11/2/21, 4:25 AM G.R. No.

197556

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THIRD DIVISION

March 25, 2015

G.R. No. 197556

WATERFRONT CEBU CITY CASINO HOTEL, INC. and MARCO PROTACIO, Petitioners,

vs.
ILDEBRANDO LEDESMA, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to
set aside the Decision1 dated March 17, 2011 and Resolution2 dated June 21, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 05071. The CA reversed the Decision3 dated November 27, 2009 and Resolution4 dated
February 22, 2010 ofthe National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and reinstated the Decision5 dated April 29,
2009 of the Labor Arbiter (LA). The LA declared that respondent

Ledesma Ildebrando was illegally dismissed from his employment by petitioner Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel,
Inc. (Waterfront).

The factual antecedents follow:

Respondent was employed as a House Detective at Waterfront located at Salinas Drive, Cebu City.

On the basis of the complaints filed before Waterfront by Christe6 Mandal, a supplier of a concessionaire of
Waterfront, and Rosanna Lofranco, who was seeking a job at the same hotel, Ledesma was dismissed from
employment.7 From the affidavits8 and testimonies9 of Christe Mandal and Rosanna Lofranco during the
administrative hearings conducted by Waterfront, the latter found, among others, that Ledesma kissed and mashed
the breasts of Christe Mandal inside the hotel’s elevator, and exhibited his penis and asked Rosanna Lofranco to
masturbate him at the conference room of the hotel.

On August 12, 2008, Ledesma filed a complaint10 for illegal dismissal which was docketed as NLRC RAB-VII Case
No. 08-1887-08. The LA found that the allegations leveled against Ledesma are mere concoctions, and concluded
that Ledesma was illegally dismissed. The dispositive portion of the April 29, 2009 Decision of the LA, reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, a decision is hereby rendered declaring the suspension as well as the
dismissal of herein complainant illegal. Consequently, respondent Waterfront Cebu City Hotel is ordered to reinstate
complainant Ildebrando Ledesma to his former position without loss of seniority right and with full backwages
reckoned from the date of the suspension up to actual reinstatement.

Herein respondent is likewise ordered to pay complainant Ledesma service incentive leave pay in the amount of
THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P3,910.50) plus ten percent (10%) of
the total monetary award as attorney’s fees.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

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11
SO ORDERED.

On appeal to the NLRC, the latter reversed the ruling of the LA and held that Ledesma’s acts of sexual overtures to
Christe Mandal and Rosanna Lofranco constituted grave misconduct justifying his dismissal from employment. The
fallo of the November 27, 2009 Decision of the NLRC reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Another one is
entered declaring the dismissal of complainant as valid.

SO ORDERED.12

The NLRC denied Ledesma’s motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated February 22, 2010. A copy of the
said Resolution was received by Atty. Gines Abellana (Atty. Abellana), Ledesma’s counsel of record, on March 15,
2010.13

On May 17, 2010,14 or sixty-three (63) days after Atty. Abellana received a copy of the NLRC’s Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration, said counsel filed before the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.

In its Comment,15 Waterfront prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition on the ground that it was belatedly filed.

On August 5, 2010, Ledesma, now assisted by a new counsel, filed a motion for leave to file amended petition,16
and sought the admission of his Amended Petition for Certiorari.17 In the amended petition, Ledesma contended that
his receipt on March 24, 2010 (and not the receipt on March 15, 2010 by Atty. Abellana), is the reckoning date of
the 60-day reglementary period within which to file the petition. Hence, Ledesma claims that the petition was timely
filed on May 17, 2010.18

By its Resolution19 dated August 27, 2010, the CA granted leave of court to Ledesma and admitted his amended
petition for certiorari. The CA, thereafter, rendered a Decision dated March 17, 2011, reversing the Decision of the
NLRC and reinstating the ruling of the LA. The fallo of the assailed CA Decision reads:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this petition is GRANTED. The 27 November 2009 NLRC Decision and 22
February 2010 Resolution in NLRC Case No. VAC-09-000912-2009 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the 29
April 2009 Decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.20

The CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Waterfront in a Resolution dated June 21, 2011. Thus, the
present petition for review on certiorari where Waterfront raised the main issue of whether the petition for certiorari
was timely filed with the CA.21

In his Comment,22 Ledesma sought the dismissal of the instant petition of Waterfront on the basis of the following
formal infirmities: (1) the presentation of Gaye Maureen Cenabre, the representative of Waterfront, of a Community
Tax Certificate before the Notary Public to prove her identity, violated A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, and rendered the jurat in
the verification and certification on non-forum shopping of the petition as defective; and (2) no certified true copy of
the August 10, 2011 Board Resolution quoted in the Secretary’s Certificate was attached to the petition.

The Court finds Waterfront’s petition to be meritorious.

The procedural infirmities23 pointed out by Ledesma are not adequate to cause the dismissal of the present petition.
Gaye Maureen Cenabre presented to the Notary Public a Community Tax Certificate numbered 27401128 to prove
her identity instead of a current identification document issued by an official agency bearing her photograph and
signature as required by A.M. No. 02-8-13- SC. This rendered the jurat in the verification/certification of non-forum
shopping of Waterfront as defective. Nonetheless, any flaw in the verification, being only a formal, not a jurisdictional
requirement, is not a fatal defect.24 In like manner, there is no need to attach the certified true copy of the Board
Resolution quoted in the Secretary’s Certificate attached to the petition. Only the judgment, order or resolution
assailed in the petition are the attachments required under Section 4,25 Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to be duplicate
originals or certified true copies.

On the main issue, the unjustified failure of Ledesma to file his petition for certiorari before the CA within the 60-day
period is a ground for the outright dismissal of said petition.

Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07- 7-12-SC, reads:

SEC. 4. When and where to file the petition. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of
the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
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motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial
of the motion.

If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a
person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same
is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency,
unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court
of Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed
exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals,26 we categorically ruled that the present rule now mandatorily
requires compliance with the reglementary period. The period can no longer be extended as previously allowed
before the amendment, thus:

As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change its meaning. It
is presumed that the deletion would not have been made if there had been no intention to effect a change in the
meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should accordingly be given a construction different from that
previous to its amendment.

If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the
paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph under the
amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any extension
of the 60- day period within which to file a petition for certiorari.

The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph
allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now
stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order
denying a motion for reconsideration.27

(Additional emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the subsequent case of Domdom v. Third & Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan,28 the absence of a specific
prohibition in Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, for the extension of the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari
was construed as a discretionary authority of the courts to grant an extension.

Republic v. St. Vincent De Paul Colleges, Inc.29 clarified the "conflict" between the rulings in Laguna Metts
Corporation30 and Domdom,31 in that the former is the general rule while the latter is the exception, thus:

What seems to be a "conflict" is actually more apparent than real. A reading of the foregoing rulings leads to the
simple conclusion that Laguna Metts Corporation involves a strict application of the general rule that petitions for
certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a
motion for reconsideration. Domdom, on the other hand, relaxed the rule and allowed an extension of the
sixty (60)-day period subject to the Court’s sound discretion.32 (Emphasis in the original)

In relaxing the rules and allowing an extension, Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals33 reiterated the
necessity for the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation34 for the failure to file
the petition for certiorari within the 60-day period.

The petition for certiorari was filed

Atty. Abellana, Ledesma’s counsel, admittedly received a copy of the NLRC Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration on March 15, 2010 while Ledesma received his copy on March 24, 2010.

Ledesma erroneously asserted in his petition for certiorari filed before the CA, that the 60th day is May 15, 2010,
counted from March 15, 2010.35 In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included;36
hence, the last day to file his petition for certiorari is on May 14, 2010, a Friday. Ledesma therefore belatedly filed
his petition on May 17, 2010.

Realizing his procedural faux pas, Ledesma filed an amended petition where he contended that he timely filed his
petition for certiorari on May 17, 2010 counted from his receipt of the NLRC Resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration on March 24, 2010.37 This stance is bereft of any legal basis. When a party to a suit appears by
counsel, service of every judgment and all orders of the court must be sent to the counsel. This is so because notice
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to counsel is an effective notice to the client, while notice to the client and not his counsel is not notice in law.38
Receipt of notice by the counsel of record is the reckoning point of the reglementary period.39

The negligence of Atty. Abellana in the computation of the 60-day period, and reckoning such period from the party’s
receipt of the assailed NLRC resolution were similar arguments rejected in Labao v. Flores.40 In the Labao case,41
the respondents maintained that they should not suffer the negligence of their counsel in the late filing of their
petition for certiorari, and the 60-day period be reckoned from their own notice of the NLRC’s denial of their motion
for reconsideration. In rejecting said arguments we ruled as follows:

The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural
technique. The exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that
the client is deprived of his day in court. The failure of a party’s counsel to notify him on time of the adverse
judgment, to enable him to appeal therefrom, is negligence that is not excusable. We have repeatedly held that
notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an
adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and
regular on its face.42 (Emphasis omitted)

With the expiration of the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari, a review of the Resolution of the NLRC will be
beyond the jurisdiction of any court.43 No longer assailable, the NLRC Resolution could not be altered or modified,
as previously held in Labao v. Flores:44

The NLRC’s resolution became final ten (10) days after counsel’s receipt, and the respondents’ failure to file the
petition within the required (60)-day period rendered it impervious to any attack through a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari. Thus, no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the resolution.

Needless to stress, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. All the issues between the
parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a judgment becomes final and executory; execution of the
decision proceeds as a matter of right as vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has
the right to appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
decision on the case. After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the merits.
Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation, and this will set to naught the main role of courts of justice to assist in
the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with
finality.

Ledesma did not attempt to justify

The relaxation of procedural rules may be allowed only when there are exceptional circumstances to justify the
same.45 There should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious
explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.46 Moreover, those who seek exemption from the application
of a procedural rule have the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious reason warranting such
departure.47 In Philippine National Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,48 we said:

It is an accepted tenet that rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive and
weighting reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure, however,
should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by
the rules. (Emphasis supplied)

Both in his petition and amended petition, Ledesma never invoked the liberality of the CA nor endeavored to justify
the belated filing of his petition. On the contrary, Ledesma remained firm that his petition was filed with the CA within
the reglementary period.49 Absent valid and compelling reasons for the procedural lapse, the desired leniency
cannot be accorded to Ledesma.50

In sum, the late filing by Ledesma of his petition for certiorari, and his failure to justify his procedural lapse to merit a
lenient application of the rules divested the CA of jurisdiction to entertain the petition.51

Assuming for a moment that the petition for certiorari was timely filed with the CA, said recourse should suffer the
same fate of dismissal for lack of merit. Otherwise stated, there is no substantial justice that may be served here in
disregarding the procedural flaw committed by Ledesma because the NLRC correctly found him guilty of misconduct
or improper behavior in committing lascivious conduct and demanding sexual favors from Christe Mandal and
Rosanna Lofranco.

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The CA ruled in favor of Ledesma since it believed his version that the complainants merely invented the
accusations against him because Waterfront failed to present as evidence the CCTV footages of the alleged
lascivious conduct of Ledesma inside the elevator and the conference room. But this argument was not even raised
by Ledesma himself and it was only the CA which utilized this as a justification to bolster its findings that Ledesma
did not commit any infraction. This being a labor case, the evidence required is only substantial evidence which was
adequately established here by the positive and credible testimonies ofthe complainants.

Notably, Ledesma never refuted, at the administrative investigation level at Waterfront, and even at the
proceedings before the LA, NLRC, and the CA, the allegations leveled against him by Rosanna Lofranco that, after
deluding her to perform a massage on him, Ledesma exhibited to her his penis and requested that he be
masturbated while inside the conference room of the hotel. Ifnot for the position of Ledesma as a House Detective,
he will not have access to the conference room nor will he know that the premises is not monitored through a
closed-circuit television,52 thus giving him the untrammeled opportunity to accomplish his lewd design on the
unsuspecting victim. Such acts of Ledesma constituted misconduct or improper behavior53 which is a just cause for
his dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The March 17, 2011 Decision and June 21, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 05071 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The November
27, 2009 Decision and February 22, 2010 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission which found as
valid the dismissal from employment oflldebrando Ledesma are REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 43-56. Penned by Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon and concurred in by Associate Justices
Portia Alifto-Hormachuelos and Socorro B. Inting.
2
Id. at 58-59. Penned by Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela with Associate Justices Portia Alifio-
Hormachuelos and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez concurring.

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