DONATION CASES DOCTRINES

LIGUEZ V CA

1. DONATION; CAUSE OR CONSIDERATION; LIBERALITY OF DONOR WHEN

DEEMED "CAUSA".—Under Article 1274, of the Civil Code of 1889, liberality of
the donor is deemed causa only in those contracts that are of "pure" beneficence;
that is to say, contracts designed solely and exclusively to procure the welfare of
the beneficiary, without any intent of producing any satisfaction for the donor;
contracts, in other words, in which the idea of self-interest is totally absent on the
part of the transferor. For this very reason, the same Article 1274 provides that
in remuneratory contracts, the consideration is the service or benefit for which the
remuneration is given; causa is not liberality in these cases because the contract or
conveyance is not made out of pure beneficence, but "solvendi animo".
2.
ID.; ID.; MOTIVE WHEN REGARDED AS "CAUSA."—The motive of the parties
may be regarded as causa when it predetermines the purpose of the contract.

1. 3.ID.; DONATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY BY THE HUSBAND, EFFECT

OF.—The right of the husband to donate community property is strictly limited by
law (Articles 1409, 1413, 1415, Civil Code of 1889; Baello vs. Villanueva, 54 Phil.
213). However, the donation made in contravention of the law is not void in its
entirety, but only in so far as it prejudices the interest of the wife. The rule applies
whether the donation is gratuitous or for a consideration.

1. 4.ID. ; ID.; LEGITIME OF FORCED HEIRS UNAFFECTED; LEGITIME, How

COMPUTED.—The forced heirs are entitled to have the donation set aside in so far
as inofficious; i.e., in excess of the portion of free disposal (Civil Code of 1889, Arts.
636, 654), computed as provided in Articles 818 and 819, and bearing in mind that
"collationable gifts" under Article 818 should include gifts made not only in favor of
the forced heirs, but even those made in favor of strangers. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, May 4, 1889 and June 16, 1902.)

1. 5."PARI DELICTO;" PARTIES TO ILLEGAL CONTRACT BARRED FROM

PLEADING ILLEGALITY OF BARGAIN.—The rule that parties to an illegal
contract, if equally guilty, will not be aided by the law but will both be left where it
finds them, has been interpreted by this Court as barring the party from pleading
the illegality of the bargain either as a cause of action or as a defense.

1. 6.ACCESSION; RULES GOVERNING IMPROVEMENTS MADE IN GOOD

FAITH.—Improvements made in good faith are governed by the rules of accession
and possession in good faith.

DE LUNA V ABRIGO

Civil Law; Donations; Article 764 of the New Civil Code does not apply to onerous
donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations
are governed by the rules on Contracts.—It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil
Code, actions for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from
the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation. However, it is Our opinion that said
article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733
providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts.
Same; Same; Same; The rules on contracts and the general rules on prescription and
not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar.—In the light of the above, the
rules on contracts and the general rules on prescription and not the rules on donations are
applicable in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; The stipulation under paragraph 11 of the Revival of Donation
Intervivos not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is
valid and binding upon the foundation who voluntarily consented thereto.—Under Article
1306 of the New Civil Code, the parties to a contract have the right “to establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.” Paragraph 11 of
the “Revival of Donation Intervivos, has provided that” violation of any of the conditions
(herein) shall cause the automatic reversion of the donated area to the donor, his heirs, x x
x, without the need of executing any other document for that purpose and without
obligation on the part of the DONOR.” Said stipulation not being contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy, is valid and binding upon the foundation who
voluntarily consented thereto.

Same; Same; Same; Nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into an
agreement that violation of the terms of the contract would cause cancellation thereof even
without court intervention.—“x x x There is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties
from entering into agreement that violation of the terms of the contract would cause
cancellation thereof, even without court intervention. In other words, it is not always
necessary for the injured party to resort to court for rescission of the contract.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial intervention necessary not for purposes of obtaining
a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded but in order to
determine whether or not the rescission was proper.—It is clear, however, that judicial
intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a
contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even
without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was
proper.

HEIRS OF VELASQUEZ V CA

Property; Donations; Partition; An action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no
rightful interest over the subject property.—In actions for partition, the court cannot
properly issue an order to divide the property unless it first makes a determination as to
the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the
first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie if
the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact, Section. 1 of Rule 69
requires the party filing the action to state in his complaint the “nature and the extent of
his title” to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of the properties.
Same; Same; Same; A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective
transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee and the donation is perfected
from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. And once a donation is
accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.—A donation as a
mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over the property from
the donor to the donee and the donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of
the acceptance by the donee. And once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property donated. The donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino
spouses to petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez who were then nineteen (19) and ten
(10) years old respectively was accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the
acceptance was incorporated in the body of the same deed of donation and made part of it,
and was signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was delivery and
acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The donation
inter vivos may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the
Civil Code. The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second parcel became
the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of donation propter nuptias
can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the other causes mentioned in
article 86 of the Family Code. The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e., that
the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their properties since Anatalia (Leoncia’s
sister) had several children to support is not one of the grounds for revocation of donation
either inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation might be inofficious.

GONZALES V CA

Same; Same; To be considered a “credible witness” to a will it is not mandatory that

witness’ good community standing and probity be first established.—In fine, We state the
rule that the instrumental witnesses in order to be competent must be shown to have the
qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under
Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to
credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record that the witnesses
have a good standing in the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is
established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and
their testimonies must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will they have
attested.
Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; Contracts; A will duly acknowledged before a notary
public has in its favor the presumption of regularity, as for example, regarding the date
when the notary was furnished the residence certificates of the witnesses.—But whether
Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the
witnesses on a prior occasion or on the very occasion and date in April 15, 1961 when the
will was executed, is of no moment for such data appear in the notarial acknowledgment of
Notary Public Cipriano Paraiso, subscribed and sworn to by the witnesses on April 15, 1961
following the attestation clause duly executed and signed on the same occasion, April 15,
1961. And since Exhibit “F” is a notarial will duly acknowledged by the testatrix and the
witnesses before a notary public, the same is a public document executed and attested
through the intervention of the notary public and as such public document is evidence of
the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the
presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant.
Same; Same; Same; Findings that testatrix dictated her will to her attorney without
any note is a finding of fact.—It is also a factual findings of the Court of Appeals in holding
that it was credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will, Exhibit “F”, without
any note or document to Atty. Paraiso as against the contention of petitioner that it was
incredible.
Same; Same; Same; Attestation clause best evidence of date the will was signed.—The
attestation clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the best evidence as to the date of signing
because it preserves in permanent form a recital of all the material facts attending the
execution of the will. This is the very purpose of the attestation clause which is made for
the purpose of preserving in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution
of the will, so that in case of failure in the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other
casualty they may still be proved.
Same; Same; Same; Fact that there was conflict of testimony as to identity of
photographer who took a photograph of the signing and attestation of the will, not a
requirement of law, is of minor importance. What matters most is the photograph itself.—
The law does not require a photographer for the execution and attestation of the will. The
fact that Miss Orobia mistakenly identified the photographer as Cesar Mendoza scarcely
detracts from her testimony that she was present when the will was signed because what
matters here is not the photographer but the photograph taken which clearly portrays
Matilde Orobia herself, her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, Isabel
Gabriel and Atty. Paraiso.”
Same; Same; It cannot be expected that the testimony of all the witness will be identical
in all their minutest details.—These are indeed unimportant details which could have been
affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory such that by themselves
would not alter the probative value of their testimonies on the true execution of the will,
(Pascua vs. de la Cruz, 28 SCRA 421, 424) for it cannot be expected that the testimony of
every person will be identical and coinciding with each other with regard to details of an
incident and that witnesses are not expected to remember all details. Human experience
teach us “that contradictions of witnesses generally occur in the details of certain incidents,
after a long series of questionings, and far from being an evidence.

IMPERIAL V CA

Civil Law; Property; Succession; Legitime; A claim for legitime does not amount to a
claim of title.—Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount
to a claim of title. In the recent case of Vizconde vs. Court of Appeals, we declared that what
is brought to collation is not the donated property itself, but the value of the property at the
time it was donated. The rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation which
conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any deterioration or
loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.
Same; Same; Prescription; Prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an
inofficious donation.—What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of
an inofficious donation? The Civil Code specifies the following instances of reduction or
revocation of donations: (1) four years, in cases of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition
or adoption of a child; (2) four years, for non-compliance with conditions of the donation;
and (3) at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled to support, for
failure of the donor to reserve property for his or their support. Interestingly, donations as
in the instant case, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of
legitime, are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason we must
resort to the ordinary rules of prescription.
Same; Same; Same; Actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues.—Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code,
actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time
the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation
to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent
that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
Same; Same; Same; The cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the
donor-decedent.—From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs.
Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a donation propter
nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of
the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained
and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined.

CALANASAN V SPOUSES DOLORITO

Civil Law; Donations; Classifications of Donations.—In Republic of the Phils. v. Silim, 356
SCRA 1 (2001), we classified donations according to purpose. A pure/simple donation is the
truest form of donation as it is based on pure gratuity. The remuneratory/compensatory
type has for its purpose the rewarding of the donee for past services, which services do not
amount to a demandable debt. A conditional/modal donation, on the other hand, is a
consideration for future services; it also occurs where the donor imposes certain conditions,
limitations or charges upon the donee, whose value is inferior to the donation given. Lastly,
an onerous donation imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation; this is made for a
valuable consideration whose cost is equal to or more than the thing donated.
Same; Same; Onerous Donations; Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that
donations with an onerous cause are governed not by the law on donations but by the rules
on contracts, as held in the cases of Carlos v. Ramil, L-6736, September 5, 1911, 20 Phil.
183; Manalo vs. de Mesa, L-9449, February 12, 1915, 29 Phil. 495. The same rules apply
under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof.—In De Luna v. Judge Abrigo,
181 SCRA 150 (1990), we recognized the distinct, albeit old, characterization of onerous
donations when we declared: “Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations
with an onerous cause are governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on
contracts, as held in the cases of Carlos v. Ramil, L-6736, September 5, 1911, 20 Phil.
183, Manalo vs. de Mesa, L-9449, February 12, 1915, 29 Phil. 495.” In the same case, we
emphasized the retention of the treatment of onerous types of donation, thus: “The same
rules apply under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which provides:
Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts,
and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion
which exceeds the value of the burden imposed.” We agree with the CA that since the
donation imposed on the donee the burden of redeeming the property for P15,000.00, the
donation was onerous. As an endowment for a valuable consideration, it partakes of the
nature of an ordinary contract; hence, the rules of contract will govern and Article 765 of
the New Civil Code finds no application with respect to the onerous portion of the donation.
VICTORIA V PIDLAOAN

Same; Simulated Documents; A document is absolutely simulated when the parties

have no intent to bind themselves at all, while it is relatively simulated when the parties
concealed their true agreement.—There are two types of simulated documents — absolute
and relative. A document is absolutely simulated when the parties have no intent to bind
themselves at all, while it is relatively simulated when the parties concealed their true
agreement. The true nature of a contract is determined by the parties’ intention, which can
be ascertained from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts. In the present case, Elma
and Normita’s contemporaneous and subsequent acts show that they were about to have
the contract of sale notarized but the notary public ill-advised them to execute a deed of
donation instead. Following this advice, they returned the next day to have a deed of
donation notarized. Clearly, Elma and Normita intended to enter into a sale that would
transfer the ownership of the subject matter of their contract but disguised it as a donation.
Thus, the deed of donation subsequently executed by them was only relatively simulated.

THE MISSIONARY SISTERS V ALZONA

Civil Law; Donations; Elements of.—In order that a donation of an immovable property
be valid, the following elements must be present: (a) the essential reduction of the
patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; (c) the intent to do
an act of liberality or animus donandi; (d) the donation must be contained in a public
document; and (e) that the acceptance thereof be made in the same deed or in a separate
public instrument; if acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor must be
notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both instruments.
Same; Same; Under Article 737 of the Civil Code, “[t]he donor’s capacity shall be
determined as of the time of the making of the donation.” By analogy, the legal capacity or
the personality of the donee, or the authority of the latter’s representative, in certain cases, is
determined at the time of acceptance of the donation.—Under Article 737 of the Civil Code,
“[t]he donor’s capacity shall be determined as of the time of the making of the donation.” By
analogy, the legal capacity or the personality of the donee, or the authority of the latter’s
representative, in certain cases, is determined at the time of acceptance of the donation.
Article 738, in relation to Article 745, of the Civil Code provides that all those who are not
specifically disqualified by law may accept donations either personally or through an
authorized representative with a special power of attorney for the purpose or with a general
and sufficient power.