Scribd
Upload
82 views

Tamper Detection in Processor

This document discusses tamper detection in smart energy meters. It describes how traditional energy meters had no ability to detect tampering but smart meters can report tampering in real-time. It outlines various tampering methods like physical, magnetic, and current bypassing. Detection methods are also discussed, like using less magnetic sensors, measuring both line and neutral current, and firmware to detect reversed current. The document concludes that smart meters equipped with microcontrollers are best suited for robust tamper detection and reporting.

Uploaded by

iskandarn_el5735
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
82 views

Tamper Detection in Processor

This document discusses tamper detection in smart energy meters. It describes how traditional energy meters had no ability to detect tampering but smart meters can report tampering in real-time. It outlines various tampering methods like physical, magnetic, and current bypassing. Detection methods are also discussed, like using less magnetic sensors, measuring both line and neutral current, and firmware to detect reversed current. The document concludes that smart meters equipped with microcontrollers are best suited for robust tamper detection and reporting.

Uploaded by

iskandarn_el5735
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 5

Tamper detection in processor-

based energy meters


Smart e-meters make it possible to report tampering in real
time
BY KRIPASAGAR VENKAT
Smart Grid Applications Manager 
Texas Instruments, www.ti.com

Energy meters have gone through several changes with respect to design and
functionality in the last decade. A variety of improvements such as lower cost, increased
accuracy, tamper detection, less bulk, bigger feature set, no moving parts, digital
display, etc. were incorporated in the newer electronic meters. In most developed
nations, traditional electronic meters are being replaced by smart energy meters. Smart
meters can communicate (one-/two-way) to the outside world through various wired and
wireless communication methods. However, looking into the global landscape, the
adoption of these improvements is inconsistent due to a lack of investments in grid
infrastructure, challenging environments, and prioritized feature sets. For example, most
meters are electronic in India, but are far behind the concept of smart meters (two-way
communication) due to poor grid conditions. However, India’s meters are the most
advanced with respect to tamper detection and protection. 

Meter tampering in the broadest sense is an illegal method employed by consumers to


gain entry, break in, or some cases break the meter to deplete key functionalities, with
the goal of reducing or completely eliminating the cost of energy usage. Traditional
electricity meters have no ability to detect or deal with tampering because they only
measure energy based on the voltage and current flowing between the inlet and outlet
terminals. In such meters, tampering has become very easy and detection is harder.
Just as metering and anti-tamper technologies have improved, in parallel, bad
consumers continue to get smarter with newer methods to tamper and combat existing
anti-tampering schemes. 

All electronic meters have a digital processor, microcontroller, microprocessor, or


mixed-signal IC that performs energy measurement. These devices, collectively referred
to as processors, are very powerful and directly contribute to the robustness of any
meter. Energy is the instantaneous product of ac voltage and ac current averaged over
time. Separate sensors for voltage and current will convert ac-mains voltage and current
to a reduced and acceptable input for analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) processing in
the digital domain. Figure 1 shows the signal chain inside an electronic meter from ac
inputs to ADCs.

 Fig. 1: Front end of an electricity meter.

Sensors are external to the processor and are probably the easiest targets for
tampering. It is important to establish that the ac-mains voltage is always fixed, whereas
ac current varies with loads being turned on/off. Therefore, voltage sensors are minor
targets since they are easily replaced with fixed values in the event of voltage sensor
tampering. In comparison, current sensors are the most critical part of an energy
measurement system. In any electronic energy meter, current sensors play an important
part in energy accuracy, cost, size, and safety. Current sensors can be shunt resistors,
current transformers (CT), Rogowski coils, Hall-effect, and others, with choices primarily
made based the accuracy requirement of the meter. However, the sensors’
susceptibility to tampering varies and must be understood by metrology engineers
worldwide in order to design a tamper-proof meter that can cater to worldwide needs. 

Various methods of tampering have been identified, including physical tampering,


magnetic interference, bypassing currents, removing wires, adding passives to cause
interference, and electroshock technologies (including electrostatic discharge) to break
meters. Predictably, single-phase meters used in most residential complexes are
targets for tampering and anti-tamper techniques for these are most needed. Physical
tampering includes trying to break the case, inserting metal objects to prevent
measurement, etc. Magnetic interference is the most common and easiest way to
tamper with a meter. Typical sources of magnetic interference are powerful magnets
and strong ac fields. Magnetic core-based components in meters such as CTs and
transformer-based power supplies saturate in such conditions, resulting in a complete
shutdown of metering. 

Figure 2 shows magnetic interference using magnets and/or application of strong ac


fields to disrupt measurements in a single-phase meter. 
 

 Fig. 2: Magnetic interference applied to an e-meter.

Bypassing current or an unbalanced current condition occurs when a consumer tries to


bypass some of the current consumed so the meter reports less usage. This condition
can easily go undetected as these changes can be reverted quickly when the meter is
due to be read by the utility. Reversing current falls under this category as well, where
the meter leads are reversed to negate the true readings so the meter counts backward.
Although this maneuver sounds simple, it is a complicated process that involves
rewiring the meter. The process is a significant safety risk to the perpetrator and difficult
to perform if the meter is sealed and/or installed in a cramped location. 

Physical tampering can be eliminated by using costly polycarbonate cases, secondary


casing, hermetic sealing, or simply by welding it shut to provide isolation and protection
against foreign objects. Magnetic tampering can be prevented by using less magnetics
in a meter. Current sensors such as shunt resistors and Rogowski coils have no
magnetic elements and are immune to this type of attack. However, shunt resistors
have limitations such as reduced accuracy due to self-heating and provide no isolation
to the processor. Rogowski coils are coreless in their design, therefore cheaper,
smaller, and harder to tamper with. They have to be customized for electricity meters,
which increases manufacturing challenges in comparison to shunt resistors or CTs.
Simple power supplies like the resistive capacitive type are designed without magnetics
to ensure uninterrupted system power during tampering, but lack the capability to
source large currents. Hence, electricity meters equipped with processors requiring
lower power are a benefit, and are more resilient, during attacks. Bypassing current
tampering can be quickly combatted by measuring current in both the line and neutral,
and checking for balance. Any significant difference between the two is a clear
indication of tampering. However, this calls for an additional sensor and an ADC
channel to measure the return current. Two shunt resistors will not work due to high ac
voltage between line and neutral applied directly to the processor, whereas two CTs are
an option, but with a bigger increase in cost. In such meters, a shunt resistor CT combo
would ensure the best accuracy, isolation, balanced cost, and ability to remain tamper
resistant.

Reversed current tampering is easily resolved by firmware that indicates negative


energy readings. Measures can then be taken to report tampering, make the readings
positive and continue or bill the consumer at a very high rate under these conditions. 

This article provided a brief outline into the various types of energy meter tampering and
methods to detect them. Most of these methods are adaptive over time, and processors
must have programmability and flexibility to combat the newest means of tampering.
With the introduction of smart e-meters, reporting of tampering is now available in real
time. With a remote disconnect feature on these meters, utility companies can now cut
off power to bad consumers almost instantly. This is a huge benefit and savings in
terms of energy and revenue lost due to tampering, which justifies the roll-out of smart
meters for yet another good reason. An important practical conclusion is that
microcontrollers with mixed-signal capabilities are best suited to provide systems-on-
chip for smart meters. The low-cost, low-power, powerful analog and digital peripherals,
and firmware flexibility, allow for robust tamper-free meters.  
By KRIPASAGAR VENKAT, Smart Grid Applications Manager, Texas Instruments,
www.ti.com

You might also like

pFad - Phonifier reborn

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.

Note: This service is not intended for secure transactions such as banking, social media, email, or purchasing. Use at your own risk. We assume no liability whatsoever for broken pages.


Alternative Proxies:

Alternative Proxy

pFad Proxy

pFad v3 Proxy

pFad v4 Proxy