Defence Standard 00-970 Part 1

Section 3
Issue 15 Date: 13 Jul 2015
_______________________________________
Design and Airworthiness Requirements
for Service Aircraft

Part 1: Fixed Wing

Section 3: Structure
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 DEF STAN 00-970 PART 1/15
SECTION 3

REVISION NOTE
This standard is raised to Issue 15 to update its content.

HISTORICAL RECORD
This standard supersedes the following:

Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Part 1 Section 3 Issue 14 dated 30 January 2015
Design and Airworthiness Requirements for Service Aircraft

Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Part 1 Section 3 Issue 13 dated 11 July 2014
Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Part 1 Section 3 Issue 12 dated 10 January 2014
Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Part 1 Section 3 Issue 11 dated 05 July 2013
Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Part 1 Section 3 Issue 10 dated 07 January 2013
Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Part 1 Section 3 Issue 9 dated 06 July 2012
Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Part 1 Section 3 Issue 8 dated 31 October 2011
Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Part 1 Section 3 Issue 7 dated 31 January 2011
Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Part 1 Section 3 Issue 6 dated 05 February 2010
Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Part 1 Issue 5 dated January 2007
Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Part 1 Issue 4 dated January 2006
Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Issue 3 dated October 2003
Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Issue 2 dated 01 December 1999
Defence Standard (Def Stan) 00-970 Issue 1 dated 12 December 1983

Aviation Publication (AvP) 970 dated 1959

Design Requirements for Service Aircraft

Air Publication (AP) 970 2nd Edition dated 1924

Handbook of Strength Calculations

Handbook (HB) 806 1st Edition dated 1918

Handbook of Strength Calculations

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CONTENTS
Description Page No

Preface 4

SECTION 3 - STRUCTURE

3.0 Introduction 6
3.1 Static Strength and Deformation 7
3.2 Fatigue 21
3.3 Symmetric Manoeuvres 32
3.4 Asymmetric Manoeuvres 36
3.5 Gust Loads 44
3.6 High Lift Devices and Airbrakes 49
3.7 Pressure Cabins 57
3.8 Spinning and Spin Recovery 68
3.9 Control Systems 70
3.10 Active Control Systems 83
3.11 Strength for Ground Handling 108
3.12 Picketing 112
3.13 Lightning Protection 115
Tables 116
Figures 120

SUPPLEMENTS

Leaflets 0 to 45 127

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DESIGN AND AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE AIRCRAFT

PART 1 – FIXED WING

SECTION 3 – STRUCTURE

PREFACE

(a) This Part of the Defence Standard provides requirements for Airworthiness and
Design Certification for the design, development and testing of Fixed Wing Aircraft for UK
Military operation. The requirements stated herein shall be applied by the Ministry of Defence
(MOD) and the contractor as agreed and defined in the contract.

(b) This document has been produced on behalf of the Military Aviation Authority
Executive Board (MEB) by the Military Aviation Authority (MAA), MAA Technical Group, MOD
Abbey Wood.

(c) The appropriate Parts of this document are to be used, when called up in the
Contract, for all future designs, and whenever practicable for amendments to existing
designs. If any difficulty arises which prevents application of this document, DSA-MAA-Cert-
ADS1 shall be informed so that a remedy may be sought: e-mail: DSA-MAA-Cert-
ADSGroup@mod.uk

(d) Where the requirements of other Standards are considered applicable, the relevant
chapters and/or clauses are cross-referenced by this Part of the Defence Standard.

(e) Any enquiries regarding this document in relation to an invitation to tender or a

contract in which it is incorporated are to be addressed to the relevant MOD Project Team
Leader (PTL) named in the invitation to tender or contract.

(f) Please address any enquiries regarding this standard, whether in relation to an
invitation to tender or to a contract in which it is incorporated, to the responsible technical or
supervising authority named in the invitation to tender or contract.

(g) Compliance with this Defence Standard shall not in itself relieve any person from any
legal obligations imposed upon them. Project Leaders are to ensure that equipment procured
from outside of the European Union (EU) meets or exceeds those legal requirements
mandated within the EU (See MAA 01 Chapter 1 and the RA1000 Series).

(h) This standard has been devised solely for the use of the Ministry of Defence (MOD)
and its contractors in the execution of contracts for the MOD. To the extent permitted by law,
the MOD hereby excludes all liability whatsoever and howsoever arising (including, but
without limitation, liability resulting from negligence) for any loss or damage however caused
when the standard is used for any other purpose.

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WARNING

(i) The Ministry of Defence (MOD), like its contractors, is subject to both United
Kingdom and European laws regarding Health and Safety at Work. Many Defence Standards
set out processes and procedures that could be injurious to health if adequate precautions
are not taken. Adherence to those processes and procedures in no way absolves users from
complying with legal requirements relating to Health and Safety at Work.

Note: Where a design to the requirements of this document may result in an adverse
environmental impact the MOD PTL shall be advised.

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SECTION 3 - STRUCTURE

3.0 INTRODUCTION

3.0.1 This section specifies the requirements for structural strength of the aircraft. Requirements are provided to cover the following aspects:

3.1 Static Strength and Deformation

3.2 Fatigue
3.3 Symmetric Manoeuvres
3.4 Asymmetric Manoeuvres
3.5 Gust Loads
3.6 High Lift Devices and Airbrakes
3.7 Pressure Cabins
3.8 Spinning and Spin Recovery
3.9 Control Systems
3.10 Active Control Systems
3.11 Strength for Ground Handling
3.12 Picketing
3.13 Lightning Protection

3.0.2 The section is intended to provide information similar to that contained in CS 25 Section C.

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3.1 STATIC STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION

3.1.1 This clause states the requirements for static strength and freedom from deformation which might adversely affect airworthiness,
operational capability or supportability. These requirements apply to all structures and mechanical components, including mechanical systems
such as undercarriages. Additionally, they shall apply to all materials and methods of construction. Compliance with these requirements shall be
demonstrated by the procedures recommended in the accompanying leaflets, unless prior agreement has been obtained from the PTL. This
clause contains information similar to EASA CS 25.301 – 25.307

REQUIREMENT COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE

APPROACH
3.1.2 Consideration shall be given to all This should include, but not be limited to, loads
forces imposed on the structure during its caused by the following:
operation.
 ground loads
 gust and turbulence loads
(including ground gusts,
 aerodynamic loads,
 stores carriage and release,
 flight condition (for example,
buffet),
 inertia loads,
 maintenance,
 environmental effects (such as
heating (including that from
aerodynamic effects), cooling
(see Leaflet 04), and moisture),
 systems - induced loads (for
example from control surfaces,
undercarriage deployment, etc.),
 engine - induced loads (and
auxiliary power unit induced
loads, where appropriate) and
loads from the associated
thermal environment.

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3.1.3 The interfaces and interactions See Leaflet 45 – Interaction of Systems and
between the structures system and all other Structures.
systems within the aircraft shall be considered.
3.1.4 The effect of systems that may
affect structural performance, either directly or as a
result of failure or malfunction, shall also be
considered.
3.1.5 A static Type Record shall be
prepared and maintained in accordance with the
requirements of MAA Regulatory Publication RA
5103. This shall include a periodic review of the
mass and other design load assumptions.
STRENGTH
ALLOWABLES
3.1.6 All Grade A structure shall be Coupon tests shall be done to establish A definition of Grade A structure is given in Part 1,
identified; an allowable stress, load or strain shall materials allowables on a ‘B’ basis, where such Section 4, Clause 4.1
be determined for each of them, on a ‘B’ value allowables are not available from an acceptable
basis for each failure mode. source, for each potential failure mode. (See
Leaflets 01 and 03 for data requirements for
derivation of materials allowables and Part 1,
Section 4, Clause 4.1 for acceptable sources of
metallic materials data)

Should this be impractical, the material

allowable shall be based on the mean of at least
15 coupon test results. These must be obtained
under the most adverse environmental
conditions, if such conditions significantly affect
the strength.

When only 15 coupons are used, these shall

comprise at least 5 samples from each source of
supply and at least 3 batches of material from
each source. Similarly representative samples

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shall be used, if larger numbers of coupons are
tested.
Exceptionally, it may be acceptable to allocate
allowable values to individual batches of
material: in circumstances where the mean
strength of the material varies from batch to
batch, but the coefficient of variation (c.v.)
(based on individual batches) remains
reasonably constant, the ‘B’ value in a given
batch of material must be reduced if the mean of
the batch in question is lower than that of the
batch on which the reference ‘B’ value is based.
No increase in the reference ‘B’ value is
permissible unless it can be shown that other
failure modes do not thereby become significant.
3.1.7 The allowable shall be determined See also Leaflet 02.
under the most adverse environmental conditions
arising in the critical design case for the structure
in question.
3.1.8 Allowables for each failure mode
shall take due consideration of environmental
degradation.
3.1.9 Allowables shall take account of
inherent defects, such as those arising from
manufacture.
3.1.10 All static allowable values of load,
stress or strain shall be based on nominal
dimensions, unless adverse tolerances significantly
affect the strength.
DESIGN CASES
3.1.11 For the purposes of design and Critical load cases for each component shall be A limited number of discrete design cases are
demonstration of compliance with the design simulated on the test article(s). Component and prescribed, for which the loads and other
requirements, critical design cases, corresponding airframe test articles need not be conditions are specified. They are defined in the
to the most severe specified use of the aircraft, environmentally conditioned, provided that either appropriate clauses of this publication.

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shall be identified. degradation factors are applied or environmental
degradation has been substantiated at all In some cases, it is permissible, by agreement
previous test levels. with the PTL, to use probabilistic methods (see
Leaflet 01) to define the design case.
The test structure shall be loaded up to limit load
for all relevant load cases. Subsequently, the
test structure shall be loaded to proof load and
ultimate load, for selected, critical load cases. It
shall be shown that no detrimental deformation
occurs at proof load. Consideration shall be
given to a progressive approach to this test (see
also Clause 3.1.30 and Leaflet 03).

Following testing to ultimate load, consideration

should be given to testing beyond this level, in a
limited number of load cases, to achieve failure
or a specified level above ultimate load. Such
additional testing should be agreed with the
PTL.

To allow for the variability in strength between

nominally identical items, a test factor
appropriate to each test shall be determined
from Table 2. The factors given in Table 2
correspond to a ‘B’ level of assurance,
normalized to the variability test factor of 1.0 that
is customary for conventional metallic
structures.
3.1.12 The loads associated with each Many of the cases overlap, and the whole
case shall be traced through the structure far structure need not be analyzed for every one.
enough to ensure that the requirements are
satisfied everywhere. When it can be shown that a particular case is
covered by other, more stringent, requirements, it
need not be considered further.
3.1.13 Where the rate of load application is

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such that transient stresses may be produced, the
effects of this rate of application shall be
considered.
3.1.14 There may be cases that are more Compliance with the requirements shall then be
demanding of some designs than those defined in demonstrated in that case also.
this publication. When such a case is identified, it
shall be defined.
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
3.1.15 The structural analysis shall be As part of the verification of the structural
substantiated by test, unless it can be shown that analysis, at least one structural detail,
the methods used have already been verified. (See representing each structural feature of interest,
also Clause 3.1.27) shall be tested under the most adverse loading
and environmental conditions specified for the
design, unless it can be shown that the method
of structural analysis has already been verified
on a similar structure. Where there are similar
structural features, it may be acceptable to verify
them by means of element tests.

The value of strength so obtained shall be

reduced in order to obtain an acceptable
estimate of the ‘B’ value for the element or detail
(Table 1) and, where appropriate, a further
allowance shall be made for differences
between the element and the structure itself.
The size of the reduction factor of Table 1
depends upon the failure mode and the number
of coupons used in establishing that variability.
In general, the larger the sample of coupons
upon which the variability is based, the smaller
the reduction factor.

Tests shall be done to substantiate the method

of structural analysis used to estimate

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component allowables from materials data,
unless the method has already been verified on
a similar structure.

Sub-component, component and/or airframe

tests shall also be used as part of the
verification of the analysis. Separate element
tests will be unnecessary in those cases where
the airframe or component static test adequately
exercises the structure.
3.1.16 The methods and rationale used
shall be sufficient to cover the effect of any
deformation, especially where compliance cannot
be substantiated directly by test.
3.1.17 Check stress calculations shall be
performed (see Leaflet 01), and the results
summarized in the static Type Record.
DEFORMATION
3.1.18 Deformations shall be accounted for The functionality of major control and
in the analysis. This shall include consideration of mechanical systems throughout the flight
the effect that deformation may have on load envelope shall be substantiated by analysis or
cases, internal or external load distributions, and test. Up to proof load, it shall be shown that
load paths. these systems have full range and freedom of
movement.
3.1.19 Structural deformation which takes
place during normal operation and maintenance of
the aircraft shall not:

(a) cause interference between control

surfaces or between the structure and any
control systems;

(b) reduce the clearances between

moveable parts of the control system and

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adjacent structure or equipment to values
less than the minimum permitted for safe
flight;

(c) affect the aerodynamic

characteristics of the aircraft to the extent
that the flying qualities are affected, or
performance is degraded;

(d) be permanent, or cause

delamination, permanent buckling, or
exceedance of the yield point of any part,
component or assembly that would result in
subsequent maintenance, repair or
replacement.
DESIGN LOADS AND REQUIREMENTS
3.1.20 Until the Design Ultimate Load The Design Ultimate Load shall be the product Exceptions to this requirement are detailed in
(DUL) is exceeded, no Grade A item shall collapse of the design limit load and the ultimate factor, Leaflet 01 and in other Clauses in this publication.
and the stress, load or strain shall not exceed the which shall normally be 1.5
static allowable value.
3.1.21 Until the Design Proof Load is The Design Proof Load shall be the product of Exceptions to this requirement are detailed in
reached, no Grade A items shall sustain the design limit load and the proof factor, which Leaflet 01 and in other Clauses in this publication.
deformation detrimental to airworthiness; moving shall normally be 1.125
parts essential to safety shall function satisfactorily.
After removal of the design proof load, no effects of
loading shall remain that might result in
subsequent maintenance, repair or replacement.
3.1.22 The Design Limit Load shall be the The Design Limit Load shall be the maximum
maximum and most critical combination of loads and most critical combination of loads and
and environmental conditions resulting from the environmental conditions resulting from the
specified ground and flight operation of the aircraft. specified ground and flight operation of the
aircraft.

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TOLERANCE OF DEFECTS AND DAMAGE
3.1.23 The structure shall be tolerant of Tests shall substantiate the effects of inherent
inherent defects, such as those arising during defects and of accidental damage.
manufacture, and shall have adequate strength to
withstand DUL.
3.1.24 The structure shall have strength The impact threat shall be characterized in See also Clause 3.2 for damage growth criteria.
adequate to withstand DUL, following damage from terms of impact energy, shape of the impactor
accidental impacts, commensurate with the and the level of threat posed to each structural
specified threat level for the aircraft type and location. Consideration shall be given to ‘zoning’
structural location. the structure with respect to the impact threat,
and this shall be reflected in the testing and
analysis to substantiate the impact tolerance of
the design.
3.1.25 The sources of impact to be Exceptionally, where the tool drop or maintenance
considered shall include, but need not be limited damage impact specified in Clause 3.1.25 causes
to, the following: obvious damage, such as cracking or puncturing,
it is assumed that such damage would be
 low velocity impacts (less than 20 repaired before flight and the requirements of
ms–1, for example, tool drops, Clause 3.1.24 need not apply.
equipment and maintenance
damage);
 medium velocity impact (20 ms–1 to
100 ms–1, for example runway
debris and hail, both on the ground
and in flight);
 bird strike (see also Pt 1 Sect 4
clause 4.9);
 lightning strike.
3.1.26 The structure shall be tolerant of Means of compliance shall be agreed with the
battle damage, commensurate with the specified PTL.
threat level for the aircraft type (see also Part 13,
Sect 3, Clause 3.9)
TEST REQUIREMENTS
3.1.27 A programme of tests shall be done The test programme shall include, but not be The principle types of structural test specimen are

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to substantiate the necessary design allowables limited to, the following tests: defined below.
and to validate the structural analysis; the tests
 coupon tests,
shall be sufficiently instrumented to enable Coupon: the simplest form of test specimen
 element or detail tests,
validation. suitable for obtaining materials properties or
 sub-component tests, properties of generic structural features (e.g.
 component and / or airframe bonded or mechanically fastened joints).
tests.
Component: a major section of the structure,
The scope of the test programme shall be which can be representatively loaded on test, and
agreed with the PTL. Where it can be shown which can be tested as a complete unit to qualify
that structural analysis methods have already the structure (e.g. wing, fuselage, rotor blade).
been verified on a similar structure, the scope of
the testing programme may be reduced, up to Detail: a non-generic structural element of a more
and including the sub-component level, by complex member (e.g. specific design configured
agreement with the PTL. joints, splices, stringers, stringer runouts, or
access panels).
The objectives of the sub-component test
programme shall include, but need not be Elements: a generic element of a more complex
confined to: structural member (e.g. skin, stringers, shear
 validation of the structural panel, sandwich panels, joints or splices).
analysis;
 establishing design allowables; Sub-component: a major three-dimensional
 determination of failure modes; structure, which can provide complete structural
 establishing the effect of representation of a section of the full structure
environmental variables on the (e.g. stub-box, section of a spar, wing panel, wing
failure mode and failure strain rib, or frames).
levels in composite materials.
Further guidance is given in Leaflet 02.
Separate sub-component tests will be
unnecessary in those cases where the airframe
static test adequately exercises the structure.

A programme of tests shall be done on an

airframe or on components, in order to
demonstrate the ultimate load capability of the

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structure. Where it can be shown that a
component can be loaded representatively, it
may be tested separately; otherwise it shall be
tested as part of the airframe test.
FLIGHT AND GROUND LOADS MEASUREMENT
3.1.28 Measurements to derive loads, Measurements shall be made at sufficient The basic aim of the measurements, in
temperatures and other relevant parameters during stations to establish the loads in the relevant conjunction with the programme of mechanical
flight and on the ground, to an extent to be agreed parts of the structure with reasonable accuracy. testing (both static and fatigue) is to ensure that
with the PTL, shall be made on one or more the structure achieves the required strength
representative aircraft, as required by the In cases where structural temperatures are factors, both static and fatigue, under the loads
appropriate Clauses of this publication. expected to be significant, these shall also be that are actually applied to it during flight and
measured. ground manoeuvres. This is particularly important
for novel designs, for which there is no basis of
The following quantities shall be considered for comparison and on which calculated loads could
measurement: be seriously in error.

(a) shear, bending moment and To this end, the first objective of the tests is to
torque at the wing roots and at one or obtain measured values of the loads in flight and
more stations in the wing, on the ground in various manoeuvres. The
accuracy of the calculated loads on which the
(b) shear, bending moment and design of the aircraft was based should be
torque at the roots of the fin and tailplane, checked on the basis of these measurements.
Information on the magnitude and variation of
(c) shear and bending moment at loads to be applied in the fatigue tests should be
one or more fuselage stations, obtained. Any loading conditions that were not
foreseen in the design, but which are detected
(d) hinge moments on control during measurement, should be accounted for.
surfaces,
The number and position of the measurement
(e) load distributions over particular stations will depend on the project concerned, on
surfaces where special investigations (for the quantities being measured and on the
example, of buffet loads) is required, practical aspect of accessibility.

(f) undercarriage loads, and See also Leaflet 6 "Structures General

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Information” for further guidance.
(g) loads on external stores.

Consideration shall be given to the

measurement of aeroelastic distortions and
modes of vibration.

A continuous record shall be made of the

relevant flight parameters necessary to define
the particular manoeuvres in which the load
measurements are being taken. The following
quantities shall be considered for measurement:

(a) airspeed and Mach number,

(b) altitude,

(c) normal acceleration,

(d) pilot’s forces on elevator, aileron

and rudder (or other relevant) controls,

(e) position of all relevant controls,

(f) rates of roll, pitch and yaw,

(g) aircraft weight and its distribution,

and

(h) thrust conditions.

3.1.29 These measurements shall be used The magnitude, distribution and time history of
to validate the design assumptions and to confirm the loads shall be determined in the agreed
the structural strength of the aircraft. flight conditions and appropriate aircraft
configurations. In selecting the flight conditions,
the following cases shall be considered, and

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also any other static or fatigue loading cases
arising from the particular role of the aircraft:

(a) symmetric manoeuvres,

(b) asymmetric manoeuvres,

(c) manoeuvres developing the

maximum calculated gust loads for aircraft
in which the gust loads exceed the
manoeuvre loads,

(d) continuous turbulence, where

practicable,

(e) special flight manoeuvres, such

as in-flight refuelling, or supply dropping,
and any other manoeuvres that are likely
to be performed during the specified use
of the aircraft, for example, terrain
following in still and turbulent air, and

(f) the take-off and landing cases of

Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4 and other
specified ground manoeuvres.

In all manoeuvre cases, the loads and their

distributions and time histories shall be
determined over a range of severity of the
manoeuvre up to the design conditions or any
lower limit set by safety or other considerations.

Thorough inspection of the structure shall be

made after flight tests, and there shall be no
signs of proof failure.

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QUALIFICATION PROGRAMME
3.1.30 Structural qualification and When staging flight envelope releases within The programme should be planned at a
certification shall be achieved by means of a this programme, account shall be taken of the sufficiently early stage in the design to ensure
staged, integrated programme of structural following: adequate technical and financial coverage.
analysis, structural tests, and flight and ground  the use of complex and/or
loads measurement, to be agreed with the PTL. unconventional structures; The philosophy behind this approach is described
 the progressive stages of the in Leaflet 03, which also gives an example of an
major structural tests; acceptable route to compliance.
 the timing and extent of flight and
ground loads surveys;
 the timing and extent of
qualification of any load limiting
system.
DEVELOPMENTS AND VARIANTS
3.1.31 The following considerations shall Where structurally significant changes are made
apply to all main load path structure. Structurally to a previously qualified design, additional
significant differences between the basic aircraft testing shall be done, which shall include, as a
and any of its developments and variants, for minimum, such major structural tests as are
example a twin-seat aircraft or ‘stretched’ fuselage necessary to demonstrate the strength of those
variant of the same type, shall be qualified features peculiar to the variant. Where structural
separately. This includes not only significant differences are significant (for example, between
differences in basic structure but also changes in a land-based and carrier-capable variant of the
equipment and/or usage that affect the original same type), a separate major airframe or
design assumptions. component static test shall normally be
necessary. This shall be linked to a staged
approach, including flight loads measurements
on the appropriate aircraft, as outlined in
Clauses 3.1.28 and 3.1.29

Exceptionally, where testing to qualify significant

structural changes to previously qualified
designs is not done, a ‘no test’ factor of at least
1.25 shall be applied. This factor is necessary
and sufficient to allow only for uncertainties in

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the calculations of strength and does not include
allowance for uncertainties in loads.

Where it can be demonstrated that differences

are not significant, qualification may be by
analysis alone.

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3.2 FATIGUE

3.2.1 This information states the fatigue requirements that apply to all structures and mechanical components which affect safety, operational capability
and supportability (Grade A parts), including undercarriages and systems. In some circumstances special requirements apply to fibre-composite
components. These are summarised in Leaflet 40. Guidance on the additional considerations which apply when service lives are extended is provided in
Leaflet 39. Terms specific to this clause are highlighted in bold at first use. These terms are defined in Part 0.

REQUIREMENT COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE

APPROACH
3.2.2 Structures and mechanical Compliance with the requirements shall be During design, the aim should be to provide
components shall have an acceptable tolerance to demonstrated by the procedures recommended inspectability, robustness, repairability and
defects and damage, see Clauses 3.2.9 to 3.2.11 in the accompanying leaflets unless prior replaceability in accordance with a Reliability-
agreement has been obtained from the PTL. Centred Maintenance (RCM) approach to be
agreed with the PTL.
3.2.3 The structure or mechanical system The advantage of the Safe Life approach is that it
as a whole shall have an acceptable Safe Life, see minimises the need for in-service inspections.
Clauses 3.2.12 to 3.2.15
3.2.4 A Safe Life approach shall always Structures and mechanical components may
be used for components where fatigue damage remain in service beyond their Safe Life (or
cannot be identified readily. However, where a Equivalent Safe Life), when cleared by
component is exposed to impact damage during inspection, provided that compliance is
maintenance or operations, it shall also be the demonstrated with the conditions and limitations
subject of an inspection-based substantiation, see detailed in Clauses 3.2.18 to 3.2.21
Clauses 3.2.18 to 3.2.21
3.2.5 Structures and mechanical
components shall have adequate residual strength
throughout their service life, as detailed in Clauses
3.2.18 – 3.2.21
3.2.6 Account shall be taken of the
monotonic and cyclic variations in service
temperature where these may have a significant
deleterious effect on performance.
3.2.7 Means shall be provided for
determining the fatigue life consumption of each

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individual aircraft during service, as defined in
Clauses 3.2.22 to 3.2.23
3.2.8 A Fatigue Type Record shall be This shall contain a record of compliance with all
prepared and maintained in accordance with the the requirements stated in this clause and the
requirements of MAA Regulatory Publication RA associated leaflets.
5309.
MATERIAL SELECTION
3.2.9 The variability of the manufacturing See Leaflet 34.
processes, product forms and material fatigue
properties shall be accounted for in the fatigue
substantiation.
3.2.10 Materials, in the product forms Exceptionally, materials and components which
chosen, shall show: have identified shortcomings in meeting these
criteria (for example, materials with a poor
(a) good fatigue performance; toughness to yield strength ratio or materials
with a poor corrosion resistance) may be used
(b) good resistance and tolerance to with the prior agreement of the PTL. Any
damage, in particular, they shall have a high shortcomings shall be taken into account in the
toughness to yield strength ratio; design and maintenance philosophy.

(c) good resistance to environmental

degradation.
3.2.11 Structural components and
assemblies shall also have:

(a) acceptable resistance and tolerance

to fatigue crack growth;

(b) protection from any effects of

environmental degradation, other than those
effects which have been accounted for in the
substantiation;

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(c) tolerance to accidental damage.
SAFE LIFE SUBSTANTIATION
3.2.12 The Safe Life of the structure shall (a) Normally, the Safe Life shall be at least See Leaflet 35 and Leaflet 37.
be demonstrated under the Design Spectrum. equal to the Specified Life. Exceptionally, a
Safe Life of less than the Specified Life may be
acceptable if advantages from earlier
replacement or continuation under inspection-
based support can be demonstrated (see
Clauses 3.2.18 to 3.2.21)

(b) Compliance shall normally be

demonstrated by test(s) supported by
calculations. Normally, at least one example of
each component shall be tested. However, if
differences between components and the loads
they experience are small, then the results from
testing one may be read across to substantiate
another. Exceptionally, the substantiation may
be based on generic data from representative
structural elements if suitable allowances are
made to account for the added uncertainty.
3.2.13 Evidence supporting these Consideration shall be given to the effects of At the design stage, it is necessary to reveal the
considerations shall be included in the Fatigue increases in the severity of service loading in the sensitivity of individual fatigue-critical features to
Type Record. design and qualification of components for increases in loading severity so that those
which the fatigue life is particularly sensitive to features with exceptionally high sensitivity can be
such increases. identified and their stresses reduced so that they
do not limit the life of the structure as a whole.
3.2.14 Structure, fully assembled wherever Pre-production testing must be timed so that any
possible, or otherwise in representative consequent design changes can be introduced
subassemblies, shall be tested at a pre-production into production with the minimum of
standard. Account shall be taken of the monotonic retrospective modifications and should be under
and cyclic effects of service temperatures where a representation of the Design Spectrum which
these may have a significant deleterious effect on is acceptable to the PTL.

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performance.
3.2.15 Stabilised production standard The Service Spectrum should be determined
structures shall be tested using a load spectrum using data from development flight testing and
which is representative of the Service Spectrum. available Operational Loads Measurement
(OLM) programmes. The load spectrum shall be
acceptable to the PTL.
RESIDUAL STRENGTH
3.2.16 Following completion of fatigue Notwithstanding the ultimate strength capability See Leaflet 37.
testing, a satisfactory residual strength shall be required by Clause 3.1, it is permissible to use a
demonstrated. This shall be accomplished by residual strength of 1.2 x Design Limit Load in For combat aeroplanes, the maximum flight loads
analysis, supported, where appropriate, by the determination of safe lives and critical crack are often associated with deliberate and quite
evidence from additional testing and tear-down sizes, since, by definition; these terminal frequent excursions towards the limits of the flight
inspections. conditions have a very low probability of envelope. The aim of residual strength testing
occurrence. It is noteworthy that this assumption should be to demonstrate that the structure can
would be invalidated if an inspection-dependent sustain Limit Load factored by the residual
aircraft were permitted to remain in service strength factor in each of the principal static
indefinitely. Exceptionally, the factor of 1.2 may loading cases.
be reduced by agreement with the PTL, but the
factor shall never be less than 1.0, as might
apply, for example, where loads are naturally
limited or Design Limit Load is associated with a
discrete case that is provided to cover extreme
circumstances that are independent of fatigue
loading.
3.2.17 A tear-down inspection shall be It is desirable to retain for inspection the fatigue
done on built-up structure. All major load paths test article during the service life of the type; this
shall be carefully dismantled and inspected in will normally follow any residual strength testing
order to reveal any significant fatigue damage. and the mandatory tear-down inspection. The
Pending completion of the tear-down inspection, destruction of test evidence should also be
the test life used for the substantiation of any avoided. Test structures should be disposed of
components that have not failed during the course only in exceptional circumstances and only with
of the test - and which may therefore contain agreement of the PTL.
undetected damage - must be limited to 90% of the

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life demonstrated by test.
INSPECTION-BASED SUBSTANTIATION
3.2.18 Normally, the Safe Life of Inspectable components may remain in service See Leaflet 36.
components which are to be cleared by inspection beyond their Equivalent Safe Life, subject to the
shall be demonstrated to be at least half of the agreement of the PTL, if:
Specified Life under the Design Spectrum.
(a) the presence of fatigue cracks
can be identified with acceptable
confidence;

(b) any crack that remains

undetected after an inspection will not
grow, under the Service Spectrum, to an
unacceptable size before the next
inspection or before scheduled
replacement or retirement;

(c) in-service incident reports, if any,

are taken into account;

(d) the inspection penalty is

acceptable on operational and economic
grounds. It is emphasised that the residual
strength assumptions would be invalidated
if an inspection-dependent aircraft were
permitted to remain in service indefinitely.
3.2.19 Evidence supporting these Consideration shall be given to the effects of At the design stage, it is necessary to reveal the
considerations shall be included in the Fatigue increases in the severity of service loading in the sensitivity of individual features to increases in
Type Record. definition of the inspection intervals and loading severity so that those features with
techniques for components for which fatigue exceptionally high sensitivity can be identified and
crack growth or residual strength are particularly their stresses reduced so that they do not impose
sensitive to such increases. restrictions on inspection intervals for the aircraft
as a whole.

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3.2.20 The inspection periodicity shall be See Leaflet 37.
substantiated by calculations, supported by
evidence from relevant crack growth testing, tear-
down inspections and in-service inspections.
3.2.21 Cracks meeting the inspection-
based requirements in terms of crack growth and
residual strength shall not result in the rupture of
vital services such as control runs.
SERVICE MONITORING
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
3.2.22 In order to attract the ‘monitored’ For those components/areas that are not
factors in fatigue design, it shall be demonstrated individually monitored by an advanced direct
during the design process that the monitoring strain measuring technique, a continuous or
system covers all critical features. In service, the periodic Operational Loads Measurement
effectiveness of the fleet-wide monitoring system programme is a condition of compliance with
shall also be demonstrated. these requirements and shall be agreed with the
relevant Service Policy Organisation.
3.2.23 Every aircraft in the fleet shall be The type of instrumentation to be installed will See Leaflet 38, Section 4.
provided with instrumentation, for the purpose of be stated in the Aircraft Specification.
estimating the fatigue damage accumulation for the
maintenance of structural integrity. Provision shall
be made for any required instrumentation during
production.
3.2.24 Where the fleet-wide Operational Loads Measurement programmes See Leaflet 38, Section 5.
instrumentation referred to in Clause 3.2.23 is for fixed wing aircraft or Operational Data
insufficient to monitor all fatigue-critical Recording for helicopters shall be used to
components; a representative sample of aircraft demonstrate the effectiveness of the monitor
shall be fitted with instrumentation that is more and underpin any simple ‘unmonitored’ lifing
extensive for in-service loads assessment. metrics adopted, e.g. hours and number of
Provision shall be made for this during production. landings.
3.2.25 Where there is a risk of critical See Leaflet 38, Sections 4.4 and 6.13
structural design limit exceedance during normal
service flying, such events and their magnitude

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shall be identified before the next flight and made
available for post flight activities.
3.2.26 The monitoring system should be See Leaflet 38, Sections 1.3, 1.4 and 6.
active for the entire period of significant fatigue
loading.
ACCURACY
3.2.27 The monitor shall not underestimate System accuracy shall be judged against an See Leaflet 38, Section 6.11
the fatigue damage accumulation of a OLM/ODR.
representative service usage spectrum by greater
than 10%. If fatigue damage is only accrued over
isolated regions of the flight envelope, then in
these regions the monitoring system shall be
shown to be conservative.
DATA INTEGRITY
3.2.28 Data loss for any reason within See Leaflet 38, Section 6.12
individual flights shall not be load dependent.
3.2.29 Interference, such as spikes, must See Leaflet 38, Section 6.13
either be prevented or removed prior to analysis.
RELIABILITY
3.2.30 The fleet-wide monitoring system See Leaflet 38, Sections 4 and 6.
will be classified as flight safety-related. As such,
the system shall be operational from first flight and
the entire system failure rate shall not exceed two
in one hundred flights.
3.2.31 System drift must be kept within Checks for drift are to be done at regular
limits to achieve the overall system accuracy intervals – frequency to be agreed with the PT.
requirements as per Clause 3.2.27
FATIGUE LOAD METER INSTALLATIONS
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
3.2.32 Where the fatigue meter has been (a) The type of individual aircraft tracking The type of individual aircraft tracking system to
chosen as the individual aircraft tracking system, system to be installed will be stated in the be installed should be commensurate with the
provision shall be made in every aeroplane for the Aircraft Specification. complexity of loading to be monitored. The type of
installation of an RAE fatigue load meter, and one system to be used should be subject to approval

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or more switches to start and stop the meter (b) In prototype and development by the PTL after consultation with appropriate
automatically in flight. aeroplanes, space shall be provided. In Subject Matter Experts.
production aeroplanes, full provision shall be
made by furnishing all the appropriate See Leaflet 41 for guidance and a more detailed
attachments, supplies and connections. description of the fatigue meter and its installation
on different aircraft types.
STRUCTURAL MONITORING SYSTEMS USING NON-ADAPTIVE PREDICTION METHODS
RELATED REQUIREMENTS
3.2.33. The MOD requirements for safety See Leaflet 42, Section 3.
management, appropriate for the safety criticality
of the structural monitoring system, defined in Def
Stan 00-56, shall be complied with.
3.2.34 The MOD requirements for aircraft See Leaflet 42, Section 3.
Service Monitors, detailed in Def Stan 00-970 Part
1, Section 3.2 and Leaflet 38 – Fatigue Service
Monitoring, shall be complied with.
EXCLUSIONS
3.2.35 Adaptive predictive techniques, See Leaflet 42, Section 4.
where the model continues to train or adapt itself in
response to new input data, whilst in service, shall
not be used as an aircraft structural monitor.
TASK DEFINITION
3.2.36 A task definition shall be produced See Leaflet 42, Section 5.
in which the aims of the structural monitor shall be
clearly documented.
SYSTEM DESIGN
3.2.37 The design of the non-adaptive The design shall be described clearly and See Leaflet 42, Section 6.
predictive structural monitor, including all methods unambiguously. The document shall contain
for data manipulation and identification of domain sufficient detail for certification authorities to
knowledge shall be clearly documented. comprehend the internal workings of the models
used.
TRAINING, TESTING AND VALIDATION DATA
3.2.38. A data collection strategy, for The data collection strategy shall include See Leaflet 42, Section 7.

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training, test and validation data, shall be identification of the data requirements, data
developed and documented. sources, estimated data quantities, data quality
requirements and data limitations.
3.2.39. The criteria for selection of training, See Leaflet 42, Section 7.
testing and validation data shall be documented.
3.2.40. Where practicable, training, testing See Leaflet 42, Section 7.
and validation data shall be captured over the
whole of the flight envelope.
3.2.41. Evidence of the coverage of training, See Leaflet 42, Section 7.
testing and validation data sets shall be
documented.
3.2.42. Where practicable, training, testing See Leaflet 42, Section 7.
and validation data shall be captured from more
than one aircraft in the fleet.
3.2.43. Methods used to exclude data from This document shall include details of all See Leaflet 42, Section 7.
Evidence of the coverage of training, testing and anomaly detection routines and statistical
validation data sets shall be documented. techniques used.
3.2.44. The format of the training, testing See Leaflet 42, Section 7.
and validation data sets shall be identified and
documented.
3.2.45. All data collected for training, testing See Leaflet 42, Section 7.
and validation shall be catalogued and stored in its
raw form.
3.2.46. All processed training; testing and See Leaflet 42, Section 7.
validation data shall be catalogued and stored in its
final form.
3.2.47. All collateral information, relevant to Collateral data may include data calibration files, See Leaflet 42, Section 7.
the captured training, testing and validation data, pilot’s notes, flight and fatigue data sheets and
shall be identified, catalogued and stored. equipment running logs.
MODEL TRAINING
3.2.48. The algorithms used to train the See Leaflet 42, Section 8.
non-adaptive predictive structural monitor shall be
documented.

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3.2.49. The performance of the trained non- See Leaflet 42, Section 8.
adaptive predictive structural monitor, with training
and test data shall be documented.
MODEL VALIDATION
3.2.50. Validation, using unseen data sets, See Leaflet 42, Section 9.
shall be undertaken to compute the structural
monitor’s performance metric.
3.2.51. The confidence intervals in the See Leaflet 42, Section 9.
predictions made by the structural monitor and
their evaluation methods shall be documented.
3.2.52. Evidence of the generalised Sensitivity analysis of the structural monitor’s See Leaflet 42, Section 9.
solutions, with reference to data limitations, for the response to variations in input parameters may
structural monitor shall be documented. be one of the methods of providing evidence of
generalisation.
IN-SERVICE MAINTENANCE
3.2.53. An in-service performance See Leaflet 42, Section 10.
assessment mechanism and performance review
plan for the non-adaptive predictive structural
monitor shall be developed and published prior to
the entry to service of the system.
3.2.54. The in-service performance See Leaflet 42, Section 10.
assessment mechanism shall include detection
and reporting of anomalous input data.
3.2.55. The in-service performance See Leaflet 42, Section 10.
assessment mechanism shall include detection
and reporting of input data outside the experience
of the training data set (novel data).
3.2.56. The in-service performance See Leaflet 42, Section 10.
assessment mechanism shall include
performance-warning levels.
3.2.57. The performance review plan shall See Leaflet 42, Section 10.
include periodic routine revalidation of the
structural monitor using OLM/ODR data.

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3.2.58. The need to retrain the structural See Leaflet 42, Section 10.
monitor shall be reviewed if there is a significant
change of role of the aircraft (including revised
stores and tactics), or if a significant modification to
the aircraft is embodied, or if warning levels have
been triggered in the performance assessment
mechanism.
3.2.59. The training status of the structural See Leaflet 42, Section 10.
monitor shall be reviewed no less than annually at
the Structural Integrity Working Group / Type
Airworthiness Meeting.

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3.3 SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

3.3.1 The requirements of this clause apply to all aeroplane types and to the aeroplane as a whole in each case. The requirements are expressed in
terms of a flight envelope, the co-ordinates of which are the forward speed and normal acceleration. Refer to Part 0 for definitions.

REQUIREMENT COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE

FACTORS
3.3.2 The structure shall have proof and
ultimate factors as specified in Clauses 3.1.20 to
3.1.22, unless otherwise agreed with the PTL,
under conditions involving steady normal
acceleration and forward speed as represented by
all points within and on the boundary of the
specified flight envelope, and under specified
manoeuvres involving pitching acceleration within
the envelope.
THE FLIGHT ENVELOPE
3.3.3 The structural design flight envelope In this context level coordinated turns and wind See also Clause 3.4.14
is defined by Fig 1 and by the values of n1 and VD up turns shall be considered as symmetric
which will be given, with any necessary manoeuvres. Any rate of roll required to
amplifications for special types, in the particular minimise lateral acceleration on entering the
Aeroplane Specification. All altitudes up to the turn shall be allowed for.
maximum operating altitude shall be considered.
MANOEUVRES TO BE CONSIDERED
STEADY PITCHING VELOCITY
3.3.4 The condition of a steady pitching The pitching velocity shall be that associated
velocity shall be considered at all points within and with the appropriate value of the normal
on the boundary of the flight envelope specified by acceleration factor at a given speed. It shall be
Fig 1. assumed that the pitch control motivators are
deflected at a sufficiently slow rate so that
pitching acceleration effects are negligible.
PITCHING ACCELERATION
3.3.5 The loads shall be considered which In evaluating the loads which arise in the (a) When the flight control system of the
arise when the aeroplane is initially in steady level manoeuvres covered by Clauses 3.3.5 and 3.3.6 aeroplane incorporates load limiting devices the

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flight at the manoeuvre speed, VA1 and the pitch consideration shall be given to: combination of nominal accelerations and pitching
motivators are moved suddenly to cause the conditions described in Clauses 3.3.5 and 3.3.6
extreme positive pitching acceleration (nose up), (a) The aeroplane trimmed to a zero shall be determined in agreement with the PTL.
except as limited by pilot or actuator effort or inceptor force condition. See also Leaflet 8 and Clauses 3.10.54 – 3.10.62
control system design Guidance (a).
(b) The aeroplane in any out of trim (b) When the flight control system of the
condition as agreed in accordance with aeroplane is of conventional design such that
Part 1, Section 2, Clause 2.1.20 movement of the motivators is directly related to
the movement of the pilot's inceptors use shall be
made of a rational motivator motion versus time
profile when determining the loads which occur in
the manoeuvres described in Clauses 3.3.5 and
3.3.6 See also Leaflet 7.
3.3.6 Consideration shall be given to the The speed shall be assumed constant until the
loads arising from a movement of the pitch extreme value of the normal acceleration is
motivators to cause a transition from steady level achieved.
flight at a speed within or on the boundary to the
appropriate extreme steady normal acceleration
condition.
SUPPLEMENTARY CONDITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
ENGINE POWER
3.3.7 All engine power conditions See also Leaflet 8.
(including "engine-off' and any capability for
altering the direction of the total thrust vector) likely
to occur in association with the particular
manoeuvre under investigation shall be
considered.
HIGH LIFT DEVICES, AIRBRAKES AND UNDERCARRIAGE
3.3.8 All positions of the high lift devices See also Clauses 3.6.3 – 3.6.17
likely to occur in association with the particular
manoeuvre and speed under investigation shall be
considered.
3.3.9 When airbrakes are fitted all See also Clauses 3.6.18 – 3.6.21

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positions that can be selected in flight shall be
considered.
3.3.10 All positions of the undercarriage Refer also to Part 1, Section 4, Clauses 4.11 51
which can occur in association with a particular to 4.11.75
condition shall be considered.
PITCHING MOMENT COEFFICIENT
3.3.11 The values of the pitching moment (a) Appropriate allowance shall be made for
coefficient Cmo and the position of the the effects of the following on the pitching
aerodynamic centre shall be determined by the moment coefficient Cmo and the position of the
most accurate means available, and subsequently aerodynamic centre:
checked by wind tunnel or flight tests.
(1) The limited accuracy of the
method used to determine the values of
these data.

(2) Tolerances in aileron setting, flap

setting, wingbody setting, wing twist, etc.,

(3) Elastic deformation of the

aeroplane under aerodynamic and inertia
loads.

(b) Allowance shall also be made for the

effects of propellers and slip-stream, or flow
through jet engines, on the pitching moment
coefficient Cmo and the position of the
aerodynamic centre. This allowance shall be
based, whenever possible, on the results of
wind tunnel or other tests of the particular
design.
OTHER AERODYNAMIC COEFFICIENTS AND DERIVATIONS
3.3.12 The values of all relevant
aerodynamic coefficients and derivatives shall be

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based on the best available data. Wind tunnel or
flight test results shall be used, wherever possible,
to determine or check these values.
MASS AND MASS DISTRIBUTION
3.3.13 Consideration shall be given to all See Part 0 for definition of Minimum Flying Mass.
masses between:-

(a) The minimum flying mass.

(b) The maximum mass at which the

aeroplane can reach the altitude considered.
3.3.14 The design centre of gravity This tolerance shall be 1.5% of the mean
positions at each mass and aerodynamic aerodynamic chord unless otherwise agreed
configuration shall include a tolerance beyond the with the PTL.
actual maximum forward and actual maximum aft
positions which are attainable in that configuration.

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3.4 ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

3.4.1 The requirements of this clause are applicable to all aeroplanes and to the aeroplane as a whole unless otherwise specified. The asymmetric flight-
conditions associated with side-slipping and rolling are considered, spinning being dealt with in Clause 3.8

REQUIREMENT COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE

FACTORS
3.4.2 The structure shall have proof and
ultimate factors as specified in Clauses 3.1.20 to
3.1.22, unless otherwise agreed with the PTL
under the loads which arise in each of the following
cases.
MANOEUVRES TO BE CONSIDERED
3.4.3 When the flight control system of the The cases stated in Clauses 3.4.5 to 3.4.14 Reference shall be made to Clause 3.10 and
aeroplane incorporates load limiting devices the shall be considered in so far as they are Leaflets 8, 10 and 28.
appropriate combinations of asymmetric and applicable.
symmetric manoeuvre conditions to be considered
shall be agreed with the PTL.
3.4.4 When the flight control system of the Guidance on the application of the requirements
aeroplane is of conventional design such that the is given in Leaflet 9.
movement of the control motivators is directly
related to the movement of the pilot's inceptors the
asymmetric manoeuvres stated in Clauses 3.4.5 to
3.4.14 shall apply.
YAWING MANOEUVRES
DESIGN CONDITIONS
3.4.5 The manoeuvres shall be
considered with the aeroplane in initially
unaccelerated flight at zero sideslip at all attainable
airspeeds up to the design diving speed, VD, and
at all altitudes up to the maximum operating
altitude.
DESIGN CASES
3.4.6 The deflection(s) of the yaw The following specific phases of the manoeuvre The input from the pilot's inceptor shall be such

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motivator(s) shall be determined by the following shall be considered: that, in the absence of response of the aeroplane,
considerations, whichever yields the critical cases it results in an effectively instantaneous
for a particular aeroplane: (a) The loads resulting from the application of the yaw motivator(s).
prescribed instantaneous deflection(s) of
(a) That corresponding to the maximum the yaw motivator(s), before the aeroplane (Refer to Clause 3.3.3 for the definition of speeds
output permitted by the flight control system responds. VA, VC and VD).
for the power unit of each control motivator.
(b) The loads in the condition of RAE Report
(b) When the motivator(s) is(are) maximum sideslip angle resulting from the
activated through the deflection of pedals, aeroplane to the prescribed deflection of Structures 76 - Dynamic fin and rudder loads in
the specified deflection(s) shall be that the yaw motivator(s). yawing manoeuvres.
corresponding to a total pedal force of 1344N
(300 lbf) from the minimum control speed, (c) With the aeroplane yawed to the
VMC, to the manoeuvre speed, VA and static equilibrium angle corresponding to
89ON (200 lbf) from the cruise speed, VC, to the prescribed deflection of the yaw
motivator(s), the loads which arise when
the design speed, VD, with linear variation
the deflection(s) is (are) instantaneously
between VA and VC. returned to the neutral position.
3.4.7 For all aeroplanes, consideration See Part 1, Section 2, Clause 2.22 and Section 2
shall also be given to pilot input such that the yaw Leaflet 47 for Dutch Roll information.
motivator, or combination of motivators, moves
sinusoidally at the natural frequency of the Dutch
Roll Motion of the aeroplane. The maximum value
reached by the deflection of the directional
motivator(s) during this process shall be two thirds
of that specified in Clause 3.4.6 and the input shall
consist of one and half cycles of the pilot's inceptor
(that is left-central-right-central-left-central).
3.4.8 Where appropriate, consideration See Clause 3.10
shall also be given to the deflection of the yaw
motivator(s) which will result from inceptor inputs
from the automatic control system.
CROSS COUPLING CONSIDERATIONS

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3.4.9 In those cases where inertial or
aerodynamic cross-coupling results in the
aeroplane rolling or pitching during the
manoeuvres described by Clauses 3.4.6 to 3.4.8,
unless the aeroplane flight control system ensures
that there are smaller limited values of bank angle
and normal acceleration increments, corrective
action shall be assumed as follows:

(a) Deflection of the roll motivator(s) to

arrest the rolling motion, but not until the
angle of bank has reached 15° or the
maximum dynamic sideslip angle, described
in Clause 3.4.6 (Compliance (b)), has been
achieved, whichever comes first.

(b) Deflection of the pitch motivator to

reduce the pitching response, but not until
the increment in normal acceleration has
reached 0.25g.
LONGITUDINAL STABILISER/CONTROL SURFACE LOADS
3.4.10 Except when Clauses 3.4.3 and Consideration shall also be given in the design See Leaflet 9 Para 6.
3.4.9(b) apply it is not necessary to superimpose a to the possible effects of asymmetrical
manoeuvre load upon the load on the longitudinal longitudinal stabiliser/control surface loads due
stabiliser/control required to trim the aeroplane in to buffeting which may occur near the minimum
the initial conditions specified in Clause 3.4.5. permissible flight speed as defined in Part 0.
However, in calculating the loading on a
longitudinal stabiliser/control surface the
magnitude of the pitching moment coefficient,
CMO, shall be increased and the resulting trim
(balancing) load shall be distributed asymmetrically
so as to ensure that the effect of sideslip angle is
covered.

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EFFECTS OF ASYMMETRIC ENGINE FAILURE
3.4.11 Multi engine aeroplanes shall be (a) The aeroplane shall be considered to be See Part 1, Section 2, Clause 2.22.37 to 2.22.48
designed to withstand the loads which arise from in level flight at any speed from the minimum for definition of V mc
the sudden failure of the critical engine. control speed, VMC, up to the design diving
speed, VD, at any attainable altitude. The
remaining engine(s) shall be assumed to be
delivering the maximum rated power appropriate
to the speed and altitude.

(b) When reverse thrust or propeller drag

may occur because of automatic features,
consideration shall also be given to these effects
being present on the failed engine.

(c) Corrective action by the pilot may be

assumed to be initiated at the time the
aeroplane has reached the maximum yawing
velocity subsequent to the engine failure, but not
before two seconds after the engine failure. The
magnitude of the corrective action shall be
based on the control forces stated in Clauses
3.9.6 and 3.9.7, unless it can be demonstrated
by analysis or test that lower values can control
the yaw and roll which result from the prescribed
engine failure conditions.
ROLLING MANOEUVRES
3.4.12 Part 1, Section 2, Clauses 2.22.18 to 36 specifies
minimum roll performance for handling purposes
and Part 1, Section 2 Leaflet 49 gives acceptable
criteria for meeting these requirements. The loads
which arise during rolling manoeuvres are
covered by the Combined Rolling and Pitching
cases specified in Clause 3.4.14 The roll control

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conditions which contribute to these cases are
specified in the following clauses.
3.4.13 The maximum roll inceptor input to (a) If the deflection (or any one deflection), The deflection(s) of the roll motivator(s) shall be
be used for stressing purposes at a particular so defined, exceeds that for full travel, it shall be assumed to be instantaneous unless otherwise
speed and altitude shall be that which gives the replaced by the maximum available deflection. agreed with the PTL, see also Leaflet 9, Para
largest steady-state deflection, or set of 7.2.4
deflections, of the roll control motivator, or (b) In the conditions of Requirement (c)(2)
motivators, whichever is applicable, defined by the the accuracy with which the actual hinge
most critical of the following conditions: moments of each individual motivator may be
predicted may sometimes be such that doubts
(a) That deflection, or set of deflections, arise as to the magnitude of the deflections so
which results in one and a third times the defined. The assumed deflections shall be
specified minimum rolling performance at increased, in such cases, by 30 per cent.
that speed and altitude.
(c) For ailerons or spoilers having
(b) The following deflection, or set of differential motion, the actual angles shall be
deflections: used for stressing, but the mean of the actual
angles shall correspond to the angle given by
(1) At speed VA - the full available Requirement (a), (b) or (c) as appropriate.
deflection(s)
(d) Regardless of which of the conditions
(2) At speed VC - the deflection(s) specified is critical the following specific phases
of the manoeuvre shall be considered:
required to give the steady roll rate which
occurs in condition (1)
(1) The loads which arise due to the
rolling acceleration consequent upon the
(3) At speed VD - the deflection(s)
deflection(s) of the roll motivator(s) with
required to give one third of the steady roll the aeroplane initially in steady level flight.
rate which occurs in condition (1)
(2) The loads when the rate of roll
(c) The deflection, or set of deflections, has reached its steady value consequent
given by whichever of the following is upon the prescribed deflection(s) of the
appropriate to the particular design: roll motivator(s).

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(1) that corresponding to the maximum
output permitted by the flight control (3) With the aeroplane in the steady
system for the power unit of the single roll rate of roll condition referred to in (2)
motivator, or of the individual power units above, the loads which arise when the roll
for a number of roll motivators used in motivator(s) are returned to the neutral
combination. position(s).

(2) where the motivators are driven (4) With the aeroplane in the steady
solely by the deflection of the pilot's stick rate of roll condition referred to in (2)
or wheel, that corresponding to a control above, the loads which arise when the roll
force of 267N (60 lbf) for a stick control of motivator(s) are moved to a deflected
222N (50 lbf) applied to the rim of a wheel position of equal magnitude of that in (1)
of diameter Dm (Din), resulting in a couple above, but of opposite direction.
of magnitude 222D (Nm) or 50D (lbf in)
COMBINED ROLLING AND PITCHING
3.4.14 The loads arising from the combined For the definition of normal acceleration see
application of the pitch and roll motivators shall be Clause 3.3.3 and Part 0.
considered for all speeds up to the design diving
speed, VD, and all altitudes up to the maximum
operating altitudes for the following conditions:

(a) The deflection, or set of deflections,

of the roll motivator shall be:

(1) The critical value specified in Clause

3.4.13 for all values of normal acceleration
from -1.0g up to 0.67n1g, and

(2) One half of the critical value

specified in Clause 3.4.13 associated with
a normal acceleration of 0.9n1g, and

(3) Linear variation between the values

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specified in (1) and (2) with normal
accelerations between 0.67n1g and
0.9n1g

(b) The yaw motivator(s) shall be:

(1) Held fixed in the position(s) for trim

with the aeroplane in wings-level flight,
and

(2) Deflected to reduce the sideslip

angle to zero, or if this is not possible, to
minimise the sideslip angle.

(c) Air brakes shall be either open or

closed, as appropriate to the speed - see
Clauses 3.6.18 to 3.6.21
BOMB BAY AND DOOR LOADS
3.4.15 The flight loading cases which arise The aerodynamic loads on the bomb doors, and
from the conditions specified in Clauses 3.4.5 to their distribution, shall be obtained from full
3.4.11 and 3.4.14 are applicable to bomb bays scale or wind tunnel tests. Consideration shall
when the doors are open and to bomb doors, their be given to buffet effects.
operating mechanisms and supporting structure
when the doors are in all positions from fully open
to fully closed and locked.
MASS AND MASS DISTRIBUTION
3.4.16 The range of masses to be
considered and the corresponding positions of the
centre of gravity shall be as specified in Clauses
3.3.13 to 3.3.14
AERODYNAMIC COEFFICIENTS AND DERIVATIVES
3.4.17 The values of relevant aerodynamic See also Leaflet 9, Para 6.
coefficients and derivations shall be based on the

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best available data. Wind tunnel or flight test
results shall be used wherever possible to
determine or check values.

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3.5 GUST LOADS

3.5.1 The requirements of this clause are applicable to all aeroplanes and to the strength of the complete structure, when the aeroplane encounters gusts
normal to the flight path both in the plane of symmetry (vertical gusts) and perpendicular to the plane of symmetry (lateral gusts).

REQUIREMENT COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE

GENERAL
3.5.2 The aeroplane shall have adequate
strength for any gusts encountered from directions
intermediate between the vertical and horizontal
plane which provide critical loading conditions.
FACTORS
3.5.3 The structure shall have proof and
ultimate factors not less than 1.125 and 1.5
respectively on the loads arising in each case
specified in Clauses 3.5.7 to 3.5.9
3.5.4 As an alternative to meeting these
factors against cases Clauses 3.5.7 to 3.5.9, a
probabilistic analysis (Clause 3.5.12) may be used
to demonstrate a low risk of design limit load
occurring. In this case the structure shall have
proof and ultimate factors not less than 0.8 and
1.05 respectively on the loads arising in each case
specified in Clauses 3.5.7 to 3.5.9
DESIGN CONDITIONS

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3.5.5 The required strength shall be All altitudes up to the maximum altitude (a) The aeroplane is assumed to be in
achieved at all masses between the maximum attainable shall be considered. unaccelerated flight when gusts are encountered.
mass at which the aeroplane can reach the altitude The aeroplane speed, engine operating
considered and the minimum flying mass. conditions and the associated maximum velocities
of gusts are specified in Clauses 3.5.7 to 3.5.9
(b) The trim of the aeroplane shall be
assumed to be unchanged by the pilot during the
passage of the aeroplane through the gust,
unless it is considered that flight control system
inputs will cause an additional adverse effect on
the loading, or an active alleviating system having
a sufficiently low probability of failure is fitted to
the aeroplane.
See Part 0 for definition of minimum flying mass.
3.5.6 In those cases where terrain
following flight is specified the aeroplane shall be
designed for the case when a vertical gust of
7.6m/s (25 ft/sec) is encountered at the same time
as it is performing a manoeuvre of 60% of the
maximum limit load factor.
DISCRETE GUST CASES
3.5.7 The aeroplane shall be assumed to See Fig 1 for V H
be subjected to the gust velocities (EAS) stated See Fig 2 and Section 2, Leaflet 5 for V G
below, unless otherwise agreed with the Aeroplane
Director, at the aeroplane speeds defined below.
SUBSONIC FLIGHT

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3.5.8

(a) At speed V G : the gust velocity of

20.0 m/s (66 ft/sec) between sea level and
6100m (20,000 ft) thereafter decreasing
linearly to 11.6 m/s (38 ft/sec) at 15200m
(50,000 ft), being constant thereafter.

(b) At speed V H : the gust velocity of

15.2 m/s (50 ft/sec) between sea level and
6100m (20,000 ft) thereafter decreasing
linearly to 7.6 m/s (25 ft/sec) at 15200m
(50,000 ft), being constant thereafter.

(c) At speed V D : the gust velocity of

7.60 m/s (25 ft/sec) between sea level and
6100m (20,000 ft) thereafter decreasing
linearly to 3.8 m/s (12.5 ft/sec) at 15200m
(50,000 ft), being constant thereafter.
GUST LOADS THROUGHOUT THE SPEED RANGE

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3.5.9 In addition to the loads at the Design See Figure 2.
Aeroplane Speeds the aeroplane shall be
subjected to appropriate combinations of loads
resulting from both vertical, lateral and where
relevant, intermediate gusts at all speeds above
the static stall boundary. The total load factors for
speed intermediate between the Design Aeroplane
Speeds shall be derived by assuming linear
variations in gust velocity between the design
cases specified in Clause 3.5.8. For speeds below
V G the total normal load factor shall be assumed to
vary linearly between unity at zero forward speed
and the design value at V G except for the static
stall boundary cut off.
DESIGN ANALYSIS
3.5.10 A dynamic analysis of the response In addition continuous turbulence analysis shall In evaluating the loading conditions on the
of the aeroplane to discrete gusts shall be be undertaken when this is considered to be horizontal stabiliser the airload increment due to
undertaken taking full account of the aeroelastic appropriate by the PTL. the specified gust shall be added to that of the
properties of the structure, and varying gust initial stabiliser load required to trim the aeroplane
gradients using an assumed gust shape defined in a balanced condition in steady level flight at the
by: specified speed. For horizontal and where
appropriate, intermediate gust conditions the
U = + ½ U de (1 - cos (π s/ K)
initial stabiliser load should be redistributed
where U de is the design gust velocity as specified symmetrically to an amount appropriate to the
in Clause 3.5.7 effective sideslip produced by the gust.
s - is the distance the aeroplane has penetrated
into the gust.
K - is the gradient distance, the minimum value of
which shall be 15.20m (50 ft)

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3.5.11 An investigation shall be carried out The shape of the gust defined in Clause 3.5.10
to estimate the dynamic amplification of stress in shall be used with the gradient distance varied
the discrete gust cases resulting from the effect of to establish the peak response of the aeroplane.
structural flexibility.
GUST PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS
3.5.12 As an alternative to meeting the The analysis should be based on the best See Guidance Clause 3.5.5 and Requirement and
factors specified in Clause 3.5.3 for design cases estimate of operational usage of the aircraft. The Guidance Clause 3.5.10 for basic conditions of
Clauses 3.5.7 to 3.5.9, an assessment shall be sortie definitions should include usage to the full gust loads calculations. The full gust probabilistic
made of the risk of encountering gusts which envelope as defined in Clause 3.5.5 If the analysis is described in leaflet 43.
produce Design Limit Loads. This assessment utilisation changes significantly at any later time,
shall be based on the anticipated operational the analysis shall be repeated. Limits on sortie
usage for the aeroplane. The probability of parameters or flight conditions may be required
encountering either a vertical gust or a lateral gust to achieve an acceptable gust risk.
producing Design Limit Load shall be no more than
once during the specified life. The structure shall
have proof and ultimate factors not less than 1.125
and 1.5 on the Design Limit Loads.

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3.6 HIGH LIFT DEVICES AND AIRBRAKES

3.6.1 The requirements of this clause are applicable to all aeroplanes and to the strength of high lift devices and airbrakes, their operating mechanisms
and all parts of the complete airframe affected by the load cases specified. Attention is drawn to the fatigue and damage tolerance requirements of Clause
3.2 and to the aeroelasticity requirements of Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.8

REQUIREMENT COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE

FACTORS
3.6.2 The high lift devices and airbrakes,
their operating mechanisms and associated
attachment structure shall have proof and ultimate
factors of not less than 1.125 and 1.5 respectively
in each of the appropriate loading cases specified
below unless otherwise stated.
HIGH LIFT DEVICES
3.6.3 High Lift Devices are defined in Part 0.
OPERATION DURING TAKE-OFF, APPROACH AND LANDING
3.6.4 The operating mechanisms shall be The following specific extension positions shall,
capable of lowering the flaps, and where used, the where appropriate, be identified, with
slats, to the fully extended position at an corresponding limiting speeds as defined in
appropriate design speed. Clause 3.6.7:

(a) Take-off position at any flight

speed up to and including a limited speed
for the take-off condition.

(b) An intermediate position which

shall be that used during the approach to
landing or that required immediately after
a baulked landing, whichever is more
severe at any flight speed up to and
including the limiting speed for the
intermediate condition.

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(c) A fully extended position at any
flight speed up to and including the limiting
speed for the fully extended condition.
OPERATION EN-ROUTE OR IN COMBAT
3.6.5 If required by the Aeroplane
Specification, the operating mechanism shall be
capable of lowering the high lift devices to any
position defined for use en-route or in combat, at
all speeds up to the maximum required by the
Aeroplane Specification, or as agreed with the
PTL.
RAISING SPEED
3.6.6 The rate at which flaps are retracted For Class II and Class III aeroplanes (as defined
shall be such that excessive sinking does not in Section 2 Leaflet 1, Table 1) for time taken for
occur. This requirement should be associated with the flaps to move from the fully down position to
a speed of V TO , defined in Clause 3.6.8 and the retracted position shall not be less than 15
maximum take off power. seconds; in general, 15-20 seconds is a
satisfactory period and quick travel during the
early stage of the movement is an advantage so
long as the rate of sink is never at any stage
excessive.

For Class I and Class IV aeroplanes the flaps

should retract as quickly as possible consistent
with no serious sinking or change of trim
incompatible with the handling requirements of
Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.10
DESIGN AND LIMITING SPEEDS
3.6.7 The design speeds for each position
of the high lift devices as stated in Clauses 3.6.4
and 3.6.5 must be sufficiently greater than the
limiting speed quoted in the Aircrew Manual for
that position to allow for probable variation in

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control of airspeed and for transition from one high
lift position to another.
3.6.8 The design speed shall not be less
than the following:-

(a) For the high lift devices in the take- (a) If an automatic positioning or load
off position, V TO which shall be the greater limiting system is used the speeds and
of, 1.15 times the equivalent airspeed during corresponding positions programmed or allowed
take-off at the maximum design mass before by the system may be used.
the devices can be fully retracted, or 1.6
times the equivalent stalling speed with the (b) When high lift devices are used en-route
flaps in the take-off position, zero engine or in combat condition appropriate design
power and maximum design mass. speeds shall be established which are
equivalent to speeds V A , V C , V D , V G and V H as
(b) For the high lift devices in the specified in Part 0 except that allowance may be
intermediate position, V BL , which shall be the made for the position of the high lift devices.
greater of, the equivalent airspeed attained in
a baulked landing at maximum design
landing mass before the devices can be
retracted to the intermediate position, or 1.8
times the equivalent stalling speed with the
devices in the intermediate position, zero
engine power and maximum design landing
mass.

(c) For the high lift devices in the fully

extended positions, V FL , which shall be the
greater of, 1.8 times the equivalent stalling
speed with the devices in the fully extended
position, zero engine power and maximum
design landing mass, or 1.4 times the
equivalent stalling speed with the devices
retracted, zero engine power and the landing

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mass.
STRENGTH
3.6.9 When the high lift devices are in the
retracted position the strength of those parts of the
airframe specified in Clause 3.6.1 shall be
adequate to meet the conditions stated in Clause
3.3.8, throughout the flight envelope.
3.6.10 When the high lift devices are used
for take-off, approach, and landing, the strength of
those parts of the airframe specified in Clause
3.6.1 shall be adequate to meet the load cases
specified in Clause 3.6.12 at each position and
corresponding design speed, for all appropriate
configurations of the aeroplane including the
carriage of wing stores.
3.6.11 The engine conditions shall be
appropriate to the position of the high lift devices:-

(a) Take-off power for take-off and

baulked landing conditions (MAT or MT as
appropriate - see Part 1, Section 2 Leaflet 6)

(b) Cruise power for intermediate

positions (MCT - see Part 1, Section 2
Leaflet 6)

(c) Idling power for fully extended

position.

(d) Take-off power for en-route or

combat positions (MAT or MT as appropriate)
3.6.12 For all positions other than en-route In the case of primary, intermediate and
or combat positions:- advanced trainers only the proof and ultimate

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factors in the baulked landing case shall be 1.5
(a) The aeroplane shall be assumed to and 2.0 respectively.
be subjected to manoeuvres and gusts within
the range:-

(1) Manoeuvring to a positive limit load

factor of 4.0 for Class IV, and 2.0 for other
types.

(2) Positive and negative gusts of 7.60

m/s (25 ft/see) (EAS) normal to the flight
path whilst the aeroplane is in level flight,
up to an altitude of 6100 m (20,000 ft)

(b) With the aeroplane in level flight the

separate effects of:-

(1) Propeller slipstream or fan/jet efflux

where appropriate, corresponding to both
the maximum continuous power at the
design speed and the take-off power
appropriate to not less than 1.4 times the
stalling speed at the relevant position of
the high lift devices and aeroplane mass.

(2) A head-on gust of 7.60 m/s (25

ft/sec) (EAS)

(c) A baulked landing condition where

the design speed is V BL , as defined in Clause
3.6.8(b), at the maximum design landing
mass and with the high lift devices at any
position between the fully extended and

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intermediate position.

(d) The most severe load of cases (a),

(b) and (c) above on one side of the
aeroplane with 80% of this load on the other
side.
3.6.13 When the high lift devices are used
en-route or in combat the design load cases at the
speeds specified in Clause 3.6.8 Compliance (b)
shall be those of Clause 3.6.12(a) and (b) unless
otherwise agreed with the PTL.
MECHANICAL INTERCONNECTION
3.6.14 Unless the requirements of Part 1,
Section 4, Clause 4.10 can be met when full
asymmetric deployment of the high lift devices
occurs the motion of the individual section on
opposite sides of the plane of symmetry shall be
synchronised by a mechanical interconnection or
other approved means.
3.6.15 When mechanical interconnection is
provided to meet the requirement, proof and.
Ultimate factors of 1.0 and 1.33 shall be applied to
the loads which arise following a failure which
could result in any single surface becoming
incapable of movement or of attempting to move in
an uncontrolled manner.
3.6.16 The mechanical interconnection
shall have adequate strength to account for
applicable asymmetric loads including those which
arise during flight with one or more engines on one
side of the aeroplane inoperative and the
remaining engines at take-off power.
CIRCUIT STIFFNESS

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3.6.17 It shall be shown, by calculation or
test, that the angles of opening of corresponding
port and starboard sections of the high lift devices
due to circuit flexibility or distortion of the structure
will not differ by more than 5 degrees under the
limit loads of Clauses 3.6.14 and 15 or the
maximum angle at which the handling
requirements of Part 1, Section 2 can be met,
whichever is the lower.
AIRBRAKES
3.6.18 The time for full extension or The requirements of Clauses 3.6.18 to 3.6.21
retraction of the airbrakes shall be as short as apply to airbrakes and other speed control
possible consistent with the handling requirements devices wherever they are fitted on the aeroplane.
of Part 1, Section 2. The time shall not exceed 2
seconds at high altitude and 4 seconds at the low
altitude, except under baulked landing conditions
when the retraction time should not exceed 2
seconds.
3.6.19 The airbrakes shall be safely usable
at all speeds up to the maximum permissible
speed appropriate to any possible configuration of
the aeroplane, for example, high lift devices and
undercarriage extended where appropriate,
external stores carried, etc.
STRENGTH
3.6.20 The airbrakes shall be designed to
have adequate strength under those conditions
specified in Clause 3.3.9 and Figure 1, at the
appropriate design speed defined as:-

(a) When no limiting device is fitted;

aeroplane speed V D with the airbrake fully
extended.

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(b) When a limiting device is fitted to

prevent full extension above some
predetermined speed, V B :-

(1) aeroplane speed V D with the

airbrake extended as far as permitted by
the limiting device, and

(2) 1.15 V B or V D , whichever is less,

with the airbrake fully extended.
MECHANICAL INTERCONNECTIONS
3.6.21 When mechanical interconnection is
provided between separate sections of the
airbrakes and the requirements of Part 1, Section 2
cannot be met if the interconnection fails, the
airbrake drive and interconnecting system shall
have proof and ultimate factors not less than 1.0
and 1.33 respectively on the loads which arise
following a failure which could result in any single
section becoming incapable of movement or of
attempting to move in an uncontrolled manner.

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3.7 PRESSURE CABINS

3.7.1 The requirements of this clause apply to all pressurised cockpits or cabins designed to maintain an internal pressure in excess of the external
atmospheric pressure.

REQUIREMENT COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE

DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE REQUIREMENTS
DEFINITIONS
3.7.2 The type of cabin pressurisation system required
will be stated in the Aeroplane Specification as
one of two basic types as follows:

(a) Low differential pressure system -

normally applicable to short duration
aeroplanes with the crew in fixed positions
and using oxygen routinely.

(b) High differential pressure system -

normally applicable to long duration multi-
seat aeroplanes where the crew do not use
oxygen routinely and are free to move
around.
LOW DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SYSTEMS
3.7.3 For aeroplanes with a low In order to maintain the rate of change of cabin
differential pressure system, a cabin altitude not pressure within acceptable limits during rapid
exceeding 6,700 m (22,000 ft) shall be maintained descent, the differential pressure shall be not
either at the service ceiling or, for an aeroplane less that 28 kPa.
with a primary operational role at low level, at the
maximum operational altitude stated in the
Aeroplane Specification. Pressurisation shall start
at 1,500 m (4,900 ft) and the maximum differential
pressure shall be reached at an altitude
corresponding to a cabin altitude of 5,000 m
(16,400 ft), between these altitudes, the cabin

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absolute pressure shall vary linearly with
atmospheric pressure. Above the altitude
corresponding to a cabin altitude of 5,000 m
(16,400 ft) the differential pressure shall remain
constant (see Fig. 3).
3.7.4 In level flight the cabin differential
pressure shall be maintained within -0 + 1.5 kPa of
the nominal value.
HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SYSTEMS
3.7.5 For aeroplanes with high differential
pressure systems, the maximum cabin differential
pressure shall be as high as possible consistent
with weight and other considerations; at least it
shall be such that:

(a) a cabin altitude not exceeding 1,850

m (6,060 ft) is maintained at the maximum
cruising altitude stated in the Aeroplane
Specification, and

(b) a cabin altitude not exceeding 2,500

m (8,200 ft) is maintained at the service
ceiling.
3.7.6 The crew shall be able to select the
desired cabin altitude between sea level and 1,850
m (6,060 ft). The desired altitude shall be
maintained until the maximum differential pressure
is reached.
3.7.7 In level flight, the cabin differential
pressure shall be maintained within ± 1.5 kPa of
the nominal value.
3.7.8 The rate of change of cabin
pressure shall be adjustable and shall not exceed

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7 kPa per minute for all other types of aeroplane.
PRESSURISATION SYSTEM
3.7.9 The cabin pressure and, where
appropriate, the rate of change shall be
automatically controlled.
3.7.10 No single failure in the cabin See Part 13, Section 3, Clause 3.12
pressurisation system shall lead to inability to use
any item of pressure clothing specified in the
Aircrew Equipment Assembly (AEA) for the
aeroplane.
3.7.11 The pressurisation system shall be
mounted in the aeroplane so that as far as possible
the effects of vibration and flight loads are minimal.
3.7.12 No single failure of the pressure The use of suitable protective clothing, where
control system, including the depressurisation this is provided for other reasons, can be taken
control Clauses 3.7.14 to 3.7.17, shall be capable into account in meeting this requirement.
of causing a fall in cabin pressure to a value below
the ambient pressure corresponding to the safe
altitude, as defined in Clause 3.7.33, before
descent to the safe altitude, can be made (Clause
3.7.32(b)).
3.7.13 Standard couplings in accordance See also STANAG 3312.
with Def Stan 53-68 (cancelled) shall be used in
the duct system.
DEPRESSURISATION SYSTEM
3.7.14 On all aeroplanes means shall be The control shall be in accordance with Part 1, See also Clauses 3.7.26 – 3.7.30
provided whereby the pressure differential can be Section 4, Table 23, Item 7.
reduced to zero at any altitude.
3.7.15 The time taken for the pressure to
fall from the maximum differential pressure to 0.3
kPa shall be:

(a) for low differential pressure

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systems, not less than 5 seconds and not
more than 10 seconds, and

(b) for high differential pressure

systems, as stated in the Aeroplane
Specification.
3.7.16 It shall be possible to repressurise
the cabin following decompression at a rate which
should not exceed 7 kPa per minute.
3.7.17 The operation of the
depressurisation system shall be independent of
any power supplies or systems whose failure might
result in the need to abandon the aeroplane.
PRESSURE INDICATORS
ALTIMETERS
3.7.18 An altimeter to indicate the cabin
altitude shall be fitted in the cabin and be readily
visible to the appropriate crew member, as well as
the pilot.
WARNING DEVICES
3.7.19 Means shall be provided at the Appropriate warning markings on the cabin See also Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.19.59
pilot's or flight engineer's station to indicate when differential pressure indicator meet this
the safe or preset pressure differential or cabin requirement.
altitude limits are exceeded.
3.7.20 An aural or visual signal shall be This warning need not function at operating See Leaflet 14.
provided (ref Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.19.59 (b)) altitudes below 7,600m (25000 ft)
as the warning of pressurisation failure or of
exceeding the cabin altitude limits, in addition to
the cabin altitude indicator.
PRESSURE CONTROLLING DEVICES
DISCHARGE AND SAFETY VALVES
3.7.21 Valves shall be provided to prevent
the differential pressure exceeding the design

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maximum by more than 7 kPa under all conditions
of failure of the control system.
3.7.22 These valves shall be mounted so See also Leaflet 14.
as to prevent blockage of the protective guard by
dirt or litter and to facilitate servicing. The
installation of these valves and their associated
pipelines shall be such as to prevent the entry and
accumulation of water.
INWARDS RELIEF VALVES
3.7.23 An inwards relief valve or valves
shall be provided to prevent the cabin pressure
falling below the pressure outside the cabin by
more than 3.5 kPa in any circumstances.
NON-RETURN VALVES
3.7.24 Failure of the air supply to the cabin
shall cause minimal loss of pressure, preferably by
the use of non-return valves to prevent leakage
back through the pressurisation system.
ISOLATING VALVES
3.7.25 A valve or valves shall be provided,
as near as possible to the source of the air used
for pressurisation, for stopping the air supply to the
cabin in an emergency.
CONTAMINATION
3.7.26 The facility shall be provided to This may be automatically operated upon Every possible precaution shall be taken to avoid
purge the cabin with a free flow of uncontaminated selection of cabin depressurisation or contamination of the cabin air by exhaust gases
air from a ram air or other system. independently selectable. or other noxious fumes both in normal operation
and, as far as possible, after damage by enemy
action or a breakdown in any part of the
pressurisation system, hydraulic piping, cabin
heating or other service. See also Leaflet 14.
3.7.27 Means shall be provided to isolate Consideration shall be given to linking this
the source of any contaminated air to the cabin. provision to the selection of the alternative

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supply of air for purging the cabin.
VENTILATION
3.7.28 Ventilation shall provide at least 0.5
kg of fresh air per person per minute under the
most severe climatic and altitude conditions of
which the aeroplane is capable with all engines
functioning.
3.7.29 On multi-engine aeroplanes,
multiplication of the sources of supply of the cabin
air shall be sufficient to ensure that no combination
of failure of one or more engines will cause the
cabin equivalent altitude to be in excess of 10,000
m (32,800 ft), or the ventilation rate to be less than
0.25 kg per person per minute when the aeroplane
is maintaining maximum possible height on the
remaining engines at light load.
3.7.30 A system of ventilation shall be
provided for use at low altitudes when the cabin is
not under pressure, and shall be of adequate
capacity to ensure that satisfactory ventilation
ensues, under the climatic conditions for which the
aeroplane is designed.
LEAKAGE RATE
3.7.31 Following failure of the cabin air
supply (see Clause 3.7.32) the rate of fall in cabin
pressure shall be slow enough to allow sufficient
time for the aeroplane to descend from the
maximum operational altitude to a safe altitude
(see Clause 3.7.32) before the effective cabin
pressure falls to a value below the ambient
pressure corresponding to the safe altitude.
3.7.32 The following causes of failure of (a) In each case, account shall be taken of
cabin air supply shall be considered: the pilot's reaction time (assumed to be 5

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seconds) and the time to retrim the aeroplane
(a) Failure due to failure of all engines, for the descent.
in which case it shall be assumed that a
descent is started immediately, and (b) In the case of aeroplanes for which a
ballistic climb is required by the Aeroplane
(b) Failure due to other causes, in Specification as an operational manoeuvre, it
which case it shall be assumed that a shall be assumed that in case (a) the failure
descent with engine power is not started until occurs, and that in case (b) the warning
after the warning of Clauses 3.7.19 – 3.7.20 operates just after the aeroplane has begun its
has operated. ballistic climb.
3.7.33 The safe altitude shall be taken as
12,200 m (40,000 ft) for all aeroplanes.
3.7.34 Each and every pressure cabin shall
be subjected to a ground leakage test to
demonstrate that the requirement of Clauses
3.7.31 to 3.7.33 is met. To cater for deterioration of
the pressure sealing arrangements in service, this
test shall demonstrate that the initial equivalent
leakage area of the pressure cabin is not greater
than one half that required to comply with Clauses
3.7.31 to 3.7.33
TEST CONNECTIONS
3.7.35 Standard air pressure connections
conforming to Def Stan 16-17(Obsolescent)
SHALL be fitted to enable the cabin, ducting, seals,
etc., to be tested on the ground.
STRENGTH OF PRESSURE CABIN
3.7.36 For the purposes of strength Note: On aeroplanes which have a relief valve
considerations two differential pressures are with a fixed pressure setting as a safety device,
considered as follows: as opposed to a duplicate discharge valve (see
Leaflet 14), the use of DPR may result in
(a) The maximum working differential excessive loads for the high speed low level
pressure DPw, i.e., the setting of the case. On such aeroplanes, provided that the

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discharge valve plus tolerance. pilot is given a secondary warning of
overpressurisation (see Part 1, Section 4,
(b) The relief differential pressure DPR, Clause 4.19.57 Compliance (b)), the differential
i.e., the maximum differential pressure pressure at which the warning operates may be
attainable following operation of the safety used in place of DPR. The use of the
valve with the discharge valve blocked. overpressure setting for stressing purposes shall
be restricted to those altitudes at which the
overpressure warning is designed to operate.
3.7.37 The pressure cabin and local
structures shall have proof and ultimate factors not
less than 1.125 and 1.5 respectively under the
following loads at any height H:

(a) All differential pressures up to 0.9

DPR or 1.0 DPw appropriate to height H,
whichever is the greater, combined with,

(b) The critical combination of the most

severe inertia and flight loads and the loads
arising from the local external pressure
distribution obtainable at the height H and at
any speed up to the design diving speed VD.
3.7.38 The pressure cabin and local See Clause 3.7.23
structure shall have proof and ultimate factors not
less than 1.125 and 1.5 respectively under the
loads produced when the cabin pressure falls
below the external pressure by the maximum
amount permitted by the inwards relief valve.
FATIGUE LIFE
3.7.39 A fatigue analysis shall be carried It shall be shown, using Leaflets 35 and 37 or
out on the pressure cabin and the local structure to other agreed criteria, that the safe fatigue life for
a loading spectrum to be agreed with the PTL. The the specified spectrum is at least equal to the

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differential pressure shall vary from 0 to DPw and specified life of the aeroplane unless otherwise
the resulting loads shall be combined with the agreed.
appropriate flight and inertia loads and the loads
arising from the local external pressure distribution.
STATIC STRENGTH OF PRESSURISATION SYSTEM
3.7.40 All components, pipes and ducting
shall have proof and ultimate factors not less than
1.125 and 1.5 respectively on the following
combined loads at any height H.

(a) The local pressure in the system

when the cabin is at the differential pressure
appropriate to the height H, and

(b) Inertia loads and gyroscope loads,

where applicable, due to the most severe
conditions obtainable at the height H.
3.7.41 Unless it can be demonstrated that The most adverse conditions of temperature of
a blockage in the system by component failure is the air and of the structure should be taken into
impossible, all components, pipes and ducting account in each case.
shall have proof and ultimate factors not less than
1.125 and 1.5 respectively on:

(a) The maximum local working

pressure in the system, or

(b) The maximum possible pressure

which can occur in that part of the system
when blockage has occurred, or

(c) If a relief valve is fitted, the

maximum relief valve pressure.
STRENGTH TESTS

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PROVING TEST
3.7.42 Each cabin, when installed in the See also Leaflet 13.
aeroplane and with all instruments and equipment
fitted, shall be subjected, before delivery, to an
internal pressure of 1.125 times the maximum
differential pressure maintained for one minute and
shall not suffer any permanent deformation.
STATIC TEST
3.7.43 On all aeroplanes, strength These tests shall be made on a representative See also Leaflet 13.
calculations shall be supported by static pressure specimen of the complete pressure cabin, or, if
tests. The specimen shall be tested to the loads this is not practicable, on one or more special
given in Clause 3.7.37, as agreed with the PTL. test specimens which include all the features
known to present design difficulties.
3.7.44 Where a component, pipe or ducting
in the pressurisation system is of welded
construction or of complicated shape, so that there
is doubt about the strength calculations, a test
shall be made to establish compliance with Clause
3.7.41
FATIGUE TEST
3.7.45 A representative specimen of the It shall be shown, using Leaflets 35 and 37 or
pressure cabin, complete or represented by a other agreed criteria, that the safe fatigue life for
number of special test specimens, shall be the specified spectrum is at least equal to the
subjected to a fatigue test except where it can be specified life of the aeroplane unless otherwise
shown by calculation that the pressurisation loads agreed.
are an insignificant part of the loading spectrum
and the pressure cabin is included in the fatigue
test of the whole fuselage. The loading spectrum
shall be that given in Clause 3.7.39 unless
otherwise decided after discussion with the PTL.
3.7.46 A representative pressurisation It shall be shown, using Leaflets 35 and 37 or
system shall be subjected to a fatigue test in which other agreed criteria, that the fatigue life for the
the working temperatures and pressures are conditions specified is at least equal to the

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reproduced. Vibration and racking movements specified life of the aeroplane, unless otherwise
arising from the flight conditions shall also be agreed.
represented as far as possible.
FLIGHT TESTS
TIME NEEDED FOR EMERGENCY DESCENT FOLLOWING LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURE
3.7.47 As soon as practicable after the Airbrakes, spoilers, throttles and other devices See also Leaflet 16.
aeroplane has been cleared for high altitude flying which affect the rate of descent may be used,
and has reached a development stage where any provided the technique employed is sufficiently
results obtained would be reasonable simple for emergency use.
representative of production aeroplanes, flight tests
shall be made by the Contractor to establish the
time required for an emergency descent from the
maximum operating altitude to a safe altitude
under the most adverse conditions likely in
Service, taking into account all probable loads of
the aeroplane.

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3.8 SPINNING AND SPIN RECOVERY

3.8.1 This clause states design and strength requirements for spinning, including entry to and recovery from the steady condition. It is applicable only to
those aeroplanes where recovery from a post stall gyration or spin is called for in the Aeroplane Specification and it applies whether the entry to the post
stall gyration or spin is intentional or inadvertent If spin prevention devices having sufficiently low probability of failure are used the spinning requirements
which then apply shall be agreed with the PTL. Part 1, Section 2, Clauses 2.24.11 to 2.24.13, specifies the aeroplane handling requirements for post stall
gyration and spins. Guidance on Design Criteria for Spin Resistance and Spin Recovery is given in Leaflet 18.

REQUIREMENT COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE

STRENGTH REQUIREMENTS
FACTORS
3.8.2 The ultimate factor in Clause 3.1 of
at least 1.5 shall apply to the whole aeroplane
under the loads arising during a spin and during
entry and recovery there from. The proof factor in
Clause 3.1 of at least 1.125 shall also be met.
DESIGN CONDITIONS
3.8.3 The spinning conditions used for (a) The effect of unsteadiness shall be Leaflet 17 gives an acceptable means of
strength calculations shall be those which give the considered. estimating the rate of rotation for design purposes
most adverse combination of the yaw, pitch and in the absence of other information.
roll components of the rotation. (b) Departure from controlled flight at point A
on the flight envelope as defined in Clause 3.3.3
with the appropriate combination of angular
rotations shall be considered.

(c) To cover roll during recovery from a spin

or post stall gyration the most adverse rate of
rotation about a longitudinal axis, assumed to be
vertical, must be used.
3.8.4 Full scale spinning tests shall be The rates of roll, pitch and yaw, and the normal
made at the earliest opportunity in accordance with and longitudinal accelerations measured during
the requirements of Part 1, Section 2, Clause 2.12 these tests shall be checked against those used
for design, and if they are greater a report shall
be made to the PTL so that appropriate action

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can be taken.
ASSOCIATED CONDITIONS
3.8.5 In the departure phase of an
inadvertent spin the engine conditions in the range
of engine off to maximum power, including
maximum rotational speed, shall be assumed.
3.8.6 In other phases of the spin and
recovery, the engine condition assumed shall be
that appropriate to the manoeuvre.
3.8.7 When the aeroplane is designed to
carry external stores the most severe combinations
of mass, moments of inertia and aerodynamic drag
shall be considered at each phase of the
manoeuvre.
RECOVERY STANDARD
3.8.8 When available flight test results will
be regarded as the final evidence of the
aeroplanes characteristics as regards spinning and
recovery. However, to ensure a reasonable
probability of satisfactory full scale behaviour
advance information shall be derived by
appropriate model tests and/or calculations as
agreed with the PTL.

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3.9 CONTROL SYSTEMS

3.9.1 The requirements of this clause apply to all control systems, including engine controls, in which the position of the motivators is determined solely by
the pilot through a direct connection from the inceptors. It also applies to those parts of the flight control system which are not covered by the requirements
of Clause 3.10 for active control systems, or of Part 1, Section 6, Clause 6.5 for autopilot systems.

The requirements relate mainly to mechanical components, but powered controls, power operated trimmers and devices such as Q-feel and variable stops
are also included. Autostabilisers, auto-trim and similar devices which can move the motivators independently of inceptor inputs are not included, but are
covered by Clauses 3.10 and Part 1, Section 6, Clause 6.5

The requirements shall be considered in conjunction with other relevant clauses including:

Clause 3.1 Static Strength and Deformation

Clause 3.2 Fatigue Damage Tolerance
Clause 3.10 Active Control Technology
Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.8 Aero-elasticity
For piloting aspects, reference should be made to Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.10

REQUIREMENT COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE

GENERAL
3.9.2 The requirements shall be met over
a range of temperatures (as given in Clause 3.2)
from that at ground level to the minimum value at
the service ceiling of the aeroplane when operating
at the lightest practicable weight, and for all design
speed and acceleration conditions.
STRENGTH
GENERAL
3.9.3 Each circuit shall have proof and See Clause 3.1
ultimate factors not less than 1.125 and 1.5
respectively under the given loading conditions,
unless otherwise stated.
3.9.4 The ultimate factor for cables shall
be 2.0 and for chains shall be 3.0

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3.9.5 The loads shall be applied in each
case at the point at which the pilot would normally
apply them and shall be reacted as appropriate:

(a) by the control system with the

motivator deflected to its stops, or

(b) by an intermediate component

specifically provided for the purpose of
reacting the input loads; such as an
irreversible mechanism locked in the most
adverse position, or local system stops used
in conjunction with a load limiting device in
the circuit. When this is the case the strength
requirements for the remainder of the circuit
shall be agreed with the PTL.
PRIMARY CIRCUIT DESIGN LOADS
3.9.6 Conventional Controls For Yaw inceptor see also Part 1, Section 4,
Clause 4.12 and Part 1, Section 4 Leaflet 56
(a) Pitch Inceptor: Para. 10.

(1) Stick control column 800 N (180 lbf)

(two hands together on a single hand
grip).

(2) Wheel or W type 1000 N (225

lbf) (two control column hands, 500 N
(112 lbf) at each hand grip).

(3) Wheel or W type 500 N (112

lbf) (one hand only) column.

(b) Roll inceptor:

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(1) Stick type control column 300 N

(67.5 lbf)

(2) Wheel or W type The

torque resulting from two control
column equal and opposite loads
of 300 N (67.5 lbf) applied
tangentially at diametrically
opposed points of the wheel of
diameter D metres (inches)

(c) Yaw inceptor:

(1) Rudder bar/pedals 1350 N (303

lbf) (on one side only)

(2) Rudder bar/pedals 800 N (180

lbf) (simultaneously on each side in the
same direction) except where overridden
by brake loads.
3.9.7 Side Stick Inceptor 665 N (150 lbf)
in any direction in a horizontal plane.
DUAL CONTROL
3.9.8 Dual control systems shall be Note: For dual control aeroplanes which are
designed to the following conditions: derived from a single pilot design of aeroplane
and are intended for operational conversion
(a) Pilots acting together. training, the loading may be reduced, with the
Each pilot applying simultaneously loads prior agreement of the PTL, to each pilot
equal to 75% of those specified in Clause applying simultaneously loads equal to 50% of
3.9.6 for each inceptor. the loads specified in Clause 3.9.6

(b) Pilots acting in opposition. Note: This case provides a design condition for

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Each pilot applying simultaneously the loads the inter-connecting circuit between the two sets
specified in Clause 3.9.6 for each inceptor. of controls.
GROUND GUST CONDITIONS
3.9.9 The primary control circuits must be The limit hinge moment H is defined as:
designed to cater for control surface loads which
arise from gusts when the aeroplane is on the H = qcSK Nm (lbf ft)
ground and when taxiing downwind.
where q - is the dynamic pressure based on a
(a) That part of the control circuit speed of 41 m/s (135 ft/sec) - N/m2(lbf/ft2).
between the cockpit controls and the control c - is the mean chord of the control
stops nearest to the surface shall be surface aft of the hingeline, metres (ft).
subjected to the loads arising from a limit S - is the control surface area aft of the
hinge moment, H, defined in Guidance but hingeline, m2 (ft2).
not exceeding those of Clause 3.9.6 or 3.9.8, K= ± 0.50 for the ailerons at full deflection.
as appropriate. = + 0.75 for the ailerons with the inceptor
locked in the central position.
(b) The control system locks and the = ± 0.75 for the elevator at full deflection,
stops nearest to the surfaces and any parts up and down.
of the control circuit between these locks and = + 0.75 for the rudder at neutral and at
stops and the control surface final operating full deflection.
lever shall be subjected to the loads arising
from a limit hinge moment, H. (K is positive where the tendency is to depress
the surface)
SECONDARY CIRCUIT DESIGN LOADS
3.9.10

(a) Crank, wheel or lever (applied only to flaps,

slats, tabs, stabiliser, spoiler or wing sweep
operation)

220 (1+40R) N [50 (1+R) lbf]

3 3

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where R - is the radius at which the load is applied
metres (inches) but not less than 220 N (50 lbf),
nor more than 660 N (150 lbf)

(b) Twist 15 Nm (133 lbf in)

(c) Push-pull controls - There are no specific

loads.
CONTROL CIRCUITS - OVERALL DESIGN
EFFICIENCY AND MOVEMENT
3.9.11 Every effort shall be made to keep Within the limitations of the airframe design and
the efficiency of the mechanical control circuits as the overall requirements of the control system,
high as possible. Movement shall be smooth and the routing of control circuits shall be as simple
positive as appropriate to the function. and direct as possible and their length shall not
change during operation, or due to structural
deformation or flight accelerations, such as to
affect the control of the aeroplane.
3.9.12 Control systems for essential
services shall be so designed that when a
movement to one position has been selected, a
different position can be selected without waiting
for the completion of the initially selected
movement, and the system shall arrive at the
finally selected position without further attention.
The movements which follow and the time taken by
the system to allow the required sequence of
selection shall not be such as to adversely affect
the airworthiness of the aeroplane.
3.9.13 Where practical, the sense of
movement involved in the operation of the
inceptors shall correspond with the sense of
aeroplanes response.
3.9.14 Where appropriate the design shall

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be such that each circuit will retain any given
setting and will not tend to creep under control
loading or vibration.
3.9.15 Each circuit shall possess adequate See also Part 1, Section 4 Leaflet 28, Para. 4.
stiffness to react to the operating loads without
excess deflection.
INCORRECT ASSEMBLY
3.9.16 Each element of each control
system shall be designed so as to minimise the
probability of incorrect assembly that could result in
malfunctioning of the system.
3.9.17 For control systems which, if
incorrectly assembled would hazard the aeroplane,
the design shall be such that at all reasonable
break-down points it is mechanically impossible to
assemble elements of the system to give out of
phase action, reverse sense of the control or
unintended interconnection between two systems.
FAILURE IMMUNITY, SAFETY
3.9.18 It shall be shown by analysis, test or All foreseeable kinds of failure shall be See also Leaflet 24 and Part 1, Section 4 Leaflet
both that the aeroplane is capable of continued considered. 36.
safe flight and landing after any of the following
failures of the flight control systems, (including trim,
lift, drag, feel and thrust systems) within the
permissible flight envelope (see Part 1, Section 2,
Clause 2.1.31 to 2.1.33) without requiring
exceptional pilot skill or strength, unless it is
agreed with the PTL that such failures are
acceptably improbable:

(a) Any single failure, excluding

jamming.

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(b) Any combination of failures,
excluding jamming.

(c) Any jam in a control position

normally encountered during any phase of
flight and any manoeuvre appropriate to the
role of the aeroplane.
3.9.19 The design and location of the
inceptors shall be such as to minimise the risk of
inadvertent operation either by personnel entering
or leaving the aeroplane or by the flight crew
during normal movement in the cockpit.
3.9.20 Protection shall be provided to See also Part 1, Section 1, Clauses 1.1.24 to
prevent any control circuit components from being 1.1.26
used as a step or handhold and to prevent
interference, jamming or chafing from cargo,
passengers or loose objects. There shall be
means, especially in the cockpit area, to prevent
foreign objects entering locations where they would
jam the system.
DURABILITY, WEAR AND BACKLASH
3.9.21 The fatigue life of the control As far as possible control system elements
systems shall not be less than that of the airframe subject to wear shall have a wear life equal to
primary structure, consideration being given to all the specified life of the aeroplane as a whole.
forms of inputs expected during the design service
life.
3.9.22 The design of the control system
shall be such as to minimise backlash.
BREAKOUT FORCE
3.9.23 In the case of primary flight control See also Part 1, Section 4 Leaflet 34.
circuits the force required on the inceptor to
overcome the static friction in the relevant circuit,
when measured with a standard spring balance,

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shall be as low as possible and shall not exceed
the value stated in Table 3.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, TEMPERATURE, MOISTURE, AND ICE
3.9.24 The control circuits shall be Sufficient clearance shall be provided to ensure
designed to operate over the whole temperature the efficient operation of all detail fittings, such
range specified in Clause 3.9.2 and without any as jacks, bearings, guides, fairleads, etc., over
deleterious effects due to tightening or slackening the temperature range of Clause 3.9.2 It shall be
resulting from differential expansion. demonstrated in hot and cold temperature tests
that the clearances are sufficient.
3.9.25 Component design shall avoid It shall be demonstrated that the clearances
pockets, traps, wells, etc., into which water, provided are sufficient to ensure efficient
condensed moisture or other liquids would collect; operation of the controls under all conditions of
or adequate drain provision shall be made. humidity. Wherever possible materials which
expand appreciably with moisture should be
avoided for such parts as fairleads and washers.
3.9.26 Clearances shall be sufficient to
avoid the possibility of jamming due to the
accretion of ice.
COMBAT VULNERABILITY, PRIMARY, TRIM, SERVO AND ENGINE CONTROLS
3.9.27 On all aeroplanes except trainers, The aim shall be that the failure of any single
consideration shall be given to the reduction of the part of the flying control system shall not leave
vulnerability of all flight and engine controls vital to the pilot without adequate control for a return
the safety of the aeroplane. flight and safe landing.
3.9.28 Control circuits shall be run in those Wherever practical the primary flight control
areas of the airframe where combat damage is systems and their trim systems shall be so
less probable with respect to threat and the role of arranged that in the event of a primary circuit
the aeroplane. being rendered inoperative sufficient use of the
autopilot or trim circuit will be available to
provide a measure of control of the aeroplane.
3.9.29 Duplicated parts of control circuits
shall be located as far apart as possible.
3.9.30 When an aerodynamic servo control
surface is fitted the control system shall be

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arranged so that, in the event of the servo surface
being rendered inoperative by enemy action or
other cause, it will be possible to retain some
measure of control over the aeroplane.
CONTROL CIRCUIT - DETAILS
COMPONENTS
3.9.31 The components used in control See also Leaflet 24.
circuits shall be compatible with one another and
their design and installation shall be such as to
ensure compliance with the requirements of
Clauses 3.9.3 to 3.9.30
STOPS
3.9.32 The range of movement of each Each stop shall be located so that wear,
flight control surface, including trimming, lift and slackness, or take-up adjustments will not
drag devices and wing sweep shall be limited by adversely affect the control characteristics of the
stops. Each stop shall be able to withstand any aeroplane as a result of a change in the range of
loads corresponding to the design conditions for surface travel.
the control system.
GUST LOCKS
3.9.33 Where a device is used for locking a
control surface whilst the aeroplane is stationary,
the locking device shall:

(a) Automatically disengage when the

primary flight controls are operated in the
normal manner, or

(b) Limit the operation of the aeroplane

so that the pilot receives unmistakable
warning at the start of take-off.
3.9.34 Means shall be provided to preclude
the possibility of the locks becoming engaged in
flight.

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RUDDER PEDAL INTERCONNECT
3.9.35 Rudder pedals shall be
interconnected to ensure positive movement of
each pedal in both directions.
MOTIVATOR INTERCONNECTS
3.9.36 A connecting circuit shall be Unless otherwise agreed with the PTL, inter- See also Clauses 3.6.14 to 3.6.16 and 3.6.21
provided between the port and starboard ailerons, connecting circuits shall be provided for other
unless otherwise agreed with the PTL. motivators which are duplicated port and
starboard, such as canard, elevator/tailplane
and wing sweep and for high lift and drag
devices.
3.9.37 The aileron connecting circuit shall See also the stiffness requirements of Part 1,
have an ultimate factor at least as great as that for Section 4 Leaflet 25.
the wings as a whole in all stressing cases where
the ailerons share the total load on the wings.
UNCONVENTIONAL CONTROLS
3.9.38 When other than conventional pilot
controls are used prior agreement shall be
obtained from the PTL.
TRIM CONTROL SYSTEMS
3.9.39 Trim controls shall normally be
provided for each of the three principal control
axes.
3.9.40 Trim controls shall be designed to
avoid inadvertent operation or abrupt effect.
3.9.41 The trim inceptors shall operate in
the plane and with the sense of motion of the
aeroplane. Means shall be provided, preferably
adjacent to the inceptor, to indicate the direction or
inceptor movement relative to the aeroplane
motion.
3.9.42 Trim controls shall be designed to
retain any given setting and shall not creep under

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control loading or vibration.
3.9.43 Unless the trim tab, if fitted, is
appropriately balanced and demonstrated to be
free from flutter the control shall be irreversible.
3.9.44 If, due to failure, a power operated The inceptor for this stand-by system, and, if
trim control can stop at such a position that the applicable, the power supply for it shall be
piloting requirements of Part 1 Section 2 cannot be separated from and independent of the main
satisfied then a stand-by trim system shall be system.
provided.
POWER CONTROL UNITS AND SYSTEMS
3.9.45 Power operated control systems See also Clause 3.10 and Leaflet 19.
shall comply with the requirements of this clause in
so far as they are applicable.
3.9.46 The proof and ultimate factors shall Where appropriate the strength requirements
be 1.125 and 1.5 respectively under the maximum shall be met with the system both operative and
load which can be developed in the system under inoperative.
all practicable operating conditions.
TESTS ON POWERED FLYING CONTROL UNITS
3.9.47 Flight Clearance Test - Any new The tests required by Clauses 3.9.47 and 3.9.48 See also Leaflets 20, 21 and 23.
type of powered flying control unit shall be shall be carried out in a ground test rig.
submitted to a flight clearance test before the first
flight test of the unit.
3.9.48 Unit Design Clearance Test - Any
prototype of any new design of powered flight
control unit shall be submitted to a ground test for
design clearance.
TESTS ON POWERED FLYING CONTROL INSTALLATIONS
3.9.49 INSTALLATION FLIGHT The tests required by Clauses 3.9.49 and 3.9.50
CLEARANCE Test - Any new installation of may be made partly in a ground rig but shall
powered control unit shall be submitted to a ground include adequate ground testing in the
test for flight clearance before the first flight of the aeroplane.
installation.
3.9.50 Installation Design Clearance - A

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prototype of any new installation of a powered
flying control shall be submitted to a ground test for
design clearance.
FATIGUE TESTS
3.9.51 Each powered flying control system
shall have a safe life determined in accordance
with Clause 3.2 at least equal to the specified life
of the aeroplane, unless otherwise agreed. This
shall be demonstrated by a fatigue test.
MECHANICAL G-RESTRICTORS
3.9.52 When it is proposed to fit a See Leaflet 22.
mechanical g-restrictor, the Contractor shall
discuss the proposal with the PTL at an early stage
of the design.
MAINTENANCE
ACCESSIBILITY
3.9.53 Components shall be designed, See also Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.4
installed, located and provided with access so that
inspection, rigging, repair, replacement and
lubrication can be easily accomplished, including
visual inspection of fairleads, pulleys, terminals
and turnbuckles.
SAFETY
3.9.54 Systems and components shall be
designed and installed to preclude injury of
personnel doing maintenance and testing. Where
positive protection cannot be provided adequate
warning and instructions shall be given.
RIGGING INFORMATION
3.9.55 The limiting breakout force
established for the design in accordance with
Clause 3.9.23, or preferably some lower figure
chosen by the designer as appropriate to the type,

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shall be stated on the drawings for inspection
purposes together with the conditions of its
measurements.
3.9.56 In the case of cable-operated The requirements of Clause 3.9.23 for static
systems, the initial tensions at which, at normal friction shall be met at the correct rigging
hangar temperatures, each primary control circuit tension.
should be rigged shall be stated on the appropriate
drawings for inspection purposes.
3.9.57 The information on correct rigging
dimensions, rigging tensions and allowable static
friction limits shall be included in the relevant
Aeroplane Publications.

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3.10 ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

3.10.1 This information contains the requirements relating to flight with active controls. Active Control Systems (ACS) are systems in which commands to
the motivators are computed from sensor inputs with or without inceptor inputs. Thus, although the term is normally applied to systems which must operate
continuously and without whose correct operation safe flight cannot be maintained, it also includes all forms of autostabiliser and other systems which can
command motivator position independently of inceptor units. Definitions of terms are given in Part 0.

The requirements of this clause are concerned primarily with the most critical systems, those which operate continuously (full-time). The extent to which
they apply to other flight control systems will be stated in the Aeroplane Specification. All flight control systems, including ACS, must satisfy the
requirements of Clause 3.9 Requirements for autopilots are stated in Part 1, Section 6, Clause 6.5 For piloting aspects, handling qualities are dealt with in
Section 2, and, in particular, the reaction of the pilot to mode changes and failures, in Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.10

ACS may be provided for purposes other than flight control. In all cases the requirements of this clause will apply if maintenance of safe flight is involved.
Fig 4 shows the fundamental features which constitute an ACS. The Categories A and B outlined define those functions which are respectively purely
automatic and those which involve manual inputs. Table 4 lists representative control functions in Categories A and B. See also Leaflet 25.

REQUIREMENT COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS
3.10.2 In determining the integrity of a Full- If a full-time active flight control system is Further integration is possible and arises from the
time ACS all inputs to that system and the effects required the aeroplane designer may elect to fundamental high integrity implicit in the Full-time
of associated systems must be taken into account. integrate a number of other control functions, ACS.
These effects and their influence upon integrity e.g., structural mode and secondary controls,
must be identified during qualification. thrust and thrust vectoring, within that one
system. Such an integrated system would not
necessarily replace the need for, say, a
dedicated engine control system but could
certainly perform the necessary thrust command
computations.
APPLICATIONS
3.10.3 Full-time Active Flight Control They may also provide structural mode control, See also Clauses 3.10.94 to 3.10.107 and Leaflet
systems must provide vehicle control and where either through the conventional control surfaces 25.
necessary stability augmentation. or by means of additional specially located
surfaces or other motivators. However some

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structural mode control systems may be
designed as discrete autonomous active control
systems and may even not require to be full-
time.
FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
3.10.4 The designer must provide An ACS may be required to provide Reference to other areas
performance, to the levels stated in the aeroplane performance at the following levels of integrity:
specification. (Categories of Status, Performance, Flying
(a) Full-time. Qualities, Handling Qualities to be added later).

(b) With reversion to equivalent

performance.

(c) With reversion to degraded

performance.

(d) Fail-safe (for systems other than

primary flight control)

For systems involving reversion, as in (b) and (c)

above, the integrity of the reversionary system
and the ability to make the essential transition to
it shall be considered to be flight safety critical.
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
3.10.5 See also Leaflet 26. In considering the design of
an ACS it is important to understand that effective
operation will depend upon the compatible
interactions of pilot, airframe, ACS and the total
possible environment. A fully integrated ACS will
include some or all of the following features:

- Pilot's inceptors, switches, and indicators

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required for operating the ACS.
- Motion sensors, e.g., rate gyros,
accelerometers, airstream direction
sensors.
- Transducers and sensors required for
command and measurement of outputs.
- Structural strain sensors.
- Air data sensors.
- Computers and system management
logic.
- Status data storage.
- System power supply conditioning.
- Dedicated power supplies.
- Actuators.
- Environmental control system.
- Electrical power supply.
- Hydraulic power supply.
- Aerodynamic interfaces: control surfaces,
spoilers (motivators).
- Engine functions: thrust and vectoring
(motivators).
- Signalling elements: mechanical,
electrical, optical etc.
- Guidance sub-system.
- Intake controls.
- Software.
INTEGRITY
3.10.6 The system shall be designed to
meet the specified levels of integrity to be agreed
with the PTL.
3.10.7 A detailed analysis of the System Where redundancy is used to meet integrity
Design in respect of integrity shall be presented to targets, care shall be taken that performance
show the basis upon which the Aeroplane after failure is acceptable. This may require

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Specification is to be met. In particular the testing of simulated failure modes.
philosophy for treating common-mode failures shall
be stated and shall be to the approval of the PTL.
RELIABILITY
3.10.8 The system shall be designed to
meet the specified levels of reliability, to be agreed
by the PTL.
3.10.9 A full reliability development plan See Def Stan 00-40 (Part 1) (NATO ARMP-1)
shall be prepared to show how the full reliability
potential of the design is to be realised, to
establish compliance with the requirements and to
specify how the reliability achievement will be
maintained throughout production and service.
3.10.10 The ACS design shall take account
of maintenance requirements under all anticipated
environmental conditions.
INVULNERABILITY
3.10.11 The system shall be designed to (a) The system design shall take full account See also Part 13, Section 3, Clause 3.9
survive all threats defined in the specification. of its installation in the airframe, variations in the
operating environment including the effects of
failures of and within other on-board systems,
the potential for maintenance error, flight crew
error, enemy action and flight in lightning
conditions.

(b) The susceptibility levels for all

environmental influences shall be determined,
and all practical limitations affecting
effectiveness and survivability shall be declared
to the satisfaction of the PTL as early as
possible in the design and development
process.

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(c) Wherever possible survival shall be
achieved by providing inherent passive
resistance to the influencing factors.

(d) In the event of the aeroplane sustaining

damage, the probability of the ACS providing
less than Level 3 flying qualities shall be to the
satisfaction of the PTL (Ref. Part 1, Section 2,
Clause 2.1.19)

(e) Exceptionally, where compliance with

requirements for invulnerability proves
impracticable, it shall, with the PTL's approval,
be permissible to adopt such strategies as shut-
down and reinstatement to achieve survivability.
3.10.12 Where parallel processing or control
paths are provided to ensure redundancy, they
should be physically separated as far as possible,
so that minor accidental or battle damage does not
cause failure of the active control system.
3.10.13 The ACS and its installation, In designing resistance to Electromagnetic
together with all other installed equipments, shall Interference (EMI) consideration shall be given,
be mutually electromagnetically compatible when in particular, to the following:
installed in the aeroplane; and demonstration of
their satisfactory integration into the total aeroplane (a) An Electromagnetic
is required. Compatibility (EMC) test and EMI
avoidance philosophy must be
stated by the designer.

(b) Effects on performance,

the physical and operational
effects, must be considered during
system design.

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(c) The designer must show that his

design meets the specified threats as part
of an overall system safety analysis (Ref.
Clause 3.10.7)

(d) The effect of the requirements on

choice of system must be clearly indicated
to the PTL early in the design stages.

(e) Maintenance of essential

screening and bonding effectiveness must
be considered and means of in-service
testing incorporated into the design.
3.10.14 To avoid ACS failure due to
maintenance error, the system shall be designed
so that it is impossible to install or connect any
component part improperly.
POWER SUPPLIES
3.10.15 Hydraulic, pneumatic and electrical
power shall be provided for the system with
characteristics, levels of integrity and reliability
compatible with system requirements.
3.10.16 Power transients shall not degrade
the performance of the ACS.
3.10.17 Suitable means of sustaining
sufficient power to maintain control of the
aeroplane for recovery from engine failure shall be
provided.
3.10.18 Essential flight controls shall be
given priority over non-flight phase essential
controls in apportioning the use of power supplies.
COMPUTERS

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3.10.19 ACS computers shall be designed (a) The designer shall aim to ensure that all The response of the ACS to both pilot commands
to provide speed of operation and levels of functions embedded in a processor or computer and external disturbances will be determined by
discrimination fully compatible with the intended are identified and fully understood with respect signal computation effected by computers.
performance of the control laws, and they shall to their possible influence upon correct Feedback signals from specially provided sensors
enable all management functions to be effective functioning of the ACS, whether or not these will enable the computers to take account of the
without incurring significant penalties arising from functions are intentionally employed during motion of the aeroplane, changes in configuration
time delays. normal ACS operation. and, where incurred, flexure of its structure.

(b) Each ACS computer, as an LRU and its

interface, shall be uniquely identified such that
its correct function when installed in an
aeroplane system is assured.

(c) The ACS computer design and its

interfaces shall have sufficient reserve or be
capable of growth, to meet later expansion
requirements to be agreed with the PTL.
SENSORS
3.10.20 The locations of primary sensors in (a) Any necessary compromise shall be to
an aeroplane shall be chosen making due the satisfaction of the PTL.
allowance for rigid and flexible body motions, and
the achievement of adequate protection from bird- (b) Where use is made of sensors already
strike, accidental and battle damage. Furthermore, provided for other systems any resulting
the location of air-data sensors, and the processing compromise in the ACS aeroplane performance
of their signals shall take account of normal shall be to the satisfaction of the PTL.
disturbances (e.g. sideslip, effect of asymmetric
manoeuvres)
INCEPTORS
3.10.21 The design of inceptors shall meet For novel inceptors, operating characteristics
the performance, reliability and integrity shall be to the approval of the PTL.
requirements specified for the system.
3.10.22 The operation of control switches
etc., mounted on flight control inceptors shall be

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shown to produce minimal interference with
inceptor output signals.
3.10.23 Where appropriate, upon failure of a
feel system, reversion shall be made to, at worst,
the least acceptable breakout force and gradient
defined in Section 2.
3.10.24 Dual Control Inceptors

(a) Where mechanical

interconnection between inceptors is
impracticable, e.g., between force
sensors, the designer shall advise the
PTL, as early as possible of the
method of interfacing inceptors with
the control law computing.

(b) The interface logic shall

whenever possible avoid the use of
manually operated inhibiting switches.

(c) Inhibition of primary

inceptors shall be avoided. (for
example the instructor's)

(d) The effects of dual command upon

control law authority and stability shall not
lead to over controlling or system instability.
3.10.25 The effects of pilot-coupled mass
shall be shown not to degrade precision control
during rapid manoeuvres and flight in turbulence.
ACTUATORS
3.10.26 The actuators shall meet the (a) Demonstration of actuator performance The requirements of Clauses 3.10.28 to 3.10.31,
requirements of the specification which should at shall be carried out in a rig which is fully and Clauses 3.10.39 and 3.10.40 shall also be

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an early stage be amplified by an interface representative of control and installation noted.
document to ensure compatibility of all mechanical, parameters.
hydraulic, pneumatic, electrical and electronic
interfaces. (b) Particular attention shall be given to the
maintenance of performance with service life
and to the accommodation of the duty cycle
expected to result from the control laws in use.
COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
3.10.27 The forms of signalling adopted, An ACS typically makes use of non-mechanical
e.g., electrical or optical, shall be shown to provide signalling between inputs and outputs.
the required integrity and invulnerability.
FAILURE MANAGEMENT
3.10.28 The effects of failures upon the (a) It is important that first failures shall incur
motion of the aeroplane shall be minimised and minimum disturbance; subsequent failures may
shall not exceed the levels stated in the Aeroplane be permitted to give rise to greater transients,
Specification. but these shall be to the satisfaction of the PTL.

(b) Where degradation of performance due

to failures is unavoidable, the designer shall aim
to achieve regression in flying qualities between
normal and emergency characteristics.

(c) Consideration shall be given in the See Leaflet 26, Para 3.

design and in the failure analysis to air-data and
other sensors which may lack coherent physical
input and for which cross-monitoring is difficult.
3.10.29 The designer shall ensure that The means whereby failures are detected and
nuisance disconnects do not compromise system isolated shall be designed so that the
integrity and performance. compromise between failure transient level and
nuisance disconnect frequency is acceptable to
the PTL.
3.10.30 Where redundancy is employed This provision does not prohibit the use of
special care shall be taken to eliminate sources of interlane transfer of information, but it does mean

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common-mode failure. that devices implemented to achieve this shall be
designed and implemented to meet identified
integrity, reliability and performance levels. See
also Part 1, Section 4, Leaflet 36.
3.10.31 Interlane tracking errors and voting
transients shall be kept to a minimum; in particular,
errors between sensors measuring the same
parameter shall not compromise required
maximum allowable failure transient levels.
INTERACTION WITH OTHER SYSTEMS
3.10.32 Any interaction with the ACS shall Data acquired by the ACS must be controlled by Interaction with other systems may form part of
be fully defined and restricted in respect of any the ACS to render its use fully compatible with the overall aeroplane avionics strategy.
data imported by the ACS. the ACS integrity requirements.
CONTROL LAWS AND SOFTWARE
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
3.10.33 The control laws incorporated in an
ACS shall provide the levels of performance stated
in the Aeroplane Specification. In respect of flying
qualities and operational performance, when
operating in turbulence these shall be at least to
the standard of Section 2.
3.10.34 Where control laws (mode) can See also Clause 3.10.96
compete for control authority a clear protocol shall
be established to prevent essential control laws
suffering premature saturation.
3.10.35 The designer must treat Control
Laws and common software as common-mode
elements in design and proving.
CONTROL LAWS
3.10.36 The control laws shall use the
minimum number of sensor derived feedbacks, in
particular the most rugged sensors shall be
employed for primary feedbacks essential to

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continued safe flight.
3.10.37 Control laws essential to initial
flights of any new configuration shall be robust in
that they shall be insensitive to those aeroplane
characteristics which may be subject to uncertainty
prior to flight validation.
3.10.38 Gain and phase margins or
equivalent measures relating to all modes shall be
maintained at acceptable levels for all predictable
variations in system operating conditions and
aeroplane configurations throughout the specified
life of the system.
3.10.39 Residual oscillations and
quantisation effect shall not exceed levels which
significantly affect the piloting task or pilot
subjective acceptance, or which can result in
significant wear of the system and airframe
components.
3.10.40 The probability of loss (if gain or
phase margins which results in an unrecoverable
aeroplane condition shall be significantly less than
the required probability for loss of the aeroplane
due to control system failure.
3.10.41 Mode compatibility logic shall
provide flexibility of ACS operation and ease of
mode selection by the pilot. Where changes of
control law (mode) can occur in flight, either
automatically or by pilot selection, they shall incur
minimum disturbance to controlled flight. The need
to manually re-trim following a mode change shall
be avoided by design.
3.10.42 The designer shall ensure that
control laws permit the aeroplane to make safe and

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controlled entries into and departures from
conditions of full and partial constraint (e.g.,
undercarriage restraint)
3.10.43 Where control laws involve a
trimming or integral function, which can result in
motivators moving progressively towards authority
limits during nominal operations, such conditions
shall be fully identified and appropriate pilot
warnings introduced.
3.10.44 Recovery from unusual attitudes,
particularly beyond the stall, or from intentional
manoeuvres which involve transition through a
period of low or negative airspeed shall be
considered and appropriate control law strategies
implemented to ensure safe and controlled
behaviour.
3.10.45 The Flight Control Laws shall be These documents shall be revised and
defined in an unambiguous Flight Requirements corrected throughout the ACS development.
Document (FRD) or Software Requirements
Statement (SRS)
3.10.46 The data describing the
mathematical model of the aeroplane and ACS
shall be defined in Master Data Sets which shall be
revised and corrected with the SRS.
SOFTWARE
3.10.47 The FRD or Software Requirements A method by which the structure and algorithms The overall standards for software in Critical
Statement shall include definitions of system of Flight Safety Critical Software shall be Systems are given in Part 13, Section 1, Clause
redundancy and failure management algorithms, evaluated to eliminate design errors arising from 1.7 The requirements of this clause are not
built in test functions, pre-flight test, and all other Control Law Specification ambiguity or lack of intended as replacements for, nor do they
functions to be written in software terms. definition shall be agreed with the PTL. invalidate, the above. However, they shall be read
as enlargements which emphasise the needs of
this critical software application.
3.10.48 Every reasonable effort shall be

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made to ensure that the software is free from
errors and is wholly compatible with Safety Critical
function.
3.10.49 The Software shall be specified, (a) The software shall be structured so that
designed, verified and validated in a rigorous and its functions are visible and discrete changes
controlled process which shall be defined to the permissible, without involving large areas of
satisfaction of the PTL. code.

(a) The Software Design (b) A Software Plan or Control Statement

Process shall facilitate software shall be prepared and shall cover all aspects of
assessment and Certification of the the software development life cycle.
ACS.
(c) At least one completely independent
(b) All Software associated with the software audit shall be carried out to assess
ACS development shall be identifiable, correct functioning of the software.
separately deliverable, and appropriately Independence may be achieved by the
documented. employment of a separate and different team for
this purpose from that designing the software.

(d) A listing of the techniques to be

employed in the software audit shall be
submitted for the approval of the PTL.

(e) All software anomalies or related

anomalies which arise during software
development and testing shall be recorded
together with the details of changes arising
therefrom.
3.10.50 The Flight Resident Software (FRS) (a) These FRS rig tests shall be carried out Ref. Clause 3.10.87 and Leaflet 30.
or In-Flight Software, shall be tested on the CS rig. using the ACS flight standard hardware.

(b) FRS rig tests shall cover all modes of

operation and shall explore the full context of

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conditions to be met in the required flight
envelope.

(c) Where software other than the FRS is

required to facilitate testing the ACSD hardware,
e.g., during environmental testing, such software
shall be rigorously tested to show that as far as
is possible it is free from anomalies which could
reduce the effectiveness of the hardware test.

(d) Automatic test software shall be shown

to be free as far as is possible from anomalies
which could hazard the ACS, and with which the
Automatic Test Equipment has been designed
to be used.
3.10.51 Each FRS programme shall be
clearly and uniquely identifiable.
3.10.52 All changes to programmes during
development and service shall be rigorously
recorded and uniquely identified.
3.10.53 All changes shall be subject to the
FRS audit and rig test procedures, unless
specifically identified and excluded by agreement
with the PTL.
AIRFRAME ASPECTS
GENERAL
3.10.54 Interaction will occur between the overall Airframe
Design and ACS design. The resulting
performance, reliability and integrity will depend
upon An optimisation of such features as
motivators, airframe configuration, and ACS
control laws. See also Leaflet 28.
STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS

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3.10.55 In the assessment of structural (a) In demonstrating compliance with the The aim of these requirements is to ensure that
integrity consideration shall be given to all ACS static strength requirements of Clause 3.1 the an aeroplane with an ACS system exhibits the
modes, including those degradations and failures designer shall examine the sensitivity of the same level of structural integrity as an aeroplane
from which the aeroplane can reasonably be loads on significant items to their dependent designed to fulfil a similar role without an ACS
expected to recover. variables (dependent variables could embrace system.
flight/aeroplane conditions, control surface
inputs, response parameters, gust velocities) to These requirements are subject to the agreement
ensure that sufficient safety margins exist. of the PTL.

(b) When assessing design loads

consideration shall be given to the loads due to
manoeuvres, gusts and combinations of
manoeuvres and gusts. It must be shown that
sufficient control authority is available for
adequate ACS system performance under all
foreseen circumstances, and in particular that
the ACS system shall have the capability to
function throughout the duration of severe
turbulence encounters. The loading assessment
shall consider those loading conditions which
would exist following the occurrence of
reasonable combinations of structural damage
and system degradation from which recovery is
expected, for example that which might be
caused by a birdstrike or minor battle damage.
3.10.56 Where recovery of the
aeroplane following failure of the ACS is
possible the load spectrum used to
establish the Design Limit Load (Clause
3.1) shall be reviewed and limitations
(Section 2 Leaflet 9) defined, if necessary,
to establish an acceptable level of risk.
3.10.57 Where intervention on the

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part of the pilot is required after the failure
of an active control system, in order to
prevent a potentially catastrophic situation
from developing, an unambiguous failure
warning shall be provided for the pilot in
accordance with Part 1, Section 4, Clauses
4.15.43 to 4.15.45
INTEGRITY OF THE ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEM
3.10.58 In cases where there would
be a significant structural penalty, if the
structure was designed to sustain the
critical loads arising from a malfunction of
the active control system, attention shall be
given to the possibility of improving the
integrity of the ACS.
DESIGN CASES
3.10.59 The critical design cases for aeroplanes
incorporating ACS may be more difficult to
determine than those for conventional
aeroplanes, consequently many more flight
conditions must be investigated at the design
stage and in flight test.

Critical design cases will be dependent not only

on aeroplane category and role but also on the
actual application of ACS in a given aeroplane
design.

Non-linearity effects which arise due to system

dwells, motivator rate limits and system authority
limits must be accurately or conservatively
represented in the design loads analysis.

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The principles to be used in the derivation of
critical design cases for aeroplanes incorporating
ACS are given in Leaflets 27 and 28.
LOADS MEASUREMENT
3.10.60 Prototype, Development and The data so obtained must be analysed to
Preproduction Aeroplanes assess the validity of design loads and to
determine whether any additional critical loading
A sufficient number of aeroplanes in these actions could occur if the relative phasing of
categories engaged in either manufacturers or manoeuvre and gust loads was altered. When
MOD flight trials shall, as required by the PTL, be critical loading actions are identified which have
fitted with comprehensive instrumentation to not been envisaged by the designer early action
enable fatigue and static loads to be measured and must be taken to ensure that the structure has
critical loading actions to be defined. sufficient strength to sustain the new loads (for
example: an increase in structural strength, a
control system re-design, a structural integrity
substantiation by calculation, or the use of a
static test airframe).
3.10.61 In-Service Aeroplanes In cases where such new critical loading actions
are identified there must be a reassessment of
In-service aeroplanes incorporating ACS shall, as the structural substantiation for the aeroplane to
required by the PTL, be fitted with instrumentation determine whether any remedial action is
to enable defined critical fatigue loads (as defined required. If a re-design or development of in-
by actions taken to comply with Clause 3.10.60 to service ACS software is necessary, either to
be measured and assessed, so that consumption ensure that the structure has sufficient strength
of structural life can be quantified. In addition, a to sustain newly identified critical loading actions
representative sample of in-service aeroplanes or to modify aeroplane performance
shall be fitted with a comprehensive load characteristics, then flight trials must be
measurement system, which although not repeated to reassess all critical loading actions.
necessarily as comprehensive as that fitted to
prototype and development aeroplanes, shall be
sufficient to enable defined critical static and
fatigue loads to be monitored and to allow any new
critical loading actions (caused for example by

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differences between actual aeroplane usage and
that assumed during design and development
flying) to be identified.
MODIFICATIONS TO SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE
3.10.62 Before approving any modifications
to either the ACS software or hardware the design
authority shall ensure that the proposed changes
do not alter the characteristics of the flying control
system sufficiently to invalidate the structural
substantiation of the aeroplane. In those cases
where the structural substantiation would be
invalidated by the proposed changes this must be
stated in the MAP RA 5300 series, and the design
authority must ensure that the necessary
resubstantiation of the structure is completed,
preferably before approving the associated
modification. Until the completion of the
resubstantiation, flying limitations shall be applied
which shall ensure that the loads applied to the
structure do not exceed 80% of the unfactored limit
load.
OPERATIONAL AND PILOTING ASPECTS
GENERAL CONDITIONS
3.10.63 The ACS shall be designed to See also Leaflet 29.
function within a specified time, to include gyro run-
up, Pre-flight (PF) test etc., following the
application of power. This time shall be defined in
the Aeroplane Specification.
3.10.64 The system shall be designed so See also Part 1, Section 4 Leaflet 36.
that the pilot is kept informed of any change of
status or failure which requires pilot action to
maintain performance or to safeguard
airworthiness.

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3.10.65 The pilot shall be given clear
indication of any modes which are engaged
whether by manual or automatic selection.
3.10.66 All otherwise undisplayed status
information shall be made available on demand
during flight, wherever possible.
3.10.67 All system performance aspects The method whereby the designer takes
must be considered in the context of normal account of these deteriorations must be to the
service and battle damage deterioration of satisfaction of the PTL.
components and due allowance made for these
effects.
3.10.68 Indication of normal ACS
functioning at those times where no operating
limitations are implied shall not be distracting to the
pilot.
PREFLIGHT TEST
3.10.69 The installed ACS shall incorporate Normally it shall be mandatory for the pre-flight
an automatic, and where unavoidable pilot- test to be satisfactorily completed before flight.
interactive, pre-flight test function to ensure that all The actual fault status of the system shall
redundant elements, failure detection and signal determine the ability to proceed to take-off.
selection algorithms, etc., are correctly functioning.
The fault status for take-off under normal
conditions shall be specified by the aeroplane
designer. Special operational cases where take-
off will be required to be made at lower levels of
integrity will be defined by the PTL.
3.10.70 The level of testing provided in the
pre-flight test shall be sufficient to determine
whether the ACS is flight-worthy.
3.10.71 System status, as detected by the
pre-flight test and interruptive and continuously
operating BIT, shall be presented to the pilot during
preflight tests.

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IN-FLIGHT TEST
3.10.72 Any automatic In-flight system self-
tests incorporated as part of ACS failure detection
and management shall not give rise to levels of
disturbance which may affect the pilot's ability to
perform precision tasks.
3.10.73 Essential elements of an ACS which
are only required to operate in discrete parts of the
flight envelope (modes) shall be monitored to
ensure that they are fit for use.
3.10.74 Where an ACS includes a number
of subsystems or modes with significantly
degraded performance and handling levels, a
training facility shall be provided. This shall enable
the pilot to select the otherwise naturally occurring
degraded modes for training purposes. This
provision must not compromise the status of the
failure detection and monitoring of functions
involved with these modes. Selection of failed sub-
systems or modes shall not be possible.
FAILURE MONITORING
3.10.75 Status data derived from the system Where the design requires failed signals to be
shall be made available for fault diagnosis automatically rejected by the system, these
purposes. These data shall be accessible after signals shall be identified and their rejection
flight and shall survive removal of main bus and recorded with time and other appropriate context
external electrical power from the system. data for maintenance purposes, in any
appropriate recorder.
3.10.76 If pilot action is required in response See also Part 1, Section 4, Leaflet 36.
to a failure, then an appropriate indication shall be
automatically generated in the cockpit. Information
regarding system status which may affect flight
management shall be accessible by the pilot.
3.10.77 Fault location to at least Line

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Replacement Unit (LRU) level shall be automatic
and to a confidence level to be agreed with the
PTL.
COCKPIT INSTRUMENTS
3.10.78 All displays, indicators, selectors
and switches providing essential functions for an
ACS, shall be demonstrated to have the necessary
levels of integrity.
AEROPLANE AND SYSTEM PROVING
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
3.10.79 While the design is being See also Leaflet 30.
developed, and on completion, every effort shall be
made to identify all possible faults and to
determine the consequences in order to eradicate
all identifiable design errors, in order to meet the
design specification. A record of this proving
process shall be kept.
3.10.80 All Flight Resident Software (FRS)
shall be subject to a full independent audit.
3.10.81 All flight control laws shall, during
design and development, be subject to piloted
simulator assessment to establish both quantitative
measures of performance and qualitative
acceptability.
3.10.82 An Electromagnetic Compatibility
(EMC) Philosophy Statement and Test Plan shall
be written to precede design and development.
3.10.83 A Reliability Demonstration Plan for
System and LRU’S Shall be prepared before
testing commences.
3.10.84 A Common-Mode Analysis shall be
made to justify the design.
3.10.85 All identifiable hardware faults shall

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be apportioned probabilities of occurrence which
together with the effects upon performance shall
be shown to be compatible with the requirements.
3.10.86 A total System Safety statement
shall be prepared by the aeroplane designer.
RIG TESTING
3.10.87 The complete ACS shall be tested The inclusion of, or representation of, engine
in a working rig in which all the flight hardware is based functions, e.g., bleed air servos, thrust
installed and provided with suitable power vectoring, etc., shall be to the satisfaction of the
supplies, cooling and motivator loads. PTL.
3.10.88 Rig testing shall include A schedule of tests to be performed detailing all
measurement of performance, both as a fault free performance and failure measurement shall be
system and for all classes of failure. prepared and agreed with the PTL prior to the
commencement of rig testing.
3.10.89 The rig tests with hardware-in-loop These tests shall cover all aspects of flight and
shall include piloted 'flight' testing. ground operations.
3.10.90 A period of fault-free endurance Testing time shall be kept ahead of flight time
testing of the full system in the ACS rig with pilot in during initial development. The duration of the
the loop shall precede first flight. test shall be agreed with the PTL.
AEROPLANE-ON-GROUND TESTING
3.10.91 The complete ACS shall be Special environmental compatibility tests shall
correctly installed in the aeroplane for which it has be performed on the installed system as may be
been designed and tested to prove correct required by the PTL.
functioning and compatibility with the airframe
(structural coupling) and all other systems.
FLIGHT TESTING
3.10.92 Flight tests shall be conducted to (a) Early flight tests shall be carried out to
establish verification of the performance of the verify the aerodynamic data used for the ACS
ACS. design.

(b) Any special functions required for the

purposes of flight test (e.g., fault simulation)
shall be designed and tested in compliance with

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this clause. Such functions must be identified
early in the system design and their provision
made as part of the overall ACS Design.
IN-SERVICE CHANGES
3.10.93 All changes which may affect an All changes to an ACS which arise during
ACS shall be scrutinised and implications development and in service use shall be subject
identified. to the requirement of this clause unless
specifically excepted by the PTL.
APPLICATIONS
INTRODUCTION
3.10.94 Systems whose failures could lead Apart from those Active Control applications
to imminent loss of the aeroplane shall be shown directly affecting stability augmentation and flight
to provide saturation characteristics which are control, there are specific applications which
compatible with reasonable margins of affect structural behaviour and aeroplane
exceedance of the maximum gust or manoeuvre configuration. These applications may be
levels stated in the design specification. discretely implemented or integrated within, for
example, a Full-Time Active Flight Control
System.

See also Clauses 3.10.54 to 3.10.62 and Leaflets

25 and 28.
3.10.95 All such systems must be mutually
compatible with other ACS functions, i.e., flight
control and stability, present in the same
aeroplane.
3.10.96 Where a choice exists of control
mode to be engaged, whether by automatic or
manual selection, the designer shall ensure that
the use of the selected mode does not cause an
otherwise avoidable loss of essential control. If the
rejection, inhibition or limitation in the authority of
an engaged mode can lead to a significant loss of
flying qualities and/or mission performance then

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suitable means of warning the pilot shall be
provided.
3.10.97 For all modes an ultimate Where necessary for reasons of safety,
subservience to pilot demand shall be ensured, consideration shall be given to providing the
unless it can be shown that priority is essential for facility for the pilot to override specific ACS
a specific alternative mode. modes (e. g., 'g' limiting) whilst remaining within
structural limits to be agreed with the PTL.
ACTIVE FLUTTER CONTROL (AFC)
3.10.98 The system shall provide stability Objective: To widen the Operational Flight
with the integrity and reliability levels specified in Envelope by automatic enhancement of the
the Aeroplane Specification. stability of a particular flutter mode.
3.10.99 Where applicable the ability to AFC may require the provision of specially
recover to a safe flight envelope following failure or located motivators.
degradation of the AFC, shall be shown to be
compatible with the Integrity Requirements.
MANOEUVRE LOAD ALLEVIATION (MLA)
3.10.100 The system shall not compromise Objective - To redistribute absolute loads during
overall structural integrity. manoeuvres, to increase structural life, and to
permit more efficient structural design.

MLA may require the provision of specially

located motivators.
GUST LOAD ALLEVIATION (GLA)
3.10.101 Special Requirements. (To be Objective - To enhance structural life.
completed).
WING CAMBER CONTROL (WCC)
3.10.102 Reversion to recovery and landing Objective - To optimise lift and drag (especially at
configuration must be achievable to specification. high lift conditions) throughout manoeuvring
envelope, and to effect high drag for braking.
STALL AND SPIN PREVENTION (SSP)
3.10.103 If full-time operation is not involved (a) Particular attention must be given to Objective - To automatically deter the pilot and
and departures expected, post departure and establishing the required levels of manoeuvre airframe from initiating a departure from controlled
recovery characteristics must be defined and an and gust to be met in combination. flight and to provide resistance to post stall

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optimum recovery mode provided where gyration and spins.
appropriate. (b) Consideration shall be given to
implementing SSP in such a manner that the
pilot may choose to exceed these conditions in
an emergency.
STRUCTURAL LOAD LIMITING (SLL)
3.10.104 SLL shall be implemented in such a Objective - To prevent defined critical loads
manner that the pilot may choose to exceed these exceeding specified limits. See Clause 3.10.103
limits in emergency. Compliance (a).
VARIABLE CONFIGURATION CONTROL (Wing sweep etc.) (VCC)
3.10.105 Fail-safe reversion to manual Objective - To automatically configure airframe to
control for recovery shall be provided for non full- achieve most efficient performance for any
time systems. operational flight condition and/or mission phase
etc.
3.10.106 The pilot shall be presented with
configuration data at integrity levels compatible
with the maintenance of safe flight.
RIDE CONTROL (RC)
3.10.107 Particular attention shall be given to achieving Objectives - To provide ride characteristics
structural life compatibility. compatible with mission requirements.
RC may need specially located motivators.

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3.11 STRENGTH FOR GROUND HANDLING

3.11.1 The requirements should be read in conjunction with the design, operational and standardisation requirements for transport, handling and storage
given in Part 1, Section 4, Clauses 4.4.8 to 4.4.24

REQUIREMENT COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE

SLINGING
3.11.2 Proof and ultimate factors of not less
than 2.25 and 3.0 respectively shall be achieved
when either:

(a) the whole aeroplane at its maximum

design take-off mass less passengers and
crew, if required by the aeroplane
specification, or

(b) any component of the aeroplane

which is required to be slung,

is hanging freely from the slinging gear.

JACKING
3.11.3 Proof and ultimate factors of not less Consideration shall be given to the horizontal
than 2.25 and 3.0 respectively shall be achieved at loads present at the jacking points in the
maximum design take-off mass less passengers following conditions:
and crew when supported on the jacking points. To
allow for some ground slope and some abnormal (a) On land at the conditions stated
aeroplane attitude, this condition shall be met at in the requirement and at such greater
angles up to 10 in any plane between the angles but lesser aeroplane masses as
aeroplane vertical axis and the jacking axis. may be appropriate to effect crash
recovery.

(b) At sea in the sea conditions given

in the Aeroplane Specification using
appropriate ship motion data and

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assuming standard naval trestling and
lashing practice whilst jacked.
TOWING
3.11.4 The aeroplane as a whole shall (a) The requirement shall be met at
have adequate strength to provide proof' and maximum design take-off mass.
ultimate factors of not less than 1.5 and 2.0
respectively when towing in either direction in (b) Consideration may be given to reducing
accordance with the detailed requirements of these factors to 1.125 and 1.5 respectively, if the
Clauses 3.11.5 to 3.11.7 towing load designs the nose unit or any part of
the aeroplane structure, provided that failure in
all modes (including lateral bending against a
rigidly held wheel) is prevented by shear pins or
equivalent devices specified in the Operating
Manual.
TOWING STRESSING CASE - MAIN UNDERCARRIAGE UNITS
3.11.5 CASE 1. Conditions shall be as Couples in the vertical plane caused by the (see Fig. 5) See Leaflet 32.
follows: loads in these cases may be assumed to be
balanced by pitch and roll inertia, but this may
(a) Towing load P = 0.15G.MT be ignored so far as stressing is concerned.
separately and together at each main-unit
towpoint balanced by a side load S having a
value of P sin  and a drag load D having a
value of P cos  at each mainwheel axle.

(b) Appropriate nose-unit vertical

reaction with zero side and drag reactions.

(c) Appropriate main-unit vertical

reactions at each main-wheel.

(d) Balancing inertia loads at the

aeroplane CG if necessary.

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(e) Tow load angle  at any critical
value from zero to ±30° unless limited by the
geometry of the aeroplane.

CASE 2. Conditions shall be as follows:

(a) Towing load P = 0.15G.MT at each

main-unit towpoint balanced entirely by
inertia forces.

(b) Appropriate nose-wheel vertical

reaction with zero side and drag reactions.

(c) Appropriate main-unit vertical

reactions at each main-wheel.

(d) Zero drag and side loads at each

main-unit.

(e) Tow load angle  at any critical

value from zero to ±30° unless limited by the
geometry of the aeroplane.
TOWING STRESSING CASES - NOSE UNDERCARRIAGE UNITS
3.11.6 The conditions shall be: See Fig. 6.

(a) Towing load P = 0.15G.MT See Part 1, Section 4 Leaflet 42.

(b) Nose-unit alignment angle A at any

critical value between zero and the maximum
castoring angle.

(c) Tow load angle B at any critical

value from zero to the maximum possible.

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3.11.7 The applied loads shall be balanced (a) Where a load-limiting device is
by either: incorporated in the tow bar its value shall be
chosen having consideration to the torsional
(a) aeroplane inertia alone, or forces which could be applied to the nose unit
before the device operates.
(b) by a combination of a force Q
applied at the axle equal and opposite to P (b) For ship-borne aeroplanes a load limiting
together with such inertia forces as are device is not permitted. A dynamic analysis shall
needed to balance the aeroplane. therefore be done to check if applied loads
greater than 0.15G.MT could occur in the sea
states specified and if they do they shall be
used. In particular the case of sudden brake
application on a pitching, rolling deck shall be
considered.

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3.12 PICKETING

3.12.1 The requirements aim to ensure that provision is made on all aeroplanes for picketing.

REQUIREMENT COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
GENERAL
3.12.2 Provision shall be made for (a) For aeroplanes which are designed to be See also Leaflet 33 Para. 3.
picketing the aeroplane from picketing points landborne only, the fittings shall be designed by
located on or near each undercarriage unit. the Aeroplane Designer.

(b) If the aeroplane and the fittings are

designed such that the fittings are removable
when not required, stowage for the removed
items shall be provided on the aeroplane.

(c) When selecting picketing points

consideration shall be given to the need for
securing jacked or trestled aeroplanes in
adverse wind and sea conditions and the need
to perform undercarriage retraction tests with
the aeroplane picketed.

(d) Additional picketing points may be

provided at the following positions as required
by the PTL:

(1) On each wing, at a position

approximately two-thirds of the distance
from the main undercarriage to the wing tip,

(2) In the vicinity of the tailplane.

3.12.3 The picketing points shall When designing for picketing no account shall
accommodate sufficient lashings to meet the be taken of any forces provided by chocks or

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strength requirement of Clause 3.12.10 brakes.
PICKETING ON LAND
3.12.4 Aeroplanes picketed on land shall
be safe in wind speeds up to 80 kt horizontally
from any direction.
PICKETING ON BOARD SHIP
3.12.5 Aeroplanes shall be safe when The lashing configuration shall employ the See MIL-T-81259
picketed on a ship according to the ship's picketing minimum practical number of lashings and
plan in the sea states given by the PTL. If no sea occupy the smallest spread compatible with the
states are available the following values of wind deck securing points, spacings of which are to
speeds and ship motion are to be used: be obtained from the PTL.

(a) wind speeds up to 148 km/h (80 kt)

from any direction between dead ahead and
45° each side of the ship's fore-and-aft axis,
or 120 km/h (65 kts) from any other quarter,

(b) angles of pitch and roll up to ±5°

and ±15° respectively, together with flight
deck vertical, athwartships and fore-and-aft
accelerations of 7.62m/s² (25 ft/s²), 1.52 m/s²
(5 ft/s²), 0.61m/s² (2 ft/s²) respectively.
LOCKING OF CONTROLS
3.12.6 All flying control systems shall be If this creates a design case for part of the See also Part 1, section 4, Table 19 Item 5.
safe-guarded against damage in wind speeds up to structure the problem should be discussed with
148 km/h (80 kt) by locks built into the aeroplane or the PTL.
by irreversibility of the control operating
mechanism.
3.12.7 All internal locking devices shall be
arranged so that the pilot cannot take-off, or
attempt to take-off, with any of the flying controls,
including trimmers, locked.
3.12.8 The locking devices shall be

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arranged so that when not engaged they can
neither hamper the pilot nor obstruct the use of the
controls.
3.12.9 The locking devices when engaged
shall not prevent the aeroplane being ground
handled.
STRENGTH
STRENGTH FOR PICKETING
3.12.10 At all masses between the basic Leaflet 33 gives acceptable assumptions for
mass and the maximum design take-off mass the assessing the aerodynamic forces.
picketing points and the surrounding structure shall
have proof and ultimate factors not less than 1.125
and 1.5 respectively under the conditions specified
in Clause 3.12.4 for picketing on land and Clause
3.12.5 for picketing on board ship.
STRENGTH OF CONTROL SYSTEMS
3.12.11 Control systems and surfaces shall
have proof and ultimate factors not less than 1.125
and 1.5 respectively under the loads arising in the
conditions specified in Clauses 3.12.2 to 3.12.9
3.12.12 When the pilot's control is moved to
the full extent allowed by the stops, control
systems and surfaces shall have proof and
ultimate factors not less than 1.125 and 1.5
respectively under the loads arising in winds up to
at least the following:

(a) 65 km/h (35 kts) for basic trainers,

and

(b) 93 km/h (50 kts) for all other

aeroplanes.

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3.13 LIGHTNING PROTECTION

3.13.1 All information currently held within Part 1, Section 4, Clauses 4.27.23 to 4.27.40 and Def Stan 59-113.

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Estimated Sample size of coupon tests n, used to estimate population cv in observed failure mode
population cv
from n coupon 15 30 100 or more
tests
i.e. Number of element tests N
1* 2 3 5 10 1* 2 3 5 10 1* 2 3 5 10

Characteristic 3% or less 1.14 1.11 1.10 1.09 1.08 1.12 1.10 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.10 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.06
cv in observed 5% 1.26 1.20 1.18 1.16 1.14 1.20 1.17 1.16 1.14 1.13 1.18 1.15 1.14 1.12 1.11
failure mode 7.5% 1.37 1.31 1.28 1.26 1.23 1.32 1.27 1.24 1.22 1.20 1.28 1.23 1.21 1.19 1.17
10% 1.53 1.44 1.40 1.36 1.32 1.45 1.37 1.34 1.31 1.27 1.39 1.32 1.29 1.27 1.24
15% 1.89 1.74 1.68 1.61 1.55 1.75 1.62 1.57 1.51 1.46 1.63 1.53 1.48 1.44 1.39

TABLE 1
FACTORS BY WHICH THE MEAN STRENGTH OF DETAILS OR ELEMENTS MUST BE REDUCED TO OBTAIN A 'B' ALLOWABLE VALUE:
WHERE APPROPRIATE ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE TESTS:
THESE FACTORS APPLY TO ALL GRADE A DETAILS AND TO ALL MATERIALS

*Normally at least 2 tests must be done so that any gross inconstancy is likely to be revealed.

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Estimated cv for type of Number of tests upon which the mean value
complete is estimated

item under test* 1 2
5% or less 1.00 1.00
8% 1.10 1.05
10% 1.15 1.10
15% 1.33 1.25

TABLE - 2

TEST FACTORS BY WHICH THE MEASURED STRENGTH OF COMPLETE STRUCTURES FOR COMPONENTS MUST EXCEED THE DESIGN ULTIMATE LOAD IN
ORDER TO ALLOW FOR THE INFLUENCE OF VARIABILITY - WHERE APPROPRIATE A SEPARATE ALLOWANCE MUST BE MADE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
DEGRADATION

*To be agreed with the PTL. It is customary to use a figure of 5% for conventional metal structures.
 Wherever practical at least 2 tests must be done so that any gross inconsistency is likely to be revealed.

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CLASS OF AEROPLANE MAXIMUM FORCE N (LBF)

PITCH ROLL YAW
ALL FIGHTERS, AND OTHER TYPES UP 18(4) 9(2) 27(6)
TO 4,536 KG (10,000LB)
ALL TYPES BETWEEN 4,536 KG (10,000 VALUES OBTAINED BY LINEAR
LB) AND 22,680 KG (50,000 LB) EXCEPT INTERPOLATION
FIGHTERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS
ALL HEAVY BOMBERS, AND OTHER 45(10) 36(8) 45(10)
TYPES OVER 22,680 KG (50,000) LB

TABLE 3

CONTROL CIRCUITS - BREAKOUT FORCE

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A. Automatic Flight and Structural B. Augmented Flight Control

control

AFCS (Autopilots) Integrated FBW/FBL Flight Control

Yaw Dampers CSAS (Control and Stability
Pitch Dampers Augmentation System)
Terrain Following Manoeuvre Demand
Manoeuvre Load Control Manoeuvre Limitation
Gust Load Alleviation Stall Prevention
Structural Mode Control (Damping) Spin/Departure Prevention
Flutter Mode Control (Damping) Post Stall control
External Store Stabilisation Spin/Departure Recovery
Ride Control Weapon aiming/fuselage pointing
'Auto Pilot' modes integrated Wing configuration control
FCS (camber/sweep optimising)
Terrain Avoidance
VSTOL Control
Plus all functions category A

TABLE 4

ACTIVE CONTROLS

Categories of function

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FIG 1 - THE BASIC FLIGHT ENVELOPE

VALUES SPECIFIED FOR PARTICULAR AEROPLANE TYPES (see Part 0 Annex F for definitions).

VD - Design diving speed (E A S).

n1 - Maximum normal acceleration coefficient.

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DEPENDENT VALUES
(Unless otherwise specified in the Aeroplane Specification).

VA is the manoeuvring speed that is that minimum flying speed at which n1 can be achieved.

VH shall be the maximum speed attainable in level flight with the aeroplane flying at the basic design mass, with no external stores at the maximum
continuous cruise engine condition.

n2 = 1-0.3n1

n3 = -0.6(n1 -1)

NOTE:

On aeroplanes designed for dive bombing or ground attack duties:

VH will be equal to VD1 which means that n2 will be equal to n3.

VG: Shall be determined as:

(a) Aeroplanes where speed V H is equivalent to a Mach number of less than unity, other than weapon system aeroplanes; V G shall be either the speed
determined by the intersection of the line representing the maximum lift coefficient and the 20 m/s (66 ft/sec) gust line on the n-V diagram or V S n G
where V S is the stalling speed in level flight and n G is the maximum load factor resulting from a 15.2 m/s (50 ft/sec) gust at speed V H .

(b) Weapon system aeroplanes and others where speed V H is equivalent to a Mach number of unity or greater; V G shall be determined by mission
requirements, the permissibility of reducing speed and the slow-down speeds attainable and shall be agreed with the Project Team Leader, but need not be
greater than V H .

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FIG 2 - GUST LOADS THROUGHOUT THE SPEED RANGE

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FIGURE 3

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Categories:

A: Automatic Flight and Structural Control Functions

B: Flight Control (Augmented)

FIG. 4 - ACTIVE CONTROLS

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FIG. 5 - TOWING BY BRIDLE

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FIGS. 6a and 6b - NOSE-WHEEL TOWING

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LEAFLET 0

REFERENCES

Each set of references within this leaflet is divided according to the reference number within
Section 3.

3.1 STATIC STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION

No additional references.

3.2 SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

ARC Reports

R and M 3001 Loading conditions of tailed aircraft in longitudinal manoeuvres

R and M 3327 Simplified loading formulae for pull out manoeuvres of tailed aircraft

3.3 ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

No additional references.

3.4 GUST LOADS

ARC Reports

R & M 2308 An analysis of the lift slope of aerofoils of small aspect ratio, including
fins, with design charts for aerofoils and control surfaces

R & M 2970 Gust alleviation factor

CP324 The variation of gust frequency with gust velocity and altitude

CP419 The distribution of gusts in the atmosphere. An integration of UK and

US data

CP498 Programme fatigue tests on notched bars to a gust load spectrum

CP836 The chance of a rough flight

CP873 A review of information on the frequency of gusts at low altitude

CP933 A review of counting accelerometer data on aircraft gust loads

NACA Reports

1206 A revised gust-load formula and a re-evaluation of V-G data taken on

civil transport airplanes from 1933 to 1950.

Page 1 of 5
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3.5 HIGH LIFT DEVICES AND AIRBRAKES

No additional references.

3.6 PRESSURE CABINS

MOD Specifications

DTD/RDI 3716 Specification and schedule of tests on cold air units

DTD/RDI 3750 Pressure-cabin equipment – General requirements
DTD/RDI 3755 Cabin-pressure control valves
DTD/RDI 3763 Specification and schedule of tests for aircraft filters for cabin air
conditioning systems
DTD/RDI 3810 Specification and schedule of tests for airborne heat exchangers

Defence Standards

16-17(Obsolescent) Air supply and test connections for aircraft

53-68(Cancelled) V-Flange couplings for aircraft piping and ducting. (Metric).

RAE Reports

Mech.Eng.13 Vulnerability aspect of aircraft design

SME3359 Memorandum on the construction and operation of pressure-cabin
aircraft
Structures 242 Some notes on pressure cabin design

RAE Technical Reports

65083 Ozone in aircraft cabins

RAE Technical Notes

Mech.Eng.330 An investigation of the vulnerability of aircraft pressure cabin

structures to battle damage
Structure 234 Importance of shape of stringer section in pressure cabin design

ARC Reports

CP217 Stress considerations in the design of pressurised shells

CP226 Pressure-cabin design - a discussion of some of the structural
problems involved, with suggestions for their solution
CP239 Optimum designs for reinforced circular holes
CP286 A constructional method for minimising the hazard of a catastrophic
failure in a pressure cabin
CP357 An experimental verification of the theoretical conclusions of RAE
Technical Note Structures 156 (ARC CP286). A constructional
method for minimising the hazard of catastrophic failure in a pressure
cabin, with further comments on its implications

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3.7 SPINNING AND SPIN RECOVERY

ARC Reports

CP 195 A criterion for the prediction of the recovery characteristics of

spinning aircraft.

AGARD Proceedings

CP No. 199 Stall/spin problems of military aircraft

CP No. 235 Dynamic stability parameters (Papers 19 and 29)

Other Papers

AIAA 80-1564 Spin Prediction Techniques (Bihrle J)

AIAA 80-1580 Overview of stall/spin technology (Chambers JR)
Journal of Aircraft Vol.20,
No.2 Spin Prediction techniques (Bihrle J and Barnhart W)
Journal of Aircraft Vol.21,
No.12 Estimation of Aerodynamic forces and moments on a steadily
spinning aeroplane (Pamadi BN and Taylor LW)
British Standards

C10 Coupling dimensions for aircraft ground air-conditioning connections

C11 Coupling dimensions for aircraft pressure cabin ground test
connections

3.8 CONTROL SYSTEMS

RAE Reports

Aero 1972 Spring tab controls - Notes on development to date, with special
reference to design aspects
Aero 2232 Papers and proceedings of a meeting to discuss powered flying
controls
Mech.Eng.12 Transitional friction effects in powered controls with particular
reference to hydraulic jacks

RAE Technical Reports

66304 An investigation into the problem of valve stiction associated

with the use of high temperature hydraulic fluids

RAE Technical Notes

Aero 1173 Note on friction in control circuits

Aero 2026 The effect of control circuit friction on handling characteristics
of aircraft with artificial spring feel

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Aero 2294 Notes on "g"-restriction

SME86 Alternative bearings for control circuits
SME247 High thermal expansion steel in aircraft control circuits
SME349 Theoretical analysis of the response of a servo controlled
aircraft fitted with a "g"-restrictor
SME367 The vulnerability of flying control systems in military aircraft
Mech.Eng.2 The presence of air in oil and its probable effect on the
irreversibility of hydraulic transmission systems
Mech.Eng.10 Tests on servodyne hydraulic control assister
Mech.Eng.77 An electro-hydraulic-powered flying control system with
automatic safeguards and variable control characteristics
Mech.Eng.98 A contribution to the theory of servo mechanisms: dynamic
rigidity of valve-controlled hydraulic servos
Mech.Eng.100 Free oscillations of valve-controlled hydraulic servos
Mech.Eng.108 Impedance of idealised hydraulic valve-controlled servos
Mech.Eng.110 Portable hinge moment simulator for powered control circuits
Mech.Eng.129 Comparative rigidities of certain valve-controlled hydraulic
servos
Mech.Eng.132 Valve proportionality effects in aircraft hydraulic flying control
systems
Mech.Eng.144 Some notes on irreversible machines
Structures 58 Aircraft with automatic pilots and powered controls; safety
aspects

A & AEE Reports

Tech.105 Control system requirements for military aircraft in relation to

the task of the human operator
Tech.194 Iss.2 A further resume of pilots' experience with various forms of
feel and power control systems

RAE Specifications

AD115 Control column force indicator

Scientific and Technical Memoranda

13/51 Some studies in hydraulic servo flying controls

15/51 An investigation of methods of duplicating hydraulically -
operated irreversible flying controls
8/53 On the stability of powered flying controls
2/54 Some problems of powered flying controls

ARC Papers

R & M 3001 Loading conditions of tailed aircraft in longitudinal

manoeuvres
R & M 3094 A case of longitudinal stick-force dynamic instability of an
aircraft fitted with power-operated controls, of "g"-restrictor
and spring feel

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CP273 Some advantages and disadvantages of variable and non-

linear gearing between the pilot's control and the control
surfaces (formerly AAEE Report Res 283)

RAeS Journal

March, 1949 Some thoughts on the use of powered flying controls in

aircraft

3.9 ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

MIL-DTL-9490E Inactive - Flight control systems - design, installation and test

of piloted aircraft, general specification for

AFFDL-TR-74-116 J.L.Townsend and E.T.Raymond – Background information

and user guide for MIL-F-9490D Jan. 1975 (S/S by MIL-DTL-
9490E)

RTCA/DO-178A Software considerations in airborne systems and equipment

certification

Interim DEF STAN 00-31(Obsolescent) The development of safety critical software for
airborne systems.

3.10 STRENGTH FOR GROUND HANDLING

No additional references.

3.11 PICKETING

No additional references.

3.12 FATIGUE

No additional references.

3.13 LIGHTNING PROTECTION

No additional references.

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LEAFLET 01

STATIC STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION

UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The purpose of this Leaflet is to outline the basic principles underlying the strength and
deformation requirements in this publication and, in particular, to show why these requirements are
sometimes expressed in terms of proof loads, sometimes ultimate load, and sometimes both.

2 ACCOUNTING FOR UNCERTAINTY IN STRENGTH

2.1 There are several causes of uncertainty that must be taken into account in designing
aircraft to operate within the required envelope.

2.2 One of these is the variability in the strength of materials and structural details. This is
accounted for in three separate ways.

2.2.1 First, the designer is required to use 'B' allowable values of stress in design (see
Part 1, Section 4, Clauses 4.1 and 4.5) because they are founded on a standardized test
procedure and give a uniform statistical assurance of the strength of materials. Exceptionally,
however, Specification 'S' values may be used where no 'B' value is available.

2.2.2 Second, any test of a structural detail or structural element is subject to a test factor,
as required by Table 1 of Clause 3.1. These are related to the measured variability in the
strength of the materials from which the details or elements are made; data on the variability
of metallic materials can be found in ESDU 00932 Metallic Materials Handbook. The test
factors are calculated to give assurance, with 95% confidence, that 90% of similar items will
reach or exceed the required strength. It is emphasised that separate allowance must be
made for any uncertainties arising from differences between elements and the structural
details they represent.

2.2.3 Finally, the designer must make separate allowance for environmental degradation
and demonstrate that the allowable values (or 'S' values) of ultimate stress are not exceeded
under the DUL. The most appropriate allowance for degradation can be obtained by
conducting tests on structural elements under the most adverse combinations of moisture
content and temperature to which they will be exposed in service (see Part 1, Section 3,
Clauses 3.1.23 – 27). It should be noted that cold/dry conditions may also have an adverse
effect on the strength of the material, and should therefore be considered in addition to
'hot/wet' conditions. Furthermore, the effects of exposure to ultra-violet light and other non-
ionising radiation should be considered.

3 CHECK STRESS CALCULATIONS

3.1 To perform a check stress is a condition of compliance with the static strength
requirements. A reference analysis shall be done, using definitive loads and masses, together with
a structural analysis model, all fully representative of the final design. The check stress should
ideally be completed by an independent team.

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4 DESIGN LIMIT LOAD

4.1 Each aircraft is subject to an enormous variety of combinations of loads and other
conditions, and it is obviously impracticable and unnecessary to consider them all. The most
adverse of these are identified in the form of design cases, which must be used in demonstrating
compliance with the requirements.

4.2 In the majority of design cases, the severity of the loads that may arise in service is not
limited naturally, and limiting conditions have to be chosen for design purposes. A classic example
is provided by the symmetric flight case. For aircraft without an active control system, there are
usually no means (other than the pilot) to prevent the exceedance of either the speeds or the
normal accelerations that are permissible for an aircraft in symmetrical flight. In choosing the
limiting conditions for design, use is made of past experience of the speeds and accelerations
needed for the operational duty of the type, of the predicted flight characteristics and performance
of the aircraft, and of the way structure mass is likely to depend on the severity of the chosen
conditions.

4.3 Every aircraft in service is subject to flying limitations that prohibit its use beyond the
limiting conditions chosen for design (see Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.9).

4.4 In some situations, limit load cases are defined-such that it is impossible (extremely
improbable, or so unlikely as not to occur during the entire operational life of all aircraft of one type)
or extremely remote (unlikely to occur during the entire operational life of all aircraft of one type,
but nonetheless still possible) for-the loads to be exceeded. These cases are normally chosen
either to reduce the number of combinations to be considered (ease of analysis), where there are
limiting mechanisms, or where the loads are difficult to define rationally.

5 THE ULTIMATE STRENGTH AND PROOF REQUIREMENTS

5.1 Though the design ultimate strength defines the margin of strength that must be provided, it
is not sufficient on its own to ensure that there is also a margin of airworthiness. This margin of
airworthiness is defined by the design proof requirement.

5.2 The proof requirement defines the minimum conditions up to which the airworthiness and
serviceability of the aircraft can be depended upon. The designer should ensure, by analysis and
tests as appropriate, that loads up to the design proof load will neither impair safety nor
functionality nor necessitate inspection or rectification other than to predetermined and defined
schedules acceptable to the operator. Thus, under the design proof load and after its removal
there should be no loosening or pulling of fasteners, structural deformation which might cause
unacceptable redistribution of aerodynamic loads, jamming or undue slackness of controls, or any
other sign of structural distress which might cause the operator to have doubts about the
serviceability of the aircraft. Beyond the proof strength, catastrophe could result from structurally
induced causes such as jamming of controls or unstable aerodynamic loading.

5.3 There are several causes of uncertainty that must be taken into account in designing the
aircraft to withstand the pertinent limiting conditions. For example, the methods used in the
evaluation of the loads and in the stress analysis are inexact.

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5.4 Furthermore, when the aircraft enters service, the most severe conditions under which it is
actually used may differ from the design cases. For all these reasons the aircraft must be designed
to have, in each design case, an ultimate strength that is more than would be needed just to
sustain the limit load.

6 REDUCTIONS IN FACTORS

6.1 In some circumstances, load factors may be reduced, where it can be shown that
exceedances of limiting conditions are impossible (extremely improbable) or extremely remote, as
defined in paragraph 4.4. In these cases there is no proof requirement above limit load.

6.2 A reduced ultimate factor of 1.4 may be used in conjunction with these cases, provided it
can be shown that all underlying rational cases, multiplied by the conventional ultimate factor of
1.5, are covered. For example, this may apply to aircraft equipped with active flight control
systems, where it can be demonstrated that such systems are load-limiting and sufficiently reliable.
Other examples may include load limiting mechanisms, such as pressure relief valves, provided
that the upper tolerance is used.

6.3 To justify the use of a reduced ultimate load factor deterministic methods have traditionally
been used and the amount of the reduction has been based on engineering judgement. However,
such an approach does not rigorously account for systems effectiveness (in limiting the loads) and
reliability.

6.4 In order to take a probabilistic approach, it is necessary to define the structural factors of
safety as a function of systems reliability. Such an approach has been proposed for inclusion in
JAR 25 (NPA 25C-199, dated 24 April 1996 incorporated into CS-25 amendment 1), and a similar
methodology would be considered acceptable.

7 THE USE OF PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS

7.1 The traditional, semi-deterministic approach involves designing the structure to withstand a
factored maximum load to satisfy the required limit load criterion. In some cases, however, it may
be acceptable to use a probabilistic approach to estimate the required limit or proof loads having
an acceptably low probability of occurrence. In essence, this is achieved by modelling the variables
determining the loading envelope and then deriving a suitable value for the limit (or proof) load,
based on the distribution.

7.2 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF LIMIT LOAD

7.2.1 It is first necessary to establish exactly which probability of occurrence is to be

estimated. It will usually be required to estimate the probability of occurrence of failure loads
for the structure, over its planned life. For structures whose usage can vary significantly from
one example of the structure to another, it may be required to consider only the most
adverse conditions of use.

7.2.2 There may be different consequences of exceedance of the chosen limit load, with
consequences ranging from the catastrophic to the merely inconvenient, and this will be
reflected in the probability of failure which is considered acceptable. More information on
determining the level of risk that will be acceptable is given in Def Stan 00-56.

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7.2.3 It should be remembered that the calculated probability of occurrence takes into
account stochastic variability only. It does not take into account the possibility of human
errors on the part of the user; in practice, failures due to non-quantifiable sources of
unreliability may well predominate.

7.2.4 It should also be noted that, as with deterministic analyses, changes in usage may
change the loading envelope. Thus any limit load definition, based on assumptions from a
probabilistic analysis, may be invalidated by changes in usage. Therefore, it is essential that
usage data are compared with any assumptions made, as part of the mandatory aircraft
monitoring programmes.

7.3 UNCERTAINTY

7.3.1 It is important to distinguish between the two fundamentally different types of

statistical uncertainty which are involved in probabilistic design.

7.3.2 Firstly, there is the unavoidable uncertainty associated with the values of quantities
which exhibit scatter. It is this inherent stochastic variability which provides the motivation for
the probabilistic design method, and which must be modelled when using this method. In the
absence of such variability, the probability of failure associated with a particular design of
structure would always be either 0 or 1.

7.3.3 Secondly, there is the uncertainty that arises from incomplete knowledge of the
probability distributions of variables which affect structural integrity. Given complete
knowledge of the form and parameters of each such distribution (and the deterministic
relationships between them), the loading envelope could, in principle, be accurately
determined. However, uncertainty in the designer's knowledge of these distributions, due to
lack of data, leads to uncertainty in the calculated probability of occurrence. It is essential
that this be taken into account: this can be done by calculating confidence limits. Determining
loading distributions to the accuracy required to have sufficient confidence in what may occur
in at the extremes of the distribution is no easier than defining strength distributions.

7.3.4 Finally, only as complex an analysis and test programme as will have a significant
effect on the resulting design should be undertaken. The degree to which the design of a
component can be optimized should depend on the overall contribution which it makes to the
reliability, performance and cost of a structure.

7.4 QUANTITIES TO BE MODELLED

7.4.1 The quantities whose inherent variability may have a significant effect on the loads
must be identified and modelled by probability distributions. These quantities might include
coefficients, of friction, temperature, manoeuvre acceleration, gust loads, internal pressure,
vibration and shock loads.

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7.4.2 Ideally, the applied load (or stress) envelope would be modelled for each design
case, but in many cases this will not be feasible, especially at the initial design phase. In
these circumstances, a more indirect approach is necessary, involving the probabilistic
modelling of quantities on which loads depend. In such cases, an analytical solution it
unlikely to be obtainable and a simulation method should be used to sample from the
appropriate probability distributions.

7.4.3 It is the variability in the maximum load relevant to each critical design case which
should be modelled, not the variability of the loading over the life of the structure.

7.4.4 A sensitivity analysis should be carried out at an early stage in the project to
identify, on the one hand, the variables whose scatter has no significant effect on the failure
probability, and which can therefore be treated as constants and, on the other hand, the
variables whose scatter is highly significant. Effort can then be concentrated on more
accurate modelling of the latter.

7.5.1 The choice of a suitable form of probability distribution to model each of the
significant variables may involve:
- physical considerations
- previous experience
- examination of relevant test data.

7.5.2 Having chosen an appropriate form of probability distribution, the distribution

parameters must then be estimated (for example, mean and variance for a normal
distribution, shape and scale parameters for a two-parameter Weibull distribution, minimum
and maximum values for a uniform distribution). Where data are lacking, it is often possible
to read across from previous experience to some extent.

7.5.3 Alternatively, rather than estimating the form and parameters of the probability
distribution of a variable as described above, a non-parametric approach may be used to
analyse available data. This involves making no assumptions about the form of the
distribution, but instead constructing an empirical cumulative distribution from the data
themselves. This approach can be useful where there is a lack of previous relevant
experience to suggest a suitable form of probability distribution, and when the data do not
obviously come from one of the common-distributions. Its applicability is limited, however,
since it is frequently necessary to extrapolate- into the tails of a distribution from data which
all lie within a few standard deviations of the mean. In order to do this, it is necessary to have
knowledge of the distributional form (or to assume a form which will result in an over-
estimate of failure probability rather than an underestimate).

8 SPECIAL CASES

8.1 In most design cases both strength and deformation are regarded as important. It seldom
happens that both requirements can be satisfied exactly; usually a margin above the standard
required by one requirement must be provided in order to comply with the other. Nevertheless
when both requirements are imposed, the designer is expected to demonstrate compliance with
them both.

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8.2 In some exceptional design cases, deformation is all that matters and a design ultimate
requirement is superfluous. The principal example is that of ejection seats and their surrounding
structure. Under the worst possible combinations of flight loads and ejection gun thrust, the seats
and the airframe must not distort so much that they prevent an ejection, or cause a seat to eject
too slowly or in the wrong direction, or make the ejection of one seat interfere with the ejection of
another.

8.3 In a few other cases, strength is critical but deformation is not important, and a design
ultimate requirement is imposed without a design proof requirement. An example is that of seats
and harnesses at crash stations, and their supporting structures. In a crash landing that would do
serious damage to the aircraft, some distortion of the seat and harness attachments would be
trivial, (and may be beneficial in absorbing the energy of impact), but the crew must remain safely
restrained within reasonable physiological limits. Accordingly an ultimate factor of 1.0 is required in
the crash landing case but there is no proof requirement (see Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.22).

8.4 There are a few other special cases in which the respective values of the proof and ultimate
factors are lower than the usual 1.125 and 1.5. These cases represent rare events such as
malfunctions of systems and operation of systems under exceptional conditions. Provision of the
full strength and stiffness that would be necessary to achieve the usual factors in these cases
would add mass to the aircraft that would penalise it in normal operations. In emergencies that are
infrequent and of short duration, and in which the aircraft may be at additional risk for other
reasons, the higher risks to the aircraft and its crew that are associated with the lower factors are
regarded as acceptable. Examples are malfunctions of automatic flight control systems and the
use of anti-spin parachutes at exceptionally high speeds (Part 13, Section 3, Clause 3.7).

8.5 Finally there are several cases in which both the proof and ultimate factors are higher than
the usual values. They represent the normal operations of systems and installations in which the
loads are particularly difficult to estimate. The difficulties are caused principally by transient
pressures in hydraulic, pneumatic and fuel systems, by variability in the performance of pressure
relief devices, and by variability in the loading on air brakes, flaps and undercarriages. Since these
cases represent events that happen frequently, the greater risks associated with the greater
uncertainty in estimation of the loads must be compensated by higher factors. Examples are flap
systems (Clause 3.6), undercarriage retraction and lowering (Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.11) and
refuelling and defuelling systems (Part 1, Section 5, Clause 5.2).

8.6 The foregoing paragraphs indicate the diverse nature of the strength requirements and the
reasons why emphasis is sometimes placed on a proof requirement, sometimes on an ultimate
strength requirement, and why often both are specified. It is clear that the same factors, and the
same ratio of proof factor to ultimate factor, cannot be used in all cases without serious loss in
structural integrity. This is a consideration that far outweighs the convenience that uniform factors
might bring.

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LEAFLET 02

STATIC STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION

STATIC TESTING PHILOSOPHY

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The test procedure adopted should provide the maximum practicable information on
the structure. In particular, the tests should be conducted with the following aims:
a. to verify the structural analysis by means of strain, deflection and other appropriate
measurements under all test conditions and thereby demonstrate, for each Grade A
structural detail, that the allowable values of stress or strain are not exceeded at the
design ultimate load.
b. to establish, for selected design cases, the highest load at which the proof
requirement is satisfied.
c. to demonstrate, in the critical design case(s) established by earlier testing and
analysis, a strength that is sufficient to show, as far as practicable, that all Grade A
structural details have been identified.

2 THE TEST PYRAMID

2.1 The certification and qualification route is via a ‘pyramid’ or ‘building block’ approach
starting with simple coupons, leading to elements, details and sub-components, and finally
the component and/or airframe static tests. This concept is illustrated schematically in Figure
1. This progressive approach will minimize the risk of failing to meet the structural strength
requirements, in that corrective action can be taken early in the design phase, if required.
The aim of the sequence should be to secure as much factual information as possible from
each structural specimen tested.
2.2 This approach is applicable to all structures and materials, although the extent of
testing required at each level will depend on the amount of data available from previous
programmes, the similarity of the structure to previous designs and the level of confidence in
the analysis techniques used. Where structures and materials may be susceptible to
degradation by the environment, to damage and defects, these effects must be accounted for
during certification and qualification. Variability due to method of manufacture, process or
material must also be taken into account.
2.3 Figure 2 shows a flow chart of the relationship between the test programme and the
remainder of the static certification and qualification programme.

3 COUPON TESTS
3.1 Coupon tests can be used to determine the materials allowables on a ‘B’ basis for
use in design. Since the ‘B’ allowable is a material property, tests must be undertaken for all
potential failure modes. Statistical methods for the derivation of ‘B’ basis values are given in
Reference 1.

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3.2 In determining the ‘B’ value, allowance must be made for the degradation by
moisture absorption, exposure to extreme temperatures, ultra-violet (UV) light and non-
ionising radiation. The scope, range and combination of environmental parameters
considered should be appropriate to the material and its application. Examples may include,
but are not limited to, the effects of extremes of temperature on material properties such as
strength, stiffness and fracture toughness.
3.3 Tests should include, but not be limited to:
 tension,
 compression,
 shear,
 bearing,
 holes and notches,
 Young’s Modulus.

3.4 When considering the scope of the coupon test programme necessary to obtain
materials design data (materials qualification issues are addressed in Part 1, Section 4,
Clause 4.1), limitations of the applicability of these data to the structural level should be
considered. Such limitations may include:
 scale effects,
 differences in variability and properties between the as-received material and
the as-manufactured component.

4 ELEMENT AND DETAIL TESTS

4.1 Elements may be considered to be generic and representative of families of similar
structural features, whereas details are usually considered to represent specific or unique
structural features.
4.2 Element and/or detail tests should be performed early in the test programme to
validate particular new design concepts and derive basic design allowables for any new
materials used. The variability associated with the manufacture of the features should also
be established. Environmental conditioning should be used at this level, to determine hot /
wet degradation factors.
4.3 Test should include, but not be limited to:
 joints,
 compression panels,
 shear panels,
 skin cut-outs;

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and additionally, for example, for fibre composite structures, this may include:
 tension angles,
 shear angles,
 flange / skin attachments,
 impact damage, e.g. bird strike, tool drop, etc.,
 rain / hail erosion.

4.4 The number of tests necessary at this level will be dependent on past experience.
Where a new design is based on existing structures, or confidence in the analytical methods
to be used is already established, the number of tests may be reduced.

5 SUB-COMPONENT TESTS
5.1 Sub-component tests should be representative of large portions of the aircraft
structure and should be used to validate the analysis of structural features and confirm
design allowables. The tests represent a significant part of the test programme and have the
following objectives with respect to the structural qualification of the aircraft:
 to demonstrate that data derived from coupon and element tests can be
successfully used to predict the performance of the structure;
 to verify analysis techniques (including FEM where applicable);
 to obtain load/strain relationships for the sub-components. In the case of
composites, tests should be carried out under both room temperature / as
received (RT/AR) and degraded conditions for read-across to the major static
tests (see note below).
 to substantiate the fatigue life and residual strength of large scale critical features
(see Clause 3.2).

Note: Where major tests involving composites are undertaken under RT/AR conditions,
the results of the sub-component tests under degraded conditions are required to obtain read
across from the major test results to the actual service environment.

5.2 Typical sub-components to be tested may include:

 major attachment fittings and support structure,
 large structural cut-outs,
 complex composite fittings,
 boxes to test compression skin,
 boxes to test tension skin,
 pressure boxes,
 boxes containing discrete source damage, such as lightning strike or battle
damage,
 main rotor blade root end,
 spars.

5.3 It may also be necessary to carry out comparability tests (for components
manufactured at two or more locations) at the sub-component level, for components that
undergo a complex manufacturing route, for example mouldings, forgings and
superplastically-formed, diffusion bonded structures.

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6 COMPONENT TESTS
6.1 It is a requirement to carry out at least one test of the entire structure: it is
permissible, and may be more manageable, to test the structure in a series of component
tests. The loading on these test articles should be representative of the operating conditions
acting upon the component. The objective of the major test(s) is to substantiate the structural
integrity of all primary structure, including all major load paths and to validate the structural
analysis in terms of the load paths, strains and deflections.
6.2 The test articles shall be fitted with such control runs and systems as are necessary
to demonstrate compliance with the proof requirement.
6.3 Consideration should be given to the instrumentation of the test article, especially to
the placing of strain gauges (and other instrumentation) and the placement of loading fixtures
and reaction points to ensure that sufficient data are obtained to demonstrate compliance
with the requirements.
6.4 The following test procedure is recommended:
a. Load in increments up to the design proof load in each critical loading case. If
measured flight loads data are available, these should be used. Check that there is no
structural deformation which might cause unacceptable redistribution of aerodynamic
loads. After removal of the load, examine and report on the condition of the specimen,
noting with photographs, all structural distress, which, if it occurred on an aeroplane in
service, might cause it to be declared unserviceable or not airworthy (for example, skin
distortion, loose rivets, serious permanent deformation, etc.).
b. Consideration should be given to loading the test article, in each test case, to an
intermediate level between design proof load and design ultimate load. This serves to
maximise data obtained in the event of premature failure.
c. Demonstrate an appropriate test factor from Table 2 within Section 3 on the design
ultimate load for static tests, or the required residual strength. If, during these tests,
serious damage to the specimen occurs unexpectedly or appears imminent, a decision
should be made whether to repair the specimen or to proceed to (d).
d. Repeat stage (c) for each of the other selected loading cases.
6.5 For mixed metal and composite structures, the use of test factors to account for
variability and environmental effects can cause problems. Loading beyond the design
ultimate load may over-stress components with low static reserve factors. Hence,
consideration may be given to the use of dummy metallic structures and where these are
used, it will be necessary to provide alternative test substantiation for the real parts.
6,6 Where enhanced loading is not used, the only practicable method of ensuring that
the structure is capable of carrying ultimate load is by comparing the strain gauge results
obtained from the major static test with the results obtained from tests on smaller boxes and
elements containing representative defects and tested under the correct environmental
conditions. These results are used to validate the analysis.

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7 FUNCTIONALITY TESTS
7.1 Testing is done to validate analysis of the functionality of major control and
mechanical systems up to the proof load. The objective of such testing is to show that these
systems have full range and freedom of movement under critical loading conditions.
7.2 Such tests may be done on the static test article or it may be necessary, or
expedient, to use separate test installations.

8 DEFINITIONS
8.1 B basis data – a (one sided) lower 95 per cent confidence limit for the value above
which 90 per cent of the population lies. This means that there is a 95 per cent probability
that at least 90 per cent of the material released will exceed the B value.

9 REFERENCES
Metallic Materials Data Handbook ESDU 00932, ESDU International plc, ISSN 0261-2402.

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Component Component Tests

Complete structures
Certification / Qualification
Sub-Components, e.g.
Validation of analysis
Wing box
Landing gear support
Main rot or blade root end

Details, e.g.
Skin/stringer panels
Major joints
Spar or rib box test Development Tests
Proof of concept
Elements, e.g.
Bolted joint elements Design data generation
Compression panels
Impact damage toleranc e

Coupons, e.g.
Materials & processes
Design data generation
Environment

Figure 1 - The structural test ‘pyramid’

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 tension
 compression
 shear
Coupons  holes & notches
 defects
Obtain design ‘B’ allowables  Young’s modulus
 environmental effects

 joints
Details & elements  compression panels
 shear panels
Detail stress analysis  skin cut-outs & reinforcements
 flange to skin attachments

 major attachment fittings

 large cut-outs
Sub-components  complex fittings
Validate analysis (incl. FEM)  compression skin
 tension skin
 pressure
 discrete source damage
 rotor blade root end lugs
 spars

Components

Test to 100% design

ultimate load
Check stress

Static strength statement

Figure 2 - Testing programme and qualification route

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LEAFLET 03

STATIC STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION

QUALIFICATION PROCEDURES – PHASED FLIGHT RELEASE

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 In Clause 3.1, it was stipulated that structural qualification should be achieved by
means of a staged, integrated programme of structural analysis, structural tests and flight
load measurements. The staged approach allows the use of clearance factors to provide an
aircraft release at intermediate qualification levels, thereby enabling preliminary test flights.
1.2 As each stage of the qualification programme is successfully completed, these
factors are then individually removed to allow progression to full clearance; that is, at the
100% strength envelope capability.
1.3 This approach may also be used to provide a staged release to service.

2 CLEARANCE FACTORS
2.1 Clearance factors provide a means of restricting the flight envelope, such that the
loads experienced by the structure are appropriately limited for the stage reached in the
qualification programme. These factors apply to the appropriate minimum reserve factors
shown by analysis. The flight envelope is then restricted to respect this allowable load
envelope. It should be noted that the same procedure can be used for flight and ground
loading actions, although this Leaflet refers mainly to flight loads.
2.2 The following defines the range of clearance elements that should be considered to
provide this staged approach:
2.2.1 The use of unconventional structures. Aircraft projects have seen an
increased use of new and complex and/or unconventional materials and manufacturing
processes, for example carbon fibre composites and superplastically formed, diffusion
bonded titanium. Until the properties of these unconventional structures have been fully
explored, in the full aircraft test programme, a restriction should be applied for early
clearances. A factor of 0.8 – 1.0 should be agreed for this requirement, dependant on
the extent and nature of unconventional structure employed and the test evidence
available.
2.2.2 Absence of Ultimate Load structural tests. Full aircraft static tests are
normally undertaken using a staged approach, initially exploring main load cases to
limit load conditions, before proceeding to the ultimate cases. As the test programme is
likely to continue over an extensive period, early clearance requirements will again
require an envelope restriction until the ultimate load cases have been completed.
Factors to be applied are given in Table 1.

Tests to limit load incomplete, or no test planned 0.8

Test to significant load cases complete to limit 0.9
Test to Ultimate Load 1.0

Table 1 - Factors to be applied in the absence of structural load tests

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2.2.3 Absence of flight and ground loads measurement. The flight and ground
load surveys are usually undertaken late in the development programme when most of
the structural testing has been completed and a reasonable envelope can thus be
cleared for this stage of the flight testing. A factor of 0.9 should normally be applied to
account for the absence of aircraft loads data and validation of loads models used in
the flight clearance process.
2.2.4 Absence of qualification of any load limiting aircraft system. Aircraft
programmes have begun to employ “carefree handling” techniques where control of the
aircraft is vested in the flight control system and the development design process will
aim to ensure that the control system “respects” the strength envelope of the structure.
In some cases, the Design Organisation may seek to reduce the Ultimate Factor, on
the basis that the control system offers better protection from structural overloads than
would normally be the case for conventional aircraft. In such cases a factor based on
the ratio of ultimate factors should be considered for this element and the final level will
depend on development progress, where the following aspects will require
consideration:
 limited carefree handling flights and evidence of structural overshoot levels;
 Flight Control System (FCS) software development progress;
 other load control systems; for example, pressure relief valves (PRVs). In these
cases, the upper tolerance level shall be used.

3 EXAMPLE OF CLEARANCE STAGES

3.1 The following provides an example of how the clearance factors listed above have been
employed in an aircraft development programme and formed an acceptable route to
structural clearance.
3.1.1 Initial clearance to 64% Allowable Load. The percentage was derived
from the product of the factors considered in Para 2 above. The following factors were
applied:
 use of unconventional structure – 0.85;
 absence of Ultimate Load testing – 0.9;
 absence of flight loads measurements – 0.9;
 absence of qualification of any load limiting aircraft system – 0.93.
3.1.2 Clearance to 75% Allowable Load. Progress to this clearance level was
permitted on the basis of initial results from the Major Airframe Static Test, upon
successful completion of a defined set of Limit Load cases. This corresponds to the
removal of the 0.85 factor for unconventional structures.
3.1.3 Clearance to 84% Allowable Load. This clearance level was considered
sufficient to proceed with the flight load survey and was obtained by the removal of the
0.9 factor, following the completion of Ultimate Load testing and associated analysis
validation.
3.1.4 Clearance to 93% Allowable Load. This clearance followed the completion
of the flight loads survey and the validation of the loads models, which allowed the
removal of the corresponding factor of 0.9.

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3.1.5 Final Clearance for Development Flying. The final clearance stage
provides a release to 100% only when the load limiting capabilities of the flight control
system have been fully proven.
3.1.6 Release to Service. For this programme, the PTL agreed that the initial
Release to Service should be restricted at 93% (based on the ratio of 1.4/1.5) until it
had been proven that the flight control system fully respected the strength envelope
under service conditions. Confidence in the ability of the FCS to provide carefree
handling under service conditions would be obtained from the Structural Health
Monitoring System (event monitor) and should eventually lead to the removal of the
final factor.
3.2 It should be noted that individual components had different levels of load clearance,
allowing maximum exploitation of the flight envelope. For example, some flying control
surfaces had been fully qualified before the wing and fuselage.

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LEAFLET 04

STATIC STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION

STRENGTH OF STRUCTURES UNDER CONDITIONS OF HEATING AND COOLING

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 This Leaflet recommends the use of methods and design factors to ensure that
significant thermal effects are properly accounted for in the design and substantiation of
aircraft structures.
1.2 When a Design Organisation wishes to use a different method, he should seek the
agreement of the PTL.
1.3 Changes in structural temperature can produce the following effects:
a) stresses and strains caused by differential expansion within the structure;
b) a temporary loss in material properties if temperatures pass a critical threshold;
c) permanent deterioration in material properties due to prolonged exposure to
temperatures beyond a critical threshold;
d) creep due to prolonged exposure to temperature and stress;
e) for composite materials, stresses and strains due to local anisotropy.

2 MECHANISMS PRODUCING THERMALLY INDUCED LOADS

2.1 Changes in structural temperature produce differential strains which can give rise to
significant stresses. These may be a consequence of thermal inertia between a skin and
deeper structure during super-sonic flight, or some local heating effect near an engine
installation or other heat source. Thermal stresses may be due to the proximity of materials
having different coefficients of thermal expansion or simply due to differences in the ability of
the structure to transfer heat.
2.2 It shall be necessary to account for temperature changes, including those where
there are significant differences between internal and external temperatures, for example,
between a cooled avionics bay and the remainder of the structure.
2.3 Other cases to be considered include the effect of heating on a hybrid
composite/metal structure.
2.4 Changes in temperature arising from ground soak shall also be taken into account,
for example as might arise from proximity to an engine installation or in transparencies
exposed to high ambient temperatures.

3 THERMAL EFFECTS ON MATERIALS

3.1 Structural materials may suffer a temporary loss in strength while at high
temperature (for polymeric materials, particularly when the glass transition temperature is
approached), and also permanent deterioration in properties due to prolonged exposure to
high temperature (see, for example, Reference 1). Low temperatures may also reduce
fracture toughness. The material properties assumed in calculations should, therefore, take
account of the temperature that could occur in the case considered, the time for which it is
maintained, and also the temperature history. Both upper and lower limits of the values of the
various properties should be considered in cases where the thermal strains may either
aggravate or relieve the stress due to the applied loads. Therefore, in estimating the service
life of a structure, an appropriate allowance must be made for structural degradation, taking
into account variability in materials properties, structural temperatures and operational
conditions.

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3.2 This Leaflet does not call for the provision of a safety margin by an arbitrary
increase in the structural temperature, either directly by factoring the temperature or
indirectly by factoring the design speed. Thus flight in excess of the design speed could lead
to a temperature higher than that considered in design. Although cases of exceeding the
design speed are rare, it is recommended that, as far as practicable, materials should be
used which do not suffer a substantial reduction in properties at a temperature slightly higher
than that corresponding to the design speed.

4 CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CALCULATION OF THERMALLY INDUCED LOADS

4.1 In order to calculate the magnitude of thermally induced loads, it is necessary to
consider at least the following:
a) the flight profile/envelope in terms of ambient conditions, speeds and speed
changes,
b) the surface airflow pattern and the type of flow, laminar or turbulent,
c) the heat transfer to the surface, allowing for emission and the convective flow from
the boundary layer,
d) time at temperature, and
e) the temperature distribution in the structure taking account of the heat flow through
complex paths and joints and the possible presence of other heat sources and
sinks.
4.2 Having described the temperature distributions, the various thermal stresses and
strains can be calculated.
4.3 Allowance should be made for the variability of thermal properties of materials and
structural elements, and it is preferable that design values and their variability be determined
by test wherever possible. Otherwise, reasonably conservative values of all properties should
be assumed in the calculations.
4.4 The conductivity of joints may depend on the temperature, the pressure between
the surfaces and the surface finish. The variability can be very large, but this does not
necessarily result in large variations in stress. In those cases where local stress is sensitive
to the conductivity of a particular joint, the variability should be investigated and then taken
into account when assessing the results of subsequent strength tests.
4.5 External loads, when combined with thermal stresses and strains, must satisfy the
overall conditions of loading equilibrium and geometrical compatibility. If the total stress is
below the elastic limit, the stresses and strains due to the two effects are independent, and
can therefore be calculated separately and superimposed. However, if the total stress
exceeds the elastic limit the stresses and strains due to the two effects are interdependent
and should therefore be calculated simultaneously.
4.6 Inaccuracies will arise at various stages of the calculation of thermal stresses and
are likely to be as great as those occurring when estimating the magnitude and distribution of
stress due to the external mechanical loads. Hence an equal safety factor on thermal effects
is necessary and it is recommended that factored conditions should be calculated as
described in Para. 4.

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5 DESIGN CASES
5.1 The Clauses of Part 1, Section 2 define the manoeuvres to be considered in design,
specifying aircraft speeds in each case, but they do not define those conditions giving rise to
thermal stress or strain (i.e., rate of change of speed and time spent at any given speed). For
each type of aircraft, therefore, it is necessary to examine all flight conditions in which the
combination of applied loads and thermal strains are likely to produce critical structural loads.
Normally, these loading cases are based upon the combination of full manoeuvre loads with
the most adverse thermal effects. Where such cases are thought to be improbable,
appropriate alternative cases should be formulated and these should be discussed with the
PTL.
5.2 The effect of thermally induced stresses either alone or in combination with other
loading actions should also be considered.
5.3 It may also be necessary to consider residual strength of vital controls and structure
during specified emergency conditions such as fire.

6 THE APPLICATION OF FACTORS

6.1 When the stresses due to thermal effects and to the applied loads are of the same
sign, the combined factored conditions for an individual structural member may be obtained
by the method of either Para. 6.2 or 6.4. The case when stresses are opposite in sign is
discussed in Para. 6.6
6.2 In the first method, the factored thermal strain for a particular member is obtained by
calculating the unfactored thermal strain assuming no external sources of load. This value is
then multiplied by the same proof and ultimate factors used for loads due to external
sources. This factored thermal strain is then added to the strain corresponding to the
factored loads due to mechanical sources.
6.3 The total factored strain can then be used to derive the corresponding factored
stress from the stress-strain curve for the particular member. It is permissible to neglect the
effect on adjacent members of factoring the loads and strains, but the combined effect
obtained in this way should be treated with reserve as it may result in lower stresses than
those obtained if the total forces are brought into equilibrium under factored conditions by the
method of Para. 6.4
6.4 In the second method the loading equilibrium and geometrical compatibility of the
structure are recalculated in the presence of the factored loads when the thermal expansion
coefficient(s) of the material(s) concerned is multiplied by the same proof and ultimate factors
as applied to the loads. This calculation will give the total factored strains due to the factored
loads and factored thermal effects which the member has to withstand. This method is
preferable to that stated in Para 6.2 because it is a closer approximation to what would
happen in flight or in a laboratory test, but it is recognised that, for complex structure, it may
not be practicable.

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6.5 In both methods the thermal strain, rather than the thermal stress, is factored. This
means that the ratio of stress at limit conditions to that at ultimate conditions is usually higher
for thermally induced loads than that for applied loads. The ratio is therefore also higher for
the combined loading case. This decision was made on the grounds that an ultimate factor
on thermal stress is not justified as far as static strength is concerned, because thermal
stresses are relieved when plastic deformation occurs. Consequently, a thorough
investigation of all fatigue and creep aspects is necessary, including creep buckling and
progressive distortion under cyclic temperature and loading conditions.
6.6 Cases where the load and thermal effects are opposite in sign may not be critical
because the most severe cases may well be when either one or other of these affects is
absent. If there is a critical case when both are present and the load effect is the greater it
may be desirable to disregard any alleviating thermal effects. When the thermal effect is the
greater, it appears reasonable to combine it with the load effect using the appropriate factors.
In either case, care should be taken to ensure that an adequate net load is used for design
purposes, particularly when the opposing effects are comparable in magnitude.

7 GROUND TESTS
7.1 When it is necessary to include thermal effects in strength tests in order to
demonstrate compliance with the requirements, the factored loads and, if practicable, the
factored thermal strains should be simulated. The method of simulating the factors on
thermal strain should be discussed with the PTL.
7.2 It should be noted that, in order to obtain realistic conditions in any structural
member, it will usually be necessary to test it as part of the complete structure so that all
balancing loads can be developed. When this is not done, results of the tests should be
interpreted bearing in mind any differences between the actual and the applied balancing
loads.

8 INSTABILITY FAILURES
8.1 For structures in which failure by instability is possible, thermal strain may be high
enough to produce structural collapse under low external loads. It is essential, therefore, that
this effect be taken into account in all design cases when considering the combination of
thermal strain and applied load.

9 REFERENCES
1. Metallic Materials Data Handbook ESDU 00932, ESDU International plc, ISSN
0261-2402.

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LEAFLET 5

The content of this leaflet has been removed JAC Paper 1348 refers.

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LEAFLET 6

STRUCTURES

GENERAL INFORMATION

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This Leaflet amplifies the requirements of Clause 3.1 and explains more fully the purpose
of the tests.

2 BASIC AIM

2.1 The basic aim of the tests, in conjunction with the static and fatigue strength tests, is to
ensure that the structure achieves the required strength factors both static and fatigue, under the
loads that are actually applied to it during flight and ground manoeuvres. This is particularly
important for novel designs for which there is no basis of comparison and on which calculated
loads could be seriously in error. Refer to Leaflet 3 Phase Flight Release.

2.2 To this end the first objective of the tests is to obtain measured values of the loads in flight
and on the ground in various manoeuvres and thus check the accuracy of the calculated loads on
which the design of the aeroplane was based and also provide information on the magnitude and
variation of the loads to be applied in the fatigue tests. It may also bring to light any loading
condition not foreseen in the theoretical assessment. In particular cases where structural
temperatures are expected to be significant temperature measurements can also be made.

2.3 In some cases the design loads may be found to have been overestimated and an
unexpected reserve of strength becomes available or, alternatively, an alteration thought
necessary because of a failure during strength tests may be found to be unnecessary.

3 RELATION WITH STATIC STRENGTH TESTS

3.1 Any strength tests done before the flight measurements are available can only be based on
calculated loads and are therefore only a check on the internal load distribution and the structural
strength under these calculated loads. However such tests are valuable in that they show up any
unforeseen weakness in the structure and this is borne out by experience which has shown that in
many cases the first design of a structure has needed strengthening alternations in order to carry
the design loads. For this reason, until the static strength tests have shown that the structure has a
satisfactory level of strength, flying must be restricted as required by Clause 3.1 Refer to Leaflet 3
Phase Flight Release.

3.2 When flight load measurements are available from the early restricted flight tests the early
strength tests can be re-assessed and the measured loads can be used in further static tests up to
factored conditions to ensure safety in flight tests up to higher loading conditions. An ideal
procedure is set out in Para 4.

4 PROCEDURE

4.1 The flight load measurement programme and the static strength test programme should be
planned together early in the design stage of the aeroplane. The static strength test procedure of
Leaflet 2 should be used but it should be phased in with the flight load measurement programme.

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4.2 The manoeuvres in which loads are to be measured in flight, as required by Clause 3.1,
cover a wide variety of loading conditions and it may not be practical to cover the corresponding
cases in the static strength tests in the time available. It may therefore be necessary to perform
some manoeuvres in flight without having first done ground tests. This has always been standard
practice however and the measurement of the flight loads will itself contribute to safety since by
progressively increasing the severity of a particular manoeuvre and comparing the measured loads
with the design loads, precautions can be taken should the measured loads prematurely reach the
design values.

5 RELATION WITH FATIGUE TESTS

5.1 The response of the aeroplane in terms of the loads, their distribution and their time history
during a particular manoeuvre or gust can be used in determining the representative loading cycle
to be applied to the structure in the fatigue test. The frequency of application of this loading cycle
at any particular level of severity must be obtained from Service records. Reliance entirely on a
calculated load cycle may produce large errors in fatigue test results and life estimation.

6 METHODS OF LOAD MEASUREMENT

6.1 Two current methods of measuring loads in flight, which may be combined if required, are:

(a) strain gauging - A technique of flight load measurement using this method has been
developed in the United States and is described in Ref 1. This technique requires the
interpretation of the gauge responses in flight in terms of a static calibration on the ground,

(b) pressure plotting - This method has also been developed in the United States and
requires the installation of several hundred pressure points with corresponding pressure
transducers either for continuous plotting of pressure at each point or for use with a scanning
mechanism by which a number of points are scanned over a period of 2 or 3 seconds. A
comprehensive system of accelerometers is also necessary for the measurement of inertia
loads.

REFERENCES

No AUTHORS TITLE

1 Skopinski, T.H Calibration of strain gauge installation in aircraft structures for the
Huston, W. B measurement of flight loads N.A.C.A. Report 1178, August 1952.
Aiken, Jr. W.S

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LEAFLET 7

SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

THE CALCULATION OF THE RESPONSE OF AN AEROPLANE TO PITCH CONTROL INPUT

AND ASSOCIATED LOADS WHEN A CONVENTIONAL CONTROL SYSTEM IS USED

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Clause 3.3 requires the use of a rational representation of the motion of the pitch
control motivator to be used to evaluate the loads which arise during a pitching manoeuvre.
The control systems of many aeroplanes are complex and it is not possible to present a
detailed analytical procedure for the load evaluation which will cover all cases. In the more
general case it is possible to give a broad outline of the stages of the analysis required to
derive the loads. For these cases see Leaflet 8.

1.2 Where there is effectively a direct link between the pilot's inceptor and the
deflections of the pitch motivator it is possible to give an analytical technique. Examples of
such closed algebraic forms may be found in R and M 3001 and 3327.

2 MANOEUVRE CONDITIONS

2.1 The complete pitching manoeuvre involves the transition of the aeroplane from
steady level flight at a particular speed and altitude to a condition of steady normal
acceleration, usually at some point on the boundary of the flight envelope; and then a
return to level flight. As the manoeuvre is primarily the response of the aeroplane to control
input in the short period longitudinal mode it is rapid and it is adequate to assume that the
forward speed does not vary during the manoeuvre.

2.2 The aim of the analysis is to specify the control input which results in a maximum
increment in the normal acceleration corresponding to the desired value at the appropriate
point on the boundary of, or within, the flight envelope. It should be noted that unless the
short period response is overdamped the motion of the aeroplane will be oscillatory, in
which case the maximum incremental value of normal acceleration will exceed the steady
state value appropriate to that control input. Whilst the steady state value is simply related
to the dynamic characteristics of the aeroplane for a given motivator deflection, the
maximum value is a function of the shape of the motivator movement versus time profile.

2.3 The final phase of the manoeuvre is conventionally analysed by assuming that the
aeroplane has achieved the steady state value of the normal acceleration and then
applying the pitch inceptor input required to return it to level flight.

2.4 From the foregoing description it will be realised that the important parameter is the
way in which the movement of the pitch motivator varies with time rather than the motion of
the pilot's inceptor. In a complex control system, such as one using active control
techniques, it is necessary to consider the effect of all the inceptors which contribute inputs
to the longitudinal control system. Refer to Leaflet 8 and Clause 3.10

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3 PILOT INPUT

3.1 For those cases where the pilot's inceptor is either directly linked mechanically to
the longitudinal control motivator, or through a power control unit having no other inputs it is
possible to specify the motivator movement in terms of the input of the pilots inceptor. Two
separate forms of motion have been used, in the past:-

(a) Unchecked; where the inceptor is moved to the appropriate deflection and
held there whilst the aeroplane responds.

(b) Checked; where after the initial movement of the inceptor, it is moved back
towards its initial setting, sometimes after a time delay.

3.2 The variation of the inceptor motion with respect to time generally takes a form
closely described by a ramp function, although for analytical purposes the unchecked
motion has often been represented by an exponential relationship.

3.3 The U.S. Mil-A-008861A (Inactive) Para 3.19.2 identifies three specific movements
of the pitch inceptor, all based on ramp functions. In each case the inceptor is assumed to
be deflected through an angle,  such as to give the desired normal acceleration at the end
of the aeroplane response time. The type of aeroplane effects the time, t1, assumed to
achieve the angle, , it being 0.2 seconds for highly manoeuvrable aeroplanes. The three
conditions relate to the movement of the inceptor after the angle,  has been achieved.

(a) Movement of the inceptor back to the original position in the same time as
the application, unless inceptor angle limitation requires a dwell time, t2, at angle 
to enable the specified normal acceleration to be achieved.

(b) Dwell at the angle, , for a time t3 determined so that the specified normal
acceleration is just achieved in a total time (2t1 + t3), , being determined
accordingly.

(c) Dwell at the angle, , for a time, t4, and then movement of the inceptor to an
angle, /2, in the reverse direction in a time 1.5t1. Both t4 and  are determined to
enable the specified normal acceleration to be just achieved in a total time (2.5t1 +
t4).

4 CALCULATION OF THE RESPONSE OF THE AEROPLANE

4.1 The first stage in the actual calculation of the loads which arise in a pitching
manoeuvre is to determine the response of the aeroplane to the specified pilot and/or other
inceptor inputs.

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4.2 This involves setting up the equations of motion of the aeroplane. In accord with the
assumptions of Para 2 these consist merely of the Z-force equation and the pitching
moment equation (as in the approximation to the short period motion of the aeroplane).
This completes the description of the dynamic system for the aeroplane, for which  is a
prescribed function of time.

4.3 In the more general case, it is necessary to add all the equations governing the
dynamic behaviour of the control system.

4.4 To proceed to the calculation of a control surface loading, the effective incremental
angle of incidence at the control position is required. One of the response quantities that
can be obtained from the response calculation is the incremental angle of incidence of the
aeroplane (i.e. at the cg). This quantity may then be used to determine the incremental
angle of incidence at the longitudinal control/stabiliser surface, making due allowance for
pitching velocity and rates of change of downwash with time and wing incidence where
appropriate.

4.5 In addition the variation of motivator deflection during the manoeuvre will either
have been specified or will have to be determined as a response quantity.

5 CONTROL/STABILISER SURFACE LOADS

5.1 At any time during the manoeuvre the total load is the algebraic sum of the load on
a control/stabiliser surface due to its incidence at that time and the incremental load due to
the deflection of any part of it at that same time.

5.2 When the aeroplane having a conventional wing-tail layout is pitched from steady
level flight towards the positive normal acceleration boundary the total surface load will
pass through a maximum download in the early stages of the manoeuvre, then through a
maximum upload before reaching the steady circling flight value. It finally passes through
another maximum in the upload sense when during the second stage of manoeuvre the
input is reversed to return the aeroplane to steady level flight. In the case of an aeroplane
having a foreplane-wing layout the foreplane load passes through a maximum upload
during the first part of the manoeuvre as the steady circling flight value is approached. A
maximum download condition may result as the input is reversed to return the aeroplane to
steady level flight. It should be noted that in this second configuration the critical design
loads conditions are reversed. That is the critical foreplane load is likely to arise in a steady
state condition whilst the transient case is likely to give the wing design conditions.

6 CONTROL SURFACE HINGE MOMENTS

6.1 The moment about the hinge line of the aerodynamic load acting on a control
surface is also dependent on the incidence of the control/stabiliser where appropriate and
the control surface deflection. Again this passes through maximum positive and negative
values as does the load, when the aeroplane is of conventional wing-tall layout.

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7 GENERAL REMARKS

7.1 As previously mentioned, it is possible to obtain an analytic solution in closed form

for certain aeroplanes. In such an approach it is usual to make the following assumptions
for initial analysis:

(a) variation of forward speed and the gravity component during the motion is
neglected, already mentioned.

(b) the contribution of the control motivator force to the total lift is omitted.

(c) the elastic distortion of the aeroplane structure is ignored, and

(d) the equations of motion are linearised and the aerodynamic derivatives
assumed constant throughout the manoeuvre.

7.2 Should it be considered necessary in a given case to account for any of these
effects, the equations of motion of the aeroplane must be amended accordingly.

7.3 If the data required under Clause 3.3 are not forthcoming from wind-tunnel or other
tests, it is acceptable that the effects under Clause 3.3 shall be estimated using appropriate
theories, in combination with the best available structural data. Whenever possible, the
effects under Clause 3.3 shall be based on the data from model and full-scale tests of a
closely similar design.

7.4 For aeroplanes with unswept wings and of conventional structural design flying at
low Mach numbers, in the absence of data from any of the investigations detailed above,
some allowances should be made. Changes in Cmo of ± 0.0075 and a shift of ±2.5% of the
mean chord in the position of the aerodynamic centre should be considered.

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LEAFLET 8

SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

THE CALCULATION OF THE LOADS ASSOCIATED WITH SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES FOR

AEROPLANES HAVING CONTROL SYSTEMS WITH LOAD LIMITING DEVICES
1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The application of the techniques described in Leaflet 7 is inappropriate for those
aeroplanes which use an active control system incorporating load limiting devices. In these
aeroplanes the automatic system can override pilot input and result in a so called "carefree"
manoeuvring situation. For the purposes of structural load evaluation it is usually necessary
to consider cases where motion of the aeroplane occurs in six degrees of freedom,
although constant forward speed may be assumed in some circumstances. The analysis
may be further complicated by the integration of flight and propulsion controls, as in the
case of vectored-thrust aeroplanes. Reference in all these cases should be made to Clause
3.10, which deals with the airframe aspects of active control systems design.

1.2 The use of a simple expression to specify the movement of the control motivators is
not appropriate for advanced flight control systems. The specification of the flight envelope
itself is relevant since the implied accelerations are one of the common design features of
the airframe and control system.

2 MANOEUVRE PARAMETERS

2.1 One way of proceeding with the design of both the airframe and control system is to
establish a set of "manoeuvre parameters". These include aeroplane velocities as well as
accelerations. They should be derived after consideration of the handling and agility
requirements of the aeroplane and in consultation with the Project Team Leader.

2.2 Design loads are calculated by balancing the aeroplane at selected points within
and on the boundaries using an assumed, appropriate control usage.

2.3 Subsequently, as the design of the flight control system becomes more fully defined
it is necessary to investigate the effect of control response on the manoeuvre parameters
and to check the load calculations in order to obtain flight clearance.

2.4 Reference should be made to Leaflet 28 for a further discussion of the structural
implications of active control systems.

3 NORMAL ACCELERATION/PITCHING ACCELERATION ENVELOPE

3.1 In the case of symmetric, or primarily symmetric, manoeuvres it is useful to consider

an envelope which describes the interaction of normal acceleration and pitching
acceleration. In practice it is convenient to use a 'modified' pitching acceleration which
includes a term consisting of the product of the roll rate, p and yaw rate, r, then:-

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.
Modified pitching acceleration = ( q - pr)
.
where q is the pitching acceleration

A typical form of the envelope for a supersonic aeroplane is shown at Fig 1. As would be
expected maximum negative, nose down, pitching acceleration coincides with all positive
values of normal acceleration. Equally there is a reduction in design positive, nose up,
pitching acceleration as the maximum normal acceleration is approached.

3.2 The value of maximum normal acceleration is defined in Clause 3.2 and the
maximum pitch acceleration by aeroplane handling and agility considerations.

4 MAXIMUM COMBINATION OF ANGULAR RATES AND ACCELERATIONS

4.1 A further consideration is the combination of maximum angular acceleration, for

example, q in pitch, with angular rate, for example, q, and vice-versa. Fig 2 is an example
of an envelope which describes such a combination. In this case the maximum angular rate
applies with angular accelerations up to about 40% of the maximum and vice versa.

4.2 It is also necessary, to specify the combinations of pitching velocity, q, with normal
acceleration. The relationship shown in Leaflet 10, Fig 2 for asymmetric manoeuvre
parameters is also appropriate for combinations of q/q MAX and n/n1.

FIG. 1 - COMBINATIONS OF NORMAL AND PITCHING ACCELERATIONS

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FIG. 2 - COMBINATIONS OF ANGULAR RATES AND ACCELERATIONS

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LEAFLET 9

ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

YAWING, SIDESLIPPING AND ROLLING MOTIONS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This leaflet gives explanatory notes on the requirements of Clause 3.3 and outlines
the methods of determining the critical stressing conditions arising in the course of the
manoeuvres specified therein. It is particularly applicable to those aeroplanes where the
movement of the control motivators is directly related to the movement of the pilot's
inceptors.

1.2 As in the case of the symmetric manoeuvres of Clause 3.2 and Leaflet 7, present-
day developments in aeroplane control systems can render past practices inapplicable in
the general case. Whilst in the past there always existed a direct relationship between a
given manoeuvring task and a control device, this is no longer the case. The demands of
improved performance in a number of directions have resulted in an increasing trend to
combine the effects of a number of control devices for a given task. Simple examples of this
trend are provided by the use of ailerons supplemented by differentially deflected tail
panels. When this is coupled with the increased application of automatic control systems
and unusual aerodynamic configurations the consequence can be an extremely complex
situation. However, there does exist a type of conventional aeroplane, namely those for
which the pilot's control is connected directly, or via a power unit only, to the rudder and
aileron control surfaces that can be catered for by simplified methods as hitherto (RAE
Report Structures 76).

2 LATERAL MANOEUVRES ARISING FROM APPLIED YAWING MOMENTS

2.1 Whether a yawing moment arises from the application of the yaw motivator(s) or by
a sudden loss of engine thrust on one side of a multi-engine aeroplane, the resulting motion
has the same character, being primarily a combination of yawing, sideslipping and rolling.

2.2 For the simple type aeroplane mentioned in Para. 1.2 above the first stage in
satisfying the requirements of Clause 3.4 is the calculation of the response of the aeroplane
as the solution of the lateral/directional equations of motion. In the more general case it is
necessary to include the equations which govern the dynamics of the control system when
determining the overall response.

2.3 The inputs referred to in Para 2.1 above principally give rise to yawing moments but
in certain cases there may be significant induced rolling moments and sideforces.

2.4 It has been usual for the linearised equations of motion to be used in calculating the
response of the aeroplane. Often the effect of the sideforce may be neglected in the
calculation of the overall response of the aeroplane but it does have a significant effect
upon the lateral and yawing accelerations. If the wing of the aeroplane is unswept and of
moderate to high aspect ratio it may be acceptable to neglect the rolling content of the
lateral motion, at least over part of the range of operating conditions.
When this is so for the simple aeroplane referred to, the response of the aeroplane is
derived from a solution of the two equations which describe the lateral and yawing motions.

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2.5 For the simple aeroplane it is adequate to assume that there is no input from the roll
or pitch motivators during the execution of the complete yawing described in Clause 3.4.
However, when inertial or aerodynamic cross-coupling is present it is admissible to
introduce corrective action both in the rolling and longitudinal senses. In order to ensure
that adequate allowance is made for the loads which may arise before this corrective action
is effective, Clause 3.4 specifies minimum values of bank angle, coupled with dynamic
sideslip angle and nominal acceleration which must be catered for, unless it can be
demonstrated that the flight control system ensures lower limited values.

3 YAWING CONTROL INPUTS

3.1 The inputs into the yaw channel are generally specified such that the deflection(s) of
the appropriate motivator(s) may be derived. For the simple aeroplane with a more direct
link between the pilot and the yaw motivator the input may be specified directly or indirectly
in terms of applied pilot force or inceptor movement. See Clause 3.4

3.2 When the yaw motivator(s) is (are) sensitive or powerful the application of a specific
deflection may result in unrealistically high loads for the directional stabilising/control
surface. It may then be desirable to change the characteristics of the motivator to reduce
the load. Alternatively there may be strong reasons for retaining the sensitivity or power of
the control, in which case some reduction of the severity of the loading case might be
reasonable if there is an aeroplane characteristic (such as high lateral acceleration on the
pilot) which would act as a natural deterrent against high pilot inceptor inputs. In such
cases the Project Team Leader should be consulted.

3.3 If calculations indicate that sudden loss of lift on the vertical stabilising/control
surface is likely to occur in the specified manoeuvres, then compliance with the
requirement of Part 1, Section 2, Clause 2.22 is in doubt. It may be found necessary to
adjust the aeroplane characteristics in order to satisfy this requirement.

4 EFFECTS OF ASYMMETRIC ENGINE FAILURE

4.1 The stressing case specified in Clause 3.4 to cover the loads arising following the
loss of thrust or power of an engine envisages that corrective action will be taken by the
pilot. The case therefore is concerned with the response of the aeroplane to the sudden
application of a constant yawing movement. It is usual for the loads which arise in a yawing
manoeuvre case, Clause 3.4, to be higher than those consequent upon an engine failure.
However, should the aeroplane characteristics be such that the engine failure case gives
more severe loads, then the implication of the corrective action specified in Clause 3.4
needs to be carefully considered.

5 THE ESTIMATION OF LOADS ON THE DIRECTIONAL STABILISER/CONTROL

SURFACE

5.1 The solution of the overall equations which govern the motion of the aeroplane, as
described in Para 2 above, yields the response parameters which are inquired to determine
the loads acting on the vertical (directional) stabiliser/control surface(s). These are:

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(a) Sideslip angle.

(b) Sidewash angle.

(c) Rate of yaw.

From these the effective angle of incidence of a location on the vertical surface(s) may be
calculated. The corresponding deflection of the yaw motivator(s) is (are) also required to
enable the total loads to be evaluated.

6 LOADS ON HORIZONTAL TAIL STABILISER/CONTROL SURFACE IN YAWED

FLIGHT

6.1 Clause 3.4 specifies the loading conditions to be applied to the longitudinal
stabiliser/control surface in yawed flight.

6.2 It is required that the magnitude of the pitching moment coefficient, Cmo, be
increased to allow for the effect of sideslip angle. The required value should be derived by
the best available method and verified in the flight testing, but in the absence of more
precise information it should be assumed that the low speed value of Cmo is increased by -
0.0015 per degree of sideslip.

6.3 It is also required that the resulting trim (balancing) load be distributed
asymmetrically. The effective rolling moment on the longitudinal stabiliser/control surface is
defined as:

p V2 St bt Kß
2

Where p V2 is the dynamic pressure

2

St is the area of the surface

bt is the span of the surface

ß is the sideslip angle

K is the slope of the curve of longitudinal surface rolling moment coefficient versus
sideslip angle at the appropriate Mach number.

6.4 The value of the derivative K should, wherever possible, be verified by actual tests.
It depends upon the configuration of the aeroplane, and for instance in a conventional
aeroplane layout it is significantly affected by such factors as tailplane dihedral, sweepback
and the position of the tailplane on the fin and also to a lesser extent by other aerodynamic
components. However, experience has indicated that, for unswept, relatively low down
tailplanes having no dihedral, a value of K of -0.0025 per degree of sideslip is conservative.

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6.5 The provision of strength to meet the effects of asymmetric buffeting which may
occur near the minimum permissible flight speed has apparently been covered incidentally
on many past aeroplanes by the use of K = -0.0025 in the asymmetric flight cases. It is
important however to ensure adequate strength on aeroplanes which are designed for
much smaller numerical values of K. It will probably be satisfactory to cater for a difference
in lift coefficient between the two halves of the horizontal stabiliser of 1.0 or CL max,
whichever is smaller. As an overriding minimum it is suggested that the horizontal stabiliser
shear strength inboard of the pick-up points should not be less than the strength outboard.

6.6 During asymmetric flight the drag as well as the lift on the longitudinal surface will
usually be distributed asymmetrically. This asymmetry of drag loads should be considered
in the design, although the provision of extra structure to meet it should not normally be
necessary.

7 COMBINED ROLLING AND PITCHING MANOEUVRES

7.1 ROLL INPUTS FOR STRESSING

7.1.1 The roll input conditions to be used for stressing purposes are defined
according to the requirements of Clause 3.4 That is expressed indirectly in terms of
the specified minimum rate of roll. Since designers will usually ensure that this rate
of roll will be exceeded by some margin, a factor of one and a third has been
applied. To determine the deflection of single roll motivator (or the deflections of
individual motivators where a combination of these devices is used) that
corresponds to the rate of roll which results after the factor has been applied, it is
sufficient to use a modified single degree-of-freedom roll equation. For an aeroplane
employing wing-mounted flap-type motivators, such as ailerons, flaperons or
segmented flaps, the modification consists of a factor applied to the rolling moment
due to the roll motivator embodying the reversal speed, to account for the elasticity
of the wing structure. The one and a third factor takes some account of the indirect
effect of the yawing and sideslipping motions that must occur.

7.2 DETAILS OF THE MANOEUVRES

7.2.1 The following assumptions are acceptable as an interpretation of the

manoeuvres defined in general terms in Clause 3.4

7.2.2 The aeroplane should be assumed to be flying in a steady pull-out or push-

over or a steady turn at the specified normal acceleration, when the specified roll
input is applied. Instantaneous application of roll input is an acceptable simplifying
assumption, but this will usually lead to higher loads in the structure than a more
realistic rate of application of the roll motivator(s). This roll input should in general
be maintained until the rate of roll has built up to its maximum, when the roll
motivator(s) is/are quickly returned to the neutral position. Again, instantaneous
motivator movement is an acceptable, though over-severe, simplification. The pitch
motivator deflection should be assumed constant throughout. Constant speed may
also be assumed.

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7.2.3 In the foregoing conditions, the pilot is assumed to be applying sufficient

pitch motivator deflection to produce the specified amount of normal acceleration.
When inertia cross-coupling effects are present the same motivator deflection
should be considered but this may give rise to a normal acceleration in excess of
that specified and to sideslip angles in excess of those arising from the manoeuvres
specified in Clause 3.4 These increased values should be used in strength
calculations. In the application of the requirements, the pilot's input into the pitch
plane is that which, in a steady pull-out, a steady turn or a push-over, as the case
may be, results in the specified level of normal acceleration. It may happen that, in
certain cases, inertia cross-coupling effects are significant and the use of linearised
equations of motion is no longer justified. In such cases the same pilot input, that
results in the specified level of normal acceleration during pitching motion only,
should be used.

7.2.4 The roll motivator power on some aeroplane designs may be so great that
the application of the requirements of Clause 3.4 results in unduly high values of the
rate of roll. In this case it is suggested that for the ground attack role, the maximum
rate of roll that need be considered to develop before the specified deflection of the
roll motivator (or the deflections of each roll-motivator, where a number of these are
used in combination) is removed, is the maximum that can be achieved in rolling
from a steady pull-out with zero bank into a 90 degree banked turn, when the
specified roll input is applied as rapidly as possible, or 200 degrees/sec, whichever
is less. For air fighting and evasive manoeuvres, the maximum rate of roll that need
be considered to develop before the specified deflection of the roll motivator (or the
deflections of each roll motivator, where a number of these are used in combination)
is removed, is the maximum that can be achieved in rolling from a 90 degree
banked turn in one direction to a 90 degree banked turn in the opposite direction
when the specified roll input is applied as rapidly as possible, or 200 degrees/sec,
whichever is less. The value of 200 degrees/sec is tentatively suggested as an
operationally usable maximum for fighters. Corresponding rates of roll for other
aeroplanes are not suggested as it is possible that on these aeroplanes the
maximum rate of roll corresponding to the specified roll input may be an adequate
criterion.

7.2.5 Any of the four stages of the manoeuvre, specified in Clause 3.4 (i.e., the
initiation, the steady roll, the arresting of the rolling motion and reversed roll), may
give critical loads in some parts of the structure. If instantaneous roll motivator
movement is assumed, it will probably be satisfactory to consider only the four
separate cases. If instantaneous roll input is not assumed, or if the maximum rate of
roll considered is less than the steady rate of roll corresponding to the applied roll
input, then examination of the response of the aeroplane throughout the manoeuvre
becomes advisable.

7.3 CALCULATION OF LOADS

7.3.1 Solution of the appropriate equations for the overall aeroplane system, yields
the response quantities necessary for the calculation of the loads acting on the
wings, their attachments to the fuselage and the directional stabiliser/control
surface(s).

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7.3.2 The load acting on the wings depends on the following:

(a) the angle of attack of the aeroplane,

(b) the distributed effective angle of attack resulting from the rate of roll,

(c) the corresponding quantity associated with the rate of pitch, and

(d) the rate of change in the angle of attack of the aeroplane.

(e) the deflections of any auxiliary surfaces.

(f) changes in effective angle of attack associated with any downwash

effects due to a lifting surface ahead of the wing.

Of these, the first two are the predominant effects.

7.3.3 The loads on the directional stabiliser/control surface follow from a

knowledge of the sideslip angle, sidewash derivative and angle and rate of yaw, see
Para 5.1 They also depend upon loads on the longitudinal stabiliser/control surface
if this is mounted on the directional surface.

8 GENERAL REMARKS

8.1 Although the effects of the sideslip which occurs during asymmetric manoeuvres are
most easily calculated for the fin and rudder loads, there are noticeable effects on other
parts of the airframe which are not so amenable to calculation. Such items include
undercarriage doors, cabin hoods, radar scanning housings and externally carried stores,
in general. Special wind-tunnel tests to investigate the magnitude of these effects are
recommended whenever it is not possible to base an estimate on the results of previous
tests of a closely similar design.

8.2 The yawing velocities which occur during asymmetric manoeuvres cause a
gyroscopic pitching couple on the engine and propeller which should be considered in the
design of the engine mounting. The effect of rate of yaw on other rotating parts within the
aeroplane should not be overlooked. See Clause 3.1 and Leaflet 3.

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LEAFLET 10

ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

THE CALCULATION OF THE LOADS ASSOCIATED WITH

ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES FOR AEROPLANES HAVING CONTROL
SYSTEMS WITH LOAD LIMITING DEVICES

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The application of the techniques described in Leaflet 9 is inappropriate for those
aeroplanes which use an active control system incorporating load limiting devices. This
different design situation is discussed in Leaflet 8 to which reference should be made, as
well as in Clause 3.10 and Leaflet 28.

1.2 One way of dealing with the design is to make use of Manoeuvre Parameters, see
Leaflet 8, Para. 2. These should be determined after consideration of the handling and
agility requirements of the aeroplane and in conjunction with the Project Team Leader.

2 LATERAL ACCELERATION/YAWING ACCELERATION ENVELOPE

2.1 Clause 3.4 specifies the yawing manoeuvre load cases for aeroplanes with
conventional controls. In the case of aeroplanes with active control systems it is useful to
consider an envelope which describes the interaction of lateral acceleration and yawing
acceleration. In practice it is convenient to use a 'modified' yawing acceleration defined as:
.
Modified yawing acceleration = ( r +pq)
.
where r is the yawing acceleration
p is the rate of roll
q is the pitch rate

Such an envelope is illustrated in Fig 1. The maximum negative yawing acceleration

applies at all positive values of lateral acceleration and vice-versa. However, as would be
expected there is an alleviation of the value of negative yawing acceleration at higher
negative values of lateral acceleration, and vice-versa.

2.2 The maximum value of the yawing acceleration is determined by the control system
characteristics required to meet the aeroplane handling and agility requirements. The
maximum lateral acceleration is likely to be limited by consideration of crew tolerance.

3 COMBINED PITCHING AND ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

3.1 Clause 3.4 specifies the design load cases for an aeroplane with conventional
controls in combined pitching and rolling manoeuvres. The situation is more complex in the
case of aeroplanes designed to possess 'carefree' manoeuvring characteristics due to the
need to consider all six degrees of freedom at the same time.

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3.2 Fig 2 is an example of an envelope which specifies the relative values of lateral
manoeuvre parameters in terms of the normal acceleration. The lateral manoeuvre
parameters covered are:-

roll rate, p as a function of the maximum value

.
roll acceleration, p , as a function of the maximum value

yaw rate r, as a function of the maximum value

.
yaw acceleration, r , as a function of the maximum value

lateral acceleration, ny, as a function of the maximum value

The diagram shows that for values of each of these parameters of up to 25% of the
maximum value there is coincidence with the maximum normal acceleration. There is then
a linear variation so that 80% of the maximum value coincides with 80% of the normal
acceleration. Further linear variation of the parameters occurs so that the maximum values
coincide with 50% of the normal acceleration.

3.3 The maximum values of the roll and yaw rates and acceleration are determined by
consideration of the handling and agility requirements of the aeroplane.

4 MAXIMUM COMBINATION OF ANGULAR RATES AND ACCELERATIONS

4.1 The combination of maximum angular acceleration with angular rate for both the roll
and yaw motions is a further consideration. A typical diagram showing this relation can be
found in Leaflet 8, Para. 4.1 and Fig 2.

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FIG 1 - COMBINATION OF LATERAL AND YAW ACCELERATIONS

FIG 2 - COMBINATIONS OF NORMAL ACCELERATION AND ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRE

PARAMETERS

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LEAFLET 11

GUST LOADS

SAFE SPEEDS FOR AEROPLANES FLYING IN TURBULENT WEATHER

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 To enable Service flying to be undertaken in all weather, pilots must be advised of
the best speed at which to fly in severe turbulence. This Leaflet outlines the type of
investigation which should be made to determine the conditions of speed and altitude at
which there is least risk of structural damage or loss of control resulting from excessive
incidence in a gust. The outcome of this investigation together with practical flying
experience will form the basis of advice given to pilots.

2 SAFE SPEED-ALTITUDE ENVELOPE

2.1 When an aeroplane meets a severe gust at low altitude, the upper limit of the safe
speed range is the speed at which the gust load can just be withstood without structural
damage. The lower limit is the speed at which the incidence during the passage of the gust
just reaches that at which loss of control would occur as a result of stalling or instability, or
at which severe buffeting would endanger the aeroplane. Within these limits lies the safest
speeds at which the severest gust can just be withstood without either structural damage or
loss of control. At high altitudes, the load developed in a gust may be insufficient to cause
structural damage throughout the speed range of the aeroplane, and loss of control or
severe buffeting is then the only danger.

2.2 Safe speed ranges at various altitudes can be shown on a speed-altitude envelope.
A safe speed-altitude envelope and the safest speeds within the envelope should be
determined for gusts of 20 m/s (66 ft/sec) EAS below 6100 in (20,000 ft) altitude thereafter
decreasing linearly to 11.6 m/s (38 ft/sec) at 15,200 in (50,000 ft) altitude, with the
aeroplane at the most adverse weight for the altitude considered. Fig 1 shows examples for
hypothetical subsonic and supersonic fighter aeroplanes.

3 STRENGTH BOUNDARY

3.1 The strength boundary should correspond to the achieved strength, unfactored,
resulting from the gust or manoeuvring strength requirements, and should be determined
for upward, downward and sideways gusts.

4 CONTROL AND BUFFET BOUNDARY

4.1 The loss of control boundary should be regarded only as an indication of the
conditions in which control difficulties might be expected to occur in severe turbulence.

4.2 On low speed, low altitude aeroplanes, the loss of control boundary should be
assumed to correspond to the stalling C L max. On high speed, high altitude aeroplanes,
flight tests will be necessary to establish the C L - Mach No. boundary that can be achieved
without loss of control, dangerous instability or severe buffeting. It will usually be
impracticable for this to be obtained from flight tests in severe turbulence, so the boundary
obtained in manoeuvring tests will have to be used.

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4.3 It will generally be unnecessary to allow for the transient increase in C L max or
buffet C L that occurs during the rapid change in incidence produced by a gust, as this
effect, which is difficult to determine, provides additional safety from stalling or buffeting
beyond the boundary obtained assuming static C L max or C L max determined from
manoeuvring flight tests.

4.4 In addition to the effects of excessive incidence, control difficulties may arise in
continuous turbulence at high altitudes and supersonic speeds, as a result of deterioration
in damping and control effectiveness. Control difficulties may also arise in turbulence at low
altitudes and high subsonic speeds because of over-effectiveness of the elevator or aileron
control. These may be particularly dangerous when attempting to fly at high speed near the
ground. These effects cannot be determined from considerations of the aeroplane meeting
an isolated gust. Advice on the flight procedure to be adopted where they are present will
have to be based on experience gained during flight in turbulence.

5 VARIATION OF SAFE SPEED WITH ALTITUDE

5.1 LOW SPEED AEROPLANES

5.1.1 For aeroplanes on which compressibility effects can be neglected the safest
speed is a constant E.A.S. at low altitudes, and is limited at higher altitudes by the
maximum speed of the aeroplane.

5.2 HIGH SPEED SUBSONIC AEROPLANES

5.2.1 The variation of safest speed with altitude for a high speed subsonic
aeroplane can generally be represented by a constant E.A.S. at low altitudes where
the upper limit of the safe speed depends on strength, and a constant Mach No at
higher altitudes where the upper limit depends on the deterioration in maximum safe
C L as transonic speeds are approached.

5.3 SUPERSONIC AEROPLANES

5.3.1 Supersonic aeroplanes are safer both at subsonic and supersonic speeds
than in the transonic range, where the load produced by a gust reaches a
maximum, and the C L at which loss of control or buffeting occurs deteriorates to a
minimum. The conditions, under which it is safer to fly supersonically than
subsonically, and vice versa, are an important consideration.

5.3.2 In supersonic flight, there is generally little to be gained in safety from

structural damage by flying at any particular speed up to a Mach No of about 2.0, as
gust loads vary little with speed due to the decrease in lift curve slope with increase
in Mach No, and strength is not appreciably reduced by kinetic heating. Altitude is
more important than speed in its effect on gust loads. Strength considerations will
determine a minimum altitude above which the aeroplane is safe from structural
damage over a wide range of speed.

5.3.3 Loss of control as a result of excessive incidence in a gust will set only a
lower limit to the safe speed in supersonic flight. At any given altitude an aeroplane
is safer in this respect at supersonic speeds, once it is through the transonic range,
than at the safest subsonic speed.

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5.3.4 The safest flight procedure for a supersonic aeroplane will generally consist
of a constant subsonic E.A.S. up to a point A on Fig 1 corresponding to the altitude
above which the safest subsonic speed is determined entirely by control difficulties
or buffeting. This will be followed by transition to supersonic speed at a safe
altitude. On some aeroplanes with low gust or manoeuvre load factors the control
and strength boundaries may intersect in the transonic range, indicating no clearly
defined safe speed for the gust specified. In these circumstances the recommended
speeds should be chosen on the safe side of the strength boundary.

6 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

6.1 For operational reasons, it is not always practicable to fly at the safest speed
determined from the foregoing considerations, and a compromise between this and the
normal operating speeds for best rate of climb and descent, or maximum range then
becomes necessary. Consideration of the speed band within which 95% of the maximum
range could be obtained might assist in reaching a compromise. On high altitude
aeroplanes, particular attention should be given to climbing and descent where turbulence
is most likely to be met. Any special limitations which might arise from the use of flaps or
airbrakes during descent should be considered. For crew comfort and efficiency, a speed
somewhat lower than the safest speed may have to be chosen, particularly with supersonic
aeroplanes in which excessive pitching may be troublesome at supersonic speeds.

6.2 It is important that the speed finally recommended in Pilots' Notes should be in the
simplest terms, so that it is easily remembered. A range of speeds should be given
covering all stages of flight, and lying within the strength boundary of the safe speed-
altitude envelope as near as possible to the safest speed. If a single speed can be chosen
that is a reasonable compromise for all stages of flight, this should be quoted for simplicity.
Complicated variations of speed with altitude should be avoided as far as possible.

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FIG. 1 - SAFE SPEED - ALTITUDE ENVELOPE FOR FLIGHT IN SEVERE TURBULENCE AS

REPRESENTED BY GUSTS OF 20 m/s (66 ft/sec) TO EAS BELOW 6100 m (20,000 ft) ALTITUDE
THEREAFTER DECREASING LINEARLY 11.6m/s (38 ft/sec) AT 15200 m (50,000 ft)

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LEAFLET 12

GUST LOADS

A METHOD OF CALCULATING GUST LOADS FOR PRELIMINARY DESIGN PURPOSES

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This leaflet presents a method of calculating gust loads for conventional aeroplanes in the
absence of a rational investigation of the aeroplanes response to gusts. It applies only to
aeroplanes with straight or sweptback wings and tailplane behind the wings. It may be used as a
preliminary design aid to more detailed full response calculations. The full response calculations
should always be undertaken for aeroplanes of unconventional layout or abnormal stability or
when structural flexibility is likely to be significant.

2 GENERAL

2.1 The speed and attitude of the aeroplane should be assumed to be unchanged during the
passage of the gust.

2.2 The maximum change in load on an aerofoil produced by the gust should be assumed to
equal that resulting from a change in incidence of:

tan-1 FU
V

where: U - is the design gust velocity (Clause 3.5)

V - is the aeroplane speed
F - is an alleviating factor (see Para 3)

2.3 Allowance should be made for the extent to which the lift coefficient of an aerofoil, where
effective angle of incidence is increasing rapidly, may exceed the maximum value at steady flow.
In the absence of better information the maximum lift coefficient assumed should be at least 1.25
times the maximum static value corresponding to the appropriate Mach number.

2.4 In calculating the loads on the horizontal tail surface the conditions of Clause 3.5 are to
be applied. Allowance should be made for the change in downwash produced by the gust on the
mainplane.

2.5 Wing flexibility should be neglected.

3 GUST ALLEVIATING FACTORS

3.1 VERTICAL GUSTS

3.1.1 Mainplane - The alleviating factor for vertical gusts is given by:

0.88
Subsonic flight: - F =
5.3  
103
.
Supersonic flight: - F=
6.95  103
.
2M
where µ - is a mass parameter as: - µ =
 Sca

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where M - is the aeroplane mass (kg or slugs)

S - is the wing area (m2 or ft2)

c  is the aerodynamic mean chord (m or ft)

a - is slope of the wing normal force coefficient/incidence curve at the appropriate

Mach number (per radian)

 - is the air density (kg/m3 or slugs/ft3)

3.1.2 Horizontal tail service - The alleviating factor for vertical gusts acting on the
horizontal tail surface in subsonic flight should be that derived for the mainplane in
Para 3.1.1. In the case of supersonic flight it should be taken as unity.

3.2 LATERAL GUSTS

The alleviating factor for lateral gusts is given by:-

0 .88 L
Subsonic flight: -
5. 3   L

Supersonic flight: - F = 1.0

where µ L - is a lateral mass parameter defined as:-

2
2M  k c 
µL =  
St ct a, t   t 

M - is the aeroplane mass (kg or slugs)

S t - is the reference area of the vertical tail surface (m² or ft²)

c t - is the aerodynamic mean chord of the vertical tail surface (m or ft)

k c - is the radius of gyration of the aeroplane in yaw (m or ft)

 t - is the distance from the centre of gravity of the aeroplane to the

centre of lift of the vertical tail (m or ft)

a, t - is the slope of the vertical tail lift coefficient/incidence curve at the appropriate Mach
number (per radian)

 - is the air density (kg/m3 or slugs/ft3)

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LEAFLET 13

PRESSURE CABINS

STRENGTH TESTING

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This Leaflet amplifies the strength test requirements of Clause 3.6 and makes
recommendations on testing methods.

2 LOADING CONDITIONS

2.1 The requirements of Clause 3.7 call for tests of the pressure cabin under the
loading conditions either of Clause 3.7.37 or of Clause 3.7.38, or of both, as agreed with
the Project Team Leader. The loading cases and the method of testing to be used should
be discussed with the Project Team Leader.

3 METHOD OF TEST

3.1 The best method of testing a cabin under internal pressure, whether static or fatigue
loading is needed, is to use water as the pressurising medium and so avoid the risk of
explosive failure which can occur if air is used (see Para 4). The specimen is placed in an
empty tank and both specimen and tank are filled with water until the specimen is
completely submerged; water pressure is then applied internally. During all filling and
emptying processes the water level in the specimen should be the same as that in the tank
thus avoiding any loading of the fuselage due to static head effect.

3.2 With this method it is possible to encounter a premature failure, identify a weak
spot, repair and strengthen, and then continue the test with the minimum of delay. In cases
where the failure occurs at or near the design pressure, it is possible to continue the tests
to higher pressures after repairing and strengthening the specimen so that data may be
obtained for the design of future projects.

4 DANGERS AND DISADVANTAGES OF USING AIR PRESSURE

4.1 Calculations of the energy stored in compressed air show that tests using air
pressure can be exceedingly dangerous since if failure occurs, the sudden release of
energy may lead to widespread destruction. This has been borne out by experience which
has shown that where failure originates in the metal structure violent explosion occurs with
excessive tearing and with bodily movement of the test specimen. Where the failure occurs
in a window the damage is usually limited to the window, but danger to personnel is still
present from flying fragments and from movement of the specimen.

4.2 Special precautions must therefore be taken to protect personnel and adjacent
equipment. There have been cases where protective steel netting and cables have been
broken and shelter doors sucked out of their frames by blast. Observers should therefore
remain at a safe distance and should not approach the specimen until the pressure is
reduced to a known safe value. The danger can be reduced if the quantity of air in the
cabin is reduced to a minimum by filling the cabin with some suitable material of low
density, but internal loading due to the weight of the material should be avoided.

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4.3 Apart from the danger aspect, explosive failure causes so much secondary damage
that the determination of the primary cause of failure is extremely difficult and even if it can
be identified, repair and strengthening of the weak spot may be impossible. The structure
may then be useless for further tests, and in a case of premature failure it would be
necessary to build another specimen before the tests could be continued and, for a large
fuselage, this would mean great expense and long delay. The advantages of using water
as the pressurising medium are therefore overwhelming.

5 PROVING TESTS USING AIR PRESSURE

5.1 From the foregoing it is evident, in the interests of safety, that all tests in which the
use of air pressure cannot be avoided, (e.g., functioning tests, leakage tests and the
proving pressure test as required by Clause 3.7) should be deferred until the static test, as
required by Clause 3.7 has been satisfactorily completed.

5.2 There seems to be no practical way of avoiding the use of compressed air for these
proving tests and they will therefore be attended by some risk of explosion through failure
of the pressure shell. This risk will be reduced as much as possible by the previous
strength tests on the test specimen. However, it is not always practical to do the water
pressure test on the whole of the pressure shell. Hence although all known design
difficulties may have been represented, some risk may still arise from some unknown
design weakness not included in the strength test specimens, or through some design
modification, works' concession, bad workmanship, service defect or repair causing a
reduction in the strength of the pressure shell.

5.3 Although the risk of explosion may be slight it is recommended that during all air
pressure tests in which the maximum differential pressure for normal operation is to be
exceeded, the following safety precautions be taken:

(a) the test should be made in the open (the use of blast walls for tests made
within a building tends to increase the risk of roof damage and falling fragments),

(b) the test cabin should be well away from other aeroplanes or any other
objects which could be damaged, and

(c) all personnel should remain at a safe distance and only approach for close
observations, such as leakage tracing, after the pressure has been reduced to the
normal working pressure.

6 ROUTINE TESTS IN SERVICE

6.1 In routine tests of the pressure cabin system on aeroplanes in service it will not be
necessary, and indeed is undesirable, that the maximum differential pressure for normal
operation (i.e., the pressure "p" of Clause 3.6) should be exceeded. No special precautions
are therefore needed.

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LEAFLET 14

PRESSURE CABINS

CABIN PRESSURISATION SYSTEMS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This Leaflet gives recommendations amplifying the requirements for warning and
pressure controlling devices, for the prevention of damage due to discharge or leakage
from the pressure supply system, and for the operation of cockpit hood inflatable seals.

2 WARNING DEVICES

2.1 It is essential that the warning device should operate only when the pressure loss is
sufficient to constitute a state of emergency, which the pilot must quickly do something
about; too frequently premature warnings seriously reduce the effectiveness of the warning.

2.2 To prevent unnecessary operation of the warning device due to the rapid change in
differential pressure during a dive, it is recommended that the warning device should
operate only when the differential pressure falls by more than 7 kPa below the value set by
the pressure control unit coupled to the discharge valve. There is, however, no need for the
warning to operate at altitudes below 7,600 m (25,000 ft), since even sudden pressure loss
would not be serious enough to warrant a warning.

3 PRESSURE CONTROLLING DEVICES

3.1 GENERAL

3.1.1 The requirements of Clause 3.6 have, for convenience, been presented in
terms of various types of valves but in each case any device which ensures
compliance with the basic requirement will be termed a valve for the purpose of the
requirement.

3.2 DISCHARGE AND SAFETY VALVES

3.2.1 The requirements call for a safety valve as a safeguard against failure of the
discharge valve. Acceptable means of meeting the requirement are to duplicate the
discharge valve (see also Para 3.2.3) or to incorporate the safety valve and the
discharge valve in a single unit (see also Para 3.2.4 and 3.2.5).

3.2.2 In any case, the inlet to the discharge and/or safety valves should not be
protected by a fine mesh filter as blockage of such a protective mesh has been the
direct cause of cabin failures.

3.2.3 If any part of the pressure control system should fail, this should cause the
discharge valve(s) actuated by the control system to maintain a safe differential
pressure in the cabin.

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3.2.4 Although it is desirable to have the discharge and safety valves completely
separate, consideration of icing prevention, space, etc., may dictate that the valves
be incorporated in a single unit. The flow of warm air through the discharge valve
tends to keep the safety valve free from ice.

3.2.5 If the discharge and safety valves are mounted together with a common
inlet, one of the following alternative arrangements is recommended:

(a) a coarse mesh gapped debris guard should be provided to protect

the inlet from blockage by loose objects in the cabin; it should, however, be
mounted so that the full flow of air can pass to the valves through the gap in
the event of the guard being blocked, or

(b) the flow of air to the common inlet should be ducted through more
than one inlet; each inlet in the ducting should be suitably protected by a
coarse mesh debris guard.

3.2.6 The safety valve should open when the cabin pressure exceeds the
maximum working differential pressure and be fully operative as soon as
practicable, but in any case before the pressure has reached 7 kPa above the
maximum working differential pressure (see Clause 3.7).

3.3 INWARDS RELIEF VALVES

3.3.1 In complying with the requirements for the inwards relief valve, consideration
should be given to the conditions arising when owing to enemy action or to failure of
the air supply, the cabin pressure drops to atmospheric while the aeroplane is at its
operational ceiling following which it dives steeply to a low altitude.

4 DISCHARGE OR LEAKAGE FROM PRESSURE SUPPLY SYSTEMS

4.1 Ductings will contain air at high temperature and at high pressure and hence
adequate precautions should be taken to ensure that the discharge of air from relief valves
or leakage from components cannot damage adjacent structure, equipment or services.

5 COCKPIT HOOD INFLATABLE SEALS

5.1 On aeroplanes fitted with sliding hoods and inflatable seals, the last movement of
the hood in closing should cause the seal to inflate automatically and the first movement of
the control for opening the hood should cause the seal to deflate.

6 TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE MEASUREMENTS

6.1 The maximum local working temperature and pressure should be measured at all
critical points in the prototype system to check that the temperature and pressures used in
the design are not exceeded. The same measured temperatures and pressures should be
used in the fatigue test of Clause 3.7

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LEAFLET 15

PRESSURE CABINS

PREVENTION OF CABIN AIR CONTAMINATION BY FUMES FROM FUEL TANKS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The requirements of Clause 3.6 state that every possible precaution shall be taken
to avoid contamination of the air in the pilot's cabin. Experience has shown that serious
contamination, and a fire hazard, can readily arise when air tapped from the engine
compressor is used both for pressurising the fuel tanks and for air conditioning the cabin.
This Leaflet is concerned with the design precautions needed to prevent contamination in
such a case.

2 BASIC PRINCIPLES

2.1 There are two main ways by which the possibility of contamination can be greatly
reduced. They are:

(a) by arranging that the tapping which supplies air for cabin conditioning is
positioned well above, and remote from, that which supplies air to the fuel tanks,
and

(b) by using a reliable non-return valve in the air pipe from the engine to the fuel
tanks.

2.2 On many aeroplanes where only one of those two alternatives has been employed
cases of cabin air contamination have arisen, either due to the malfunctioning of the non-
return valve or because the two engine tappings, although separate and a few centimetres
apart, were nevertheless so placed that fuel coming back from the tanks into the engine
could enter the air pipe going to the cabin. It is therefore strongly recommended that both
courses of Para 2.1(a) and (b) should be adopted.

3 SEPARATION OF AIR TAPPINGS AT ENGINE

3.1 It is obviously desirable that the two tappings be as far apart as is reasonably
practicable, and that the tapping for the fuel tank air supply should be below that for the
cabin air, thus ensuring that any fuel coming back from the tanks cannot drip into the cabin
air supply tapping. The tapping for the fuel tank air supply, being the one where danger
arises, should be placed so that the flow of air through the engine will tend to carry fumes
away from the cabin air tapping when the engine is running. It will usually be satisfactory to
take any subsidiary air supplies, (e.g., for gun heating, equipment cooling or pilot's
ventilated suit), from the cabin air tapping. In other words, as the danger arises from the
pipe going to the fuel system, that is the one to keep apart from others.

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4 NON-RETURN VALVES IN AIR SUPPLY LINE TO FUEL TANKS

4.1 Two points need study here - the kind of valve used and its location.

4.2 The valve should be one which is absolutely leakproof when in the nominally closed
position and which can be relied upon to function with the necessary reliability in a pipe
passing air, or air and fuel vapour mixed.

Note: Advice on non-return valves already under development for this purpose can
be obtained from the Project Team Leader.

4.3 As regards location of the non-return valve, the designer will probably wish to make
one valve serve for several fuel tanks, if not for the whole fuel system and will thus wish to
place the valve fairly close to the engine. A further advantage of doing this is that, by
incorporating a testing connection near this non-return valve, the whole of the fuel system
can be subjected to a pressure test as a convenient servicing operation when desired.
However this location of the non-return valve close to the engine may subject it to high
temperatures and the aeroplane designer should establish that the valve he chooses for
the job can withstand the temperatures to which it will be subjected in the particular
installation. Duplication of the non-return valve (i.e., two of them in series) may be justified
in some cases.

5 AEROPLANES WITH AIR SUPPLY FROM SOURCE INDEPENDENT OF ENGINE

5.1 Some aeroplanes do not take the cabin air from an engine tapping, but have a
separate blower or, possibly, bottled air supply. Even in such cases the fuel system needs
careful study as an air/fuel mixture might be a serious fire hazard if it passed into, say, an
electrical generator cooling system.

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LEAFLET 16

PRESSURE CABINS

TIME NEEDED FOR EMERGENCY DESCENT FOLLOWING LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURE

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Clause 3.6 requires that the time needed for an emergency descent from the
maximum operating altitude down to a safe altitude shall be established by flight tests so as
to confirm the calculations made in complying with the pressure cabin sealing
requirements. This Leaflet lays down the features which should be considered when
making the design calculations and flight tests.

1.2 In addition, the flight tests are required to provide information on the adequacy of
the choice of the pressurised clothing and equipment specified in the Aircrew Equipment
Assembly (AEA).

2 STARTING CONDITIONS

2.1 The time required may vary markedly depending on the initial flight conditions. On a
fighter, for example, the time for descent from a given operating altitude will probably be
quite different for initial conditions of say M = 0.7 and M = 2.0. It may also vary appreciably
depending on whether the aeroplane is initially in a steep climb, in level flight or in a dive.
Other factors that will affect the time taken are initial engine conditions (e.g., throttle
position, reheat on or off) and possibly the position of the air brake, nose flaps, etc.
External stores or weapons may affect the time required by imposing speed or handling
limitations. On a bomber, although there is likely to be less variation in initial conditions,
there can be a large variation in operating altitude due to the large change of weight during
a sortie.

2.2 It is impracticable to lay down as a general case, exactly what combination of

conditions will give the longest time required for an emergency descent. The Contractor
should therefore consider what combination of starting conditions that is reasonably likely
to arise in normal operational use of the aeroplane, gives the most adverse case and
should cover this in all estimates and tests made.

3 TEST TECHNIQUE

3.1 It is for the Contractor to propose for each aeroplane the conditions under which
descent measurements should be made. In this connection, it must be remembered that in
a real emergency, the pilot will probably have suffered sudden decompression immediately
prior to descending. Any descent procedure adopted should therefore be straightforward,
simple to do and not necessitate precise control of the aeroplane. For this reason, it is
suggested that the tests should be made at what are likely to be the normal Service limits
for the aeroplane. Obviously on a real emergency descent, it may be expected that normal
Service limits will on occasions be exceeded and this is acceptable provided that a
condition is not reached where the aeroplane would be seriously endangered. However if
design speeds are not to be grossly exceeded, this will probably mean that the
recommended technique for the descent should be the Normal Service limit and that tests
should therefore be made at this condition.

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3.2 On aeroplanes where sudden decompression could be caused by complete loss of

a cockpit canopy or escape hatch, consideration should be given to any lower limitation on
speed that might be necessary as the result of such loss.

3.3 On an emergency descent, an appreciable part of the time may be spent in losing
engine thrust and reaching steady diving conditions with air brakes out. This time should be
included in the design estimates and in the measured times for descent.

3.4 The flight condition after reaching the safe altitude is unimportant provided the flying
limitations are not exceeded and it can be assumed that the aeroplane continues through
the safe altitude in the steady dive condition.

4 DEVELOPMENT STATE OF THE AEROPLANE WHEN TESTS ARE MADE

4.1 It is obviously desirable that the tests should be made as soon as practicable after
the aeroplane has been cleared for high altitude flying, so that the adequacy of the
pressure cabin sealing can be checked and the final decision on the type of pressurised
clothing and breathing equipment to be fitted can be made.

4.2 However, it is also important that the development state of the aeroplane should be
such that the results that will be obtained on a production aeroplane can be reliably
estimated, since too high a complexity of pressure clothing is as undesirable as too low a
standard of safety.

4.3 The following list gives examples of the development stage that should ideally have
been reached before making these tests:

(a) that the likely Service limiting speed and Mach Number are known and that
the aeroplane has been cleared for flight at those speeds with the appropriate
normal accelerations,

(b) that the airbrake design has been finalised and any limitations on use have
been established,

(c) that the engine and full system have been cleared for maximum 'g' push
overs, or alternatively if the dive is to be entered by a half roll and pull through, that
the aileron limitations have been established over the speed range, and

(d) that the engine idling thrust is representative of production engines and that
any engine handling difficulties have been resolved.

5 REPORTING

5.1 Copies of the flight test report should be sent, through the MOD Resident Technical
Officer (RTO) to the Project Team Leader.

5.2 The choice of pressurised clothing and equipment for service use in the aeroplane
will then be reviewed. If any changes are necessary, they will be conveyed to all concerned
by a re-issue of the AEA.

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LEAFLET 17

SPINNING AND SPIN RECOVERY

DESIGN RATES OF ROTATION

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Clause 3.8 prescribes that the spinning conditions used for strength calculations shall
be those which give the most adverse combination of the yaw, pitch and roll components of
the rotation, with adequate allowance for unsteadiness. This leaflet outlines the means which
may be used to derive the design rate of rotation in the spin.

2 DESIGN RATES OF ROTATION

2.1 The design rate of rotation may be derived by one or more of the methods outlined
below.

2.2 Use of semi-empirical formula.

 18 . 3 V  1
S    2 rads / sec
 
 K Z2  K X 2  


where V - is the tail volume coefficient

- is the wing mean chord, m.

K Z and K X - are the radii of gyration about the Z and X aeroplane axes of stability,
respectively, m.

S is the steady rate of rotation about a space vertical associated with an aeroplane
incidence of 60° as defined by the inclination of the aeroplane longitudinal axis to the space
vertical with the aeroplane lateral axis horizontal. The equation has been derived from a
consideration of the pitching moment equation in the steady spin. The value of the constant
was derived by consideration of measured rates of rotation on a series of models with a
standard yawing moment applied. Good agreement was obtained between the measured
model rates of rotation and the prediction of the formula and there was fairly good agreement
with the average rates of rotation measured full scale during incipient spinning tests. The
formula applies only to aeroplanes of conventional layout and moderate aspect ratio. It is
suggested that a factor of at least 1.15 be applied to S to allow for unsteadiness during
spin.

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2.3 MODEL TESTS

2.3.1. Various model test techniques are available (see for example AGARD CP 199
Paper 13). Model scaling is extremely important and it is especially necessary for the
model Reynolds number to be as representative of full scale as possible. Where the
steady rate of rotation has been evaluated from model tests it is necessary to
compare it with that given by the formula of Para 2.2 above and if less the procedure
to be adopted shall be discussed with the Project Team Leader. The factor of 1.15
should be applied to the agreed steady rate of rotation to cover unsteadiness.
2.3.2 Model test techniques which will be acceptable for providing evidence of spin
characteristics include:-

(a) Wind tunnel free-flight techniques, which can provide valuable

information on spin entry.

(b) Vertical wind tunnel tests which can be used to obtain data on the
steady developed spin and recovery, but usually require careful interpretation
because of the disparity in the Reynolds number.

(c) Free-flight tests with model dropped from a helicopter, with either pre-
programmed control settings or radio control.

(d) Wind tunnel rotary balance tests, which may be used to obtain the
basic aerodynamic characteristics of the aeroplane whilst in the spinning
mode and hence the rates of rotation by solving the equations of motion of the
aeroplane (see for example AIAA Paper 80-1564).

2.4 SIMULATOR STUDIES

2.4.1 Simulator studies demand the availability of a valid mathematical model of the
aeroplane and for this reason the application to the spin regime may be limited.
However, the technique has value in investigating the conditions from which a spin
may develop.

3 ROLL DURING RECOVERY

3.1 In the absence of other information a rate of rotation of 5 rad/sec about the
longitudinal axis, assumed to be vertical, should be used to cover the condition of rolling
during recovery from a spin or post stall gyration.

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LEAFLET 18

SPINNING AND SPIN RECOVERY

DESIGN CRITERIA FOR SPIN RESISTANCE AND SPIN RECOVERY

1 GENERAL

1.1 In the case of training aeroplanes which are to be certificated as Part 1 designs (see
Part 1, Section 2, Clause 2.1) it is necessary to establish the spinning and spin recovery
characteristics of the aeroplane (see Part 1, Section 2, Clause 2.24 and Section 2 Leaflet
53).

1.2 The Aeroplane Specification may state that aeroplanes in other categories,
especially highly manoeuvrable combat types, have to be designed to meet spin conditions,
although they should also be resistant to departure from controlled flight and to post stall
gyrations and spins in accordance with Part 1, Section 2, Clause 2.24 However, if an
automatic spin prevention device with a sufficiently low probability of failure is used Clause
3.8 states that the spinning requirements to be applied must be agreed with the Project
Team Leader. If such a device is part of an automatic flight control system reference should
be made to Clause 3.9

2 SPIN RESISTANCE
(see for example AGARD CP-199 Paper 5, and CP-235 Paper 19).

2.1 The aim of spin resistance is to incorporate characteristics in the aeroplane which
result in resistance to departure into spin type motions subsequent to a stall.

2.2 Design criteria suitable for use during the design stage have been developed, but
must be substantiated by subsequent model and full scale testing as prescribed by Clause
3.8.3. The full attainable incidence range should be investigated.

(a) Directional Departure Parameter - N vDYN 

The parameter is defined as:-

I
N v DYN  N cos  z L v sin 
v Ix

This is derived from a consideration of the lateral directional equation of motion of the
aeroplane. It is a measure of the stability of the aeroplane about the flight path and predicts


departure from longitudinal control inputs. Essentially N v
DYN should be greater than
zero in all conditions to avoid the possibility of departure in yaw.

(b) Lateral Control Departure Parameter - LCDP.

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Various versions of this criteria have been proposed. They have been developed from a
consideration of the simplified rolling and yawing moment equations assuming the
aeroplane to be laterally and directionally trimmed. Essentially the criterion predicts the
point where the rolling moment due to sideslip, resulting from adverse yaw, overcomes the
rolling effect of the ailerons and, where appropriate, rudder.

 N  KN 
LCDP = N v - L v  
 L  KL 
   


where K = and represents the aileron/rudder interconnect


Again LCDP should be positive to avoid departure.

(c) Combined yaw and roll criterion.

Criteria have been proposed which combine both

N v DYN  and LCDP.

One such is the (ß+) axis stability indicator

    and   L v  o

 Nv Ix 
where -   tan 1  
 Lv Iz 

 N  KN  
   tan 1   Ix
 
 L  KL  Iz 

which implies that N vDYN  has to be positive, and

LCDP will be zero for  - =

(d) The damping of the lateral oscillation should be positive.

(e) Some evidence suggests that the value of the pitching moment due
to sideslip C m v should be zero or

slightly nose down to avoid undesirable directional-lateral coupling effects. A

method of predicting couple pitch-yaw departure has been suggested which is
based on analysis of the non-linear static equation of the aeroplane in angle of
attack and sideslip. (See AGARD CP235 Paper 29). However, further substantiation
of this technique is required and it is not recommended.

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3 SPIN RECOVERY

3.1 The design of an aeroplane for spin recovery is complicated by the number of
design parameters which influence the problem. The most important of these are:-

(a) The relative moments of inertia of the aeroplane about its three reference
axes in all appropriate configurations including with stores.

(b) The wing geometry, particularly on the outer parts of the mainplane.

(c) The fuselage shape, especially in cross section and nose shape.

(d) The relative position of the horizontal and vertical stabilising surfaces,
including the degree to which the fin and rudder are shielded by the tailplane in spin
attitudes.

(e) The effectiveness of the motivators and their cross axis effects.

(f) Store configuration, especially when asymmetric.

3.2 A relatively simple criterion known as the Tail Damping Power Factor (TDPF) was
used for many years. This basically relates the product of a so called tail damping ratio and
the 'unshielded' rudder volume coefficient to the difference between the moments of inertia
in roll and yaw. More recent work has shown clearly that it is not a satisfactory criterion as it
does not describe either a necessary or sufficient characteristic for satisfactory spin
recovery. This is not surprising in view of the limited parameters covered.

3.3 A more comprehensive criterion is that given in ARC CP No. 195. This method
predicts an overall unbalanced (anti-spin) rolling moment coefficient (URMC) and relates it
to the moment of inertia parameter

1 Iy 
Ix

The unbalanced rolling moment coefficient is the sum of three separate quantities:-

(a) that due to the body damping coefficient, L B , which makes allowance
for body shape - Fig 1a. The effect depends upon the width of the strakes, if
present, which are horizontal extensions to the fuselage forward and in the
plane of the tailplane.

(b) that due to the unshielded rudder volume coefficient, L RV Fig 1b. The
elevator position used should be that which results in the minimum
unshielded rudder area.

(c) that due to the mainplane, L M , Fig 2.

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The boundaries for satisfactory spin recovery are shown in Fig 3. The technique has shown
good correlation with flight tests for aeroplanes of conventional layout with wings of
moderate aspect ratio. The parameter:-
1 Iy 
Ix
represents a simplification which effectively assumes that the second moment of mass in
the z direction is negligible. This may introduce errors when I x is approximately equal to I y .
However, the method considers only fin/rudder recovery effect and is thus limited to
aeroplanes of conventional layout. AGARD CP 199 Paper 7, Fig 10 suggests a criterion for
roll control which may be dominant on slender configurations.

4 NOTATION

AR Wing aspect ratio

b Wing span

bl I z  I x  / [S (2b) ,]
Cm v pitching moment derivative due to sideslip

h local height of body (Fig 1a)

I x ,I y ,I z moments of inertia about body axes in roll, pitch and yaw respectively

K ratio of rudder deflection to aileron deflection

LB rolling moment coefficient due to body damping - Fig 1a

LM rolling moment coefficient due to wing effect - Fig 2

L RV rolling moment coefficient due to unshielded rudder volume coefficient. Fig lb

Lv dihedral effect derivatives - body axes

L aileron rolling moment derivative

L rudder rolling moment derivative

Nv directional stability derivative - body axes

Nv directional departure parameter

DYN
N aileron yawing moment derivative

N rudder yawing moment derivative

S Wing area

t/c wing thickness chord ratio (Fig 2)

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V true rate of descent in spin

 angle of attack

N I 
  tan 1  v x 
 Lv I z 

 N  KN  I 

  x 
  tan 1

 L  KL  I z 

weighting factor in body damping coefficient (Fig 1a)

1
 1. 3  2  b
   
 AR b1  2V

 air density

rate of rotation about spin axis (rad/sec)

LCDP lateral control departure parameter

TDPF tail damping power factor

URMC unshielded rudder moment coefficient

BODY CROSS-SECTION  at x -45

CIRCULAR + 0.6
RECTANGULAR + 1.5
ELLIPTICAL + 2.1
ROUND TOP, FLAT BOTTOM + 1.1 * Depends on the
ROUND TOP, FLAT BOTTOM + STRAKES + 1.7* width of strake.
ROUND BOTTOM, FLAT TOP + 2.5 The values quoted are
ROUND BOTTOM, FLAT TOP + STRAKES + 3.5* for a width of 0.014 
(FREE + 1.5 where  is the
FIN (UNDER TAILPLANE + 3.0 distance from the c.g.
(ABOVE TAILPLANE - 0.4 to the rudder post
(FREE) + 1.5
RUDDER (UNDER TAILPLANE + 2.0
(IN TAILPLANE WAKE - 0.25

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FIG 1 - BODY DAMPING & UNSHIELDED RUDDER VOLUME COEFFICIENTS

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FIG 2 - AN ESTIMATION OF THE WING ROLLING MOMENT COEFFICIENTS

(WIND AXES) IN THE SPIN

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FIG 3 - THE CRITERION FOR THE PREDICTION OF THE RECOVERY

CHARACTERISTICS OF SPINNING AEROPLANES

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LEAFLET 19

CONTROL SYSTEMS

POWERED FLYING CONTROLS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Basic safety requirements for powered flying controls are specified in Part 1,
Section 4, Clause 4.10 This Leaflet deals with the strength of the powered flying control
circuit, mounting the control unit into the aeroplane and the control characteristics when the
controls are operated in conjunction with an automatic stabilisation device.

2 CONTROL CIRCUIT STRENGTH

2.1 The design load for a mechanical input circuit of a powered flying control system is
that applied by the pilot in the presence of a feed-back or artificial feel mechanism: the
powered control unit valve(s) input may, therefore, be loaded by the pilot's maximum effort,
less whatever is absorbed by the feel mechanism. Hence there is no significant difference
between a mechanical input circuit of a powered control and a manual control circuit. This
part of the circuit should meet the strength requirements of Clause 3.8 which call for an
ultimate factor of at least 1.5 on the maximum effort which a pilot is capable of applying,
with a jam of the powered control unit input. The pilot's nominal effort, however, is only a
small fraction of his attainable maximum and so this part of the circuit will usually meet the
fatigue strength requirements of Clause 3.12 (see Para 2.4 below), when designed to the
strength requirements of Clause 3.8 Reaction of the maximum effort in both directions
should be assumed at all possible parts of the circuit including an extreme position at the
power unit. As this loading implies a failure of the powered control unit or its input valve to
respond to normal effort, its application must be considered in both directions.

2.2 Account should be taken of loads that may be induced in the parked condition when
surfaces may deflect downwards under weight or upwards and downwards due to wind
loads. Circuit loads will depend on the location of input circuit stops, possibly artificial feel
forces, and damping devices if fitted.

2.3 The design load for the output circuit should be the maximum load which the power
unit is capable of applying increased by the pilot's effort through the feed-back or artificial
feel mechanism where this is possible. The contribution of the powered control unit is,
however, much larger than that due to the pilot and in general the working load in this
circuit is much closer to the maximum attainable load than is the case in the input circuit.
Consideration should also be given to conditions arising in the circuit during and after
change-over to any emergency system of control. High transient peak loads may occur
when the system is brought to rest rapidly e.g., by sudden closure of a valve after
movement at maximum velocity, owing to the kinetic energy to be dissipated in a small
displacement. It is important therefore in hydraulic systems to stress for the loads then
arising as these may be greater than those due to the maximum working pressure.
Care should also be taken to avoid stress concentrations; testing to an approval schedule
will be necessary. The maximum load may be greater than that needed for aeroplane
control: for instance, each part of a duplicated power system may be capable of three
quarters of all of the necessary force.

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2.4 The fatigue strength of mechanical powered flying control circuits should be
established in accordance with the principle outlined in Clause 3.12 (Account should be
taken of the loading actions referred to above).

3 POWERED FLYING CONTROLS IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUTOMATIC

FLIGHT CONTROL OR WITH AN AUTOMATIC STABILISATION DEVICE

3.1 When the powered flying controls are to be operated by an automatic flight control
or in conjunction with an auto-stabiliser the control characteristics under powered flying
controls should be satisfactory both with and without the automatic flight control and/or the
auto-stabiliser in operation (see Part 1, Section 4 Clause 4.10).

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LEAFLET 20

CONTROL SYSTEMS

TESTING OF POWERED FLYING CONTROLS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 In this Leaflet, information and explanation are given regarding the tests of powered
flying controls called for in Clause 3.9

1.2 The tests are divided into two stages:

(a) the powered control unit by itself - part of the Type Approval of the Unit, and

(b) the powered control installation for a particular aeroplane covering the
complete system from pilot's input to the control surface.

2 GROUND TEST RIGS

2.1 The test rig for the powered control unit should be capable of applying loads to the
output member of the unit varying at the required relationship to the displacement and
should operate the input member through the required duty cycle at any required load,
speed, frequency, and for any desired endurance period. Means should be provided for
measuring all characteristics of the control such as loadings, friction, rates of operation,
elasticity, mass, inertia, resonance frequencies, stability, and temperatures and pressures,
where applicable, at critical points in the control. The need to apply assisting loading and
not merely resistive, when this may occur naturally in flight, should not be overlooked. A
chamber should be available for checking the operation of the unit at high and low
temperatures as required by Part 1, Section 7, Clause 7.2

2.2 In the case of the complete control system the test rig should represent, as closely
as possible, the conditions of the aeroplane in which the powered control is to be flight
tested. All loads should be applied to the actual control surface or its test rig equivalent and
operation of the input member should be through the pilot's input. For check testing of the
complete system when installed in the aeroplane, some form of control surface loading rig
should be available.

3 TESTS OF THE POWERED CONTROL UNIT

3.1 PROTOTYPE CONTROL UNIT - FLIGHT CLEARANCE TEST

3.1.1 During the development stages of a new design of control unit some testing
of the prototype unit will be necessary before the unit reaches the test stage of Para
3.2. In order to ensure a reasonable standard of safety in flight, before any flight
testing is done the prototype control unit should be submitted to a Flight Clearance
Test in a ground rig as required by Clause 3.8 This test may be either separate
from, or included in, the Flight Clearance Test of the installation in which the unit is
to be flight tested, described in Para 4.1 below. An endurance test, followed by an
inspection and performance check, should be carried out before flight.

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3.2 THE CONTROL UNIT - UNIT DESIGN CLEARANCE TEST

3.2.1 The development of a new design of control unit to the stage when it is
ready for production may involve much rig and flight testing. Before production is
started, however, approval of the type should be obtained and for this purpose a
prototype/typical production unit should be subjected to the Unit Design Clearance
Test called for in Clause 3.8 This should be an extended test covering all aspects of
performance, endurance, stability and functioning of safety devices under all
reasonably foreseeable types of simulated failures. During the test the unit should
demonstrate that it gives its declared performance, that it functions within its
declared temperature conditions and also when subjected to negative 'g' and
sustained inverted flight.

3.2.2 For endurance testing, the input member should be operated through a 'duty
cycle' repeating it continuously for an adequate total running time. The composition
of this duty cycle should be decided on before the start of the test to suit the
particular control and the type of aeroplane for which the control is intended, in
accordance with Leaflet 21.

3.2.3 The aim of the complete test should be to establish that the performance of
the unit is maintained over the specified flying hours between scheduled removals.
Should unit design clearance - testing be included in Installation Design Clearance
testing only sufficient testing to give confidence for development flying need be
done.

3.2.4 No modifications or major adjustments should be made during the test and
on completion there should be a complete strip and examination of the unit. The unit
will not be deemed to have passed the test unless the strip and examination is
satisfactory, the standard to be that its condition is such that the unit would still be
satisfactory for safe use in the aeroplane.

3.2.5 If it is necessary to modify an approved control unit to suit a particular

aeroplane type, a full test of the modified version is unlikely to be necessary but a
test to cover the revised design requirements and modifications to the unit should
be made.

4 TESTS OF THE POWERED CONTROL INSTALLATION

4.1 THE POWERED CONTROL INSTALLATION - FLIGHT CLEARANCE

4.1.1 Before any powered control unit is flight tested either in an established type
of aeroplane or in a new prototype, the complete powered control system, including
control runs and/or circuitry and control surface actuators is required by Clause 3.8
to undergo a Flight Clearance Test, partly in a ground test rig and partly when
installed in the aeroplane in which flight tests are to be made.

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4.1.2 The rig test should be carried out on a prototype of the complete system to a
test schedule which should be representative of the test flying intended. The test
schedule should call for an endurance period but this need not be extensive if the
unit is already cleared for flight since the aeroplane controls themselves do not
usually require long endurance testing. If the control unit is not already cleared for
flight by either of the tests at Para's 3.1 or 3.2 adequate endurance testing should
be included in the schedule. All other characteristics of the system such as
performance, stability, resonance and functioning of safety devices under all
required conditions should be thoroughly investigated. (For resonance testing, see
Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.8 and Section 4 Leaflet 30).

4.1.3 Tests should be made to demonstrate that the safety requirements of Clause
4.10 are met and that the operation or malfunctioning of other powered systems in
the aeroplane has no adverse effects on the powered control system under both
normal and emergency conditions.

4.1.4 The aeroplane ground test may be made on the actual installation which is
to be flight tested. This installation should be identical with that tested in the rig. If
both rig and aeroplane ground tests are satisfactory and meet the standards
declared in the pre-test declarations, flight testing may proceed.

4.1.5 It is possible that the rig test may reveal that flying time should be restricted
until further ground tests have proved the reliability of the system.

4.2 INSTALLATION - DESIGN CLEARANCE

4.2.1 Further development of the system involving modifications may prove

necessary as a result of ground and flight tests, and when the complete control
system has reached the stage when it is considered satisfactory for production it
should be submitted to its Final Installation Design Clearance Test as required by
Clause 3.8 This test should be carried out on the final version of the prototype
installation. It should be similar to the Flight Clearance Test except that the
endurance test should be sufficient to establish the satisfactory continued
functioning of all working parts not already tested and approved. It should be
followed by a strip and examination of all working parts, unless agreed by the
Project Team Leader that an extended endurance test be carried out to establish a
satisfactory. Functioning life without strip examination. This should be considered if
it is required to leave the test rig in a life consumed condition for further reliability or
life extension testing.

4.2.2 In cases where the control unit employed in the installation has not already
been tested and approved separately, the Installation Design Clearance Test may
be extended to cover the Control Unit Design Clearance Test of Para 3.2

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LEAFLET 21

CONTROL SYSTEMS

TEST SCHEDULES FOR POWERED FLYING CONTROLS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 In this Leaflet, specimen test schedules for the testing of powered flying controls, as
called for in Clause 3.8 and as described in Leaflet 20, are given in detail. These schedules
are intended to show the general form that the testing procedure should take and should be
modified where necessary to suit any particular design of control.

2 PROTOTYPE CONTROL UNIT - FLIGHT CLEARANCE TEST (see Leaflet 20, Para 3.1)

2.1 PRE-TEST DECLARATIONS

2.1.1 The following, each at the appropriate power supply conditions, need to be
decided before commencement of the test:

(a) the composition of the "duty cycle" appropriate to each portion of the
test,

(b) the maximum and minimum rates of operation with the corresponding
maximum loads at the control unit output member, and the maximum rate at
zero load,

(c) the maximum loads at the control unit output with the corresponding
maximum rate, and

(d) temperature and pressure limitations where applicable.

2.2 ENDURANCE TEST

2.2.1 With the power supply, if engine driven, at conditions corresponding to

continuous cruising, operate the input member of the unit, repeating the appropriate
duty cycle for a total running time of 25 hours.

2.2.2 Every 5 hours approximately, carry out full cycles of the input member (full
cycle comprises movement from the neutral to one extreme position, return through
neutral to opposite extreme and return to neutral) as follows:

(a) 10 full cycles at the declared maximum rate and corresponding

maximum load,

(b) 10 full cycles at intermediate load and rate,

(c) 10 full cycles at declared maximum load and corresponding

maximum rate, and

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(d) operate safety device and allow 10 full cycles in the emergency
condition. Where a means of change-over from emergency control back to
normal is provided, check that this operates satisfactorily.

Note: In special cases where the change-over from the duty cycle to the full
cycle involves undue time and labour, the total of 200 full cycles may all be
carried out at the end of the endurance test.

2.2.3 The temperature rise at critical points in the control unit, (e.g., electric motor
cooling air, fluid in hydraulic pumps, motors and jacks, etc.), should be recorded
during the test.

2.2.4 At some suitable time during the test, check under low temperature
conditions sufficient to clear the unit for the experimental flying intended and under
negative 'g' conditions sufficient to clear the unit for operation under negative 'g' or
inverted flight as applicable.

2.3 STRIP EXAMINATION

2.3.1 Strip and examine working parts.

Note: Performance testing is included in the Flight Clearance Test of the

installation at Para 4.

3 CONTROL UNIT DESIGN CLEARANCE TEST (see Leaflet 20 Para 3-2)

3.1 PRE-TEST DECLARATIONS

3.1.1 The following, each at the appropriate power supply conditions, need to be
decided before commencement of the test:

(a) the composition of the "duty cycle" appropriate to each portion of the
test,

(b) the maximum and minimum rates of operation with the corresponding
maximum loads at the control unit output member, and the maximum rate at
zero load,

(c) the maximum loads at the control unit output with the corresponding
maximum rate, and

(d) temperature and pressure limitations where applicable.

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3.2 PRELIMINARY FUNCTIONING TEST

3.2.1 This test, comprising about 20 cycles at varying loads and rates, should
precede all performance and endurance testing. Checks on the operation of the
safety device should be made by simulating a failure in various positions of the
control output member allowing a number of cycles in the emergency condition in
each case. This should be repeated for all agreed possible types of failure including
runaway, freeing or seizure of the control. Where a means of change-over from
emergency control back to normal is provided, this should be checked in each case.
The time to change over to the emergency condition, and back again, when
appropriate, should be measured in each case.

3.3 PRELIMINARY PERFORMANCE CHECK

3.3.1 This test should precede the endurance test in order to establish the
performance of the unit in the new condition. It should include the following:

(a) sensitivity tests, including backlash and overshoot measurements,

(b) measurement of input friction,

(c) measurement of maximum load developed by the output member,

(d) measurement of maximum rate of operation at various loads from

zero to maximum, applied to the output member, and

(e) frequency response tests to establish stability criteria.

3.3.2 The above should be repeated over a range of power supply conditions from
the minimum emergency conditions to the maximum.

3.4 ENDURANCE TEST

3.4.1 With the power supply, if engine driven, at conditions corresponding to

continuous cruising, operate the input member of the unit, repeating the appropriate
endurance duty cycle, for a total running time of approximately 200 hours (see
Leaflet 20 Para 3.2.4).

3.4.2 Every 10 hours approximately, carry out full cycles of the input member (full
cycle comprises movement from neutral to one extreme position, return through
neutral to the opposite extreme and return to neutral) as follows:

(a) 10 full cycles at declared maximum rate and corresponding

maximum load,

(b) 10 full cycles at intermediate load and rate,

(c) 10 full cycles at declared maximum load and corresponding

maximum rate, and

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(d) operate safety device as at Para 3.2 allowing 10 cycles in the

emergency condition.

Note: In special cases where the change-over from the duty cycle to the full
cycle involves undue time and labour, the 10 hour interval between the sets
of full cycles may be increased to not more than 50 hours with the number of
cycles at each interval adjusted to make the same total of 800.

3.4.3 The running times should be arranged to include at least one continuous
endurance period equivalent to the endurance of the particular aeroplane for which
the unit is designed, or in the case of a unit not associated with a particular
aeroplane, a period of twelve hours.

3.4.4 The temperature rise at the critical points in the control unit, (e.g., electric
motor cooling air, fluid in hydraulic jacks, etc.), should be recorded during the test.

3.4.5 At some suitable time during the test, check under the temperature
conditions of Clause 7.2, as appropriate to the particular case under consideration.
Record time taken to reach satisfactory functioning condition from starting. Check
safety device.

3.5 FINAL PERFORMANCE CHECK

3.5.1 Repeat preliminary performance check at Para 3.3 and note changes.

3.6 STRIP EXAMINATION

3.6.1 Strip and examine working parts.

4 INSTALLATION FLIGHT CLEARANCE TEST (see Leaflet 20, Para 4.1)

4.1 PRE-TEST DECLARATION

4.1.1 The following, each at the appropriate power supply conditions, need to be
decided before commencement of the tests:

(a) the composition of the duty cycle appropriate to each portion of the
test,

(b) the maximum and minimum rates of operation with the corresponding
maximum loads at the control surface, and the maximum rate at zero load,

(c) the maximum loads at the control surface and the corresponding
maximum rate, and

(d) temperature and pressure limitations, where applicable.

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4.2 PRELIMINARY FUNCTIONING TEST

4.2.1 The complete powered control system should be installed in the ground test
rig under conditions similar to the installation in the test aeroplane. About 20 duty
cycles at varying loads and rates should be made. Checks on the operation of the
safety device should be made by simulating a failure in various positions of the
control surface allowing a number of cycles in the emergency condition of each
case. This should be repeated for all agreed possible types of failure including
runaway, freeing or seizure of the control. Where a means of change-over from
emergency control back to normal is provided, this should be checked in each case.
The time to change over to the emergency condition and back again, when
appropriate, should be measured in each case.

4.3 PRELIMINARY PERFORMANCE CHECK

4.3.1 This test should be made with the complete control system in the test rig and
should precede the endurance test in order to establish the performance of the
system in the new condition. It should include:

(a) sensitivity tests, including backlash and overshoot measurements,

(b) measurement of input friction,

(c) measurement of maximum torque developed at control surface,

(d) measurement of maximum rate of operation at various loads from

zero to maximum, applied to the control surface, and

(e) resonance tests (see Part 1, Section 4, Leaflet 40) applied to the test
rig.

4.3.2 The above should be repeated over a range of power supply conditions from
the minimum emergency conditions to the maximum, including that appropriate to
the all engine failure case. The tests using the emergency power supply appropriate
to the all engine failure case should check that the performance is adequate and
that the system will function for a sufficient length of time to meet the requirements
of Part 1, Section 1, Clause 1.1 appropriate to the particular aeroplane concerned.

4.3.3 Tests should be made to demonstrate that the safety requirements are met
and that operation of all other powered systems supplied from the same power
source, does not materially affect the performance of the powered control.

4.4 ENDURANCE TEST

4.4.1 With the system in the test rig and with the power supply, if engine driven, at
cruising conditions, operate the pilot's control through the declared endurance duty
cycle for a total running time of:

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(a) 5 hours, if the control unit is already cleared for flight, or

(b) 25 hours with the full cycles of Para 2.2 if the control unit is not
already cleared for flight.

4.4.2 Carry out 600 full cycles of the pilot's control (full cycle defined at Para 3.4.2)
as follows:

(a) 200 full cycles at declared maximum rate and corresponding

maximum load,

(b) 200 full cycles at intermediate loads and rates, and

(c) 200 full cycles at declared maximum load and corresponding

maximum rate.

4.4.3 After every 50 cycles and at same load and speed, operate safety device as
in Para 4.2.1 and allow five cycles in the emergency conditions in each case.

4.4.4 Temperature and pressure measurement should be taken throughout as

applicable.

4.5 FINAL PERFORMANCE CHECK IN TEST RIG

4.5.1 Repeat preliminary performance check at Para 4.3 and note changes.

4.6 STRIP EXAMINATION

4.6.1 Strip and examine all parts not already tested as part of the control unit.

4.7 AEROPLANE GROUND TEST

4.7.1 Install a complete powered control system identical to that tested as above,
in the test aeroplane, and carry out the performance tests of Para 4.3 as far as
practicable on the ground using a control surface loading device.

4.7.2 Carry out the resonance tests (see Part 1, Section 4 Leaflet 30).

5 INSTALLATION DESIGN CLEARANCE TEST (see Leaflet 20, Para 4.2)

5.1 PRE-TEST DECLARATION

5.1.1 As in Flight Clearance Test at Para 4.1

5.2 PRELIMINARY FUNCTIONING TEST

5.2.1 As in Flight Clearance Test at Para 4.2

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5.3 PRELIMINARY PERFORMANCE TEST

5.3.1 As in Flight Clearance Test at Para 4.3

5.4 ENDURANCE TEST

5.4.1 With the system in the test rig and with power supply, if engine driven, at
cruising conditions, operate the pilot's control through the declared endurance duty
cycle for a total running time of:

(a) 50 hours if the control unit employed is a type tested and approved
unit, or

(b) 200 hours if the control unit employed is not a type tested and
approved unit.

5.4.2 Every 10 hours carry out full cycles (full cycle defined at Para 3.4.2) making
a total of 3000 cycles, as follows:

(a) in a 50 hour test:

(1) 200 full cycles at declared maximum rate and corresponding

maximum load,

(2) 200 full cycles at intermediate loads and rates, and

(3) 200 full cycles at declared maximum load and corresponding

maximum rate, and

(b) in a 200 hour test, the number of full cycles at (a), (b) and (c) above
should be reduced to 50 so that the same total of 3000 cycles is achieved in
the complete test. Alternatively, the time interval between the sets of full
cycles may be increased from 10 to a maximum of 50 hours with the number
of full cycles in each set adjusted accordingly.

5.4.3 After every 50 full cycles and at same load and rate, operate safety device
as at Para 4.2 and allow five cycles in the emergency condition in each case. When
a means of change-over from emergency control back to normal is provided, this
should be operated in each case.

5.4.4 Temperature and pressure measurements should be taken throughout as

applicable.

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5.5 FINAL PERFORMANCE CHECK

5.5.1 Repeat preliminary performance check and note changes.

5.6 STRIP EXAMINATION

5.6.1 Strip and examine all working parts.

5.7 AEROPLANE GROUND TEST

5.7.1 Install the same prototype powered control system, or an identical one, in
either a prototype or a production version of the aeroplane for which the system is
intended, and carry out the performance tests of Para 4.3 up to about 30%
maximum load, using a control surface loading device, and check results with the rig
test results.

5.7.2 Carry out resonance tests (see Part 1, Section 4 Leaflet 30).

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LEAFLET 22

CONTROL SYSTEMS

USE OF MASS-SPRING UNITS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The purpose of this Leaflet is to draw attention to certain airworthiness aspects
which should be considered when bob-weights or similar mass elements are incorporated
in conjunction with springs in flying control systems.

1.2 Cases have occurred in the past where such devices have been introduced into
flying control circuits in order to improve the stick force/g characteristics or to achieve some
measure of g restriction. A device of this type is sensitive to the normal acceleration, the
angular acceleration in pitch, the longitudinal acceleration or any other response quantity of
the disturbed longitudinal motion of the aeroplane, or to a combination of such quantities; in
turn it moves the pitch control surface and so controls the normal acceleration of the
aeroplane.

1.3 It may sometimes happen that an element such as an unbalanced link may be
unintentionally included in a control system in such a way as to act as a bob-weight and so
introduce a coupling between pitching of the aeroplane and motion of the control circuit.
Such a case should be treated as if the mass-spring unit had been deliberately included,
and the following recommendations should be taken as applicable.

2 RECOMMENDATIONS

2.1 In all cases where a mass spring system of the general type described in Para 1.2 is
to be installed, a full analytical investigation should be made of the stability of the
aeroplane-control system combination.

2.2 For such investigations the following points should be borne in mind:

(a) in cases where power units are incorporated in pitch control circuits, the
dynamic properties of these units (i.e., their transfer functions and time constants)
should be taken into account,

(b) dry friction in the elevator control circuit may adversely affect the stability of
the g-restrictor-aeroplane combination, and should therefore be also taken into
account,

(c) neither the numerical value of the ratio of the natural frequency of the g-
restrictor unit to that of the short period mode of the aeroplane, nor the stability
characteristics of the g-restrictor and the aeroplane taken separately give any prior
indication as to the behaviour of the combined system, and

(d) the forward speed may be an important parameter, and its whole practical
range should be covered in the analytical investigation.

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2.3 The above recommendations apply also to any devices having dynamic properties
similar to those of the g-restrictors considered, and in particular to devices intended to
improve stick force/g characteristics.

2.4 Some g-restrictors of the general type considered, though efficient and otherwise
satisfactory, may induce excessive control surface loads. The magnitude of these loads
should be assessed by appropriate response calculations embracing both the initiation of
an unduly severe manoeuvre and the checking movement of the control surface as induced
by the g-restrictor. For this part of the investigation R.A.E. Technical Note No. SME 349
may be of assistance.

2.5 The effect of accelerations on unbalanced control circuits controlling other axes
should also be considered.

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LEAFLET 23

CONTROL SYSTEMS

FATIGUE TESTING OF HYDRAULIC POWERED FLYING CONTROLS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This Leaflet contains details of the fatigue testing of hydraulic powered flying
controls required by Clause 3.8 The tests aim to ensure that hydraulic powered flying
controls have adequate fatigue life under conditions of varying pressure stress to which
they will be subjected in service. Included in the tests are screw jacks driven by hydraulic
motors and, where applicable, automatic flight control system actuators and artificial feel
simulators.

2 STANDARD DUTY CYCLE FOR CONTROL SURFACES

2.1 The duty cycle for the control surfaces should be specified by the airframe designer
who should state clearly whether the additional factor of Leaflet 34 Para. 6 has been taken
into account. In the absence of such a specification the standard duty cycle in Table 1
should be used, in which case the factor specified in Leaflet 34 Para. 6 is not required.
Tests should then be applied in accordance with Para's 3 and 4 below.

2.2 Due to the wide variation between the performance characteristics of various types
of hydraulic powered flying control, standardisation of test conditions is based on flight duty
cycles as applied to the control surfaces rather than the fluid pressures in the hydraulic
powered control circuits. In the case of small amplitude high frequency control surface
movements, the internal jack pressures in a throttled valve servo will be entirely different
from the pressures in a variable delivery servo pump. Similarly, for identical output
conditions, the internal pressure will depend upon the precise nature of valve overlaps or
underlaps, and in duplicated jacks, upon the inter-jack mechanical stiffness.

2.3 In addition to the standard duty cycle, which is based on aerodynamic hinge
moment, fatigue loading on a powered control component may arise from other sources,
and in many cases these may constitute the heaviest fatigue loading. These sources
include ground testing cases, operation of other surfaces both on the ground and in flight,
pump ripple and parking locks. The conditions controlling the above factors must be given
full consideration in addition to the effects of the standard duty cycles.

3 CONVERSION OF DUTY CYCLE INTO TEST PRESSURE

3.1 Although the external loads applied to hydraulic powered flying control jacks will be
broadly similar to those applied to the local aeroplane structure, the internal jack pressures
will be determined by other considerations. In each case, therefore, it will be necessary to
determine experimentally the internal pressure fluctuations at critical points throughout the
powered flying control system resulting from the duty cycles. The test should be carried out
on a test rig representing as closely as possible the aeroplane installation and special
instrumentation may be necessary at this stage to ensure that local peak pressures are
recorded.

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3.2 Factors influencing the pressure variations are given below, but it is emphasised
that this list does not necessarily include all the parameters significant to the performance
of a powered flying control:

(a) inertia of the system,

(b) stiffness of the system,

(c) aerodynamic damping,

(d) control valve damping characteristics,

(e) phasing of control valve ports (the smallest variation in port position can
cause large pressure differences particularly in duplicated jacks, thus the magnitude
of pressures applied in fatigue testing should be adjusted to include the most
adverse conditions),

(f) peak pressures imposed on the system by resonant tendencies at a control

surface, and

(g) actual control velocities and frequencies experienced in flight.

4 METHOD OF TEST

4.1 The tests should be carried out under any one or a combination of the following
conditions, or by any other approved method:

(a) By simple pressure pulse applications to units with output members locked
or unlocked according to whether or not the load is transferred through these
members during the particular duty cycle case. The jacks should be stationary,
externally restrained and the output member locked in the position given in Table 1,
and the relevant fluid pressures applied to the various pressure chambers. This
method offers the advantages of allowing greater acceleration of the test cycle and
reduction of test time (this can be lengthy when, for instance, clearance for 1000
hours is being sought and a scatter factor of 5 is to be applied).

(b) By stroking the units in the normal manner (i.e., by an extension of the
normal endurance tests called for in Leaflet 20) with the jacks moving against
externally applied loads. In this condition the normal supply pressure should be
provided at the powered control inlet and the internal jack pressure win be
developed automatically. When using this method, any reduction in the test time by
acceleration of the flight duty cycle is liable to modify the internal jack pressures and
due allowance should be made for this.

(c) With the jack and fittings uncoupled, in particular cases where the simulated
internal pressure conditions could impose loads on the external attachments of the
jacks in excess of those experienced in flight. In this condition, pressures on
opposite sides of the jack piston should be suitably balanced.

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5 TEST FACTORS

5.1 Fatigue test factors should be derived in accordance with Clause 3.12

(a) All aeroplanes other than transports:

Hinge Moment Displacement Number of cycles

Loading condition (% of maximum) (% of maximum) per hour
100 approx.
Extreme Manoeuvre 100 (Just clear of jack 20
stops)

Normal Manoeuvre 30 30 200

Continuous residual
displacement 10 2 3600
(straight and level) (see Note) (see Para 3.2(vi))

(b) Transport aeroplanes:

Hinge Moment Displacement Number of cycles

Loading condition (% of maximum) (% of maximum) per hour
100 approx.
Extreme Manoeuvre 100 (Just clear of 10
jack stops)
2 1800
Straight and Level 10 (see Note) (see Para 3.2(vi))

TABLE 1

STANDARD FLIGHT DUTY CYCLE

Note: For control systems without autostabilisation the jack stroke may be insignificant in
the standard duty cycle at 10% hinge moment.

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LEAFLET 24

CONTROL SYSTEMS

DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The leaflet presents supplementary information with respect to the design of
mechanical components in control systems. The aim is to amplify the requirements of Clause
3.8 for particular detail design considerations. In many cases the adoption of the
recommendations of this leaflet will be found to be necessary to meet the specified
requirements.

2 DETAIL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

2.1 GENERAL

2.1.1 Clause 3.9 requires that a control system shall be designed to tolerate the
possibility of jamming, chafing and interference from personnel, cargo, loose objects and
freezing of moisture. These overall considerations should be applied to each detail
component.

2.2 PREVENTION OF JAMMING; CLEARANCES (see also Part 1, Section 1, Clause

1.1)

2.2.1 Each control run should be arranged with adequate local clearances to minimise the
possibility of jamming by loose objects. Control runs should not be too close to horizontal
surfaces, or have levers designed to operate in local pockets. Multiple levers on common
spindles should not have lightening holes, or inward facing flanges. Chains with sprockets
having a horizontal pivot are undesirable and pulley guards should be sufficiently close to
prevent the ingress of small parts.

2.2.2 As a guide the minimum clearances should be:

(a) 3 mm between elements which move in relation to one another but which are
guided or connected to the same component.

(b) 6 mm between elements which move in relation to one another and which are
guided or connected to separate components.

(c) 12 mm between elements and aeroplane structure or equipment to which they are
not attached, unless structural flexibility requires a greater clearance to be provided.

2.3 JOINTS

2.3.1 All adjoining parts should be secured in a manner that will prevent loosening when
subjected to internal, external and vibration loads. All pins, etc., subjected to load or motion
should be positively secured and locked using slotted nuts and split pins together with
additional means of retention where possible. Clevis pins retained only by split pins are not
acceptable.

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2.3.2 Control system joints in push-pull systems that are subjected to angular motion,
except those in ball and roller bearing systems, should have an ultimate factor of safety of
not less than 3.33 with respect to the ultimate bearing strength of the softest material used as
a bearing. The approved ratings of ball or roller bearings may not be exceeded.

2.4 PRECAUTIONS AGAINST FAILURE OR DISCONNECTION

2.4.1 If it is assumed that any failure or disconnection is extremely remote then the design
should be such that no failure or disconnection could be foreseen under practical
circumstances, including errors of operation, assembly or maintenance, for such an
assumption to be acceptable. The following considerations should be given:

(a) Choice of materials to avoid undue notch sensitivity or stress corrosion cracking.

(b) Adequate robustness to cater for all conditions arising, including those due to errors
in operation, assembly or maintenance.

(c) Avoidance of design features which tend to give rise to fatigue effects, including
sensitivity to vibration.

2.5 CABLES AND CHAINS

2.5.1 The choice of pulley diameter for use with cables should be such as to preclude the
possibility of fatigue arising from bending of the cable and local rubbing together of individual
wires in the cable.

2.5.2 Pulleys should not be arranged so that a reverse bend in the cable arises as it
traverses from one pulley to another, and the pulleys should be in the plane of the cables so
that the cable does not rub against the pulley flange.

2.5.3 The wrap angle of the cable round the pulley should be adequate and pulleys and
sprocket should be guarded to prevent any cable or chain jamming or coming off when slack
and re-engaging correctly after slack has been taken up.

2.5.4 Each kind and size of pulley should correspond to the cable with which it is used, to
ensure that the minimum bend radius of the cable is squalled or exceeded.

2.5.5 Fairleads should be installed so that they do not cause a change in cable direction.

2.5.6 Where turnbuckles are attached to parts having angular motion they should be
arranged so that fouling is positively prevented throughout the range of travel.

2.6 ANTI-FRICTION BEARINGS

2.6.1 Bearing installations should be arranged in such a manner that failure of the rollers
or bags will not result in a complete separation of the control. Where direct axial control force
application cannot be avoided a failsafe feature should be provided.

2.7 PUSH-PULL AND TORQUE TUBES

2.7.1 The tubes used in push-pull and torque control systems should be adequately
vented and drained, or completely sealed, to prevent the accumulation of condensed
vapours.

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2.7.2 Joints incorporated in torque tube control systems to enable axial movement should
have sufficient engagement to ensure that disengagement will not occur and positive drive
will be retained under the most adverse set of manufacturing and installation tolerances and
structural flexibility. Minimum engagement should not be less than one diameter. A means
for inspection of the amount of engagement should be provided.

2.7.3 All torque tubes should be mounted on anti-friction bearings with supported
couplers spaced at close enough intervals with sufficient misalignment capability to prevent
undesirable bending or whipping of the tubes.

2.7.4 Each torque tube in a link system should be removable and re-installable in the
aeroplane without having to disturb the support, component, or other interfacing system
elements at either end of the tube.

2.7.5 The rated operating speed of a torque tube system should be no greater than 75%
of the critical speed unless a supercritical design has been agreed with the Project Team
Leader.

2.7.6 Where a broken tube could cause damage to other components an adequate guard
should be provided.

3 CONSIDERATION OF FAILURES

3.1 The failures to be considered include those of mechanical, hydraulic and electrical
devices in the primary and secondary control systems. Failures of Q-actuated mechanisms
(including devices such as Mach-trim and Q-actuated gearing, if not covered by Clauses 3.9
& 6.5 in Part 1, Section 6) are also to be considered.

3.2 Failures in power operated trimming systems can be particularly serious. Creeping
or runaway can lead to a dangerous situation from which it may be difficult to recover once
the failure has been detected. Evidence that a pilot can override any out-of-trim force is not
sufficient to ensure safety under all conditions, in an instrument approach for example.

3.3 Any kind of interlock between main and standby trimmers should be avoided.
Systems which, when the console switch is used, automatically render the main system dead
until it is reset, should not be used.

3.4 When pitot and static pressures are used to operate mechanisms in the flight
control system the consequences of failure of the pitot-static system by blockage or
breakage shall be considered.

3.5 Control system sensors such as probes, vanes and other mechanical devices
should be installed at locations which minimize exposure to conditions which could result in
inaccurate output signals or failures.

3.6 When pilot intervention is necessary to recover from a failure in the control system
or to change to a reversionary mode, a realistic time delay should be allowed for. See Part 1,
Section 4 Leaflet 36.

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LEAFLET 25

ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS AND APPLICATIONS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Where the aeroplane designer, in order to meet the performance requirements,
accepts reductions in the natural stability and control characteristics to an extent which
demands artificial augmentation in order to restore acceptable levels of airworthiness, then
he must provide such augmentation with integrity at least as high as that achieved with
previous generations of primary control systems.

1.2 Such an aeroplane design, which may be inherently unstable, demands restoration
of stability by means which are viable throughout the full flight envelope. To achieve this,
full control authorities may be required, indeed the absolute limits of control authority may
well need to be re-assessed in the light of the degree of instability.

1.3 To effect both stability augmentation and to provide full flight control to the pilot, it is
desirable to provide an efficient and airworthy integration of these functions in one
continuously active control system.

1.4 Having taken the decision to adopt active controls for a new aeroplane, the designer
is then free to develop interactively the airframe and active control system fully to optimise
performance.

2 APPLICATIONS

2.1 RELATED APPLICATIONS

2.1.1 An ACS can offer the potential for providing facilities to support a number of
other airframe systems.

2.1.2 If the ACS comprises dedicated motion sensors, then various computed data
may readily be made available for instrument display purposes and as reference
data for other systems.

2.2 Although it is not envisaged that inner-loop engine control is likely to be

incorporated in an ACS it is probable that in combat and V/STOL aeroplanes quite complex
thrust and thrust vector commands will be computed by the ACS. The need for careful
treatment of commands at the ACS/Engine CS interface is evident. The essential engine
protection and optimum performance controls may be assumed to be provided by the
engine control designer. However, he will require to be aware of any intended extension of
engine utilisation arising from its inclusion in ACS control loops. As a consequence some
protective shaping of thrust and vectoring commands may require to be incorporated within
the ACS.

2.3 Other systems which may be expected to interface with an ACS include:

- Fuel system; mass distribution/configuration.

- Weapon system; special aiming/weapon modes.
- Radar; terrain following/avoidance modes.
- Stores management; configuration.
- Guidance.

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LEAFLET 26

ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

1 INTEGRITY

1.1 Two of the most dominant problems in the development of an ACS are the selection
of the means to achieve a very low probability of catastrophic failure and to demonstrate
that this has been achieved.

1.2 Designers may be asked to aim for a risk of loss of the aeroplane due to ACS failure
in the order of 10-7 per flight hour. For this reason, systems employing redundancy are
necessary.

1.3 Single lanes using electronic control may exhibit failure rates exceeding 1 in 1000
flying hours, it follows that a simple cross-compared redundant system of this quality may
require four independent lanes of control.

1.4 Fewer lanes may be utilised if adequate methods of self-monitoring can be

satisfactorily demonstrated.

1.5 Use of redundancy introduces the prospect of having to transfer data between
otherwise isolated lanes.

1.6 Where such intercommunication is utilised great care should be taken to avoid all
sources of common-mode failure.

1.7 Use of similar redundancy is attractive to the designer because of the ability to
thereby secure good identity of data. It does, however, present another source of common-
mode failure.

1.8 The natural distribution of random defects or failures amongst similar hardware
components results in a low probability of simultaneous failure, but there nevertheless
remains the possibility of an unidentified common susceptibility to undefined influences
arising from the inherent commonality of design and manufacture. For this reason great
care should be exercised in the selection of components for use in redundant systems.

2 SENSOR CONFIGURATIONS

2.1 Conventionally, in redundant systems, there are three choices of primary motion
feedback sensor configurations, which may be summarised as follows:

(a) Orthogonal, single axis packs.

Measuring axis close to aeroplane body axis and packaged in packs of redundant
similar sensors.

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(b) Orthogonal, multi-axis set.

Measuring axes close to body axes but with a group of, say three axis sensors in
each set, one set per lane.

(c) Skewed axis, redundant sets.

This configuration permits a reduction in the total number of sensors needed to

meet the integrity and reliability requirements.

2.2 The disadvantages of the skewed axis system lie in the extra computing required to
resolve the skewed sensor signals into the required axis and that necessary to handle the
failure management, together with the architectural complications associated with this
computing and its power supplies.

2.3 A trade-off exists between the minimum number of sensors and the magnitude of
failure transients and nuisance warnings.

2.4 There are inevitable compromises which arise from the co-located sensors and the
fact that there may need to be at least two redundant sets located apart.

2.5 Each sensor and each set may sense variable mixes of structural mode responses,
the eradication or resolving of which demands special attention.

2.6 The optimisation of management of a skewed axis sensor configuration can lead to
this being implemented as a discrete sub-system with a different level of redundancy to that
of the ACS proper. In this case the choice of method by which essential sensor data is
transferred to the control computers needs special care, in order to ensure that the required
levels of integrity are met.

3 AIR-DATA SENSORS

3.1 Air-data sensors (pitot-static probes and airstream direction sensors) present
special difficulties. The special separation needed to ensure that two or more sensors are
not damaged by the same event (e.g. bird strike) causes inevitable differences between
their signals, especially at low speeds or at extreme attitudes. To avoid unacceptably
frequent rejection of their signals when no fault has occurred, cross-monitoring has to be
compromised with the risk that some faults remain undetected.

3.2 In some systems (e.g. Q-feel) the air-data signal only affects the characteristics of
the inceptor in some way and does not affect the position of the motivator. In others the
signal is fed into the system and automatically applies motivator movement. Both cases
should be considered, but for the second type some form of "fail safe" in the design is
essential.

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4 CONTROL AUTHORITIES

4.1 Two levels of control displacement authority may exist in an ACS:-

(a) Motivator (or actuator) authority, which normally represents the maximum
usable geometric output.

(b) Mode authority, or internal signal authority. This is a flexible parameter which
may be fixed or variable, and which is usually established with an integrity of similar
order to that of the system itself.

4.2 Finite motivator authorities have a profound effect upon the behaviour of an
aeroplane which relies upon an ACS to provide essential performance. The choice of
displacement and rate authority for a given function has to be made in the light of both
specified performance and malfunction requirements and the nature of circumstances
expected to be met at and beyond control saturation.

4.3 Other levels of displacement authority exist in an ACS in association with

mechanical implementation and are concerned with the provision of a finite tolerance
between electrical transducer operating authority and mechanical, absolute, authority.
These authorities are not usually relevant to overall control performance.

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LEAFLET 27

ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

CONTROL LAWS AND SOFTWARE

1 MATHEMATICAL MODEL

1.1 In order that the overall aeroplane performance objectives may be addressed, it is
necessary to acquire a thorough understanding of all the aeroplane and system dynamics.
From these a mathematical model of the total aeroplane and system should be built up.

1.2 This model should be as complete as possible. Airframe structural modes and the
effects of variable mass configuration such as disposable and consumable stores, fuel and
its dynamics should be considered together with detailed non-linearities and time
dependent phenomena such as transport and iteration delays and quantisation effects.

1.3 The efficient design of control laws will depend upon the accuracy of the model.

2 COMMONALITY OF SOFTWARE

2.1 If the designer chooses to utilise one common software interpretation of control laws
for use in all lanes of a redundant system, then he should recognise the implications of this
in respect of common-mode failure susceptibility.

2.2 This element of commonality is difficult to assess in terms of reliability and attention
is drawn to various methods of establishing confidence in the design of such software. Ref
Interim Def Stan 00-31 (Obsolescent).

2.3 Confidence is currently established by ensuring that all software paths and
functional elements are adequately exercised during rig testing.

2.4 There is however, to date, no practical method for establishing a quantitative

measure of software confidence.

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LEAFLET 28

ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF ACS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This Leaflet provides guidance on acceptable means of compliance with the
structural requirements of Clause 3.9 and related requirements such as those for static
strength (Clause 3.1), fatigue and damage tolerance (Clause 3.12) and aero-elasticity (Part
1, Section 4, Clause 4.8).

1.2 The procedures used for static and fatigue design of aeroplanes incorporating ACS
are similar to those for conventional aeroplanes. However, critical design cases may be
more difficult to determine, and the design process will necessitate integration of the
procedures used for structural, aerodynamic and active control system design.

2 GENERAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

2.1 From a structural point of view Active Control Systems (ACS) may be grouped into
two categories;

(a) Those whose prime purpose is to enhance performance characteristics such

as agility and weapon platform stability and,

(b) Those whose prime purpose is to alleviate loading actions so as to permit

reductions in structural weight, size or stiffness.

2.2 ACS in the first category might include, for example, carefree manoeuvring (to
prevent departure from controlled flight), ride improvement, weapon platform improvement,
relaxed stability. manoeuvre enhancement, direct lift control.

2.3 ACS in the second category might include, for example, gust load alleviation,
manoeuvre 'g' limiting, flutter margin improvement, flutter suppression.

2.4 For systems in the first category and, for those systems in the second category
which as a secondary effect enhance performance (e.g., flutter suppression), loading
actions are usually of a different form to those for conventional aeroplanes.

2.5 For ACS aeroplanes it is likely that design requirements alone are insufficient to
define all critical static loading cases. Therefore the intended aeroplane usage should be
probed for potentially critical or hazardous loading actions due to pilot input or particular
gust patterns, separately or in combination. The effects of augmentation system
disconnects, degrades and failures should be evaluated.

2.6 In particular, attention should be given to the flight and ground loads which arise
when the active control system is:

(a) Fully serviceable.

(b) Transient between the serviceable and degraded state.

(c) Degraded either actively (producing undemanded and/or excessive control

surface movements) or passively (producing either no control surface movement or
control surface movements in the correct sense but of inadequate authority).

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2.7 When identifying those loads which are likely to occur during flight in the degraded
state the designer should consider whether the pilot could, if he was aware of the
degradation, reduce the severity of the loads which are likely to be encountered by taking
appropriate measures such as:

(a) Limitation of maximum speed.

(b) Limitation of maximum 'g'.

(c) Reduction of adverse stresses by jettison of stores or fuel.

(d) Restoration of flutter stability by jettison of stores.

If, to cope with a particular degradation of the ACS, the designer chooses to maintain the
structural integrity of the aeroplane by requiring the pilot to observe a flying limitation, then
the margin between the maximum load predicted to occur following the implementation of
the limitation and the limit load capability of the degraded aeroplane should comply with the
guidance given in Section 2 Leaflet 9.

2.8 An aeroplane structure possesses a safety margin in terms of load bearing

capability because a structure is required to withstand Design Ultimate Load (DUL), which
is Design Limit Load (DLL) multiplied by a factor of safety of 1.5, without collapse. In the
case of an ACS aeroplane control system saturation and other non-linearities may mean
that operating margins, such as the increment in input function required to generate an
increase in load from say DLL to DUL, may be smaller than for a similar conventional
aeroplane of which there is knowledge. Thus for an ACS aeroplane the designer should
examine the variation of structural loading with input function in respect of multi-axis input
and gusts, separately and in combination, and should establish that the loading gradients
are not so severe that a small increment in input function could produce such a large
increment in load that there would be a high probability, if Service Release conditions were
slightly exceeded, of DUL being approached and exceeded.

2.9 ACS aeroplanes which feature either carefree manoeuvring or manoeuvre 'g'
limiting may fly to the extremes of their flight envelope more frequently than conventional
aeroplanes. Providing the ACS is sufficiently reliable and DLL is adequately defined, it is
unlikely that an ACS aeroplane will exceed DLL more frequently than an equivalent
conventional aeroplane in which the pilot must observe flight limitations to prevent
exceedances of DLL- Nevertheless, the use of 'g' limiting system does not guarantee that
critical loads will not be exceeded as it may only limit one of the components of load in a
particular structural item. Consequently, to enable the Service Release levels in respect of
static loads to be assessed, the proposed aeroplane usage should be probed to identify
possible exceedance of DLL and the ease with which DLL can be approached.

2.10 Aeroplanes incorporating ACS are likely to exhibit increased control activity, in
particular more high frequency small amplitude motions, and the designer should pay
special attention to the fatigue design of the actuators, the motivators, the mechanical
interface between the motivators and the actuators, and the associated support structure.

2.11 The ACS should be designed to avoid inertia instability of the control system
occurring when the aeroplane is undergoing system testing on the ground.

2.12 There can be no guarantee that the loads analysis can identify all critical
combination of possible loading actions. Consequently, Clause 3.10 contains requirements
for the in-service confirmation of the load levels deduced from the analysis.

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2.13 Where an ACS is used to contain structural loads within limits, the system
capabilities and performance derived from calculation must be substantiated by direct strain
measurement during development flying.

2.14 Special structural implications arise from the application of Active Controls to
combat aeroplanes and transport aeroplanes and these are examined separately in the
following Para.

3 COMBAT AEROPLANES

3.1 Aeroplanes which feature either a carefree manoeuvring or a manoeuvre 'g' limiting
facility will probably experience more frequent medium to high 'g' manoeuvre than
conventional aeroplanes. Therefore, special attention should be given to the definition of
fatigue load spectra.

3.2 The calculated flutter speed of an aeroplane with a fully serviceable ACS should be
at least 1.15V D at any point in its flight envelope for any authorised mass/stores
configuration. Also, an aeroplane with ACS inoperative should be flutter free to V D at any
point in its flight envelope for any store/mass configuration. However, it may be acceptable
to design an aeroplane employing an active flutter control system to be flutter free with that
system inoperative to a speed less than V D when carrying external stores if:

(a) Following a failure of the flutter suppression system an adequate flutter

margin can be restored safely by jettison of external stores or by a reduction in
airspeed, and

(b) The pilot can be given the necessary warning to enable him to perform the
actions detailed in Para 3.2(a).

Note: A requirement to be flutter free to V D gives a small margin on flutter speed

compared with requirement to be flutter free to the Service Limit Speed V max , This
margin allows for variations in those physical parameters which affect flutter and
which may change during the service life of the aeroplane.

4 TRANSPORT AEROPLANES

4.1 It is permissible, providing the requirements specified in Clause 3.10 are met, to
take full advantage of the amount of load alleviation provided by a Gust Alleviation System
when designing the structure to the loads corresponding to the gust cases specified in
Clause 3.4.

4.2 The use of load alleviation systems to achieve lighter and smaller structures may
result in reduced structural stiffness and reduced flutter stability. Consequently, ACS
aeroplanes may feature unconventional sizing of structural items, for example wing skin
thicknesses may be greater at the tip than at the root to achieve maximum torsional
stiffness or vary across the chord to achieve an optimum position of the flexural axis.

4.3 Notwithstanding the use of flutter suppression systems, the flutter speed with the
flutter suppression system inoperative should never be less than V D .

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LEAFLET 29

ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

OPERATIONAL AND PILOTING ASPECTS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Experience has shown that agile military aeroplanes equipped with ACS may be
subject to increased manoeuvre frequency and magnitude in service, compared with
conventionally controlled combat aeroplanes. It is recognised that if high levels of
manoeuvring are frequent then reduced airframe life will ensue, if not allowed for in the
design.

1.2 Two possible options which may be considered are:

(a) Design for maximum performance and allow for airframe life consumption by
investing in a more resistant airframe (at possible weight cost).

(b) Design for two levels of performance; maximum performance which could be
termed 'Wartime' Performance and a lower level, perhaps termed 'Peace-time'
Performance, either of which could be selected for use by the pilot. Carefully
regulated service use of these alternatives could ensure a reasonable rate of
consumption of airframe life.

The latter option has system design and training implications in that a lower level
performance has to be defined and appropriate mode selection provided, with possibly
instinctive override available to the higher level of performance.

1.3 NUISANCE WARNINGS

1.3.1 Redundant Systems with voting incur a finite probability of nuisance failure
warnings, although with careful design these may be minimised. When apparently
'nuisance' failures occur the conditions leading to the event can, if known, enable
confirmation and/or rectification to be carried out to avoid repetition and
investigatory loss of aeroplane availability. It is therefore desirable for context data
to be recorded for each 'failure' incident.

1.3.2 Experience has shown that incidents of this nature prove difficult to resolve if
no specific information, other than aircrew reports, is available.

1.3.3 Useful context data would include:

- Failed item
- Relative errors (redundant items)
- Control system status
- Dynamic data (3 axes)
- Flight case (speed, height, mach no.)

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LEAFLET 30

ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

AIRFRAME AND SYSTEM PROVING

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 In order to develop the ACS to flight standard, a rig is required in which the
complete system hardware can be fully functioned. A comprehensive real-time flying
simulation which permits all operational performance to be assessed should form part of
the rig.

1.2 The rig simulation should also be utilised to enable test pilot assessments to be
carried out with particular reference to system management including the effects of failures.
The tests should also allow impromptu pilot investigations which explore off-design cases
and any other points of curiosity.

1.3 This facility should provide the basis for system performance proving prior to first
flight. A detailed schedule of failure cases should be assessed.

1.4 This testing should precede installed system testing in the aeroplane and enable
installed testing to be restricted to essential items.

1.5 Endurance testing on this rig may be restricted to whole system operating with a
pilot in the loop or may be in part automated. Sequences of start-up, pre take-off checks,
taxi, take-off, climb, through representative flight conditions and manoeuvres covering all
operational roles etc., to return to circuit, landing, post-flight checks and shut-down should
be included.

1.6 These tests are all to be completed to an agreed equivalent number of flying hours
before first flight.

1.7 The required number of hours before first flight are to be conducted with full flight
standard ACS equipment and are expected to exhibit defect free operation.

1.8 Subsequent to first flight, rig tests should continue to back-up flight development.

1.9 A separate life test programme is necessary for individual ACS items and these life
tests are conducted by the suppliers prior to delivery for installation in the aeroplane.

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LEAFLET 31

ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

PART TIME SYSTEMS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The provisions of Clause 3.9 are specifically for those control systems where correct
operation of the system is essential for continued safe flight, so called 'full-time' systems.
(Refer to Part 0 Definitions). A 'full-time' system may be understood to include those
systems where there is automatic reversion to an alternative active mode in appropriate
circumstances. When an active control system is employed in such a way that continued
safe flight is possible after an incorrect operation of the system by reversion to some form
of direct control by the pilot it may be referred to as a 'part-time' active control system. The
extent to which the provisions of Clause 3.9 then apply will be related to the required flight
envelope and has to be defined in conjunction with the Project Team Leader. This Leaflet is
intended as a guide in making this definition.

1.2 Examples of ACS which may be defined as part-time are:-

(a) Where there is provision for reversion to direct control input, the reversion
mode not being part of the full-time active control system, and resulting in degraded
performance.

(b) An auto-stabilisation system used to improve handling, but where continued

safe flight is possible after ACS failure with a degradation in flying qualities (see
Part 1, Section 2, Clause 2.1).

(c) A dual control aeroplane where the operation of the ACS is limited to the
inceptors of a single pilot station: the second 'safety pilot' being provided with a
means of controlling the aeroplane which is not affected by failures of the ACS.

(d) An aeroplane which employs an ACS mode to enhance the overall

performance, but where failure of that mode is not flight critical: e.g., some
applications of wing camber control (Clause 3.10.102) and gust load alleviation
(Clause 3.10.101) where failure may result only in reduced fatigue life.

2 SAFE DESIGN PHILOSOPHY OF PART-TIME ACS

2.1 In the case of a part-time ACS system the application of the requirements of Clause
3.9 may be limited to those components of the system which affect overall safety of the
aeroplane.

2.2 In the event of an incorrect operation of the ACS being detected there should be an
automatic reversion to the back-up mode, and there should be an indication to the pilot(s)
of the reversion. The requirements of Clause 3.9 therefore apply to those components
which sense the failure condition and initiate reversion to the back-up mode.

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2.3 Whilst the ACS system is in operation, including any incorrect operations and
reversion to the back-up mode, it should not introduce any situation which is likely to put
safety of the aeroplane in jeopardy.

3 APPLICABILITY OF ACS REQUIREMENTS

3.1 In general, some aspects of all the main paragraphs of Clause 3.9 may be
applicable to part-time ACS.

3.2 Specific aspects of Clause 3.5 which may need to be considered are:

(a) Reversion.

(b) All aspects of systems requirements which ensure safe flight.

(c) Nuisance reversion to the back-up mode, and especially failure transients.

(d) Interaction with other systems.

(e) Control laws and software generally insofar they affect safe flight whilst the
ACS is in operation, and during reversion to the back-up mode.

(f) Airframe strength whilst the ACS is in operation, including limitations

automatically introduced by the ACS including reversion to the back-up mode.

(g) Operational and piloting aspects generally in as much as the continued safe
operation in the system is involved.

(h) Aeroplane and system proving, again related to those components which
ensure continued safe flight.

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LEAFLET 32

STRENGTH FOR GROUND HANDLING

TOWING

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Minimum mandatory strength requirements for towing are given in Clause 3.11 This
leaflet gives background information and recommendations relating to those requirements.

1.2 Design, operational, and standardisation requirements are given for towing in Part
1, Section 4, Clause 4.4 Note particularly that load-limiting devices are not allowed on tow
bars provided for use on board ship.

2 GENERAL

2.1 The extreme cases which have to be considered are:

(a) towing from a point at or near a main or nose unit which happens to be on a
surface where the co-efficient of friction is nearly zero (as for spilt fuel or wet mud
on a firm surface) and where the only reaction is supplied by the inertia of the
aeroplane,

(b) extracting a wheel which is bogged down,

(c) turning a nose wheel with zero forward speed.

2.2 The applied towing force would, in practice, be balanced by a combination of some
or all of the following:

(a) frictional forces at points of tyre contact with the ground,

(b) gravitational forces due to inclined or uneven ground surfaces,

(c) re-distribution of vertical reactions at wheels, and

(d) linear and angular inertia forces.

2.3 So far as possible, the need for detailed consideration of all these possibilities on
every aeroplane has been eliminated by specifying detailed stressing cases which, while
not representing accurately any one particular condition, will normally cover all reasonable
conditions except where the aeroplane geometry is unconventional.

2.4 It is not intended that the requirements should be used to design major parts of the
undercarriage or structure of the aeroplane if satisfactory towing procedures can be
devised which will provide for all normal aeroplane movements and also the extreme cases
described in Para 2.1 It is the Aeroplane Designer's responsibility to agree these
procedures with the Project Team Leader and include them in the Operating Manual.

2.5 The tyre and shock absorber deflections may usually be assumed to be those for
the aeroplane standing on level ground at maximum design take-off mass (MT) and
associated CG position. However, appropriate allowances should be made if there are
considerable geometrical changes under towing loads.

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2.6 Where towing backwards by attachment of a bridle to other strong points (e.g. the
arresting hook or tail bumper) is required the effect of snatch loads on the undercarriage
should be considered.

3 MAIN-UNIT ATTACHMENT LOADS

3.1 The design loads illustrated for the main-undercarriage towing points in Section 3
Fig. 5 are arranged to provide for the use of a towing bridle on one main-undercarriage unit.

4 NOSE-UNIT ATTACHMENT LOADS

4.1 Two different nose-wheel towing attachment methods are represented in Section 3
Fig. 6. Fig. 6a illustrates the case when the towing arm, wire, chain, or rope, is attached to
a strong point on a castoring nose unit. Fig 6b illustrates the case when a towing arm is
attached to the nose wheel such that towing and steering occur at the same time. The
applied loads will be opposed by side, drag and torsional tyre forces.

4.2 Consideration should be given to variations in these loads and forces arising from:

(a) Geometry of the nose unit and wheel(s).

(b) Frictional forces from the castoring system.

(c) The displacement of the tyre(s) relative to the ground.

(d) Practical combinations of towing speeds and swivel rates particularly the
case of swivelling with zero forward speed.

4.3 It is the designer's responsibility to ensure that the material chosen for the towing
points specified in Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.4 is such that the strength requirements of
Clause 3.10 are met.

5 SHIPBORNE AEROPLANES

5.1 Shipborne aeroplanes are not allowed to have a relief device in the tow bar (see
Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.4) and must be stressed for the maximum loads expected in the
worst sea state for which towing is required. A dynamic analysis is therefore required

5.2 For preliminary stressing a tow force of 0.8G.MT should be used to represent
sudden braking of the aeroplane or tractor on a non-slip surface and the nose wheel
vertical load may be calculated from:

Rn = MT.G (1m + 1.6f) / (1m + 1n)

where f is the moment arm of the braking force about the aeroplane centre of gravity. Then
f = h for tractor braking with nose-wheel tow at the nose-wheel axle and f = H for main-
wheel braking of the aeroplane with any form of towing.

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LEAFLET 33

PICKETING

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PICKETING

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This leaflet gives recommendations relating to the requirements of Clause 3.11

1.2 Chocks are normally used during picketing but their effectiveness cannot be relied
on and so no account is to be taken of any contribution they may make. Brakes are not
used during picketing.

2 FORCES TO BE CONSIDERED

2.1 LIFT FORCES

2.1.1 Wherever possible test data is to be used for calculating the aerodynamic lift
on the aeroplane.

2.1.2 If no test data is available it is acceptable to use the normal aerodynamic lift
formula provided that the value of the angle of attack used is calculated as follows:

a = (ad + 2) x 1.5 where:

ad = datum incidence in static attitude,

2 - is the allowance added for variation in wind direction caused by

ground contours,

2.1.3 If the calculated angle of attack exceeds the stalling angle then the stalling
angle is to be used instead.

2.1.4 The formula in Para 2.1.2 assumes that any high-lift devices remain fully
retracted.

2.2 SIDE AND DRAG FORCES

2.2.1 During picketing, side and drag forces due to winds will be present on the
aeroplane. The effects of loads due to ship's motion must also be considered. For
calculations the basic mass of the aeroplane should be used together with a range
of co-efficients of friction from 0.1 to 0.8

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2.3 SHIP MOTION AND WIND FORCES

2.3.1 The most adverse combination of ship motion and wind forces should be
considered. It may be assumed that provided the flight deck securing requirements
are met, then the hangar case will be automatically met, since there are no wind
forces and generally less ship motion in the hangar. The values of ship motion and
wind forces contained in Clause 3.12 are considered to be acting in the most
adverse weather conditions. It is recommended that the force imposed on secured
aeroplanes by the relative wind-over-deck, be added to those resulting from ship
motions.

3 PICKETING POINTS

3.1 To meet the requirements of Clause 3.12, it is advisable to have picketing points on
the aeroplane structure immediately inboard and outboard of each main undercarriage unit.
Where this presents difficulties a single point at each main unit is acceptable provided that
picketing can still be achieved in accordance with the picketing plan. When the
undercarriage track is narrow, and if other considerations such as the direction of
undercarriage retraction permit, single points should be outboard of the main wheels.

3.2 Securing points should be either built in to the structure of the aeroplane or the
undercarriage or take the form of detachable screw-in or clamp-type fittings.

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LEAFLET 34
FATIGUE
MATERIAL SELECTION

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This leaflet provides guidance on the selection of metallic materials for aircraft
structural components where fatigue life and residual strength are major considerations.
Guidance is given on fatigue performance, fracture toughness, resistance to impact and
crack growth behaviour. Special considerations relating to fibre-composite components are
discussed in Leaflet 40.

1.2 Sufficient material must have been tested to demonstrate that the properties used
for design reflect variability both within and between batches, see for example Def Stan
00-932 (Cancelled – replaced by EDSU 932 Metallic Materials Data Handbook). Otherwise a
programme of testing will be required to establish material behaviour or to confirm assumed
or estimated properties.

2 FATIGUE PERFORMANCE

2.1 Definition. Fatigue performance is a term defining the resistance of a structural

component to the development of cracking under fatigue loading. Under fatigue loading the
design allowable stress levels may be considerably lower than those acceptable for static
design.

2.2 General. The extent to which the intrinsic fatigue performance of a material can be
realised is strongly dependent upon the influence of stress-concentrating features such as
notches, cut-outs and fillet radii, and the extent to which crack initiation is accelerated by the
effects of fretting, such as may occur in joints. Fatigue performance is also affected in
varying degree by material quality, that is the presence in a material of inclusions, residual
stresses and discontinuities introduced by material processing and heat treatment, and the
surface quality, that is the introduction of imperfections into a surface during manufacturing
processes and subsequent surface processes and treatments. Material quality and surface
quality are unlikely to have a controlling effect on fatigue performance unless stress
concentration factors are low and there is no fretting.

2.3 Comparative testing. True comparison of materials for fatigue performance must be
done using coupons representative of component condition (including any significant batch
effects), loading and environment. Where changes are made to the material processing or
manufacturing route, comparative testing must be done under representative conditions to
ensure that fatigue performance has not been adversely affected.

2.4 Surface coatings and surface treatments. Surface layers of different structure or
properties to that of the bulk substrate may significantly affect fatigue performance. For
example, plating, cladding or thickened oxide layers may develop cracks which can then
grow into the substrate. Chemical surface treatments can produce surface pitting leading to
reduced fatigue performance. Part 1, Section 4 Leaflet 18 gives guidance on the effects of
surface finishing and protective treatments on fatigue properties.

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2.5 Temper and tensile strength. At high applied stress levels, that is low-cycle fatigue,
the fatigue strength can be strongly influenced by material tensile strength. At low applied
stress levels under constant amplitude loading there is, in some materials, a clear fatigue
limit, which can be related directly to tensile strength and below which no significant fatigue
cracking develops. Under variable amplitude loading this fatigue limit is suppressed. Fatigue
limits determined under constant amplitude loading cannot be assumed to apply to the same
cycle applied during a variable amplitude sequence. Where the existence of a fatigue limit or
a shallow slope on the fatigue curve in the high cycle region are essential for aircraft life then
the design curve must be substantiated for each material by tests under realistic loading on
coupons representative of the structural details concerned. (see also Para 2.3)

2.6 Operating stress levels. The selection of materials for high tensile strength to
minimise structural mass is seldom consistent with good fatigue performance. Lower strength
materials are often more suitable for structures in which tensile applied loading
predominates, for example lower wing skins, where it is often fatigue life rather than static
strength considerations that define allowable stress levels. In such cases the selection of a
high tensile strength material may offer little or no practical fatigue advantage; a lower yield
strength allows benefit to be obtained from residual compression stress fields produced by
tensile yielding at critical features, but can be detrimental in those cases where the
predominant loading is in compression; particular care must be taken in relation to fatigue-
enhancing systems (see Leaflet 35, Para 7.9)

3 FRACTURE TOUGHNESS

3.1 Definition. The fracture toughness is a measure of the resistance of a material to

failure by rapid, unstable crack growth. Materials with a high fracture toughness can sustain
a longer crack for a given applied stress level than a material with a lower fracture
toughness.

3.2 Section thickness. In thick sections the plane strain fracture toughness, K Ic , is most
commonly used to describe resistance to fracture; this is a material property independent of
geometry. In thin sections the toughness is influenced by component dimensions and cracks
may extend in a stable manner under high loads (particularly in low strength, high toughness
materials). In these cases a single value of toughness cannot adequately describe the
fracture resistance and a crack growth resistance curve (R curve) is required to define
failure. Material selection for sheet materials should be made on the basis of single-pull tests
on identical panels or using R curves.

3.3 Temper and tensile strength. For a given material type the toughness decreases
with increase in tensile strength. Peak age tempers (such as the T6 and T651 tempers in
aluminium alloys) usually have the lowest fracture toughness for a material and should be
avoided where possible. Relatively small reductions in tensile properties, for example by
over-ageing, can produce a significant increase in fracture toughness (and usually an
increase in resistance to environmental attack).

3.4 Product form and grain orientation. Toughness varies with product form and grain
orientation (i.e. with loading and cracking direction with respect to texture imparted by
material processing). In general, the fracture toughness is lowest if cracks are running
parallel to the short transverse grain, that is in ST or SL orientations, and highest if cracks
have to cross the grain, that is in LT or LS orientations.

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3.5 Toughness to yield ratio. To maintain a required level of damage tolerance, for
example a minimum acceptable critical crack size as employed in some aircraft design
philosophies, the ratio of fracture toughness to tensile strength must be maintained at an
acceptable level whereas the material property trend is for toughness to decrease with
strength in a given material. A measure of the damage tolerance capability of metallic
materials is the ratio of fracture toughness to yield strength (0.2% proof strength). This
parameter is termed the Toughness to Yield Ratio, TYR [1,2]. In fracture-critical components
it is beneficial to use a material with a high toughness to yield ratio. Experience on a range of
military aircraft has been used to define a rating, A - D, based on the TYR, which can be
used for any aerospace structural alloy for material selection, see Table 1 and Figure 1.
Materials with 'A' or 'B' rating should be selected where possible. Materials rated 'C' or 'D'
must not be used without the prior agreement of the Project Authority. Materials with a 'D'
rating shall be used only in exceptional circumstances.

3.6 Operating environment. For many materials the fracture toughness is largely
unaffected by environmental conditions. However, some material/environment combinations
exhibit rapid crack growth under stored or residual stress conditions due to stress corrosion
mechanisms, see Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.3 and Section 4 Leaflet 7. For some materials,
particularly high strength steels, there exists a transition temperature below which toughness
can be dramatically reduced. It is important that materials do not exhibit such a transition
within the working temperature range of the component for which they are used.

4 IMPACT RESISTANCE

4.1 Definition. Impact resistance is defined as the energy required to cause cracking in
a given section thickness. Impact resistance cannot be determined solely by monotonic
toughness testing and ballistic tests. Where impact threats have been identified, confirmatory
tests of material performance should be done at appropriate impact energies with suitably
representative impactors and impact angles on coupons with representative restraint.

4.2 Problems arising from impact. Cracking occurring during impact can significantly
reduce residual strength and may subsequently extend due to fatigue loads. Materials should
not be used in product forms or section thicknesses which suffer significant cracking or
damage under the impact threats anticipated in component manufacture or peacetime
service. Where forward facing surfaces, particularly those ahead of intakes, are made of
metal, it is preferable to use ductile, high toughness materials. This increases the likelihood
of denting and ductile tearing rather than fragmentation. Materials with low impact resistance
are likely to experience cracking during manufacture.

4.3 Material properties. Materials with a low ductility and low toughness are likely to
suffer extensive damage from low speed - low energy impact. Some materials may exhibit a
variation in material properties through the section thickness. In such cases it is possible that
a low ductility region may be exposed by chemical or mechanical removal of material -
leading to a serious reduction in impact resistance [1].

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5 FATIGUE CRACK GROWTH RESISTANCE

5.1 Definition. Crack growth rate for a given material, stress ratio (R ratio) and
environment is closely linked to applied stress and crack length through the range of stress
intensity factor, K. It is usual for crack growth life calculations to be based on constant
amplitude data which are generally available in terms of growth rate, da/dN, against the
applied stress intensity factor range, K.

5.2 Temper, tensile properties and modulus. Growth rate is strongly dependent on
modulus - the higher the modulus the lower is the growth rate. Materials with similar
modulus, for example aluminium alloys, exhibit very similar growth rates except in the near-
failure region; see Para 5.4

5.3 Low crack growth rates and the crack growth threshold. Unless the use of a crack
growth threshold can be substantiated under realistic service conditions (loading, crack size
and configuration, environment, etc.) then the crack growth curve should be estimated by
extending the steady state growth region on a straight line basis to very low growth rates,
see also Para 2.5

5.4 Product form and grain orientation. Crack growth rates in aerospace structural alloys
are usually independent of product form and grain orientation except in the near-failure crack
growth region. The fracture toughness, on the other hand, is highly dependent on grain
orientation, product form and temper.

5.5 Operating environment. In some materials the growth rate shows a marked
sensitivity to the operating environment. The effect of operating environment on growth rate
must be considered in damage growth analysis; guidance is given in [1]. Where an adverse
operating environment is known, then confirmatory crack growth tests should be done in that
environment. The peak-aged tempers in high strength 7000 series (aluminium - zinc) alloys
are particularly prone to increases in growth rate with humidity.

REFERENCES

1 Dolphin, A.S. Damage tolerance (fatigue and impact) evaluation of materials,

BAe Report BAe-WSS-RP-GEN-SOR-000315, January 1997
2 Sharp, R. Selection of metallic materials for damage-tolerance capability
using a rating system, BAe Report BAe-WSS-RP-GEN-SOR-
000222, Issue 1, December 1992

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Rating Grain Orientation

L-T and L-S T-L and T-S S-L and S-T

A > 0.088 > 0.075 > 0.067

B 0.07-0.088 0.06-0.075 0.053-0.067
C 0.056-0.07 0.048-0.06 0.042-0.053
D < 0.056 < 0.048 < 0.042

TABLE 1

RATINGS FOR TOUGHNESS TO YIELD RATIO (PLANE STRAIN)

Values in the table are TYR values (m). LT values illustrated in Figure 1. Values of TYR are
determined from consideration of scatter in strength and toughness [2].

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LEAFLET 35
FATIGUE
SAFE-LIFE SUBSTANTIATION

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 For combat aeroplanes, the cornerstone of safe-life substantiation is a
full-scale test of a complete airframe to a factor of 5 times the service life. This
factor consists of an allowance of 3 1/3 for scatter in fatigue performance and a
further factor of 1.5 which is applied to those parts of the structure where the
loads are not monitored on a continuous basis. Where only one side of a
component has been tested, for example a port or starboard taileron, the
scatter factor is increased to 4. Exceptionally, individual structural elements can
be substantiated by calculation alone; here it must be shown that the
calculations are based upon conservative assumptions and that the calculated
safe life exceeds the service life by a factor of at least 2.0
1.2 For helicopters, the emphasis is on the rotating (dynamic)
components, where the stress levels are relatively low and compliance is
demonstrated using a factor on stress. Several examples of each component
are tested and in these circumstances a stress factor of about 1.5 is required to
allow for scatter. An additional stress factor of 1.2 is applied unless the design
loads are suitably conservative. A further stress factor may be used to
accelerate the test. Exceptionally, individual dynamic components can be
substantiated by calculation alone; here it must be shown that the calculations
are based upon conservative assumptions and that the calculated safe fatigue
strength exceeds that which would be required by test by a factor of at least 1.2
1.3 The scatter factor of 3 1/3 is insufficient to demonstrate that an
adequate safe life has been achieved for all fatigue-sensitive features and so
the test must be underpinned by evidence that suitable allowable stresses have
been achieved and that the test loading is of suitable severity.
1.4 Acceptable procedures for demonstrating compliance are summarised
below and described in the paragraphs which follow:
(a) construction and use of Safe S-N curves;
(b) derivation of usage spectra for design and substantiation;
(c) adaptation of usage spectra for test purposes;
(d) supplementary evidence for features with higher scatter than can be
accommodated in airframe tests;
(e) allowances for additional uncertainties when loads are unmonitored on
individual aircraft;
(f) allowances for additional uncertainties when components have not
been tested;
(g) checking for sensitivity to increases in loading severity;
(h) adjustment of lives under the Design Spectrum to equivalent lives
under the Service Spectrum.

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1.5 Considerations underlying the test factors that are normally required to
allow for scatter in the fatigue performance of full-scale test specimens are
discussed in Paragraph 10.
1.6 The factors associated with the different aspects of safe-life
compliance are presented in Tables 1 to 4. It is emphasised that these factors
will be judged to be sufficient only in those circumstances where the Service
Spectrum is confirmed by regular sampling of the service loads by Operational
Loads Measurement (OLM) or Operational Data Recording (ODR) in
compliance with the requirements of Clause 3.2
1.7 Special considerations relating to the safe-life substantiation of fibre-
composite components are given in Leaflet 40. See also Part 1 section 3 leaflet
44 “Impact Damage Resistance of Composite Materials.”

2 CONSTRUCTION AND USE OF SAFE S-N CURVES

2.1 The Safe S-N procedure is central to the assessment of compliance
with the requirements of Clause 3.2 Specifically, the procedure is used in the
adaptation of usage spectra for test purposes, in the derivation of the notional
test factors for individual structural features and in setting the S-N curves to be
used in service loads monitoring. Whilst it is the constructor’s prerogative to
use other methods in sizing his structure, he must still use the Safe S-N
procedure to demonstrate the effectiveness of the test and to provide any
supplementary data that are required.
2.2 Mean S-N curves obtained from representative element tests under
constant amplitude loading should be chosen to represent each of the features
of the component at which failure may occur. These mean S-N curves should
normally have been located so that Miner’s Rule gives a damage summation of
unity for tests under realistic loading. Guidance on the allowances that should
be made when curves have not been located in this way is given in Paragraph
7. These mean curves are then factored by the life and stress factors of Table
2 in accordance with the following procedure, to obtain Safe S-N curves from
which safe lives may be obtained.
2.3 The factors of Table 2 have been derived using the scatter observed
when large numbers of specimens representing structural features have been
tested under realistic (spectrum) loading [1, 2]. When used with the customary
statistical technique [3], they correspond to a probability of failure of 1 in 2000;
this makes some provision for the symmetry in geometry and loading of
[aeroplane] airframes so that a probability of 1 in 1000 is achieved for individual
pairs of features; the same factors are acceptable for helicopter airframes and
dynamic components.
2.4 If it is desired to have a single set of Safe S-N curves which
incorporate the additional factors that must be used for unmonitored structure,
it will be convenient to multiply the factors of Table 2 by the further factors of
Table 3 before constructing the Safe S-N curves. If, the Safe S-N curves are
also to be used for clearance by calculation then the further factors of Table 4
should be applied.

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2.5 The safe curve must take much the same shape as the mean curve
and retain the life factor as long as possible, consistent with a smooth transition
to the stress factor by an endurance of about 5  106 cycles. More precise
guidelines are unnecessary because no such constraints apply in choosing the
shape of the mean curve. However, the shape of the mean curve must suit the
feature under consideration. It must also be compatible with the material static
strength.
2.6 Figure 1 shows examples of Safe and mean S-N curves for an
aluminium alloy pinned-lug specimen. The curves were drawn using the basic
factors of Table 2 and a conventional four-parameter Weibull equation of the
form:

S = S inf (1 + A / (N + G)m)

where S = stress,
S inf = stress at infinite life,
A = numerical constant,
N = endurance,
G = numerical constant governing low endurances,
m = numerical exponent.

The parameters used for the curves of Figure 1 were:

m A S inf G
Mean 0.604701 7072.70 7.25900 2820.00
Life-factored 0.604701 3794.80 7.25900 1007.00
Stress-factored 0.604701 7072.70 4.87181 2820.00
Safe 0.604701 5831.13 4.87181 1156.50

2.7 The factors of Table 2 are suitable for use in the design of components
manufactured from conventional aluminium alloys, titanium alloys and steels.
The factors to be used for structural features in advanced metallic materials
should be agreed with the PTL. Factors for the construction of Safe S-N curves
for fibre-composite materials are given in Leaflet 40. Factors of 10 on life and 2
on stress may be used for the construction of Safe S-N curves for castings, in
the absence of rationally-derived scatter factors in the development phase. In
all other cases, scatter factors shall be rationally derived, and the factors to be
used shall be agreed with the PT.
2.8 The use of Safe S-N curves in constructing test spectra is described in
Paragraph 4.

3. DERIVATION OF USAGE SPECTRA FOR DESIGN AND SUBSTANTIATION

3.1 An overall usage spectrum must be specified for the aircraft as a
whole so that the Design Spectrum for each major component and mechanical
system can be derived. The interpretation of the usage spectrum for design
and substantiation purposes must be agreed with the PTL.

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3.2 If the Design Spectrum for a particular component is to be based on a

continuous stress sequence, the sequence should be broken down into a
number of occurrences of discrete stress amplitudes and associated mean
stresses using the range-mean-pairs (or similar) counting [4] method.
3.3 On those occasions where the Design Spectrum is based upon a
stated cumulative exceedance spectrum of peaks and troughs, this should be
expressed as individual cycles by first dividing the spectrum into a number of
intervals of stress. Care must be taken that the number of intervals is sufficient
to avoid introducing appreciable inaccuracies into the estimates of fatigue
damage produced by the spectrum. It should then be assumed that the
stresses within each interval all have a range given by the difference between
the average maximum and the average minimum stresses in that interval.

4 ADAPTATION OF USAGE SPECTRA FOR TEST PURPOSES

4.1 Fatigue tests have three primary objectives:
(a) to demonstrate compliance with the Specification;
(b) to reveal any features which have insufficient fatigue life and
(c) to demonstrate crack growth characteristics for components which
have an inspection-based clearance.

4.2 NATURE OF THE TEST LOADING

4.2.1 The loading used should simulate typical usage. Where the
usage differs appreciably between groups of aircraft and these are not
rotated for fleet management purposes, care should be taken to avoid
using extreme loads which are higher than those which will be
experienced by most aircraft in the fleet.
4.2.2 Realistic loading should normally be applied in a flight-by-flight
sequence in which the sequence of loads within each flight is also
represented. The flights contained in the test spectrum should be
representative in type and number of the usage of the aircraft. For
combat aeroplanes, for example, a test sequence of between 50 and 100
flights should be repeated no less than 100 times before the required test
life is achieved.

4.3 CONFIRMATION OF LOADING SEVERITY FOR LIFE-FACTOR

TESTS
4.3.1 Analysis using the Safe S-N procedure has shown that the
severity of the loading spectra used in association with the life factors of
Table 1(a) has traditionally given life factors of between 3.0 and 4.0 for
the most fatigue-sensitive features of an airframe [5]. Future tests may be
on structures which have been designed to higher agility or, conversely to
longer lives, and so confirmation is needed to show that this standard is
maintained.
4.3.2 For tests to the customary factor of 3 1/3 or the other factors for
monitored structure given in Table 1(a), the Safe S-N curve of Figure 1
should be used, with Miner’s Rule, as a transfer function representing
those features with the lowest ratio of fatigue to static strength - in other
words, those which are most likely to be the source of any unexpected
problems.

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4.3.3 The Safe S-N curve should first be positioned so that Miner’s
rule gives the Specified Life under the Design Spectrum or, where
appropriate, the Service Life that is to be demonstrated under the Service
Spectrum.
4.3.4 When the test loading used to represent the Design (or Service)
Spectrum is of appropriate severity, the life calculated using the Safe and
mean S-N curves will differ by a factor of between 3.0 and 4.0.
4.3.5 If the calculated life factor is too high, the severity of the
spectrum can be increased by using the Safe S-N curve to express some
of the lower amplitudes as a smaller number of higher amplitudes giving
the same damage and then repeating the procedure.

4.4 OMISSION OF NON-DAMAGING LOADS

4.4.1 It is obviously impractical to represent the entire Design
Spectrum, but it is essential to represent all the loads that would produce
damage on a Safe S-N curve for the most fatigue-critical features.
4.4.2 Those loads which are estimated to produce stresses of less
than the fatigue limit of this Safe S-N curve may be excluded from the
test, with the proviso that the number of cycles per flight must still be
sufficient to ensure that any effects of fretting are represented. For
combat aircraft wing-bending spectra, for example, the average number
of cycles per flight should be about 100. Where large numbers of low
amplitude cycles still remain, as might be the case for buffet loadings, the
Safe S-N curve may be used to determine a smaller number of higher
stresses that will produce equivalent damage.
4.4.3 For life-factor tests, it should be confirmed that the test spectrum
remains compliant with the loading severity criterion of the previous
paragraph.

5 SUPPLEMENTARY EVIDENCE FOR FEATURES WITH HIGHER SCATTER

THAN CAN BE ACCOMMODATED IN AIRFRAME TESTS
5.1 Having established that the test will provide adequate substantiation
for those structural features with the lowest mean lives, consideration must be
given to the extent to which supplementary information must be provided for
those fatigue-critical features which exhibit higher variability in fatigue life than
is accommodated by the customary factor of 3 1/3 or the equivalent factors of
Table 1(a).
5.2 Only those features which are calculated to require a life factor of up to
4.0 under the test loading (after setting the Safe S-N curve, obtained with
factors of 2.8 and 1.49 on stress, to the safe life required under the test
loading) can be judged to be substantiated by tests to the customary factors.
However, if the calculated factor is between 4.0 and 6.0 and the loads on the
feature are monitored on individual aircraft, then the feature will be tested
sufficiently when the customary life factor of 5.0 is used to make provision for
uncertainties in loading on unmonitored features.

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5.3 Where the calculated life factor is more than 4.0, or more than 6.0 for
monitored features which are to be tested to a life factor of 5.0, supplementary
evidence should be provided in the form of a calculated allowable stress for the
required safe life under the test spectrum. The allowable stress should be
associated with Limit Load or exceptionally with the maximum load in the
spectrum if this is lower. Structural analysis, and/or strain gauge measurement
(on the test specimen), should be used to show that these allowables have not
been exceeded. Retrospective analysis introducing, the ‘no-test’ factors of
Table 4 will be required in those cases where the calculations are not
supported by relevant test data on structural elements.

6 ALLOWANCES FOR ADDITIONAL UNCERTAINTIES WHEN LOADS ARE

UNMONITORED ON INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT
6.1 It is emphasised that all aircraft must be fitted with basic
instrumentation and that a continuous or periodic OLM/ODR programme is a
condition of compliance with the requirements of Clause 3.2
6.2 According to whether most fatigue damage is accumulated towards
the top or bottom of the S-N curve, a factor of 1.5 on life or 1.2 on stress must
be applied to unmonitored structure.
6.3 These factors also apply to monitored structure in circumstances
where the monitoring system has been removed or is unserviceable. In this
case they should be associated with the typical loading severity to which the
unmonitored usage relates.
6.4 It is noteworthy that, for helicopters, the factor of 1.2 need not be
applied in circumstances where design is based on the maximum value
recorded in a sample of measurements which is sufficient to take into account
scatter due to mechanical condition and piloting technique.

7 ALLOWANCES FOR ADDITIONAL UNCERTAINTIES WHEN COMPONENTS

HAVE NOT BEEN TESTED
7.1 This Paragraph presents the procedures that must be followed for
clearance by calculation using the factors of Table 4.
7.2 Fatigue is an insidious process which searches out small design
imperfections which are not apparent from the most detailed calculations. For
this reason, clearance by calculation is normally acceptable only for simple
components. Fatigue lives which are not underpinned by component tests must
include an allowance for the added uncertainty.
The following paragraphs provide guidance on the procedures to be followed
and the additional factors to be used when the substantiation is to be based on
S-N data. The additional factors to be used in conjunction with other methods
of life estimation must be supported by relevant test evidence and must be
acceptable to the PTL.
7.3 When using Miner’s rule and S-N data, the principal additional
uncertainties arise in:
(a) choosing those features of the component which must be examined;
(b) choosing the most appropriate S-N curve for each of these features;

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(c) deriving the stresses, and

(d) choosing a suitable value of n/N to adjust the life estimated using
Miner's rule in those cases where the chosen S-N curve does not already
include such an allowance; most established design curves will contain a
suitable allowance.
7.4 S-N curves should be chosen to represent each of the features of the
component at which failure may occur. At the one extreme, features such as
lugs have relatively steep S-N curves with a low ratio of fatigue to static
strength, whereas the S-N curves for fillets are much less steep and show a
good ratio of fatigue to static strength. The working stresses will determine
which features must be examined in detail.
7.5 Fatigue life is strongly dependent upon the local stresses which are
applied and for this reason particular care is needed to ensure that local
bending, such as occurs in single-shear joints, is taken into account.
7.6 The value of  n/N to be used to adjust Miner's rule should be
determined as follows:
(a) If specimens of the type used to obtain the S-N curve have also been
tested under service-type loading, then a suitable value of  n/N should be
determined by comparing the estimated lives (using the mean S-N curve)
with those actually obtained. Alternatively, the mean S-N curve may be
scaled on stress, using a factor on [linear] stress amplitude, to compensate
for any shortcomings in Miner’s Rule (enabling  n/N to be set to 1.0 when
using the scaled S-N curve). Many of the S-N curves used in Industry have
been adjusted in this way and are suitable for use with a value of  n/N =
1.0.
(b) Exceptionally, if such a comparison is not possible, then the following
considerations apply:
In the case of fastened joints with high shear transfer through the fasteners,
Miner's rule is likely to underestimate the life under predominantly tensile
loading. This effect is associated with the beneficial effects of local plasticity
[6]. In these circumstances failure should be assumed to occur when  n/N
= 1.2.
When joints with clearance-fit fasteners are subjected to predominantly
compressive loadings any effects of local plasticity will be detrimental and
failure should be assumed to occur when  n/N = 0.8.
For fillet-type features, a further mechanism is involved - the detrimental
interaction effects that occur when the life of a component is occupied
predominantly by the formation of microcracks - and lives can be seriously
overestimated even under predominantly tensile loading [6]. In these
circumstances failure should be assumed to occur when  n/N = 0.2.
7.7 Having obtained an adjusted S-N curve, or a suitable value of  n/N, a
Safe S-N curve can be constructed.

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7.8 FACTORS FOR UNCERTAINTY

7.8.1 Where most fatigue damage is done where the S-N curve is
relatively steep, the safe life obtained using this curve should be divided by
a factor of at least 2.0 to allow for the absence of confirmatory test evidence.
It is emphasised that the life factor of 2.0 is a minimum; a higher factor may
be applicable in some circumstances. Where there is particular uncertainty,
the factor to be used should be agreed with the PTL.
7.8.2 In other circumstances, the Safe S-N curve could simply be reduced
by a factor of 1.2 on stress to allow for the uncertainty in calculation or the
life factor of 2 could be used with the stress factor of 1.2 to construct a
factored Safe S-N curve.
7.8.3 For completeness, these factors a re presented as table 4.
7.9 Fatigue-enhancing systems: Particular care must be taken in
assessing the benefits of fatigue-enhancing systems such as fatigue-resistant
fasteners and cold-working. The benefits which are claimed must be supported
by data from tests under realistic loading and it must be shown that the scatter
is not appreciably higher than that normally obtained.

8 CHECKING FOR SENSITIVITY TO INCREASES IN LOADING SEVERITY

8.1 In the longer term, the loading spectrum experienced in service
seldom corresponds to the Design Spectrum. For wing-bending, for example,
increases in aircraft mass and in the severity of the normal acceleration
spectrum can increase the severity of the loading spectrum by a factor of 1.2 or
more. For airframes, a factor of 1.2 on the most fatigue-damaging stresses
would approximately halve the safe life for many fatigue-critical features [7].
8.2 At the design stage, it is necessary to reveal the sensitivity of
individual fatigue-critical features to such increases in loading severity and to
ensure that the life of the structure as a whole is not limited by features which
have an exceptionally high sensitivity to such changes in loading. For this
purpose, the safe life of individual components/assemblies must be estimated
with the stresses under the Design Spectrum elevated by a suitable factor. This
factor, which will typically be 1.2 for combat aircraft wing bending and nearer
1.1 for helicopter dynamic components, must be agreed with the PTL.
8.3 The life under the enhanced loading will normally be estimated by a
calculated adjustment of the life established under the Design Spectrum. In
making the calculation, the extreme stresses under the elevated loading should
be clipped/truncated to the extreme stresses under the Design Spectrum
(normally the Limit Loads) in order to avoid the influence of any beneficial
interaction effects which may not occur in service.
8.4 Those features which are found to particularly sensitive to increases in
loading severity should have their stresses reduced so that they are no-longer
likely to limit the service life of the structure as a whole.

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9 ADJUSTMENT OF LIVES UNDER THE DESIGN SPECTRUM TO

EQUIVALENT LIVES UNDER THE SERVICE SPECTRUM
9.1 Throughout the service life, the loading history of fatigue-critical
features must be reviewed (Leaflet 38) and the effect of deviations from the
Design Spectrum must be assessed.
9.2 The monitoring must be done using Safe S-N curves which have been
chosen and located using the procedures described in this leaflet.
9.3 Subject to compliance with these procedures, including the provision
of supplementary information for those features which are not adequately
substantiated by test, the Safe S-N curves can be located so that Miner’s rule
gives the Specified Life under the Design Spectrum. As the substantiation
proceeds monitoring is unaffected, but components can be cleared to a
corresponding proportion of the anticipated life.
9.4 The Safe S-N curves for all features which fail during the test must be
located so that Miner’s rule gives the test result when used with the mean S-N
curve.
9.5 In circumstances where life factors have been used and less than two
examples of each critical feature have been tested, an allowance must be
made for the added uncertainty. A suitable allowance can be made by reducing
the life accredited to the test by the ratio of the test factor of Table 1(a) to the
factor of 3 1/3.

10 FACTORS TO ALLOW FOR SCATTER IN THE PERFORMANCE OF FULL-

SCALE TEST SPECIMENS
10.1 The purpose in testing structures and individual components is to
estimate the mean (typical) performance. For aeroplanes, both the airframe
structure and the loading are largely the same port and starboard and so in
most cases an airframe test can be considered to have exercised two
examples of each component. The same is not true of helicopter airframes
which must be treated as a single test.
10.2 As a general rule, the scatter under realistic loading is lower than that
obtained under constant amplitude loading. The factors stated here reflect the
fact that airframes and other items which are sensitive to load interaction
effects will be tested under realistic loading.
10.3 LIFE FACTORS
10.3.1 For combat aeroplanes, the cornerstone of safe-life
substantiation is a full-scale test of a complete airframe to a factor of 5 times
the service life. This factor consists of an allowance of 3 1/3 for scatter in
fatigue performance and a further factor of 1.5 which is applied to those
parts of the structure where the loads are not monitored on a continuous
basis.
10.3.2 If only one half of an aeroplane structure is tested, for example,
a port or starboard taileron, then a scatter factor of 4, rather than 3 1/3, is
required to provide an equally searching examination of the structure.
10.3.4 For helicopter airframe tests, a scatter factor of 3.75 is used to
maintain this standard of testing. In this case, due to asymmetry, only one
example of each critical feature/loading combination is tested, but there is
only one such example on each airframe.

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10.3.5 Where more than one result has been obtained, the test life of
each feature is adjusted to an effective value where the residual strength
requirement is just satisfied. The appropriate test factor is then applied to
the log (geometric) mean of the failures.
10.3.6 The scatter factors for use in conjunction with the further factor
of 1.5 for unmonitored structure are summarised in Table 1(a).
10.3.7 It is emphasised that these test factors are insufficient to
demonstrate that an adequate safe life has been achieved for all fatigue-
sensitive features and so the test must be underpinned by evidence that
suitable allowable stresses have been achieved and that the test loading is
of suitable severity.

10.4 STRESS FACTORS

10.4.1 For tests on mechanical components in which most fatigue
damage is done by large numbers of low-amplitude cycles, a life factor is
inappropriate and it is customary to use enhanced loads.
10.4.2 Several tests must be done and the results must be pooled,
using an appropriate S-N curve, to obtain a curve that is a best estimate of
the mean performance. In this pooling process it is usual to assume a
normal distribution of fatigue strength. The stress factor by which the mean
curve must be reduced to allow for the effects of scatter is dependent upon
the number of tests. These factors are given in Table 1(b).
10.4.3 The safe life is then calculated from a Safe S-N curve
constructed as described in Paragraph 2.
10.4.4 For helicopters, it is usual to test 6 specimens, some of which
are strain gauged in the same manner as components which are fitted to the
flight-test aircraft. S-N curves for the observed failure mode and for other
possible failure modes are fitted through the test results, using Miner’s rule
where appropriate, to enable an estimate to be made of the mean fatigue
strength expressed as an equivalent endurance limit. A test endurance
equivalent to at least 107 cycles is required to avoid large extrapolations to
the endurance limit (assumed to be 109 cycles).

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REFERENCES

1 Perrett, B.H.E. Fatigue endurance of structural elements in various materials

under constant and variable amplitude loadings. Royal Aircraft
Establishment Technical Report 77162, November 1977
2 Simpson, A. Fatigue data for the derivation of Safe S-N curves - low-load-
transfer joints and lug specimens. British Aerospace Report No
BAe-MSM-R-GEN-0683, March 1988
Bullen, N.I. A note on test factors. Aeronautical Research Council R & M
3166, September 1956
Cardrick, A.W. On the use of Safe S-N procedures in the interpretation of fatigue
Pike, Vera J. tests. (R) DERA/AS/ASD/TR97324/1.0, December 1997
Ellis, S.D. A combined range-mean-pairs rainflow count of load time histories
for use in the formulation of structurally relevant cost functions
and fatigue analysis. Royal Aircraft Establishment Technical
Report 81122, October 1981
Cardrick, A.W. Elastic and Plastic Interactions - their influence on the validity of
Meyer, M.L. the Palmgren-Miner hypothesis. Proc. IMechE Conference on
Designing against Fatigue, London, October 1974
Cardrick, A.W. Responding to the challenge - A short guide to the principles
underlying some recent changes to the design requirements for
British military aircraft. IMechE seminar on the Structural Integrity
of Civil and Military Aircraft, Univ. Bristol, September 1990

450
Mean stress (net) = 55 MPa
400
Life-factored
Alternating stress (net), MPa

350 Safe Stress-factored

300

250

200 Mean

150

100

50

0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Life

FIG.1a - SAFE AND MEAN S-N CUVES FOR AN ALUMINIUM ALLOY PINNED-LUG
SPECIMEN - SHOWING COMPATIBILITY WITH SAFE VALUE OF STATIC STRENGTH

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110
Mean stress (net) = 55 MPa
100
90 Life-factored
Alternating stress (net), MPa

Stress-factored
80
70
60 Mean
50
40
30 Safe
20
10
0
4 5 6 7
10 10 10 10

Life

FIG.1b - SAFE AND MEAN S-N CURVES FOR AN ALUMINIUM ALLOY PINNED-LUG
SPECIMEN - SHOWING TRANSITION BETWEEN LIFE AND STRESS FACTORS IN THE
REGION OF MOST INTEREST

(a) Factors on life

Test article Life factor
Aeroplane airframe - complete (both 3.33 on the log (geometric)
port and starboard); the factor mean of the port and
applies to the fin and nose starboard failures
undercarriage (providing these are
symmetrical about the centre line)
and to the main undercarriage when
both examples are tested. It also
applies when two tests are done on
any individual component, which is
identically loaded on port and
starboard sides of the aircraft
Helicopter airframe - complete (no 3.75
symmetry of loading) or one test on
a component that occurs on only one
side of the aircraft
Aeroplane airframe - one side only, 4.00
such as a single main undercarriage
or a port or starboard taileron

TABLE 1 - FACTORS NORMALLY APPLIED TO ALLOW FOR SCATTER IN FULL-SCALE

TESTS

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These life factors have been derived using the customary statistical procedure
(Bullen’s method 2(iii) [3]), together with a standard deviation in Log 10 life of 0.1296;
the figures of 3.75 and 4.00 have been slightly rounded. The factors correspond to a
probability of failure of 1 in 1000 on the basis of 1 or 2 items per aircraft. This same
procedure may be used to calculate the corresponding factors for other numbers of
tests.
(b) Factors on stress - to be used in lieu of factors on life in circumstances where
most fatigue damage is done by large numbers of low-amplitude cycles.

Number of items tested Factor on mean fatigue limit

1 1.54
2 1.49
3 1.47
4 1.45
6 1.44

Factor on geometric mean life where Factor on mean fatigue limit

the curve is steep
2.8 1.49

TABLE 2 - FACTORS FOR CONSTRUCTING SAFE S-N CURVES

These factors must be used in calculating safe lives when loads are unmonitored on
individual aircraft, and the loading spectrum is a best estimate confirmed by regular
sampling of service loads (see Paragraph 6).
Factor on life at low service lives Factor on stress at high service lives
1.5 1.2

TABLE 3 - ADDITIONAL FACTORS TO BE USED WHEN LOADS ARE UNMONITORED

These factors are applicable only when the life has been estimated using S-N data in
accordance with the recommendations of Paragraph 7. The additional factors to be
used in conjunction with other methods of life estimation must be supported by
relevant test evidence and must be acceptable to the PTL.
Factor on life at low service lives Factor on stress at high service lives
2.0 1.2

TABLE 4 - ADDITIONAL FACTORS TO ALLOW FOR THE ADDED UNCERTAINTY WHEN

INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS HAVE NOT BEEN TESTED

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LEAFLET 36
FATIGUE
INSPECTION-BASED SUBSTANTIATION

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This leaflet describes acceptable procedures for demonstrating compliance with the
requirements of Clause 3.2 It covers:
(a) conditions governing the use of inspection-based substantiation;
(b) detection of cracks;
(c) time to first inspection;
(d) conditions governing the determination of crack-growth curves;
(e) allowances for uncertainties in estimates of inspectable life;
(f) derivation of inspection intervals;
(g) check for the sensitivity of inspection intervals to increases in loading severity.

It is noteworthy that consideration must also be given to the monotonic and cyclic
variations in service temperature where these may have a significant deleterious effect on
performance.

Terms shown in bold type when they first occur are defined in Paragraph 9.

1.2 This leaflet deals primarily with the use of directed fatigue-related inspections to
support structural integrity in service. It is generally assumed that inspections will be defined
using a deterministic approach using fixed mean or design data with factors applied to
calculated life to reflect the known variability in input parameters. This approach centres on
the use of a factor of 3 to allow for scatter in crack propagation as well as the uncertainty in
estimating the crack size that is very unlikely to be missed under service conditions. As such,
it makes provision for inspection intervals to be increased by improvements in inspection
technique, but leaves no room for the wider benefits that could be obtained if sufficient data
could be provided to justify a probabilistic approach [1]; the application of such an approach
would require, in addition, the probability distributions of load, crack length at a given time
and detection capability (probability of detection).

1.3 It is emphasised that cracks meeting the inspection-based requirements in terms of

crack growth and residual strength must not result in the rupture of vital services such as
control runs.

1.4 The leaflet is aimed primarily at metallic structure; special considerations relating to
fibre-composite components are discussed in Leaflet 40.

2 CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE USE OF INSPECTION-BASED SUB-STANTIATION

2.1 As a general rule, inspection-based substantiation should not be used for compact
and inaccessible structure or for any structure in which fatigue damage is difficult to detect. It
must be used, however, for any component which is susceptible to defects or to damage in
manufacture or service. It may also provide a means for extending the life of selected safe-
life components for which the inspection penalties are acceptable.

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2.2 Inspection-based approaches are permissible only if the materials concerned

behave in a predictable manner (for example in terms of crack path and failure mode) and
where variability in material properties is known and is acceptably low.

2.3 In some structures the adoption of an inspection-based approach may not be

practicable, for example where growth rates are high and critical crack lengths short, which is
often the case for undercarriage components.

2.4 An inspection-based approach is not usually considered practicable unless the

critical crack size is at least twice the detectable crack size.

2.5 Normally the critical crack size should be at least 2.0 mm.

2.6 Multiple-site damage (MSD) can present a serious threat to the integrity of
structures and mechanical components that are the subject of inspection-based
substantiation. MSD can occur where nominally-identical features are uniformly loaded so
that simultaneous cracking occurs from adjacent sites, such as rivet holes. Small cracks can
suddenly link up to form a crack of critical size; the small size of cracks at the point at which
they link up is often at the limit of practical detectability. The problem is largely associated
with pressure-cabin lap joints on large transport aircraft. Normally the safety of components
can be assured without fatigue-related inspections by withdrawing them from service upon
completion of a safe life; this would need to be established by test in the case of components
susceptible to MSD. However, experience suggests that it may be impractical to protect
pressure-cabin lap-joints from a degree of local degradation due to corrosion and/or
disbonding/loss-of-friction - thereby invalidating the safe life. In such circumstances it must
be shown that any MSD arising from local degradation will be safely contained until it is
detected by the agreed programme of RCM inspections.

3 DETECTION OF CRACKS

3.1 The cornerstone of inspection-based compliance is the crack size that will be
detected reliably by inspection - the detectable crack size. If too large a crack size is chosen,
inspection intervals will be unnecessarily short. On the other hand, if the crack size is too
small the inspection interval could be much too long (the relationship is exponential) and
safety could be undermined.

3.2 As a general rule, the aim should be to choose a detectable crack size that is very
unlikely to be missed at the given location under service conditions. This choice must be
guided by experienced NDI operators using accumulated evidence for the technique in
question and taking account of the standards that have been achieved when special trials
have been done. Detection capability must be demonstrated on test articles representing the
component geometry, cracking, surface condition and structural configuration of the
component in question, with consideration given to lighting and access restrictions which
may apply in service.

3.3 Inspections must be carried out by trained operators using techniques that have
been demonstrated on representative test articles with representative defects. Consideration
must be given to the need for regular calibration and replacement of NDI probes.

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3.4 Attention is drawn to the need to avoid exposing operators to the risk of missing
cracks because they are accustomed to finding nothing.

3.5 If a possible crack is indicated during an inspection then, wherever practicable,

alternative methods of inspection should be used to confirm the presence of a crack before
embarking on repair options.

3.6 Loads acting to force crack faces together or surface treatments such as machining
or shot peening can mask surface-breaking cracks. Where practicable the aircraft should be
loaded such that anticipated cracks will be open during an inspection.

3.7 Evidence of cracking from service inspections and data available from test and tear-
downs should be collated to increase confidence in the specified inspection regime.

3.8 It may be necessary to remove protective treatments or surface coatings to inspect

for fatigue cracks. These should be restored following inspection to the original build level of
surface protection. If this is not practicable then appropriate allowance must be made in
definition of inspection periods for possible environmental degradation.

3.9 Where limited disassembly is required for crack detection, for example fastener
removal, then the structure must afterwards be restored to the pre inspection condition,
including any fatigue enhancements previously incorporated. Disassembly and re-assembly
must not in themselves introduce damage atypical of the original build quality.

3.10 The method of inspection must reflect the position, orientation and mode of cracking
most likely to occur, taking into consideration processes such as cold working that can
transfer the crack initiation location away from that expected in untreated structures.

4 TIME TO FIRST INSPECTION

4.1 The time to the first inspection must be the safe life (Leaflet 35) except where an
item is made from a material which is susceptible to defects or to damage in manufacture or
service, including impact from runway debris, environmental degradation or may still contain
cracking or damage following a repair. In such cases the time to first inspection shall be
equal to the normal inspection interval.

4.2 Following fatigue arisings in service, the time to first inspection (safe life) for
unrepaired aircraft in the fleet must be assessed by recognised statistical techniques, such
as a maximum likelihood approach [2]. It cannot be assumed that a particular arising is
typical of fleet status.

4.3 Normally, the safe life of inspection-dependent structure shall be at least half the
Specified Life under the Design Spectrum. Exceptionally, a lower safe life may be acceptable
for easily-inspectable structure. Conversely, a higher safe life may be needed for buried
structure in order to meet the requirement for the inspection penalty to be acceptable on
operational and economic grounds.

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5 CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE DETERMINATION OF CRACK-GROWTH CURVES

5.1 By definition, inspection-based substantiation must be based only upon that part of
the crack-growth curve that is detectable in service with NDI equipment that is acceptable to
the Project Authority.

5.2 A calculated crack growth curve for the detail in question is central to the definition
of inspection intervals. A best estimate of the mean crack growth curve must be produced as
described below. Appropriate allowance must be made for the uncertainties examined in
Paragraph 6.

5.3 The following are examples of the considerations which may influence the
maximum acceptable crack size:
 the onset of rapid, unstable crack growth.
 net section failure (tension or compression) including any allowance for loss of
area due to corrosion.
 unacceptable leakage or loss of pressure.
 maximum crack size that can be removed - this may be governed, for example,
by maximum bush or oversize-fastener dimensions.
 maximum size allowing practical or economic repair.
 any other failure mode, such as buckling, induced by crack growth.

5.4 Mean growth rate data, determined from constant amplitude tests, are normally
used in growth rate calculations. These data must include environmental and temperature
effects where appropriate. If the crack growth characteristics of the material are not known
then test data sufficient to define the growth behaviour, including environmental effects,
variability in growth rates within and between batches, etc., must be obtained.

5.5 It is usual to calculate crack growth using linear summation methods, making no
allowance for retardation of crack growth occurring as a result of peak loads in the spectrum.
However, as non-linear prediction routines are generally available and can afford a
significant increase in predicted life over linear summation predictions, which are inherently
conservative for tension dominated loading spectra, then consideration must be given to their
use. Any benefits over and above linear summation predictions must be shown to be
appropriate for the in-service loading, confirmed by representative tests and agreed by the
Project Authority.

5.6 The crack growth threshold observed in coupon tests with long, through-section
cracks under constant amplitude loading in laboratory air may not be observed under
variable amplitude loading in realistic service environments; much shorter cracks may
propagate under these conditions. It is usually conservative to assume a zero threshold and
extrapolate the steady-state growth rate behaviour down to very low stress intensities. Any
inspection period relying on the existence of a crack growth threshold must be substantiated
by appropriate representative testing.

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5.7 The variation of stress intensity factor coefficient during crack development may be
estimated from standard texts, from finite element analysis or from observations of crack
behaviour made in tests and tear-downs. A record of solutions used must be included in the
Fatigue Type Record.

5.8 Cracks should be considered to exist at the most unfavourable location in a load
path. Where adjacent load paths or details are equally loaded then identical cracks should be
considered in each.

5.9 Where cracking reaches a boundary (an edge, cut-out or adjacent hole) a
secondary crack must be assumed to exist at the most unfavourable position in relation to
this boundary to allow consideration of continuing damage.

5.10 Inspection-based approaches must take no account of the life following arrest of
rapid, unstable crack growth unless arrest capability has been demonstrated in
representative tests and the damage will be evident in service.

6 ALLOWANCES FOR UNCERTAINTIES IN ESTIMATES OF INSPECTABLE LIFE

6.1 The following uncertainties must be taken into account in estimating the mean crack
growth curve which determines the inspectable life. The calculations should be supported,
where practicable, by test evidence from element tests or the structure itself.

6.2 The geometrical correction factor used in the stress intensity factor solution, the
assumed loading spectrum and the data used in the crack growth analysis should err on the
side of conservatism.

6.3 Uncertainties in calculated growth behaviour: Where there is no full-scale test

evidence to support the growth behaviour of cracks under realistic conditions, for example as
observed on tests or read-back from cracks found during tests or in tear-downs, then a
reduction factor of 2.0 should be applied to allow for uncertainties in the calculated crack
growth life. It is noteworthy that a factor of 2.0 is also used to allow for corresponding
uncertainties in safe-life calculations (See Leaflet 35). As with safe-life substantiation, this
factor may be waived if the validity of the calculations can be confirmed by relevant data for
similar details and loadings.

6.4 Uncertainties in fracture toughness: The inspectable life is terminated when the
crack reaches the maximum acceptable size. Where the maximum size is governed by
fracture toughness, the critical crack length should be based upon Minimum Specification or
‘B’ allowable values of fracture toughness. Where only mean toughness data are available
these should be reduced by a factor of 1.3

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7 DERIVATION OF INSPECTION INTERVALS

7.1 The inspection interval is obtained by dividing the inspectable life by a factor of 3.0
to allow for scatter in crack propagation and uncertainty in estimating the detectable crack
size. The derivation of inspection intervals is shown schematically in Figure 1. It is
noteworthy that the factor of 3.0 is in addition to the factor of 2.0 that is applied to estimates
of inspectable life which are unsupported by relevant test evidence (Para 6.3).

7.2 The inspectable life must be divided by a further factor of 1.5 when loads are
unmonitored (Leaflet 35). Higher factors may be required for helicopter dynamic components
and other items which experience large numbers of damaging low-amplitude stresses.

7.3 The smaller the detectable crack size the longer will be the inspectable life and,
potentially, the inspection interval. However, to find smaller cracks a more sensitive
inspection technique will be required which may incur economic and downtime penalties that
can offset any benefits from an increased inspection interval.

7.4 Flexibility is needed to allow combinations of inspections at different locations in a

practicable maintenance plan (inspections timed to coincide with other planned maintenance
activities, for example scheduled inspections). An inspection may be carried out at any time
within the defined inspection interval provided that the period between inspections never
exceeds the defined inspection interval.

7.5 Where inspection intervals have been specified in terms of flying hours under the
Design Spectrum, they must be expressed as equivalent flying hours under the Service
Spectrum. This complication is avoided in those cases where it is appropriate to specify
intervals in terms of Fatigue Index or some other appropriate parameter.

7.6 If there are any significant changes in usage or in the aircraft structure itself then the
inspection periods of those items which are affected must be re-assessed.

7.7 It may sometimes be practicable to permit continued operation after a crack has
been found. In these circumstances the desired maximum crack size to be left in the
structure after inspection would be balanced against the desired inspection interval.
Specifically, the maximum crack size to be left in the structure would be treated as if it were
the ‘detectable crack size’ and the inspection interval would be obtained in the usual way.

8 CHECK FOR SENSITIVITY OF INSPECTION INTERVALS TO LOADING SEVERITY

8.1 As noted in Leaflet 35, in the longer term, the loading spectrum experienced in
service seldom corresponds to the Design Spectrum. For wing-bending, for example,
increases in aircraft mass and in the severity of the normal acceleration spectrum can
increase the severity of the loading spectrum by a factor of 1.2 or more.

8.2 At the design stage, those features with exceptionally high sensitivity to increases in
loading severity must be identified and their stresses reduced so that they do not impose
restrictions on inspection intervals for the aircraft as a whole.

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8.3 The inspection intervals of individual structural features must be estimated with the
stresses under the Design Spectrum elevated by a suitable factor. This factor, which will
typically be 1.2, must be agreed with the Project Authority. The inspection interval under the
enhanced loading will normally be estimated by a calculated adjustment of the interval
established under the Design Spectrum. In making the calculation, the extreme stresses
under the elevated loading should be clipped/truncated to the extreme stresses under the
Design Spectrum (normally the Limit Loads).

8.4 The inspection interval required under the elevated Design Spectrum must be
acceptable to the Project Authority and reported in the Fatigue Type Record.

9 DEFINITIONS

9.1 Detectable crack size: The size of crack that is very unlikely to be missed by a
given technique for a particular combination of material, component, access and
environment.

9.2 Inspectable life: The average period of usage throughout which a crack is of
detectable size. The period begins when the crack reaches the detectable size and
terminates when the crack reaches the maximum acceptable size.

9.3 Time to first inspection: The period from entry into service to the point at which the
first inspection must be made.

9.4 Inspection interval: The maximum interval between inspections under the Design
Spectrum.

9.5 Equivalent inspection interval: The maximum interval between inspections under
the Service Spectrum.

9.6 Critical crack size: The crack size associated with the onset of rapid, unstable
crack growth under the load corresponding to the residual strength requirement.

9.7 Maximum acceptable crack size: The Critical crack size or a lesser size
associated with other constraints such as those listed in Para 5.3

REFERENCES

1 Spence, S. H. Fatigue-related inspections: the trade-off between effectiveness

and inspection interval, BAe Report No. BAe-WSS-RP-RES-SOR-
000317, 1997
2 Sweeting, T. J. Parameter estimation for failure time distributions when data
contain both failed and unfailed items, Department of
Mathematics, University of Surrey, Guildford, July 1988

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FIG. 1 - DERIVATION OF INSPECTION INTERVALS

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LEAFLET 37
FATIGUE
TESTING

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This leaflet describes the scope of testing which must be done to satisfy the safe-life
substantiation requirements of Clause 3.2.12 It covers:
(a) development tests;
(b) airframe fatigue tests;
(c) representation of high-frequency loading;
(d) test accuracy;
(e) documentation of tests;
(f) residual strength tests and tear-down inspections.

1.2 For components which experience significant fatigue loads at high cycles, such as
rotating components on helicopters, fatigue testing should be designed to substantiate both
the low and high frequency load cycles and to establish accurately the endurance limit.

2 DEVELOPMENT TESTS

2.1 Where appropriate, design development tests must be done to support the selection
of materials, to establish basic data for design and to support the methods of analysis to be
used in substantiation.

2.2 Generic data on fatigue performance and crack growth may need to be
supplemented by tests on specimens representing particular features of the structure. In
general, these specimens should be tested under constant amplitude loading and under
spectra which will reveal any interaction effects that may need to be taken into account.
Where it is necessary to use a specimen representing a major sub-assembly, it will usually
be sufficient to test this under realistic loading.

2.3 Supplementary tests may be necessary to investigate the effects of increases in

loading severity.

2.4 Due to the complications of applying aero-acoustic-vibratory loadings during major

tests, the methods used to address these effects may also need to be substantiated by
supplementary testing.

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3 AIRFRAME FATIGUE TESTS

3.1 GENERAL PROCEDURE

3.1.1 The main load-carrying structure must be tested, together with sufficient
of the remaining structure, control runs and systems to ensure that the loads can
be applied and reacted in a representative manner. All significant flight and
ground loads must be represented, including, for example, loads from
pressurisation, the undercarriage and such features as arrester hooks, pylons
and brake parachutes.

3.1.2 Airframes are normally tested to a factor of at least 5 on life. The

generation of test spectra is described in Leaflet 35. The sequences of test
loadings should be noted, particularly the positions of the highest (infrequent)
loads in the spectrum. Any very infrequent high loads should be applied in a
randomised, but known, pattern to assist in this identification.

3.1.3 The structure should be strain-gauged in suitable locations to enable the

strains produced under the fatigue loading to be correlated with those measured
in static strength tests, flight trials and Operational Loads Measurement (OLM)
programmes (Leaflet 38). In general, strain gauges should be located away from
appreciable stress gradients.

3.1.4 At suitable intervals the structure should be inspected for fatigue cracks.
In these inspections, full advantage should be taken of advanced inspection
equipment such as articulated video probes; particular attention should be given
to those locations which are known to be fatigue-critical. Early warning of
damage is essential in order to devise repair solutions, enable alternative repair
schemes to be evaluated and, where possible, to confine the damage.

3.1.5 Crack-growth characteristics should be recorded where appropriate.

3.1.6 The aim must be to continue the test to the required duration or until the
structure is no longer representative through reasons of repair, production
changes or a major failure.

3.1.7 The fatigue lives and crack-growth periods observed on test must be
reduced to allow for scatter and adjusted to equivalent lives under the service
spectrum using the procedures described in Leaflets 35 and 36.

3.1.8 It may be appropriate to do separate tests on major components or sub-

assemblies such as undercarriages, flying control surfaces, airbrakes and pylons.

3.2 PRE-PRODUCTION FATIGUE TESTS

3.2.1 The pre-production airframe tests is termed the Development Major
Airframe Fatigue Test (DMAFT). It is emphasised that this test must be
complemented by a test on a production structure or equivalent representative
assemblies. The objectives of the DMAFT cannot be met without this assurance.

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3.2.2 In cases where the fatigue performance of the primary load-carrying

members is likely to be significantly influenced by high frequency loadings, the
successful completion of the early part of the DMAFT will be a prerequisite for
test-flight clearance.

3.2.3 The test must proceed at a brisk pace to enable any necessary design
changes to be incorporated into production airframes with a minimum of
retrospective modifications.

3.2.4 Within the constraints of early manufacture and testing, the quality of
materials and manufacture, including influences such as surface treatment,
should be as representative as possible.

3.2.5 In principle, the airframe could be tested as a series of major assemblies

and this would offer the obvious advantage of minimising the effects of discrete
failures. However, for airframe tests, this advantage would be offset by the
difficulty of producing representative end-conditions.

3.2.6 On completion of the fatigue testing, it is desirable to demonstrate that

the Design Limit Load factored by the residual strength factor (Clause 3.2) can be
sustained in each of the principal static loading cases.

3.2.7 When all testing is complete, it is essential that those main load paths
that are still representative of the production structure should be subjected to a
tear-down inspection in order to reveal any significant fatigue damage that has
not been observed during the test.

3.3 PRODUCTION FATIGUE TESTS

3.2.8 Structures of safe-life design and any major safe-life assemblies of
inspection-based designs must be tested to confirm the effectiveness of any
modifications arising from the test of pre-production structures and to show that
changes arising from production considerations have not adversely affected
fatigue performance.

3.2.9 The Production Major Airframe Fatigue Test (PMAFT) must be done on
a structure, or equivalent representative components, manufactured to the
mature production standard. The PMAFT should be timed to extend the
clearance obtained from the DMAFT and maintain a clearance that, for the bulk
of the life, is at least 10% ahead of the life consumed by the fleet leaders.

3.2.10 The loading used should simulate typical usage. Where the usage
differs appreciably between groups of aircraft and these are not rotated for fleet
management purposes, care should be taken to avoid using extreme loads which
are higher than those which will be experienced by most aircraft in the fleet
(Leaflet 35).

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3.2.11 As the PMAFT proceeds, all structural modifications which have been, or
are to be, embodied on service aircraft should be incorporated on the specimen.
The test life at which each modification is done should exceed the life chosen for
service-embodiment by the appropriate test factor (Leaflet 35). Exceptionally,
earlier modification may be necessary to prevent the cracking in the test
specimen from becoming unrepresentative.

3.2.12 When all testing is complete, the specimen must be subjected to a tear-
down inspection in which the main load paths are carefully dismantled and
inspected in order to reveal any significant fatigue damage that has not been
observed during the test (Paragraph 8). The timing of residual strength testing
and the tear-down inspection will be dependent on the life of the type and should
be balanced against the need to retain the test article for further testing, as would
be necessary if a life extension programme were required.

3.4 LIFE EXTENSION TESTS

3.4.1 Life extension fatigue tests must be done where the service life of the
type is to be extended. Ideally, production fatigue test articles, including the
PMAFT, should be used. Where this is not possible, tests may be done on new
articles or examples taken from service. When a service airframe is to be used, it
is acceptable to employ one with a high utilisation in terms of Fatigue Index or
flying hours. This acknowledges the fact that the service life is a small proportion
of the test life, maximises operational utilisation and, in the case of flying hours,
provides maximum exposure to the service environment. A best estimate should
be made of the damage associated with periods of unmonitored usage.
Therefore, the ‘unmonitored’ factor of 1.5 should be removed and, where
possible, the estimate should be underpinned by OLM data.

3.4.2 The Life Extension Fatigue Test (LEFT) must be done on a structure, or
an equivalent assembly of components, which is representative of the fleet,
including any fleet-wide modifications. Supplementary testing may be necessary
to substantiate the life extension of build concessions or other modifications, or
where existing data are inadequate.

3.4.3 The LEFT must proceed at a sufficient rate to ensure that the test retains
an adequate lead over the fleet. This lead should be sufficient to allow for the
design and implementation of repairs to the LEFT article.

3.4.4 The test spectrum applied in the LEFT should be an acceptable

representation of the usage spectrum.

3.4.5 Where appropriate, additional tests may be required to substantiate

inspection-based clearances.

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4 COMPONENTS SUBJECT TO HIGH FREQUENCY LOADING

4.1 Components which suffer significant fatigue damage at high cycles may need to be
tested separately using a factor on stress.

4.2 For example, the fatigue substantiation of helicopter dynamic components is

normally achieved by testing 4 to 6 specimens. A block load programme, representing high
and low frequency cycles is normally used, and a test achievement equivalent to an
endurance of at least 107 cycles on the appropriate mean S-N curve is required to avoid
large extrapolations to the endurance limit (109 cycles). The required test factor on load must
be applied to the load amplitude, but where possible, the test should use the same stress
ratios as seen in flight.

4.3 In tests on airframes, it is important to apply the high frequency loading so that the
structure is excited in a realistic way. This means that loading frequency becomes an
important parameter. Successful tests have been done on helicopter airframes using bursts
of severe, but otherwise unfactored, loading interspersed between the low frequency loads.
Aeroplane structures tend to have been tested by applying lesser numbers of higher-
amplitude loads that produce equivalent damage (whilst retaining sufficient lower amplitude
cycles to ensure that any effects of fretting are represented), but here too there are moves to
apply more realistic loading.

5 LOADING ACCURACY IN MAJOR FATIGUE TESTS

5.1 Close control, recording and monitoring of loading is necessary in fatigue tests
because small changes in loads can cause large changes in fatigue life. In tests on complete
structures or systems, or on major components, the accuracy of the applied loads should be
within 3% of the maximum demanded load.

5.2 All applied loads should be measured periodically during the test to check that the
repeatability is within 2% of the particular applied load or 0.5% of the maximum demanded
load, whichever is the greater. This should be done by checking the applied jack loads rather
than the measured loads in the test article.

5.3 Test systems which provide perfect control of applied loads at discrete monitoring
points may produce excessive strains at other locations due to dynamic effects. The aim
should be to achieve the required accuracy and repeatability throughout the structure.

6 FATIGUE TEST DOCUMENTATION

6.1 Fatigue test summaries must be provided in order to meet the requirements of the
Fatigue Type Record (see MAP RA 5309).

6.2 In addition, records of test calibration procedures and frequencies, damage

documents and records of repairs and modifications must be maintained; references to these
must be provided with the fatigue test summaries.

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7 RESIDUAL STRENGTH TESTS FOLLOWING MAJOR FATIGUE TESTS

7.1 Where practicable, the test specimen should be used to provide evidence to support
the Critical Crack Lengths which have been used in the interpretation of the test result. This
might be done by removing selected repairs in turn and observing the behaviour of the
cracks under loads of up to the Design Limit Load  the residual strength factor. Areas where
repairs have been effected by means of blending or use of oversize holes may also be tested
in this way. At this early stage in the residual strength testing the aim should be to obtain
useful measurements at a number of locations and so the loads should be limited to avoid
premature failure.

7.2 Subsequently the tests should probe the specimen for any debilitating cracks not
detected during the fatigue test. On-line inspection or monitoring techniques should be used
where possible to minimise the chance of premature failure.

8 TEAR-DOWN INSPECTIONS

8.1 The purpose of a tear-down inspection is to identify any significant cracking that has
not been revealed by inspections during the fatigue test and any residual strength tests.

8.2 The inspection also provides a valuable pointer to those further damage sites that
will need to be considered if the life is extended on the basis of inspections.

8.3 The main load-carrying structure must first be completely dismantled. Extreme care
is needed in order to avoid masking or destroying fatigue damage.

8.4 The structure should then be examined using appropriate non-destructive inspection
techniques, paying particular attention to fastener holes, cut-outs and changes of section.
Structure loaded primarily in compression should be included.

8.5 Each damage site should be examined fractographically and, where appropriate,
crack growth characteristics should be determined.

8.6 Where significant damage is discovered in load paths which may not have been
subjected to a residual strength test, calculations must be done to determine the size of the
Critical Crack. Where this is less than the crack size at the end of the fatigue test, the test life
must be reduced. Supplementary testing may be necessary to support this adjustment.

8.7 Data obtained during the tear-down inspection may be used to validate or develop
inspection techniques.

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LEAFLET 38
FATIGUE
SERVICE MONITORING

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This Leaflet describes the scope of in-service monitoring, and an

acceptable means of compliance with the requirements of Clause 3.2 Service
Monitoring. It covers:
(a) Description of Aircraft usage;
(b) Continuous Fleet-wide Monitoring;
(c) Operational Data/Loads Recording and
(d) System Installation and Analysis Considerations.
1.2 In order to meet the requirements of Clause 3.2, the Designer/Design
Organisation will have demonstrated the adequacy of the proposed in-service
monitors together with their appropriate factors when used with the specified
design spectrum and usage.

1.3 Comparison of in-service usage with design assumptions is

fundamental to airworthiness, in determining equivalent safe lives and
inspection criteria. This through-life activity is realised by monitoring the fatigue
exposure on each aircraft of the fleet and the results are used in the fatigue life
management of the fleet. Fleet-wide structural monitoring, including the use of
simple usage parameters, is underwritten by Operational Loads Measurement
(OLM) on fixed-wing aircraft or by Operational Data Recording (ODR)
programmes on helicopters. Monitoring of service usage links the intrinsic
fatigue performance of the structure, as achieved by design and proven by test,
with the damage to which the structure is actually exposed. The capability to
operate OLM/ODR programmes should be permanent, to enable periodic
recording to be done on an as-required basis with the minimum of recovery
work.

1.4 Although this Leaflet is primarily concerned with fatigue damage

evaluation during flight operations, it is equally important to make provision for
recording other usage data which can impact on airframe and component
fatigue lives. These include, but are not limited to, normal acceleration spectra,
flight envelope usage, landings (type and severity), rotor start/stop cycles (for
rotorcraft), pressurisations cycles (level), undercarriage cycles (in flight and
during maintenance) and engine runs. Therefore, all parameters necessary to
monitor in-service usage are to be identified by the Designer/Design
Organisation to the PT during the design process for the PTL’s agreement.

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2 TERMINOLOGY

2.1 Flight Safety-Related

Incorrect functioning of a flight safety-related system does not affect the
immediate mission capability of an aircraft. It could however, affect future
mission capability and availability. Failure to identify structural limit
exceedances correctly could lead to avoidable structural failure during a
subsequent sortie. Misidentification of fatigue consumption could lead to
premature retirement of expensive military assets or catastrophic fatigue failure
of the airframe (or other significant structure) in flight.
2.2 Ground Support Station (GSS)
Ground-based computer or network, with interface to accept data from airborne
data acquisition system. Also included under the generic GSS heading is
analysis software, archiving and printing facilities.
2.3 Rotary Wing Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) and Fixed
Wing Structural Health Monitoring System (SHMS).
HUMS/SHMS are integral instrumentation systems used to acquire pertinent
monitoring data from aircraft response parameters, flight condition and
configuration data together with top-level usage data. Additionally for rotary
wing aircraft, vibration-signatures from rotating parts are collected. Data are
downloaded from the airborne system at the end of each sortie and used in a
GSS for the purposes of usage monitoring, fault detection, failure prevention
and limit exceedance identification/verification.
2.4 Manual Data Recording Exercise (MDRE) (generally a rotary wing
practice)
An MDRE provides usage data that can be analysed in a format compatible
with that used by the Designer/Design Organisation to life the components and
structure of the aircraft. Ultimately, this requires a list of steady state flight
conditions, plus the time for which they apply; a list of transitions between
steady conditions, plus their frequency of occurrence; and a list of low
frequency event rates such as Ground-Air-Ground cycle, rotor spin-up cycles
and aircraft mass changes. A manual observer currently gathers this
information using a printed form or a laptop.
2.5 Monitored Structure
Structure is considered monitored, if all critical loading histories are rigorously
assessed for life usage over the entire period of significant fatigue loading. The
loading history can be obtained via direct monitoring, e.g. by strain gauges, or
by inference from monitored flight parameters. The effectiveness of the monitor
is to be validated by ODR/OLM. Simple counters of events, such as landings,
and usage metrics such as hours, cannot be used to support the use of
monitored factors, since there is no quantification of the severity of the loading
environment in relation to the design spectrum. In certain circumstances, where
each occurrence is associated with a conservative loading assumption, the
applicable fatigue safety factor is to be agreed with the PT.

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2.6 Operational Data Recording (ODR) – Rotary Wing and Operational

Load Measurement (OLM) – Fixed Wing
In concept, ODR and OLM are the same; one or more aircraft from a fleet are
instrumented with strain gauges, conditioning and recording equipment. The
recorder also captures data from a wide range of flight parameters such as
control positions, airspeed, altitude, etc. These systems are carefully calibrated
and the aircraft are then flown in normal service, in order to confirm the
Designer/Design Organisation understanding of how loads and usage are
related and to substantiate the performance of the fleet-wide monitoring
system. The principal difference for rotary wing aircraft is the need to monitor
rotating components; hence ODRs include equipment such as slip-rings or
radio frequency transmitters.
2.7 System
Unless specified in more detail, the System is assumed to encompass all
aspects of the airborne monitoring equipment, any required ground-based post-
processing facility and associated data transfer method.
3 DESCRIPTION OF USAGE
3.1 The Design Spectrum is the best estimate of the typical loading that
an aircraft is expected to experience when it enters service. In collaborative
projects, this spectrum may represent an agreed compromise between the
various national authorities.
3.2 Since in-service or national usage will vary from the Design Spectrum
and long-term changes may occur to national flying patterns, it is essential to
monitor the operation of most types of military aircraft throughout their service
life. This monitoring enables the changes in operating patterns to be assessed
by the aircraft Designer/Design Organisation for their impact on structural
component lives and inspection intervals.
3.3 An overview of the way in which an aircraft is being operated is
recorded in a Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU). This document
contains information and assumptions relating to both the current usage and
the operating intent. For fixed wing aircraft, Sortie Profile Codes (SPC) may be
used to describe the characteristic flying patterns in the fleet. Estimated % SPC
utilisation is also stated.
3.4 The usage, declared in the SOIU, is based on feedback from the
operator, combined with available MDRE/data logging or HUMS/SHMS data.
3.5 SOIUs are published and periodically reviewed by the Service
Authorities. After each review, the aircraft Designer/Design Organisation should
be tasked to assess the significance of any changes highlighted in the latest
operational usage data in relation to published lives and/or inspection criteria.
To support this task, the Designer/Design Organisation should utilise available
MDRE or HUMS/SHMS usage information.

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4 CONTINUOUS FLEET-WIDE MONITORING

4.1 For fleet-wide monitoring, the scope of the sensor fit will depend on
the type of aircraft, ranging from a comprehensive suite on highly
manoeuvrable combat types to a more simplistic approach on aircraft being
used exclusively in a passenger role. These latter aircraft may rely on a civil
aircraft approach, i.e. flying hour accumulation against an assumed usage
spectrum. This assumed spectrum, however, must be confirmed as being
representative. The monitor can also be effected using non-adaptive monitoring
systems, as described in Leaflet 42.
4.2 For fixed-wing fleets, every aircraft must be provided with
instrumentation to enable the fatigue life consumption to be tracked. The most
commonly used acronym to describe this system is SHMS. Furthermore, it is
preferable to have a single range of equipment to undertake both fleet-wide
structural health monitoring and OLM programmes, configured to suit specific
type requirements.
4.3 The airborne hardware should use configurable data acquisition
systems, which can be downloaded to the appropriate Ground Support Station
(GSS) for processing and analysis. This will also assist the investigation of in-
service engineering problems. The ground station used to maintain aircraft
lifing data must embody appropriate cross-checks and trending analyses to
establish the short and long term integrity of the data. Flight-by-flight loading
information must be retained for subsequent reappraisal should the need arise.
4.4 Consideration should be given to the relative merits of on-board
computation of fatigue metrics versus ground processing of recorded time
histories, to generate the required metrics. Exceedance monitoring aspects of
SHMS have to be identified at aircraft turn-round so that any necessary
structural inspections can be carried out before the next flight, whereas detailed
fatigue and crack growth assessments can be done in the longer term. Data
integrity issues may be more easily handled if time-history data are acquired by
the airborne system for subsequent processing in a ground environment, but
the time constraints may not be acceptable logistically. However, faults within
the airborne monitoring system requiring maintenance activity should be
identified automatically at aircraft turn-round.
4.5 The complexity of rotary wing loading makes it difficult to identify and
monitor the fatigue damage using basic instrumentation. Fatigue damage
accumulation rates can be managed using one of five approaches: operating
hours only; basic usage (operating hours, plus rotor starts, take-offs, etc);
manoeuvre recognition; fatigue load/damage synthesis from flight data
parameters; direct load measurement. Although helicopter Health and Usage
Monitoring Systems (HUMS) may eventually provide comprehensive
operational usage data for most fleets, many fleets still rely on the civil aircraft
approach to damage accumulation, which is merely to log flying hours. In
practice, the logistics and quality control overhead of current systems limits the
use of more advanced techniques to high value parts, and the majority of
components will continue to be managed using conventional, conservative,
retirement lives.

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4.6 For helicopters lacking an adequate HUMS fit, automatic flight data
logging (manoeuvre recognition) exercises or Manual Data Recording
Exercises (MDREs) are conducted to provide data to update the SOIUs.

5 OPERATIONAL DATA/LOADS RECORDING

5.1 A primary aim of an OLM/ODR programme is to substantiate the

process used to monitor the fatigue life consumption under the in-service
loading environment. For those components not covered by the fleet-wide
monitor, ODR/OLM programmes are required to confirm that simple lifing
metrics are adequate, and that any read-across to the fleet-wide monitor is
valid. The only exception is civilian derivatives for which the usage has been
shown to be the same as civilian operations and confirmed by the
Designer/Design Organisation as within their design assumptions.
5.2 A capability for loads measurement is to be incorporated on a selected
number of aircraft in a fleet, i.e. provision is made for the instrumentation and
recording equipment fit. When required, comprehensive instrumentation is then
fitted to record the loads on the major structural components of the airframe,
together with other relevant parameters. For a helicopter, additional
instrumentation to measure signatures of rotating components may also be
required. The number of aircraft requiring this system will depend on the range
of fleet flying patterns, the number of roles and theatres of operation. The
requirement for back-up aircraft must also be considered.
5.3 An ODR/OLM programme is required, within 5 years of introduction into
service, commensurate with a need to allow the aircraft’s full operational
capability to be established. This is aimed at allowing the usage profiles to
stabilise before data are gathered. The programme duration is dependent on
the variability of flight profiles and the number of instrumented aircraft. The
benchmark for any ODR/OLM programme is to capture a sufficient proportion
of the fleet’s usage across all types and roles to enable an accurate
assessment to be made of the total usage.
5.4 For agile fixed-wing combat aircraft an OLM recording capability should
be available on a permanent basis, although not necessarily always recording.
In practice, a permanent recording capability is often utilised to gather samples
of data from each sub-fleet by rotation of the instrumented aircraft through the
different roles.
5.5 Even the most comprehensive ODR/OLM systems will not directly
measure the loading on every single fatigue-critical component. In practice,
only the most fatigue-critical components are likely to be instrumented and less
critical structure will be covered by analysis, confirmed by test. As stated in
Paragraph 1.4, in some cases additional measurements may be made using
the ODR/OLM system to confirm assumptions made during analysis.

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5.6 Design proving information and fleet statistics are used in conjunction
with ODR/OLM results to substantiate the fleet-wide monitoring process. The
following should be considered:
(a) Flight Loads Measurement data acquired by the Designer/Design
Organisation during development of the type, in conjunction with structural
modelling, are used to confirm that the ODR/OLM monitor points cover the
remaining fatigue critical structure.
(b) Results from the continuous monitor, including usage statistics, are
required to align the ODR/OLM sample to match overall fleet usage. Where
the continuous monitor does not provide adequate usage statistics, periodic
MDRE/data logging should be used.
(c) Fatigue test spectra are compared with the normalised ODR/OLM
results, to confirm that test loading is representative. Test results also help
to confirm fatigue critical feature selection and establish the life associated
with the monitored locations. For aircraft managed under damage tolerance
principles, test results are used in the establishment of inspection thresholds
and intervals.
(d) The performance of the fleet-wide monitor is compared with the
normalised sample of ODR/OLM data. The monitor process can thus be
validated or revised to improve correlation.
5.7 The requirement to carry out a periodic ODR/OLM is reviewed every 2
years but the interval between programmes should not normally exceed 5
years. The review should take into account any change in usage of the aircraft
and whether it is likely to degrade the continuous monitor. Maintaining a
permanent recording capability can be less onerous than trying to reinstate the
system whenever it is deemed further data are required.
5.8 The PT has the overall responsibility for running the ODR/OLM
programme, however, the specific requirements of the system; the equipment
interfaces and analysis routines should be agreed between the
Designer/Design Organisation, the Service specialists and their advisors. This
includes selection and positioning of sensors. This process can be formalised
as a Project Definition Study, which can also define the objectives and scope of
the programme. The aspects to be considered in the realisation of an OLM
programme are detailed in [1].
6 SYSTEM INSTALLATION AND ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS
6.1 The guidance in the following paragraphs applies equally to OLM/ODR
and fleet-wide monitoring installations.
6.2 The complexity of the instrumentation fit is normally related to the
number of different loading actions that have an influence on the life of the
structure and the potential variability of flight profiles.

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6.3 Sensor positioning and orientation should be optimised to minimise

errors. Examples of this are the attachment of accelerometers to substantial
structure and positioning them to minimise errors due to secondary motion
effects. Where this is unavoidable, analysis should be done to identify
correction factors and/or potential error. Filtering should be utilised to minimise
interference from unwanted frequencies, such as local panel vibration when a
sensor is attempting to measure rigid body loads.
6.4 Strain sensors should be located away from high strain gradients and
configured to minimise output variation due to temperature changes. Strain
sensor location and orientation should be defined in a manner that supports
accurate repeatable installation.
6.5 Strain sensors should in general be calibrated, usually by applying
known load distributions to the associated structure. The sensitivity to all
potential loading actions should be identified. Where cross-coupling of loading
actions cannot be avoided, multiple sensors will be required to solve the
resulting simultaneous equations. The magnitude of calibration loads need to
be high enough to confirm the relationship between the sensor output and
applied load. Un-calibrated (i.e. non-load calibrated) sensors can be utilised
when replicating sensor locations on fatigue test articles, or, when positioned
close to a critical feature and the local stress field is well understood. It is
necessary to ensure that any un-calibrated strain gauges perform as expected
both as individuals and between like installations on other aircraft. This can be
done by response testing during build for a fleet-wide fit and/or dedicated flight
tests post build.
6.6 If loads are not measured directly, and the transfer function changes for
different flight states, e.g. in air and on the ground, the flight state will also need
to be monitored to ensure that loads are predicted correctly.
6.7 Sensor installations and wiring should be designed to minimise the risk
of interference from other systems and external sources. Consideration should
be given to amplification of low amplitude signals at, or close to, the sensor
locations.
6.8 Selection and positioning of sensors and associated wiring should be
optimised to minimise risk of damage during aircraft service operations and
maintenance. Repairability should also be considered. Where access for repair
is difficult, sensor installations and wiring should be duplicated.
6.9 Sensor power supplies should have high reliability and be very stable.
Voltage levels should be monitored for variation. The monitoring system should
be tolerant of any power spikes, which might occur at power on, power off, or
during flight. Examples of events that can cause spikes are; switching from
batteries to a generator or during engine flame-out/re-light.
6.10 Sensor processing and recording should not be affected by other
systems. Where a common processor is used to support multiple systems,
consideration should be given to processor capacity. The total system
requirement should not exceed 50% of the processor’s storage and processing
power. Where processing is required post engine shutdown, power should be
automatically maintained for the required duration.

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6.11 All aspects of the System need to be assessed when meeting the
overall system accuracy requirement. This includes, but is not limited to, sensor
accuracy, bandwidth, sampling rate and digitisation resolution. The level of
accuracy required for a fleet-wide monitoring system is dependent on available
structural margins. Where margins are considered to be large, a less accurate
system than that specified in Clause 3.2.27 might be considered acceptable,
provided that overall damage predictions are not overly optimistic and any
conservatism does not compromise the design life, or cause an unacceptable
inspection burden.
6.12 Data loss can occur for a number of reasons (e.g. processor conflicts,
media jams, lost media, or even media not fitted). Gaps during recording
should be kept to a minimum, should be logged and should not be load
dependent. A significant source of lost data is usually data transfer between the
aircraft and the GSS. Rigorous procedures need to be in place to minimise the
risk of excessive unmonitored flying.
6.13 Both analysis of operational flight data and limit load exceedance
identification should utilise validated time histories, i.e. these should not contain
interference spikes or voids. Aircraft, that require fast turn-around between
sorties, will have real time limit exceedance monitoring with post flight
indication. This is to prevent continued operation when there is a risk of
permanent structural deformation. Ideally all aircraft should have an on-board
indication of a loads limit exceedance but in some cases, where time history
data are transmitted to the GSS, it may be possible to utilise the GSS to report
limit exceedances. Ground analysis of OLM/ODR data is considered essential
to establish the quality of the data and that the expected relationships between
the recorded parameters are realised.

7 REFERENCES

1. Reed, S.C. and Holford, D.M. Guidance for Aircraft Operational Loads
Measurement Programmes. MASAAG Paper 109, 31 May 2007.

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LEAFLET 39
FATIGUE
LIFE EXTENSION

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This leaflet provides guidance on the additional considerations which apply to
ensure that the customary standard of compliance is maintained when service lives are
extended.

1.2 The need for life extension should be kept under constant review in order to give
adequate time for preparations to be made.

1.3 The period of extended service life must be clearly defined in terms of loading
spectra and appropriate parameters including, flying hours, landings, Fatigue Index and
numbers of pressurisation cycles.

2 LIFE EXTENSION ASSESSMENT

2.1 All fatigue-critical airframe and mechanical components must be assessed to

determine their life extension capability. This assessment should include features for which
an unlimited safe life was originally declared.

2.2 They must be categorised in the following manner:

(a) those features where the safe life may be extended on the basis of existing
design data, test evidence or in-service monitoring data;

(b) those features where the safe life may be extended, subject to substantiation by
additional testing and/or analysis, or by in-service monitoring;

(c) those components which must be retired at their original design life;

(d) those components where the life may be extended beyond the safe-life by the
adoption of an inspection-based methodology;

(e) those components already subject to a substantiated inspection-based

clearance.

2.3 The assessment should consider the methods and assumptions used in the original
substantiation, together with any design modifications and relevant operational experience
including any instances of cracking, repair, corrosion, wear or accidental damage.

2.4 The presence and consequences of multiple-site damage should also be

considered.

2.5 All airframe and mechanical components considered in the life extension
assessment should be checked against the build standard to identify components which
have been superseded or are obsolescent.

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2.6 Reference must be made to all concessions which have been permitted during the
manufacture of the aircraft. If it cannot be shown that items with concessions have the
necessary additional life, then they must be identified and either modified or withdrawn from
service.

3 LIFE EXTENSION DOCUMENT

3.1 A supplement to the Fatigue Type Record must be prepared in accordance with the
requirements of MAP RA 5309.

3.2 This supplement must record the evidence provided to demonstrate compliance with
all the requirements of Clause 3.2 and its associated leaflets, for the period of the life
extension.

3.3 If no Fatigue Type Record is available, a life extension document must be prepared
to record the evidence provided to demonstrate compliance with all the requirements of
Clause 3.2 and its associated leaflets, for the period of the life extension.

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LEAFLET 40
FATIGUE
FIBRE-COMPOSITE COMPONENTS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This leaflet provides guidance on methods of substantiating the fatigue life of
polymer-matrix fibre-composite components 1 . In order to minimise the need for in-service
inspections compliance is normally demonstrated using a safe-life approach. However, the
most common failure mode in fatigue-sensitive composites is delamination growth and this
can sometimes be exploited to provide an acceptable inspection-based substantiation.

1.2 The performance of composite components manufactured from a given fibre/matrix

system is affected to varying degrees by factors such as fibre orientation and volume
fraction, component geometry and loading and the method by which components are
manufactured. It is essential, therefore, that these conditions are represented in the test
specimens upon which the fatigue substantiation is based.

1.3 The performance is also influenced by the hygrothermal properties of the matrix -
the matrix tending to ‘soften’ after prolonged exposure to moisture and under elevated
temperature. Slight softening of the matrix can have a small beneficial effect on notched-
tensile strength, but can produce a marked reduction in compressive strength. Any such
effects must be taken into account in planning the fatigue test programme.

1.4 The fatigue strength of composite materials may be reduced by impact damage and
this must also be accounted for in the fatigue substantiation.

1.5 The leaflet draws largely upon experience gained in the Helicopter Industry, where
composites are used for the manufacture of dynamic components such as rotor blades and
control systems. In these applications the fatigue environment is more challenging than is
normally found in applications to airframes. Most helicopter dynamic components are of safe-
life design and are substantiated using a factor on stress (see Leaflet 35). This same
procedure has been applied to composite components and is reproduced here for more
general application.

1.6 In aeroplane airframe applications, the relatively high static notch-sensitivity and
modest impact resistance of high-modulus composites, together with the relatively low
gradient of their S-N curves, means that most components are unlikely to experience
significant fatigue problems [1]. The reserves of fatigue strength are normally sufficient to
permit substantiation using a conservative adaptation of the safe-life procedure described in
the following paragraphs, but using static testing to locate the mean S-N curve and drawing
upon library data for S-N curve shape and scatter in fatigue strength. Fatigue substantiation
obtained in this way must be underpinned by the extensive ‘building-block’ programme of
hygrothermal-mechanical tests on coupons, structural elements and components that
accompanies static certification. The next generation of advanced composites for airframe
applications is expected to be less notch-sensitive and to have improved resistance to impact
damage. As these restrictions are eased, then fatigue can be expected to become a more
significant consideration in the design of composite airframe structures [2].

1
Hereafter termed ‘composite’ components
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1.7 Composite materials may have higher coefficients of variation of fatigue strength
than metals. It is important that this variability is not underestimated when determining the
appropriate test factor on stress to be used in constructing a Safe S-N curve.

2 S-N CURVE SHAPES FOR STRUCTURAL FEATURES

2.1 A structure or mechanical component can sometimes have more than one critical
feature according to influences such as loading complexity and severity, together with
environmental effects.

2.2 It is normally impracticable to test sufficient components to establish an S-N curve

shape - indeed this would not necessarily be effective because critical features might change
with stress level. Therefore curve shapes are obtained by testing structural elements
representing individual fatigue-critical features.

2.3 The structural elements used to obtain these S-N curves must be made from the
same materials and by the same processes as the features themselves. They should
generally be of the same size as the feature and be loaded so that the conditions at the test
section represent those in the component.

2.4 These structural elements are normally found to have shallow S-N curves which
may not exhibit a distinct endurance limit. The endurance limit, S inf , should be taken to be the
alternating stress a component can sustain for 109 cycles; for practical purposes S inf may be
associated with a lower endurance providing this does not increase the value by more than
about 1%.

3 EFFECTS OF BARELY-VISIBLE IMPACT DAMAGE

3.1 Clause 3.12 specifies that components which are exposed to impact damage must
be the subject of an inspection-based substantiation. However, the structural performance of
composite components can be degraded by an insidious form of impact damage which is
neither apparent nor readily detectable by inspection. This is termed Barely-Visible Impact
Damage (BVID); it is believed to correspond to the term ‘Undetectable Damage’ used by the
US military authorities.

3.2 The nature of the BVID threat and how it is to be represented for compliance
purposes must be agreed with the Project Authority. The appropriate energy level will
normally be applied using a ‘blunt’ impactor.

3.3 In order to demonstrate tolerance to BVID arising from a defined threat, all full-scale
composite fatigue test specimens, other than the structural elements used to define S-N
curves, must be subjected to the appropriate impact conditions before they are fatigue
tested.

4 ESTIMATION OF COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION OF FATIGUE STRENGTH

4.1 The coefficient of variation of fatigue strength, which is needed to determine the
appropriate test factor on fatigue stress, can be estimated from tests on representative
structural elements. Lower scatter is likely to be obtained if the tests are done using variable
amplitude loading.

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4.2 At least 20 specimens should be tested. For most purposes tests on four specimens
at each of five stress levels will be suitable. The lowest stress level should be chosen so that
most specimens fail during the test.

4.3 A mean ‘S-N’ curve should be determined from the test data using, for example, a
four-parameter Weibull equation (see Leaflet 35) and taking due account of any run-outs
(non-failures). Run-outs must not be treated as failures, as this can seriously distort the
shape of the curve.

4.4 When the test data do not include run-outs, an estimate of the coefficient of variation
can be determined as below. If run-outs are present, the estimate will normally be an integral
part of the optimisation procedure used in fitting the S-N curve (see, for example, [3]).
However, the procedure given below can also be used, providing the proportion of run-outs is
low and that the results from the unfailed specimens are discarded. Static results must not be
included in the analysis.

4.5 An unbiased estimate of the coefficient of variation,, is given by:

2
1 n  S i  S Mi 
 
n  p i1  S Mi 


where S i is the stress (amplitude for constant amplitude tests) at test point i, and S Mi
the corresponding stress on the mean curve at the same life, n is the number of test
points corresponding to failures and p is the number of unknown parameters whose
values have been determined in the curve-fitting process (i.e. four in the case of a four-
parameter Weibull equation).

4.6 Allowance for batch effects:

(a) The test specimens should be made from each of at least three batches of each
material.

(b) Alternatively, if the failure modes in static and fatigue tests are similar, the
coefficient of variation in fatigue strength obtained from a single batch can be adjusted
using variability data from static tests on coupon specimens, such as may be used for
batch acceptance purposes [4]:

Population coefficient of variation =  se  2   b  2

where  se = coefficient of variation from structural element tests
 b = coefficient of variation for material batch to batch variability

and  b =  sb   ft /  st
where  sb = coefficient of variation for static strength batch-to-batch variability
 ft = coefficient of variation for fatigue strength variability from coupon tests
 st = coefficient of variation for static strength variability from coupon tests

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5 ESTABLISHING THE MEAN S-N CURVE FOR A COMPONENT

5.1 The mean S-N curve for a component must be positioned using test results from full-
size specimens.

5.2 In the simplest case, where only a single failure mode need be considered, an
appropriate mean S-N curve (obtained from structural element tests and normally a library
curve) must first be fitted to each test result in turn so that a family of S-N curves is obtained
- each curve corresponding to a Miner damage summation of unity.

5.3 The mean S-N curve for the component must then be positioned to correspond to
the mean fatigue strength given by these curves. It is often convenient to obtain the mean
fatigue strength at the fatigue limit, but by the nature of their construction the relative fatigue
strength given by the curves does not vary with endurance.

5.4 It is usual to substantiate those potentially critical features which do not fail on test
by repeating the above procedure assuming they were about to fail. However, in principle,
these other features could be substantiated using supplementary evidence as described in
Leaflet 35.

5.5 The mean S-N curve for the component is taken to be that of the failure mode which
gives the lowest safe life (see following paragraph) under the service loading.

6 FATIGUE STRENGTH SCATTER FACTORS

6.1 The factors, given in Table 1 are to be used to reduce the mean S-N curve to obtain
the Safe S-N curve.

6.2 As can be seen, the factors depend upon the population coefficient of variation and
the number of components tested. If high scatter in fatigue strength (coefficient of variation 
15%) has been demonstrated, then appropriate factors must be agreed with the Project
Authority.

6.3 The factors have been calculated to correspond to a nominal probability of failure of
1 in 1000, assuming a normal distribution of fatigue strength. However, unlike the factors
used for metallic materials, they have been calculated to provide 95% confidence that this
probability will be achieved (i.e. that it will be achieved on approximately 19 occasions out of
20 rather than on average) and no account has been taken of the notional number of
[identical/identically loaded] components per aircraft [5]. As it happens, in this application, the
factors are closely similar to those that would have been obtained using the procedure
described in Leaflet 35 and so there is no reason for them to be changed.

7 FATIGUE LIFE SCATTER FACTORS

7.1 As is the case for metallic materials, fatigue life scatter factors depend on the
coefficient of variation of fatigue life which, unlike the coefficient of variation of fatigue
strength, varies significantly with endurance. It follows that life factors cannot be established
directly without extensive testing and so a form of Safe S-N procedure is used.

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7.2 It is inappropriate to use a life factor of 2.8 (Leaflet 35) in constructing Safe S-N
curves for composite materials. This is because the factor is based on the scatter observed
at low endurances when structural elements made from conventional metallic materials are
tested under variable amplitude loading. Composite materials generally exhibit higher life
factors.

7.3 Appropriate life factors for test purposes can be determined by constructing a Safe
S-N curve from the mean [constant amplitude] S-N curve using an appropriate stress factor
(only) from Table 1. Where appropriate, a further stress factor of 1.2 may be required to allow
for uncertainties in loading (see Leaflet 34).

7.4 The life factor corresponding to any [variable amplitude] test severity can then be
obtained by calculating the life at that severity, using Miner’s rule and the mean S-N curve,
and dividing by the corresponding life obtained from the Safe S-N curve. It is emphasised
that factors obtained in this way will not necessarily be achievable on test for all potentially-
critical features. Guidance on their interpretation is provided in Leaflet 35.

7.5 Where a life factor is required for discrete (constant amplitude) stress amplitudes
(as might be interspersed between stress-factored loading in tests on some helicopter
dynamic components), this can be obtained directly from the S-N curves by dividing the
mean life by the safe life at the test amplitude concerned.

8 ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION FACTORS

8.1 The static and fatigue strengths of polymer-matrix composites are affected by
moisture uptake and temperature. If the operating temperature is close to the resin glass-
transition temperature a significant drop in strength can be expected; moisture uptake lowers
the glass-transition temperature.

8.2 The moisture distribution associated with prolonged operation in the most adverse
environment world-wide can be represented by the equilibrium condition corresponding to a
relative humidity of about 85% [6].

8.3 Often it is impractical to degrade thick components to the equilibrium condition prior
to testing because of the time required to obtain a representative moisture content and
distribution. Instead superfactors (sometimes termed ‘knock-down’ factors) can be applied.
These superfactors can be determined from fatigue tests on coupons and structural elements
with artificial degradation and without. During degradation, travellers should be used to
monitor moisture uptake and specimens should reach at least 95% of the target equilibrium
condition. The factors so obtained can be refined in due course by reference to tests on
naturally-aged full-size specimens, or at least coupons and/or elements cut from them.

8.4 The effect of cyclic and prolonged exposure to both hot/dry and cold/dry conditions
must be considered.

8.5 Consideration must also be given to any deleterious effects of aircraft fluids which
may come into contact with the structure.

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9 INSPECTION-BASED SUBSTANTIATION

9.1 Whilst delamination growth can sometimes be exploited to provide an inspection-

based substantiation, growth rates can sometimes accelerate rapidly and render the
approach impractical. In consequence, the detection of damage is commonly followed by
repairs which are underpinned by generic or specific test data.

9.2 Special techniques may need to be developed to detect the occurrence of BVID or
to register potentially-damaging impacts.

9.3 There is a body of evidence showing that airframe structures containing BVID and
designed to the reduced-strain allowables currently employed do not exhibit significant
damage growth under gust and manoeuvre-dominated spectra. Test substantiation has
focused on demonstrating that damage of an agreed size does not grow under service
conditions. Arguably, such damage should represent defects/damage of ‘detectable size’
(see Leaflet 36) that would be unlikely to be missed in manufacture, or in service in the case
of components exposed to impact damage. Furthermore, since the damage is intended to
represent defects that might be present throughout the life, the damaged structure would
need to be capable of sustaining the Design Ultimate Load; some alleviation of this
requirement would be obtained if sufficient data could be provided to justify a probabilistic
approach, but this would require information on the probability distributions of crack
detection, residual strength and service loading.

REFERENCES

1 Cardrick, A. W., Certification of composite structures for military aircraft,

Curtis, P.T. IMechE/RAeS AeroTech ‘92 Symposium, Birmingham, January
1992
2 Curtis, P. T. Designing for fatigue and environmental effects in polymer
composites, IMechE International Conference on Designing Cost-
Effective Composites, London, 15-16 September 1998
3 ESDU Derivation of endurance curves from fatigue test data including
run-outs, Engineering Sciences Data Unit Item 97024
4 DoD MIL-HDBK-17B (S/S by Mil-HBK-17/1), United States Department
of Defense
5 Cansdale, R. A Note on the Derivation of Fatigue Scatter Factors, Airworthiness
Division, Materials and Structures Dept., RAE Farnborough,
September 1984.
6 Collings, T.A. Moisture Management and Artificial Ageing of Fibre Reinforced
Epoxy Resins: T A Collings, RAE Farnborough, Tech. Memo.
Mat/Str. 1093, 1987.

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Coefficient of NUMBER OF COMPONENT TESTS

Variation
1 2 3 4 5 6
0.08 or less 1.50 1.45 1.43 1.42 1.41 1.40
0.09 1.59 1.53 1.50 1.49 1.48 1.47
0.10 1.69 1.62 1.58 1.57 1.55 1.54
0.11 1.79 1.71 1.67 1.65 1.64 1.63
0.12 1.90 1.81 1.77 1.75 1.73 1.72
0.13 2.03 1.92 1.88 1.85 1.83 1.82
0.14 2.17 2.05 2.00 1.97 1.94 1.93
0.15 2.32 2.19 2.13 2.09 2.07 2.05

TABLE 1

FATIGUE STRENGTH SCATTER FACTORS FOR FIBRE-COMPOSITE COMPONENTS

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LEAFLET 41
FATIGUE LOAD METER INSTALLATIONS
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1 PURPOSE
1.1 The fatigue load meter is intended to provide information that will
enable the consumption of the fatigue life of an aeroplane to be monitored, and
to give immediate warning when the aeroplane may have been overstressed.
2 THE FATIGUE LOAD METER
2.1 The fatigue load meter operates by counting the peaks of normal
acceleration, at the centre of gravity of the aeroplane, that are caused by
external forces in flight.
2.2 The Meter comprises essentially an accelerometer and a group of
counters to record the numbers of times that eight or more predetermined
accelerations are exceeded. For variable geometry aeroplanes, the meter must
separately record the number of times the predetermined accelerations are
exceeded at each of several structurally significant configurations or flight
conditions. It should be installed so that, as nearly as possible, the axis of the
accelerometer lies in the plane of symmetry of the aeroplane and is normal to
the flight path (normally within 5 degrees of vertical, when the aircraft is flying
straight and level). An automatic switch in the 24 volt electrical power supply is
employed to start the meter when the aeroplane has become airborne and to
stop it before the aeroplane lands, so that accelerations caused by contact with
the ground are not counted.
2.3 The accelerometer is a double spring-mass system with eddy-current
damping, designed to respond faithfully to oscillations up to a certain frequency
and to attenuate oscillations of higher frequencies. It has a good transient
response (i.e., a 5% to 10% overshoot after an applied step function). The
meter records absolute accelerations; thus straight and level flight corresponds
to 1.0 g. The meter will not be damaged by accelerations of 12 g.
3 INSTALLATION
3.1 The fatigue meter should always be installed as close as possible to
the centre of gravity of the aeroplane in order to minimise errors in the
measured accelerations. The distance of 1.5 metres, is the maximum that is
tolerable; usually the distance should not exceed one metre.
3.2 The counter display should be installed where it may be read easily
when the aircraft is standing on the ground.
3.3 The fatigue meter should be installed rigidly to the wing centre section,
or to a part of the structure that has an inflexible load path to the wing centre
section. Any flexibility in the connection between the meter and the centre of
gravity of the aeroplane has an adverse effect on the accuracy of
measurement. Therefore the meter should not only be attached firmly to rigid
aeroplane structure but it should be placed where structural modes of vibration
will not cause spurious inputs.

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4 SWITCHING ON AND OFF

4.1 GENERAL

4.1.1 The switch should start the meter as soon as possible after the
aeroplane leaves the ground and should stop it in as short a time as
possible before the aeroplane lands. Unfortunately the switch cannot be
operated successfully by the extension and compression of the
undercarriage legs. During take-off the wheels remain briefly in contact with
the ground after the legs have extended completely, and the full leg
extension persists for a short time after the initial landing contact.
4.2 COMBAT AND TRAINER AEROPLANES WITH RETRACTABLE
UNDERCARRIAGE

4.2.1 It is recommended that combat and training aeroplanes with

retractable undercarriage be provided with a switch that closes when the
undercarriage is retracted and opens when it is lowered. These aeroplanes
spend little time flying with their undercarriage extended, and this kind of
switch has the merit of simplicity.
4.3 AEROPLANES WITH FIXED UNDERCARRIAGES

4.3.1 A switch operated by changes in indicated air speed is

recommended for aeroplanes that have fixed undercarriages. However, an
aeroplane loses mass during every sortie by consuming fuel, and it may
shed more mass by dropping supplies or paratroops. As a result it may often
be able to fly at speeds below its take-off speed. If it does so its Fatigue
Load Meter should continue to function. Therefore, an air speed switch
should operate at two speeds a higher one at which the meter is started and
a lower one, reached as late as possible in the landing approach, at which
the meter is stopped. Both speeds should be selected to match the
performance of the aeroplane. Usually the higher figure is 10 knots above
the speed recommended for take-off at the maximum permitted mass, and
the lower one is 10 knots above the threshold speed recommended for the
maximum permitted landing mass. In any case the 2 speeds should differ by
at least 10 knots, to obviate the risk that small variations in speed will cause
intermittent operation of the meter.
5 VARIATIONS IN LOADING ACTION
5.1 In some aeroplanes, the loading actions associated with different
phases of flight, or with different configurations of the aeroplane, may differ
sufficiently to cause significant variations in wing stress per g. For example,
changes may occur when the wing sweep angle is altered in flight or when
vectored thrust is used. They can be accommodated by using more than one
set of counters, and switching automatically from one to another by means of a
potentiometer, microswitch or voltage source.
5.2 When a potentiometer is used, spark suppression must be
incorporated in order to ensure an adequate operational life and to alleviate the
effects of contact bounce. Usually this consists of a capacitor across the output
terminals and a resistor in series with the wiper lead. These components
should be installed with extremely short leads, preferably inside the
potentiometer case; they will then suppress the microsparks in the

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potentiometer which decompose hydrocarbon vapour and thereby cause

pollution of the potentiometer track or slip ring.
6 RELIABILITY
6.1 The need for reliability is stated in the requirements because
unmetered flying carries a heavy penalty. The life consumed during an
unmetered flight is estimated from the records of other flights, and then
increased by a factor of 1.5 to allow for the uncertainty of the estimate. Thus
unmetered flying consumes the safe life of the aeroplane 50% faster than
metered flying; hence the reliability of the meter system has a direct effect on
the utilisation of the aeroplane.
6.2 The failure rate of the complete fatigue meter system, for all reasons,
shall not exceed on in 1,000 flights. This shall be demonstrated by an approved
reliability demonstration technique. Particular care shall be taken to ensure
very high reliability in the supplies and connections to the meter, and in the
devices that are used in flight to switch the meter on and off and to switch from
one group of counters to another.

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LEAFLET 42
STRUCTURAL MONITORING SYSTEMS
USING NON-ADAPTIVE PREDICTION METHODS

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Within this leaflet guidance is provided to support of the requirements
identified in Clauses 3.2.33 to 3.2.59 – Structural Monitoring using Non-
Adaptive Prediction Methods. The following topics are addressed:
(a) Definitions;
(b) Related Requirements;
(c) Exclusions;
(d) Task Definition;
(e) System Design;
(f) Training, Testing and Validation Data;
(g) Model Training;
(h) Model Validation;
(i) In-Service Maintenance.
2 DEFINITIONS
2.1 Non-Adaptive Prediction Method
A prediction method is defined as a set of coefficients/weights and a set of
transformation equations that operate on a set of inputs (such as flight
parameters e.g. normal acceleration, roll rate etc) to produce outputs that
approximate a target value (e.g. stress, strain, load or fatigue damage).
Prediction techniques use a range of mathematical or statistical methods that
may include neural networks, model-based analysis, linear or non-linear
regression, clustering algorithms etc. Non-adaptive prediction methods use a
fixed set of weights, which are evaluated through calibration/training using
target data that contains examples of inputs and target outputs. After training,
the coefficients of non-adaptive methods are fixed until the commencement of
any further training.
2.2 Supervised Learning
Supervised learning is a technique where the model is presented with input
data and examples of the required output data, or target. The relationships
within the model are adjusted, for example by iteration, to reduce an error
function. This error function is based upon the difference between the desired
output and that predicted by the model. There is a plethora of training
algorithms used to minimise the error by converging as quickly as possible
while ensuring that the model does not over fit the solution to the training data.
Well-known examples of supervised learning include Multi-Layer Perceptron
(MLP) and Radial Basis Function (RBF) Artificial Neural Networks (ANN).

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2.3 Unsupervised Learning

Unsupervised learning techniques allow the model to determine the
characteristic relationships within the data without reference to output or target
examples. Information about the characteristic features of input data is created
during the learning process and stored in the model. Output signals describe
relationships between the current input signals and the model internal
relationships. Well-known unsupervised techniques include Clustering
Algorithms, Kohonen Networks and Learning Vector Quantisation (which
incorporates both unsupervised and supervised architecture).
2.4 Domain Knowledge
Domain knowledge is the specialist or a priori knowledge about the system.
The application of domain knowledge to select and combine the system input
parameters can be explained by a simple example. The loads introduced into
an aircraft structure due to the deployment of a control surface will be a
function of the degree of deployment (e.g. angle) and the dynamic pressure
(½v2) around the aircraft at the time. Therefore, appropriate domain
knowledge would be that the control surface deployment angle should be
conditioned by dynamic pressure before input into the prediction model. Hence
the prediction model can be used to determine the unknown relationships in the
system rather than learning a relationship already known. For an aircraft fatigue
monitoring system, domain knowledge could be obtained from a variety of
sources including aircraft loads models, from equations of motion, or previous
aircraft parametric monitor inputs.
2.5 Numeric Data
Numeric data vary along a continuous scale, such as strain output.
2.6 Categorical Data
Categorical data are discrete and are not represented by a continuous scale. A
weight-on-wheels micro switch that occupies 2 states (true and false or ‘1’ and
‘0’) is an example of categorical data.
2.7 Training Data
Training data are inputs and the target values to be predicted. The training data
are used to evaluate the coefficients/weights.
2.8 Test Data
Test data are inputs and target values used to test the accuracy of the trained
prediction methods. The test data are not used to change the
coefficients/weights, but may be used to judge one prediction method against
another.
2.9 Validation Data
Validation data are inputs and target values not included in the training or test
data. Validation data are used to compute the performance metric of the final
prediction method after it has been trained and tested.

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3 RELATED REQUIREMENTS (Clause 3.2.33 to 3.2.59)

3.1 This Leaflet and the corresponding regulations detailed in Clause 3.2
cover the specific use of non-adaptive prediction methods within an aircraft
structural monitoring system. These regulations are subordinate to and should
be read in conjunction with Clause 3.2 and Leaflet 38 - Service Monitoring, as
well as Def Stan 00-56 – Safety Management Requirements for Defence
Systems.
3.2 It cannot be overemphasised how important it is that those involved in
the design, development and certification of an aircraft structural monitor are
familiar with these standards.
3.3 It is not appropriate to include directly extracts from high-level standards
within specific lower-level requirements or guidance, as this increases the risk
of contradictory regulation with future amendment. Rather, it is more
appropriate to call up these standards directly and hence this leaflet relates
only to issues specific to non-adaptive prediction methods.
4 EXCLUSIONS (Clause 3.2.35)
4.1 Adaptive prediction methods are excluded from this regulation. Adaptive
prediction methods are defined here as models where the system continues to
train itself when it is in service use rather than just during designated training
runs, within a formal training environment. Without formal control over the
training data set, certification of such a mechanism for a safety related or safety
critical application would be highly unlikely and hence these adaptive networks
are not considered suitable as the basis of a structural monitoring system.
5 TASK DEFINITION (Clause 3.2.36)
5.1 All projects require a clear task definition at the outset and a non-
adaptive prediction structural monitor is no different. Hence, the task definition
should be clear and concise and should include the identification of the
structural monitoring locations, the monitoring method (e.g. stress-life, strain-
life or damage-tolerance), the required performance metric for the system (refer
to Clause 3.2 and Leaflet 38– Service Monitoring), the data coverage required
and any constraints on the system. These constraints might include: limitations
on the parametric data available for training, testing and validation, high-
frequency structurally significant loads in monitor locations or airborne and off
board processing speeds and storage limitations.
6 SYSTEM DESIGN (Clause 3.2.37)
6.1 Domain knowledge is the specialist or a priori knowledge about the
system. The incorporation of domain knowledge into the system can greatly
improve the capability of the structural monitor.

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6.2 Domain knowledge may also be applied to identify the system input
parameters that could improve the accuracy of the prediction method. For
example, if a vertical fin monitor was being developed, domain knowledge may
indicate that sideslip angle, lateral acceleration at the tail, yaw rate and yaw
acceleration are important parameters to include. Many of these parameters
have not routinely been included within an OLM programme parameter data
set. Therefore, early identification and documentation of this type of domain
knowledge for the structural monitor will assist in ensuring that necessary data
are captured within training, testing and validation data sets.
6.3 Each input or output to a model will be either numeric or categorical and
thought needs to be given to the data type and its proposed treatment. This is
particularly significant for categorical data where poor treatment can lead to
non-sense outputs. For example, weight-on-wheels can only be true or false (1
or 0). Therefore, a value of 0.8 is meaningless. In such cases, spread encoding
should be considered, where a single numeric value is transformed into a set of
category variables. This can be envisaged as a large array of pigeonholes,
each of which represents a category. This is particularly useful when the
variable is an output and a number of categories can be chosen. A spread
encoding technique can be used to identify the probability that the answer is in
each of the given possible categories. Examples of this technique could be
helicopter flight condition recognition algorithms.
6.4 Data normalisation methods used for example to match data to non-
linear activation functions and to prevent scale error effects and methods used
to reduce the dimensionality of the input data need to be documented. It is
often desirable to reduce the number of input variables to a minimum to reduce
the size of the training data set needed to produce a suitable solution. This
process is termed dimensionality reduction as each input or output parameter
provides an additional dimension to the input space. Dimensionality reduction
can be achieved in a number of ways. For example, input variables can be
removed that carry the least predictive power. However, in practice
identification of the least predictive variables in a multidimensional space can
be problematic. Input parameter significances can be determined by using
methods such as Automatic Relevance Determination (ARD). This method
uses a Bayesian framework to identify the relative significance of an input to
the network output based upon the overall variance in the weights relating to
each input parameter. Alternatively, methods whereby high-dimensional input
data are projected onto a lower dimensional space are often used. Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) is a well-known tool used for this process. The
input data are resolved into principal components or directions. Those
components that contribute most significantly to the variance of the data are
preserved. Another method is to use an Auto-Associative network as a feature
extractor. This method involves constructing a MLP ANN where the target
output is the same as the input. The hidden layer that contains the least
number of neurons (less than the number of inputs), acts as feature extractors.
The inputs to the prediction method are then generated by entering the full
input vector into the Auto-Associative network and extracting the outputs of the
hidden layer with the least number of neurons.

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6.5 It is noteworthy that differences in flight phase or state of the aircraft

may necessitate several different models, if the underlying relationships within
these phases or states are different. For example, the change in state between
aircraft on ground and aircraft airborne or subsonic flight and supersonic flight
can generate significant changes in the parametric to strain relationships.
Hence, it may be more appropriate to incorporate several models and use
deterministic methods, or selection models, to identify which model is
appropriate for each phase of flight.
6.6 It is not appropriate for the design of the structural monitor to be
prescribed in the regulations, as this should be the prerogative of the system
designer. Furthermore, this would inhibit progress and it is highly likely that a
combination of tools would be used as a structural monitor. It is essential
however that the design, architecture and all data manipulation methods of the
predictive structural monitor be unambiguously documented.
7 TRAINING, TESTING AND VALIDATION DATA (Clause 3.2.38 to 3.2.47)
7.1 The data collection strategy will include identification of the data
requirements, data sources, estimated data quantity and data limitations. A
predictive structural monitor will require large quantities of data for training,
testing and validation, throughout every stage of its development. For most
models input data (such as aircraft flight parameters) and output, or target, data
(such as strains, stresses or loads), will be required for training, testing and
validation.
7.2 As part of this strategy it is important to consider the requirements of the
monitor. Ultimately, the success criteria of the monitor will be identified by
comparison with representative data obtained from an OLM/ODR programme.
For example, fatigue damage is usually approximated to somewhere between
the 3rd power and 5th power of stress range. Therefore, accuracy in predicting
extremes of stress is far more significant, in fatigue damage terms, than
predicting steady-state values.
7.3 In addition, the accuracy requirements for the monitor need to be
appropriate to the input and target data accuracy. Hence, the designer will
need to be familiar with the input and target sensor behaviour and accuracy.
7.4 The data collection strategy needs to populate adequately the training,
testing and validation data sets. In addition, care should be taken to ensure that
the various aircraft configurations are covered in the data sets. Stores carriage
and aircraft configurations are likely to affect significantly the relationships
between flight parameters and strains for combat aircraft. For fighter aircraft,
combat flap scheduling may have a significant affect on wing root bending
loads. For large aircraft types, fuel management and load alleviation devices
are likely to have effects. For helicopters, weight and centre of gravity
management are likely to be significant. This information should have been
highlighted during the domain knowledge capture exercise and should be
reviewed to ensure adequate domain knowledge capture. Specialist
knowledge, particularly from the aircraft Design Organisation, is important for
understanding type-specific information.

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7.5 The training, testing and validation data sets need to be captured from
all practicable areas of the flight envelope. This is to ensure the models can
provide coverage for all flight regimes and to ensure that any significant
changes in the relationships between the model inputs (e.g. flight parameters)
and the model outputs (e.g. strains) are captured. This requirement is identified
as all practicable areas because it may not be possible to obtain flight loads
data from every location in the flight envelope and hence it is essential that
evidence of the coverage of the training, testing and validation data is also
provided.
7.6 Furthermore, where practicable, data from a number of aircraft should
be captured and used within the training, testing and validation process. These
data should be used to demonstrate that the models can provide a generalised
solution across more than one individual aircraft.
7.7 The possible sources of flight data to train, test and validate structural
models are largely restricted to data from Flight Loads Measurement (FLM),
Operational Loads Measurement (OLM) or Operational Data Recording (ODR)
programmes. However, additional data could be obtained from Ground
Resonance Testing (GRT), analytical loads models or Finite Element Models
(FEM). FLM data can exercise areas of the flight envelope not routinely visited
during in-Service operations. Therefore, FLM data could be used to train initial
models to predict the underlying data relationships required for the monitor and
once OLM data becomes available additional training could be undertaken as
required.
7.8 The statistics of the training, testing and validation data need to be
identified and documented. For numeric data this may include the mean,
standard deviation, minimum and maximum values and for categorical data this
may include the range of different categories and the population densities.
Basic statistical data, such as mean, standard deviation, minimum and
maximum values provides the first indication that the training, testing and
validation data are consistent with each other.
7.9 There is no straightforward method of determining how many data are
required to train and test a predictive structural model. In general, the quantity
of data required is governed by the number of training cases that will be
needed to ensure the network performs adequately. A training case, for
supervised learning, is defined as one input vector and one output vector. In
turn, the number of training cases is defined by the nature of the application,
the intrinsic dimensionality of the data, the resolution required and the
frequency distribution of the data. Additionally, the quality of the data and
presence of ambiguous inputs also needs to be considered. Most importantly,
evidence of the coverage of the structural monitor from training data needs to
be provided.
7.10 For a complex system in which there is a significant variation between
nearby points within the input or output space, data that are significantly
different to smooth interpolation may not be modelled correctly. More complex
problems may require more complex models and more data to train with to
provide adequate generalisation capability.

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7.11 Analysis of the frequency distribution of input and output data is a useful
tool in identifying the range and density of the training, test and validation sets.
These distributions can be used to select the most appropriate data for training,
testing and validation. For example, high strain variations are more significant
in fatigue damage terms than steady-state strains. Therefore, it would be ill-
advised for benign flying to dominate the training sets.
7.12 Methods used to check the integrity of the data, including anomaly
detection routines and statistical techniques, need to be applied across
training, testing and validation data sets and documented accordingly.
Assessment of the quality of the data to be presented to the model is essential.
Data anomalies, such as range exceedences, dropouts, sensor failures, datum
shifts and bad blocks should be identified and removed. All raw data should be
stored and a record of all data anomalies should be retained (detailed in next
paragraph). Flight data will not be perfect and where there is noise in the data
then a larger quantity of data will be required to train the model.
8 MODEL TRAINING (Clause 3.2.48 and 3.2.49)
8.1 The function of the training algorithm is to minimise the error between
the predicted output and the required output. Generally, the smaller the error,
the better the performance of the model. This error is calculated either each
time a new data set is presented to the model (on-line mode), or at each pass
(epoch) through the training data (batch mode). These errors are used to
update the internal relationships within the model. During or after training, the
model(s) is/are tested on a data set (test set) to indicate the performance on
unseen data (to confirm generalisation) or to choose an optimal model.
8.2 For some techniques, such as ANNs, a randomisation function may be
used to set the initial weights for training. In this case, a number of models are
required as some may get stuck in local minima on the error surface and the
risk of using a model in this condition is reduced if several models are trained
and the model best performing on the test data is selected. Thereafter, only the
best performing model would be used to compute the performance metric using
the validation data.
8.3 There are numerous training algorithms used for non-adaptive
prediction methods. Broadly, these training algorithms work by presenting each
pattern of data to the network and either at each data presentation of after the
entire set (epoch) has been presented the model is updated based upon the
error criteria used. The most appropriate method will depend on the
application. Whichever method is chosen by the designer, it needs to be
documented clearly and unambiguously together with supporting material
including the performance of the selected non-adaptive prediction method on
training and testing data. As well as the algorithm itself, the methods used to
prevent effects such as over fitting to the training data need to be documented
clearly.
9 MODEL VALIDATION (Clause 3.2.50 to 3.2.52)

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9.1 The independent validation using unseen data (validation set) is

undertaken to compute the performance metric (e.g. fatigue damage). Use of a
validation data set is required because this data set has not been used within
the training process. Although the test set is independent of the training set, it
may have been used to select the best performing models during development.
Hence, an element of the independence of the test data has been eroded. The
validation requirements for the models should be set with an understanding of
the accuracy of the input and target data. Where possible, validation data shall
be obtained from a number of aircraft to confirm that a generalised solution has
been obtained.
9.2 For a predictive structural monitor to be deployed, it is essential that the
models provide an indication of the confidence interval in the prediction or the
likely error in the output. There are a variety of methods published in the
literature for identifying confidence intervals. These include using statistical
approaches based upon the variance of the output and the correlation
coefficients between the network output and the required output. Alternative
methods include generating confidence intervals by training a second model to
predict the errors in the first model. Also, methods of producing error bars
within a Bayesian training method are frequently used. In this situation, the size
of the error bars, and hence confidence, vary with the inverse of the training
data density: larger bars are produced where data densities are low (i.e. sparse
data). Therefore, evidence of the coverage of the structural monitor from
validation data needs to be clearly identified and documented.
9.3 Although anomaly detection and data novelty detection processes will
be in place it is still necessary to have an appreciation of the sensitivity of the
non-adaptive prediction structural monitor to input variations. The output from
this sensitivity analysis can be used as part of the knowledge base for trend
analysis in Service.
10 IN-SERVICE MAINTENANCE (Clause 3.2.53 to 3.2.59)
10.1 Before the monitor enters service it is essential that a performance
assessment mechanism and a performance review plan be identified.
Processes for software anomaly reporting are well established. However, these
mechanisms have to be extended to cater for situations where the software is
operating correctly but the output is questionable. A continued monitoring plan
is therefore required. Within this plan the measures for detecting and reporting
input data anomalies, novel input data (i.e. data outside the experience of the
training set) and confidence intervals need to be detailed and methods for
undertaking trend analysis and setting warning levels need to be specified.
10.2 One of the key issues for in-service support will be to identify when
structural monitoring models require retraining. Until a system enters service it
is not possible to identify how often retraining will be needed. This will largely
depend on how good the model was in the first place and the implication of
changes in Service usage. However, if measures are in place to undertake a
review then it should be possible to identify when retraining is required. The
main challenge will be identifying erroneous but credible results and here
comparison with conventional statistical methods and trend analysis will be
useful tools.

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LEAFLET 43
GUST
PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The gust amplitudes quoted in the discrete gust cases are set at levels based on
collected gust data and which have given satisfactory gust strength on previous
aeroplanes. The loads produced by gusts of these amplitudes are at the Design Limit
Load level that is to be expected once in a specified time (e.g. aircraft lifetime).
1.2 The probability of meeting a severe gust depends on the aircraft altitude,
geographical terrain and weather patterns. Whether or not that gust generates loads in
excess of limit load on the airframe structure depends on the aircraft speed when the
gust is encountered, the gust amplitude and sharpness and the configuration of the
aircraft – mass, fuel quantity, payload, store load, etc.
1.3 The rigid application of the gust design cases may result in an aircraft being
judged unacceptable and consequently having a limit imposed on the flight envelope or
requiring an excessive weight penalty to strengthen the structure. These penalties have
a overall impact on the aircraft, whereas it is possible that there is only a low probability
of encountering a severe gust in the particular combination of flight conditions which
infringe the gust design case.
1.4 The Gust Probabilistic Analysis quantifies the overall risk of encountering a gust
which reaches a limit load capability level during the planned full operational usage of
the aircraft, which yields the frequency with which limit load level will be reached. This
frequency is considered acceptable if it implies a period between encounters which is at
least as long as the specified life in the definition of the Design Limit Load.
1.5 It may be noted that such probabilistic analysis can also be used to maximise the
level of clearance offered to an aircraft of a given gust capability while maintaining the
risk of a limit load gust encounter at acceptable levels. The analysis can also provide an
insight into the implications of sortie planning to minimise gust risk
1.6 The overall process is illustrated in figure 1 and is described in the following
paragraphs. Figure 2 shows more detail for the process applied to one flight condition. A
discussion of the effect of parameter variations is included in reference 1 and the generic
aircraft model used to generate examples in this leaflet is described in reference 2.

2. SORTIE DEFINITION
2.1 The starting point for the process is the definition of operational usage of the
aircraft. The military operator often defines utilisation in a Statement of Operating Intent
and Usage (SOIU), expressed in terms of a number of different sorties reflecting specific
operational duties and the fraction of total aircraft flight time expected to be devoted to
each duty.

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2.2 For the purpose of the gust analysis greater detail is necessary, so that a range
of variations of the same sortie type may be defined to cover, for example, different flight
duration, take-off fuel, and payload. Each sortie variation will have a probability
associated with it, represented by a predicted number of sorties with those conditions
during a period of operation. The variations of sorties are necessary to ensure that the
effects of the most severe operating conditions are included in the analysis. For
example, flight with low fuel and high payload may entail a much higher gust risk than
the same flight with average fuel and payload weights. It is important to include sorties
which take the aircraft into the extremes of the flight envelope, with a wide range of
values of take-off fuel and payloads studied. The improbability of operating sorties at
these conditions will be accounted for via a small number of flights associated with that
combination of parameters.
2.3 The effect of different flight duration cannot be achieved by a linear scaling of
similar flights, since duration is a significant variable in the analysis for two reasons. One
is the effect of fuel consumption, so that the aircraft will be carrying less fuel at the end
of a longer flight with the same take-off conditions. The other effect is the modified
balance between flight at different altitudes: on a shorter flight a higher proportion of total
time will be spent in, for example, the descent and landing phases.
2.4 In general, take-off and climb will be defined by handling and performance
requirements and have been taken to remain fixed at the baseline values for the initial
phase of all flights of a particular sortie type, subject to a possible reduction of rate of
climb when flying at high gross weights. Similarly, descent, approach, and landing are
likely to be fixed in time relative to the end of the flight. The adjustments to duration after
climb and before final descent should be appropriate to the operational task in the sortie.
For example, a transit or transport flight is easily modified by suitable reduction or
extension of cruise, possibly with altitude changes as appropriate. A maritime patrol
mission, with low altitude patrol interspersed between higher altitude transits, can be
extended by introducing additional cycles of patrol and transit.
2.5 There is also the possibility of variable discrete changes of weight during the
flight, from causes such as air-dropping of some payload, release of stores, and
receiving or dispensing fuel in air-to-air refuelling. These must be included as further
variations of the basic sorties.
2.6 On an existing aircraft, operational data should be available to guide the likely
range of variations in all these sortie parameters. For the analysis of a new design,
assumptions will have to be made on the basis of operational experience with similar
aircraft. In both circumstances these data will have to be checked by operational
recording on the aircraft in service and a revised analysis undertaken if significant
utilisation changes become apparent.

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3. SORTIE SUBDIVISION
3.1 The variations of aircraft operations have now been defined in terms of a
multiplicity of sorties, each having a specific flight duration, take-off fuel and payload,
and possibly discrete mass changes during the flight. The SOIU often defines the
baseline sorties in terms of altitude and airspeed variations between a number of key
events during the flight, as shown in figures 3 and 4.
3.2 The probabilistic gust analysis requires the sortie to be broken down into small
segments within which there are only small changes in the aircraft gust response
characteristics and in the frequency of gusts in the atmosphere. The breakpoints in the
sortie definition are very likely to be too coarse for the subdivisions needed to meet
these requirements.
3.3 The altitude variations of frequency of occurrence of two gust velocities are
shown in figure 5 and table 1, taken from reference 3. At low altitude the gust
frequencies (on a logarithmic scale) shows a rapid decrease with increasing altitude and
this drives a requirement for fine subdivisions of altitude at low altitude. It has been
found that the use of 1000 ft altitude bands up to 4000 ft has been the minimum required
to give an adequate prediction of the low altitude gust risk, with the gust frequency for
each band evaluated for the mean altitude of the band. The preferred choice of altitude
bands above 4000 ft is to use bands of 2000 ft up to 10000 ft and 2500 ft bands at all
higher altitudes.
3.4 By comparison the need for subdivision of the flight due to the variation of the
gust response is less significant and only has an effect during cruise at constant altitude,
when the reduction of weight due to fuel consumption may become the determining
factor on segment duration. For a large aircraft a segment time of 10 minutes during
cruise gives a negligible error in the gust response compared to the precise value. For
combat aircraft, with a reduced impact of fuel on the loads, a longer interval may be
acceptable, but in this case it is more likely that speed or altitude variations may
intervene in the sortie definition. Indeed, for a combat aircraft the organisation of the
analysis may be more oriented towards the time spent in specific point conditions within
the envelope rather than the steady progression through a flight profile which is more
appropriate for a large or transport type of aircraft.
3.5 To illustrate the subdivisions required for the bands described here, figure 6
shows the segmentation of a simple short sortie typical of transport operations (i.e. a
one-hour flight with climb to 27000 ft, cruise, descend and land). This sortie is
subdivided into 32 segments. More segments will be required to model a longer sortie or
a complex military sortie in which a considerable proportion of flight time is spent at low
altitude and with frequent changes of flight condition.

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4. GUST RESPONSE CALCULATION

4.1 By the subdivision into bands described in the previous paragraph, each sortie
will have been reduced to a number of flight segments, each with a specific aircraft
configuration, mass, air speed and altitude. The next stage of the analysis process is to
calculate the gust response loads for each of these segment conditions, which is the first
part of the process shown in figure 2.
4.2 The complexity of loads prediction models and the number of flight conditions
required point towards the calculation of tables of gust load responses over a full range
of typical conditions rather than making specific calculations for each point in each
sortie. It is necessary to generate gust response loads for the full range of operating
conditions (fuel, cargo, altitude, and airspeed). At each condition the required quantities
for each load are the maxima and minima for each of a range of discrete gust lengths
and also the value of the load in trimmed steady level flight.
4.3 These tables of loads are then used as the basis for interpolation to each flight
condition encountered during the analysis to obtain the maxima, minima and trim values
of each load for each gust length. The tabulated values should be defined at a spacing
close enough to allow the interpolation to be sufficiently accurate.

5. GUST VELOCITY TO PRODUCE LIMIT LOAD

5.1 From the calculated gust load responses it is necessary to calculate the
velocities of up and down gusts which produce a limit load value in each load.
5.2 The limit loads are defined from the Allowable Loads Envelopes (ALE) which
usually show the limiting value as a function of applied bending moment and torque. The
bending moments tend to dominate gust loads, in which case the ALE may be reduced
to an upper and lower bound on bending moment at each station. The extension to
include torque loads would be relatively straightforward if required.
5.3 The incremental gust loads are assumed to be linear with the gust velocity and
so the gust velocity used in the response calculation may be scaled to find the gust
velocity required to produce a limit load. There are four possible ways in which the gust
can produce a limit load. Consider first an up gust, as shown in figure 7 for two different
sample response quantities. A response quantity which does not have a significant
oscillatory dynamic response, may have the maximum load reach the upper ALE, which
occurs for a gust velocity U L scaled from the nominal gust velocity U G used in the
response calculation by
U L = U G (L U - B T )/(B G+ - B T )
where L U denotes the upper ALE, B T the load in trimmed level flight, B G+ the maximum
load found in the calculated response to gust U G .

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5.4 If there is significant oscillatory response, such as the sample response 2

illustrated in figure 7, then the case of the later minimum load reaching the lower ALE
may be more critical than the direct maximum. In this case the limit load gust velocity is
given by
U L = U G (L L - B T )/(B G- - B T )
where L L denotes the lower ALE, B G- the minimum load found in the calculated response
to gust U G .
5.5 The velocity of an up-gust that produces a limit load is the lower of these two
possibilities. In the examples shown in figure 7, sample response 1 reaches the upper
limit, and would be able to withstand a much larger gust velocity until the minimum of the
response would encounter the lower limit. The more oscillatory sample response 2 is
bounded by the lower limit, but only a small further increase in gust velocity would be
required to reach the upper limit.
5.6 For a negative gust, the time history is obtained from the up gust response by
reflecting the time history about the trim value. The up-gust maximum and minimum
values thus becomes minimum load of magnitude 2B T - B G+ and a maximum load of 2B T
- B G- respectively. In this case the down-gust magnitude to produce a limit load will be
either when the minimum load reaches the lower ALE:
U L = U G (L L - B T )/(B T - B G+ )

or the overswing may reach the upper ALE:

U L = U G (L U - B T )/(B T - B G- )
5.7 The velocity of the down-gust that produces a limit load is the lower of these two
possibilities. Both the example responses shown in figure 8 are limited by the lower load
limit, although for response 2 there is only a small difference between the gust velocities
which would produce the upper or lower limit loads.
N.B. Response 1 is more typical of many loads, such as bending moments on
the inner wing of an aircraft, in that the initial forced response is the most critical.
This results from damping in the wing bending mode and the values of up and
down load capabilities relative to the trimmed load. There would appear to be few
cases for which the minimum part of the response is critical, since for highly
oscillatory loads it will be necessary to have a similar range of up and down load
capability about the trim value. In most cases considered there is only a small error
in gust risk by ignoring the minimum load and making the analysis solely on the
basis of the direct maximum of the response. Combinations of gust response time
histories and relative positions of the trim load relative to the upward and
downward load envelopes have been explored for sensitivity to overswing. The
errors in neglecting the overswing responses were assessed against the size of
the overswing amplitude relative to the magnitude of the direct response peak. It
was assumed that the trim load was within 25% range of the mean of the upper
and lower load envelopes, i.e. at the most extreme the range from the trim value to
the nearest envelope would be 1/3 of the range to the other envelope.

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ratio of overswing/
1 0.7 0.6 0.5
direct response
maximum error in
50% 6% 1.4% 0.2%
gust frequency

5.8 These results emphasise the need to include the overswing response for highly
oscillatory quantities and the error at 60% or less overswing is well within the overall
accuracy of the complete process. This may be used as a guideline for ignoring
overswing properties on a specific quantity if the simplification of analysis is considered
significant.
5.9 For each load quantity the selection process gives a pair of gust velocities which
produce a limit load, one for an up-gust and one for a down-gust. These limit load gust
velocities are calculated separately for all the loads considered on the aircraft for each
gust length.

6. GUST PROBABILITY
6.1 Having calculated the gust velocities which produce limit load it is now necessary
to predict the probability of encountering a gust of this magnitude. This stage of analysis
is repeated for each of the gust lengths considered applicable to the aircraft under
review and for each load quantity. The minimum gust length should be 15.20m (50 ft) as
specified in Clause 3.5.9 The maximum gust length should be either 100m (305 ft) or
double the gust length which produces the maximum tuned gust response if this is
longer than 50m. Across this defined range, it is recommended that at least 8 gust
lengths be analysed.
6.2 It is necessary to account for the effect of gust length on the gust probabilities.
This is carried out via an assumption that gusts of different lengths H are equally
probable when the gust velocities are related by the H1/6 power law. The H1/6 law was
derived by Jones 4, 5 as the most realistic model of gust characteristics in severe
turbulence. In the analysis the gust velocities are adjusted to the velocity of an equally
probable gust with a standard reference length, i.e.
U R =U G * (H/H ref )1/6
where U G is a limit load gust velocity from the calculation of response to a gust of length
H, H ref is the reference gust length and U R is the velocity of an equally probable gust
with length H ref . A family of gusts with amplitude related to gust length by the H1/6 law is
illustrated in figure 9, all the gusts shown having the same probability of occurrence as a
20 m/sec gust with length 40m.

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6.3 A review of gust data is given in reference 1, combining records from early RAE
data and more recent records from 747s in the service of two airlines. The
recommended gust frequency models which resulted from these studies are biased
towards the older RAE data below 15000 ft, where data are reckoned to be more
representative of the environment for military operations, and blend into the data from
747s by 25000 ft. The frequency distributions for 50 ft/sec (15.24 m/sec) and 66 ft/sec
(20.12 m/sec) gusts from reference 5 are shown in figure 5 and the values are given in
table 1. Note that the data has been standardised for a gust length of 40m and this value
should be used for H ref in the analysis.
6.4 In order to find the probability of any gust velocity, interpolation is used on both
altitude and gust velocity. Interpolation is linear with altitude and gust velocity used with
the logarithm of the frequencies of occurrence from table 1. First, for each of the two
basic gust velocities 15.24 and 20.12 m/sec the altitude variation of the frequencies is
removed by interpolating to the altitude of the mission segment under analysis:
Y= Y 1 + (Y 2 -Y 1 ) * (A - A 1 ) / (A 2 - A 1 )
where A is the required altitude, A 1 and A 2 are two altitudes from table 1 (one above and
one below A) and Y 1 =log(F 1 ), Y 2 =log(F 2 ) with F 1 and F 2 is the frequency of an up or
down gust at the altitudes A 1 and A 2 (for either 15.24 m/sec or 20.12 m/sec gusts). Note
that the frequencies defined in table 1 are for up and down gusts. Since this analysis
accounts for the different response of the aircraft to up and down gusts, it is necessary
to divide the values in table 1 by 2 to obtain the probability of an explicit up gust or down
gust.
6.5 The result Y = log(F) defines the frequency of the basic gust at this altitude. A
second interpolation is then used to find the frequency of the required gust velocity U R
(normalised to the gust reference length).
Y= Y A + (Y B -Y A ) * (U R - U A ) / (U B - U A )
where U A and U B denote the basic gust velocities 15.24 and 20.12 m/sec and Y A and Y B
are the corresponding values of log frequency at the required altitude. The exponential
of the result Y gives the frequency of the desired gust velocity at the specific altitude of
the mission segment.
6.6 For a single gust length, the two different probabilities of a up gust and a down
gust are added together. Since the gusts have been normalised to an equi-probable
family of gusts the different gust lengths may be handled by finding the mean probability
over all the gust lengths in the analysis (i.e. the sum of all the probabilities divided by the
number of gust lengths in the analysis). The calculation of gust probability in this flight
segment is repeated for each load quantity.

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6.7 There is the possibility that the aircraft would stall before generating the lift
required to produce a limit load, most likely for a slow flying aircraft on which the gust
velocities represent a greater proportion of the flight speed and hence higher
incremental aerodynamic incidence. In these cases it is logical to keep track of stall
boundaries in the extrapolation to find the gust velocity which produces a limit load. If a
limit load could not be generated in the conditions of this flight segment, the probability
of encountering a gust which generates a limit load on the structure is zero. This value
should be included in the structural risk analysis. However, a risk of encountering this
severe gust can be quantified and this should be recorded for the risk assessment of
stability or handling issues which might arise from such an upset.

7. GUST RISK FOR A COMPLETE SORTIE

7.1 Following the process shown in figure 1, the gust probabilities must be calculated
in the manner just described for each segment of a sortie, for each load quantity, and for
each sortie in the planned operational usage of the aircraft.
7.2 The variation of worst gust probability through the course of a single sortie gives
a clear insight into the parts of the sortie with the greatest gust risk, and can provide a
powerful input into operational planning to minimise the risk. Sample sorties are shown
in reference 1.

8. PREDICTION OF GUST RISK FOR COMPLETE UTILISATION

8.1 To predict the overall gust risk of operations, the constituent risks must be
summed over all the sorties and variations of sorties that make up the planned usage of
the aircraft. This gives a gust risk for each load quantity, and the highest risk is then the
most significant risk for the aircraft.
8.2 This will be demonstrated with a sample analysis for a single load from reference
1, shown in table 2. The sortie codes describe the type of sortie and, as well as the flight
duration variation shown in the table, each line of the table represents the combination of
many sortie variations of payload, take-off fuel, etc. The relative sortie weighting is
represented by the number of flights predicted for each sortie type and duration. In this
case the arbitrary normalisation was based on a total of 10,000 flights. The total flight
time and distance flown apply to the flying on the quoted number of flights. The gust
probability is the probability of encountering a limit load gust during the stated number of
flights in this sortie. The final column, number of hours to encounter one limit load gust,
is the number of hours divided by the probability of encountering a gust in that flying.
This is a normalised quantity representing the gust risk for that type of flying and allows
an immediate comparison of the severity of the different sorties.
8.3 The final result is the predicted number of hours to one limit load encounter for
the planned utilisation, derived again from the total flight time divided by the total gust
probability. This is the quantity to compare against the life specified for the occurrence of
Design Load.

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9. GUST DIRECTION
9.1 The process description has concentrated on a single gust direction. The major
interest for gust load design on a large aircraft is the vertical gust, which relate closely to
the normal accelerations which were measured on aircraft collecting the gust data used
in the analysis. The same considerations apply to lateral gusts and the method can be
applied directly to lateral gust load prediction. However, there would be difficulties in
extending the probability analysis to encompass gusts from other directions. The relative
importance of gusts from other directions should be explored against the basic design
cases.

LEAFLET REFERENCES
1. Kaynes I W. Probabilistic gust analysis example. QINETIQ/FST/CR031374, March
2003
2. Patel H. Generic Gust Response Investigation. QINETIQ/FST/CR030991, February
2003
3. Kaynes I W. Flight loads data for gust load prediction.
QINETIQ/FST/SMC/CR021764, March 2002
4. Jones J G. A theory for extreme gust loads on an aircraft based on the
representation of the atmosphere as a self-similar intermittent random
process. RAE TR68030, February 1968
5. Jones J G, Foster G W, Haynes A. Fractal properties if inertial range turbulence with
implications for aircraft response. Aeronautical Journal, October 1988.

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Frequency of up plus down gusts, per nautical mile

(scaled for reference gust length 40m)

Altitude ft 15.24 m/sec 20.12 m/sec

(50 ft/sec) (66 ft/sec)

0 2.0E-5 3.0E-6

9000 4.0E-7 3.0E-8

17000 2.5E-7 1.5E-8

25000 5.0E-8 1.5E-9

30000 3.0E-9 4.0E-11

40000 4.0E-10 4.0E-12

Table 1 - Gust probabilities for 15.24 and 20.12 m/sec (50 and 66 ft/sec) gusts

sortie flight number total distance gust number of

sortie
code duration of flights flight flown (n m) probability hours to one
(hr) time (hr) limit load
gust
SOR02 1 800 800 289718 0.0092 87328
SOR02 2 2400 4800 1996598 0.0321 149405
transport SOR02 3 2400 7200 3124040 0.0393 183005
SOR02 4 1600 6400 2834322 0.0285 224295
SOR02 5 800 4000 1792975 0.0161 248374
SOR04-2 2 200 400 125847 0.0255 15715
military SOR04-3 3 700 2100 671692 0.2376 8838
SOR04-4 4 600 2400 773930 0.3111 7714
SOR04-5 5 500 2500 810104 0.3642 6865
all SOR02 all 8000 23200 10037653 0.1253 185200
transport
all military SOR04 all 2000 7400 2381573 0.9384 7886
Combined all sorties 10000 30600 12419227 1.0636 28769

Table 2 - Results of a sample operational gust risk analysis

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Figure 1 - Schematic of overall process

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Figure 2 – Schematic of detail risk prediction for one condition

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30000

25000

20000
altitude (ft)

15000

10000

5000

0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
time (min)

Figure 3 - Definition of typical transport sortie profile, altitude v time

350 350

300 300

250 250
airspeed (kt EAS)
airspeed (kt EAS)

200 200

150
150
100
100
50
50
0
0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0 10 20 30
time (min)
40 50 60
time (min)

Figure 4 - Definition of typical transport sortie profile, airspeed v time

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15.24 m/sec (50 ft/sec) 20.11 m/sec (66 ft/sec)

1.00E-04

1.00E-05
Up and down gusts per n.mile

1.00E-06

1.00E-07

1.00E-08

1.00E-09

1.00E-10

1.00E-11

1.00E-12
0 10000 20000 30000 40000
Altitude (ft)

Figure 5 - Probability of severe gusts, variation with altitude

30000

25000

20000
altitude (ft)

15000

10000

5000

0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
time (min)

Figure 6 – Analysis points in subdivided sortie profile, altitude v time

Diamonds mark analysis conditions at middle of segment. Vertical lines mark
the boundary times of each segment

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160

120

bending moment
80

40

0
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
-40

-80
time (sec)

response to Ug=15
response for Ug=20.2, upper ALE limit
response for Ug=98.2, lower ALE limit
upper ALE
lower ALE

a) Response quantity 1

50
bending moment

25

0
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5

-25
time (sec)

response to Ug=15
response for Ug=27.8, upper ALE limit
response for Ug=19.5, lower ALE limit
upper ALE
lower ALE

b) Response quantity 2

Figure 7 – Up gust velocities required to produce limit loads for two sample response
quantities

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a) Response quantity 1

b) Response quantity 2

Figure 8 – Down gust velocities required to produce limit loads for two sample response
quantities

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Figure 9 – Sample gusts from one equi-probable family

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LEAFLET 44

IMPACT DAMAGE RESISTANCE OF COMPOSITE MATERIAL STRUCTURES

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Structures are at a threat from impact damage from a number of sources, during
manufacture and in service. Impact damage can have consequences both for the immediate
structural integrity and the supportability of structures. Composite structures require
particular consideration of this type of damage, because while there may be little or no
outward sign, the structural integrity of the structure can be significantly reduced.
1.2 This Leaflet gives guidance on the certification and qualification route for composite
structures, with particular reference to impact damage resistance. Composite aircraft
structures in this case means structures fabricated from continuous fibre-reinforced polymer
matrix materials, for example, carbon, boron, aramid and glass reinforced plastics. The
guidance is equally applicable to monolithic and sandwich structures.
1.3 Compliance with the requirements of Clause 3.1 (Static Strength) and Clause 3.2
(Fatigue) must be demonstrated. Guidance on acceptable means of compliance is given in
the Leaflets accompanying these Clauses. The impact damage resistance issues and
associated residual strength requirements are covered in this Leaflet, but fatigue and
damage tolerance issues are not, although some guidance on this is provided in Leaflet 40,
which accompanies the fatigue design requirements of Clause 3.2 Damage resistance and
damage tolerance differ in that the former quantifies the damage caused by a specific
damage event, while the latter addresses the ability of the structure to retain the required
residual strength, in the presence of specific damage.
1.4 Comprehensive guidance and discussion of impact damage resistance is also given
in Chapter 7, Volume 3 of The Composite Materials Handbook Mil 17 (formerly know as Mil-
Hdbk-17) [1], which describes means of compliance likely to be acceptable to US military
certification authorities. AC20-107A [2] presents an acceptable means of compliance with
civil certification requirements; essentially the same information is contained in CS-25 [3] at
AMC No. 1 to Paragraph 25.603. For a discussion of certification issues for composite
structures, see Chapter 7 of [1].

2 SOURCES OF IMPACT DAMAGE AND THE IMPACT THREAT

2.1 Composite structures must be designed to sustain impacts from the range of
sources likely to be encountered in the lifetime of the aircraft (which includes manufacture
and assembly), without unacceptable structural degradation. The sources to be considered
include both natural sources and others, on the ground, in flight and during transportation.
Natural sources include, but are not necessarily limited to: hail, birds (birdstrike is dealt with
specifically in Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.9), lightning (see Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.27
and Def Stan 59-113) and shed ice. Other sources include, but are not necessarily limited to,
runway debris (including stones), tools, aircraft equipment, debris from an uncontained
engine failure, weapons self-damage (ricochet) and high velocity projectiles. Ballistic
requirements are not considered here, and should be addressed on a project-specific basis.

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2.2 Different areas of the air vehicle will be subject to different types and levels of
impact threat. Therefore, an impact threat assessment should be done, to determine which
areas of the air system are susceptible to particular types of impact damage. For example,
lower surfaces of the air vehicle (the underside of the airframe, the landing gear, and external
stores) may be more vulnerable to runway stone damage, while upper surfaces may be more
susceptible to damage by dropped tools or equipment. Edges may also be vulnerable to
impacts, for example those of control surfaces, or of panels; where this is identified as a risk,
it should be taken into consideration. It should also be considered that removable structural
parts could be damaged during maintenance, or storage off-aircraft.
2.3 Having identified the likely sources and locations of impact damage, probabilistic
analysis of the impact threat should be made, in terms of the likelihood of occurrence. For
these threats, impact energy, velocity and mass/geometry of the impact source should also
be taken into account, coupled with the probability of the aircraft encountering an extreme
load. The impact resistance criteria for the composite structures under consideration should
be selected on the basis of this assessment.
2.4 The criticality of the structure should also be taken into account when assessing the
consequences of an impact. The guidance given here is principally aimed at Grade A
structure (see Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.1).

3 FACTORS AFFECTING THE IMPACT RESISTANCE DESIGN APPROACH

3.1 The damage caused by a particular impact is not only related to the impact energy,
but also to the shape, mass, velocity and material properties of the damage source. A
relatively slow, blunt * , impact at a given energy may well result in a different level of damage
to an impact by a fast-moving, sharp object at the same energy. The damage is also related
to the angle of incidence, the material properties and the structural response to the impact.
These factors together can be considered to be a measure of the impact damage resistance
of a composite structure.
3.2 Therefore, in doing the impact threat assessment described in 2.3, not only should
the likely impact energy be taken into account, but also the velocity and shape of the impact
source. The testing to substantiate the impact resistance of the structure should be designed
to account for this, and test conditions should be chosen, commensurate with the structural
threat.
3.3 Although the extent of damage is in part related to the nature of the impact, the
presence of visible surface damage may not be a reliable indicator of impact damage. As a
result, a number of different approaches may be taken in design and qualification, including a
visible damage criterion and an energy cut-off criterion. Each has advantages,
disadvantages and implications for in-service structural integrity management; the structure
should be sufficiently robust not to require frequent inspection for damage.

*
In this Leaflet, “blunt” and “sharp” refer to the geometry of the impactor. A blunt impactor will generally have a high
radius of curvature, whereas a sharp impactor will have a low radius of curvature, or sharp edges.
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3.3.1 It may be desirable, depending on the type of aircraft and the desire to trade
off inspections against the increased structural weight brought about by more robust
structure, to allow visually-detectable damage from ‘exceptional’ impacts. Where a
visible impact criterion is used, a level of damage is defined, which is on the verge of
being visually detectable. In such circumstances, ‘exceptional’ damage should be
detectable as Barely Visible Impact Damage (BVID), detectable during routine or
periodic inspections or Clearly Visible Impact Damage (CVID), which can be found
before the next flight (see also Leaflet 40). Damage visibility criteria should be set and
justified on a project-specific basis, as the visibility of damage may vary with, for
example, surface finish, and lighting conditions during inspection.
3.3.2 Damage visibility criteria are more often used in civil aircraft, but can negate
the requirement to characterise the impact threat fully. The setting of the damage
visibility criterion is also subjective, and its use may be less appropriate for military
aircraft, where visual inspections may have to be carried out in less than ideal
conditions. These conditions may lead to a greater dent dept being chosen, leading to
a heavier structure, which in turn may not be practical for performance reasons.
3.3.3 Furthermore, dent depths depend on a number of variables, including impact
source shape, the type of structure, and the location on the structure. For many blunt
impacts, a very shallow dent, which may relax with time, or no dent at all, can result; in
either case, considerable delamination may occur, with consequent loss of strength,
without any dent being visible. For this reason, a visible damage criterion may not be
appropriate for ‘routine’ levels of impact damage. In some structures, planar damage
size (such as may be detected by non-destructive examination) may give an indication
of the loss of structural integrity due to impact (see, for example, [5]), but this should be
demonstrated as part of compliance with the requirements.
3.3.4 In the energy cut-off approach, it is assumed that the damage threshold
energy (the impact energy level at which damage first forms) of the structure is chosen
to be greater than that imparted by the pre-characterised threat. This relies on the
accurate characterisation of the impact threat. The probability of a large impact event
may be quite low, however, and designing against this threat may cause the structure
to be overly heavy. The approach may also lead to a “window of uncertainty”, where
impact damage may occur just above the chosen threat level, but just below that which
would be readily visible. Non-destructive inspections would need to be implemented in
service to ensure that damage, which would compromise structural integrity, has not
occurred within this “window of uncertainty”. Appropriate non-destructive inspection
methods should be chosen and substantiated against realistic damage scenarios.
3.4 The investigation of the advantages and disadvantages of the methods above,
coupled with a consideration of the damage tolerance criteria, will lead to a selection of the
most suitable design approach. The selection of the most suitable approach will be a trade-
off between structural weight and supportability considerations.

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4 IMPACT TEST CONDITIONS

4.1 The aircraft may be divided up into impact threat zones, depending on the results of
the probabilistic analysis described in 2.3 above. Where more than one type of impact for a
zone is shown to be probable, all types should be taken into account, as failure/damage
modes may be different and it is not necessarily possible to determine which will be the most
critical failure/damage mode. The types of structure within a given zone may differ (for
example, there may be monolithic and sandwich structures present), so consideration should
be given to testing representative examples of each type.
4.2 The chosen design approach will determine the conditions to be tested. Much useful
guidance is given in [4], but the points discussed below should also be considered.
4.2.1 In determining the impact resistance, allowance must be made for
environmental degradation by moisture absorption, exposure to service operating
temperatures, ultra-violet (UV) light and non-ionising radiation. Manufacturing defects
must also be taken into account.
4.2.2 To simulate ‘sharp’, high velocity impacts, sharp (and generally lightweight)
impactors should be used at high velocities, commensurate with those likely to be
experienced in service. Table 1 gives an example: these conditions are given as
guidance. In any case, analysis should be done to demonstrate that the test conditions
chosen are representative of the impact threat, appropriate to the aircraft under
consideration.
4.2.3 To simulate ‘blunt’, lower velocity impacts, a heavier, larger impactor should
be used. A typical example is again given in Table 1. As for sharp impacts, these
conditions are given as guidance. Accordingly, it should be demonstrated that the
energies, velocities and sizes of impactor selected are appropriate to the type of impact
under consideration.
4.2.4 The loading to which the structure is subjected in-service must be taken into
account, and the most critical loading action, with respect to impact damage and
location, should be established when defining the test programme. The effects of
multiple, or repeated, impacts should also be considered, where the threat analysis has
shown that this is likely in service; similarly, edge impacts should be taken into
consideration. Impact testing should be done normal to the surface, unless it is shown
that an oblique impact is more realistic and simulates the critical condition. The nature
of the damage produced by a given impact will be affected by the level of constraint of
the test specimen/article, since the constraint will affect the structural response.
Factors to consider should include:
− scale effects, between the as-tested specimens and the as-manufactured
component,
− the relationship of the impact location with any substructure (for example,
stringers),
− thickness of the structure,
− differences between the structural response between the as-tested specimens and
the as-manufactured component.

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4.3 Consideration should be given to how any damage introduced into specimens
before testing is to be measured and characterised, pre- and post-test. Measurement of
damage generated by testing must be correlated with additional parameters, which can be
used to judge residual strength.

5 RESIDUAL STRENGTH
5.1 The results of the probabilistic impact threat assessment, and the selection of a
design and certification/qualification approach will be used in establishing impact resistance
test conditions. These should be expressed in terms of the probability of occurrence of the
impact event, associated with the probability of the aircraft encountering an extreme load.
Following a routine, ‘probable’ † , impact event, the structure must be able to sustain Ultimate
Load. After an exceptional, ‘incredible’, event, the structure must be capable of sustaining 1.2
 Limit Load (this is partly for consistency with the residual strength criterion of the fatigue
design requirements ‡ ).
5.2 Where the concepts of BVID and CVID have been applied to exceptional impact
events, the following criteria apply. Structure which has been subjected to an impact or
impacts resulting in BVID should be shown, by analysis and test evidence, to be capable of
sustaining the design Ultimate Load. Where flaw tolerance (no growth) is to be
demonstrated, residual static strength testing should be carried out after repeated load
cycling. Structure which has been subject to an impact or impacts resulting in CVID should
be shown, by analysis and test evidence, to be capable of withstanding 1.2  Limit Load § .
This method is to be used in conjunction with a flaw tolerant or fail safe approach that
produces either an enhanced safe life, or an on-condition inspection interval (see also Leaflet
40).
5.3 For all impacts where the probability of occurrence is shown to be improbable,
impact testing should be carried out to demonstrate that in the damaged state, the static
strength requirements of Clause 3.1 and the fatigue requirements (particularly the residual
strength criterion) of Clause 3.2 are met. The functional requirements of Clause 3.1 shall also
be met.

6 MAINTAINABILITY AND SUPPORTABILITY CONSIDERATIONS

6.1 It should be noted that impact events may give rise to damage that adversely affects
the structural integrity, without visible indication. Therefore, it may be necessary to implement
a regime of non-destructive examination, if a probabilistic analysis of the impact threat shows
that there may be inadequacies in the impact criteria used, or that the probability of failure in
the region between routine damage and exceptional damage becomes unacceptable. The
purpose of the examinations will be to determine whether any damage, requiring repair, has
occurred.
6.2 The substantiation of the impact damage tolerance of the structure should be used
to develop critical damage size information. This will correspond to the size of damage at
which either the static, or fatigue, strength criteria are no longer met. These data will be used
to establish in-service repairs and will also be used to target an inspection regime, if it has
been shown to be necessary, or if it is suspected that an impact outside the design criteria
has occurred. These inspections should be part of the in-service maintenance programme.

†
See Definitions.
‡
See Clause 3.2.16 for guidance on circumstances where the residual strength factor on Limit Load may be reduced.
§
See Clause 3.2.16 for guidance on circumstances where the residual strength factor on Limit Load may be reduced.
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6.3 Where impact resistance assessment criteria have been established on the basis of
probabilistic considerations, aircraft usage and exposure to impact threat must be monitored
and analysed in service to ensure that the assumptions underlying the analysis remain valid,
and that the impact threat has not changed. Feedback from in-service inspections should
also be used to validate the assumptions concerning impact threat levels.

DEFINITIONS

Probable – Will occur to a significant proportion of aircraft during the life of a particular fleet.
Probability of occurrence between 10–3 to 10–4 per flying hour for combat aircraft and
between 10–4 to 10–5 per flying hour for combat support aircraft and helicopters.
Improbable – Remote likelihood of occurrence during the operational life of a particular fleet.
Probability of occurrence between 10–6 to 10–7 per flying hour for combat aircraft and
between 10–7 to 10–8 per flying hour for combat support aircraft and helicopters.
Incredible – Less likely than improbable. Probability of occurrence less than 10–7 for combat
aircraft and 10–8 for combat support aircraft and helicopters.

REFERENCES

1. American Society for Testing and Materials International. The Composite Materials
Handbook Mil 17 Volume 3. Polymer Matrix Composites: Materials, Usage, Design and
Analysis. Mil-Hdbk-17-3F, August 2002.
2. Federal Aviation Administration. Composite aircraft structure (Advisory Circular). AC20-
107A, 25 April 1984.
3. European Aviation Safety Agency. Certification Specifications for Large Aeroplanes.
CS-25, Amendment 2, 2 October 2006.
4. Advanced certification methodology for Composite Structures. Report No.
DOT/FAA/AR-96/111, April 1997.
5. Impact Damage Characterization and Damage Tolerance of Composite Sandwich
Airframe Structures. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-00/44, January 2001.

Impact simulated Impactor mass, diameter Impact velocity Impact energy

of hemispherical tup
Runway stone 10 g, 12.7 mm Ø 47 m/s 11 J (‘routine’ impact)
Tool/equipment Blunt 25 – 50 mm Ø As required 50 J
drop hemispherical
Sharp 3 kg, 0.23 mm
Ø 3-face
pyramid tip
3 kg, 25.4 mm Ø 4.2 m/s 27 J

TABLE 1 - EXAMPLE IMPACT TEST CONDITIONS

Note: it may be possible to simulate high velocity impacts by changing the mass/shape of a
standard test set-up, providing it can be shown that the damage mode is equivalent or worse.

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LEAFLET 45

INTERACTION OF SYSTEMS AND STRUCTURES

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This Leaflet gives guidance on the requirements to be followed in evaluating the
structural performance (that is, the capability of the aircraft to meet its specified structural
requirements) of aircraft (aeroplanes, helicopters and remotely piloted aerial vehicles) with
systems, the failure or malfunction of which during a mission may influence safe flight and
landing. System failure conditions for the purposes of this Leaflet are those that affect
structural performance and induce loads, change the response of the aircraft to inputs such as
gusts or pilot actions, or lower flutter margins. These requirements are based on Appendix K
to CS 25 [1], with changes appropriate to operation in the military environment.

1.2 The criteria given in this Leaflet must be used to demonstrate compliance with the
requirements of Clause 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 (Static Strength). They are intended for application to
aircraft equipped with flight control systems, autopilots, stability augmentation systems, load
alleviation systems, flutter control systems (see also Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.8), and fuel
management systems. If the requirements of this Leaflet are applied to other systems, it may
be necessary to adapt the criteria to the specific system.

1.3 The criteria defined in this Leaflet only address the direct structural consequences of the
system responses and performances and cannot be considered in isolation, but should be
included in the overall safety evaluation of the aircraft. These criteria may in some instances
duplicate standards already established for this evaluation. These criteria are only applicable
to structure whose failure could prevent continued safe flight and landing. Specific criteria that
define acceptable limits on handling characteristics or stability requirements when operating
the system-degraded or -inoperative mode are not provided in this Leaflet.

1.4 Depending on the specific characteristics of the aircraft, additional studies may be
required that go beyond the criteria provided in this Leaflet, in order to demonstrate the
capability of the aircraft to meet other realistic conditions, such as alternative gust or
manoeuvre descriptions, for an aircraft equipped with a load alleviation system.

1.5 The criteria prescribed in this Leaflet should be used in determining the influence of a
system and its failure conditions on the aircraft structure.

1.6 For specific guidance on the requirements to be followed in evaluating the aeroelastic
stability of aircraft with systems, the failure or malfunction of which during a mission may
influence safe flight, see Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.8, and Part 1, Section 4, Leaflets 23 and
97.

1.7 Effect of systems on structures – system fully operative

1.8 When the system under consideration is fully operative, the following criteria apply:

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(a) Limit loads must be derived in all normal operating configurations of the
system from all the limit conditions defined for the aircraft (consistent with the
requirements of Clause 3.1.2), taking into account any special behaviour of such a
system or associated functions or any effect on the structural performance of the
aircraft that may occur up to the limit loads. In particular, any significant nonlinearity
(rate of displacement of control surface, thresholds or any other system
nonlinearities) must be accounted for in a realistic or conservative way when
deriving limit loads from limit conditions.
(b) The aircraft must meet the strength requirements of Clause 3.1 (with respect
to static strength and residual strength), using the specified factors to derive
ultimate loads from the limit loads defined above. The effect of nonlinearities must
be investigated beyond limit conditions to ensure the behaviour of the system
presents no anomaly compared to the behaviour below limit conditions. However,
conditions beyond limit conditions need not be considered when it can be shown
that the aircraft has design features that will not allow it to exceed those limit
conditions.
(c) The aircraft must meet the aeroelastic stability requirements of Part 1, Section
4, Clause 4.8; specific guidance on flutter considerations is given in Part 1, Section
4, Clause 4.8 and Part 1, Section 4, Leaflets 23 and 97.

2 EFFECT OF SYSTEMS ON STRUCTURES – SYSTEM IN THE FAILURE CONDITION

2.1 For any system failure condition not shown to be extremely improbable (i.e., so unlikely
as not anticipated to occur during the entire operational life of all aircraft of the type), the effect
of the failure on the structure in terms of static and residual strength must be determined, for
specified flight conditions. Two states should be addressed: the conditions prevailing at the
time of failure and immediately thereafter, and continued flight. For continued flight, one of two
situations should be considered: one where the pilot does not know that a failure has
occurred, and the other where the pilot is aware of the failure and a limited flight envelope can
be attained.

2.2 Load cases to be considered for each of these states are set out in the sections below.

3 FAILED SYSTEM AT THE TIME OF FAILURE AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER

3.1 The initial conditions to be considered at the time of failure should be established on the
basis of a realistic scenario, including pilot corrective actions, to determine the loads occurring
at the time of failure and immediately thereafter.

3.2 For the civil certification requirements, it is deemed sufficient to start from a 1g level
flight condition. However, this is unlikely to be realistic for military aircraft, and analysis should
therefore be done to establish and justify the criteria to be applied.

3.3 The criteria to be applied may be determined by a consideration of the proportion of time
spent at different manoeuvre conditions, to give a probabilistic assessment of the condition at
time of failure, and the resultant load levels.

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3.4 A typical example, for a large transport aircraft, might be as follows:

(a) for logistic configurations: 1±0.25g (covering nominally 1g conditions);

(b) for tactical and training configurations: 1±0.25g (covering nominally 1g conditions),
pull-up at 2/3*n1 g, and 40˚ turn;

3.5 When the loads have been established, the static strength, residual strength and
aeroelastic response (see Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.8 and Part 1, Section 4, Leaflet 97)
must be substantiated.

3.5.1 For static strength substantiation, these loads, multiplied by an appropriate factor
of safety that is related to the probability of occurrence of the failure, are ultimate loads
to be considered for design. The required factor of safety (FS) is defined in conjunction
with the probability of occurrence per hour of the failure mode j, Pj.

3.5.2 Failures with Pj ≥ ‘once per lifetime’ shall be protected by a factor of safety of 1.5.
Remote failure conditions down to 10–9/hr shall be considered, for which a smaller factor
of safety, down to 1.25, may be used. The ‘lifetime’ to be considered shall not be less
than the specified life of the aircraft. The impact of a life extension should also be
considered.

3.5.3 Figure 1 shows how the factor of safety is to be defined, using the specified life of
a typical transport aircraft as an example. In this case, the aircraft has a ‘lifetime’ of
30000 hrs, so that the breakpoint becomes (3.33 × 10–5, 1.5) and the end points are (1,
1.5) and (1 × 10–9, 1.25): this is illustrated by the blue line in Figure 1. For an aircraft with
a ‘lifetime’ of 6000 hours (typical for a combat aircraft), the breakpoint would be (1.67 ×
10–3, 1.5) and the end points remain at (1, 1.5) and (1 × 10–9, 1.25). Values for rotorcraft
and remotely piloted air vehicles should be derived in a similar manner.

3.5.4 For life extension of large aircraft, the value of Pj to be considered should be that
of the civil requirements of CS-25, i.e., those shown by the black line in Figure 1. For
combat aircraft, a value of Pj commensurate with a life extension of at least 100%
should be considered. Thus, for the typical combat aircraft from the example above, the
breakpoint would be (8.33 × 10–4, 1.5) and the endpoints are (1, 1.5) and (1 × 10–9,
1.25). Values for other aircraft types should be derived in a similar manner.

3.5.5 For residual strength substantiation, the aircraft must be able to withstand 80% of
the ultimate loads defined above. For pressurised cabins, these loads must be
combined with the normal operating differential pressure. The value of 80% of ultimate
loads is consistent with the residual strength criteria of Clause 3.2, and is selected
because military aircraft are used to the extremes of their manoeuvre envelopes. Those
parts of the flight envelope which do not conform to this criterion shall be advised.

3.5.6 Freedom from aeroelastic instability must be shown up to the speeds specified in
Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.8

3.5.7 Failures in the system that result in forced structural vibrations (oscillatory failures)
must not produce loads that could result in detrimental deformation of primary structure.

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4 SYSTEM IN THE FAILED CONDITION – CONTINUED FLIGHT

4.1 WITHOUT MANOEUVRE LIMITATIONS

4.1.1 These conditions are to be considered, if the failure mode is such that the pilot is
unaware of the failure, and therefore would not apply manoeuvre limitations appropriate
to the failure condition.

4.1.2 For the continuation of the flight, with the aircraft having the system in a failed
state, and taking into account any appropriate reconfiguration, the following apply.

4.1.3 The loads derived from the following conditions at speeds up to V H must be
determined:

(a) the specified limit symmetrical manoeuvring conditions (see also Clause 3.3);

(b) the specified limit gust and turbulence conditions (see also Clause 3.5);

(c) the limit rolling conditions and the limit unsymmetrical conditions specified for
the aircraft (see also Clause 3.4);

(d) the specified limit yaw manoeuvring conditions (see also Clause 3.4);

(e) the specified limit ground loading conditions.

4.1.4 For static strength substantiation, each part of the structure must be able to
withstand the loads specified in Paragraph 5.1.3 above, multiplied by a factor of safety
depending on the probability of being in this failure state. The factor of safety is defined
in conjunction with the probability of being in the failed condition j, Qj (where Qj = (Tj)(Pj)
and Tj = average time in hours spent in the failed condition).

4.1.5 The factor of safety in the failed condition is 1.5 for Qj = 1, reducing to 1.25 for
Qj = 1 hour / ‘lifetime’, thence reducing to 1.0 for Qj = 1 × 10–9. Figure 2a shows how the
factor of safety may be derived, using the transport aircraft with a ‘lifetime’ of 30000 hrs
as an example: the breakpoints become (1, 1.5), (3.33 × 10–5, 1.25) and (1 × 10–9, 1).
The end points at Qj = 1 and Qj = 1 × 10–9 remain unchanged.

4.1.6 For aircraft having different ‘lifetimes’, the breakpoints should be derived in an
analogous manner.

Note: If Pj is greater than ‘10 / lifetime’ per flight hour, then a 1.5 factor of safety must be
applied to all specified limit load conditions. For an aircraft with a ‘lifetime’ of 30000 hrs,
this condition shall be applied for Pj > 3.33 ×10–4 / flight hour. For aircraft having different
‘lifetimes’, the applicable value should be substituted.

4.2 WITH MANOEUVRE LIMITATIONS

4.2.1 These conditions are to be considered for failure modes where the pilot is aware of
the failure. A typical failure of this type is one where a flight control system fails to a
basic state, and pilot-observed limitations are to be used. The limited manoeuvre
envelope must be sufficient to permit recovery to base in all necessary configurations,
including those at landing.

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 DEF STAN 00-970 PART 1/15
SECTION 3

4.2.2 For the aircraft, in the system-failed state and considering, over the whole flight
envelope, any appropriate reconfiguration, the loads from the following manoeuvre
limitations and gust conditions apply:

(a) A manoeuvre capability not less than half that used for design in the un-failed
state. The limited manoeuvre envelope shall be sufficient to permit recovery to base
in all necessary configurations including those at landing.

(b) Gust capability not less than half that used for design in the un-failed state.

(c) Ground loading conditions specified for the aircraft in the un-failed state.

4.2.3 For static strength substantiation, each part of the structure must also be able to
withstand the loads in the failed state, multiplied by a factor of safety depending on the
probability of being in this failure state. The Factor of Safety is defined in conjunction
with the probability of being in the failed condition j, Qj (where Qj = (Tj)(Pj) and Tj =
average time in hours spent in the failed condition).

4.2.4 For overall military usage, the factor of safety is maintained at 1.5 for
Qj ≥ 1 hour / lifetime. For Qj < 1 hour / lifetime, the factor of safety may be reduced to
1.25 at Qj = 1 × 10–9. Figure 2b shows the factor of safety versus Qj for an aircraft with a
‘lifetime’ of 30000 hours. For aircraft having different ‘lifetimes’, the breakpoints should
be derived in an analogous manner.

Note: If Pj is greater than ‘10 / lifetime’ per flight hour, then a 1.5 factor of safety must be
applied to all specified limit load conditions. For an aircraft with a ‘lifetime’ of 30000
hours this condition shall be applied for Pj > 3.33 × 10–4 / flight hour.

4.3 For residual strength substantiation, the aircraft must be able to withstand 80% of the
ultimate loads defined by the appropriate situation above. For pressurised cabins, these loads
must be combined with the normal operating differential pressure.

4.4 If the loads induced by the failure condition have a significant effect on fatigue or
damage tolerance, then their effects must be taken into account.

4.5 Freedom from aeroelastic instability must be shown up to the speeds specified in Part 1,
Section 4, Clause 4.8

4.6 Regardless of the calculated system reliability, certain failure conditions may require
consideration. Where analysis shows the probability of failure for these conditions to be less
that 10–9, criteria other than those described in this Leaflet may be used for structural
substantiation to show continued safe flight and landing.

5 FAILURE INDICATIONS

5.1 For system failure detection and indication, the following apply:

5.1.1 The system must be checked for failure conditions, not extremely improbable that
degrade the structural capability below the level required by Def Stan 00-970 or
significantly reduce the reliability of the remaining system. As far as reasonably
practicable, the flight crew must be made aware of these failures before flight. Certain
elements of the control system, such as mechanical and hydraulic components, may
use special periodic inspections, and electronic systems may use daily checks, in lieu of
detection and indication systems to achieve the objective of this requirement. These
certification maintenance requirements must be limited to components that are not

Page 5 of 7
 DEF STAN 00-970 PART 1/15
SECTION 3

readily detectable by normal detection and indication systems and where service history
shows that inspections will provide an adequate level of safety.

5.1.2 The existence of any failure condition during flight, not extremely improbable, that
could significantly affect the structural capability of the aircraft and for which the
associated reduction in airworthiness can be minimised by suitable flight limitations,
must be signalled to the flightcrew. For example, failure conditions that result in a factor
of safety between the aircraft strength and the loads below 1.25, or flutter margins below
those specified in Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.8, must be signalled to the crew during
flight.

6 DISPATCH WITH KNOWN FAILURE CONDITIONS

6.1 If the aircraft is to be dispatched in a known system failure condition that affects
structural performance, or affects the reliability of the remaining system to maintain structural
performance, then the provisions of Clause 3.1.4 must be met for the dispatched condition
and for subsequent failures. Flight limitations and expected operational limitations may be
taken into account in establishing Qj as the combined probability of being in the dispatched
failure condition and the subsequent failure condition for the safety margins in Figures 2a and
2b, and including the flutter margins of Part 1, Section 4, Clause 4.8 These limitations must be
such that the probability of being in this combined failure state and then subsequently
encountering limit load conditions is extremely improbable. No reduction in these safety
margins is allowed if the subsequent system failure rate is greater than ‘10 / lifetime’. For an
aircraft with a lifetime of 30000 hours, this equates to 3.33 × 10–4 per hour.

REFERENCE
1. European Aviation Safety Agency. Certification Specifications for Large Aeroplanes. CS-25,
Amendment 2, 2 October 2006.

Page 6 of 7
 DEF STAN 00-970 PART 1/15
SECTION 3

1.5

1.25

1
FS
0.75

0.5

0.25

0
1.E-10 1.E-09 1.E-08 1.E-07 1.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-04 1.E-03 1.E-02 1.E-01 1.E+00

Pj - probability of occurrence of failure mode j (per hour)

FIG. 1 - FACTOR OF SAFETY AT THE TIME OF OCCURRENCE

1.5

1.25

FS
0.75

0.5

0.25

0
1.E-10 1.E-09 1.E-08 1.E-07 1.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-04 1.E-03 1.E-02 1.E-01 1.E+00
Qj - probability of being in failure condition j

FIG. 2a - FACTOR OF SAFETY FOR CONTINUATION OF FLIGHT (WITHOUT MANOEUVRE

LIMITATIONS)

1.5

1.25

1
FS
0.75

0.5

0.25

0
1.E-10 1.E-09 1.E-08 1.E-07 1.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-04 1.E-03 1.E-02 1.E-01 1.E+00
Qj - probability of being in failure condition j

FIG. 2b - FACTOR OF SAFETY FOR CONTINUATION OF FLIGHT (WITH MANOEUVRE LIMITATIONS)

Page 7 of 7
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