JUANARIA FRANCISCO, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. LOPE TAYAO, Defendant-Appellee.

(1927)

FACTS: Juanaria Francisco, the plaintiff, and Lope Tayao, the defendant, contracted marriage in the City of Manila in
1912. They separated in 1917. Tayao was later prosecuted for having committed adultery with a married woman
named Bernardina Medrano. Ambrosio Torres, the husband of Bernardina was the one who instituted the criminal
case of adultery against his wife Bernardina and the herein defendant Tayao. As a result of that proceeding, Lope
Tayao, together with his co-accused Bernardina Medrano was convicted of the adultery case.

In this case, Juanaria Francisco, the wife of Tayao, institutes a proceeding to dissolve the marriage. Such action was
denied by the trial court judge

ISSUE: Whether or not, under the facts, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce in accordance with the Philippine
Divorce Law.

The related question resolutory of the appeal is whether or not the wife can secure a divorce from the husband,
where the latter has been convicted of adultery and not of concubinage, although the acts for which the
husband was convicted of adultery may also constitute concubinage.

HELD: No. The prevailing law during this time was the The Philippine Divorce Law, Act No. 2710.

The said law provided that “A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband . . . ." It further provides "The divorce may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage, as the case
may be. . . . and that "A divorce shall not be granted without the guilt of the defendant being established by
final sentence in a criminal action"- by final sentence in a criminal action for adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband.

The undeniable fact remains that the defendant Tayao was prosecuted for, and was convicted of, the crime of
adultery and not the crime of concubinage. The criminal case was instituted by the offendd husband of
Bernardina. It was not instituted by the injured wife which is essential for the proper initiation of a prosecution for
concubinage.

A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or husband or concubinage on the part of
the husband." This likewise the court cannot do. It would amount to judicial amendment of the law.

Therefore, the divorce cannot be granted.

G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987

FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA

TOPIC: grounds for legal separation and Support pendente lite; pending case for legal separation

NOTE: The doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao has now been modified, as that case was decided under Act. No. 2710,
when absolute divorce was then allowed and had for its grounds the same grounds for legal separation under
the New Civil Code, with the requirement, under such former law, that the guilt of defendant spouse had to be
established by final judgment in a criminal action. 

That requirement has not been reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present Civil Code, and the omission has
been uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao.
FACTS: The legal wife filed with the RTC a civil complaint against her husband for legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage, with a petition for support pendente lite and payment of damages. The same petitioner also filed with
the MTC a criminal case against her husband for concubinage.

The husband contended that contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto,
such as, application for support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him the private respondent. The civil action for legal separation, grounded as it is on concubinage, it is
petitioner's position that such civil action arises from, or is inextricably tied to the criminal action for concubinage, so
that all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended to await conviction or acquittal for
concubinage in the criminal case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the civil action for legal separation and the application for support shall be suspended to give
way to the criminal action for concubinage?

HELD: No. In other words, in view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for
legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for
concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the
civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense.

Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as,
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting
from the innocent spouse, among others.

The governing rule is now is that “A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon
proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation

As earlier noted this action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal
rights of the spouses and their relations to each other, within the contemplation of Articles 7 to 108, of the Civil Code."

No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao 4 has been
modified, as that case was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then allowed and had for its
grounds the same grounds for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the requirement, under such former
law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by final judgment in a criminal action. That requirement
has not been reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present Civil Code, and the omission has been uniformly
accepted as a modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao.5

Support pendente lite,  as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion
of the judge. 6

G.R. No. 153206             October 23, 2006

ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner,

FACTS: Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code before the RTC
alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct.
; William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt.

The defendant denied all allegations and countered that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal
separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation
shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation.

ISSUE: WON issuance of decree of Legal separation is proper?

The court noted that although the Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution it does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the
province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to
protect it and put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect the same. With the enactment of the Family
Code, this has been accomplished as it defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity
and those for legal separation.