36. MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and

ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 115024    [February 7, 1996]

Facts: Plaintiff was driving a car when she noticed something wrong with her tires.
Some bystanders informed her that her rear right tire was flat. She then parked
along the sidewalk, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went
to the rear to open the trunk.

While she was standing at the left side of the rear of her car, she was suddenly
bumped by another car driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name
of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc and was brought to the UERM Medical
Memorial Center where she was found to have a “traumatic amputation, leg, left
up to distal thigh (above knee).” She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20)
days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg.

Issues: Whether or not the plaintiff is negligent.

Held: No. The Court held that Valenzuela was not negligent applying the
emergency rule.

Under the “emergency rule,” an individual who suddenly finds himself in a

situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.

Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and
could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances.
The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk was due to her flat
tires, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions. Obviously,
the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the
accident.
37. G.R. No. 98243 July 1, 1992 ALEJANDRO ARADA, doing business under the
name and style "SOUTH NEGROS ENTERPRISES", petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner entered into a contract with San Miguel Corporation (SMC) to
transport cargoes using plaintiff’s vessel.

A clearance was first secured from the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) but was
denied due to typhoon. The following day, the vessel started its voyage after
securing a clearance, and during the course of the voyage, a typhoon developed
and hit the vessel resulting it to sink including its cargoes.

SMC then filed an action for the recovery of the value of the cargoes based on
breach of contract of carriage.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the loss of the cargoes.

Held: Yes. The SC ruled that that petitioner’s vessel is a common carrier and
should have exercised extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the ensuring of
safety of the cargoes transported by it.

In order that it may be exempted from responsibility due to fortuitous events, it

must prove that the fortuitous event is the proximate cause and only cause of the
loss or destruction of goods and the common carrier must have exercised due
diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after the occurrence
of the fortuitous event.

Such was not observed by the common carrier, the captain knew that there was a
typhoon before it departed, it was given clearance on the departure day but the
captain should have checked where the typhoon was headed, neither did the
captain of the vessel monitor and record the weather conditions everyday as
required by Art, 612 of the Code of Commerce. It was also found that the crew
were unlicensed. The carrier is therefore liable for the damages it caused to the
respondents as it failed to observe due diligence.
38. Saludo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 95536, 23 March 1992, 207 SCRA 498

FACTS: A funeral home made the necessary arrangements for the shipment of the
remains of the mother of the Petitioners from Chicago to the Philippines. by
bringing the remains to a mortuary Air Services at the Airport which made the
necessary arrangements such as flights, transfers, etc. where it booked the
shipment with PAL thru the carrier’s agent Air Care International.

PAL Airway Bill Ordinary was issued wherein the requested routing was from
Chicago to San Francisco on board Trans World Airline (TWA) and from San
Francisco to Manila on board PAL.

Upon arrival at San Francisco, one of the petitioners was told by the mortuary air
services that the remains were on a plane to Mexico City due to switching of
caskets and informed her that they were sending the remains back to California
via Texas.

Petitioners filed a complaint against TWA and PAL for the misshipment and delay
in the delay of the cargo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the delay in the delivery of the casketed remains of
petitioners’ mother was due to the fault of respondent airline companies?

HELD: Yes. Under Article 1736 of the Civil Code provides that the extraordinary
responsibility of the common carrier begins from the time the goods are delivered
to the carrier. This responsibility remains in full force and effect even when they
are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit, unless the shipper or owner
exercises the right of stoppage in transitu, and terminates only after the lapse of a
reasonable time for the acceptance, of the goods by the consignee or such other
person entitled to receive them. And, there is delivery to the carrier when the
goods are ready for and have been placed in the exclusive possession, custody
and control of the carrier for the purpose of their immediate transportation and
the carrier has accepted them. Where such a delivery has thus been accepted by
the carrier, the liability of the common carrier commences eo instanti.
39. Fisher v. Yangco Steamship Co.
G.R. No. L-8095, 31 March 1915, 31 Phil 1

FACTS: Plaintiff is a stockholder in the Yangco Steamship Company, the owner of

a large number of steam vessels, duly licensed to engage in the coastwise trade of
the Philippine Islands.

A resolution was adopted by the directors of the company which was ratified and
affirmed by the shareholders of the company which prohibits explosives to be
carried by its vessels, and expressly prohibiting the officers, agents and servants
of the company from offering to carry, accepting for carriage said dynamite,
powder or other explosives.

Thereafter the respondent Acting Collector of Customs demanded and required of

the company the acceptance and carriage of such explosives; that he has refused
and suspended the issuance of the necessary clearance documents of the vessels
of the company unless and until the company consents to accept such explosives
for carriage

ISSUE: Whether the refusal of the owners and officers of a steam vessel, duly
licensed to engage in the coastwise trade of the Philippine Islands and engaged in
that trade as a common carrier, to accept for carriage “dynamite, powder or
other explosives” is a valid act.

RULING: No. A refusal by a particular vessel engage as a common carrier of

merchandise in coastwise trade in the Philippine Island to accept such explosives
for carriage constitutes a violation. The prohibition against discrimination
penalized under the statute, unless it can be shown that there is so Real and
substantial danger of disaster necessarily involved in the courage of any or all of
this article of merchandise as to render such refusal a due or unnecessary or a
reasonable exercise or prudence and discretion on the part of the ship owner
40. Transportation Case Digest: Isaac V. A.L. Ammen Trans. Co. (1957)
G.R.No. L-9671 August 23, 1957

FACTS: Cesar Isaac boarded a bus and seated himself on the left side resting his
left arm on the window sill but with his left elbow outside the window. Before
reaching his destination, a pick-up car at full speed and was running outside of its
proper lane came from the opposite direction.

The bus swerved to the very extreme right of the road until its front and rear
wheels have gone over the pile of stones or gravel situated on the rampart of the
road.
Despite efforts, the rear left side of the bus was hit by the pick-up car. Isaac was
rushed to a hospital and was transferred to another hospital where he underwent
treatment for 3 months and he was later moved to the Orthopedic Hospital
where he was operated on and stayed for another 2 months.

ISSUE: W/N driver of the bus has done what a prudent man could have done to
avoid the collision?

HELD: YES. Where a carrier's employee is confronted with a sudden emergency,

the fact that he is obliged to act quickly and without a chance for deliberation
must be taken into account, and he is held to the some degree of care that he
would otherwise be required to exercise in the absence of such emergency but
must exercise only such care as any ordinary prudent person would exercise
under like circumstances and conditions, and the failure on his part to exercise
the best judgment the case renders possible does not establish lack of care and
skill on his part

Considering all the circumstances, we are persuaded to conclude that the driver
of the bus has done what a prudent man could have done to avoid the collision
It is true that Isaac's contributory negligence cannot relieve A.L. Ammen of its
liability but will only entitle it to a reduction of the amount of damage caused
(Article 1762, new Civil Code), but this is a circumstance which further militates
against the position taken by Isaac.
41. PHILIPPINES FIRST INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioner, v. WALLEM PHILS.
SHIPPING, INC., UNKNOWN OWNER AND/OR UNKNOWN CHARTERER OF THE
VESSEL M/S "OFFSHORE MASTER" AND "SHANGHAI FAREAST SHIP BUSINESS
COMPANY," Respondents. G.R. NO. 165647, SECOND DIVISION, MARCH 26,
2009, TINGA, J.

COGSA provides that under every contract of carriage of goods by sea, the carrier in relation to the loading,
handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care, and discharge of such goods, shall be subject to the responsibilities and
liabilities and entitled to the rights and immunities set forth in the Act. Section 3 (2) thereof then states that among
the carriers responsibilities are to properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the
goods carried.

FACTS: Anhui Chemicals Import and Export Corp. loaded on board a vessel a
shipment, complete and in good order for transportation to its consignee,
covered by a clean bill of lading.
The shipment arrived in Port of Manila and was discharged which caused
various degrees of spillage and losses as evidence by the turn over survey of the
arrastre operator.
Upon delivery to the consignee and during the unloading, it was found by
the consignee that the shipment was damaged and in bad condition. Hence, the
consignee filed a claim with Wallem but to no avail. Hence, the consignee filed a
claim against the insurance company who paid the consignee, and in the exercise
of its right of subrogation, sent a demand letter to Wallem for the recovery of the
amount paid to the consignee.
Since Wallem did not respond to the claim, the insurer then instituted an
action.

ISSUE: Whether or not as a common carrier, the carrier’s duties extend to the
obligation to safely discharge the cargo from the vessel;

RULING: Yes, the vessel is a common carrier, and thus the determination of the
existence or absence of liability will be gauged on the degree of diligence required
of a common carrier. The damage of the shipment was documented by the turn-
over survey and request for bad order survey, with these documents, petitioner
insist that the shipment incurred damages while still in the care and responsibility
of Wallem before it was turned over to the arrastre operator. However, RTC
found the testimony of Mr. Talens (cargo surveyor) that the loss was caused by
the mishandling of the arrastre operator. This mishandling was affirmed by the CA
which was the basis for declaring the arrastre operator solely liable for the
damage. It is established that damage or losses were incurred by the shipment
during the unloading. As common carrier, they are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them.
Subject to certain exceptions enumerated under Article 1734 of the Civil Code,
common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the
goods. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time
the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the
carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively,
by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.
For marine vessels, Article 619 of the Code of Commerce provides that the ship
captain is liable for the cargo from the time it is turned over to him at the dock or
afloat alongside the vessel at the port of loading, until he delivers it on the shore
or on the discharging wharf at the port of unloading, unless agreed otherwise.
COGSA provides that under every contract of carriage of goods by sea, the carrier
in relation to the loading, handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care, and
discharge of such goods, shall be subject to the responsibilities and liabilities and
entitled to the rights and immunities set forth in the Act. Section 3 (2) thereof
then states that among the carriers responsibilities are to properly and carefully
load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods carried. On the
other hand, the functions of an arrastre operator involve the handling of cargo
deposited on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper
and the ship's tackle. Being the custodian of the goods discharged from a vessel,
an arrastre operator's duty is to take good care of the goods and to turn them
over to the party entitled to their possession. Handling cargo is mainly the
arrastre operator's principal work so its drivers/operators or employees should
observe the standards and measures necessary to prevent losses and damage to
shipments under its custody. Thus, in this case the appellate court is correct
insofar as it ruled that an arrastre operator and a carrier may not be held
solidarily liable at all times. But the precise question is which entity had custody of
the shipment during its unloading from the vessel? DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 254 The records are replete with evidence which show
that the damage to the bags happened before and after their discharge and it was
caused by the stevedores of the arrastre operator who were then under the
supervision of Wallem. It is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that cargoes
while being unloaded generally remain under the custody of the carrier. In the
instant case, the damage or losses were incurred during the discharge of the
shipment while under the supervision of the carrier. Consequently, the carrier is
liable for the damage or losses caused to the shipment. As the cost of the actual
damage to the subject shipment has long been settled, the trial courts finding of
actual damages in the amount of P397,879.69 has to be sustained.

42. LU DO & LU YM CORPORATION vs. I. V. BINAMIRA G.R. No. L-9840, April 22,
1957

FACTS:
On August 10, 1951, the Delta Photo Supply Company of New York shipped on
board the M/S "FERNSIDE" at New York, U.S.A., six cases of films and/or
photographic supplies consigned to the order of respondent I. V. Binamira. For
this shipment, Bill of Lading No. 29 was issued. The ship arrived at the port of
Cebu and cargo was discharged including the shipment in question, placing it in
the possession and custody of the arrastre operator of said port, the Visayan Cebu
Terminal Company, Inc. Petitioner hired a stevedoring company to unload its
cargo. During the discharge, good order cargo was separated from the bad order
cargo on board the ship, and a separate list of bad order cargo was prepared by
the checker of the stevedoring company. All the cargo unloaded was received at
the pier by the arrastre operator of the port. The terminal company had also its
own checker who also recorded and noted down the good cargo from the bad
one. The shipment in question, was not included in the report of bad order cargo
of both checkers, indicating that it was discharged from the, ship in good order
and condition. Three days after the goods were unloaded from the ship,
respondent took delivery of his 6 cases of photographic supplies from the arrastre
operator. He discovered that the cases showed signs of pilferage. Respondent
hired marine surveyors, to examine them. The surveyors examined the cases and
made a physical count of their contents in the presence of representatives of
petitioner, respondent and the stevedoring company. The finding of the surveyors
showed that some films and photographic supplies were missing valued at
P324.63.

ISSUE:
Whether the carrier is responsible for the loss considering that the same occurred
after the shipment was discharged from the ship and placed in the possession and
custody of the customs authorities?
RULING:
NO. As a rule, a common carrier is responsible for the loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods it assumes to carry from one place to another unless
the same is due to any to any of the causes mentioned in Article 1734 and that, if
the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, for causes other that those
mentioned, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless it proves that it has observed extraordinary diligence in
their care and that this extraordinary liability lasts from the time the goods are
placed in the possession of the carrier until they are delivered to the consignee,
or "to the person who has the right to receive them". These provisions only apply
when the loss, destruction or deterioration takes place while the goods are in the
possession of the carrier, and not after it has lost control of them. The reason is
that while the goods are in its possession, it is but fair that it exercises
extraordinary diligence in protecting them from damage, and if loss occurs, the
law presumes that it was due to its fault or negligence. This is necessary to
protect the interest the interest of the owner who is at its mercy. The situation
changes after the goods are delivered to the consignee. While the Court of
Appeals is correct in saying that while delivery of the cargo to the consignee, or to
the person who has a right to receive them", contemplated in Article 1736,
because in such case the goods are still in the hands of the Government and the
owner cannot exercise dominion over them, SC believes however that the parties
may agree to limit the liability of the carrier considering that the goods have still
to through the inspection of the customs authorities before they are actually
turned over to the consignee. This is a situation where we may say that the carrier
losses control of the goods because of a custom regulation and it is unfair that it
be made responsible for what may happen during the interregnum. And this is
precisely what was done by the parties herein. In the bill of lading that was issued
covering the shipment in question, both the carrier and the consignee have
stipulated to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or damage that may
because to the goods before they are actually delivered.

43. Caltex [Philippines], Inc. vs. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.

Facts:
On December 20, 1987, motor tanker MV Vector, carrying petroleum products of
Caltex, collided in the open sea with passenger ship MV Doña Paz, causing the
death of all but 25 of the latter’s passengers. Among those who died were
Sebastian Canezal and his daughter Corazon Canezal. On March 22, 1988, the
board of marine inquiry found that Vector Shipping Corporation was at fault. On
February 13, 1989, Teresita Cañezal and Sotera E. Cañezal, Sebastian Cañezal’s
wife and mother respectively, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a
complaint for damages arising from breach of contract of carriage against Sulpicio
Lines. Sulpicio filed a third-party complaint against Vector and Caltex. The trial
court dismissed the complaint against Caltex, but the Court of Appeals included
the same in the liability. Hence, Caltex filed this petition.

Issue:
Is the charterer of a sea vessel liable for damages resulting from a collision
between the chartered vessel and a passenger ship?

Held:
First: The charterer has no liability for damages under Philippine Maritime laws.

Petitioner and Vector entered into a contract of affreightment, also known as a

voyage charter.

A charter party is a contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part

thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a specified time or use; a
contract of affreightment is one by which the owner of a ship or other vessel lets
the whole or part of her to a merchant or other person for the conveyance of
goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of freight. A
contract of affreightment may be either time charter, wherein the leased vessel is
leased to the charterer for a fixed period of time, or voyage charter, wherein the
ship is leased for a single voyage. In both cases, the charter-party provides for the
hire of the vessel only, either for a determinate period of time or for a single or
consecutive voyage, the ship owner to supply the ship’s store, pay for the wages
of the master of the crew, and defray the expenses for the maintenance of the
ship. If the charter is a contract of affreightment, which leaves the general owner
in possession of the ship as owner for the voyage, the rights and the
responsibilities of ownership rest on the owner. The charterer is free from liability
to third persons in respect of the ship.
44. Lara v. Valencia
G.R. No. L-9907, 30 June 1958, 104 Phil 65

FACTS:
The deceased was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry stationed in Davao.The
defendant is engaged in the business of exporting logs from his lumberconcession
in Cotabato. Lara went to said concession upon instructions of his chief toclassify
the logs of defendant which were about to be loaded on a ship anchored inthe
port of Parang. Lara boarded with several others a pick-up bound for Davao
andwere seated at the back on an improvised bench. Lara accidentally fell from
the pick-up and as a result he suffered serious injuries which lead to his death.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent failed to exercise the ordinary required?

RULING:
Yes. The owner and driver of a vehicle owes to accommodation passengers
orinvited guests merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may
betransported safely to their destination. Thus, “The rule is established by weight
ofauthority that the owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty to an
invitedguest to exercise reasonable care in its operation, and not unreasonably to
exposehim to danger and injury by increasing the hazard of travel. The owner of
the vehiclein the case at bar is only required to observe ordinary care, and is not
in duty boundto exercise extraordinary diligence as required by our law.A
passenger must observe the diligence of a father of a family to avoid injury
tohimself which means that if the injury to the passenger has been proximately
causedby his own negligence, the carrier cannot be held liable.

45. Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 84458, 6 November 1989, 179 SCRA 95

FACTS:
On May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded M/|V Antonio from Occidental
Mindoro bound for Manila. Upon arrival on May 12, 1975, the passengers therein
disembarked through a gangplank connecting the vessel to the pier. Viana,
instead of disembarking through the gangplank, disembarked through the third
deck, which was at the same level with the pier. An hour after the passengers
disembarked, Pioneer stevedoring started to operate in unloading the cargo from
the ship. Viana then went back, remembering some of his cargoes left at the
vessel. At that time, while he was pointing at the crew of the vessel to where his
cargoes were loaded, the crane hit him, pinning him between the crane and the
side of the vessel. He was brought to the hospital where he died 3 days after (May
15). The parents of Anacleto filed a complaint against Aboitiz for breach of
contract of carriage.

The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Then both Aboitiz and Pioneer filed a
motion for reconsideration, upon which the trial court issued an order absolving
Pioneer from liability but not Aboitiz. On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court ruling.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Viana is still considered a passenger at the time of the incident.

HELD:
Yes. The La Mallorca case is applicable in the case at bar.

The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger
has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock or
premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the
passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier’s
conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. All
persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the
conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances,
and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his
departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact
that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example,
such person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.

The reasonableness of the time should be made to depend on the attending

circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its
business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a
consideration of the time element per se without taking into account such other
factors.

Where a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is presumed to have

been at fault or to have acted negligently. This gives rise to an action for breach of
contract where all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of the
contract of carriage and its non-performance by the carrier, that is, the failure of
the carrier to carry the passenger safely to his destination, which, in the instant
case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary
diligence while such relation subsists.

46. Sabena Belgian Airlines vs. CA

Facts:
Mrs. Fule purchased three round trip tickets for herself and two children from
Sabena; the route: Manila-Brussels-Barcelona-Madrid. During the trip, they
encountered inconveniences, such as, walking under the drizzle after
disembarking; delayed connecting flight to Barcelona; and a missing luggage,
among others. They allegedly incurred medical and hotel expenses. Thus, Mrs.
Fule made a letter-complaint to Sabena office. The Madrid Office offered to pay
about half of what she was asking, that the rest would be paid by the Manila
Office. A certain Yancha made her sign a document in French language which she
did not understand. It turned out that the document was a quitclaim. The trial
court awarded them actual, moral and exemplary damages, among others. CA
modified the decision by reducing the amount of moral and exemplary damages.

Issue:
WON Sabena is liable to the Fules for damages arising from breach of contract of
carriage.

Held:
Yes. In the imposition of moral damages, the defendant’s act must be wrongful or
wanton or done in bad faith. Here, there is no finding that the carrier’s delay in
delivering Mrs. Fule’s luggage was wrongful or due to bad faith. While there is
failure on the part of the carrier in protecting Mrs. Fule et al from the rain, its
neglect was not so gross as to amount to bad faith or wantoness. What is involved
in this case is simple negligence, considering that the rain through which Mrs. Fule
et al had to walk was a slight drizzle. Nonetheless, there is still bad faith in making
Mrs. Fule sign a quitclaim without informing her of its contents.
---------------------“[W]ith respect to moral damages, the rule is that the same are
recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage
only where (1) the mishap results in the death a of passenger and (2) it is proved
that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith, even if death does not result.”
(Ibid, at p. 13) As the appellate court found the petitioner guilty of bad faith in
letting the respondent sign a quitclaim without her knowledge or understanding
and contrary to what she was planning to do, the reduced award of moral and
exemplary damages is proper and legal.

47. LASAM VS. SMITH 45 PHIL 657

FACTS:
The defendant was the owner of a public garage in the town of San Fernando, La
Union, and engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire from one point
to another in the Province of La Union and the surrounding provinces. Defendant
undertook to convey the plaintiffs from San Fernando to Currimao, Ilocos Norte,
in a Ford automobile. On leaving San Fernando, the automobile was operated by
a licensed chauffeur, but after having reached the town of San Juan, the chauffeur
allowed his assistant, Bueno, to drive the car. Bueno held no driver’s license, but
had some experience in driving. The car functioned well until after the crossing of
the Abra River in Tagudin, when, according to the testimony of the witnesses for
the plaintiffs, defects developed in the steering gear so as to make accurate
steering impossible, and after zigzagging for a distance of about half kilometer,
the car left the road and went down a steep embankment. The automobile was
overturned and the plaintiffs pinned down under it. Mr. Lasam escaped with a
few contusions and a dislocated rib, but his wife, Joaquina, received serious
injuries, among which was a compound fracture of one of the bones in her left
wrist. She also suffered nervous breakdown from which she has not fully
recovered at the time of trial. The complaint was filed about a year and a half
after and alleges that the accident was due to defects in the automobile as well as
to the incompetence and negligence of the chauffeur. The trial court held,
however, that the cause of action rests on the defendant’s breach of the contract
of carriage and that, consequently, articles 1101-1107 of the Civil Code, and not
article 1903, are applicable. The court further found that the breach of contact
was not due to fortuitous events and that, therefore the defendant was liable in
damages

ISSUE:
Is the trial court correct in its findings that the breach of contract was not due to a
fortuitous event?

RULING:
Yes. It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of the defendant’s legal liability is
the contract of carriage; that by entering into that contract he bound himself to
carry the plaintiffs safely and securely to their destination; and that having failed
to do so he is liable in damages unless he shows that the failure to fulfill his
obligation was due to causes mentioned in article 1105 of the Civil Code, which
reads: “No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which,
even if foreseen, were inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which the law
expressly provides otherwise and those in which the obligation itself imposes
such liability.” As will be seen, some extraordinary circumstances independent of
the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso
fortuito. In the present case, this element is lacking. It is not suggested that the
accident in question was due to an act of God or to adverse road conditions which
could have been foreseen. As far as the record shows, the accident was caused
either by defects in the automobile or else through the negligence of its driver.
That is not a caso fortuito.

48. Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation 21 SCRA 279, G.R. No. L-21749
(September 29, 1967)

Facts:
Barge owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation(defendant, LSC for brevity) was
being towed down the Pasig river by tugboats belonging to the same
corporation.`
The barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan Bailey
Bridge, smashing the posts and causing the bright to list. The river, at that time,
was swollen and the current swift, on account of the heavy downpour of Manila
and the surrounding provinces.
Republic of the Philippines (PH) sued LSC for actual and consequential damages
caused by its employees.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the collision of LSC’s barge with the supports or piers of the
Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure.

Ruling:
No. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary
object and uncontrovertibly provided with adequate openings for the passage of
water craft, including barges like of NSC’s, it is undeniable that the unusual event
that the barge, exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge supports
raises a presumption of negligence on the part of appellant or its employees
manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. For in the ordinary course of events,
such a thing does not happen if proper case is used. Res ipsa loquitur.
NLS stresses the precautions (due diligence) taken by it: (1) that it assigned two of
its most powerful tugboats to tow down river its barge, and (2) that it assigned to
the task the more competent and experienced among its patrons, (3) had the
towlines, engines and equipment double-checked and inspected; (4) that it
instructed its patrons to take extra precautions. These very precautions,
completely destroy the NLS’defense.

Caso fortuito or force majeure by definition, are extraordinary events not

foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, were inevitable.” It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not
have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. The more difficulty to foresee the happening is
not impossibility to foresee the same. The very measures adopted by NSC prove
that the possibility of danger was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and
was not caso fortuito.

LSC, knowing and appreciating the perils posed by the swollen steam and its swift
current, voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger; it therefore
assured the risk, and cannot shed responsibility merely because the precautions it
adopted turned out to be insufficient.
49. G.R. No. 111386 August 28, 1995

METAL FORMING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, represented by the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, VIRGILIO
M. DEL ROSARIO and CORAZON PAREDES-DEL ROSARIO, respondents.

On 21 November 1990 the private respondents, spouses Virgilio M. del Rosario

and Corazon Paredes-del Rosario, filed a letter-complaint with the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) charging petitioner METAL FORMING CORPORATION
with violation of Sec. 3 of Act No. 3740, "An Act to Penalize Fraudulent
Advertising, Mislabeling or Misbranding of any Product, Stocks, Bonds, Etc."
Specifically it provides:

Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, either as principal
or agent, in any handbill, billboard, sign, pamphlet, circular, projected lantern
slides, or any other form of advertising whatsoever printed, displayed, or
circulated in the Philippine Islands, to misrepresent the character, value,
properties or condition of any article offered or exposed for sale, barter, or
exchange, or of the materials of which the article is composed.

The spouses alleged, among other things, that in selling to the public roofing
materials known as "Banawe" shingles, petitioner made representations on the
durability of the product and the sturdiness of its installation. Aside from massive
advertisements in print media and television, it also distributed brochures to its
prospective customers containing the same representations.

The alleged advertisements were not submitted in evidence at the DTI except a
copy of a brochure which was among those distributed by petitioner to
prospective customers and which prompted private respondents to buy the
"Banawe" shingles and had them installed at their residence. On the first page of
the brochure appears the following: "STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND STRONG
. . . The BANAWE METAL TILE structure acts as a single unit against wind and
storm pressure due to the strong hook action on its overlaps."2 Barely two (2)
months after completion of the installation, portions of the roof of private
respondents were blown away by strong winds brought about by typhoon
"Ruping."
On 29 May 1991 the DTI rendered a decision ordering petitioner to pay an
administrative fine of P10,000.00, otherwise, for failure to do so within ten (10)
days from finality of the decision, the business name registration of petitioner, if
any, would be deemed suspended and its establishment closed until the fine was
fully paid.3 Its decision was based on the finding that petitioner misrepresented
that (a) the Banawe metal tile structure was strong against wind and storm
pressure, and (b) it acted as a single unit against wind and storm pressure.
According to the DTI, letter (a) was a misrepresentation as far as the metal tile
structure installed at the residence of private respondents was concerned
because as the records showed, strong winds blew off part of the structure/roof;
and letter (b) was likewise a misrepresentation as far as the structure installed at
the residence of private respondents was concerned because the records showed
that the structure acted in parts when strong winds blew. A part remained while
another part was blown off. Therefore petitioner misrepresented the character of
the merchandise offered.4

On 9 January 1992 the motion to reconsider the decision was denied.5

On 30 April 1993, on appeal to respondent Office of the President, the decision of

the DTI was affirmed6 in toto. On 18 June 1993 the motion for its reconsideration
was denied. On 2 August 1993 the second motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied except that public respondent reversed its previous finding that
petitioner also misrepresented that its product was "strong when there (was)
wind and storm pressure" for the reason that —

A careful reading of the pertinent portion of the brochure, supra, readily reveals
that what (petitioner) represented is that its (product) "acts as a single unit
against wind and strong (storm?) pressure due to the strong hook (action) on its
overlaps."

Nowhere is it mentioned in the brochure that "the structure is strong when there
is wind and storm pressure."

As correctly pointed out by (petitioner), this is already "misinterpretation" or a

strained interpretation, to say the least. While the term "strong" is indeed found
in said brochure, it was there mentioned only to describe the hook's action on the
overlaps.7

Petitioner raises as an issue whether the statement in its brochure that "the
Banawe metal tile acts as a single unit against wind and storm pressure due to the
strong hook action on its overlaps" is a misrepresentation within the
contemplation of Sec. 3 of Act No. 3740 simply because a section or portion of the
roof of private respondents was blown away by a strong typhoon.

Petitioner asseverates that under Art. 1174 of the Civil Code it should not be
made responsible for the adverse consequences of a fortuitous event such as
typhoon "Ruping" which, as admitted by private respondents, caused the blowing
away of a section or portion of their roof. Besides, its product acts as a single unit
specifically against storm pressure. A cursory examination of the questioned
statement in the brochure shows that even without availing of said provision
there could not have been any misrepresentation under Sec. 3 of Act No. 3740.
What appears to be emphasized in the brochure is the strong hook action on the
overlaps of the tiles. There is no evidence whatsoever that single panels of the
tiles from the same section or portion were blown away while other panels in the
same section or portion remained; or that individual panels from different
sections or portions were blown away. It is common knowledge in the trade that
roofs are not monolithically constructed but are made up of sections. A section
can be entirely blown off without affecting the others. Consequently even if only
one section or portion was blown away, it can still be reasonably concluded that
the tiles in that section acted as a single unit.

The claim of petitioner that roofs are made up of sections such that even if only
one section or portion is blown away the tiles in that section can be said to have
acted as a single unit, may appear to be a sound argument. Nevertheless, it is a
defense that should have been established at the administrative level. We take
into account the finding of the DTI, that a part of the roof was blown away while a
part remained. There was no reference to a section or distinct portion of the roof
that was blown away nor to a section or distinct portion that remained. Public
respondent arrived at the same finding. Whether the part that was blown away
and that which remained constitute sections is a question of fact that we will not
determine here. This Court is not a trier of facts. Moreover, we agree with the
observation of the Solicitor General that —
Petitioner (gives) a restricted interpretation of its statement that the structure of
its roof tiles has the capacity to act as a single unit . . . Surely, in buying the
subject roof tiles, the private respondents correctly relied on petitioner's
representations as it would be commonly and reasonably interpreted by the
buying public, viz., that since its structure acts as a single unit, wind and storm
pressure would not be able to blow away any part or portion thereof.8

Petitioner harps on the distinction between a tropical storm and a typhoon.

According to the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services
Administration, "the maximum winds about the center of the disturbance
(tropical storm) range from 64 to 117 kilometers per hour (kph) or 18 to 32
meters per second (mps) or 34 to 64 knots, while the maximum winds about the
center of the disturbance (typhoon) are 118 kilometers per hour or 33 meters per
second or 65 knots or more.9

Contrary to petitioner's pretension, the phrase "against wind and storm pressure"
is not couched in specific terms because as correctly pointed out by the Office of
the Solicitor General —

. . . . in deciding whether or not to buy the subject roof tiles being advertised by
petitioner, it is reasonable to assume that buyers, like private respondents, would
consider (said) phrase . . . as referring to all kinds of weather disturbances being
experienced in our country during the rainy season, be it a mere tropical
depression, a storm or even a typhoon. 10

In this regard, public respondent opined, which we sustain, that —

(Petitioner) cannot place undue reliance on the distinction between or among the
terms "storm," "typhoon" or "cyclone" because it itself had caused the
misrepresentations to be couched in general terms. Also, considering the weather
situation in the country where storms and typhoons are not a rare or unusual
occurrence, these terms ought to, as they should only be, understood as
comprehending and referring practically to the same thing, at least insofar as the
jural effects of misrepresentations (petitioner's) are concerned. 11
On a different angle, petitioner avers that under Art. 1174 of the Civil Code it
should not be made responsible for the adverse consequences of a fortuitous
event such as the typhoon which caused the section or portion of private
respondents' roof to be blown away.

Article 1174 provides that subject to certain exceptional, no person shall be for
those events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen were
inevitable. A fortuitous event presents the following characteristics: (a) the cause
of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to
comply with his obligations, must be independent of the human will; (b) it must
be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can
be foreseen, it must be imposible, to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to
render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner;
and, (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the
injury resulting to the creditor.

Based on the foregoing, in order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person
from liability, it is necessary that he be free from negligence. An act of God cannot
be urged for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in
not trying to avert its results. When the negligence of a person concurs with an
act of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing
that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God.12

As correctly viewed by public respondent, although the occurrence of a typhoon

is a fortuitous event which by itself might have exempted petitioner from liability
to private respondents —

. . . . it cannot efface the fundamental fact that (petitioner) acted in bad faith
and/or with gross negligence in failing to deliver the necessary accessories for the
proper installation of the structure . . . . and actually installed inferior roofing
materials at (private respondents') residence, in violation of the proper
installation procedure expressly specified in the former's brochures and
advertisements for installation, i.e., the metal tile attached to the roof panels
should be by two (2) self-drilling screws for one (1) metal cleat. However, instead
of conforming with this procedure, (petitioner) attached some of the metal cleats
with only one (1)-inch ordinary nail each and others were fastened with only one
(1) wood screw each.13
To a large extent, the capacity of petitioner's roof tiles to act as a single unit
depends on the strong hook action on the overlaps of the individual parts which
comprise the whole structure. However, as inferred by the Solicitor General —

. . . . there can only be a strong hook action if the subject roof tiles were properly
installed by petitioner complete with all the necessary accessories thereto . . . . 14

As it turned out, the tiles were improperly installed thus contributing to the
damage to private respondents' roof.

By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of the DTI and public
respondent over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better
position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are
generally accorded respect, if not with finality, by the courts.15 Furthermore,
petitioner failed to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondent in affirming the ruling of the DTI. There is no reason indeed to rule
otherwise.

We therefore uphold the finding of the DTI and public respondent that petitioner
misrepresented the character of its product which is prohibited under Sec. 3 of
Act. No. 3740. The Banawe Metal Tile structure did not act as a single unit against
wind and storm pressure due to the weak hook action on its overlaps. However
we note that Sec. 6 of said Act, as amended by C.A. 46, provides the penalty of
fine of not less than P200.00 and not more than P5,000.00. Conformably
therewith, we have no choice but to reduce the fine imposed on petitioner from
P10,000.00 to P5,000.00.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision dated 30 April 1993, the order
dated 18 June 1993, and the resolution dated 2 August 1993 of public respondent
are AFFIRMED except as to the fine of P10,000.00 which is reduced to P5,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
50. Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. The Nisshin Fire and Marine Insurance Co., and
Dowa Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. G.R. No. 71478 May 29, 1987 Melencio-
Herrera, J.

FACTS:
(G.R. No. L-69044): a vessel operated by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.,
loaded at Kobe, Japan for transportation to Manila, 5000 pieces of calorized lance
pipes in 28 packages consigned to Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and 7 cases
of spare parts consigned to Central Textile Mills, Inc.; both sets of goods were
insured with Development Insurance and Surety Corp. (G.R. No. 71478): the same
vessel took on board 128 cartons of garment fabrics and accessories, in 2
containers, consigned to Mariveles Apparel Corporation, and two cases of
surveying instruments consigned to Aman Enterprises and General Merchandise
the vessel caught fire and sank, resulting in the total loss of ship and cargo

ISSUES:
1. which law should govern — the Civil Code provisions on Common carriers or
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act

HELD: 1. The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs
the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration. As the cargoes were transported from Japan to the Philippines, the
liability of Petitioner Carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code. However, in
all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of common
carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws. Thus, the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is suppletory to the provisions of the
Civil Code.

51. La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Company vs Valentin De Jesus

G.R. No. L-21486

FACTS:
In October 1959, Lolita de Jesus was riding a bus owned by La Mallorca and
Pampanga Bus Company which had a head on collision against a freight truck.
Apparently, the bus had a tire blow out which resulted to the accident. Lolita died
and so her father, Valentin de Jesus, filed a civil case for damages against La
Mallorca. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of De Jesus and ordered La
Mallorca to pay for actual, compensatory, and moral damages including
attorney’s fees. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. La Mallorca
assailed the decision as it argued that a tire blow out is a fortuitous event and
should not be taken as negligence.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not a tire blow out is a fortuitous event.

HELD:
No. As found by the lower court, the tire blow out in this case was due to the fact
that the inner circle of the wheel of the bus was pressed so closely to the rim
which caused it to eventually explode. This mechanical defect in the installation of
the wheel could have been easily discovered had the bus been subjected to a
thorough check up before it was allowed to hit the road. La Mallorca is therefore
negligent and the tire explosion is not a fortuitous event for it could have been
avoided had the bus been properly maintained.
The Supreme Court also emphasized in this case that moral damages are
recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of
contract of a common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article
2206, of the Civil Code.

52. LAMBERT S. RAMOS v. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION,

GR No. 184905, 2009-08-28

Facts:
On or about 10:40 o'clock in the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan
(Avenue), corner Rajah Matanda (Street), Quezon City, a vehicular accident took
place between a Toyota Altis Sedan bearing Plate Number XDN 210, owned by
petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation,... and driven by Aquilino Larin ("Aquilino"),
and a Ford Expedition, owned by x x x Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by
Rodel Ilustrisimo ("Rodel"), with Plate Number LSR 917. A passenger of the sedan,
one Estela Maliwat ("Estela") sustained injuries. She was immediately rushed to...
the hospital for treatment.
As could well be expected, (Ramos) denied liability for damages insisting that it
was the negligence of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realty's) driver, which was the proximate
cause of the accident. (Ramos) maintained that the sedan car crossed Katipunan
Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street... despite the concrete barriers placed
thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the intersection.

Issues:
It therefore found the driver Rodel guilty of contributory negligence for driving
the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection.

Lambert Ramos is held solidarily liable with Rodel Ilustrisimo to pay petitioner
C.O.L. Realty Corporation the amount of

P51,994.80 as actual damages

Ruling:
There is no doubt in the appellate court's mind that Aquilino's violation of the
MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street
was the proximate cause of the accident.

However, it also declared Ramos liable vicariously for Rodel's contributory

negligence in driving the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection.

If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring
contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter's negligence is
imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior's action against the third
person, assuming of course... that the contributory negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury of which complaint is made.[10]

Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilino's act of
crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it
was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and
thus precludes any recovery for any... damages suffered by respondent from the
accident.

It was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle
embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiff's own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he... cannot
recover damages.

53. Maranan v. Perez

G.R. No. L-22272, 26 June 1967, 20 SCRA 412

FACTS:
Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger owned and operated by
Pascual Perez, was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela.
Valenzuela was found guilty for homicide by the Court of First Instance and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the sum of P6,000. While pending appeal, mother of deceased filed an action in
the Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and
Valenzuela. Defendant Perez claimed that the death was “caso fortuito” for which
the carrier was not liable. The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and
awarded her P3,000 as damages against the defendant Perez. The claim against
Valenzuela was dismissed. From this ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez
appealed to this court, the former asking for more damages and the latter
insisting on non-liability. Defendant-appellant relied solely on the ruling
enunciated in Gillaco vs. Manila Railroad Co. that the carrier is under no absolute
liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Perez should be held liable for the death of the passenger?

HELD:
Yes. The basis of the carrier’s liability for assaults on passengers committed by its
drivers rests on the principle that it is the carrier’s implied duty to transport the
passenger safely. As between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear
the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier’s employees against
passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and remove
them. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of
the orders of the common carriers. The liability of the common carriers does not
cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of their employees. (Art. 1759)

The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar were very
different. In the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the
course of duty of the guilty employee. The Gillaco case was decided under the
provision of the Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not
impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers
against willful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death
of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted
the carrier from liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous
event has been substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their exempting effect the case
where the law expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force
majeure. The Civil Code provisions on the subject common carriers are new and
were taken from Anglo-American law. The basis of the carrier’s liability for
assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rested either on the doctrine or
respondent superior or the principle that it was the carrier’s implied duty to
transport the passenger safely. Under the second view, upheld by the majority
and also by the later cases, it was enough that the assault happens within the
course of the employee’s duty. It was no defense for the carrier that the act was
done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier’s orders. The carrier’s
liability here was absolute in the sense that it practically secured the passengers
from assaults committed by its own employees.

54. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner, vs. MACARIA BALLESTEROS,

TIMOTEO CAMAYO, JOSE REYES and JULIAN MAIMBAN, JR., respondents.

FACTS:
respondents were passengers on petitioner's bus, the driver of which was Jose
Anastacio. Anastacio stopped the bus and got off to replace a defective spark
plug. While he was thus engaged, one Dionisio Abello, an auditor assigned to
defendant company by the General Auditing Office, took the wheel and told the
driver to sit somewhere else. Anastacio tried twice to take the wheel back but
Abello would not relinquish it. Then, in the language of the trial court, "while the
bus was negotiating between Km. posts 328 and 329 (in Isabela) a freight truck ...
driven by Marcial Nocum ... bound for Manila, was also negotiating the same
place; when these two vehicles were about to meet at the bend of the road
Marcial Nocum, in trying to evade several holes on the right lane, where his truck
was running, swerved his truck towards the middle part of the road and in so
doing, the left front fender and left side of the freight truck smashed the left side
of the bus resulting in extensive damages to the body of the bus and injuries to
seventeen of its passengers, ... including the respondents.

ISSUE: won the common carrier is liable for the injuries suffered by the
respondents even if Abello, the negligent person is not an employee of the
common carrier?

HELD:
YES Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of the wilfull acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission. Sec. 48(b). No professional chauffeur shall permit any unlicensed
person to drive the motor vehicle under his control, or permit a person, sitting
beside him or in any other part of the car, to interfere with him in the operation
of the motor vehicle, by allowing said person to take hold of the steering wheel,
or in any other manner take part in the manipulation or control of the car. Also,
the Government Corporate Counsel himself, who represents herein petitioner,
rendered two separate opinions (Op. No. 86, May 19, 1960; and Op. No. 99, series
of 1961) wherein, after analyzing the facts and the law applicable, he reached the
conclusion that the acts of the bus personnel, particularly "in allowing Mr. Abello
to drive despite two occasions when the bus stopped and the regular driver could
have taken over, constitute reckless imprudence and wanton injurious conduct on
the part of the MRR employees." On the basis of those opinions the Government
Corporate Counsel advised petitioner that the offer of the claimants was
reasonable and should be accepted. His advice, however, was not favorably acted
upon, petitioner obviously preferring to litigate.

55. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN vs. MARJORIE NAVIDAD
G.R. No. 145804, February 6, 2003 Vitug, J.
FACTS:
On 14 October 1993, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station
after purchasing a “token” (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was
standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard
assigned to the area approached Navidad and a misunderstanding or an
altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. Navidad
later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train,
operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the
moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. A complaint for damages was
then filed against Escartin, Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization Inc.
and Prudent for the death of Navidad. The RTC then held that Prudent and
Escartin were liable and it ordered them to pay jointly and severally the damages
for the death of Navidad. On appeal, the CA exonerated Prudent and Escartin
from any liability for the death of Navidad and held that LRTA and Roman jointly
and severally liable. It ruled that the contract of carriage had already existed
when Navidad entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after
paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the LRTA and Roman are liable for the death of Navidad.

RULING:
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such
duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not
only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its
premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.
Thus, in this case, the foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and
its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by
reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier.
In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier
may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider
or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier
is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner Roman himself is guilty of
any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to
say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical
relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for
his own fault or negligence.