REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 Judge LYN C.

EBORA-CACHA

Case List on
REMEDIALLAWREVIEW1
Judge LYN C. EBORA-CACHA
4JD-A, JDREM1

BATCH 1: Posted on NEU VLE

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. Spouses Gonzales v. Marmaine Realty Corp., G.R. No. 214241, January 13,
2016
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Jurisprudence instructs that
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a
precondition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded
him.—The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone
of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence.
The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and
provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and
convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed. In view of this doctrine,
jurisprudence instructs that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention
of the courts, it is a precondition that he avail himself of all administrative
processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such
remedy must be exhausted first before the court’s power of judicial review
can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to one’s cause of
action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may
be dismissed for lack of cause of action. However, it must be clarified that the
aforementioned doctrine is not absolute as it is subject to certain exceptions,
one of which is when the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice.

Lis Pendens; A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world

that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who
acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he
gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.—“Lis pendens,”
which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control
which a court acquires over a property involved in a suit, pending the
continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public
policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in
litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated; and to
prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its
notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in
litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said
property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the
litigation over said property. The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-
fold effect: (a) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of
the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final
judgment by successive alienations; and (b) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or
not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the
court will promulgate subsequently.

2. Tan v. Cinco, G.R. No. 213054, June 15, 2016

Doctrine of Non-interference; The doctrine of judicial stability or nonin-

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erference in the regular orders or judgments of a coequal court is an

elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by
injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent
jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.—In
Barroso v. Omelio, 772 SCRA 437 (2015), the Court explained the doctrine of
judicial stability as follows: The doctrine of judicial stability or noninterference
in the regular orders or judgments of a coequal court is an elementary principle
in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the
power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is
founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over
the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to
the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its
incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial
officers acting in connection with this judgment. Thus, we have repeatedly held
that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered as still
pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in
the suit. A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for
the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to
control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction
of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution
proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration
of justice. x x x x To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an
issuing court may violate the law in issuing a writ of execution and have
recognized that there should be a remedy against this violation. The remedy,
however, is not the resort to another coequal body but to a higher court with
authority to nullify the action of the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial
power that the 1987 Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2,
speaks of and which this Court has operationalized through a petition for
certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Void Judgments; A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null

and void and may be attacked anytime.—A judgment rendered by a court
without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked anytime. It creates no
rights and produces no effect. It remains a basic fact in law that the choice of
the proper forum is crucial, as the decision of a court or tribunal without
jurisdiction is a total nullity. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no
judgment at all. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from
it have no legal effect.

3. Specified Contractors and Dev. Inc. v. Pobocan, G.R. No. 212014-15, 427-
28, 694-95 and 794-95, December 6, 2016

II. JURISDICTION
1. Cang v. CA, G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998
Jurisdiction; The established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.—
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the
jurisdiction of the court. As such, when private respondents filed the petition for
adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.

Appeals; Although the Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review
and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not
conform to the evidence on record.—As a rule, factual findings of the lower
courts are final and binding upon this Court. This Court is not expected nor
required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted
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by the parties. However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the
authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds
that these do not conform to the evidence on record.

Exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the trial court are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.—In Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, this Court has held that the exceptions to the rule that factual findings
of the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal
are the following: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the
finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion and (10) when the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.

2. Gios-Samar (see preliminaries)

3. Lansangan v. Caisip, G.R. No. 212987, August 6, 2018

Dismissal of Actions; As a general rule, the grounds for dismissal of
complaints must be invoked by the party-litigant at the earliest opportunity, as
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, such grounds are deemed
waived. As an exception, however, the courts may order the motu
proprio dismissal of a case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription of action, pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.—Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court provides for the grounds that may be raised in a motion to dismiss a
complaint, to wit: Section 1. Grounds.—Within the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may
be made on any of the following grounds: (a) That the court has no jurisdiction
over the person of the defending party; (b) That the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim; (c) That venue is improperly laid; (d) That
the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; (e) That there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause; (f) That the cause of
action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (g) That the
pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; (h) That the claim or
demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned,
or otherwise extinguished; (i) That the claim on which the action is founded is
unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and (j) That a
condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. x x x As a
general rule, the above listed grounds must be invoked by the party-litigant at
the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise,
such grounds are deemed waived. As an exception, however, the courts may
order the motu proprio dismissal of a case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription of action,
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, which reads: Section
1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.—Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
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action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall
dismiss the claim.

4. Abagatnan v. Sps. Clarito, G.R. No. 211966, August 7, 2017

Pre-trial; The issues to be tried between parties in a case is
limited to those defined in the pretrial order as well as those
which may be implied from those written in the order or
inferred from those listed by necessary implication.—It is
important to stress that the issues to be tried between
parties in a case is limited to those defined in the pretrial
order as well as those which may be implied from those
written in the order or inferred from those listed by
necessary implication. In this case, a cursory reading of the
issues listed in the Pretrial Order easily shows that the
parties never agreed, whether expressly or impliedly, to
include the lack of prior barangay conciliation proceedings
in the list of issues to be resolved before the MTCC. In
effect, the non-inclusion of this issue in the Pre-trial Order
barred its consideration during the trial. This is but
consistent with the rule that parties are bound by the
delimitation of issues that they agreed upon during the
pretrial proceedings.

5. Chavez v. CA, G.R. No. 159411, March 18, 2005

Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Settlements; An
amicable settlement reached after barangay conciliation
proceedings has the force and effect of a final judgment of a
court if not repudiated or a petition to nullify the same is filed
before the proper city or municipal court within ten (10) days
from its date; Settlement may be enforced by execution by
the lupong tagapamayapa within six (6) months from its
date, or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court,
if beyond the six-month period.—The Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law provides that an amicable settlement
reached after barangay conciliation proceedings has the
force and effect of a final judgment of a court if not
repudiated or a petition to nullify the same is filed before the
proper city or municipal court within ten (10) days from its
date. It further provides that the settlement may be enforced
by execution by the lupong tagapamayapa within six (6)
months from its date, or by action in the appropriate city or
municipal court, if beyond the six-month period. This special
provision follows the general precept enunciated in Article
2037 of the Civil Code.

6. Anama v. Citibank, G.R. No. 192048, December 13, 2017

Execution of Judgments; Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the
prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five
(5) years from the date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the
decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five years, the said judgment is
reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in
a regular court within ten (10) years from the time the judgment becomes final.—An
action to revive a judgment is an action whose exclusive purpose is to enforce a
judgment which could no longer be enforced by mere motion. Section 6, Rule 39 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides: Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent
action.—A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within
five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The
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revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date
of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statue of limitations.
Section 6 is clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party
can have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five years from the
date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by
a motion after the lapse of five years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action
which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within 10
years from the time the judgment becomes final.

Revival of Judgments; As an action for revival of judgment is a new action with a

new cause of action, the rules on instituting and commencing actions apply, including
the rules on jurisdiction. Its jurisdictional requirements are not dependent on the
previous action and the petition does not necessarily have to be filed in the same
court which rendered judgment.—A revival suit is a new action, having for its cause of
action the judgment sought to be revived. It is different and distinct from the original
judgment sought to be revived or enforced. It is a new and independent action,
wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon
which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. Revival of judgment is
premised on the assumption that the decision to be revived, either by motion or by
independent action, is already final and executory. As an action for revival of
judgment is a new action with a new cause of action, the rules on instituting and
commencing actions apply, including the rules on jurisdiction. Its jurisdictional
requirements are not dependent on the previous action and the petition does not
necessarily have to be filed in the same court which rendered judgment.

The principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.—Jurisdiction
is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and decide cases.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments and the character of
the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. The principle is that jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in
the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiff’s cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body
has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the
complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted. Jurisdiction being a matter of
substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.

In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary

estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be
ascertained.—In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable
of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first
be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends
on the amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, such are actions whose subjects are
incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by the RTCs.

As an action to revive judgment raises issues of whether the petitioner has a right
to have the final and executory judgment revived and to have that judgment enforced
and does not involve recovery of a sum of money, the Supreme Court (SC) rules that
jurisdiction over a petition to revive judgment is properly with the Regional Trial
Courts (RTCs).—As an action to revive judgment raises issues of whether the
petitioner has a right to have the final and executory judgment revived and to have
that judgment enforced and does not involve recovery of a sum of money, we rule that
jurisdiction over a petition to revive judgment is properly with the RTCs. Thus, the CA
is correct in holding that it does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide Anama’s
action for revival of judgment.

Venue; “Venue” and “Jurisdiction,” Distinguished.—Venue and jurisdiction are entirely

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distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court
which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action; but
the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the
parties and an objection that the plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county may be
waived by the failure of the defendant to make a timely objection. In either case, the
court may render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the
consent or agreement of the parties, whether or not a prohibition exists against their
alteration. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. Anama
vs. Citibank, N.A. (formerly First National City Bank), 848 SCRA 459, G.R. No.
192048 December 13, 2017

7. Traybilla v. Sejar, G.R. No. 204970, February 1, 2016

In the absence of the required declaration of the fair market value as
stated in the current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the property, it cannot
be determined whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or first level court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners’ action, since the
jurisdiction of these courts is determined on the basis of the value of the
property.—Since Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 is a real action made so by the
Amended Complaint later filed, petitioners should have observed the
requirement under A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC relative to declaring the fair market
value of the property as stated in the current tax declaration or zonal valuation
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Since no such allegation was made
in the Amended Complaint, then the value of the subject property as stated in
the handwritten document sued upon and restated in the Amended Complaint
should be the basis for determining jurisdiction and the amount of docket fees
to be paid. The CA is correct in its general observation that in the absence of
the required declaration of the fair market value as stated in the current tax
declaration or zonal valuation of the property, it cannot be determined whether
the RTC or first level court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
petitioners’ action, since the jurisdiction of these courts is determined on the
basis of the value of the property.

8. Heirs of Reterta v. Spouses Lopez, G.R. No. 159941, August 17, 2011
“Final Judgment” and “Interlocutory Order,” Distinguished.—The
fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on one hand, and
an interlocutory order, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 334 (1987), viz.: The concept of ‘final’
judgment, as distinguished from one which has ‘become final’ (or ‘executory’
as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A ‘final’ judgment or
order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by
the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the
basis of the evidence presented at the trial declares categorically what the
rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a
judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res
judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far
as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the
litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to
await the parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and
ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes
‘final’ or, to use the established and more distinctive term, ‘final and executory.’
xxx Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does
not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is ‘interlocutory,’
e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or
granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing
amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or
production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a ‘final’ judgment
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or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an ‘interlocutory’ order

may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may
eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.

9. Suapo v. Sps. De Jesus, G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015

BATCH 2: Received via NEU Mail on 13 September 2021, Monday at 6:14 P.M.

I. Definition and Concepts

A. Overview
1. Antonino v. Register of Deeds of Makati City, G.R. No. 185663, June 20,
2012
Annulment of Judgments; The remedy of annulment of judgment is only
available under certain exceptional circumstances as this is adverse to the
concept of immutability of final judgments.—In Ramos v. Judge Combong,
Jr., 473 SCRA 499 (2005), this Court expounded that the remedy of
annulment of judgment is only available under certain exceptional
circumstances as this is adverse to the concept of immutability of final
judgments: Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character,
allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other
adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for
annulment of judgment, i.e., extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The
underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments
goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or
cause involved therein should be laid to rest. The basic rule of finality of
judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and
sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts
and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite
date fixed by law.

Lack of Jurisdiction; This Court emphasized that only void judgments, by

reason of “extrinsic fraud” or the court’s lack of jurisdiction, are susceptible
to being annulled.—In Barco v. Court of Appeals, 420 SCRA 162 (2004),
this Court emphasized that only void judgments, by reason of “extrinsic
fraud” or the court’s lack of jurisdiction, are susceptible to being annulled.
The law sanctions the annulment of certain judgments which, though final,
are ultimately void. Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not
because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment
that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be
discharged from the burden of being bound to a judgment that is an
absolute nullity to begin with.

A petition for annulment of judgment can only be based on “extrinsic

fraud” and “lack of jurisdiction” and cannot prosper on the basis of
“grave abuse of discretion.”—A petition for annulment of judgment can only
be based on “extrinsic fraud” and “lack of jurisdiction” and cannot prosper
on the basis of “grave abuse of discretion.” By anchoring her petition on the
alleged grave abuse of discretion that attended the dismissal of her
complaint and the denial of her two (2) motions for reconsideration,
Antonino, is, in effect, enlarging the concept of “lack of jurisdiction.” As this
Court previously clarified in Republic of the Philippines v. “G” Holdings, Inc.,

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475 SCRA 608 (2005), “lack of jurisdiction” as a ground for the annulment of
judgments pertains to lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending
party or over the subject matter of the claim. It does not contemplate “grave
abuse of discretion” considering that “jurisdiction” is different from the
exercise thereof.

“Personal Action” and “Real Action,” Distinguished.—Personal action is

one that is founded on privity of contracts between the parties; and in which
the plaintiff usually seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement
of a contract, or recovery of damages. Real action, on the other hand, is one
anchored on the privity of real estate, where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of
ownership or possession of real property or interest in it Antonino vs. Register
of Deeds of Makati City, 674 SCRA 227, G.R. No. 185663 June 20, 2012

2. Dipad v. Olivan, G.R. No. 168771, July 25, 2012

“Errors of Jurisdiction,” and “Errors of Judgment,” Distinguished.―As
defined in jurisprudence, errors of jurisdiction occur when the court exercises
jurisdiction not conferred upon it by law. They may also occur when the court
or tribunal, although it has jurisdiction, acts in excess of it or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. On the contrary, errors of
judgment are those that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
They include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings based on a
mistake of law or of fact.

3. Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Bañas, G.R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013
“Petition for Review on Certiorari” and “Petition for Certiorari,”
Distinguished.―A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal
from a ruling of a lower tribunal on pure questions of law. It is only in
exceptional circumstances that we admit and review questions of fact. A
question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the
question must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue
must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the
question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of
law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising
the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue
raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a
question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. On the other hand, a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 is a special civil action, an original petition confined
solely to questions of jurisdiction because a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

4. Heirs of Santiago Nisperos v. Nisperos-Ducusin, G.R. No. 189570, July 31,

2013

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is

conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver
of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the
nature or subject matter of the action.—It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of
a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the
nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the
material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for,
irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all
such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is
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conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver
of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the
nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or
waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not
apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of
action. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB
does not prevent the court from addressing the issue, especially where the
DARAB’s lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or
petition.

5. Republic of the Philippines v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 6865

SCRA 216 (2013)

B. Allocation of Jurisdiction
1. DBM Procurement Service v. Kolonwell Trading, 524 SCRA 591 (2007)
Jurisdictions; It is Congress by law, not the courts by discretion, which
defines the court’s jurisdiction not otherwise conferred by the Constitution,
and it is through the same medium, Congress also draws the parameters in
the exercise of the functions of administrative agencies.—It is Congress by
law, not the courts by discretion, which defines the court’s jurisdiction not
otherwise conferred by the Constitution. Through the same medium,
Congress also draws the parameters in the exercise of the functions of
administrative agencies. Section 55 of R.A. No. 9184 could not be any
clearer when it mandates the manner of protesting the decision of bids and
awards committees. Similarly, there can be no quibbling that, under Section
58 of the same law, courts do not have jurisdiction over decisions of the
BACs unless the appropriate protest has been made and completed. The
absence of the IRR does not detract from the reality that R.A. No. 9184
requires a protest to be filed under the form therein prescribed. Given the
above perspective, the Manila RTC had no jurisdiction over respondent
Kolonwel’s petition for certiorari and prohibition. Accordingly, it ought to have
granted herein petitioners’ motion to dismiss, but it did not. Worse, the court
even added another layer to its grievous error when it granted the
respondent’s basic petition for certiorari and prohibition itself.

2. Imperial v. Hon. Armes, G.R. Nos. 178842 & 195509, January 30, 2017
Jurisdiction; The law vests quasi-judicial powers to administrative bodies
over matters that require their particular competence and specialized
expertise. This grant of jurisdiction is not and should not be justification to
deprive courts of law of their jurisdiction as determined by law and the
Constitution.—Indeed, our jurisprudence has leaned in favor of recognizing the
jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies. However, this jurisdiction must always be
viewed within the context of its grant. The law vests quasi-judicial powers to
administrative bodies over matters that require their particular competence and
specialized expertise. This grant of jurisdiction is not and should not be
justification to deprive courts of law of their jurisdiction as determined by law
and the Constitution. Courts of law are the instruments for the adjudication of
legal disputes. In a system of government where courts of law exist alongside
quasi-judicial bodies, the need to harmonize apparent conflicts in jurisdiction
require a determination of whether the matter to be resolved pertains to a
general question of law which belongs to ordinary courts or whether it refers to
a highly specialized question that can be better resolved by a quasi-judicial
body in accordance with its power vested by law.

3. Taglay v. Daray, G.R. No. 164258, August 22, 2012

Jurisdiction; Well-entrenched is the doctrine that the jurisdiction of a
tribunal over the subject matter of an action is conferred by law.—It is
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significant to point out, at this juncture, the well-entrenched doctrine that the
jurisdiction of a tribunal over the subject matter of an action is conferred by
law. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force
at the time of the commencement of the action. The pertinent law in the
instant case is R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the Family Courts Act of 1997,
which took effect on November 23, 1997. Section 5 (a) of R.A. 8369 clearly
provides that Family Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal
cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age
but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is
a minor at the time of the commission of the offense. In the present case,
there is no dispute that at the time of the commission of the alleged offense
on June 2, 2001, private respondent, who is also the private complainant,
was a minor. Hence the case falls under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of Family Courts.

C. Types/Classes of Jurisdiction
1. Pacific Asia Finance Ltd. (PAFIN) v. Yanigasawa, G.R. No. 175303, April 11,
2012
Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction; The various branches of the regional
trial courts of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal
authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction,
should not, cannot and are not permitted to interfere with their respective
cases, much less with their orders or judgments; Even in cases of concurrent
jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction
excludes the other courts.—Cojuangco v. Villegas, 184 SCRA 374
(1990),states: “The various branches of the [regional trial courts] of a
province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and
exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not,
cannot and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much
less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to
confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.” The matter is
further explained thus: It has been held that “even in cases of concurrent
jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction
excludes the other courts.” In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a
court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of
a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the
matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate
authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to
civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is
essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its
observance might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy,
it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to
prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of
the process.

2. Appellate jurisdiction vis-à-vis original jurisdiction

a) Maslag v. Monzon, 698 SCRA 584 (2013)
The present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original
and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), depending on the assessed value of the
subject property.―Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title
to real property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the
RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject
property. Pertinent provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as amended
by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, provides: Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (1) In all

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civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary

estimation; (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in
Metro Manila, where x x x the [assessed] value [of the property] exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos ([P]50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts; x x x x SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil
Cases.―Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise: x x x x (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) x x x.

There are two modes of appealing an Regional Trial Court (RTC) decision or
resolution on issues of fact and law. The first mode is an ordinary appeal under
Rule 41 in cases where the RTC exercised its original jurisdiction. It is
done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. The second mode is a petition
for review under Rule 42 in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate
jurisdiction over Municipal Trial Court (MTC) decisions.―There are two modes
of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues of fact and law. The first
mode is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in cases where the RTC exercised
its original jurisdiction. It is done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. The
second mode is a petition for review under Rule 42 in cases where the
RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction over MTC decisions. It is done by
filing a Petition for Review with the CA. Simply put, the distinction between
these two modes of appeal lies in the type of jurisdiction exercised by the RTC
in the Order or Decision being appealed.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Appeals; In determining the proper mode of

appeal from an Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision or Resolution, the
determinative factor is the type of jurisdiction actually exercised by the
RTC in rendering its Decision or Resolution. Was it rendered by the RTC
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, or in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction?―To reiterate, only statutes can confer jurisdiction.
Court issuances cannot seize or appropriate jurisdiction. It has been
repeatedly held that “any judgment, order or resolution issued without
[jurisdiction] is void and cannot be given any effect.” By parity of reasoning, an
order issued by a court declaring that it has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case when under the law it has none cannot
likewise be given effect. It amounts to usurpation of jurisdiction which cannot
be countenanced. Since BP 129 already apportioned the jurisdiction of the
MTC and the RTC in cases involving title to property, neither the courts nor the
petitioner could alter or disregard the same. Besides, in determining the proper
mode of appeal from an RTC Decision or Resolution, the determinative factor
is the type of jurisdiction actually exercised by the RTC in rendering its
Decision or Resolution. Was it rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, or in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction? In short, we
look at what type of jurisdiction was actually exercised by the RTC. We do not
look into what type of jurisdiction the RTC should have exercised. This is but
logical. Inquiring into what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case
is a question which already involves the merits of the appeal, but we obviously
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cannot go into that where the mode of appeal was improper to begin with.

b) Okol v. Slimmers World International, G.R. No. 160146, December 11,

2009
The determination of the rights of a director and corporate officer dismissed
from his employment as well as the corresponding liability of a corporation,
if any, is an intra-corporate dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the
regular courts.—It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter
is conferred by law. The determination of the rights of a director and
corporate officer dismissed from his employment as well as the
corresponding liability of a corporation, if any, is an intra-corporate dispute
subject to the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Thus, the appellate court
correctly ruled that it is not the NLRC but the regular courts which have
jurisdiction over the present case.

c) Pat-og, Sr. v. Civil Service Commission, 697 SCRA 567

Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same
parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate
tribunals.—Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the
same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate
tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction
to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed
that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is
likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies
have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.

Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that

first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of the others.—Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in
several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case, it
was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the
complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and
decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board of
Professional Teachers.

D. Court of Law and Court of Equity, distinguished.

1. In re: Petition for Separation of Property; Muller v. Muller, G.R. No. 149615,
August 29, 2006
Equity; It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be
done directly—he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands.—Invoking the principle that a court is not
only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has
been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be
done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. He
who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also
expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have
equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on
the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. Thus, in the instant
case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where
it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
constitutional prohibition.

2. Reyes v. Lim, et al., G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003

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Equity Jurisdiction; Purpose; The rationale of the exercise of equity

jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure
restitution.—The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to
prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to
do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its
judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of
its statutory or legal jurisdiction. Equity is the principle by which substantial
justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or customary forms of
ordinary law are inadequate. Reyes vs. Lim, 408 SCRA 560, G.R. No. 134241
August 11, 2003

E. Court of Justice and Quasi-Judicial Bodies, distinguished.

1. Spouses Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 188056, January 8, 2013
The fact that the Department of Justice is the primary prosecution arm of
the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency.—The
fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not
make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases
is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial
function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of
probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 360
SCRA 618 (2001), the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation
is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, stating: x x x [t]he prosecutor in a
preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to
enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that
pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of

law or a legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through
either adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its
awards and adjudications determine the rights of the parties coming before it;
its decisions have the same effect as the judgments of a court of law.—For
sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of law
or a legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards
and adjudications determine the rights of the parties coming before it; its
decisions have the same effect as the judgments of a court of law. In contrast,
that is not the effect whenever a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary
investigation to determine probable cause in order to file a criminal information
against a person properly charged with the offense, or whenever the Secretary
of Justice reviews the public prosecutor’s orders or resolutions.

F. Essence of Adjudicatory Powers

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1. Heirs of Spouses Crispulo Ferrer and Engracia Puhawan v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 190384, July 5, 2010
The essence of the Court’s adjudicatory function is to apply the law to
facts, as supported by the evidence and the records.—The essence of
the Court’s adjudicatory function is to apply the law to facts, as supported by
the evidence and the records. The petitioners have already exhausted all
possible legal arguments and, as we have discussed, none of which are
compelling enough to require reconsideration of our past ruling. To be sure,
repetitive filing of legally useless submissions cannot pressure this Court into
taking another look at an unmeritorious case; they can only increase the
petitioners’ legal expenses, as in this case, where we are ordering the
payment of double costs for he act of unnecessarily and stubbornly wasting
the Court’s time.

1. Vda. De Ballesteros v. Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc., G.R. No. 176260,

November 24, 2010
2.
Regular courts do not have jurisdiction over actions filed by claimants
against an insolvent bank, unless there is a clear showing that the
action taken by the BSP, through the Monetary Board, in the closure of
financial institutions was in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion.—It is clear, therefore, that the liquidation court has jurisdiction
over all claims, including that of Lucia against the insolvent bank. As declared
in Miranda v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, 501 SCRA 288
(2006), regular courts do not have jurisdiction over actions filed by claimants
against an insolvent bank, unless there is a clear showing that the action
taken by the BSP, through the Monetary Board, in the closure of financial
institutions was in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
The same is not obtaining in this present case.

G. Jurisdiction contradistinguished from Venue

1. Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appelate Court, G.R. No. L-74854, April 2, 1991
Jurisdiction; Venue; Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a
case on the merits, while venue deals on the locality, the place where the suit
may be had.—Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically
governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the laying of
venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person rather than the subject matter. Provisions relating to
venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant and not
between the court and the subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to
jurisdiction, touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than the
substance of the case. Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide
a case on the merits; while venue deals on the locality, the place where the
suit may be had.

Where a defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to

dismiss, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered,
he cannot appeal or belatedly challenge the wrong venue.—Dismissing
the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the
appropriate course of action at this stage of the proceeding, particularly as
venue, in inferior courts as well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC),
may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where defendant fails to challenge
timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be
rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to
challenge belatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
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2. Dolot v. Paje, G.R. No. 199199, August 27, 2013

Jurisdiction; None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction,
which is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a
case, is conferred by law.―None is more well-settled than the rule that
jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and
decide a case, is conferred by law. It may either be over the nature of the
action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the
issues framed in the pleadings. By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129
or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil
actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC.
Particularly, Section 21(1) thereof provides that the RTCs shall exercise
original jurisdiction — in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court does not have the power to
confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is
lodged solely in Congress.―A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008
was issued pursuant to Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, which gave the Court
authority to define the territory over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise
its authority. These administrative orders and circulars issued by the Court
merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The Court does
not have the power to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the
allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress. It also cannot be
delegated to another office or agency of the Government. Section 18 of B.P.
Blg. 129, in fact, explicitly states that the territory thus defined shall be
deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions.

3. Bonifacio v. RTC-Makati City, Br. 149, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010
Venue; Jurisdiction; Libel; Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that
the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of
the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. This principle
acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as
amended, specifically provides for the possible venue for the institution of the
criminal and civil aspects of such cases.—Venue is jurisdictional in criminal
actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not
only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of
jurisdiction. This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given
that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for
the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.

Venue of libel cases where the complaint is a private individual is

limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the
alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.—It becomes clear
that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is
limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the
alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended
Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the
second. Thus, it stated that the offending article “was first published and
accessed by the private complainant in Makati City.” In other words, it
considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing
and first publication.

H. Jurisdiction as Determined by the Presence of Essential Elements

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1. Macasaet v. Co, Jr., G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013

As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant who
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines because of the
impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court; but when the case is an action in rem or
quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because
they have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of
the non-resident defendant is not essential.—As a rule, Philippine courts
cannot try any case against a defendant who does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his
person unless he voluntarily appears in court; but when the case is an action
in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because
they have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-
resident defendant is not essential. In the latter instance, extraterritorial service
of summons can be made upon the defendant, and such extraterritorial service
of summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for
the purpose of complying with the requirements of fair play or due pro-cess, so
that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action against him
and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which
he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and
he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded. On the
other hand, when the defendant in an action in personam does not reside and
is not found in the Philippines, our courts cannot try the case against him
because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court.

2. Padlan v. Spouses Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013

Basic as hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a

case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.—In order to determine which
court has jurisdiction over the action, an examination of the complaint is
essential. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as
which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought
are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint,
jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and
the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

3. People v. Estrebella, 164 SCRA 114

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is conferred only by
law, and that jurisdiction over a given crime not vested by law upon a
particular court may not be conferred by the parties involved in the
offense.—It is of course well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter
of an action—in this case the crime of rape—is and may be conferred only by
law, and that jurisdiction over a given crime not vested by law upon a
particular court, may not be conferred thereon by the parties involved in the
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offense. (Manila Railroad v. Atty. General, 20 Phil. 523; Perkins v. Roxas, 72

Phil. 514, cited in Valdepenas vs. People, 16 SCRA 871). People vs.
Estrebella, 164 SCRA 114, No. 71464 August 4, 1988

Art. 344 of the Penal Code does not determine the jurisdiction of the court
over the offenses enumerated; The complaint required in Art. 344 is merely a
condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to
prosecute the guilty parties.—But the aforementioned provision of Art. 344
does not determine the jurisdiction of our courts over the offenses therein
enumerated. It could not affect said jurisdiction, because the same with
respect to the instant crime is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by
the Revised Penal Code, which deals primarily with the definition of crimes
and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits. The complaint
required in said Art. 344 is merely a condition precedent to the exercise by
the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. And such
condition has been imposed out of consideration for the offended woman and
her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through with the scandal of a public trial.

4. Spouses Pajares v. Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning, G.R. No. 212690,
Jurisdiction; The Supreme Court (SC) declared that “where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the
amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction
of the court.”—Paragraph 8, Section 19 of BP 129, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7691, provides that where the amount of the demand exceeds
P100,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses, and costs, exclusive jurisdiction is lodged with the RTC.
Otherwise, jurisdiction belongs to the Municipal Trial Court. The above
jurisdictional amount had been increased to P200,000.00 on March 20, 1999
and further raised to P300,000.00 on February 22, 2004 pursuant to Section 5
of RA 7691. Then in Administrative Circular No. 09-94 this Court declared that
“where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the
causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining
the jurisdiction of the court.” In other words, where the complaint primarily
seeks to recover damages, all claims for damages should be considered in
determining which court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
regardless of whether they arose from a single cause of action or several
causes of action.

I. Doctrines Affecting Jurisdiction and its Exercise

1. Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp., G.R.
No. 197592 & 202623, November 27, 2013
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds
that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized
training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the
courts even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.—The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of
the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if
the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim
is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought
to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such
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issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be
unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice. The objective of
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether
it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative
agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question
arising in the proceeding before the court.

2. Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012

Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.—It is
indisputable that petitioner was an officer in the active service of the AFP in
March 2003 and 2004, when the alleged violations were committed. The
charges were filed on October 27, 2004 and he was arraigned on November
16, 2004. Clearly, from the time the violations were committed until the time
petitioner was arraigned, the General Court Martial had jurisdiction over the
case. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Therefore,
petitioner’s retirement on November 18, 2004 did not divest the General Court
Martial of its jurisdiction

3. The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728,

January 21, 2015
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created
by the Supreme Court (SC) to ensure that every level of the judiciary
performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner.—The
doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this
court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles
in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the
facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are
likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity
of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially
organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach
within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-
important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically
presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their
territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the ‘actual case’ that makes ripe
a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of
course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where
resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions
could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of
Appeals.

4. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 5, 1968

The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon grounds of public

policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale
claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but
is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted.

5. Figueroa y Cervantes v. People, G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008

Estoppel by Laches; The general rule should be, as it has always been, that
the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel—estoppel by laches, to bar
a litigant from asserting the court’s absence or lack of jurisdiction, only
supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v.
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Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968).—The Court, thus, wavered on when to

apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the
general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in
Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that
the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar
a litigant from asserting the court’s absence or lack of jurisdiction, only
supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized
jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its
jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law
and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the
person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not
thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any harm.

J. Types of Action Determinative of Jurisdiction

1. Ganila, et al. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150755, June 28, 2005
In unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not
necessary—it is enough that plaintiff has a better right of possession; In
forcible entry, defendants, by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth, deprive the plaintiff or the prior physical possessor of
possession.—While petitioners assert that this case involves only deprivation
of possession, they confuse the remedy of an action for forcible entry with that
of unlawful detainer. In unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the
plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that plaintiff has a better right of
possession. Actual, prior physical possession of a property by a party is
indispensable only in forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the
defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his
possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his
right to possess. Thus, the fact that petitioners are in possession of the lot
does not automatically entitle them to remain in possession. And the issue of
prior lawful possession by the defendants does not arise at all in a suit for
unlawful detainer, simply because prior lawful possession by virtue of contract
or other reasons is given or admitted. Unlike in forcible entry where
defendants, by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, deprive the
plaintiff or the prior physical possessor of possession. Here there is no
evidence to show that petitioners entered the lot by any of these acts.

2. Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011

An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither
terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by
the court before the case is finally decided on the merits—as such, the general
rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a
special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.—Primarily, we emphasize that
the assailed Orders of the trial court were orders denying respondent’s motion
to dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order denying a motion to
dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes
of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is
finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a
motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari,
which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an
appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In a number of
cases, the court has granted the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the
denial of the motion to dismiss but only when it has been tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the present
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case, we discern no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
denying the motion to dismiss.

K. Class Suit
1. Legaspi Towers 300, et al. v. Muer, G.R. No. 170783, June 18, 2012
Derivative Suits; Since it is the corporation that is the real party-in-interest in
a derivative suit, then the reliefs prayed for must be for the benefit or interest
of the corporation.—Since it is the corporation that is the real party-in-interest
in a derivative suit, then the reliefs prayed for must be for the benefit or interest
of the corporation. When the reliefs prayed for do not pertain to the
corporation, then it is an improper derivative suit. The requisites for a
derivative suit are as follows: a) the party bringing suit should be a shareholder
as of the time of the act or transaction complained of, the number of his shares
not being material; b) he has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e.,
has made a demand on the board of directors for the appropriate relief but the
latter has failed or refused to heed his plea; and c) the cause of action actually
devolves on the corporation, the wrongdoing or harm having been, or being
caused to the corporation and not to the particular stockholder bringing the
suit. Legaspi Towers 300, Inc. vs. Muer, 673 SCRA 453, G.R. No. 170783
June 18, 2012

2. Juana Complex I Homeowners’ Association, Inc. v. Fil-Estate Land, Inc.,

G.R. No. 152272, March 5, 2012
“Class Suit,” Defined; Words and Phrases; Elements of a Class Suit.—
With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as a class
suit, the Court finds the opposition without merit. Section 12, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows: Sec. 12. Class suit.—When
the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest
to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties,
a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and
representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or
defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to
intervene to protect his individual interest. The necessary elements for the
maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one
of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are
so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the
parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of
the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned. In this case,
the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use
La Paz Road. As succinctly stated by the CA: “The subject matter of the
instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially
shown to be of common or general interest to many persons. The records
reveal that numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the lower
court, conveying their intention to join private respondents in the suit and
claiming that they are similarly situated with private respondents for they
were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating
the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by
private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to
join them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the
complaint. These individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in
Biñan, Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.”

3. Liana’s Supermarket v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111014, May 31, 1996

Class Suit,” Explained.—In Re: Request of the Heirs of the Passengers of the Doña
Paz to Set Aside the Order Dated January 4, 1988 of Judge B. D. Chingcuangco, the
Court had occasion to explain “class suit”—What is contemplated, as will be noted, is
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that (a) the subject matter in controversy is of common or general interest to many
persons, and (b) those persons are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring
them all before the court x x x x What makes the situation a proper case for a class
suit is the circumstance that there is only one right or cause of action pertaining or
belonging in common to many persons (italics supplied), not separately or severally to
distinct individuals x x x x The object of the suit is to obtain relief for or against
numerous persons as a group or as an integral entity, and not as separate, distinct
individuals whose rights or liabilities are separate from and independent of those
affecting the others x x x x The other factor that serves to distinguish the rule on class
suits x x x is x x x the numerousness of parties involved x x x x The rule is that for a
class suit to be allowed, it is needful inter alia that the parties be so numerous that it
would be impracticable to bring them all before the court.

“Representative Suit,” Explained.—In the present case, there are

multiple rights or causes of action pertaining separately to several,
distinct employees who are members of respondent Union. Therefore,
the applicable rule is that provided in Sec. 3, Rule 3, of the Rules of
Court on “representative parties,” which states—Sec. 3. Representative
parties.—A trustee of an express trust, a guardian, executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by statute (italics supplied), may sue
or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is
presented or defended; but the court may, at any stage of the
proceedings, order such beneficiary to be made a party x x x x x.

II. The Judiciary

A. Source of Authority
B. Organization of Courts
1. Supreme Court
a) Xxx
b) Xxx
c) Vacancy in the Office of the Chief Justice
(1) De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, March 17,
2010
The Court need not await the occurrence of the vacancy in the
position of the Chief Justice in order for the principal issue to
ripe for judicial determination by the Court.—We need not await
the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order for the
principal issue to ripe for judicial determination by the Court. It is
enough that one alleges conduct arguably affected with a
constitutional interest, but seemingly proscribed by the Constitution. A
reasonable certainty of the occurrence of the perceived threat to a
constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a
challenge, provided the Court has sufficient facts before it to enable it
to intelligently adjudicate the issues. Herein, the facts are not in doubt,
for only legal issues remain. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC), 615 SCRA 666, G.R. No. 191002<br/> March 17, 2010

d) Decisions promulgated by the Supreme Court forms part of the legal

system
(1) Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992
supreme Court decisions applying or interpreting the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines.8 No doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en
banc.9

“x x x The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way,

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a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this
Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The
settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the
legal maxim ‘legis interpretado legis vim obtinent’—the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.”

e) Decisions of the Supreme Court even if decided by one of its division

remains a decision of the Court as a whole
(1) US v. Lim Siongco, 41 Phil 94 (1920)

f) Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court

(1) Ocampo v. Cabangis, 15 Phil 626 (1910)
A constitutional court when exercising its proper judicial functions can
no more be unreasonably controlled by the legislature than can the
legislature when properly exercising legislative power be subjected to
the control of the courts. Each acts independently within its exclusive
field.

(2) Fuentes v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. 22449, July 28, 1924
The doctrine is well established in the various States of the Union that
the legislatures have no power to establish rules which operate to
deprive the courts of their constitutional authority to exercise the judicial
functions. A constitutional court when exercising its proper judicial
functions can no more be unreasonably controlled by the legislature
than can the legislature when properly exercising legislative power be
subjected to the control of the courts. Each acts independently within its
exclusive field."

g) Xxx
h) Xxx
i) Decision of the Supreme Court not reviewable by any other body
(1) In re: Joaquin Borromeo, A.M. No. 93-7-696-0, February 21, 1995

j) Xxx
k) Jurisdiction/administrative authority over courts and personnel

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(1) Re: Anonymous Letter Complaint Against Associate Justice

Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA,
March 13, 2018

l) Rule-making power
(1) Tan v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., G.R. No. 148420, December 15, 2005
Limitations on the rule-making of the Supreme Court.—Section 5
(5) of the 1987 Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts. The limitations to this rule-making power are the following: the
rules must (a) provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases; (b) be uniform for all courts of the same
grade and (c) not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. As
long as these limits are met, the argument used by petitioners that the
Supreme Court, through A.O. Nos. 113-95 and 104-96, transgressed on
Congress’ sole power to legislate, cannot be sustained. Tan vs. Bausch
& Lomb, Inc., 478 SCRA 115, G.R. No. 148420 December 15, 2005

m) Xxx
n) When exercise of authority borders on judicial legislation
(1) People v. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April 1, 2003
Judicial Legislation; The permanent dismissal of the case arising
from a provisional dismissal does not affect the right of the State
to prosecute within the periods provided in Art. 90 of the Revised
Penal Code, for the prescriptive periods provided by law cannot be
affected directly or indirectly by any agreement or consent of the
parties, much less be held hostage to procedural limitations—
courts cannot, by an act of judicial legislation—abridge, amend, alter, or
nullify statutes.—In a provisional dismissal, the prosecution, the
defense and the offended party, in effect, enter into a tacit agreement
for a temporary cessation of hostilities, i.e., to momentarily hold in
abeyance the prosecution of the accused. Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8
prescribes the requirements thereto: (a) consent of the accused, and (b)
notice to the offended party. It must be remembered however that
permanent dismissal of a case is but an offshoot of its previous
provisional dismissal and the subsequent failure to revive within the
time frames set forth in Sec. 8. But does the permanent dismissal of the
case arising from a provisional dismissal affect the right of the State to
prosecute within the periods provided in Art. 90 of The Revised Penal
Code? Certainly not, for the prescriptive periods prescribed by law
cannot be affected directly or indirectly by any agreement or consent of
the parties, much less be held hostage to any procedural limitations.
Verily, in matters of public crimes which have a direct bearing on public
interest, no agreements or personal arrangements should be brought to
bear upon the penal action. Courts cannot—by an act of judicial
legislation—abridge, amend, alter, or nullify statutes. We do not sit as
councils of revision, empowered to judicially reform or fashion
legislation in accordance with our own notions of prudent public policy.
Certainly, lest we are prepared to ride roughshod over this prerogative
of Congress, we cannot interfere with the power of the legislature to
surrender, as an act of grace, the right of the State to prosecute and to
declare the offense no longer subject to prosecution after certain
periods of time as expressed in the statute.

(2) Fetalino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191890, December 4, 2012

Same; Same; Same; Same; The discretionary power of the Court to
exercise the liberal application of retirement laws is not limitless; its
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exercise of liberality is on a case-to-case basis and only after a

consideration of the factual circumstances that justify the grant of an
exception.―We find no compelling legal or factual reasons for
thepplication of the Court’s liberality in the interpretation of retirement
laws to the present case. The discretionary power of the Court to
exercise the liberal application of retirement laws is not limitless; its
exercise of liberality is on a case-to-case basis and only after a
consideration of the factual circumstances that justify the grant of an
exception. The recent case of Re: Application for Retirement of Judge
Moslemen T. Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9946, 673 SCRA 602 (2012), fully explained how
a liberal approach in the application of retirement laws should be
construed, viz.: The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally
in favor of the retiring employee. However, when in the interest of
liberal construction the Court allows seeming exceptions to fixed rules
for certain retired Judges or Justices, there are ample reasons behind
each grant of an exception. The crediting of accumulated leaves to
make up for lack of required age or length of service is not done
indiscriminately. It is always on a case to case basis. In some
instances, the lacking element―such as the time to reach an age limit
or comply with length of service is de minimis. It could be that the
amount of accumulated leave credits is tremendous in comparison to
the lacking period of time. More important, there must be present an
essential factor before an application under the Plana or Britanico
rulings may be granted. The Court allows a making up or
compensating for lack of required age or service only if satisfied that
the career of the retiree was marked by competence, integrity, and
dedication to the public service; it was only a bowing to policy
considerations and an acceptance of the realities of political will which
brought him or her to premature retirement.

o) Original juirsdiction over certain cases

(1) Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865, March 26, 2001

(2) Liga ng mga Barangay v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. 154599,
January 21, 2004

Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for

certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court
of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned
ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the
nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this
Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.14 Section
5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides: Sec. 5. The
Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1)Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus.
(2)Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in: a)All cases in which
the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
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order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(Italics supplied).
As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have
original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only
questions of law are involved.

(3) US v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002

As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will
not prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a
motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed
to it; Exceptions.—As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a
higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given,
through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors
imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the
issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3)
in case of urgency. As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that
the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy
of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the
same as those that have already been squarely argued and
exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. Aside from being of this
nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure questions of law
that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be
dispensed with. Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of
its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are special
and important reasons therefor. Government of the United States of
America vs. Purganan, 389 SCRA 623, G.R. No. 148571 September
24, 2002

III. Court of Appeals

A. Composition, qualifications, appointment, tenure of office and removal from office
of members
1. Gonzales v. Tolentino, 611 SCRA 179
The Court of Appeals is a collegiate court whose members reach their
conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective
judgment after due deliberation—consequently, the filing of charges against
a single member of a division of the appellate court is inappropriate.—The
records show that indeed Atty. Verano signed the Petition for Review in CA-
G.R. SP No. 89358 as collaborating counsel. He was, therefore, entitled to
receive a copy of the appellate court’s resolutions including that which directed
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. In any event, the order to issue
the writ of preliminary injunction was the collective act of the members of the
Ninth Division of the Court. Bautista v. Abdulwahid, 488 SCRA 428 (2006)
enlightens: x x x The Court of Appeals is a collegiate court whose members
reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective
judgment after due deliberation. Thus, we have held that a charge of violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective
decision is “unjust” cannot prosper. Consequently, the filing of charges against
a single member of a division of the appellate court is inappropriate.

2. Niño v. Pizarro, 613 SCRA 302

The Court of Appeals is a collegiate court whose members reach their
conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment
after due deliberation—the filing of charges against a single member of a
division of the appellate court is inappropriate.—Based on the foregoing, it is
evident that the filing of the instant administrative complaint was meant to
harass respondent. Furthermore, it is notable that only respondent was singled
out in the complaint despite the fact that the challenged Resolutions were a
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collective decision of the Court of Appeals Seventeenth Division. In Bautista v.

Associate Justice Abdulwahid, 488 SCRA 428 (2006) this Court held that the
Court of Appeals is a collegiate court whose members reach their conclusions
in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due
deliberation. The filing of charges against a single member of a division of the
appellate court is inappropriate.

B. Jurisdiction exercised by the Court of Appeals in certain cases

1. National Water Resources Board v. A.L. Ang Network, Inc., 618 SCRA 22
Court of Appeals; Jurisdiction; Section 9(1) of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg.
129 granted the Court of Appeals original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, auxiliary
writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.—Section
9 (1) of BP 129 granted the Court of Appeals (then known as the
Intermediate Appellate Court) original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over quasi-judicial

agencies under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, petitions for writs of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against the acts and omissions of quasi-
judicial agencies should be filed with it, except when the law or the Rules
itself directs otherwise.—Since the appellate court has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over quasi-judicial agencies under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
petitions for writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against the acts and
omissions of quasi-judicial agencies, like petitioner, should be filed with it.
This is what Rule 65 of the Rules imposes for procedural uniformity. The only
exception to this instruction is when the law or the Rules itself directs
otherwise, as cited in Section 4, Rule 65.

It is settled that the list of quasi-judicial agencies specifically mentioned

in Rule 43 is not meant to be exclusive.—While Section 9 (3) of BP 129
and Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court does not list petitioner as
“among” the quasi-judicial agencies whose final judgments, orders,
resolutions or awards are appealable to the appellate court, it is non sequitur
to hold that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over
petitioner’s judgments, orders, resolutions or awards. It is settled that the list
of quasi-judicial agencies specifically mentioned in Rule 43 is not meant to
be exclusive. The employment of the word “among” clearly instructs so.

2. Wesleyan University-Philippines v. Reyes, 731 SCRA 516

Court of Appeals; Jurisdiction; It is settled that under Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7902,
the Court of Appeals (CA), pursuant to the exercise of its original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, is specifically given the
power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve
factual issues.—It is settled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, the CA, pursuant to the
exercise of its original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, is specifically
given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to
resolve factual issues. Sec. 9 clearly states: The Court of Appeals shall
have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and
perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in
cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the
power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. x x x Hence,
the appellate court acted within its sound discretion when it reevaluated
the NLRC’s factual findings and substituted the latter’s own judgment.

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3. Ingles v. Estrada, 695 SCRA 285

Section 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, vests the Court of Appeals with
exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for “annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts.”—Section 9(2) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, vests
the Court of Appeals with exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for
“annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts.” The remedy by which
such jurisdiction may be invoked is provided under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court. Conformably, Rule 47 sanctions the filing of a petition for the
Annulment of Judgments, Final Orders and Resolutions before the Court
of Appeals. Section 1 of Rule 47, however, defines the scope and nature
of this petition: RULE 47 ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR FINAL
ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS. SECTION 1. Coverage.—This Rule
shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. (Emphasis supplied) The above-quoted section sets forth in
no unclear terms that only judgments, final orders and resolutions in
“civil actions” of “Regional Trial Courts” may be the subject of a petition
for annulment before the Court of Appeals. Against this premise, it
becomes apparent why the Ingleses’ petition for Annulment of Final
Orders must fail.

IV. Regional Trial Courts

A. Xxx
B. Xxx
1. xxx
2. Xxx
3. Jurisdiction
a) Civil cases - Sec. 19, B.P. Blg. 129, as amended
(1) When an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation
(a) Russell v. Vestil, G.R. No. 119347, March 17, 1999
filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable
of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction
of said court.—The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court
is doubtless one incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore
within the jurisdiction of said court.

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of

which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought.—In Singsong vs. Isabela
Sawmill, we had the occasion to rule that: [I]n determining whether
an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If
it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover
a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or
a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
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considered such actions as cases where the subject of the

litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional
Trial Courts).

(b) Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation v.

Formaran, G.R. No. 175914, February 10, 2009

Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the

payment of the prescribed docket fee; Payment of docket fees
is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.—In Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562
(1987), the Court explicitly pronounced that “[t]he court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee.” Hence, the payment of docket fees is not only
mandatory, but also jurisdictional.

(2) Meaning of assessed value

(a) Hilario v. Heirs of Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005
ame; Jurisdictions; Judicial Notice; The jurisdiction of the court over
an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined
by the assessed value of the said property and not the market value
thereof, assessed value being the fair market value of the real
property multiplied by the assessment level; The court cannot take
judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands.—The
jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession
of land is now determined by the assessed value of the said
property and not the market value thereof. The assessed value of
real property is the fair market value of the real property multiplied
by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value. The fair
market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller,
who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not
compelled to buy. Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show
that it does not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of
the property subject of the complaint. The court cannot take judicial
notice of the assessed or market value of lands. Absent any
allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it
cannot thus be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners’ action.

(3) Contract of marriage and marital relations

(a) Tamano v. Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998
Marriage; Husband and Wife; Actions; Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage; Jurisdiction; Venue; Personal actions, such as one for
declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where
the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the
election of the plaintiff; What determines the nature of an action and
correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations made by the plaintiff.—Under The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction
over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations. Personal actions, such as the instant complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where
the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the
election of the plaintiff. There should be no question by now that
what determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the
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court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the
plaintiff in this case. In the complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was alleged that
Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita
and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or P.D. No. 1083.
Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she
and Tamano were married under Muslim laws. That she was in fact
married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first mentioned only in
her Motion for Reconsideration.

(4) Acting as probate court

(a) Aranas v. Mercado, 713 SCRA 194 [2014]
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership
of properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination
shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of
the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or
the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of
each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

(5) When the amount of damages should be considered in determining

jurisdiction of the court\
(a) Sante v. Claravall, G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010
Actions; Jurisdiction; Jurisdictional Amount; In cases where the
claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes
of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court.—But where damages is the
main cause of action, should the amount of moral damages prayed
for in the complaint be the sole basis for determining which court
has jurisdiction or should the total amount of all the damages
claimed regardless of kind and nature, such as exemplary damages,
nominal damages, and attorney’s fees, etc., be used? In this regard,
Administrative Circular No. 09-94 is instructive: x x x x 2. The
exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is
the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount
of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of
the court.

(b) Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 139031, October

18, 2004
Courts; Jurisdictions; Damages; Administrative Circular No. 09-94
specified the guidelines in the implementation of Republic Act No.
7691.—In Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14, 1994,
we specified the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. 7691.
Paragraph 2 of the Circular provides: “2. The exclusion of the term
‘damages of whatever kind’ in determining the jurisdictional amount
under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages
are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of
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action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such
claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court.” (italics ours) Here, the main cause of action is for the
recovery of sum of money amounting to only P195,155.00. The
damages being claimed by petitioner are merely the consequences
of this main cause of action. Hence, they are not included in
determining the jurisdictional amount.

(6) Do trial courts have jurisdiction over ecclessistical matters?

(a) Taruc v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005
Remedial Law; Actions; Jurisdictions; Religious Organizations; It is
not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the
performance of their discretionary and official functions.—We agree
with the Court of Appeals that the expulsion/excommunication of
members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to
the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control
over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and
official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.

(b) Gonzalez v. Archbishop of Manila, 51 Phil 420 (1928)

CCLESIASTICAL LAW; CHAPLAINCIES; VALIDITY OF
ORDINANCE PRESCRIBING ECCLESIASTICAL
QUALIFICATIONS FOR CHAPLAIN.—The properly constituted
authorities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church have the power
to adopt an ordinance prescribing ecclesiastical qualifications for
chaplains to be appointed to collative chaplaincies; and such
ordinance will be effective as regards an appointment to a benefice
although at the time when the particular chaplaincy was founded no
ecclesiastical qualifications were prerequisite to the appointment.

b) Criminal cases - Sec. 19, B.P. Blg. 129, as amended

(1) Rapsing v. Ables, G.R. No. 171855, October 15, 2012

; Republic Act No. 7055; Republic Act No. 7055 is very clear that the
jurisdiction to try members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) who commit crimes or offenses covered by the Revised Penal
Code, and which are not service-connected, lies with the civil
courts.―In view of the provisions of R.A. 7055, the military tribunals
cannot exercise jurisdiction over respondents’ case since the offense
for which they were charged is not included in the enumeration of
“service-connected offenses or crimes” as provided for under Section
1 thereof. The said law is very clear that the jurisdiction to try
members of the AFP who commit crimes or offenses covered by the
RPC, and which are not service-connected, lies with the civil courts.
Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean
exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its
mandate is obeyed. There is no room for interpretation, but only
application. Hence, the RTC cannot divest itself of its jurisdiction over
the alleged crime of multiple murder.

c) Original jurisdiction in other cases – Section 21, BP Blg. 129 as amended

Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
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(1) Distelleria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. v. Advertising Board of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 164242, November 28, 2008
Remedial Law; Prohibition; Requisites to be Entitled to a Writ of Prohibition.—
Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to
such recourse, it must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed
against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has
acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

(2) PRC v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004

Actions; Mandamus; Words and Phrases; “Mandamus”,
Explained.—Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of
competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign,
directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some
corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty
therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party
to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law. Section 3 of Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure outlines two situations when a
writ of mandamus may issue, when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully (1) neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station; or (2) excludes another from the use and enjoyment of
a right or office to which the other is entitled

(3) Board of Medicine v. Ota, G.R. No. 166097, July 14, 2008

Same; Same; Same; Actions; Mandamus; Where there is no definite

showing that the requirements and conditions to be granted license to
practice medicine had been satisfactorily met, the writ of mandamus
may not be granted to secure said privilege without thwarting the
legislative will—to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the
applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications, and he must also appear that he has fully
complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law
and the licensing authority.—The Court finds that the factual
circumstances of De Guzman are different from those of the case at
bar; hence, the principle applied therein should be viewed differently in
this case. In De Guzman, there were doubts about the integrity and
validity of the test results of the examinees from a particular school
which garnered unusually high scores in the two most difficult subjects.
Said doubts called for serious inquiry concerning the applicants’
satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements. And as there was
no definite showing that the requirements and conditions to be granted
license to practice medicine had been satisfactorily met, the Court held
that the writ of mandamus may not be granted to secure said privilege
without thwarting the legislative will. Indeed, to be granted the privilege
to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. It must also appear that
he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed
by the law and the licensing authority.

d) Habeas Corpus
(1) Sombong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111876, January 31, 1996
Constitutional Law; Habeas Corpus; The essential object and purpose
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of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary

restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal.—In general, the purpose of the
writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular
person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ
of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely
nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. “The writ of habeas corpus
was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application
for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object
and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner
of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve
a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient.”

Same; Same; In order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus,
the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.—Fundamentally, in order
to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty
must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under the first part of
Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides
that “except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of
habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.”

e) Writ of Amparo
(1) Callo v. Morente, G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017
Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; Extralegal Killings; Enforced
Disappearances; The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to
expeditiously provide relief to violations of a person’s constitutional
right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to address the
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.—The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to
expeditiously provide relief to violations of a person’s constitutional
right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to address the
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides: Sec. 1. Petition.—
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall
cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The writ of amparo covers extralegal

killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.—The writ
of amparo covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof. Enforced disappearance is defined under Republic Act
(RA) No. 9851, Section 3(g) of which provides: (g) “Enforced or
involuntary disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention, or
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give
information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the
intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged
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period of time. Same; Same; Parties; While “any person” may file a
petition for the writ of habeas corpus, in a petition for the writ of
amparo, the order of priority on who can file the petition should be
strictly followed.—While “any person” may file a petition for the writ
of habeas corpus, in a petition for the writ of amparo, the order of
priority on who can file the petition should be strictly followed. In this
case,there was no allegation nor proof that Parker had no immediate
family members or any ascendant, descendant, or collateral relative
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. In fact, no
allegation was made on any of the familial relationship of Parker as
only her whereabouts from 2011 were alleged and discussed.
Therefore, based on the order of priority, Callo had no legal standing
to file this petition.

(2) Saez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012
Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas Data; Despite the lack of
certain contents, which the Rules on the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data
generally require, for as long as their absence under exceptional
circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition should not be susceptible
to outright dismissal.―Although the exact locations and the custodians of the
documents were not identified, this does not render the petition insufficient.
Section 6(d) of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is clear that the
requirement of specificity arises only when the exact locations and identities of
the custodians are known. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with the
intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. Thus,
despite the lack of certain contents, which the Rules on the Writs of Amparo
and Habeas Data generally require, for as long as their absence under
exceptional circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition should not be
susceptible to outright dismissal.

Same; Same; Same; Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and
Habeas Data is explicit that questions of fact and law can be raised before the
Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As a rule then, the
Court is not bound by the factual findings made by the appellate court which
rendered the judgment in a petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and
habeas data.―Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and
Habeas Data is explicit that questions of fact and law can be raised before the
Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As a rule then, the
Court is not bound by the factual findings made by the appellate court which
rendered the judgment in a petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and
habeas data. Be that as it may, in the instant case, the Court agrees with the
CA that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof imposed upon
him by the rules to establish his claims. It cannot be overemphasized that
Section 1 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data expressly
include in their coverage even threatened violations against a person’s right to
life, liberty or security. Further, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free
will―although not involving invasion of bodily integrity―nevertheless
constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of “freedom from
threat”.

f) Xxx

g) Xxx

h) Doctrine of Residual Jurisdiction

(1) Angeles v. Court of Appeals, 735 SCRA 82 (2014)
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Same; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; Residual Jurisdiction; The

‘residual jurisdiction’ of trial courts is available at a stage in which the
court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the
subject matter involved in the appeal.—“The ‘residual jurisdiction’ of trial
courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to
have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the
appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the
parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the
transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either
instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to
issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of
indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the
withdrawal of the appeal.”

(2) Villareal v. People of the Philippines, 743 SCRA 351 (2014)

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction; Any residual
jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease — including the authority to
order execution pending appeal — the moment the complete records of
the case are transmitted to the appellate court.—Jurisdiction over a
case is lodged with the court in which the criminal action has been
properly instituted. If a party appeals the trial court’s judgment or final
order, jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The execution of
the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is concerned.
The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire case the
moment the other party’s time to appeal has expired. Any residual
jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease — including the authority to
order execution pending appeal — the moment the complete records of
the case are transmitted to the appellate court. Consequently, it is the
appellate court that shall have the authority to wield the power to hear,
try, and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and
resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and authority shall remain
with the appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction
cannot be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the nature of the
incident would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
place.

(3) Katon v. Palanca, G.R. No. 151149, September 7, 2004

Courts; Jurisdiction; Residual Jurisdiction; The trial court still retains its
so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution
pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.—The “residual
jurisdiction” of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is
normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject
matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection
of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on
appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records
on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called
residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises,
permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal,
and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.

4. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts
a) Xxx
b) Xxx
c) Jurisdiction
(1) Civil cases - Sec. 33, B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.
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(a) Spouses Del Rosario v. Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc., G.R. No.
170575, June 8, 2011

(b) Spouses Barnachea v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150025, July

23, 2008

(2) Criminal cases - Sec. 32, B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.

(a) People v. Eduarte, G.R. No. 88232, February 26, 1990
Criminal Law; Penalties; Destierro; Jurisdiction over crimes
punishable with destierro is vested in the inferior courts.—It is quite
evident that among the important factors considered in the allocation
of jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior
courts are the gravity of both the offense and the imposable penalty.
It is not, therefore, unreasonable to state that the legislature granted
to the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over crimes whose penalties
are harsher than those vested in the inferior courts. And since it is
already a settled rule that destierro, by its nature, is a lighter penalty
than imprisonment [Uy Chin Hua v. Dingalasan, supra], it follows
that even under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
jurisdiction over crimes punishable with destierro is vested not in the
Regional Trial Courts but in the inferior courts. People vs. Tablizo,
182 SCRA 739, G.R. No. 88190, G.R. No. 88232 February 26, 1990

(b) Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126623, December 12, 1997
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; R.A. 7691; By virtue of the exception in
the opening sentence of Sec. 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A. No. 7691, the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts in criminal cases does not cover those cases which by
provision of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan regardless of the
prescribed penalty.—The exception in the opening sentence is of
special significance which we cannot disregard. By virtue thereof,
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal
cases does not cover those cases which by provision of law fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and
of the Sandiganbayan regardless of the prescribed penalty.
Otherwise put, even if such cases are punishable by imprisonment
not exceeding six years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or
arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial
Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be

(3) Xxx
(4) Xxx
(5) Xxx
(6) Xxx

5. Sandiganbayan
a) Creation
(1) People of the Philippines v. Go, 719 SCRA 704 (2014)
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Sandiganbayan;The Sandiganbayan is a
special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving violations of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 committed by
certain public officers, as enumerated in Presidential Decree (P.D.)
1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who
are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said
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public officers.—The SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive

original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019
committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as
amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are
charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said
public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary
Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile
should have been charged before and tried jointly by the
Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can
no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does
not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the
person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise
would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer
be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such
as the death of one of the alleged offenders.

b) Jurisdiction
(1) People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169004, September 15, 2010
Criminal Procedure; Sandiganbayan; Jurisdiction; What applies in the
present case is the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a
criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.—Like in the
earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where
other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees
in relation to their office are involved where the said provision, contains
no exception. Therefore, what applies in the present case is the general
rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined
at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the
commission of the offense. The present case having been instituted on
March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern.

6. Court of Tax Appeals

a) Xxx
b) Xxx
c) Power to promulgate its own rules
(1) • Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. United Salvage and Towage
(Phils.), Inc., 729 SCRA 113 (2014)
ourt of Tax Appeals; Jurisdiction; The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
shall have the power to promulgate rules and regulations for the
conduct of its business, and as may be needed, for the uniformity of
decisions within its jurisdiction.—Under Section 8 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a court of
record. As such, it shall have the power to promulgate rules and
regulations for the conduct of its business, and as may be needed, for
the uniformity of decisions within its jurisdiction. Moreover, as cases
filed before it are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall prove every
minute aspect of their cases. Thus, no evidentiary value can be given
the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules on
documentary evidence require that these documents must be formally
offered before the CTA. Pertinent is Section 34, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence which reads: SEC. 34. Offer of
evidence.— The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must
be specified.

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d) Xxx
e) Xxx
f) Instances where the Court of Tax Appeals exercises exclusive appellate
jurisdiction
(1) Santos v. People and BIR, G.R. No. 173176, August 26, 2008
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised CTA Rules recognizes the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA en
banc to review by appeal the following decisions, resolutions, or orders of the CTA Division:

SEC. 2. Cases within the jurisdiction of the Court en banc. – The Court en banc shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the following:

(a) Decisions or resolutions on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Divisions in the
exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over:

(1) Cases arising from administrative agencies – Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs,
Department of Finance, Department of Trade and Industry, Department of Agriculture;

(2) Local tax cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction; and

(3) Tax collection cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction
involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties, where the principal
amount of taxes and penalties claimed is less than one million pesos;

xxxx

(f) Decisions, resolutions or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the
exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses arising from violations of
the National Internal Revenue Code or the Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue or Bureau of Customs.

(g) Decisions, resolutions or order on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the
exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over criminal offenses mentioned in the preceding
subparagraph; x x x.

Although the filing of a petition for review with the CTA en banc from a decision, resolution, or order of the
CTA Division, was newly made available to the CTA, such mode of appeal has long been available in
Philippine courts of general jurisdiction. Hence, the Revised CTA Rules no longer elaborated on it but
merely referred to existing rules of procedure on petitions for review and appeals, to wit:

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(2) Smart Communications, Inc. v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas, 716

SCRA 677 (2014)
Taxation; Court of Tax Appeals; Jurisdiction; Section 7, paragraph (a),
sub-paragraph (3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9282 vests the Court of
Tax Appeals with the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over “decisions,
orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original
or appellate jurisdiction.”—Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Republic
Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282, created the
Court of Tax Appeals. Section 7, paragraph (a), sub-paragraph (3) of
the law vests the CTA with the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
“decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local
tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate jurisdiction.”

g) Authority of the Court of Tax Appeals to issue or grant writs of certiorari

(1) The City of Manila v. Brecia-Cuerdo, 715 SCRA 182 (2014)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While there is no express
grant of the power to issue writ of certiorari, with respect to the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA), Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law
and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.—Section 5 (1),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court,
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals,
Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate
court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue,
among others, a writ of certiorari, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of
certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under
Section 21 of BP 129. The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no
express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

(2) City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority, (2014)

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Court of Tax Appeals;
Jurisdiction; The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA), not the Court of Appeals (CA), has the exclusive
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory
orders issued by Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) in a local tax case.—
We have also ruled that the Court of Tax Appeals, not the Court of
Appeals, has the exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by Regional Trial Courts
in a local tax case. We explained in The City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-
Cuerdo, 715 SCRA 182 (2014), that while the Court of Tax Appeals
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has no express grant of power to issue writs of certiorari under

Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, the tax court’s judicial power as
defined in the Constitution includes the power to determine “whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the [Regional Trial Court] in issuing
an interlocutory order of jurisdiction in cases falling within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the tax court.”

7. Shari’a Courts
a) Villagracia v. Fifth (5th) Shari’a District Court, 723 SCRA [2014]
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Shari’a District Courts; Code of the Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines; The law conferring the jurisdiction of
Shari’a District Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines.—The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is
the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Under Article 143
of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent original
jurisdiction with “existing civil courts” over real actions not arising from
customary contracts wherein the parties involved are Muslims: ART. 143.
Original jurisdiction.—x x x x (2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the
Shari’a District Court shall have original jurisdiction over: x x x x (b) All
other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1(d) wherein
the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Municipal Circuit Court.

b) Montaer v. Shari’a District Court, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009

ctions; Pleadings and Practice; The determination of the nature of an action

or proceeding is controlled by the averments and character of the relief
sought in the complaint or petition — the designation given by parties to
their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it
according to the said designation.—Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree
No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, provides that the Shari’a District Courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction.—(1) The Shari’a District Court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over: x x x x (b) All cases involving
disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims,
probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of
administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value
of the property. The determination of the na- ture of an action or
proceeding is controlled by the averments and character of the relief
sought in the complaint or petition. The designation given by parties to their
own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to
the said designation. Rather than rely on “a falsa descriptio or defective
caption,” courts are “guided by the substantive averments of the
pleadings.”

c) Mendez v. Shari’a District Court, G.R. No. 201614, January 12, 2016
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Shari’a Appellate Court; Pending
the organization of the Shari’a Appellate Court, appeals or petitions from
final orders or decisions of the Shari’a District Court (ShDC) shall be filed
with the Court of Appeals (CA) and referred to a Special Division to be
organized in any of the CA stations preferably to be composed of Muslim
CA Justices.—It has been recognized that decades after the 1989
enactment of the law creating the Shari’a Appellate Court and after the
Court authorized its creation in 1999, it has yet to be organized. Pending
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the organization of the Shari’a Appellate Court, appeals or petitions from

final orders or decisions of the ShDC shall be filed with the Court of
Appeals (CA) and referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of
the CA stations preferably to be composed of Muslim CA Justices. For
cases where only errors or questions of law are raised or in- volved, the
appeal shall be to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pursuant to Article VIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution and Section 2 of Rule 41 of the Rules. As the present petition
involves only questions of law, it has been properly filed before this Court.

d) Mamiscal v. Abdullah, A.M. No. SCC-13-18-J, July 1, 2015

BATCH 3: Received via NEU Mail on 20 September 2021, Monday at 6:10 P.M.

I. Jurisdiction
1. Sante v. Claraval Feb 2020
2. Sebastian v. Ng Apr 2015
3. Barrido v. Nonato Oct 2014
4. Brgy San Jose v. Pastor June 2000
5. Gonzales v. GJH Land Nov 2015

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Actions; Jurisdiction; Jurisdictional Amount; In

cases where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of action,
the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court.—But
where damages is the main cause of action,
should the amount of moral damages prayed for
in the complaint be the sole basis for
determining which court has jurisdiction or
should the total amount of all the damages
claimed regardless of kind and nature, such as
exemplary damages, nominal damages, and
attorney’s fees, etc., be used? In this regard,
Administrative Circular No. 09-94 is instructive:
x x x x 2. The exclusion of the term “damages of
whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional
amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1)
of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of action. However, in cases where the
claim for damages is the main cause of action,
or one of the causes of action, the amount of
such claim shall be considered in determining
the jurisdiction of the court. Sante vs. Claravall,
613 SCRA 333, G.R. No. 173915 February 22,
2010
Statutory Construction; A basic principle of
interpretation is that words must be given their
literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation where the words of a statute are
clear, plain and free from ambiguity.—The law,
as written, unequivocally speaks of the
“appropriate city or municipal court” as the
forum for the execution of the settlement or
arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably,
in expressly conferring authority over these
courts, Section 417 made no distinction with
respect to the amount involved or the nature of
the issue involved. Thus, there can be no
question that the law’s intendment was to grant
jurisdiction over the enforcement of
settlement/arbitration awards to the city or
municipal courts the regardless of the amount.
A basic principle of interpretation is that words
must be given their literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation where the
words of a statute are clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. Sebastian vs. Ng, 757 SCRA 58,
G.R. No. 164594 April 22, 2015
ontrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or
those affecting title to real property, or for the
recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage
on real property.7 Section 33 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 1298 provides:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial

Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.—Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

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xxxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil

actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That value of such property shall be
deter- Barrido vs. Nonato, 738 SCRA 510, G.R.
No. 176492 October 20, 2014

II. Rule 2
1. Larena v. Villanueva -
2. Blossom v. Manila Gas -
3. Swagman v. CA April 2005
4. Ada v. Baylon July 2012
5. Marilag v. Martinez June 2015

III. Rule 3
1. Vanda v. Erineta April 2010
2. Navarro v. Escobido Nov 2009
3. Bacalso v. Paligos March 2008
4. Tallorin v. Taroma Nov 2009
5. Crisologo v. JEW Agro Indu March 2014
6. Macawadib v. Police Dir. July 2013
7. Republic v. Uy Aug 2013
8. Resident Marine Animals v. Reyes April 2015

IV. Rule 5
1. Miguel v. Montanez Jan 2012
2. SARAY v. People Oct 2014

V. Rule 7
1. Travero v. Buhungan Sept 2009
2. Dio v. Subic Bay Marine June 2014

VI. Rule 10
1. PPA v. Gothong Jan 2008
2. Swagman v. CA Supra

VII. Rule 14
1. Villarosa v. Benito Aug 1999
2. Cultura v. Math Agro Aug 2009
3. Citizens Surety v. Herrera -

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4. PNOC v. Santos Sep 2008

5. Parid City v. Villa Feb 2010
6. Palma v. Galvez March 2010
7. Chu v. Mach Asia April 2013
8. Reicon Realty v. Diamond Feb 2015
9. Manotoc v. CA (530 Phil 454) -

VIII. Rule 16
1. Figueroa v. People Jul 2008
2. Soliven v. Fast Forms Oct 2004
3. HSBC v. Aldecoa -
4. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy -
5. Santos v. Santos-Gran -

IX. Rule 17 and Rule 36

1. Shimizu v. Magsalin June 2012

X. Rule 18
1. Soliman v. Fernandez June 2014

XI. Rule 34
1. Asian Const. v. Sannaedle June 2014

XII. Rule 37
1. Neypes v. CA -
2. Dinglasan v. CA Sept 2006
3. San Lorenzo Builders v. Banya Arpil 2015

XIII. Rule 39
1. De Leon v. PEA and
PEA v. Judge Alaras Aug 2010
2. Noceda v. Directo July 2010
3. Infante v. Aran Builders Aug 2007
4. Flores v. Lindo April 2011
5. FGU v. RTC Feb 2011

XIV. Rule 47
1. Islamic Dawah v. CA -
2. Strategic Alliance v. Radstock Dec 2009
3. Fraginal v. Heirs 516 SCRA -

XV. Rules 57 to 61
1. Luzon Dev. Bank v. Krihman April 2015
2. Lim v. Lazaro July 2013

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JURISDICTION

• Sante vs Claraval - jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint
since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s
causes of action. Since it is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint therein that
respondent’s main action is for damages, the other forms of damages being claimed by
respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, are not merely
incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in
the complaint.

The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the

jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence
of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court (Administrative Circular No. 09-94).

• Sebastian vs Ng (jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or arbitration award)

- Art 417 of the LGC provides that:

Section 417. Execution. - The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by
the lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the
settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court.

Under this provision, an amicable settlement or arbitration award that is not repudiated within a period
often (10) days from the settlement may be enforced by: first, execution by the Lupon within six (6)
months from the date of the settlement (summary in nature); or second, by an action in the appropriate
city or municipal trial court if more than six (6) months from the date of settlement has already elapsed
(judicial in nature).

Note: The MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to enforce the kasunduan regardless of the amount
involved.

• Barrido vs Nonato
- MTC has Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
propertyor interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined
by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)

- Now amended by RA 11576 - does not exceed 400k, regardles if within or outside Metro

• Brgy San Roque vs Pastor

 - an expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Court reiterated that in
determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, it is important to ascertain the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover money, or
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and within the jurisdiction of CFI/RTC

• Gonzales vs GJH Land

an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a
matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction.

The erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a Special Commercial Court is only a matter of
procedure - that is, an incident related to the exercise of jurisdiction - and, thus, should not negate the
jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had already acquired.

RULE II: CAUSE OF ACTION

• Larena vs Villanueva
- The rule is well established that when a lease provides for the payment of the rent in
separate installments, each installment is an independent cause of action, though it has
been held and is good law, that in an action upon such a lease for the recovery of rent,
the installments due at the time the action brought must be included in the complaint
and that failure to do so will constitute a bar to a subsequent action for the payment of
that rent.

• Blossom vs Manila Gas (Doctrine of Anticipatory Breach)

- In this case, Blossom & Company, Inc. entered into a contract with Manila Gas
Corporation for the sale and delivery of water gas and coal gas tar at stipulated prices
for a period of four years. On the second year of the contract, Manila Gas willfully and
deliberately refused to deliver any coal and water gas tar to Blossom and Company, Inc.
because it was asking for a higher price than what had been previously stipulated by
them. The price of its tar products had gone up. The SC held that:

… even if the contract is divisible in its performance and the future periodic deliveries are not yet due, if
the obligor has already manifested his refusal to comply with his future periodic obligations, "the
contract is entire and the breach total," hence, there can only be one action for damages.

As a general rule a contract to do several things at several times in its nature, so as to authorize
successive actions; and a judgment recovered for a single breach of a continuing contract or covenant is
no bar to a suit for a subsequent breach thereof. But where the covenant or contract is entire, and the
breach total, there can be only one action, and plaintiff must therein recover all his damages.

• Swagman vs CA (a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed cannot be
cured by the accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the case)
- Jurisprudence states that unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at
the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by the
acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint
or an amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not permissible.
• Ada vs Baylon (requisites for joinder of causes of action – sec5 rule 2)
- while parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the alternative or otherwise, as
many causes of action as they may have against an opposing party, such joinder of
causes of action is subject to the condition, inter alia, that the joinder shall not include
special civil actions governed by special rules.
- Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by the
petitioners could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said donation
inter vivos in favor of Florante since an action for partition is a special civil action
governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary
civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure.
- misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed, the courts have the
power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to order the
severance of the misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with separately.33
However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder or the court did not motu
proprio direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of
all the erroneously joined causes of action
• Marilag vs Martinez (Res Judicata and Litis Pendentia)
- For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the following requisites must concur: (a)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would
amount to res judicata in the other.
- Splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action, but with different prayers, where the ground of dismissal is
litis pendentia or res judicata, as the case may be.
- “In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-
mortgagee has a single cause of action against the debtor mortgagor, i.e., to recover the
debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of money or the
institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies
are alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by itself.
- In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor mortgagee, instituted an
action for judicial foreclosure pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court
in order to recover on Rafael's debt. In light of the foregoing discussion, the availment of
such remedy thus bars recourse to the subsequent filing of a personal action for
collection of the same debt, in this case, under the principle of litis pendentia,
 considering that the foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not shown to have
attained finality. As petitioner had already instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings
over the mortgaged property, she is now barred from availing herself of an ordinary
action for collection, regardless of whether or not the decision in the foreclosure case
had attained finality.

RULE 3: PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

• Vanda vs Ermita (Requisites of Class Suit)

- An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the
pleading. The following requisites must occur:
1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons;
2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to
court; and
3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the
class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.

- Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by
the assailed Executive Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor
General, as counsel for respondents, who pointed out that there were about 549 employees in the
NPO.4c�fa The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO employees whom they
claimed to represent. Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an Affidavit of Desistance,
while one signed a letter denying ever signing the petition,5c�fa ostensibly reducing the number of
petitioners to 34.

• Navarro vs Escobido (Real Party – in – Interest / Indispensable Party)

- Go, as the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, is the party who will directly benefit
from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarro’s contention,
Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does
not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement
that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises.
- Gos are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered under
this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these properties.
Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the
recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-
owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a
complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the
suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
- SEC. 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
 - misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for
dismissal of action
- the proper remedy when a party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any
stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may
order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend
his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to whom the order
to include the indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
court's own motion. Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include
or to amend is the action dismissed.

• Bacalso vs Paligos
- The absence then of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of a court
null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent party but even as to
those present.
- All co-owners must be impleaded in an ejectment case

• Tallorin vs Taroma
- the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal. Section 11, Rule 3
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the ground of
non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any
stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative.
Only if plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party, despite the order of the
court, may it dismiss the action.

• Crisologo vs Jew Agro Indu

- In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the back of a certificate
of title, the persons considered as indispensable include those whose liens appear as
annotations
- he cancellation of the annotation of an encumbrance cannot be ordered without giving
notice to the parties annotated in the certificate of title itself. It would, thus, be an error
for a judge to contend that no notice is required to be given to all the persons whose
liens were annotated at the back of a certificate of title.
- Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologo’s liens were indeed annotated at the
back of TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676. Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they
stand to be benefited or injured by any order relative to the cancellation of annotations
in the pertinent TCTs. In other words, they are as indispensable as JEWM itself in the
final disposition of the case for cancellation, being one of the many lien holders.

• Macawadib vs Police Director

- PNP is an indispensable party. It is the integrity and correctness of the public records in
the custody of the PNP, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and Civil Service
Commission (CSC) which are involved and which would be affected by any decision
rendered in the petition for correction filed by herein petitioner. The aforementioned
 government agencies are, thus, required to be made parties to the proceeding. They are
indispensable parties, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. An
indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or
subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring
or affecting that interest.

• Republic vs Uy
- Respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth.
Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City, without the other
indispensable parties.
- The CA held that respondent’s failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured
upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the
Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutor’s Office.
- The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation
and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the
proceedings taken. A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows
that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given
to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not
named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
parties.38 Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the
courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process
to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
• Resident Marine Mammals vs Reyes
- The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, "claim" that they have the legal
standing to file this action since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
this suit.
- In opposition, public respondents argue that the Resident Marine Mammals have no
standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to
be either natural or juridical persons
- Issue: whether or not animals or even inanimate objects should be given legal standing
in actions before courts of law
- No. the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated
by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to
enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as
real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species.
The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may
be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals,
are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition. (Citizen Suit)
RULE 5: Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts

• Miguel vs Montanez
- enforcement by execution of the amicable settlement, either under the first or the
second remedy,(see ruling in the case of Sebastioan vs Ng) is only applicable if the
contracting parties have not repudiated such settlement within ten (10) days from the
date thereof in accordance with Section 416 of the Local Government Code. If the
amicable settlement is repudiated by one party, either expressly or impliedly, the other
party has two options, namely, to enforce the compromise in accordance with the Local
Government Code or Rules of Court as the case may be, or to consider it rescinded and
insist upon his original demand.
• Sabay vs People
- The Office of the Barangay Captain Cannot be Precluded From Issuing a Certification to
File an Action Where No Actual Settlement Was Reached; the Certification to File an
Action Issued by The Office of The Barangay is Valid.
- the conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional
requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the
lower courts had already acquired over the subject matter and private respondents as
defendants therein.
- Thus, the MTC has jurisdiction to try and hear the petitioner’s case; the claimed
irregularity in conciliation procedure, particularly in the issuance of the Certification to
File an Action, did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction. If at all, the irregularity
merely affected the parties’ cause of action

RULE 7: Parts and Contents of a Pleading

• Traveno vs BOBONGON BANANA GROWERS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE

- the appellate court dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari on the ground that the
accompanying verification and certification against forum shopping was defective, it
having been signed by only 19 of the 22 therein named petitioners.
- Petitioners posit that the appellate court erred in dismissing their petition on a mere
technicality as it should have, at most, dismissed the petition only with respect to the
non-signing petitioners.
- Ruling: The following rules must be remembered –
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective certification against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily

render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction
or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance
with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served
thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
 verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or
are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect

therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or
correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the
case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs
or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-
pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-
pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The foregoing restated pronouncements were lost in the challenged Resolutions of the
appellate court. Petitioners’ contention that the appellate court should have dismissed
the petition only as to the non-signing petitioners or merely dropped them as parties to
the case is thus in order.

• Dio vs Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium

- RTC dismissed the case motu proprio based on the defective certificate of non-forum
shopping which was signed by Desmond without specific authority from the Board of
Directors of SBME
- Petitioners went back to the RTC to file a motion to set their counterclaims for hearing
but RTC denied for it has already been affirmed with finality by the appellate court, it
has already lost its jurisdiction to act on petitioners’ counterclaim, the compulsory
counterclaim being merely ancillary to the principal controversy.
- Issue: WoN dismissal of their counterclaim on the basis of the reasoning of the lower
court that the counterclaim derives its jurisdictional support from the complaint which
has already been dismissed is proper
- Ruling: No. The ruled is that if the dismissal of the complaint somehow eliminates the
cause of the counterclaim, then the counterclaim cannot survive. Conversely, if the
counterclaim itself states sufficient cause of action then it should stand independently
of and survive the dismissal of the complaint.
In this case, It bears to emphasize that petitioner's counterclaim against respondent is
for damages and attorney's fees arising from the unfounded suit. While respondent's
Complaint against petitioner is already dismissed, petitioner may have very well already
incurred damages and litigation expenses such as attorney's fees since it was forced to
 engage legal representation in the Philippines to protect its rights and to assert lack of
jurisdiction of the courts over its person by virtue of the improper service of summons
upon it.

RULE 10: Amended and Supplemental Pleadings

• PPA vs Gothong
- Facts: Petitioner amended its complaint twice. In he 2nd amendment, the petitioner
made a reformation which constituted as a substantial amendment which if granted,
will substantially alter the petitioner’s cause of action and theory of the case.
Respondent opposed to the same. RTC denied the admission of the 2nd Amended
Complaint.
- the clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules,
"the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This
should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the
cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher
interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable
objective of the rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding.”
- The phrase “or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" found in the
old rule was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules.

• Swagman vs CA (a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed cannot be
cured by the accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the case)
- Jurisprudence states that unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at
the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by the
acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint
or an amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not permissible.

RULE 14: SUMMONS

• VIllarosa vs Benito (Sec12 Rule 14 – Service of Summons to a domestic corporation must be

through its general manager, not the branch manager)
- T]he service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its branch office at
Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its principal office at Davao
City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner.
• Sps. Galura vs Math Agro Corp (the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him /
Requisites of Valid Substituted Service)
- Requisites:
(1) service of summons within a reasonable time is impossible;
(2) the person serving the summons exerted efforts to locate the defendant;
 (3) the person to whom the summons is served is of sufficient age and discretion;
(4) the person to whom the summons is served resides at the defendant's place of
residence; and
(5) pertinent facts showing the enumerated circumstances are stated in the return of
service.

- The summons must be served to the defendant in person. It is only when the defendant
cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be made.
Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant
personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service.
This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service.

- In the present case, there was no showing in the return of service (1) of the impossibility of
personal service within a reasonable time; (2) that Lapuz, the person on whom summons was served,
was of suitable age and discretion; and (3) that Lapuz resided in the residence of the Spouses Galura.
Consequently, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Galura, and thus the
Spouses Galura are not bound by the RTC's 27 June 2001 Decision and 10 November 2004 Order.

• Citizen’s Surety vs Herrera (In a personam case, summons thru publication is insufficient for
the court to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant) – 1971 case
- In an action strictly in personam, personal service of summons, within the forum, is
essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does
not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. In other words, summons by
publication cannot – consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights –
confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants.
- The proper recourse for the creditor is to locate properties, real or personal, of the
resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them two be attached, in
which case, the attachment converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem
and the summons by publication may be valid.

• Santos vs PNOC (2008 case – The rule in Sec 14, Rule 14 RoC when the defendant’s
whereabouts is unknown applies in any action, wheter in personam, in rem or quasi in rem –
unlike the old rule)
- Facts: Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be located
in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on
respondent’s motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication
- Petitioner asserts lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of
summons. He claims that the rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not actions in personam like a
complaint for a sum of money.
- Ruling: Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent
efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to
effect service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by publication. (Sec 14,
Rule 14 RoC)
 - The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was
silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable. Because of this silence,
the Court limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only.

- This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies "[i]n any action
where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now
applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.

• Rapid City Realty and Development Corp vs Villa (if there is no valid service of summons, the
court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter’s
voluntary appearance)
- Some Facts: After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, Gregorio Zapanta
(Zapanta), court process server, resorted to substituted service by serving summons
upon respondents’ househelp who did not acknowledge receipt thereof and refused to
divulge their names
- Subsequently, respondents denied the existence of two women helpers who allegedly
refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of the summons. In any event, they contended
that assuming that the allegation were true, the helpers had no authority to receive the
documents.
- The trial court ruled in favor of respondents and set aside the Order of Default due to
improper service of summons.
- Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that respondents, in filing the first Motion to Lift
the Order of Default, voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court.
- Ruling: It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter’s voluntary
appearance.
- Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the
coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance
in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had
occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with
motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such
that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s
jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
- In this case, Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a
special appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their persons.
Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the court.
• Palma vs Galvez
- Petitioner claims that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in ruling that
Section 16, Rule 14, limits the service of summons upon the defendant-resident who is
 temporarily out of the country exclusively by means of extraterritorial service, i.e., by
personal service or by publication, pursuant to Section 15 of the same Rule.
- The RTC found that since private respondent was abroad at the time of the service of
summons, she was a resident who was temporarily out of the country; thus, service of
summons may be made only by publication.
- Ruling: SC disagreed with RTC because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words "may" and
"also," it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed under the
Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-resident who is
temporarily out of the Philippines.
- Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of the country, any of the following
modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in section 7 (
formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of
court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) in any other manner the
court may deem sufficient.

• Chu vs Mach Asia

- It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating
that the person who received the summons in the defendant’s behalf was one with
whom the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would
actually receive the summon. Clearly, it was not shown that the security guard who
received the summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and possessed a
relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the summons. This is not
the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard could not
be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service.
• Manotoc vs CA
- The court’s jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid service of summons. Without a
valid service, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant
voluntarily submits to it. The defendant must be properly apprised of a pending action against
him and assured of the opportunity to present his defenses to the suit. Proper service of
summons is used to protect one’s right to due process.
- the pertinent facts and circumstances on the efforts exerted to serve the summons personally
must be narrated in the Return. It cannot be determined how many times, on what specific
dates, and at what hours of the day the attempts were made. Given the fact that the substituted
service of summons may be assailed, as in the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is
imperative that the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the service of summons be
described with more particularity in the Return or Certificate of Service.

RULE 16: MOTION TO DISMISS

• Figueroa vs People (General Rule: The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings, even on appeal.) 2008
- RTC Bulacan convicted petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. On
appeal to the CA, he challenged for the first time the jurisdiction of the RTC. The CA held
that he actively participated in the trial and raised the jurisdictional issue belatedly, so
he was already estopped by laches. SC ruled otherwise.
 - Ruling: Jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law
and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.
- a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. Hence, the
Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts
or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will even
attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.
- Exception: In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first
time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned
ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as
well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to
obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It
was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally
woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.
o Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
o The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the
exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the
issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous
to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly present;
that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to
assert it.

• Soliven vs Fast Forms (while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigants participation in
all stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for
affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the courts jurisdiction) 2004
- A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction

• HSBC vs Aldecoa (A plea of the pendency of a prior action is not available unless the prior action
is of such a character that, had a judgment been rendered therein on the merits, such a
judgment would be conclusive between the parties and could be pleaded in bar of the second
action)
- In the instant case, the former suit is to annul the mortgages while the other one is for
the foreclosure. If the final judgment in the former action is that the mortgages be
annulled, such an adjudication will deny the right of the bank to foreclose the
mortgages. But a decree holding the mortgages valid will not prevent the bank from
foreclosing them. In such an event, the judgment would not be a bar to the prosecution
of the present action (foreclosure). The rule is not predicated upon such a contingency.
 It is applicable, between the same parties, only when the judgment to be rendered in
the action first instituted will be such that, regardless of which party is successful, it will
amount to res judicata against the second action.

• Santos vs Santos-Gran (Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to prove a
cause of action. The remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the
remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence)

RULE 17 AND 36: DISMISSAL OF ACTION / JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS AND ENTRY THEREOF

• Shimizu vs Magsalin (A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in
writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court – Rule 36 Sec1)
- The December 16, 2003 dismissal order clearly violates this rule for its failure to disclose
how and why the petitioner failed to prosecute its complaint. Thus, neither the
petitioner nor the reviewing court is able to know the particular facts that had
prompted the prejudicial dismissal.
- A trial court should always specify the reasons for a complaint's dismissal so that on
appeal, the reviewing court can readily determine the prima facie justification for the
dismissal. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based leaves the parties in the dark and is especially prejudicial to the losing
party who is unable to point the assigned error in seeking a review by a higher tribunal.

RULE 18: PRE-TRIAL

• Soliman vs Fernandez
- A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC provides that: "Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply,
the plaintiff must move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the
plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch Clerk of Court shall
issue a notice of pre-trial." Dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute is not the result
stated in the rule. The trial court is required to proceed to pre-trial through the notice of
pre-trial and setting the case for pre-trial by the Branch Clerk of Court.
- Under the amended rules, it is now the duty of the Clerk of Court within 5 days from the
filing of the last responsive pleadingto issue a notice of pre-trial