TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty.

Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

VI. LIABILITY FOR ACT OR OMISSION independently, are in combination the direct and proximate
cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury
A. BY THE TORTFEASORS and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.
Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and
are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Art. 2194
of the Civil Code.”
LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES v. GLODEL
BROKERAGE RVP: The nature of liability of Loadmasters was quasi-delict
(there was absence of contract between Loadmasters and
FACTS: Columbia). While the nature of liability of Glodel was
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and contractual (between Columbia and Glodel). As such,
withdrawal of the electric copper cathodes, which was Loadmasters is not privy to the contact of the two entities.
insured by R&B Insurance, from the pier and subsequent However, Loadmasters and Glodel were made liable solidarily
delivery to its warehouse in Bulacan and Valenzuela. Glodel, by the Court, where the plaintiff can actually recover from any
in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the of them.
delivery of the cargoes to Columbia’s warehouses.
Glodel was made liable because it failed to ensure that the
Out of the six trucks en route to Bulacan, only five reached Loadmasters will eventually deliver the cargo to the
the destination. Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim warehouse. While Loadmasters was held liable because of its
for insurance indemnity. Upon payment by the latter, it failure to deliver the copper cathodes occasioned by the
thereafter filed a complaint for damages against both liability of its employees, therefore, there is a presumption that
Loadmasters and Glodel, seeking reimbursement of the Loadmasters itself is liable. There is vicarious liability,
amount it paid to Columbia. where the employer is liable for the negligent act of its
employees. The liability is hinge upon the failure to
ISSUE: either select or supervise the employees in the case.
Who between Glodel and Loadmasters, is liable for
reimbursement to R&B Insurance? Note: In this case, Glodel did not interpose a cross-claim
against Loadmasters, hence it cannot seek judicial sanction
HELD: against the latter. (In short, Glodel ra makabayad)
Both Glodel and Loadmasters are jointly and severally liable
to R&B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo.
B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
With regards to Loadmasters’ liability, the cargo was lost
while in the custody of Loadmasters whose employees Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Articcle 2176 is
(truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but
or robbery of the shipment. Hence, it should be made also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
answerable for the damages caused by its employees who
acted within the scope of their assigned task of delivering The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
the goods safely to the warehouse. mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
With regards to Glodel, it failed to ensure that Loadmasters
would fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
the subject cargo to the designated destination. It should incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live
have been more prudent in entrusting the goods to in their company.
Loadmasters by taking precautionary measures, such
as providing escorts to accompany the trucks in The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
delivering the cargoes. are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter
”Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
and each is an efficient cause without which the injury
would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
any or all of the responsible persons although under the their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them engaged in any business or industry.
was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the
injured person was not the same. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through
a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in
omissions of two or more persons, although acting which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be,
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an
custody. innocent prank not unusual among children at play and
which no parent, however careful, would have any special
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her
damage. upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to
her parents.
b.1 PARENTS
RVP: The suit was against the parents although it was their
child’s wrongdoing. Hence, there is a presumption that there is
Art. 221, Family Code. Parents and other persons a vicarious liability. The parent has no control with respect to
exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the the said incident because, generally, when the child is being
injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of sent to school, there is a transfer of accountability to the
their unemancipated children living in their company and teachers, they are considered as substitute parents, locus
under their parental authority subject to he appropriate parentis.
defenses provided by law.
Question: Does it mean to say that for anything that the child
RA 6809 will do in the school, the parents will not have any control?
AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM How about a persistent bully? How about if the parents kept
TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS on encouraging their child that he is the strongest thereby
making him a bully in school?
Sec. 1. Art. 234 of EO No. 209, the Family Code of the
Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows: RVP: No. Unless you can prove any trait in the child’s
character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing
“Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided,
majority commences at the age of eighteen years.” Question: Mutatis mutandis, could the teachers prevent the
case?
CUADRA v. MONFORT
RVP: Still no because it was something that is done in jest,
FACTS: not usually seen as foreseeable. Also, there was no showing
Cuadra (12), Monfort (13) were assigned to weed the grass that the teacher was there.
in their school premises. Monfort found a headband.
Jokingly, she said aloud that she had found an earthworm LIBI v. IAC
and to frighten Cuadra, tossed the object at her. At that
precise moment, Cuadra turned around to face her friend FACTS:
and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, Respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of the
she rubbed her injured eye and treated it with some deceased Julie Ann Gotiong; While petitioners are the
powder. The said incident led her to lose the sight of her parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19
right eye. years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also
died in the same event on the same date. Julie Ann Gotiong
ISSUE: and Wendell Libi were formerly sweethearts. As a result of
WON the father of Monfort could be held liable for the injury the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed a Civil Case
caused by his daughter. against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising
from the latter's vicarious liability under Art. 2180 of the
HELD: Civil Code.
NO. When the law refers to “all the diligence of a good
father of the family to prevent damage,” it implies a ISSUE:
consideration of the attendant circumstances in every WON the petitioners are liable for damages.
individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise
of such diligence, the damage could have been prevented. HELD:
Yes. The petitioners were found to have not exercised the
ITCAB, there is nothing from which it may be inferred that due diligence of a good father of the family. The diligence
the defendant could have prevented the damage by the of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and
observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the
the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were
such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently
his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority concerned may be given retroactive effects.
and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of
Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered that he was HELD:
a CANU agent and that Cresencio's gun was missing from No. The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of
the safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their minor children living with them, may be seen to be
their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code
activities of their children who, for all they know, may be upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an
engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers,or unemancipated child living with its parents commits a
even drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation given tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance
for the photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child
dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, holding uptight who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is,
what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he in other words, anchored upon parental authority
was in possession of that firearm. coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the
discharge of the duties accompanying such
RVP: The important factor that made the Court say that the authority.
parents were indeed remiss in supervising Wendell was when
they were not aware that he was an Informant of the During the incident, the parental authority was still lodged
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU). As it was established in respondent spouse, the natural parents of the child. It
that they were being negligent, their liability as parents was would thus follow that the natural parents who had then
primary. The difference between primary and subsidiary is that actual custody of the minor are the indispensable parties to
in primary, the parents are directly and immediately held liable the suit for damages.
without impleading the erring child. While in subsidiary, there
has to be conviction and insolvency first of the person directly RVP: Parental authority presupposes that the parents have
responsible before one could be held subsidiarily liable. actual control. In this case, there was no control and no
custody of the child by the adoptive parents who were in the
Note: If parents are involved, they are primarily liable, United States when the incident happened. It would be absurd
absolutely, whether it would be quasi-delict or culpa ex to hold them liable for failure to control and supervise the child
delicto. But if the person liable is the employee, the employer’s who was remotely connected to them. The basis for parental
liability for culpa-aquiliana is primary and direct, but for civil liability under the vicarious liability is parental authority which
liability ex delicto, it’s only subsidiary. comes with it instructing, controlling and supervising the
child.
Both pertains to vicarious liability - of parents and employers.
Moreover, the defense of the exercise of diligence of a good
There is a need to distinguish between the liabilities because it father of a family cannot even be interposed by the adoptive
affects the defenses that should be alleged. In primary, a parents because there was no control, custody or supervision
person could alleged as a defense that he exercises the to begin with by them.
diligence of a good father of a family. This defense is only
available in primary and not in subsidiary (in the context of an Note: While Art 2180 mentions father first and in the
employer) because aside from the fact that the same is alternative, the mother, that has been completely amended by
provided under the law, such defense is actually useless where the Family Code. The parents are right away held solidarily
employer could be held liable post-conviction of the employee liable and can both be impleaded in the court, not in the
and that the employee is insolvent. He cannot interpose such alternative.
defense during trial. Unlike if the person is primarily liable (in
the context of the parents), they were the people who were Question: What if the child is illegitimate?
impleaded, which means, they could interpose such defense
during trial. RVP: The standard under the law is the control and
supervision over the actuations of the child. The law does not
TAMARGO v. CA speak of legitimacy or filiation or extent of relationship. Hence,
the law still applies to illegitimate children.
FACTS:
Adelberto Bundoc, 10 yrs. old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with Example: If the niece has lived with the aunt for several years
an air rifle which caused her subsequent death. Prior to the and there was no other person who exercises parental
said incident, Sps. Sabas Rapusira filed a case to adopt supervision over her, there could be no one who could be held
Adelberto. This petition was granted after Adelberto shot liable other than the aunt.
Jennifer. Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against
the respondents, Adelberto’s natural parents. However, the Note: What the law says is that the child should be living in
respondents interposed that the parental authority of the parents’ company. It is important because it demonstrates
Adelberto shifted to the adoptive parents. custody and custody translates to control.
ISSUE:
WON the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is Example:. If the child ran away from home, the parents lose
custody and supervision over the child.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

wrongly informed petitioner.

b.2 GUARDIANS
CASTILEX INDUSTRIES v. VASQUEZ
The liability of guardians is applied by analogy.
FACTS:
Art. 217, Family Code. In case of foundlings, abandoned, Vasquez, son of the respondents was driving a motorcycle
neglected or abused children and other children similarly around Fuente counter-clockwise with no protective gears
situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary and with a SP to drive only. While Abad, manager of
judicial proceedings to heads of children’s homes, Castilex drove the company car he’s using against the flow
orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the of the traffic going through Gen. Maxilom St. In the process,
proper government agency. the two collided with each other causing severe injuries to
the former. An action for damages was then commenced by
respondents.
b.3 OWNERS AND MANAGERS OF
ESTABLISHMENTS ISSUES:
(1) WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the
SPS. VILORIA v. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC (CAI) death resulting from the negligent operation by a
managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.
FACTS: (2) WON Abad was performing acts within the range of his
Fernando bought airline tickets on board CAI after Mager of employment.
Holiday Travel informed him that there were no available
seats of Amtrak. One time, when Fernando saw an Amtrak HELD:
station and made inquiries thereto, he was told that there (1) Yes. The phrase “even though the former are not
were available seats anytime. And so he confronted the engaged in any business or industry” found in the 5th
agent about misleading him to buying CAI tickets. He asked paragraph of Art. 2180 should be interpreted to mean that
for refund for the tickets but Mager denied it. it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any
business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his
ISSUE: employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned
WON continental airlines is liable for the act of the agent of task. Whether or not engaged in any business or industry,
the travel agency. an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees
within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to
HELD: establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is
No. If the passenger's cause of action against the airline done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable,
company is premised on culpa-aquiliana or quasi-delict for a that the employee was acting within the scope of his
tort committed by the employee of the airline company's assigned task when the tort complained of was committed.
agent, there must be an independent showing that the It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to
airline company was at fault or negligent or has contributed interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and
to the negligence or tortious conduct committed by the supervision of the employee.
employee of its agent.
(2) No. The mere fact that Abad was using a service vehicle
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code does not make the principal at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient
vicariously liable for the tort committed by its agent's to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation
employees and the principal-agency relationship per se does of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the
not make the principal a party to such tort; hence, the need vehicle within the course or scope of his employment.
to prove the principal's own fault or negligence.
RVP: Castilex wanted their case to fall under the 4 th paragraph
A person's vicarious liability is anchored on his possession of of Art. 2180 because there is a geographical limitation. In this
control, whether absolute or limited, on the tortfeasor. case, the incident happened in Fuente Osmena Circle, where
Without such control, there is nothing which could justify Abad was not in the service of the branches of Castilex. Also,
extending the liability to a person other than the one who the 5th paragraph does not apply to those who are not
committed the tort. engaged in business per se. However, the court said that the
5th paragraph actually expands the limitations of the 4 th
Therefore, without evidence that CAI exercised control over paragraph in terms of employer coverage and acts included.
Holiday Travel’s employees or that CAI was equally at fault,
no liability can be imposed on CAI for Mager’s supposed
misrepresentation.

RVP: How is there a vicarious liability of owners and managers

of establishments in this case? Because according to the
petitioner, there is a principal-agent relationship between CAI
and Holiday Travels, in which Mager was an employee, who

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

ART. 2180 PARAGRAPH 4 v. PARAGRAPH 5 No. It may be gathered from the context of Art. 2180 that
the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is
used in the sense of "employer". Hence, under the
Art. 2180 (4) Art. 2180 (5)
allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual
liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-
owners and managers of an employers in general,
American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular
establishment or enterprise whether or not engaged in
accident already mentioned because he himself may be
any business or industry
regarded as an employee of his employer, Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc.
covers negligent acts of encompasses negligent acts
employees committed either of employees acting within
RVP: The interpretation of the word manager (in paragraph 4)
in the service of the the scope of their assigned
is not the managers by designation or of hierarchy but
branches or on the occasion task
managers as owners of the establishment. Ultimately, they will
of their functions
be the one who has the opportunity to select, control and
supervise the employees.
TESTS: “Acts done within the scope of the employer’s
assigned tasks” Note: It is not the nomenclature that will control but the
ownership of the establishment.
(1) THE FURTHERANCE TEST
RVP:
Any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of
the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of Will par. 4 be rendered useless considering that it was
the infliction of the injury or damages already expanded by 5?

(2) THE SPECIAL BUSINESS BENEFIT TEST Not necessarily because there can be standards that you can
find under par. 4 but not in par. 5. It appears that it would be
Even if it’s not falling under the specific functions of the irrelevant but there are cases where it will fall under par 4.
employee, but then at the time of the accident, there was
actually a special business benefit that inured to the employer, Under par. 5, it is not absolutely required that the
then the employer will be liable. establishment is a going concern, being employers in general,
it doesn’t have to be that you are engaged in a business. It
Example: The employer may, however, be liable where he could be that you are not into business, however, you still
derives some special benefit from having the employee drive engaged the services of some individuals as employees (such
home in the employer's vehicle as when the employer benefits as drivers, gardener, house-helper, in charitable institutions or
from having the employee at work earlier and, presumably, churches, etc.)
spending more time at his actual duties.
Is it possible that you are not engaged in business but
(3) SPECIAL ERRAND/ ROVING COMMISION RULE you are having employees?

Where the employee’s duties require him to circulate in a Yes.

general area with no fixed place or hours of work, or to go to
and from his home to various outside places of work, and his Taking into consideration that in our country, even if
employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work, the the person is above 18, he or she is still within the
employee continues in the service of his employer until he custody of their parents, can we make a case out of it?
actually reaches home.
Even if now, the law says that the age of majority is 18, you
PHIL. BUS RABBIT v. PHIL-AM FORWARDERS can still make a case until the age of 21. You can use as a
defense the case of Tamargo and the Family Code, that even
FACTS: ages 21-25, there is still a need for parental authority to
Pineda was driving a truck owned by the defendant when it contract a marriage. However, this boils down to a case-to-
bumped the bus driven and owned by plaintiffs. A complaint case basis. Even in the Taylor case, it was decided that it is not
for damages based on culpa-aquiliana was filed against Phil- a matter of age but the level of intelligence.
Am Forwarders and Balingit as manager of the company.
How about those who are living in a boarding house,
ISSUE: who are below 18, who has control over it?
Whether the terms “employer” and “owners and managers
of an establishment or enterprise” embrace the manager of It would be much easier to reason out that the parents has no
a corporation. control considering the distance, it would be impossible for
them to know the whereabouts of their child.
HELD:

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

b.4 EMPLOYERS driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of

the doctrine of vicarious liability. In sum, Mayor Miguel
Claims Against Employers for the Acts of Their cannot be held liable because he is neither the employer of
Employees Lozano nor the owner of the vehicle. SC also said that the
municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the
SPS. JAIME v. APOSTOL State engaged in governmental functions and, hence,
FACTS: immune from suit. (Liability attaches to the registered
Mayor Fernando Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer.)
on board an Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an
employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up
truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their
but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. employees, the following requisites must be established:
Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring
Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his (1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally
Manila flight. The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. or through another;
Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National (2) That the service to be rendered is in accordance with
Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato. Sps. orders which the employer has the authority to give at all
Jayme filed a complaint for damages. times; and
(3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or
ISSUE: by reason of the functions entrusted to him.
WON a municipal mayor may be held solidarily liable for the
negligent acts of the driver assigned to him, which resulted LOANED EMPLOYEE. An employer-employee relationship
in the death of a minor pedestrian? still exists even if the employee was loaned by the employer to
another person or entity because control over the employee
HELD: subsists.
No. Art. 218016 of the Civil Code provides that a person is
not only liable for one's own quasi delictual acts, but also Mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that
for those persons for whom one is responsible for. This the passenger has control over the vehicle nor does it render
liability is popularly known as vicarious or imputed liability. one the employer of the driver.
To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their
employees, the following requisites must be established: (1) DRIVER’S DUTY MAY NOT BE DELEGATED. The failure of
That the employee was chosen by the employer personally a passenger to assist the driver, by providing him warnings or
or through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in by serving him as a lookout, does not make the passenger
accordance with orders which the employer has the liable for the latter’s negligent acts. The driver’s duty is not one
authority to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of that may be delegated to others.
the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the
functions entrusted to him. RVP: It was alleged that because the passenger was a
municipal mayor and allegedly he is presumed to have moral
Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs ascendancy over the driver then in that specific instance then
5 and 6 of Art. 2180, it must be established that the the driver of the municipality is the employee pro hac vice of
injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the the municipal mayor. But the SC said in that case that the first
employee was performing his functions. Furthermore, the element was wanting because the driver of the van was
employer-employee relationship cannot be assumed. It is actually the employee of the municipality and therefore the
incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the relationship by mayor has no chance and did not take part in the screening
preponderant evidence. In this case, the CA correctly held and selection of the employee. One of the important aspect in
that the Municipality of Koronadal was the employer of considering an ER-EE relationship, and you know this in your
Lozano and not Mayor Miguel. This is notwithstanding the labor classes, is the ability and the power of control. Because
fact that he was assigned to Mayor Miguel. Sps. Jayme’s with the power of selections comes with the power to dismiss
argument that Mayor Miguel had at least control and and in this case it is the municipality, as a public corporation
supervision is of no moment. It has been held before that that hired the driver and the municipal mayor is not deemed
the mere giving of instructions does not mean the the employer in this specific instance. The fact that the driver
passenger has control over the vehicle. No negligence may in that case was loaned momentarily to the municipal mayor,
be imputed against a fellow employee although the person does not establish an employer-employee relationship and the
may have the right to control the manner of the vehicle's fact that the mayor can actually give instructions, can make
operation. In the absence of an employer-employee recommendations as to route or can discipline the driver at
relationship establishing vicarious liability, the driver's that specific moment does not make the mayor liable for the
negligence should not be attributed to a fellow employee acts of the driver because no amount of disciplining or control
who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle. can actually prevent the damage because the SC
acknowledged that the driver’s duty cannot be delegated and
Whatever right of control the occupant may have over the therefore the general rule attaches that is the question as to
whether who selected and who was responsible for the

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

selection and supervision of the driver which in this case was true employer of Peña and Gaddi.
the municipality of Koronadal.
In the case of Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, the Court enunciated
MAMARIL v. BOY SCOUT OF THE PHILS. thus: It is settled that where the security agency, as here,
recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or
FACTS: security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards
and watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts
Spouses Benjamin C. Mamaril and Sonia P. Mamaril (Sps. committed by the security guards attaches to the employer
Mamaril) are jeepney operators since 1971. They would agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency.
park their six (6) passenger jeepneys every night at the Boy As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency
Scout of the Philippines' (BSP) compound. one of the has no hand in selecting who among the pool of security
vehicles with Plate No. DCG 392 was missing and was never guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be
recovered. According to the security guards Cesario Peña assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good
(Peña) and Vicente Gaddi (Gaddi) of AIB Security Agency, father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in
Inc. (AIB) with whom BSP had contracted for its security the ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client
and protection, a male person who looked familiar to them whose premises or property are protected by the security
took the subject vehicle out of the compound. Sps. Mamaril guards.
filed a complaint for damages before RTC against BSP, AIB,
Pena and Gaddi (guards). The fact that a client company may give instructions or
directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by
ISSUE: itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the
WON Boy Scout of the Philippines can be held liable as an security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts
employer. or omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily
no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract
HELD: for services entered into with the security agency. Art. 1868
The petition lacks merit. Art. 20 of the Civil Code provides states that "[b]y the contract of agency, a person binds
that every person, who, contrary to law, willfully or himself to render some service or to do something in
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or
latter for the same. Similarly, Art. 2176 of the Civil Code authority of the latter." The basis for agency therefore is
states: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes representation, which element is absent in the instant case.
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or Records show that BSP merely hired the services of AIB,
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation which, in turn, assigned security guards, solely for the
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed protection of its properties and premises. Nowhere can it be
by the provisions of this Chapter. In this case, it is inferred in the Guard Service Contract that AIB was
undisputed that the proximate cause of the loss of Sps. appointed as an agent of BSP. Instead, what the parties
Mamaril's vehicle was the negligent act of security guards intended was a pure principal-client. The mishandling of the
Peña and Gaddi in allowing an unidentified person to drive parked vehicles that resulted in herein complained loss
out the subject vehicle. should be recovered only from the tortfeasors (guards) and
their employer AIB, not against lessor BSP.
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security
intervening cause, produces the injury or loss, and without guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients
which the result would not have occurred. Moreover, Peña or customers of such agency.
and Gaddi failed to refute Sps. Mamaril's contention that
they readily admitted being at fault during the investigation The fact that a client company may give instructions or
that ensued. On the other hand, the records are bereft of directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by
any finding of negligence on the part of BSP. Hence, no itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the
reversible error was committed by the CA in absolving it security guards concerned; the instructions or directions are
from any liability for the loss of the subject vehicle based on ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the
fault or negligence. contract for services entered into with the security agency.

Neither will the vicarious liability of an employer under Art. RVP: There is no ER-EE relationship between the employees
2180 of the Civil Code apply in this case. It is uncontested of the agency which is AIB and the principal, which is Boy
that Peña and Gaddi were assigned as security guards by Scout of the Philippines. There may only be an ER-EE
AIB to BSP pursuant to the Guard Service Contract. Clearly, relationship in certain exceptions or circumstances as to
therefore, no employer employee relationship existed payment of wages for example. Therefore, because of the
between BSP and the security guards assigned in its absence of ER-EE relationship, BSP cannot be held liable in this
premises. Consequently, the latter's negligence cannot be case. The mere fact that the BSP was able to give instructions
imputed against BSP but should be attributed to AIB, the to the security guard does not create the nexus required for
vicarious liability and the SC actually acknowledge in this case

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

that it is normal for the principal to actually give directions to even if such act or omission he committed while they are
the loaned security guard pursuant to the contract with the not in the performance of their duties. Finally, no
agency or between the principal and the independent negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers
contractor. Therefore the absence of the crucial role of ER-EE to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-
relationship, then BPS could not be held liable in this case. spouses.
ART 2180 (4) – Employers shall be liable for the
damages cause by their employees and household (3) On the third issue, no moral nor exemplary damages
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses. The case
even though the former are not engaged in any at bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant moral
business or industry. damages. Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v. CA besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similarly injury. Though incapable of
FACTS: pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
Ferdinand Castillo a freshman student at St. Francis HS they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful
wanted to join a school picnic but his parents did not allow act or omission. Moreover, as already pointed out
him because of short notice. However, his parents allowed hereinabove, petitioners are not guilty of any fault or
him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic with a negligence, hence, no moral damages can be assessed
directive to go back home after doing so. However, because against them.
of the persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with
them to the beach. During the picnic and while the students In St. Francis High School v. CA the Supreme Court held that:
and teachers were in the water, one of the female teachers
was drowning. Some students including Ferdinand came to (1) Art. 2180 (4) does not apply.
recuse, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who (2) No negligence could be attributable to the teachers to
drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate warrant the award of damages.
him ashore failed. Spouses filed a complaint against the
school for damages which respondents incurred from the Mere knowledge by the principal of the planning of the picnic
death of their 13 year old son. by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in
any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of
ISSUES: the same.
(1) WON there was negligence attributable to the
defendants damages which will warrant the award of RVP: The cooking of the adobo by the mother was found by
damages to the plaintiffs? the SC as an implied consent. Art. 2180 does not apply
(2) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the because the picnic was not school-sanctioned. The teachers
New Civil Code is applicable? were not acting within their assigned tasks and it happened at
(3) Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral a time that it was not a school day and not sanctioned by the
damages is proper? principal and it was not even part of the co-curricular activity
of the school.
HELD:
Under the law, it is clear that before an employer may be Therefore, it could not be said that the teachers in this case
held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or who have been sued were acting within the scope of their
omission which caused damage or prejudice must have assigned tasks. Because of that, there is no nexus between the
occurred while an employee was in the performance of his plaintiff and the accident and St. Francis Highschool. Your SC
assigned tasks. in this case provided a reason why teachers should act within
the scope of their assigned tasks. SC said that the contrary is
(1) Hence on the first issue, the teachers/petitioners were unreasonable for every omission, for every fault of the
not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The teachers whether within their assigned tasks or not, you will be
incident happened not within the school premises, not on a hailing employers to courts and that is unfair because
school day and most importantly while the teachers and employers cannot be deemed to have absolute control over
students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. This their employees all the time especially for acts which is not
picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, within the scope of their assigned tasks. Because of that there
Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school is no way that you can sue St. Francis Highschool.
sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an
extracurricular activity. Even then, the SC said that assuming that we can file a case
against the teachers, the teachers showed that they actually
(2) On the second issue, The application therefore of Art. exercised due diligence of a good father of a family. There are
2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any a lot of factual predicates that the Court considered. The fact
jurisprudence. If we were to affirm the findings of that they brought along PE instructors to serve as lifeguard,
respondent Court on this score, employers will forever be the fact that these lifeguards were able to perform first aid to
exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to the victim in this case. It had been shown that the teachers
answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees were able to exercise the required diligence to exculpate them

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

from liability. An important factor that the Court considered were to concede the status of an employee on
was the fact that they consented. The Court found out that the Funtecha, still the primary responsibility for his
parent were remiss in their duty because it took a time before wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer
they started looking for their child. The excuse that the father for the plain reason that at the time of the accident,
was busy and the mother as well was not accepted by the SC it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was
and therefore 2180 par 4 will not apply. not acting within the scope of his supposed
employment. His duty was to sweep the school passages
FILAMER CHRISTIAN v. CA for two hours every morning before his regular classes.
Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized
FACTS: driver at 6:30 in the evening and then driving the vehicle in
Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr (Kapunan)., an a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third
82 old retired schoolteacher (now deceased), was walking person were certainly not within the ambit of his assigned
along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the evening of tasks. In other words, at the time of the injury, Funtecha
October 20, 1977 and was struck by the Pinoy jeep was not engaged in the execution of the janitorial services
owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged for which he was employed, but for some purpose of his
employee, Funtecha. own. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the
full brunt of his tortious negligence.
ISSUE:
WON the term "employer" as used in Art. 2180 is applicable Petitioner Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages he
to petitioner Filamer with reference to Funtecha. had caused. Private respondents' attempt to hold petitioner
Filamer directly and primarily answerable to the injured
HELD: party under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code would have
CA decision is set-aside. The complaint for damages is prospered had they proceeded against Allan Masa, the
ordered DISMISSED as against petitioner Filamer authorized driver of the Pinoy jeep and indisputably an
Christian Institute for lack of cause of action. In employee of petitioner. It was Allan's irresponsible act of
disclaiming liability, petitioner Filamer has invoked entrusting the wheels of the vehicle to the inexperienced
the provisions of the Labor Code, 7 specifically Funtecha which set into motion the chain of events leading
Section 14, Rule X of Book III which reads: to the accident resulting in injuries to Kapunan, Sr. But
under the present set of circumstances, even if the trial
Sec. 14. Working Scholars— There is no employer-employee court did find Allan guilty of negligence, such conclusion
relationship between students on the one hand, and would not be binding on Allan. It must be recalled that Allan
schools, colleges or universities on the other, where was never impleaded in the complaint for damages and
students work for the latter in exchange for the privilege to should be considered as a stranger as far as the trial court's
study free of charge; provided the students are given real judgment is concerned. It is axiomatic that no man shall be
opportunity, including such facilities as may be reasonable, affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger.
necessary to finish their chosen courses under such
arrangement." In Filamer Christian Institute v. CA, the Supreme Court found
that:
It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of law,
petitioner Filamer cannot be considered as (1) Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha’s employer.
Funtecha's employer. Funtecha belongs to that special (2) In any case, Funtecha was not acting within the scope of
category of students who render service to the school in his supposed employment.
exchange for free tuition. Funtecha worked for petitioner for
two hours daily for five days a week. He was assigned to RVP: Filamer is a unique case. There is a specific regime
clean the school passageways from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. in the labor law that working students are not considered
with sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m. classes. As employees if the school where they work provided that they
admitted by Agustin Masa in open court, Funtecha was not are given reasonable opportunity to pursue their studies and
included in the company payroll. The wording of Section 14 because of that specific provision of law, then there is no ER-
is clear and explicit and leaves no room for equivocation. To EE relation and therefore a very important element for
dismiss the implementing rule as one which governs only vicarious liability is absent. SC was willing to take the
the "personal relationship" between the school and its argument of the plaintiff to its highest and even assumed that
students and not where there is already a third person Funtecha was an employee, Funtecha was not supposedly
involved, as espoused by private respondents, is to read acting within the scope of his employment. Under the
into the law something that was not legislated there in the circumstances, therefore no vicarious liability could attach on
first place. the part of the employer.

The provision of Section 14 is obviously intended to Question: I found out that this case was overturned. Two
eliminate an erstwhile gray area in labor relations and seeks years after this case (1990) was decided, in 1992, a MR was
to dene in categorical terms the precise status of working filed and so the decision was reversed. With regard to the
scholars in relation to the learning institutions in which they provision of the labor code, the SC said that that particular
work for the privilege of a free education. But even if we provision will not apply in this case because that specific rule

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

only provides guidelines on the matter on how the power of cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
the labor secretary should be exercised. So SC is saying that observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
the application of that specific provision in this case is prevent damage.
misplaced.
The “diligence of a good father” referred to in the last
RVP: The primordial consideration of the vicarious liability is paragraph means diligence in the selection and
the degree of control exercised by the person so charged. supervision of employees.

RVP’s Opinion: Therefore, so long as you can establish Note: All the enumerations in Art. 2180 is subject to
control it will form part as basis of the primordial reason why such diligence.
there was a reversal of decision by the Supreme Court,
otherwise, it would be easy for employers or any educational FACTS:
institutions, as in the case at bar, to evade or escape liability Baliwag Transit Bus 117 was driven by Juanito Fidel to its
on that simple provision of law. While there is no employer- terminal for repair of its brake system. Fidel told the
employee relationship, if the element of control is being mechanic Mario Dionisio to inform the headman about the
exercised by the educational institution with respect to the matter. Fidel alighted from the bus and told the gasman to
working student, then you can easily establish the nexus, even fill up the tank. Fidel returned to the bus and sat on the
if on paper, you will say that there is no employer-employee driver’s seat. Suddenly the bus moved; he felt something
relationship. was hit. When he went down to investigate he saw Mariano
lying on the ground bleeding and convulsive, sandwiched
What dictates then is the exact nature of the relationship as between Bus No. 117 and another bus parked there owned
born out on the ground or as operationalized on the ground by the same petitioner. Fidel and his co-employees all
and not as to whether there is a specific provision or helped in extricating Mariano. They rushed him to the
stipulation providing that he or she is not an employer or an hospital, however he expired.
employee, at the same time. That does not mean however that
such provision in the Labor Code is ineffective. It has its A complaint for damages was filed by the heirs of Mariano.
purposes for other reasons, but it could not potentially affect RTC ordered Baliwag and Juanito Fidel jointly and severally
the regime of Civil law especially on quasi-delict. liable. The CA affirmed the judgment with modifications.
Petitioners maintain that respondent CA erred in affirming
Question: Can Agustin Masa, the President of the school, who the appealed judgment despite the contributory negligence
is also the father of the authorized driver of the vehicle owned of the deceased Mario, i.e., in failing to take the necessary
by the school, be made liable in his own capacity as the precaution while doing repair work on the brake system of
father? Bus No. 117.

RVP: First, Allan Masa, the authorized driver and son of ISSUE:
Filamer President is no longer a minor. Second, unless you WON Baliwag Transit should be held solidarily liable
invoke piercing the veil of corporate fiction, Agustin can’t be
made liable because he has a separate personality from HELD:
Filamer. YES. Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176, of the Civil Code
provides that the employer of a negligent employee is liable
Question: How about if Allan is under the custody of Agustin? for the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is
caused by the negligence of an employee there instantly
RVP: The presumption of liability of the parent arises when arises a presumption of the law that there was negligence
the child is still a minor, but even so, if it can be proven that on the part of the employer either in the selection of his
he is not the typical type of minor, like in this case, he is employee or in the supervision over him after such
already the authorized driver of a vehicle, so it can be said that selection. The presumption however may be rebutted by a
the presumption of liability of a parent does not arise. clear showing on the part of the employer that it had
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family
Question: Does the Filamer case apply in cases of apprentices in the selection and supervision of his employee. Hence, to
and trainees? escape solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by an
employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it
RVP’s Opinion: We will have to check the provisions of the exercised such degree of care.
Labor Code in that respect. However for purposes of vicarious
liability, we will look at the ability of the person in charge to Petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the due
control the act of the erring apprentice or trainee. diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its driver Juanito Fidel will make it
BALIWAG TANSIT v. CA solidarily liable with the latter for damages caused by him.

PRINCIPLE: Driver Fidel should have known that his brake system was
Art. 2180 (8) - The responsibility treated in this article shall being repaired as he was in fact the one who told Mariano

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

Dionisio to do the repair. Fidel should have parked the bus breath. She asked for oxygen and later became cyanotic.
properly and safely. After alighting from the bus to tell the When brought to the ICY, she was showing signs of
gasman to fill the tank, he should have placed a stopper or amniotic fluid embolism.
any hard object against a tire or two of the bus. But without
taking the necessary precaution he boarded Bus No. 117 She was transferred to Cardinal Santos hospital. The
causing it to move and roll, pinning down the deceased doctors thereat found that she was suffering from
which resulted in his serious injuries and eventual death. rheumatic heart disease mitral stenosis with mild pulmonary
The reckless imprudence of Juanito Fidel makes him liable hypertension, which contributed to the onset of fluid in her
to the heirs of the offended party for damages together lung tissue (pulmonary edema). This development resulted
with his employer. in cardiopulmonary arrest and, subsequently, brain damage.
Regina lost the use of her speech, eyesight, hearing and
RVP: The Court made the petitioner liable because the limbs. She was discharged, still in a vegetative state.
presumption was not rebutted. The presumption is that
there was an omission on the part of the employer. Therefore, Respondent spouses Capanzana filed a complaint for
the employer has the burden of proof to show otherwise. Since damages against petitioner hospital, along with its co-
there was no documentary or testimonial evidence showing defendants.
that it exercises diligence of a good father, therefore the
presumption stands. The presumption that whenever the Respondents imputed negligence to Drs. Ramos and Santos
employee has committed negligent acts, the employer himself for the latter's failure to detect the heart disease of Regina,
or herself is negligent with his or her selection or supervision resulting in failure not only to refer her to a cardiologist for
of the same employee. cardiac clearance, but also to provide the appropriate
medical management before, during, and after the
Rebutting the Presumption: Claim Against the operation. They further stated that the nurses were
Employer for Employee’s Acts negligent for not having promptly given oxygen, and that
the hospital was equally negligent for not making available
Selection – Employers are required to examine them as to and accessible the oxygen unit on that same hospital floor
their qualifications, experience, and service records. (Q- at the time.
E-R)
Petitioner hospital claimed that there was no instruction to
Supervision – Employers should formulate SOPs, monitor the hospital or the staff to place Regina in a room with a
their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for standby oxygen tank. They also claimed that the nurses on
breaches duty had promptly attended to her needs.

The employer must nor merely present testimonial evidence to ISSUE:

prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of a WON petitioner hospital is negligent
family in the selection and supervision of his employee, but he
must also support such testimonial evidence with concrete or HELD:
documentary evidence. (Syki v. Begasa) YES. In this case, the expert testimony of witness for the
respondent Dr. Godfrey Robeniol, a neurosurgeon, provided
RVP: It is two-fold. Diligence in the Selection and Diligence in that the best time to treat hypoxic encephalopathy is at the
the Supervision. This should be highlighted because in one time of its occurrence; i.e., when the patient is experiencing
case, in Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital case, the SC agreed that difficulty in breathing and showing signs of cardiac arrest.
the Hospital was able to exercise diligence in selection.
However, it failed in the discharge of the diligence of To recall, the records, including petitioner's Nurses' Notes,
supervision. indisputably show that Regina complained of difficulty in
breathing before eventually showing signs of cyanosis.
OUR LADY OF LOURDES HOSPITAL v. SPOUSES When she was gasping for breath and turning cyanotic, it
CAPANZANA was the duty of the nurses to intervene immediately by
informing the resident doctor. Had they done so, proper
(Please read the full text because this is a long case.) oxygenation could have been restored and other
interventions performed without wasting valuable time. That
FACTS: such high degree of care and responsiveness was needed
Regina Capanzana, who was pregnant was brought to cannot be overemphasized - considering that according to
petitioner hospital for an emergency C-section. First expert medical evidence in the records, it takes only five
underwent a preoperative physical examination by Dr. minutes of oxygen deprivation for irreversible brain damage
Miriam Ramos (Dr. Ramos) and Dr. Milagros Joyce Santos, to set in. Indeed, the Court has emphasized that a higher
(Dr. Santos) the same attending physicians in her prior degree of caution and an exacting standard of diligence in
childbirths. She was found fit for anesthesia. Then she gave patient management and health care are required of a
birth. The following day, she complained of having a hospital's staff, as they deal with the lives of patients who
headache, a chilly sensation, restlessness, and shortness of seek urgent medical assistance. It is incumbent upon nurses

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to take precautions or undertake steps to safeguard formulation. What is more important is the actual
patients under their care from any possible injury that may implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance
arise in the course of the latter's treatment and care. with the rules. Understandably, this actual implementation
and monitoring should be the constant concern of the
The Court affirmed the findings of the courts below that the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who
negligent delay on the part of the nurses was the should regularly report on their supervisory functions. Thus,
proximate cause of the brain damage suffered by there must be proof of diligence in the actual supervision of
Regina. the employees' work.

For the negligence of its nurses, the petitioner is thus liable In the present case, there is no proof of actual supervision
under Art. 2180 in relation to Art. 2176 of the Civil Code. of the employees' work or actual implementation and
Under Art. 2180, an employer like petitioner hospital may be monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules. The
held liable for the negligence of its employees based on its testimony of petitioner's Assistant Nursing Service Director,
responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. The Lourdes H. Nicolas is belied by the actual records of
liability of the employer under this provision is "direct and petitioner. These show that Nurses David and Padolina had
immediate; it is not conditioned upon a prior recourse been observed to be latecomers and absentees; yet they
against the negligent employee or a prior showing of the were never sanctioned by those supposedly supervising
insolvency of that employee." The employer may only be them. While the question of diligent supervision depends on
relieved of responsibility upon a showing that it exercised the circumstances of employment, the Court finds that by
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection the very nature of a hospital, the proper supervision of the
and supervision of its employees. The rule is that once attendance of its nurses, who are its frontline health
negligence of the employee is shown, the burden is on the professionals, is crucial considering that patients' conditions
employer to overcome the presumption of negligence on can change drastically in a matter of minutes. Petitioner's
the latter's part by proving observance of the required Employee Handbook recognized exactly this as it decreed
diligence. the proper procedure in availing of unavoidable absences
and the commensurate penalties of verbal reprimand,
In the instant case, there is no dispute that the petitioner written warning, suspension from work, and dismissal in
was the employer of the nurses who have been found to be instances of unexcused absence or tardiness. Petitioner's
negligent in the performance of their duties. This fact has failure to sanction the tardiness of the defendant nurses
never been an issue. Hence, petitioner had the burden of shows an utter lack of actual implementation and
showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a monitoring of compliance with the rules and ultimately of
family not only in the selection of the negligent nurses, but supervision over its nurses.
also in their supervision.
More important, on that fatal night, it was not shown who
The hospital failed to discharge its burden of proving due were the actual nurses on duty and who was supervising
diligence in the supervision of its nurses and is therefore these nurses. Although Lourdes H. Nicolas explained in her
liable for their negligence. It must be emphasized that even testimony that two nurses are assigned at the nurses'
though it proved due diligence in the selection of its nurses, station for each shift and that they are supervised by the
the hospital was able to dispose of only half the burden it head nurses or the charge nurses, the documents of
must overcome. petitioner show conflicting accounts of what happened on
the fateful days of 26 and 27 of December 1997.
As testified to by Ms. Lourdes Nicolas, the assistant nursing
director, the process of selection and hiring of their nurses All these negate the due diligence on the part of the nurses,
was a rigorous process whereby the applicants undergo a their supervisors, and ultimately, the hospital.
series of examination, orientation, training, on the job
observation and evaluation before they are hired as regular RVP: Since it was only able to rebut half of the presumption,
employees. The nurses are supervised by their head nurses the hospital remains to be liable for the acts of its employees
and the charge nurse and inspected by their clinical (nurses).
supervisor and nursing director. Based on this evidence the
court believes that the defendant hospital had exercised Now when it comes to proving diligence in the Selection of the
prudence and diligence required of it. The nurses it employees, the employer must look into the Q-E-R. For the
employed were equipped with sufficient knowledge and records, you must check if one has prior instances of vehicular
instructions and are able to perform their work and were accidents, or how many times has one been dismissed from
familiar with the duties and responsibilities assigned to previous employment based on infractions.
them. Indeed, the formulation of a supervisory hierarchy,
company rules and regulations, and disciplinary measures The Supreme Court held in Syki v. Begasa that “The
upon employees in case of breach, is indispensable. employer must not merely present testimonial evidence to
However, to prove due diligence in the supervision of prove that he observed diligence of a good father of a family
employees, it is not enough for an employer such as in the selection and supervision of his employee, but he must
petitioner to emptily invoke the existence of such a also support such testimonial evidence with concrete

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

or documentary evidence”.
(1) Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of
SYKI v. BEGASA Appeals: “In making proof in its or his case, it is
paramount that the best and most complete evidence is
FACTS: formally entered.
On June 22, 1992, around 11:20 a.m., near the corner of
Araneta and Magsaysay Streets, Bacolod City, respondent While there is no rule which requires that testimonial
Salvador Begasa (“BEGASA”) and his three companions evidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by
flagged down a passenger jeepney driven by Joaquin Espina documentary evidence, inasmuch as the witnesses'
and owned by Aurora Pisuena. While Begasa was boarding testimonies dwelt on mere generalities, we cannot consider
the passenger jeepney (his right foot already inside while the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was
his left foot still on the boarding step of the passenger observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision
jeepney), a truck driven by Elizalde Sablayan “SABLAYAN”) of employees. Petitioner's attempt to prove its
and owned by petitioner Ernesto Syki (“SKYKI”) bumped the "deligentissimi patris familias" in the selection and
rear end of the passenger jeepney. Begasa fell and supervision of employees through oral evidence
fractured his left thigh bone (femur). He also suffered must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with
lacerations and abrasions in his left leg. any other evidence, object or documentary, which
might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony.”
Subsequently, on October 29, 1992, Begasa filed a
complaint for damages for breach of common carrier's (2) Central Taxicab Corp. v. Ex-Meralco Employees
contractual obligations and quasi-delict against the owner of Transportation Co., et al. (as cited in the first case)
the passenger jeepney, Skyki, and Sablayan.
“The failure of the defendant company to produce in
ISSUE: court any 'record' or other documentary proof tending
WON the CA erred in finding that Skyki failed to observe the to establish exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and family in the selection and supervision of its drivers and
supervision of the latter’s employee. buses, notwithstanding the calls therefore by both the trial
court and the opposing counsel, argues strongly against its
HELD: pretensions.”
NO. The Supreme Court (SC) affirmed the decision of the
CA. (3) The ruling in Metro Manila Transit Corporation was
reiterated in a recent case again involving the Metro
Skyki argued that he presented sufficient evidence to prove Manila Transit Corporation: In the selection of
that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family prospective employees, employers are required to examine
in the selection and supervision of his employee (herein, the them as to their qualifications, experience, and service
driver of the truck). records. On the other hand, with respect to the
supervision of employees, employers should formulate
As provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, to wit: standard operating procedures, monitor their
“Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for
employees and household helpers acting within the scope breaches thereof. To establish these factors in a trial
of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers
engaged in any business or industry. must submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.”
The responsibility treated in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove they observed all the Based therefore on jurisprudential law, in order for an
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. employer to prove that he indeed exercised the diligence of
From the above provision, when an injury is caused by the a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
negligence of an employee, a legal presumption his employee, the latter must not merely present
instantly arises that the employer was negligent in testimonial evidence to prove that he observed the
the selection and/or supervision of said employee. The said diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
presumption may be rebutted only by a clear showing and supervision of his employee, but he must also
on the part of the employer that he exercised the support such testimonial evidence with concrete or
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection documentary evidence. The reason for this is to obviate
and supervision of his employee . If the employer the biased nature of the employer's testimony or that of his
successfully overcomes the legal presumption of negligence, witnesses.
he is relieved of liability. Hence, the burden of proof is on
the employer. So, how does an employer prove that he In the case at bar, Skyki’s evidence consisted entirely
indeed exercised the diligence of a good father of a of testimonial evidence, to wit:
family in the selection and supervision of his employee? The
SC cited the following cases: (1) He testified that before he hired Sablayan, he required

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

him to submit a police clearance in order to determine if he mga police report or police clearance” easy ra man mu allege
was ever involved in any vehicular accident. ana, unless ang police na muadto sa court saying “yes. I know
this person. wala gyud na siyay records” or LTO mismo
(2) He also required Sablayan to undergo a driving test muingon etc.; If the testimonial evidence in itself is credible
conducted by his mechanic, Esteban Jaca. Skyki claimed you will not look for documentary evidence but the ideal gyud
that he, in fact, accompanied Sablayan during the driving is, especially sa selection and supervision, naa gyud dapat
test and that during the test, Sablayan was taught to read concrete proof especially when you talk about Standard
and understand traffic signs like "Do Not Enter," "One Way," Operating Procedures. Naa man gyud siguro manuals ana
"Left Turn" and "Right Turn." diba? especially of implementations; maybe you have pictures
of training programs; maybe you can even show that you have
(3) Skyki’s mechanic, Esteban Jaca, on the other hand, filed disciplinary cases against an erring employee to show nga
testified that Sablayan passed the driving test and never imo gyud gifollow ang implementation sa inyohang protocols
figured in any vehicular accident except the one in question. so, nindot jud, ideally nindot but dili siya required under ALL
circumstances especially if one type of evidence is sufficient in
(4) The mechanic also testified that he maintained in good itself to overcome the presumption.
condition all the trucks of petitioner by checking the brakes,
horns and tires thereof before providing hauling services. SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY UNDER THE RPC

Unfortunately, Skyki’s testimonial evidence was insufficient REVISED PENAL CODE

in order to prove his diligence, to wit:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. - Every
(1) He never presented the alleged police clearance given to person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
him by Sablayan nor the results of Sablayan's driving test.
(2) He also did not present records of the regular Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers,
inspections that his mechanic allegedly conducted. tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. - In
default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers,
The unsubstantiated and self-serving testimonies of tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall
petitioner and his mechanic were, without doubt, be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments,
insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or
petitioner was negligent in the selection and some general or special police regulation shall have been
supervision of his driver. committed by them or their employees.

It should be emphasized that the legal obligation of Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of
employers to observe due diligence in the selection and goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from
supervision of their employees provided in Art. 2180 of the guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value
New Civil Code is not an empty provision or a mere thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
formalism since the non-observance thereof actually advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing
becomes the basis of the employers' vicarious liability. him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
Employers should thus seriously observe such a degree of furthermore have followed the directions which such
diligence, and prove it in court by sufficient and concrete innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
evidence that would exculpate them from liability. respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against
Question: With what you have said, the defense of the ER is or intimidation of persons unless committed by the
two-fold so the ER has to prove the selection AND supervision. innkeeper's employees.
In the case of Syki v. Begasa, testimonial evidence is not
enough; there has to be documentary evidence as well. Does Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. - The
that apply to BOTH the requirement of selection and subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
supervision? or is it enough that in selection, there is shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
testimonial evidence and in supervision, only documentary corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
evidence? committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices,
or employees in the discharge of their duties.
RVP: Yes, ideally. It would be much better if you can prove
both it is not required that there will be object or documentary NEW CIVIL CODE
evidence in ALL circumstances especially if the testimonial
evidence in itself could stand in court but, ang nahitabo man Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
gud ani na case is (Syki v. Begasa) available unta, VERY preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
conveniently available ang documentary evidence nga gitry ug civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
adduce and wala siya na present which made the court doubt But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
as to the veracity of their very existence. because it is very same act or omission of the defendant.
easy to say “oh nagpa test man ni siya” or “naa man ni siya

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE parked facing north along the cemented pavement of the
MacArthur Highway at Barrio Talaga, Capas, Tarlac, thereby
Section 2 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal taking the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus (driven by
Procedure which reads: employee of private respondents). This resulted to a
collision between the two (2) vehicles. The collision resulted
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it in the deaths of the two (2) drivers of both vehicles and two
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a (2) passengers of the mini bus.
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist. An action for damages through reckless imprudence was
filed against Mr. & Mrs. Federico Franco, the owners and
EMPLOYER’S LIABILITY: operators of the Franco Transportation Company. Spouses
REVISED PENAL CODE v. NEW CIVIL CODE Franco set up, among others, the affirmative defense that
as owners and operators of the Franco Transportation
Company, they exercised due diligence in the selection and
REVISED PENAL CODE NEW CIVIL CODE supervision of all their employees, including the deceased
driver Macario Yuro.
Subsidiary Primary and direct-
Victim can right away RTC:
file a case against the Held the petitioners liable for civil obligation arising from
employer without Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code and not from Art. 2180
impleading the of the Civil Code.
employee
CA:
Liability originates from a Liability is based on Affirmed with modification of the trial court’s decision. CA
delict committed by the culpa aquiliana which ruled that there is nothing in Art.s 102 and 103 of the
employee who is primarily holds the employer Revised Penal Code which requires a prior judgment of
liable therefor and upon primarily liable for conviction of the erring vehicle driver and his obligation to
whose primary liability his tortious acts of its pay his civil liability before the said provisions can be
employer’s subsidiary liability employees applied. Award for damages was increased.
is to be based Hence, this petition. Petitioners alleged that the allegations
in the private respondent’s complaint is an action for quasi-
There should be a criminal Subject to the defense delict.
action whereby the that the employer
employee's criminal exercised all the ISSUE:
negligence or delict and diligence of a good Whether the action for recovery of damages instituted by
corresponding liability father of a family in the herein private respondents was predicated upon crime or
therefore are proved. selection and quasi-delict
supervision of his
employees. HELD:
Quasi-delict. Distinction should be made between the
The conviction of the No requirement of prior subsidiary liability of the employer under the Revised Penal
employee primarily liable is a conviction. Code and the employer's primary liability under the Civil
condition sine qua non for Code which is quasi-delictual or tortious in character.
the employer's subsidiary
liability. Under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates
from a delict committed by the employee who is primarily
It is thus, necessary: Can immediately go liable therefor and upon whose primary liability his
1. To Implead the after the employer. employer's subsidiary liability is to be based. Before the
employee; employer's subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it
2. There must be prior is imperative that there should be a criminal action whereby
conviction; and the employee's criminal negligence or delict and
3. Prior proof of corresponding liability therefor are proved. If no criminal
employee’s action was instituted, the employer's liability would not be
insolvency predicated under Art. 103.

FRANCO v. IAC In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted because
the person who should stand as the accused and the party
FACTS: supposed to be primarily liable for the damages suffered by
Petitioner’s employee, the driver of Franco Bus, swerved private respondents as a consequence of the vehicular
northbound to the left to avoid hitting a truck with a trailer mishap died. Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg
to stand on considering that their liability is merely

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

secondary to their employee's primary liability. Logically arising from crime under Art. 100 of the RPC and an
therefore, recourse under this remedy is not possible. action for quasi-delict under Art.s 2176 and 2194 of
On the other hand, under Art.s 2176 and 2180 of the Civil the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may
Code, liability is based on culpa aquiliana which holds the hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent
employer primarily liable for tortious acts of its employees act of his employee, subject to the employer’s
subject, however, to the defense that the former exercised defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of a family. (Bermudez, Sr. v. Melencio-Herrera)
and supervision of his employees.
3. The liability of an employer in an action for quasi-
In this case, a perusal of the record shows that the delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct;
appellants were not able to establish the defense of a good thus, the erring employee is not an indispensable
father of a family in the supervision of their bus driver. The party to the final resolution of an action for damages
evidence presented by the appellants in this regard is purely against the employer. (Cerezo v. Tuazon)
self-serving. Consequently, therefore, petitioners are liable
for the damages claimed pursuant to their primary liability 4. The subsidiary liability of an employer automatically
under the Civil Code. arises upon his employee’s conviction and subsequent
proof of inability to pay. (Alvarez v. CA)
Respondent appellate court seeks to enforce the subsidiary
civil liability of the employer without a criminal conviction of 5. Art. 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the
the party primarily liable therefor. But Enforcing the plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation has
subsidiary civil liability of the employer without a criminal the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict or
conviction of the party primarily liable is not only erroneous, crime or directly from quasi-delict or tort. (L.G. Foods
absurd, but is also fraught with dangerous consequences: v. Pagapong-Agraviador)

(1) It is erroneous because the conviction of the BERMUDEZ, SR. v. MELENCIO-HERRERA

employee primarily liable is a condition sine qua
non for the employer’s subsidiary liability. FACTS:
A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by
(2) It is absurd because it will result to a situation Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on which Rogelio, a
where the employer is held subsidiary liable even six-year old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy
without a primary liability being previously sustained injuries which caused his death. As a result, a
established. Criminal Case for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence
was filed against Domingo Pontino. Plaintiffs-appellants filed
(3) It is dangerous because the employer’s subsidiary in the said criminal case "A Reservation to File Separate Civil
liability would partake of a solidary obligation Action." The plaintiffs-appellants also filed a civil case for
resulting in the law’s amendment without damages against respondents.
legislative sanction.
CFI:
EMPLOYER’S SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY Held that since the plaintiffs instituted the action "on the
(BASIC PRINCIPLES) assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the
accident constituted a quasi-delict," plaintiffs had already
1. Enforcing the subsidiary civil liability of the employer elected to treat the accident as a "crime" by reserving in the
without a criminal conviction of the party primarily criminal case their right to file a separate civil action. That
liable is not only erroneous, absurd, but is also being so, the complaint against defendant Cordova Ng Sun
fraught with dangerous consequences: Kwan should be dismissed and the hearing of the case
against Domingo Pontino should be suspended until after
A. It is erroneous because the conviction of the the criminal case for Homicide Through Reckless
employee primarily liable is a condition sine qua non Imprudence is finally terminated.
for the employer’s subsidiary liability.
a. Hence, the present appeal.
B. It is absurd because it will result to a situation where
the employer is held subsidiary liable even without a ISSUE:
primary liability being previously established. WON the present action is based on quasi-delict under the
a. Civil Code and therefore could proceed independently of the
C. It is dangerous because the employer’s subsidiary criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence.
liability would partake of a solidary obligation
resulting in the law’s amendment without legislative HELD:
sanction. (Franco v. IAC) Yes. In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs
has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability
2. In cases of negligence, the injured party has the arising from crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code
choice between an action to enforce the civil liability and an action for quasi-delict under Art. 2176-2194 of the

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the contrasted with "subsidiary," refer to the remedy provided
employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the
employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of character and limits of the obligation. Although liability
the diligence of a good father of the family. under Art. 2180 originates from the negligent act of the
employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an directly. When an employee causes damage, the law
action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that presumes that the employer has himself committed an act
appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage.
independent civil action did not preclude them from This is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer
choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict. The appellant is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee's
precisely made a reservation to file an independent civil criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly
action in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Rule and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to
111, Rules of Court. In fact, even without such a exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his
reservation, the injured party in the criminal case which employee. The idea that the employer’s liability is solely
resulted in the acquittal of the accused is allowed to recover subsidiary is wrong.
damages based on quasi-delict.
In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the
CEREZO v. TUAZON subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal
negligence of the employee as provided in Art. 103 of the
FACTS: Revised Penal Code. To hold the employer liable in a
A Country Bus Lines passenger collided with a tricycle. subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must
Respondent tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for initiate a criminal action where the employee’s delict and
damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line and corresponding primary liability are established. If the
bus driver Foronda. The trial court ruled in Tuazon’s favor present action proceeds from a delict, then the trial court’s
but it made no pronouncement on Foronda’s liability jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary.
because there was no service of summons on him. The trial
court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages In this case, the present action is clearly for the quasi-delict
sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.Tuazon
Cerezo’s employee, pursuant to Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict.
Mrs. Cerezo resorted to petition for relief from judgment, In his complaint, Tuazon alleged that Mrs. Cerezo, "without
petition for certiorari and annulment of judgment. Mrs. exercising due care and diligence in the supervision and
Cerezo insisted that the trial court never acquired management of her employees and buses," hired Foronda
jurisdiction over the case considering there was no service as her driver. Tuazon became disabled because of Foronda’s
of summons on Foronda, whom the Cerezo spouses claimed "recklessness, gross negligence and imprudence,"
was an indispensable party. All of the actions were denied aggravated by Mrs. Cerezo’s "lack of due care and diligence
for lack of merit. in the selection and supervision of her employees,
particularly Foronda."
ISSUES:
(1) WON the action for damages filed by Tuazon (2) No. The responsibility of two or more persons who are
proceeds from a delict or quasi-delict liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where the obligation of
(2) WON Foronda was an indispensable party to the the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable,
action so as to enforce Mrs. Cerezo’s liability. and the other is not even a necessary party because
complete relief is available from either.
HELD:
(1) Quasi-delict. In this case, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the
case to the final resolution of Tuazon’s action for damages
The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising against Mrs. Cerezo. Mrs. Cerezo's liability as an employer
from a delict under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, or in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also
may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Art. 2180 primary and direct. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is
of the Civil Code. An aggrieved party may choose between not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from
the two remedies. An action based on a quasi-delict may Mrs. Cerezo alone.
proceed independently from the criminal action. There is,
however, a distinction between civil liability arising from a ALVAREZ v. CA
delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. The choice
of remedy, whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, Note: Please refer to the full text.
affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.
It is already a settled rule that the subsidiary liability of an
An employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and employer automatically arises upon his employee's
direct, while the employer's liability based on a delict is conviction, and subsequent proof of inability to pay. In this
merely subsidiary. The words "primary and direct," as light, the application of Pajarito is merely the enforcement

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

of a procedural remedy designed to ease the burden of liability arising from culpa criminal under Art. 100 (civil
litigation for recovery of indemnity by the victims of a liability ex delicto) of the Revised Penal Code, and an action
judicially-declared criminally negligent act. As had been for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Arts. 2176 to 2194
aptly stated, "A separate civil action may be warranted of the Civil Code. If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi
where additional facts have to be established or more delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the
evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has negligent act of its employee, subject to the employer's
been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the
just as efficacious or even more expedient than a time family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa
remand to the trial court where the criminal action was criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily
decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee.
These do not exist in this case. Considering more over the
delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and Art. 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff
review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this may choose from in case the obligation has the possibility of
case to require at this time a separate civil action to be arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi
filed.” delict/ tort. The choice is with the plaintiff who makes
known his cause of action in his initiatory pleading or
RVP: There is no need to file a separate civil action case to complaint, and not with the defendant who cannot ask for
enforce a subsidiary liability (You may opt to file a Motion for the dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of action or lack of it
the issuance of a Writ of execution). But if the filing of a based on the defendant's perception that the plaintiff should
separate case to enforce a subsidiary liability benefits the have opted to file a claim under Art. 103 of the Revised
injured party, then so be it, for the purpose of administration Penal Code.
of justice. There is no denial of due process for the employer
as we have the safeguards (prior conviction and insolvency) Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the
before he is made subsidiary liable. The requirements of prior couple's minor son was caused by the negligent act of the
conviction and insolvency is not required if the action is for petitioners' driver; and that the petitioners themselves were
quasi-delict because the employer’s liability is primary, civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for failing "to
meaning, impleading the employee is unnecessary. exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of [their]
L.G. FOODS v. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR employee, the driver, which diligence, if exercised, would
have prevented said accident. Had the respondent spouses
FACTS: elected to sue the petitioners based on Art. 103 of the
Charles, a 7-year old son of the Spouses Vallejera died Revised Penal Code, they would have alleged that the guilt
when he was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the of the driver had been proven beyond reasonable doubt;
petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Ferrer. that such accused driver is insolvent; that it is the subsidiary
An Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to liability of the defendant petitioners as employers to pay for
Homicide was filed against the driver before the MTCC. the damage done by their employee (driver) based on the
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly
accused driver committed suicide, evidently bothered by liable. Since there was no conviction in the criminal case
conscience and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC, in against the driver, precisely because death intervened prior
its order, dismissed the criminal case. to the termination of the criminal proceedings, the spouses'
recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners for their
Spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for damages before the direct and primary liability based on quasi-delict.
RTC against the petitioners as employers of the deceased
driver, alleging that as such employers, they failed to REGISTERED OWNER RULE
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of
their employees. The petitioners as denied liability for the VICARIOUS LIABILITY v. REGISTERED OWNER RULE
death of the Vallejeras' 7-year old son, claiming that they
had exercised the required due diligence in the selection
VICARIOUS LIABILITY REGISTERED OWNER
and supervision of their employees, including the deceased
RULE
driver.
Art. 2180 provides that Under the Registered Owner
ISSUE:
employers shall be liable for Rule, registered owners are
Whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of action in Civil Case
the damages caused by their liable for death or injuries
is founded on Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as
employees acting within the caused by the operation of
maintained by the petitioners, or derived from Art. 2180 of
scope of their assigned tasks their vehicles.
the Civil Code.

HELD: RVP: Take note that Caravan is a landmark case. It's the case
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Victims of negligence or their that harmonized the registered owner rule vis-a-vis art. 2180.
heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the civil There’s difficulty in assessing which of the two principles will

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

apply because in one hand, Art. 2180 provides that an ER is the van, Jimmy Bautista (Bautista), to bring Reyes to the
only held liable if the EE concerned is acting within the scope hospital. Instead of doing so, Bautista appeared to have left
of his assigned task. Under the registered owner rule the mere the van parked inside a nearby subdivision with Reyes still in
fact that RO ka of the vehicle, makes you liable. so nag libog the van.
sila tanan. what if the RO is in itself, the ER? so asa man atong
iapply? is it 2180 which requires that the EE be acting within Fortunately for Reyes, an unidentified civilian came to help and
the scope of his assigned task? or is it the registered owner drove Reyes to the hospital. Upon investigation, it was found
rule na walay requirement of acting within his assigned task that the registered owner of the van was Caravan. Caravan is
meaning basta ikaw ang RO then liable na gyud ka. Mao na a corporation engaged in the business of organizing travels
ang legal question presented in this case. In circumstances and tours. Bautista was Caravan's employee assigned to drive
where the ER is at the same time the RO of the vehicle, how the van as its service driver. Caravan shouldered the
do we dispose of the case? How do we decide whether the ER hospitalization expenses of Reyes. Despite medical attendance,
is liable or not? Reyes died two (2) days after the accident. Respondent
Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and the
So SC said, “Where both the registered owner rule and Art. person who raised her since she was nine (9) years old, led
2180 apply. The plaintiff must first establish that the ER is the before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque a Complaint for
registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff damages against Bautista and Caravan. In her Complaint,
successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable Abejar alleged that Bautista was an employee of Caravan and
presumption that the requirements of Art. 2180 have been that Caravan is the registered owner of the van that hit Reyes.
proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to show that no liability under Art. 2180 has arisen.” ISSUE:
(Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar) Whether petitioner should be held liable as an employer,
pursuant to Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
RVP: The question is: why is it that the only requirement for
the plaintiff is to prove that the ER is the RO? And why is it (Please refer to Batch 6 digests for the discussion of other
that the requirement to prove na dili siya EE; na wala siya nag issues.)
perform within the scope of his assigned task kay sa ER? It’s
because most of the accidents happen on the highway. These
are hapless victims so you don’t want to trouble them with HELD:
proving the intricate institutional relationship between the ER Contrary to the petitioner's position, it was not fatal to the
and the driver because maglisod man na kay lahi lahi man ang respondent's cause that she herself did not adduce proof that
practice kada company. therefore, since public record man ang Bautista acted within the scope of his authority. It was
registry kung kinsa nag own sa vehicle, easier pud na sa sufficient that Abejar proved that petitioner was the registered
plaintiff to identify and since ang mas nakahibalo sa owner of the van that hit Reyes.
relationship kay si ER it is but proper nga ang ER mu show
that the requirements under 2180 have not been complied The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules. First,
with. Art. 2180's specification that "employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees… acting within the scope
Therefore to avoid liability, the ER/RO must present proof of of their assigned tasks." Second, the operation of the
any of the following: registered-owner rule that registered owners are liable for
death or injuries caused by the operation of their vehicles.
(1) That there is no employment relationship;
(2) That the EE acted outside the scope of his assigned Art. 2180 requires proof of two things: first, an employment
tasks; relationship between the driver and the owner; and second,
(3) That it exercised the diligence of a good father of a that the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned
family in the selection and supervision of the EE. tasks. On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule
only requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-
employer is the registered owner of the vehicle. It is
CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC. imperative to apply the registered owner rule in a manner that
v. ABEJAR harmonizes it with Art.s 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Rules
must be construed in a manner that will harmonize them with
FACTS: other rules so as to form a uniform and consistent system of
On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking jurisprudence. In light of this, the words used in Del Carmen
along the westbound lane of Sampaguita Street, United are particularly notable. There, this court stated that Art. 2180
Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque City. A Mitsubishi L-300 "should defer to" the registered-owner rule. It never stated
van with plate number PKM 195 was travelling along the that Art. 2180 should be totally abandoned.
eastbound lane, opposite Reyes. To avoid an incoming vehicle,
the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes. Alex Espinosa Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where
(Espinosa), a witness to the accident, went to her aid and both the registered owner rule and Art. 2180 apply, the
loaded her in the back of the van. Espinosa told the driver of plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the registered

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully

proves ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is
the requirements of Art. 2180 have been proven. As a solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who
consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due
show that no liability under Art. 2180 has arisen. This diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been
vehicle in relation to the actual driver is concerned, recognizes found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic
that between the owner and the victim, it is the former that regulations at least twice within the next preceding
should carry the costs of moving forward with the evidence. two months.
The victim is, in many cases, a hapless pedestrian or motorist
with hardly any means to uncover the employment relationship If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the
of the owner and the driver, or any act that the owner may provisions of Art. 2180 are applicable.
have done in relation to that employment. The registration of
the vehicle, on the other hand, is accessible to the public. RVP: When we speak of the liability of the registered owner of
the vehicle, we have to make a distinction whether the
Here, respondent presented a copy of the Certificate of registered owner is in the vehicle himself or herself or whether
Registration of the van that hit Reyes. The Certificate attests to he was in a remote location when the accident happened. This
petitioner's ownership of the van. Petitioner itself did not is because there are two different governing provisions. Art.
dispute its ownership of the van. Consistent with the rule we 2184 will apply if the owner was in the vehicle at the time the
have just stated, a presumption that the requirements of Art. accident happened. But, if the registered owner of the vehicle
2180 have been satisfied arises. It is now up to petitioner to was not in the motor vehicle, we go back to the provision of
establish that it incurred no liability under Art. 2180. This it can Art. 2180.
do by presenting proof of any of the following: first, that it had
no employment relationship with Bautista; second, that When we speak of the owner, we pertain to the registered
Bautista acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or third, owner. It is because in some cases, even if the vehicle had
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in been sold already, what is important and the reckoning point
the selection and supervision of Bautista. would be who is indicated as the registered owner in the
registration law or in the records of the relevant (fucked up)
On the first, petitioner admitted that Bautista was its employee government offices.
at the time of the accident. On the second, petitioner was
unable to prove that Bautista was not acting within the scope If the registered owner was in the vehicle at the time of the
of his assigned tasks at the time of the accident. When asked accident, and the registered owner had the reasonable
by the court why Bautista was at the place of the accident opportunity to control, to direct and to supervise the
when it occurred, Sally Bellido, petitioner's accountant and actuations of the driver and failed to do so, then the registered
supervisor, testified that she did not "have the personal owner may be liable.
capacity to answer [the question] and that she had no
knowledge to answer it.” On the third, petitioner likewise failed As in the Principle of Last Clear Chance, this liability may
to prove that it exercised the requisite diligence in the not apply if the registered owner was faced with a sudden or
selection and supervision of Bautista. instantaneous event, ultimately depriving him of the
opportunity to prevent the accident from happening.
In its selection of Bautista as a service driver, petitioner Therefore, to hold the registered owner liable, the acts of the
contented itself with Bautista's submission of a non- driver must be of such nature or such length as to allow again
professional driver's license. Employing a person holding a the registered owner to control, to observe and to direct the
non-professional driver's license to operate another's motor acts of the driver. Failing at which, the registered owner who
vehicle violates Section 24 of the Land Transportation and was in the vehicle may be liable under Art. 2184.
Traffic Code. Evidently, petitioner did not only fail to exercise
due diligence when it selected Bautista as service driver; it also FGU INSURANCE CORP. v. CA
committed an actual violation of law. To prove that it exercised
the required diligence in supervising Bautista, petitioner FACTS:
presented copies of several memoranda and company rules. This case involves a collision of two cars. One car is owned
These, however, are insufficient because the petitioner failed by Lydia F. Soriano and driven by Benjamin Jacildone, while
to prove actual compliance. the other car is owned by FILCAR Transport, Inc. and driven
by Peter Dahl-Jensen, as lessee. Consequently, petitioner
FGU Insurance Corporation paid Soriano an amount in
b.5 VEHICLE OWNER accordance with their insurance contract. By way of
subrogation, it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as
VEHICLE OWNER well as respondent Fortune Insurance Corporation as
insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict.
In the Vehicle
Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen
Not in the Vehicle

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

since he was no longer staying at his given address; in fact, importantly, the vehicle owner is not actually with the Danish
upon motion of petitioner, he was dropped from the national at the time of the accident. Therefore, it could not
complaint. The trial court dismissed the case for failure of have been applied.
petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court fault or What’s peculiar about this however is that, assuming that the
negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proved but not owner of the business, who is also the registered owner was in
that of respondent FILCAR. the vehicle, for some good reason, he was with the lessee, he
can be held liable. This could be drawn out from the case since
Petitioner failed to establish its cause of action for a sum of the lessor could not be held liable under Art. 2184 because of
money based on quasi-delict. In this appeal, petitioner the absence of a master-driver relationship. Hence, Art. 2184
insists that respondents FILCAR and Fortune are liable on requires the master-driver relationship and in Art. 2180
the strength of the Supreme Court ruling that the registered requires an employer-employee relationship.
owner of a vehicle is liable for damages suffered by third
persons although the vehicle is leased to another. Note: Be very careful about this pronouncement of the
master-driver relationship because all the other cases
ISSUE: whenever we apply the registered owner rule, we don’t
For damages suffered by a third party, may an action based inquire or delve further into the relationship between the
on quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car company and, registered owner of the vehicle as well as the driver thereof.
consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car Although, it may be a defense raised by the registered owner
lessee in driving the rented vehicle? as to the vehicle that had been stolen or when the driver drove
the vehicle without his express authorization.
HELD:
NO. The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a What is basic however, in Art. 2184 is that whenever the
presumption of juris tantum of negligence on the part of the registered owner was in the vehicle at the time of the accident,
persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their what we need to look into is whether he had the reasonable
failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of opportunity to prevent the accident from happening. And we
subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Yet, as can say that he had the reasonable opportunity if there is a
correctly observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly sense of habit or the acts complained of happened in such a
applicable because none of the circumstances mentioned length of time as to allow the owner that window of
therein obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent opportunity to control. Other than that, he will not be held
FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the liable for the acts of the driver.
owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was
no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. As Art. 2184 provides, if the registered owner was not in the
Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for vehicle, we apply the provision of Art.2180, which means we
the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an have to look into the relationships i.e. parent and a child, an
employer of the latter. employer and employee. And because we are using the
framework of Art. 2180, the standard we are using is the
We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the presence of control or the ability to direct the
same Code which provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the actuations of the driver.
owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who
was in the vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence, Remember however, that the possible defenses available to
prevented the misfortune . . . If the owner was not in the the registered owner would be that the vehicle had been
motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." stolen or that the vehicle had been driven without his express
Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable authorization.
because of the absence of master-driver relationship
between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly,
DUAVIT v. CA
petitioner has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR
on the basis of quasi delict; logically, its claim against
FACTS:
respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper.
Plaintiffs Sarmiento and Catuar were on board a jeep which
was running at a speed of 20-35 km/hr. While slowing
RVP: Art. 2180 is not applicable because there was no down, another jeepney driven by Sabiniano hit and bumped
employer-employee relationship between the registered owner the plaintiff's jeep on the portion near the left rear wheel
of the vehicle, who happens to be engaged in the business of which resulted in the plaintiff’s jeep falling on its right and
car rental and the lessee, who happened to be the driver. skidding by about 30 yards. As a result of the collision, the
Absence employer-employee relationship and all other plaintiffs suffered numerous injuries. Plaintiffs filed a case
relationships in Art. 2180, the owner of the business will not be against Oscar Sabiniano as driver and Duavit as owner of
held liable. the jeep.

As to Art. 2184, the SC said that it is not applicable because Duavit claimed that he indeed was the owner of the jeep
there is an absence of a master-driver relationship. More but argued that Sabiniano was not and has never been his

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

employee — in fact, Sabiniano was a government employee the trial court to consider her a co-owner of the said
(Board of Liquidators). Sabiniano also admitted in his jeepney, just because she had cohabited for many years as
testimony that he took Duavit’s jeepney without the latter’s the wife of Eugenio Jose, a legally married man.
consent or authority and in fact, Duavit even filed charges
against him for theft of the jeep but the latter case was not ISSUE:
pushed through. (1) WON Art. 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a
case where one of the parties in a common-law
ISSUE: relationship is incapacitated to marry
WON the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an (2) WON Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the
accident can be held liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code jeepney can be held jointly and severally liable for
when the said vehicle was neither driven by an employee of damages with the registered owner of the same
the owner nor taken with the consent of the latter
HELD:
HELD: (1) It has been consistently ruled by this Court that
NO. As early as in 1939, the Court had ruled that an owner the co-ownership contemplated in Art. 144 of the
of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving Civil Code requires that the man and the woman
the said vehicle if the same was driven without his consent living together must not in any way be
or knowledge and by a person not employed by him. incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Eugenio
Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is
The petitioner does not deny ownership of the vehicle an impediment for him to contract marriage with
involved in the mishap but completely denies having Rosalia Arroyo. Under the aforecited provision,
employed the driver Sabiniano or even having authorized Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The
the latter to drive his jeep. The jeep was virtually stolen jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of
from the petitioner's garage. To hold, therefore, the Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis
petitioner liable for the accident caused by the negligence of for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from
Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor employee would the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the
be absurd as it would be like holding liable the owner of a passengers of the jeepney which figured in the
stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the person who collision.
stole such vehicle.
(2) NO. Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered
In this regard, the Court cannot ignore the many cases of owner of the jeepney can neither be liable for
vehicles forcibly taken from their owners at gunpoint or damages caused by its operation. It is settled in
stolen from garages and parking areas and the instances of our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of
service station attendants or mechanics of auto repair shops a public service vehicle is responsible for damages
using, without the owner's consent, vehicles entrusted to that may arise from consequences incident to its
them for servicing or repair. operation, or may be caused to any of the
passengers therein.
Where, as in this case, the records of the petition fail to
indicate the slightest indicia of an employer-employee Negligence Per Se
relationship between the owner and the erring driver or any
consent given by the owner for the vehicle's use, the Court Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
holds the owner liable. presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
RVP: In the absence of the degree of control or the vinculum traffic regulation.
juris as required under Art. 2180, the registered owner may
not be held liable. ANONUEVO v. CA

JUANIZA v. JOSE PRINCIPLE:

The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis
FACTS: for an inference that such violation was the proximate cause
Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the of the injury complained. However, if the very injury has
passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a happened which was intended to be prevented by the
freight train of the Philippine National Railways which statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be
resulted in the deaths and injuries of its passengers. At the deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury.
time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legally married to
Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant- The violation of the traffic statute must be shown as the
appellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years. In the proximate cause of the injury, or that it substantially
resulting cases for damages filed against the defendants, contributed thereto.
Rosalia was held jointly and severally liable pursuant to Art.
144 of the Civil Code. Rosalia claims that it was an error for FACTS:

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

Villagracia was traveling along Bonifacio Ave. on his bicycle peculiarities attaching to a motorized vehicle within the
while Anonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving a dynamics of road travel. The fact that there has long existed
Lancer car owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer a higher degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized
of Anonuevo’s brother. Anonuevo was in the course of vehicles, arising from the special nature of a motor vehicle,
making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision leads to the inescapable conclusion that the qualification
occurred. under Art. 2185 exists precisely to recognize such higher
standard. Simply put, the standards applicable to motor
Villagracia sustained serious injuries. Villagracia instituted vehicles are not on equal footing with other types of
an action for damages against P&G Phils., Inc. and vehicles.
Anonuevo before the RTC. Anonuevo claims that Villagracia
violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his Question: Whether Anonuevo in this case should be held
bicycle with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer or install accountable or should be deemed to have contributed to the
safety gadgets in violation of a municipal ordinance. He injury or whether his negligence was in fact the proximate
posits that Art. 2185 of the Civil which presumes the driver cause of the injury?
of a motor vehicle negligent if he was violating a traffic
regulation at the time of the mishap, should apply by RVP: We note that at the time of the accident, his bicycle was
analogy to non-motorized vehicles. not registered, no warning lights, no horns or bells given to
apprise other motorists of the existence of that cyclist . That
ISSUES: was acknowledged by the SC that these are misgivings on the
WON Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply to non- part of the cyclist. However, the Court ultimately ruled that
motorized vehicles, making Villagracia presumptively those misgivings of those requirements by law that was made
negligent by the bicycle driver, it cannot prevent the injury because of
the street lights and the driver of the other vehicle was 10
HELD: meters away, he already saw the cyclist and the location
NO. At the time Art. 2185 was formulated, there existed a where the accident happened, the street are well lit, there is
whole array of non-motorized vehicles ranging from human- still no causal connection because the offending driver has
powered contraptions on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, already been advised of the existence of the cyclist sans the
and animal drawn carts such as calesas and carromata. warning signs, the warning lights and the bells. So, SC said
These modes of transport were even more prevalent on the that no amount of bells or signal lights could have prevented
roads of the 1940s and 1950s than they are today, yet the the injury anyway because the driver in that case was
framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude these umaarangkada and was even driving at a speed not conducive
alternative modes from the scope of Art. 2185 with the use to crossing or intersections. Therefore because the proximate
of the term motorized vehicles. If Anonuevo seriously cause of the injury is not really the violation of the statute but
contends that the application of Art. 2185 be expanded due because of the negligent act of the driver, therefore even if
to the greater interaction today of all types of vehicles, such there was misbehaving on the part of Anonuevo by not
argument contradicts historical experience. complying with the traffic rules and the regulations concerning
warning signs, his violations could not preclude from filing a
The more pertinent basis for the segregate classification is case against the offending driver. If at all, SC said that the
the difference in type of these vehicles. A motorized vehicle liability on the part of Mr. Anonuevo. He will be facing liability
operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non- from the relevant government offices for failing to register and
motorized vehicle, which runs as a result of a direct exertion comply with the traffic rules and regulations but that in itself
by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A does not preclude from recovering from the offending driver in
motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical this case. In this case, SC repeatedly mentioned that the fact
exertion, is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than that It was overloaded, the fact there was decreased mobility
non-motorized vehicles. At the same time, motorized or maneuverability will not defeat the right of the plaintiff to
vehicles are more capable of inflicting greater injury or file a case against the defendant because there is no causal
damage in the event of an accident or collision. This is due connection between the traffic statute and the injury on the
to a combination of factors peculiar to the motor vehicle, ground.
such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass,
and greater combustibility due to the fuels that they use. CADIENTE v. MACAS

The Code Commission was cognizant of the difference in BFACTS:

the natures and attached responsibilities of motorized and Eyewitness Rosalinda Palero testified that on July 19, 1994,
non-motorized vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated to at about 4:00 p.m., at the intersection of Buhangin and San
compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and Vicente Streets in Davao City, 15-year old high school
regulations. If such were indeed the evil sought to be student Bithuel Macas, herein respondent, was standing on
remedied or guarded against, then the framers of the Code the shoulder of the road. She was about two and a half
would have expanded the provision to include non- meters away from the respondent when he was bumped
motorized vehicles or for that matter, pedestrians. Yet, that and run over by a Ford Fiera, driven by Chona C.
was not the case; thus the need arises to ascertain the Cimafranca. disappeared. Records showed that the Ford

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

Fiera was registered in the name of herein petitioner, Atty.

Medardo Ag. Cadiente. RVP: The argument that the registered owner cannot be held
liable because the vehicle was sold to another is unfair. The
ISSUES: Court said that if we allow this to happen then what is
(1) Was there contributory negligence on the part of Macas? stopping the registered owners from colluding with other
(2) Are both defendant Cadiente and third-party defendant individuals so that they evade responsibility, what’s stopping
Jalipa jointly and severally liable to the injured party? owners from coming up fictitious deeds of sale with individuals
with no enough money so that the plaintiff cannot recover.
HELD: Therefore, because of this propensity to circumvent the law
(1) No contributory negligence on the part of Macas. (not just so they may not make payment for damages, the Court
relevant) Records show that when the accident happened, said that it will not matter whether the vehicle has been sold
the victim was standing on the shoulder, which was the already to another person. What controls is the owner that
uncemented portion of the highway. The shoulder was appears in the registry of relevant government offices. So long
intended for pedestrian use alone. as there’s no change in the name has been effected, the
person that appears as the registered owner will be liable and
Only stationary vehicles, such as those loading or unloading accountable.
passengers may use the shoulder. Running vehicles are not
supposed to pass through the said uncemented portion of b.6 STATE
the highway. However, the Ford Fiera in this case, without
so much as slowing down, took off from the cemented part
of the highway, inexplicably swerved to the shoulder, and Art. 2180 (6). The State is responsible in like manner when
recklessly bumped and ran over an innocent victim. The it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has
victim was just where he should be when the unfortunate been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
event transpired. Cimafranca, on the other hand, had no pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be
rightful business driving as recklessly as she did. The applicable.
respondent cannot be expected to have foreseen that the
Ford Fiera, erstwhile speeding along the cemented part of A SPECIAL AGENT is one who receives a definite and fixed
the highway would suddenly swerve to the shoulder, then order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of
bump and run him over. Thus, we are unable to accept the his office (if he is a special official), so that in representation of
petitioner's contention that the respondent was negligent. the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof he
executed the trust confided to him.
2. Cadiente, registered owner is primarily liable. If a
registered owner is allowed to evade responsibility by The LIABILITY of the State has two aspects:
proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would
be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to (1) For private or government aspects where it is liable
escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an for the tortious acts of special agents only;
indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with (2) For private or business aspects, where it becomes
which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. liable as an ordinary employer.
A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually
without means to discover or identify the person actually There may be TWO TYPES of special agents:
causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than
by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office (1) A special agent that is not at all connected with the
to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law government (not an existing government official or
aims to extend to him would become illusory were the employee) - purely private person commissioned to
registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by perform a specific task
disproving his ownership. The policy behind vehicle (2) A special agent who is already part of government
registration is the easy identification of the owner who can machinery (already a government official or
be held responsible in case of accident, damage or injury employee) but performs a task which is foreign or not
caused by the vehicle. This is so as not to inconvenience or related to his principal function
prejudice a third party injured by one whose identity cannot
be secured. Therefore, since the Ford Fiera was still SUABILITY IS NOT LIABILITY
registered in the petitioner's name at the time when the
misfortune took place, the petitioner cannot escape liability By consenting to be sued the state simply waives its immunity
for the permanent injury it caused the respondent, who had from suit. It does not concede its liability to the plaintiff, or
since stopped schooling and is now forced to face life with create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to
nary but two remaining limbs. WHEREFORE, the petition is any cause not previously recognized. (Merritt v. GPI)
DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated
September 16, 2002 and Resolution dated December 18, PUBLIC INTEREST JUSTIFICATION
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64103 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. Merritt case also provides the justification as to why a state

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

must not always be made liable for the acts of its officials or
Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in
individuals who work under it: “ the contrary will be
holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is
unreasonable for it will subject the state to endless
liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result
embarrassments, difficulties, and losses, which will be
of the collision, even if it be true that collision was due to
subversive of the public interest”.
the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering
judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14, 741.
MERRITT v. GPI
ISSUES:
FACTS:
Plaintiff was riding on a motorcycle going to western part of (1) WON the Government is legally liable for the damages
Calle Padre Faura through the west side thereof at a speed resulting therefrom.
of 10-12 miles per hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and was
10 ft. from the southwestern intersection of the said streets, (2) WON the ambulance driver is considered as a special
the General Hospital Ambulance, upon reaching the said agent of the Government.
avenue, instead of turning toward south, after passing
through the center so that it would be on the left side as per HELD:
the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly (1) NO. It was already established that the accident was due
and unexpectedly into the right side of the Taft Avenue solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the
without any whistle or horn and struck the plaintiff, who was time, an employee of the defendant, and that the amount of
already 6 ft. from the southwestern point. damages sustained by plaintiff as a result of the collision has
been already fixed. However, this does not mean that
Plaintiff was so severely injured, to the point that there was pursuant to Act No. 2457, Government is legally liable for
only a little hope for him to survive. Six days before the trial, the said amount.
an examination was conducted by Dr. Saleeby, revealed that
the plaintiff became slightly deaf, slightly weak in his eyes By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity
and in his mental condition. It would be difficult for him to from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff,
do mental labor, especially for mathematical calculations. or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its
And according to various merchant witnesses, the plaintiff's liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely
mental and physical condition prior to the accident was gives a remedy to enforce a pre existing liability and submits
excellent, and that after having received the injuries that itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
have been discussed, his physical condition had undergone interpose any lawful defense.
a noticeable depreciation. As a contractor, he could no
longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and The state can only be made liable for injuries arising from
scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the building. As a the negligence of its agents or servants, only by force of
consequence, he had to dissolve the partnership he had some positive statute assuming such liability.
formed and had to give up a contract for the construction of
the Uy Chaco building. ITCAB, it is clear that Act No. 2457does not operate to
extend the Government’s liability to any cause not previously
Pursuant to Act. No. 2457, February 3, 1915, plaintiff was recognized.
authorized to bring suit against GPI in Islands in order to fix
the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle (2) NO. Art. 1903 (5) of the Civil Code provides that
and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to the state is liable in this sense when it acts through a
determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. special agent, but not when the damage should have
E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision. been caused by the official to whom properly it
pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
CFI ruled in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14, 741, provisions of the preceding article shall be
together with the costs of the cause. Both parties appealed applicable.
from the judgment.
The SC of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said
Counsel for the plaintiff alleged that FCI erred in (1) "in that responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the
limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed
P5, 000, instead of P25, 000 as claimed in the complaint," all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely damage, and among these persons, called up on to answer
disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in
damage accordingly in the sum of P2, 666, instead of P6, addition to the mother or the father in a proper case,
000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint." guardians and owners or director of an establishment or
enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because
the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision between and only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the
the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General original basis of this kind of objections, must be presumed

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

to lie with the state. Philippine National Bank in the account of the Irrigation
Service Unit, may be garnished to satisfy a money-judgment
That the responsibility of the state is limited by Art. 1903 to against the latter. This issue in turn calls for a determination
the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a of the nature of said trust fund, i.e., whether it is a fund
special agent, in the sense in which these words are belonging to the National Government.
employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his HELD: NO. The decision of the Court of Appeals
office if he is a special official) so that in representation of under review is reversed and set aside, and the order of
the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof he garnishment issued by the Sheriff of Manila on the Pump
executed the trust confided to him. This concept does not Irrigation Trust Fund in the account of the Irrigation Service
apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the Unit, with the Philippine National Bank, is hereby declared
active administration and who is in his own responsibility. null and void.

(1) The Irrigation Service Unit (ISU) was originally created

RVP: It is always the public interest which the state of the
under the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
policy of the law would like to safeguard. Therefore, if the act
by virtue of a Memorandum Agreement between the
is done by an agent of the state acting in its normal capacity
governments of the Philippines and the United States. It was
(not a special agent), then the state will not be liable. Even if
later transferred to the Department of Public Works and
you say that you are suing the individual, ultimately, it is the
Communications as an office to prosecute to completion the
state which will be responsible for the damages caused by that
rehabilitation of pump systems transferred from the former
individual.
Irrigation Pump Administration of the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. The budgetary
In this case, the driver is not deemed as a special agent
requirements to carry out the objectives of the project were
because he is employed by the General Hospital to perform the
to be financed by withdrawals from the Counterpart Fund-
specific function of driving the ambulance.
Special Account. This Counterpart Fund-Special Account was
established in the Central Bank by the Government of the
REPUBLIC v. PALACIO Philippines and made up of deposits in pesos commensurate
with the indicated dollar cost to the Government of the
FACTS: United States of economic and technical assistance made
Camarines Sur, and the Irrigation Service Unit, an office or available to the Philippines, pursuant to the Bilateral
agency under the Department of Public Works and Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
Communications, to recover possession, with damages, of a Later, on the basis of a supplemental agreement (No. 2,
958 square meter-lot located in Camarines Sur, which the Counterpart Project No. 409 — Pump Irrigation), the Pump
Irrigation Association allegedly entered and occupied, at the Irrigation Trust Fund was established in the Philippine
instance of its co-defendant. For failure to appear and National Bank, to which all authorized releases to the ISU
answer the complaint, therein defendant Irrigation Service from the Counterpart Fund — Special Account, to finance
Unit was declared in default. the peso-cost of the Irrigation Pump Project, were
transferred. This is the fund on which the disputed writ of
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the execution for money judgment rendered against the ISU, is
Solicitor General, moved for the dismissal of the complaint, being enforced. A reading of the records and documents
claiming that defendant Irrigation Service Unit has no submitted will readily show that the sales of irrigation
juridical personality to sue and be sued. This motion was pumps to farmers by ISU are governed by the terms of the
denied, on the ground that the said defendant although a Supplemental Agreement No. 2 to Counterpart Project No.
mere agency of the Republic, is engaged in the private 409:
business of selling irrigation pumps and construction C. Disposition of Proceeds from Payments under Contracts
materials on installment plan. The Solicitor General's motion of Sale form part of the ISU annual budget, which will
for reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied. finance the costs of supply and equipment purchases, the
No appeal appears to have been taken. installation and construction of pump units, and the
operating expenses of ISU for which appropriated funds are
The Solicitor General was served with copy of the writ of not available.
execution issued by the court against the defendants in the
above-mentioned civil case; and an order of garnishment (2) It is clear that the ISU is not only an office in the
was served by the Sheriff of Manila against the deposits Government of the Republic, created to promote a specific
and/or pump irrigation trust fund in the account of the economic policy of said government, but also that its activity
Irrigation Service Unit at the Philippine National Bank, (of selling irrigation pumps to farmers on installment basis)
Manila, to cover the sum of P14,874.40. is not intended to earn profit or financial gain to its
operator. The mere fact that interests are being collected
ISSUE: on the balance of the unpaid cost of the purchased pumps
WON the pump irrigation trust fund, deposited with the does not convert this economic project of the government

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

institutions are concerned with administrative functions which

into a corporate activity. The installment payments
deprive them from directly controlling the
and interests receivable from the farmers are to be
used to replenish the counterpart funds utilized in
Non-academic/Technical/Vocational School- it shall be
furtherance of the operation of the project.
the Headmaster who will be directly responsible for the tort
committed. (Amadora v. CA)
(3) It is apparent that this decision of the Court of Appeals
suffers from the erroneous assumption that because the
RVP: But this is applicable during the time of Plato, because
State has waived its immunity, its property and funds
when we speak of TESDA today, they also have their own
become liable to seizure under the legal process. This
teachers in charge. The Supreme Court recognized that the
emphatically is not the law.
provision is outdated, but since it has not been amended by
the Congress, then it shall remain applicable today.
Judgments against a state, in cases where it has consented
to be sued, generally operate merely to liquidate and
REASON FOR DISTINCTION: The opportunity to control or
establish plaintiff's claim in the absence of express
the one with the close connection with the students.
provision; otherwise they can not be enforced by processes
of law; and it is for the legislature to provide for their
payment in such manner as it sees fit. AMADORA v. CA
FACTS:
(4) It needs no stressing that to allow the levying under Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April
execution of the ISU funds would amount to diverting them 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot to death by
from the purpose originally contemplated by the P.I.U.S. Pablito Daffon, a classmate. Petitioners contend that their
Bilateral Agreement, and would amount to a disbursement son was in the auditorium in order to complete a physics
without any proper appropriation as required by law. requirement. Because of this, petitioners contend that
(5) A second infirmity of the decision under appeal Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school
originates from its ignoring the fact that the initial complaint principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with
against the Irrigation Service Unit was that it had induced Daffon and 2 other students should be liable. Later on, the
the Handong Irrigation Association, Inc., to invade and students were dropped from the complaints. Otoh,
occupy the land of the plaintiff Ildefonso Ortiz. respondents that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school
only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and
The ISU liability thus arose from tort and not from contract; that he was no longer in their custody because the semester
and it is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction, embodied had already ended.
in Art. 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that the
State is liable only for torts caused by its special agents, The CA absolved the defendants for the following reasons:
specially commissioned to carry out the acts complained of (1) Since the school was an academic institution of learning
outside of such agent's regular duties. There being no and not a school of arts and trades;
proof that the making of the tortious inducement (2) That students were not in the custody of the school
was authorized, neither the State nor its funds can since the semester has already ended;
be made liable therefor. (3) There was no clear identification of the fatal gun; and
(3) In any event, defendants exercised the necessary
diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in
RVP: Because the Irrigation unit is an extension of the DPWC,
maintaining discipline.
it is not a special agent. Also, because the fund is a public
fund, it can't be subject to garnishment or any execution.
ISSUE:
WON Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable,
b.7 TEACHERS along with its teachers.

HELD:
Art. 2180 (7). Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of
The court held that Art. 2180 covers establishments which
arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
are not technically schools of arts and trades. Where the
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
school is academic rather than technical or vocational in
their custody.
nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student
will attach to the teacher in charge of such student,
RVP: The provision applies to all schools, academic or non-
following the first part of the provision.
academic.
This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts
Academic Institution- the person directly responsible for the
and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be
tort committed by the student is the teacher incharge of the
held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other
student. Because the heads of academic institutions only have
words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their
little to no personal interactions with the students. The
students except where the school is technical in nature, in
Supreme Court recognized that the heads of academic

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. However, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held
Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis directly liable under the article because only the teacher or
"teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and the head of the school of arts and trades is made
students" and "heads of establishments of arts and responsible for the damage caused by the student or
trades" to the word "apprentices." apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort
committed by any of the other private respondents for none
At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in of them has been found to have been charged with the
the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose- custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the
Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.
formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school
auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to
QUESTION OF CUSTODY
submit his physics report for what is important is that he
was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed,
The provision mentions of custody, but such does not connote
even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the
actual and immediate physical control, rather to the influence
premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would
exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a
have also brought him in the custody of the school
result of such influence.
authorities.
The phrase “so long as they remain in their custody” means
It should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not
the protective and supervisory custody that the school
only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not
and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and so
require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike
long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess
the parent, who will be liable only if his child is still a minor,
time. (Palisoc v. Brillantes)
the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the
student under him regardless of the student's age.
“As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school
premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the
The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean,
exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the
principal, or other administrative superior to exercise
enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the
supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or sections
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility
to which they are assigned.
of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed,
even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing
The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys
in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends
cannot be held liable because none of them was the
and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he
teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each of them was
is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the
exercising only a general authority over the student body
school authorities under the provisions of Art. 2180.”
and not the direct control and influence exerted by the
(Amadora v. CA)
teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and
thus immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of
A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at
the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of
attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of
the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo
temporary adjournment of school activities where the student
Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his
still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to
physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher,
leave the school premises, or the area within which the school
respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of
activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include
Alfredo's killer. At any rate, assuming that he was the
dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in
teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was
the premises of a school without more does not constitute
negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had
“attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory
waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school
custody" of the school. (Salvosa v. IAC)
or condoned their non- observance.
RVP: It is not required that the students actually live in the
In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the
school or live with the teaches in the school
dean of boys who should be held liable especially in view of
“While the custody requirement does not mean that the
the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an
student must be boarding with the school authorities, it does
unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the
signify that the student should be within the control and under
same later to him without taking disciplinary action or
the influence of the school authorities at the time of
reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was
occurrence of the injury (Amadora v. CA)
clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves
RVP: The important issue in this case is whether the
sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to
protective and supervisory custody is coterminous with the
the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he
start and end of classes?
confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the
petitioners' son.
No. It is NOT coterminous with the holding of the classes
because even during registration of a student (no classes yet),

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

the student is already subject to the rules of the school and shooting incident, which was at about 8 o'clock in the
even after classes, the student may even be present during the evening; but considering that ABON was employed as an
school just to finish the requirements. Thus, protective and armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit, he
supervisory custody is NOT coterminous whether classes are must have been attending night classes and therefore that
going or not. Even if the student is in the school just to relax hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or
or enjoy the facilities, the student is deemed under the soon thereafter. The time interval is safely within the 'recess
protective and supervisory custody. time' that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the
Palisoc case".
Tests/Standards (Amadora):
Palisoc Case (1971): Teachers or heads of establishments of
Whether this is in pursuance of a: arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain
1. Legitimate Student Objective; in their custody."
2. Legitimate Student Right;
3. Enjoyment of a Legitimate Student Right; or ISSUE:
4. Enjoyment of a Legitimate Student Privilege Whether or not BCF and its President/Chairman (petitioners)
can be held solidarily liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC for
If the answer is yes, protective and supervisory custody shall the tortuous act of Abon
apply.
HELD:
In this case, the Dean of the boys school was not held liable NO, petitioners cannot be held solidarily liable. In line with
even though he confiscated a gun from one of the students of the Palisoc case, a student not "at attendance in the school"
the erring party because it was not shown that it was the same cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is
gun which killed the petitioner’s son. embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school,"
contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of
No defendant was successfully held accountable except for the school activities where the student still remains within call
parents of the killer. of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school
premises, or the area within which the school activity is
Recess contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal.
school activities where the student still remains within call of Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises premises of a school without more does not constitute
or the area within which the school activity is conducted. “attending school" or being in the "protective and
Being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without supervisory custody" of the school, as contemplated in the
more does not constitute “attending school” or being in the law.
protective and supervisory custody” of the school. (Salvosa v.
IAC). The record shows that before the shooting incident, the
ROTC UNIT COMMANDANT (AFP), had instructed ABON
SALVOSA v. IAC "not to leave the office and [to keep the armory] well-
guarded”. Apart from negating a finding that ABON was
FACTS: under the custody of the school, this circumstance shows
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic that ABON was supposed to be working in the armory with
institution. Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit definite instructions from his superior when he shot
which is under the full control of the AFP. BCF provides an CASTRO.
office and and an armory located at the basement of its
main building to the ROTC unit. SIDE ISSUE:
(“Is that all that was discussed in this case?”)
The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had JIMMY B.
ABON as its duly appointed armorer. As armorer of the The RTC found these facts, which were adopted by the IAC:
ROTC Unit, ABON received his appointment from the AFP. “BCF is a full-fledged technical-vocational department
Not being an employee of the BCF, he also received his offering Communication, Broadcast and Telytype Technician
salary from the AFP. courses as well as Electronics Serviceman and Automotive
Mechanics courses. These courses divest BCF of the nature
At around 8:00 pm (Note: Classes in BCF are from 7:30am- or character of being purely or exclusively an academic
8:00pm), ABON shot and killed NAPOLEON CASTRO (no institution.”
reason/motive was discussed in the case) a student of the
University of Baguio in the parking space of BCF with an Petitioners raise the issue that, under Art. 2180 of the Civil
unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory Code, a school which offers both academic and technical
of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. vocational courses cannot be held liable for a tort
committed by a student enrolled only in its academic
IAC’s challenged ruling: "It is true that ABON was not program; however, considering that ABON was not in the
attending any class or school function at the time of the custody of BCF when he shot CASTRO, the Court found it

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

unnecessary to pass upon this issue.

In the law of torts, the governing principle is that protective
custody of the school heads/teachers is mandatorily
RVP: To reconcile Amadora with Salvosa, just because a substituted for that of the parents, it becomes their
student is within the premises of the school, it does not mean obligation to supervise the students’ activities during their
that the student is attending school. Thus, the question of attendance in school, including recess, and to take the
custody is a case-to-case basis. necessary precautions to protect the students in their
custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be
The phrase “so long as they remain in their custody” means anticipated, including injuries that students may inflict
the protective and supervisory custody that the school willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.
and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students so long as they are at attendance in the school, The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving
including recess time. (Palisoc v. Brillantes) defendants- school officials on the ground that they could
be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the
student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate
PALISOC v. BRILLANTES and victim lived and boarded with his teacher or the other
defendants officials of the school. There is nothing in the
FACTS: law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or
Dominador and defendant Virgilio Daffon were classmates student who commits the tortious act must live and board in
at the Manila Technical Institute (MTI). On March 10, 1966, the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the
they, together with another classmate, Desiderio Cruz, were dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied,
in the laboratory room working on a machine. Dominador must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present
was merely looking. Virgilio remarked that he was acting decision.
like a foreman which caused Domindor to slap him slightly
on the face. In retaliation, Virgilio gave him a strong flat RVP: A student is deemed under the protective and
blow on the face, and fist blows on the stomach. Dominador supervisory custody of the school if the student is pursuing a
retreated to avoid the blows but Virgilio followed him. Both legitimate student objective. Such protective and supervisory
exchanged blows until Dominador stumbled on an engine custody does not require actual or physical control because it
block which caused him to fall face downward. He became would be absurd to require the teacher to be physically present
pale and fainted. First aid failed to revive him thus, he was together with the student all the time. It is enough that it can
taken to the hospital. He never regained consciousness and be proven that the teacher exercises authority or supervisory
finally died. influence over the student.

The postmortem findings showed that the internal injuries Note: The ruling in Exconde v. Capuno, which requires that
were probably caused by strong fist blows to the stomach the student must be boarding with the school authorities to be
which ruptured his internal organs. held accountable, has already been overturned. (Please
refer to Batch 7 digests for the discussion of the case digest.)
The trial court then rendered Virgilio Daffon guilty, but
absolved from liability the three other defendants holding VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF TEACHERS
that 2180 cannot apply.
BASIS OF NEGLIGENCE: CULPA IN VIGILANDO AND
ISSUE: LOCO PARENTIS
WON the defendants-school officials are solidarily liable with
Virgilio Daffon. The basis of the presumption of negligence of teachers is culpa
in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to
HELD: have incurred in the exercise of their authority.
Yes. Under 2180, the head and teacher (Valenton and
Quibulue) of MTI are liable solidarily for the death while no The rationale of the liability of school heads and teachers for
liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere member of the the tortious acts of their pupils and students who remain in
school’s BOD, he was improperly impleaded as a sole their custody, is that they stand in loco parentis and are called
proprietor, MTI having been incorporated in 1962. The upon to “exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of
school itself should’ve been brought in as a party, but the child.”
cannot be held liable since it was not impleaded.
RVP: Teachers also stand in loco parentis whenever the
The rationale for liability of school heads and teachers for students are within school premises. Teachers should exercise
the tortious acts of their pupils and students, for so long as reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.
the pupils/students remain in their custody, they stand to a
certain extent, in loco parentis and are called upon to VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF PARENTS v.
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF TEACHERS
child.

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consent form does not in any way lower the diligence required
VICARIOUS LIABILITY VICARIOUS
of schools and teachers-in-charge may still be held
OF PARENTS LIABILITY OF
accountable.
TEACHERS
Question: During the coronavirus outbreak, a student was
attaches if the the student is immaterial whether the
forced to go outside to look for a stable internet connection for
still a minor student is still a minor or
a school requirement at the expense of being actually infected
not.
with COVID-19. Can the school be held liable?
Requires:
RVP: It would be a stretch but it can be argued that provided
1. student is within
the student was impelled to go out due to a school
school premises and
requirement and because of the fear that he/she may get a
2. student is subject to
failing grade, then the school and teacher-in-charge may be
supervisory and
held liable.
protective custody of the
school
Question: Does the teacher liability apply in instances of
emergency situations such as earthquake?
RVP: Negligent acts of university students may serve as the
basis of liability of the teacher-in charge. RVP: It would be on a case-to-case basis. It would depend if
reasonable measures were taken by the teacher and the
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY OBLIGATIONS school to prevent damage. However, despite diligent efforts
by the teacher and the school, if the damage cannot be
Protective custody obligations of the school heads, teachers prevented, the defense of force majeure may be invoked.
and the school:
Follow-up Question: Does the teacher liability apply in
(1) To provide proper supervision of the students’ instances of crime?
activities during the whole time that they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. RVP: Same application as above.
(2) To take the necessary precautions to protect the
students in their custody from dangers and hazards Question: What if a teacher-in-charge hired a substitute
that would reasonably be anticipated, including teacher on the day a tortious act occurred?
injuries that some themselves may inflict willfully or
through negligence on their fellow students. (Palisoc RVP’s Opinion: If the teacher-in-charge was negligent in
v. Brillantes) deputizing the substitute and the latter was negligent in his
duties, both may be held liable.
Question: What if there is an activity within the school (e.g.,
family day) where the parents and teachers of minor children If the teacher-in-charge was not negligent in deputizing the
are present. In case a minor child committed a negligent act, substitute but the latter was negligent in his duties, only the
who should be held liable? substitute may be held liable.

RVP: The parents, teacher-in-charge, and the school could b.8 DEFENSE: DILIGENCE OF A GOOD
be held liable. FATHER OF A FAMILY
However, in this case, since the activity is within school
premises, there is substituted parental authority given to the Art. 2180 (LAST PARAGRAPH). The responsibility treated
teachers. In fact they have more authority to control the of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
actuations of the student since they organized the activity. mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.
Assuming the negligent act committed by the child was in
relation to the school activity, you can go after the parents but C. PROVINCES, CITIES, AND
it would be more prudent to go after the teacher-in-charge and MUNICIPALITIES
the school.
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
RVP’s Opinion: The three (3) parties may be considered as liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by,
joint tortfeasors and may be held solidarily liable. any person by reason of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works
Question: For parent consent forms, do they give any legal under their control or supervision.
protection in favor of the school in case of accidents which
happen outside the school like school field trips?
Two things that we have to remember in this provision of law:
RVP: No. Waivers of civil liability are frowned upon. A parent

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

(1) The source of liability of accountability is very specific,

Contract between respondent City and Asiatic Integrated
that is, defective condition of roads, streets,
Corporation remained under the control of the former. The
bridges, public buildings, and other public
fact of supervision and control of the City over subject public
works; and
market was admitted by Mayor Ramon Bagatsing in his
letter to Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata. In fact, the City
(2) These defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges,
of Manila employed a market master for the Sta. Ana Public
public buildings, and other public works must be
Market whose primary duty is to take direct supervision and
under the control or supervision of the local
control of that particular market, more specifically, to check
government unit of the province, city or municipality,
the safety of the place for the public.
ownership is not required.
Thus, the City of Manila is liable for damages under Art.
JIMENEZ v. CITY OF MANILA 2189 of the Civil Code, respondent City having retained
control and supervision over the Sta. Ana Public Market and
FACTS: as tortfeasor under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-
Petitioner herein, together with his neighbors, went to Sta. delicts. Petitioner had the right to assume that there were
Ana public market to buy "bagoong" at the time when the no openings in the middle of the passageways and if any,
public market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. After that they were adequately covered. Had the opening been
purchasing the "bagoong" he turned around to return home covered, petitioner could not have fallen into it. The
but he stepped on an uncovered opening which could not be negligence of the City of Manila is the proximate cause of
seen because of the dirty rainwater, causing a dirty and the injury suffered, the City is therefore liable for the injury
rusty four inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, to suffered by the petitioner. Respondent City of Manila and
pierce the left leg of plaintiff-petitioner penetrating to a Asiatic Integrated Corporation being joint tortfeasors, are
depth of about one and a half inches. solidarily liable under Art. 2194 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
WON respondent City of Manila should be jointly and CITY OF MANILA v. TEOTICO
severally liable with Asiatic Integrated Corporation for the
injuries petitioner suffered. FACTS:
Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos
HELD: Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone,
YES. Republic Act No. 409 establishes a general rule waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting
regulating the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that
injury to persons or property arising from the failure of city came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to
officers" to enforce the provisions of said Act, "or any other board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an
law or ordinance or from negligence" of the City "Mayor, uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or manhole on P.
Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the
attempting to enforce said provisions." manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces
thereof to pierce his left eyelid.
On the other hand, Art. 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a
particular prescription making "provinces, cities and ISSUE:
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or WON the City of Manila is liable.
injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically —
"of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public HELD:
buildings, and other public works under their control or YES. At any rate, under Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not
supervision." In other words, Art. 1, sec. 4, R.A. No. 409 necessary for the liability therein established to attach that
refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
regardless of the object, thereof, while Art. 2189 of the Civil municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said
Code governs liability due to "defective streets, public article requires is that the province, city or municipality have
buildings and other public works" in particular and is either "control or supervision" over said street or road.
therefore decisive on this specific case. Insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic
Act 409 is a special law and the Civil Code is a general
Under Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the legislation; but as regards the subject-matter of the
liability therein established to attach, that the defective provisions of sec. 4, Rep. Act 409 and Art. 2189 of the Civil
public works belong to the province, city or municipality Code, the former establishes a general rule regulating the
from which responsibility is exacted. What said article liability of the City of Manila for damages or injury to
requires is that the province, city or municipality has either persons or property arising from the failure of city officers to
"control or supervision" over the public building in question. enforce the provisions of said Act; while Art. 2189 of the
Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making
In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana provinces, cities and municipalities liable for damages for
Public Market, despite the Management and Operating

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

the death or injury suffered by any person by reason of the hand Art. 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising
defective condition of roads, streets and other public works from "defective streets, public buildings and other public
under the control or supervision of said municipal works. There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer
governments. In other words, sec. 4 of Rep. Act 409 refers exercises control or supervision over the public works in
to liability arising from negligence in general regardless of question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner
the object thereof, whereas Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, under article 2198 of the Civil Code is clear.
governs liability due to defective streets in particular.

In this case, the Civil Code is decisive herein because the

RVP: In the cases assigned, a recurring argument of these
present action is based on the alleged defective condition of
LGUs is that the accident happened in the national highway
a road. Even if P. Burgos avenue were, therefore, a national
owned by the central government. But such argument is of no
highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract
moment because Art. 2189 does not require ownership, it only
from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under
requires control or supervision. How do we prove control and
Republic Act 409.
supervision? For example in Guilatco v. City of Dagupan, the
victim fell into the manhole in a boulevard owned by the
central governments, however, they checked the charter of the
GUILATCO v. CITY OF DAGUPAN
City of Dagupan and they saw the functions and obligations of
the city engineer which actually disclosed the fact that City
FACTS:
Engineer’s office, and effectively the city of Dagupan, exercises
Petitioner, a Court Interpreter of Branch III, CFI-Dagupan
control over that part of the road.
City, while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a
sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the
So one way of doing that is to delve into the charter of the
control and supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally
LGU. in the case of City of Manila v. Teotico, this pertains to an
fell into a manhole located on said sidewalk, thereby causing
accountancy professor who, while waiting for a jeepney, fell
her right leg to be fractured. As a result thereof, she had to
into the manhole and sustained injuries. A recurring argument
be hospitalized, operated on, confined, at first at the
is that that wasn’t owned by the city of manila and another
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for months.
argument is that its charter provides that its officers and
officials cannot be hailed into court for any accidents that may
ISSUE:
happen and that their charter should prevail because it’s a
WON control or supervision over a national road by the City
special law because of its territorial application since it’s only
of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for
applicable to the city of manila. SC agreed that in that respect,
damages in accordance with Art. 2189 of the Civil Code.
it is a special law BUT as to the subject matter of the accident,
2189 is more specific because it is only pertains to accidents
HELD:
borne out of the defective conditions of roads, public works,
YES. The liability of public corporations for damages arising
bridges etc. therefore, any city cannot claim exemption for any
from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective
liability based on what’s indicated in their charter for as long as
condition of roads is expressed in Art. 2189 of the Civil
the accident happens due to defective conditions of public
Code.
works under their control or supervision and no amount of
stipulations in their charters could exempt them from
Under Art. 2189, it is not even necessary for the defective
accountability.
road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality
for liability to attach. The article only requires that either
In Jimenez, they were trying to prove that they had no control
control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or
and supervision because it was given to another entity by
street.
virtue of a public-private partnership. There was a MOA that a
private entity would be administering the Sta. Ana public
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for
market so they said the private entity is liable but with the
in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City
examination of the entire case disclose that even if the
Engineer. The same charter of Dagupan also provides that
administration is vested with the private entity, control is still
the laying out, construction and improvement of streets,
vested with the City of Manila as can be found in the
avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use
provisions of the MOA. There are even instances that the
thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus the
private entity must first acquire the City’s consent before they
charter clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision
are permitted to do certain acts and the fact consent is still
and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole
required is a testament of the degree of control it exercises
is located. The express provision in the charter holding the
over the private entity therefore there is still control or
city not liable for damages or injuries sustained by persons
supervision.
or property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce
the provisions of the charter, can not be used to exempt the
How do we look at whether there is control and
city, as in the case at bar. The charter only lays down
supervision?
general rules regulating the liability of the city. On the other
● look at the charter

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

● look at the functions of specific individuals should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear
● look at the totality of the circumstances e.g. review chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is
contracts, listen to testimonies, do not be limited to inapplicable to this case.
what the papers provide, look for other relevant
factors.
E. COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
D. PROPRIETORS OF BUILDINGS, ETC. RVP: This rule states that if the plaintiff or the victim was able
to find relief and recourse from 3rd parties who are in no way
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is connected to the tortfeasor that payment or indemnification
responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial should not benefit the tortfeasor meaning, it will not amount
collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. to double compensation or double recovery because the source
of the indemnification is a 3rd person who is not connected to
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor has no benefit or interest.
caused:
In Mitsubishi, the SC clarified that the CSR will not apply in no
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken fault insurance or no fault torts cases precisely because there
care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive is no fault meaning, no tortfeasor so, you cannot speak of
substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate benefit or double recovery. This particularly applies if naa
place; insurance claim na separate ang plaintiff so pwede siya maka
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or claim sa insurer and pwede siya maka claim, at the same time,
property; sa tortfeasor kay lahi man sala sa tortfeasor. Dili siya dapat
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or maka benefit sa diligence required by the victim in applying for
lanes, if not caused by force majeure; medical insurance which is why it’s inapplicable in no fault
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of insurance because there is no tortfeasor directly responsible
infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to for an act; there is no nexus, no connection meaning, the CSR
the place. (1908) is a source outside, independent of, remotely connected, to
the joint tortfeasor.
Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles
should be the result of any defect in the construction
mentioned in article 1723, the third person suffering damages MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILPPINES SALARIED
may proceed only against the engineer or architect or EMPLOYEES UNION (MMPSEU) v. MITSUBISHI
contractor in accordance with said article, within the period MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORP.
therein fixed. (1909)
FACTS:
This case arises from the dispute between the labor union
DE ROY v. CA group of the Mitsubishi and the corporation of Mitsubishi itself.
The CBA, particularly in Sec. 4 provides that the company
FACTS: shoulder the hospitalization expenses of the dependents of
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners covered employees subject to certain limitations and
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the restrictions. Accordingly, covered employees pay part of the
family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private hospitalization insurance premium through monthly salary
respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. deduction of 100 as share of insurance premium, while the
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate company, upon hospitalization of the covered employees'
their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the dependents, shall pay the hospitalization expenses incurred for
former failed to do so. the same The coverage includes group hospitalization
insurance coverage or assume employees up to max. amount
ISSUE: of 40,000.00 then room board and doctor fees must not
WON petitioners are free of liability since respondents had the exceed 300.00.
last clear chance of avoiding the incident.
When the CBA expired, the parties executed another CBA
HELD: incorporating the same provisions on dependents'
The petition is denied. This Court finds that the CA committed hospitalization insurance benefits but in the increased the
no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's amount and changing as well the terms and conditions.
decision holding petitioner liable under Art. 2190 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or On separate occasions, three members of MMPSEU Calida,
structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total Oabel and Martin, led claims for reimbursement of
or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary hospitalization expenses of their dependents. MMPC paid only
repairs.” Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument a portion of their hospitalization insurance claims, not the full
that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid amount. Claiming that under the CBA, they are entitled to
the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the hospital benefits, which should not be reduced by the amounts
tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence

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TORTS AND DAMAGES (Topic VI) | Atty. Pandi | EH 401 Tala Nation 2019-2020

paid by MEDICard and by Prosper, Calida, Oabel and Martin plaintiff who receives a double recovery for a single tort enjoys
asked for reimbursement from MMPC. However, MMPC denied a windfall; a defendant who escapes, in whole or in part,
the claims contending that double insurance would result if the liability for his wrong enjoys a windfall. Because the law must
said employees would receive from the company the full sanction one windfall and deny the other, it favors the victim
amount of hospitalization expenses despite having already of the wrong rather than the wrongdoer. Thus, the tortfeasor
received payment of portions thereof from other health is required to bear the cost for the full value of his or her
insurance providers. negligent conduct even if it results in a windfall for the
innocent plaintiff. As seen, the collateral source rule applies in
The VA rendered a Decision finding MMPC liable to pay or order to place the responsibility for losses on the party causing
reimburse the amount of hospitalization expenses already paid them. Its application is justified so that "the wrongdoer should
by health insurance companies. The VA held that the not benefit from the expenditures made by the injured party or
employees may demand simultaneous payment from both the take advantage of contracts or other relations that may exist
CBA and their dependents' separate health insurance without between the injured party and third persons." Thus, it finds no
resulting to double insurance, since separate premiums were application to cases involving no-fault insurances under which
paid for each contract. He also noted that the CBA does not the insured is indemnified for losses by insurance companies,
prohibit reimbursement in case there are other health insurers. regardless of who was at fault in the incident generating the
losses. Here, it is clear that MMPC is a no-fault insurer. Hence,
ISSUE: it cannot be obliged to pay the hospitalization expenses of the
Whether or not MMPSEU can demand simultaneous payment dependents of its employees which had already been paid by
from both CBA and their dependent’s health insurance. separate health insurance providers of said dependents.

HELD: (END)
The Petition has no merit. The VA based his ruling on the
opinion of Atty. Funk that the employees may recover benefits Kapit lang ng mahigpit
from different insurance providers without regard to the Aabutin natin ang mga tala
amount of benefits paid by each. According to him, this view is Tala, tala, tala
consistent with the theory of the collateral source rule.
#401TalaNation <3
What is the collateral source rule?
● As part of American personal injury law, the collateral source rule
was originally applied to tort cases wherein the defendant is
prevented from benefiting from the plaintiff's receipt of money from
other sources.
● Under this rule, if an injured person receives compensation for his
injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, the
payment should not be deducted from the damages which he would
otherwise collect from the tortfeasor.
● In a recent Decision by the Illinois Supreme Court, the rule has
been described as "an established exception to the general rule that
damages in negligence actions must be compensatory." The Court
went on to explain that although the rule appears to allow a double
recovery, the collateral source will have a lien or subrogation right to
prevent such a double recovery.
● In Mitchell vs. Harald the collateral source rule was rationalized by
the Supreme Court of Delaware: The collateral source rule is
'predicated on the theory that a tortfeasor
has no interest in, and therefore no right to benefit from
monies received by the injured person from sources
unconnected with the defendant'.
● According to the collateral source rule, 'a tortfeasor has no right to
any mitigation of damages because of payments or compensation
received by the injured person from an independent source.' The
rationale for the collateral source rule is based upon the quasi
punitive nature of tort law liability.

It has been explained as follows: The collateral source rule is

designed to strike a balance between two competing principles
of tort law: (1) a plaintiff is entitled to compensation sufficient
to make him whole, but no more; and (2) a defendant is liable
for all damages that proximately result from his wrong. A

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