section 2.6).

Once a gap analysis has been completed, the Operator

should prioritise gaps that present the highest potential
facility safety risks and develop action plans to address those
gaps (eg operational improvements to address identified • Complexity and size of the tailings facility.
potential instability, additional site investigation or data
• Risks and the potential consequences of failure.
collection to develop or refine site characterisation models
to validate understanding of stability performance, updated • Lifecycle phase.
or more comprehensive risk assessment). Prioritisation of • Closure plan.
gaps and the development of action plans should be done
with input from the EOR and Independent Review. In addition, the Operator should consider the continued
suitability of application of the precautionary approach,
A key consideration in prioritising gaps and the development versus adoption of a performance-based approach
of action plans is appropriately scaling application of the (Section 3.4.3).
guidance to the tailings facility in question. Considerations
in scaling application of the guidance will typically include: The Operator should develop a schedule for sequencing
• Availability of meaningful information about the history and implementing action plans, develop a budget, and
of the tailings facility. obtain budget approval. Action plans should then be
implemented in accordance with the schedule, cognizant of
• Uncertainties associated with credibility of potential the importance of effectively managing change through this
failure modes. process (Section 2.3.2.1).

In Detail
Questions to consider in this gap analysis include: • Has an OMS manual been developed and implemented?
Is it up to date, accessible, understood and utilised by
Questions related to governance of tailings management relevant personnel (Section 2.4)?
• Does the Operator have a corporate policy on tailings • Is the Operator effectively managing information related
management? Does this policy include a goal of to tailings management (Section 2.5)?
eliminating fatalities and catastrophic failures
• Does the Operator have a programme in place to
(Section 2.2.3)?
review tailings safety, including Independent Review
• Have accountability and responsibility been assigned for (Section 2.6)?
roles described in Section 2.2.2 and are persons in these
• Does the Operator have an EPRP? Is the plan tested and
roles appropriately competent as per Section 2.2.4? Are
updated appropriately (Section 2.7)? Are communities
there clear lines of communication between key roles?
and public sector agencies engaged (Section 2.2.5)?
• Has a TMS been developed and implemented
(Section 2.3)? Are processes in place to manage change
(Section 2.3.2.1)?

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 3.6 OPERATIONS

Questions related to engineering practice documentation adequate and updated as appropriate

• Is site characterisation information (including tailings (Section 3.4.5)?
material characterisation) adequate and is this • Has an integrated tailings and water management plan
information up to date (Section 3.3.2)? been developed and is it based on up-to-date data and
• Are facility performance objectives, indicators and operating rules (Section 3.2.3)?
criteria identified and described, including quantification • Does the Operator have a plan for construction
(Section 3.3.3)? management, including quality management
• Does the Operator have an up-to-date risk assessment (Section 3.5.2)? Is construction being done in
(Section 3.2.4)? Does the Operator understand the accordance with this plan?
uncertainties associated with the risk assessment? • Does the Operator have an accurate, up-to-date record
Has the Operator identified credible failure modes and of the constructed tailings facility, including and accurate
assessed the potential consequences of failure? understanding of:
• Does the Operator have an up-to-date risk management – Current conditions (Section 3.5.4)?
plan and is it being implemented (Section 3.2)? Does the – Deviations from the design intent and design basis,
risk management plan reduce risk according to ALARP? including the rationale for such decisions and
Are additional mitigations needed? assessment for implications to facility performance
• Does the Operator have documentation on the (Section 3.5.3)?
design, the design intent, and the design basis for the • Does the Operator have and use an up-to-date closure
tailings facility (eg a Design Report and DBR)? Is this plan towards which progress is being made?

3.6.3 Potential Material Changes • Other changes such as:

– Behaviour or characteristics of tailings associated with
As described in Section 2.3.2.1, managing change is the ore or ore processing.
essential to safe tailings management. Potential material – Behaviour or characteristics of construction materials
changes, in particular, should be carefully considered. for embankments.
–S  ite water management and water balance (eg increase
A material change is a change to the design or operation of in volume of water from underground mine workings as
a tailings facility, proposed or made after the design for the mine development progresses).
initial construction has been finalised and initial construction – Climate conditions.
has commenced. A material change would be a change – Upstream or downstream infrastructure or conditions.
important enough to merit attention, such as a change that
has the potential to influence the risk or performance of This may also include changes to address deficiencies
a tailings facility. The criteria for what would constitute a in performance or changes to improve performance (eg
material change should be defined by the Operator, with adoption of improved engineering practices).
input from the EOR and Independent Review.
It is important to be aware of the potential cumulative effects
Examples of potential material changes include changes to: of multiple changes or deviations which may not, on their
• The tailings facility design, design intent, or design own, be material. In considering non-material changes,
basis as documented in the design report and DBR previous changes or deviations should be considered and the
(Section 3.4.5). potential for a cumulative effect should be evaluated.
• Operating plans or procedures (eg tailings transportation
and deposition plan (Section 3.4.4)). Potential material changes should be carefully considered
by the Operator and EOR, taking into account both short-
• Business case and overall mine plan, such as a mine life
and long-term implications, before making any decision on
extension.
implementation, to determine:

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Input should be obtained from the EOR on potential material

changes. Some Operators may wish to seek input from
Independent Review as well.

As part of the planning to implement a material change,

the Operator should consider not only the need to update
relevant aspects of the design, but also other plans and
processes. For example, implementing the material change
may necessitate changes to the OMS manual.

The decision to implement the proposed material change

should be made at a level in the organisation commensurate
with the significance of the change (eg RTFE, Accountable
Executive or BoD, as appropriate).

The process of considering potential material changes,

and of implementing approved material changes should be
properly documented. The DAR (Section 3.5.4) is intended to
contain a record of all the deviations from the design across
the lifecycle, including both material and non-material
changes. The records contained in the DAR also provide
a basis for assessing the potential cumulative effects of
proposed changes or deviations. If any material changes
are proposed that are outside the scope of the DAR, these
should also be properly documented.

• Whether or not to proceed with the change, if applicable. 3.6.4 Decision-Making

• How best to proceed with the change. 3.6.4.1 Introduction
Making risk-informed decisions is essential to safe tailings
On a case-by-case basis, the Operator and EOR should
management through the Operations phase and the
engage personnel with the appropriate competencies
subsequent Closure and Post-Closure phases. This applies
and qualifications in the evaluation, planning and design
equally to new tailings facilities planned, designed and
of potential material changes. In some cases, a multi-
constructed following the guidance in Sections 3.2, 3.3, 3.4
disciplinary approach may be appropriate and may involve
and 3.5, and to facilities that are many decades old that were
personnel outside the RTFE’s immediate organisation. For
constructed to very different standards.
example, a proposed change in ore processing that would
result in different tailings characteristics may require ore
No matter how a tailings facility was originally designed,
processing and tailings management teams to collaborate,
constructed and operated, a rigorous approach to decision-
consistent with the integrated mine planning approach
making, conducted within an effective governance structure,
(Sections 1.2.2 and 3.2.2).
can help to ensure that tailings are safely managed.
Elements of a risk-informed approach to decision-making
Depending on the complexity of the potential material
are described in Section 3.2.4.
change, it may be appropriate to evaluate the potential
change using the steps outlined for the Project Conception
Decisions to be made during these lifecycle phases can be
phase (eg risk analysis and multi-criteria alternatives
categorised as:
analysis) (Section 3.3). In other cases, a less rigorous
• Immediate or short-term operational decisions, such
decision analysis approach may be appropriate, and the
as responding to unusual or upset conditions (eg a
proposed material change can proceed to the Design phase
decision to implement predictive maintenance (Section
(Section 3.4).
2.4.3.3) or a decision to increase surveillance frequency
(Section 2.4.3.4)).

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 3.6 OPERATIONS

• Medium- or longer-term decisions, such as: • Defer or transfer risks to the Closure phase without fully
– Responding to deficiencies in performance or considering the potential implications.
opportunities to continual improvement (eg responding
to recommendations from Independent Review) A rigorous approach to decisions provides a structured,
(Section 2.6). consistent mechanism for decision-making, helping
– Material changes to improve performance (eg to ensure that decisions are taken by persons with the
construction of a buttress). appropriate authority and competencies, and are based on
relevant information.
– Adjusting the design or operating practices in
response to an updated validation of the design basis A decision-making framework is based on the intersection
or updated predictions of the future performance of the between credible failure modes, performance indicators and
tailing facility. criteria, and the risk management plan. A decision-making
framework should identify:
Decision-making for medium- and longer-term decisions
would typically be addressed through the process to manage • Credible failure modes potentially subject to immediate or
change (Section 2.3.2.1) as these would be considered short-term decisions (ie implementation of mitigation).
material changes (Section 3.6.3). These types of decisions • Performance indicators and criteria able to measure and
are also addressed in Section 3.4.3 in the context of the assess performance relevant to those credible failure
discussion of the precautionary-based approach and modes.
application of the observational method (Sections 3.4.3.4 • Surveillance measures aligned with the performance
and 3.4.3.5), and the discussion of the performance-based criteria.
approach (Section 3.4.3.6).
• Pre-defined risk management measures (risk controls)
to be taken if the performance criteria associated with the
The balance of this section is focused on decision-making
credible failure modes are not met.
for immediate and short-term operational decisions.
Once the framework is established, surveillance measures
Good information is essential to all decisions. The effective
are then implemented, results are measured against the
implementation of risk-informed decision-making is
performance criteria, and if those criteria are not met, then
predicated upon the effective surveillance of tailings facility
the pre-defined risk controls are implemented.
performance. A properly designed and implemented
surveillance programme, aligned with the performance
Risk controls may include a subset of controls referred to
objectives and risk management plan, is essential to making
as critical controls, which are risk management measures
good decisions (Section 2.4.3.4).
to mitigate credible failure modes that could lead to a
catastrophic failure (Sections 2.7 and 3.2.4). Risk controls
3.6.4.2 Developing a Framework for may include operating rules with ongoing surveillance and
Decision-making validation or discrete implementation of new mitigation
To facilitate making immediate and short-term decisions measures.
in a risk-informed manner, Operators should develop
a framework for decision-making. A TMS provides a Clear, effective, timely communication is essential to
governance framework for decision-making and surveillance decision-making (Section 2.2.6), particularly in the case of
plays an essential role in providing information. However, any variances from the expected ranges of performance.
without a rigorous approach to decision-making for tailings Communication procedures and lines of communication
management, informed by surveillance results, there is an associated with decision-making should be documented and
increased risk that decisions: communicated to relevant personnel. Similarly, the pre-
defined risk controls should be documented, and personnel
• Are based on incomplete or inaccurate information.
who may be responsible for the implementation of those risk
• Are ad hoc and short-sighted in nature. controls should be informed and trained appropriately so
• Fail to recognise and account for embedded ignorance, that they are able to act if necessary.
increasing the potential for human error.
• Fail to support the objective of the safe management The advantage of this approach, including pre-defining the
of tailings. risk controls to be implemented, is that it facilitates prompt
action if the performance is outside the specified range,
• Fail to account for interactions between seemingly
since the Operator, with input from the EOR, has already
unrelated decisions.
identified the action to be taken. It also empowers junior

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staff with the authority to act in the event that the RTFE and • Define a series of thresholds corresponding to increasing
EOR cannot be contacted in a timely manner. concern or risk. For each threshold level, define the
risk controls to be implemented. The risk management
Other business units that could be affected by or involved response is escalated as the concern (magnitude of
in the implementation pre-defined risk controls should be variance of performance) increases. The number of
engaged in developing the decision-making framework levels of thresholds is dependent upon the performance
and understand the actions to be taken. For example, if indicator and the associated risk controls.
exceeding the minimum freeboard behind an embankment
means that risk controls need to be taken to reduce or The most appropriate approach to take depends on
stop the flow of tailings into the tailings facility, then those the nature of the credible failure mode and associated
responsible for ore processing / generating tailings material performance indicators. Where the second approach is
need to be aware of this and need to be part of the process. feasible, it will provide the Operator with greater flexibility
and capability to manage risk.
3.6.4.3 Trigger Action Response Plans
This second approach is sometimes referred to as a trigger
When defining the performance criteria and the risk controls
action response plan (TARP), although other terms are also
to be implemented if those criteria are not met, there are
used to describe this concept. TARPs may be used to define
two basic approaches. For a given performance indicator
escalating risk management actions under upset or unusual
associated with a credible failure mode the Operator may:
conditions and may also define the transition to emergency
• Define a single threshold for the performance criteria situations. It is up to the Operator to determine what is
and define the risk control(s) to be implemented if that considered upset versus emergency conditions, and the role
threshold is exceeded. of TARPs in the management of upset conditions.

In Detail
An example of a four risk-level framework for a TARP is: performance criteria, and the effectiveness of the risk
• Green – Acceptable Situation. Normal operating control implemented. Expert advice may be sought as
conditions. Performance is in line with performance appropriate. Results of follow-up surveillance activities
criteria. are documented and reported. The accumulation or
combination of moderate-risk situations could lead to a
• Yellow – Minor Risk Situation. The EOR and RTFE
high-risk situation and threshold values may need to be
should be notified. There may be a pre-defined risk
assessed accordingly.
control to be implemented, or the pre-defined action
may be to increase the frequency of surveillance and • Red – High Risk Situation. Depending on the credible
analysis. Additional surveillance activities may be failure mode and how the thresholds are defined,
undertaken. Surveillance results and corresponding reaching this level means there is an imminent loss
actions are documented and reported. of control or that a loss of control has occurred.
Depending on the potential consequences, this may
• Orange – Moderate-Risk Situation. In addition to the
trigger very significant pre-defined risk controls (eg
EOR and RTFE, the Accountable Executive is notified.
ceasing ore processing operations, emergency release
Depending on the credible failure mode and associated
of water through the spillway) or it may trigger the
level of concern, regulators, local emergency responders
implementation of the EPRP. It is important to note
and communities should be notified if further escalation
that the accumulation or combination of moderate-
could lead to an emergency. Pre-defined risk controls
risk situations could lead to a high-risk situation and
are implemented. Surveillance activities are intensified
threshold values may need to be assessed accordingly.
to monitor the performance indicator in question, related

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 3.6 OPERATIONS

3.6.5 Temporary Suspension of Mine Operations During temporary suspension, OMS activities continue and
the closure plan is not implemented. However, in some cases
During a temporary suspension of operations, ore extraction
temporary suspension may lead to closure of the mine and
and processing have been suspended and the placement of
implementation of the closure plan.
tailings into the facility is not occurring. A suspension may
be short-term (eg temporary suspension due to wildfires,
3.6.6 Progressive Reclamation
labour disruption) or of a longer, indeterminant duration (eg
due to low commodity prices). Progressive reclamation is the reclamation or remediation of
certain portions of a mine site during the Operations phase,
The specific timing, duration and circumstances related to in advance of the Closure phase and implementation of the
a temporary suspension are not usually known in advance. closure plan (Section 3.7).
However, a temporary suspension is a significant change
and, like all changes, must be appropriately managed to Progressive reclamation may not be possible at some tailings
reduce the risks associated with tailings management. facilities. Where progressive reclamation is possible, it may be
temporary, or intended to be a component of the closure plan.
The Operator should consider developing a contingency However, where non-temporary progressive reclamation can
plan for different credible scenarios for a temporary be undertaken, it should be planned and undertaken:
suspension, including identifying the resources (eg personnel, • In accordance with the operating plans (eg tailings
power supply, equipment) needed for the continued safe transportation and deposition plan) and the closure plan
management of the tailings facility for the duration of a (Section 3.7.2).
temporary suspension and coordination with the regulatory
• In a manner consistent with the performance objectives
authority as appropriate. Such plans should also address OMS
and risk management plan (Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4).
activities specific to temporary suspension (eg suppressing
dust from areas of the tailings facility that are normally wet) • In a manner consistent with ongoing OMS activities
and the re-start of mine operations. Contingency plans should (Section 2.4).
also address the potential implications of a longer temporary
suspension, such as changes in water management and As progressive reclamation proceeds, the risk assessment
implications for water levels in the tailings facility or changes should be reviewed accordingly, and the risk management
to seepage volume and chemistry. plan updated as appropriate. OMS activities should also be
reviewed and revised as appropriate. The closure plan should
be updated to reflect the state of progressive reclamation.

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3.7 CLOSURE & POST-CLOSURE Back to contents

3.7.1 Introduction A conceptual and final closure plan requires a vision, principles
and objectives. It should become more detailed and elaborated
Planning for closure and operating a tailings facility in a
during the Design phase (Section 3.4). The closure plan
manner consistent with the closure objectives are activities
should then be refined, elaborated, verified and updated
that crosscut the entire lifecycle. Thus, while Closure and
periodically during the Operations phase of the lifecycle, and
Post-Closure can be regarded as distinct phases of the
in preparation for transition to the Closure phase. The closure
lifecycle, planning and design for these phases begin at
plan and objectives should be considered in the multi-criteria
the outset of the Project Conception phase and continues
alternatives analysis conducted during the Project Conception
throughout the lifecycle. Closure planning for an existing
phase of the tailings facility and should be a key consideration
tailings facility that is not yet closed does not exclude it
in the facility design and location, and in the technology
from this process; rather, it accelerates the need to apply
decisions of the facility. The OMS manual (Section 2.4) should
the scope of work described in this section to ensure a
be aligned with the closure plan and objectives so that activities
successful outcome.
during the Operations phase (Section 3.6) are consistent with
and support the closure plan and objectives.
The guidance presented here is focused on the theme of
preventing catastrophic tailings facility failures from the
For existing tailings facilities that do not have closure plans,
beginning of the tailings facility’s lifecycle through to the
the development of closure plans should begin as soon as
Closure and Post-Closure phases. For many tailings facilities,
possible. If the facility was not planned and designed from the
a post-closure objective can include having the facility
outset with closure in mind, then options for closure vision,
become a landform. Landforms, as used in this guidance, are
principles, and objectives may be more limited, but it is none
not prescriptive, but meet the objective of being long-term
the less imperative that the Operator begins the process of
stable earth structures which are capable of being closed
planning for closure. The development of the closure plan may
with surveillance and limited management or maintenance
lead to changes in current practices or the adoption of newer
requirements. To be considered a landform, the facility cannot
technologies to reduce risk and better position the tailings
develop a credible catastrophic failure scenario. Irrespective
facility for closure. Regular review of such opportunities is
for the closure configuration selected, it is good practice to
central to continual improvement for any tailings facility.
reference not only this section, but also the ICMM Integrated
Mine Closure: Good Practice Guide (2019) and any site- Designing and operating for closure requires a long-term view.
specific regulatory criteria to ensure long-term sustainability Tailings facilities should be planned, designed, constructed,
is achieved. operated and closed on the assumption that they will be
permanent landforms. Tailings facilities, designed for closure,
Considerations when following this guidance will include the
are true future engineered landforms, intended to remain
recognition of application in variable environments, under
physically and chemically stable for the long-term. It is
different (and sometimes changing) legal requirements, and
important to ensure that short-term financial or operational
sometimes changing stakeholder objectives and success
priorities do not prevail over better design and operational
criteria. The ability to adapt to these considerations is key to
practices that would have lower long-term impacts, complexity
a successful outcome. Also key is to look for opportunities to
or risks.
execute progressive reclamation (when/where possible) to test
closure concepts, ensure regulatory acceptance and integrate The development of the closure plan should be informed by
stakeholder engagement into the process. a range of available references materials and tools including
ICMM Integrated Mine Closure: Good Practice Guide (2019).
3.7.2 Development of the Closure Plan In addition, it is important to have an established DBR. Through
For new tailings facilities or major expansions, the the DBR development process, the Design Team should identify
development of closure plans and performance objectives information gaps to fill prior to finalising the closure detailed
for closure and post-closure should begin during the Project design. Closure plans typically evolve and should be viewed as
Conception phase (Section 3.3). Tailings facilities should be living documents throughout the mining lifecycle.
planned and designed, from the outset, with closure and post-
closure in mind. Realising that many Operators are dealing 3.7.3 Execution of Closure Plan
with existing facilities and legacy facilities, the guidance The execution of the closure plan can be a period of rapid
provided here expresses the importance and urgency around change. It is vital to have established performance objectives
the acceleration of a timeline for the guidance that follows and success criteria in order to establish metrics and achieve
to arrive at the goal of a final closure plan that will achieve a designated goals during the Closure phase when the plan is
stable landform status. executed. It is important that the Operator continues to be
diligent through this phase, and does not become complacent

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 3.7 CLOSURE & POST-CLOSURE

about tailings safety because tailings are no longer being • Construction activities are carried out as per the closure
produced and deposited in the tailings facility. In particular: plan, with adherence to design specifications and quality
• Overall governance structures should remain in place, with management requirements.
accountability and responsibility appropriately assigned. • Independent Review continues with a focus both on
• Change management should remain robust as transitions implementation of the closure plan and preparations for the
occur in processes and personnel from the Operations Post-Closure phase.
phase to the Closure and Post-Closure phases. • Community engagement continues.
• TMS continues to be implemented to the extent appliable • EPRP is updated to reflect closure conditions, including a
and this is revised to reflect post-closure activities. potential change in the role of the Operator and third parties
• Risk assessment should be updated for closure, and the in responding to an emergency as the Operator’s on-site
risk management plan updated accordingly. resources change.
• OMS manual should be updated for closure and
Figure 17 illustrates the key activities of the Closure phase of
implemented to meet the requirements for the Closure and
the lifecycle
Post-Closure phases.

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management of tailings,

water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Closure
Implement closure in
accordance with closure plan
and final closure design.
Conduct operation, maintenance
and surveillance activities in
accordance with:
• Performance objectives
• Risk management plan
• DBR
• Closure plan
Evaluate performance of tailings
facility and tailings management
governance:
• Address deficiencies
• Implement measures for
Temporary Suspension continual improvement
Review/update:
• DBR
• Tailings management system
• OMS manual
• EPRP
Project • Site characterisation models
Design Construction Operations Post-Closure
Conception • Risk assessment

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The orange boxes and dotted lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.   

Figure 17: Key activities of the Closure phase of the lifecycle

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3.7.4 Post-Closure • Continue to implement the TMS, although the frequency

of Identifying Actions to Improve Performance and
In contrast to the Closure phase, the Post-Closure phase
reporting to the Accountable Executive may be
begins when the changes from the Closure phase have been
decreased.
fully implemented, and the facility enters a period of long-
term maintenance and surveillance. Complacency remains • Maintain the tailings facility site characterisation and
a significant risk, however, since the consequences of a knowledge base.
tailings facility failure may be the same as if the facility were • Periodically update the risk assessment, particularly if
still in the Operations or Closure phase. It is important that there are changes in the facility performance or external
all stakeholders are engaged in and understand the Post- changes that could impact the risk (eg increased
Closure phase objectives and success criteria. A tailings population in the potential area of inundation).
facility in the Post-Closure phase may require the same level • Update the risk management plan as appropriate.
of care as it did in earlier phases of the lifecycle. This can be
• Update the OMS manual and review periodically through
a challenge, since the Operator will have few if any personnel
the Post-Closure phase and update as appropriate.
on site at all times, and depending on the location there may
There may be a greater role for community engagement
be more limited access to a power supply, communication
in surveillance in the Post-Closure phase.
infrastructure, etc.
• Continue to conduct Independent Review, although the
For the Post-Closure phase, the Operator should: frequency can be reduced.
• Ensure a form of governance structure remains, with • Continue community engagement, although the
accountability and responsibility appropriately assigned (this frequency may be reduced once established success
may include a hand-over process of the Operator itself). criteria have been achieved.

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 3.7 CLOSURE & POST-CLOSURE

Performance/success monitoring is needed to determine emergency, such as a lack of heavy equipment, power supply,
whether specific pre-set criteria are being met. The EPRP fuel or communication infrastructure. Continued testing of
should be updated, in particular to reflect that the Operator the EPRP is imperative.
may have a limited capacity for immediate response to
an emergency, and emergency response may be much Figure 18 illustrates the key activities of the Post-Closure
more reliant on third parties. The EPRP should also reflect phase of the lifecycle.
changes in other resources available to respond to an

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management of tailings,

water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Post-Closure
Conduct operation, maintenance
and surveillance activities in
accordance with:
• Performance objectives
• Risk management plan
• DBR
• Closure plan
Evaluate performance of tailings
facility and tailings management
governance:
• Address deficiencies
• Implement measures for
Temporary Suspension continual improvement
Review/update:
• DBR
• Tailings management system
• OMS manual
• EPRP
Project • Site characterisation models
Design Construction Operations Closure
Conception • Risk assessment

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The orange boxes and dotted lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

Figure 18: Key activities of the Post-Closure phase of the lifecycle

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Tailings Management: Good practice guide 121

 GLOSSARY

Accountability: The answerability of an individual for their economic systems. Such failures are a function of the
own performance and that of any personnel they direct, interaction between hazard exposure, vulnerability, and the
and for the completion of specified deliverables or tasks in capacity of people and systems to respond. Catastrophic events
accordance with defined expectations. An accountable person typically involve numerous adverse impacts, at different scales
may delegate responsibility for completion of the deliverable and over different timeframes, including loss of life, damage
or task, but not the accountability. to physical infrastructure or natural assets, and disruption to
lives, livelihoods and social order. Operators may be affected
Accountable Executive: One or more executive(s) who is/ by damage to assets, disruption to operations, financial loss or
are directly answerable to the CEO on matters related to this negative impact to reputation. Catastrophic failures exceed the
Standard, communicates with the Board of Directors, and capacity of affected people to cope using their own resources,
who is accountable for the safety of tailings facilities and for triggering the need for outside assistance in emergency
minimising the social and environmental consequences of a response, restoration and recovery efforts. [based on the
potential tailings facility failure. The Accountable Executive(s) definition provided in the Standard]
may delegate responsibilities but not accountability. [based on
the definition provided in the Standard] Community: A social group possessing shared beliefs and
values, stable membership and the expectation of continued
As low as reasonably practicable (ALARP): ALARP requires interaction. It may be defined geographically, by political or
that all reasonable measures be taken with respect to resource boundaries, or socially as a community of individuals
‘tolerable’ or acceptable risks to reduce them even further with common interests.
until the cost and other impacts of additional risk reduction
are grossly disproportionate to the benefit. [based on the Construction versus Design Intent Verification (CDIV):
definition provided in the Standard] Intended to ensure the design intent is implemented and
still being met if the site conditions vary from the design
Authority: The power to make decisions, assign assumptions. The CDIV identifies any discrepancies between
responsibilities, or delegate some or all authority, as the field conditions and the design assumptions, such that the
appropriate. The ability to act on behalf of the Operator. design can be adjusted to account for the actual field conditions.
[based on the definition provided in the Standard]
Board of Directors (BoD): The ultimate governing body of
the Operator typically elected by the shareholders of the Construction Records Report (CRR): Describes all aspects of
Operator. The BoD is the entity with the final decision-making the ‘as-built’ product, including all geometrical information,
authority for the Operator and holds the authority to, among materials, laboratory and field test results, construction
other things, set the Operator’s policies, objectives and overall activities, schedule, equipment and procedures, quality control
direction as well as oversee the firm’s executives. As the term and quality assurance data, results of Construction versus
is used here, it encompasses any individual or entity with Design Intent Verification (CDIV), changes to design or any
control over the Operator, including, for example, the owner or aspect of construction, non-conformances and their resolution,
owners. Where the State serves as the Operator, the BoD shall construction photographs, construction shift reports, and any
be understood to mean the government official with ultimate other relevant information. Instruments and their installation
responsibility for the final decisions of the Operator. [based on details, calibration records and readings must be included
the definition provided in the Standard] in the CRR. Roles, responsibilities and personnel, including
Independent Review, should be documented. Detailed
Breach analysis: A study that assumes a failure of the tailings construction record drawings are fundamental. [based on the
facility and estimates its impact. Breach analyses should be definition provided in the Standard]
based on credible failure modes where loss of containment
is possible. The results should determine the physical area Continual improvement: The process of implementing
impacted by a potential failure, flow arrival times, depth incremental improvements and standardisation to achieve
and velocities, duration of flooding, and depth of material better environmental and management system performance.
deposition. The breach analysis is based on scenarios which
are not connected to probability of occurrence. It is primarily Credible failure mode/scenario: Refers to technically feasible
used to inform emergency preparedness and response failure mechanisms given the materials present in the structure
planning and for determining the potential consequences of and its foundation, the properties of these materials, the
failure. [based on the definition provided in the Standard] configuration of the structure, drainage conditions and surface
water control at the tailings facility, throughout its lifecycle.
Catastrophic failure: A tailings facility failure that results Credible failure modes can and do typically vary during the
in material disruption to social, environmental and local lifecycle of the facility as the conditions vary. A tailings facility

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that is appropriately designed and operated considers all Emergency: A situation that poses an impending or immediate
of these credible failure modes and includes sufficient risk to health, life, property, and/or the environment, and which
resilience against each. Different failure modes will result requires urgent intervention to prevent or limit the expected
in different failure scenarios. Some tailings facilities will adverse outcomes.
have no credible failure modes. Further, even more tailings
facilities will have no credible catastrophic failure modes. Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP):
The term ‘credible failure mode’ is not associated with a A site-specific plan developed to identify hazards, assess
probability of this event occurring and having credible failure capacity, and prepare for an emergency based on tailings
modes is not a reflection of facility safety. The process of facility credible failure scenarios, and to respond if it occurs.
assessing credibility or non-credibility of failure modes for This may be part of operation-wide emergency response
a given tailing facility should consider, among other factors planning and includes the identification of response capacity
such as construction and operations, whether the facility is and any necessary coordination with off-site emergency
designed to extreme external loads. [based on the definition responders, local communities and public sector agencies.
provided in the Standard] The development of the EPRP includes a community-
focused planning process to support the co-development and
Critical controls: A control that is critical to preventing a implementation of emergency response measures by those
potential undesirable event or mitigating the consequences vulnerable to a tailings facility failure. [based on the definition
of such an event. The absence or failure of a critical control provided in the Standard]
would disproportionately increase the risk despite the
existence of the other controls. [based on the definition Engineer of Record (EOR): The qualified engineering firm
provided in the Standard] responsible for confirming that the tailings facility is designed,
constructed and decommissioned with appropriate concern
Dam Safety Review (DSR): A convention from the water for integrity of the facility, and that it aligns with and meets
dam industry to describe periodic and systematic process applicable regulations, statutes, guidelines, codes and
carried out by an independent qualified review engineer standards. The EOR may delegate responsibility but not
to assess and evaluate the safety of a dam or system of accountability. In some highly regulated jurisdictions, notably
dams against failure modes, in order to make a statement Japan, the role of EoR is undertaken by the responsible
on the safety of the facility. A safe tailings facility is one regulatory authorities. [based on the definition provided in the
that performs its intended function under both normal and Standard]
unusual conditions; does not impose an unacceptable risk
to people, property or environment; and meets applicable Independent Review: Independent, objective, expert
safety criteria. An alternative approach that involves regular commentary, advice, and, potentially, recommendations
review of the entire facility though use of a programme for to assist in identifying, understanding and managing risks
reviewing tailings safety as outlined in this Guide. [based on associated with tailings facilities. This information is provided
the definition provided in the Standard] to the Operator to:
• Facilitate informed management decisions regarding
Design Basis Report (DBR): Provides the basis for the tailings management so that tailings-related risks are
design, operation, construction, monitoring and risk managed responsibly and in accordance with an acceptable
management of a tailings facility. [based on the definition standard of care.
provided in the Standard]
• Ensure that the Accountable Executive has a third-party
opinion regarding the risks and the state of the tailings
Deviance Accountability Report (DAR): Provides an
facility and the implementation of the TMS, independent
assessment of the cumulative impact of changes to the
of the teams (employees, consultants and contractors)
tailings facility on the risk level of the achieved product and
responsible for planning, designing, constructing, operating
defines the potential requirement for updates to the design,
and maintaining the facility.
Design Basis Report (DBR), and operation, maintenance,
and surveillance (OMS) activities. [based on the definition
Legal requirement: Any law, statute, ordinance, decree,
provided in the Standard]
requirement, order, judgement, rule or regulation of, and the
terms of any license or permit issued by, any governmental
Embankment: A term used to denote engineered structures
authority.
designed and built to retain tailings solids and, where
applicable, water. Constructed of tailings and/or other
Lifecycle: The series of activities or phases in the life of a
materials, embankments may include dams, dikes or other
tailings facility, consisting of: Project Conception, Design,
structures.
Construction, Operations, Closure and Post-Closure. At some

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 123

 GLOSSARY

sites, the lifecycle may also include temporary suspension of Temporary suspension of mine operations: A period of time
mine operations. Some phases, such as Operations, Closure when mine operations have been suspended and tailings are
and Post-Closure, typically only occur once in the lifecycle not being deposited into the facility. The suspension may be
of a tailings facility, while other activities, such as Project short-term (eg temporary suspension due to wildfires, labour
Conception, Design and Construction, may be recurring at disruption) or of a longer, indeterminant duration (eg due to
different periods through the life of a tailings facility. low commodity prices).

Project Conception: A recurring lifecycle activity that is the During temporary suspension, maintenance and surveillance
first step in the planning and design for: continue and some operation activities (eg active water
• Construction and Operations phases of new tailings management) may also continue. The closure plan is not
facilities. implemented. However, temporary suspension may lead to
closure in some cases.
• Closure and Post-Closure phases of tailings facilities.
• Any material changes to the design or operation of tailings Closure: This lifecycle phase begins when deposition of
facilities. tailings into the tailings facility ceases permanently and the
• Re-commissioning of an existing tailings facility for a mine closure plan is implemented, including:
re-opening. • Transitioning from the Operations phase to the Closure
phase and the Post-Closure phase.
Project Conception consists of the analysis of a range
• Removal of infrastructure such as pipelines.
of alternatives (eg location of a new tailings facility,
technologies to be applied). • Changes to water management or treatment.
• Construction of covers, recontouring or revegetation of
Design: A recurring lifecycle activity that builds upon the tailings and any embankments or other structural elements.
decisions made in the Project Conception phase. Once a • Other reclamation and decommissioning activities
preferred alternative has been selected, all aspects of that
alternative are designed in detail, based on the design intent Post-Closure: This lifecycle phase begins when the closure
and defined performance objectives. plan has been implemented and the tailings facility has
transitioned to long-term maintenance and surveillance. The
Construction: A recurring lifecycle activity that includes: Post-Closure phase should recognise all the aspects of safety
• Initial construction prior to the start-up of a new tailings and environmental compliance related to long-term stability
facility (eg starter embankment, tailings lines). and legal requirements.
• Ongoing construction through the operating life of the
mine to increase the capacity of the tailings facility (eg During the Closure or Post-Closure phases, tailings facilities
facility raises). could return to the Operations phase. In addition, tailings
could be removed for reprocessing to recover additional
Construction may also include: commodities of value, or to be used for other purposes (eg
construction material).
• Construction for any material changes (eg increase
capacity beyond original design intent, buttress to
In some jurisdictions, during the Post-Closure phase,
strengthen a tailings facility).
responsibility for a tailings facility may transfer from the
• Construction during the Closure phase (eg installation Operator to jurisdictional control.
of covers).
Maintenance: Includes preventative, predictive and corrective
Operations: The period in the lifecycle when tailings are activities carried out to provide continued proper operation
transported to, and deposited in, the tailings facility, inclusive of all infrastructure (eg civil, mechanical, electrical,
of any periods of inactivity prior to the commencement of instrumentation, etc), or to adjust infrastructure to ensure
implementation of the closure plan. Construction may be operation in conformance with performance objectives.
ongoing or periodic throughout the Operations phase. In
addition, progressive reclamation in preparation for closure Material change: A change to the design or operation of a
and consistent with the closure plan may occur during the tailings facility, proposed or made after the design for initial
Operations phase. In some cases, after the end of the active construction has been finalised and initial construction has
deposition of tailings, tailings may be removed from the commenced. A material change would be a change important
tailings facility for reprocessing or other uses. Such activity enough to merit attention, such as a change that has the
would also be considered Operations. potential to influence the risk or performance of a tailings

124 International Council on Mining and Metals

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facility. The criteria for what would constitute a material Operator: An entity that singly, or jointly with other
change should be defined by the Operator, with input from entities, exercises ultimate control of a tailings facility. This
the EOR and Independent Review. may include a corporation, partnership, owner, affiliate,
subsidiary, joint venture or other entity, including any
Management system: Processes and procedures that State agency, that controls a tailings facility. [based on the
collectively provide a systematic framework for ensuring that definition provided in the Standard]
tasks are performed correctly, consistently and effectively
to achieve a specified outcome and to drive continual Performance: There are three key terms related to
improvement in performance. A systems approach to performance, defined as follows:
management requires an assessment of what needs to be
done, planning to achieve the objective, implementation P
 erformance objectives are overall goals, arising
of the plan, and review of performance in meeting the set from the Operator’s policy and commitment, which are
objective. A management system also considers necessary quantified where practicable. They may be defined at
personnel, resources and documentation requirements. various levels of detail such as this tailings facility will not
Other definitions associated with management systems are: experience a catastrophic failure versus deformation of
the embankment will be minimised.
Policy: The expression of management’s commitment
to a particular issue area that presents the stance of the P
 erformance indicators are detailed performance
company to interested external parties. requirements that arise from the performance objectives
and that need to be established and met in order to
Practice: Documented approaches to carrying out a task. achieve those objectives. Performance indicators must be
measurable and quantifiable.
Procedure: A documented description of how a task is to
be carried out. 
Performance criteria are established based on expected
or predicted performance and are used to evaluate
Observational method: A continuous, managed, integrated, performance indicators and define limits of performance
process of design, construction control, monitoring and outside which risk management action needs to be taken.
review that enables previously defined modifications to be
incorporated during or after construction as appropriate. Personnel: Includes employees, contractors and consultants
All of these aspects must be demonstrably robust. The (eg designer, Engineer-of-Record) and includes those with
key element of the observational method is the proactive direct responsibilities for tailings management as well as
assessment at the design stage of every possible those with indirect responsibilities whose roles may be
unfavourable situation that might be disclosed by the related in some manner to tailings management (eg heavy
monitoring programme and the development of an action equipment operators working on or adjacent to tailings
plan or mitigative measure to reduce risk in case the facilities).
unfavourable situation is observed. This element forms the
basis of a performance-based risk management approach. Quality: The degree to which a set of inherent characteristics
The objective is to achieve greater overall safety. See Peck, fulfils requirement.
R.B. (1969), ‘Advantages and Limitations of the observational
method in Applied Soil Mechanics’, Geotechnique 19(2), Quality assurance (QA): All those planned and systematic
pp.171–187. [based on the definition provided in the activities implemented to provide adequate confidence that
Standard] the entity will fulfil requirements for quality.

Operation: Includes activities related to the transport, Quality control (QC): The operational techniques and
placement and permanent storage of tailings and, where activities that are used to fulfil requirements for quality.
applicable, process water, effluents and residues, and
the recycling of process water, inclusive of any periods of Responsibility: The duty or obligation of an individual
inactivity prior to commencement of implementation of the or organisation to perform an assigned duty or task in
closure plan. The term ‘operation’ applies throughout all accordance with defined expectations, and which has a
phases of the lifecycle of a tailings facility and is not limited consequence if expectations are not met. An individual or
to the Operations phase of the lifecycle when tailings are organisation with responsibility is accountable to the person
being actively placed in the facility. As a result, operation also that delegated that responsibility to them.
includes reclamation and related activities.
Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer (RTFE): An engineer
appointed by the Operator to be responsible for the tailings

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 125

 GLOSSARY

facility. The RTFE must be available at all times during the Tailings facility: A facility that is designed and managed to
Construction, Operations and Closure phases of the lifecycle. contain the tailings produced by a mine. A tailings facility
The RTFE has clearly defined, delegated responsibility for includes the collective engineered structures, components
management of the tailings facility and has appropriate and equipment involved in the management of tailings
qualifications and experience compatible with the level of solids, other mine waste managed with tailings (eg waste
complexity of the tailings facility. The RTFE is responsible for rock, water treatment residues), and any water managed
the scope of work and budget requirements for the tailings in tailings facilities, including pore fluid, any pond(s), and
facility, including risk management. The RTFE may delegate surface water and run-off.
specific tasks and responsibilities for aspects of tailings
management to qualified personnel but not accountability. Tailings management system (TMS): The site-specific
[based on the definition provided in the Standard] TMS comprises the key components for management
and design of the tailings facility and is often referred to
Risk: A potential negative impact, detrimental to as the ‘framework’ that manages these components. The
operations, a facility, the environment, public health, or TMS sits at the core of the Standard and is focused on
safety, that may arise from some present process or future the safe operation and management of the tailings facility
event. When evaluating risk, both the potential severity and throughout its lifecycle (see above). The TMS follows the
consequence of the impact and its probability of occurrence well-established Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle. Each Operator
are considered. develops a TMS that best suits their organisation and tailings
facilities. A TMS includes elements such as: establishing
Risk controls: Measures put in place to either: policies, planning, designing and establishing performance
• Prevent or reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of objectives, managing change, identifying and securing
an unwanted event; or adequate resources (experienced and/or qualified personnel,
equipment, scheduling, data, documentation and financial
• Minimise or mitigate the negative consequences if the
resources), conducting performance evaluations and risk
unwanted event does occur.
assessments, establishing and implementing controls for
Risks need to be managed via controls, and risk controls risk management, auditing and reviewing for continual
should have designated owners and defined accountabilities. improvement, implementing a management system with
Some risk controls are designated as critical controls. clear accountabilities and responsibilities, preparing and
implementing operation, maintenance and surveillance
Stakeholders: Persons or groups who are directly or (OMS) activities and the emergency preparedness and
indirectly affected by a project, as well as those who may response plan (EPRP). The TMS, and its various elements,
have interests in a project and/or the ability to influence must interact with other systems, such as the environmental
its outcome, positively or negatively. Stakeholders may and social management system (ESMS), the operation-
include workers, trade unions, project-affected people or wide management system, and the regulatory system.
communities and their formal and informal representatives, This systems interaction is fundamental to the effective
national or local government authorities, politicians, implementation of the Standard. [based on the definition
religious leaders, civil society organisations and groups provided in the Standard]
with special interests, the academic community, or other
businesses. Different stakeholders will often have divergent Technical: In this Guide, the term ‘technical’ refers to
views, both within and across stakeholder groupings. [based the physical science and engineering aspects of tailings
on the definition provided in the Standard] management.

Surveillance: Includes the inspection and monitoring (ie Trigger Action Response Plan (TARP): A TARP is a tool to
collection of qualitative and quantitative observations and manage risk controls, including critical controls. TARPs
data) of activities and infrastructure related to tailings provide pre-defined trigger levels for performance criteria
management. Surveillance also includes the timely that are based on the risk controls and critical controls of the
documentation, analysis and communication of surveillance tailings facility. The trigger levels are developed based on the
results, to inform decision-making and verify whether performance objectives and risk management plan for the
performance objectives and risk management objectives, tailings facility. TARPs describe actions to be taken if trigger
including critical controls, are being met. levels are exceeded (performance is outside the normal
range), to prevent a loss of control. A range of actions is
Tailings: A by-product of mining, consisting of the processed pre-defined, based on the magnitude of the exceedance
rock or soil left over from the separation of the commodities of the trigger level. [based on the definition provided in
of value from the rock or soil within which they occur. the Standard]

126 International Council on Mining and Metals

LIST OF ACRONYMS Back to contents

ALAR: As low as reasonably practicable

BoD: Board of Directors
CRR: Construction Records Report
CDIV: Construction versus Design Intent Verification
CEO: Chief Executive Officer
DAR: Deviance Accountability Report
DBR: Design Basis Report
DSR: Dam Safety Review
EOR: Engineer of Record
EPRP: Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan
ESMS: Environmental and Social Management System
FoS: Factor of Safety
ICMM: International Council on Mining and Metals
ITRB: Independent Tailings Review Board
ISO: International Organization for Standardization
MAA: Multiple Accounts Analysis
MAC: Mining Association of Canada
MCE: Maximum Credible Earthquake
MDE: Maximum Design Earthquake
MDF: Maximum Design Flood
OMS: Operation, maintenance and surveillance
PMF: Probably Maximum Flood
PSHA: Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis
QA: Quality assurance
QC: Quality control
RTFE: Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer
SOP : Standard operating procedure
TARP: Trigger Action Response Plan
TMS: Tailings Management System

Tailings Management: Good practice guide 127

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