Lapuz-Sy vs.

Eufemio

FACTS:

 Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against

Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. 
 They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically
after nine days. 
 They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without
any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. 
 They acquired properties during their marriage. 
 Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949.  She prayed for the
issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others,
would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his
share of the conjugal partnership profits. 

 Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his

marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage with Go Hiok.  Trial proceeded and the parties adduced
their respective evidence. 

 However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already

scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a
vehicular accident on May 1969.  Her counsel duly notified the
court of her death. 

 Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on

June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond
the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and
that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. 

 Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by

her father, Macario Lapuz. 

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an

action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply
if the action involved property rights.

HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the
plaintiff, even if property rights are involved.
These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source
being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come
into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims
are merely rights in expectation.
If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can
be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of  Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and
academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same
after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. 
Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article
144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and
determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or
by the heirs of the appellant.

the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted

from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided
in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceeding.

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and

Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as to
costs.

ALFONSO Lacson vs CARMEN SAN JOSE Lacson

Facts:
 On Feb 14, 1953, when they got married, 
 Jan 9, 1963 is when Carmen (respondent) left home in Bacolod to
go to Manila,
 on March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint for custody of
children as well as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Manila, Before it pushed through though they reached a
settlement where the two eldest kids would go to petitioner
Alfonso and the youngest would stay with Carmen, This was
affirmed by the CFI.
 and on May 7, 1963 respondent filed a motion for the custody of
all children be given to her in JDRC since, she said she only
 entered into agreement to gain custody of her younger children
and thus should be given custody of the older ones as well who
are all below 7 years old. 
 CA ruled that compromise agreement as relating to custody of
children should be declared null and void and as such the
execution of said judgment is void too.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not support should be awarded to the wife

HELD:
Yes, should have but was filed out of time, Older children at that
time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have been declared null and void
since no compelling reasons were stated otherwise, However the
children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old may choose which
parent they want to live with and Court may also award custody to who
they deem more fit through evidence

We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that the CFI erred in
depriving the mother, the respondent spouse, of the custody of the two
older children (both then below the age of 7).
The Civil Code specifically commands in the second sentence of its
article 363 that "No mother-shall be separated from her child under
seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such
measure," The rationale of this new provision was... explained by the
Code Commission, thus:
"The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy
where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her.  No man can sound
the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender...
age.  The exception allowed by the rule has to be for 'compelling
reasons for the good of the child:  those cases must indeed be rare,
if the mother's heart is not to be unduly hurt.  If she... has erred,
as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the
(relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for
her.  Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon
the baby who is as yet unable to... understand the situation." (Report
of the Code Commission, p. 12)
The use of the word shall[2] in article 363 of the Civil Code, Coupled
with the observations made by the Code Commission in respect to the
said legal provision, underscores its... mandatory character.  It
prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a mother and her
child below seven years, unless such separation is grounded upon
compelling reasons as determined by a court.
The order dated April 27, 1963 of' the CFI, in so far as it awarded
custody of the two older children who were 6 and 5 years old,
respectively, to the father, in effect sought to separate them from
their mother.  To that... extent therefore, it was null and void
because clearly violative of article 363 of the Civil Code.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision dated May 11, 1964 and the resolution dated
July 31, 1964 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 32384-R (subject
matter of G.R. L-23482), and the orders dated May 28, 1963 and June
24, 1963 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (subject matter
of G.R. L-23767) are affirmed. G.R. L-24259 is hereby remanded to the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for further proceedings,
in accordance with this decision. No pronouncement as to costs.

Ong Eng Kiam a.k.a. William Ong vs  Lucita Ong

FACTS:

William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20 years
when Lucita filed a complaint for Legal separation under Article 55
par. (1) of the Family Code.

Lucita alleged that since their third year of marriage, her husband

William subjected her to physical violence like  slapping, kicking and
pulling her hair and bang her head against the concrete wall
and been violent towards their three children.

He would  scold them using his belt buckle to beat them. One day after
a violent quarrel wherein William hit Lucita on several different
parts of her body, pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the
house which she did.

Lucita’s statements about William’s abusive behavior were corroborated

by her sister Linda Lim. Dr. Vicente Elinzan whom Lucita consulted the
day after she left her conjugal home also testified about her
injuries.

The trial court granted  Lucitas petition for legal separation which
the  CA affirmed

William then filed this petition for review on certiorari

-On the decision denying all of Lucita’s allegations and that he never

inflicted physical harm on her or their children.

-He also argued that the real motive of Lucita and her family in

filing the complaint is to deprive him of his control and ownership
over his conjugal properties with Lucita.
-That the CA overlooked some facts of the case which warrant an
exception to the general rule that questions of fact cannot be the
subject for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

-The CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita her sister and

their parents’ doctor Dr. ElinZano since their testimonies are tainted
with relationship and fraud  and since Lucita abandoned the family
home she has also given a ground for legal separation and therefore
should NOT- be granted one pursuant to Art. 56  par. 4 of The family
code – Where both parties have given ground for legal separation

ISSUE:

WON Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation

HELD:

The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for
her family to take control of the conjugal properties is absurd.
Lucita left because of her husband’s repeated physical violence and
grossly abusive conduct. That the physical violence and grossly
abusive conduct were brought to bear upon Lucita have been duly
established.

He can derive no personal gain from pushing for the financial

interests of her family at the expense of her marriage of 20 years and
the companionship of her husband and children

The assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of

witnesses is given great respect. Relationship alone is not enough to
discredit and label a witness’  testimony as biased and unworthy of
credence. Witnesses Linda Lim and Dr. Elinzano gave detailed and
straightforward testimonies  the court finds that their testimonies
are not tainted with bias.

The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without

justifiable cause for more than one year. Lucita left William due to
his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated
in the said provision

PETITION DENIED: Lucita should be granted  a decree of legal

separation
 Gandionco vs Penaranda
GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987

FACTS:

Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against

herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the
ground of concubinage as a civil case. 
Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her
husband. 
She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of
support pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent
judge. 
Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the
incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in
view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him. 
He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably
tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal
separation will have to be suspended and await the conviction or
acquittal of the criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed

pending the resolution of the criminal case for concubinage.

HELD:
Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were
incorrect. A civil action for legal separation on the ground of
concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal
action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to
enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both the
civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same
offense. 
Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences thereof including the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the
children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from the
innocent spouse.  Decree of legal separation may be issued upon proof
by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary.

Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of

in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of
the judge.   If in case, the petitioner finds the amount of
support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a
motion to modify or reduce the same.

Petitioner's contention is without merit. Divergence of opinions

between a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to applicable
laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the
judge from hearing the case, on the ground of bias and manifest
partiality. This is more so, in this case, where we find the judge's
disposition of petitioner's motions to be sound and well-taken.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against

petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Estrella de la Cruz vs. Severino de la Cruz

FACTS:

On 01 February 1938, Estrella and Severino married in Bacolod City. 

During their union, six (6) children were born, and seven (7) parcels
of land from Bacolod Cadastre and three (3) parcels of land from Silay
Cadastre were acquired.  These lands were assessed at P45,429 and
P43,580, respectively. 
The hacienda in Silay had a net profit of P3,309.49 in 1957.  Aside
from these properties, the spouses also owned a number of varied
businesses and subdivisions.
On 22 July 1958, Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint alleging that
her husband had not only abandoned her, but also mismanaged their
conjugal partnership properties. 
According to Estrella, since 1955, Severino had not lived in their
conjugal home, but instead had lived in his office and thereafter had
been living in Manila with his concubine, Nenita Hernandez.  This was
supported by notes and letters written by Nenita which Estrella found
hidden in the pocket of her husband’s polo shirt and then in his iron
safe thereafter. 
When confronted, Severino denied of abandoning his wife and children.
He reasoned that he was only living in his office to teach a lesson to
his quarrelsome and extremely jealous wife.  He further averred that
he never failed to give his family financial support as evidenced by
the allowance drawings of the wife in the amounts ranging from P1000
to P1500 from the office, which was corroborated by Marcos Ganaban,
the assistant general manager of Philippine Textboard Factory. 

Furthermore, Estrella insists that her husband refused and failed to

inform her of the status of their various business concerns.  She
further claims that such actuations are tantamount to an abuse of
administrative powers over the conjugal partnership properties. 
However,
No evidence from the plaintiff was presented.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff

constitute abandonment in law and would justify a separation of the
conjugal partnership properties?
HELD: 
The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital
obligations and support of the family.  To be legally declared as to
have abandoned the conjugal home, one must have willfully and with
intention of not coming back and perpetual separation.  There must be
real abandonment and not mere separation. 
In fact, the husband never failed to give monthly financial support as
admitted by the wife.  This negates the intention of coming home to
the conjugal abode.  The plaintiff even testified that the husband
“paid short visits” implying more than one visit.  Likewise, as
testified by the manager of one of their businesses, the wife has been
drawing a monthly allowance of P1,000-1,500 that was given personally
by the defendant or the witness himself.
SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure
of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform
the wife of the progress of the business constitutes abuse of
administration.  In order for abuse to exist, there must be a willful
and utter disregard of the interest of the partnership evidenced by a
repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the latter.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo(from which), insofar as it decrees
separation of the conjugal properties, is reversed and set aside.
Conformably to our observations, however, the defendant is ordered to
pay to the plaintiff, in the concept of support, the amount of P3,000
per month, until he shall have rejoined her in the conjugal home,
which amount may, in the meantime, be reduced or increased in the
discretion of the court a quo as circumstances warrant. The award of
attorney's fees to the plaintiff is reduced to P10,000, without
interest. No pronouncement as to costs.

Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails
to comply with his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved
spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial
separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator
of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary
conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph
refer to marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left
the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who
has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has
failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of
returning to the conjugal dwelling.

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG

FACTS:

Jose Jo, herein respondent, admits to having cohabited with three

different women and fathered fifteen children. 
The first of these women, Prima Partosa, claims to be his legal wife
by who he begot a daughter, Monina Jo. 
The petitioner filed a complaint against Jose for judicial separation
of conjugal property to which the RTC of Negros Occidental ruled in
favour of Prima as regards to support but none is mentioned in the
dispositive portion of its decision regarding the judicial separation
of conjugal property. 
Upon elevation, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.
The complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property was
dismissed for lack of a cause of action and on the ground that
separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil
Code.
Issues:
Whether or not there is such a separation decreed by the trial court
in the dispositive portion of its decision
Held:
YES, THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION IN QUESTION WAS
INCOMPLETE INSOFAR AS IT CARRIED NO RULING ON THE COMPLAINT FOR
JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY.
However, the technicality invoked in this case should not be allowed
to prevail over considerations of substantive justice.  The trial
court made definite findings that the Jose and Prima were legally
married and that the properties mentioned by Prima were acquired by
Jose during their married although they were registered in the name of
an apparent dummy. 
As there is no question that the trial court’s decision is based on
the said facts, the Supreme Court then modified the decision to grant
the prayer of the plaintiff on the conjugal property’s division
between the spouses.

The past has caught up with the private respondent. After his
extramarital flings and a succession of illegitimate children, he must
now make an accounting to his lawful wife of the properties he denied
her despite his promise to their of his eternal love and care.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the

respondent court is MODIFIED. Civil Case No. 51 is hereby decided in
favor the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, and the conjugal property
of the petitioner and the private respondent is hereby ordered divided
between them, share and share alike. This division shall be
implemented by the trial court after determination of all the
properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership, including
those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the
persons.

SO ORDERED.
 De Ocampo v. SERAFINA  Florenciano

FACTS:

The record shows that on July 5, 1955, the complaint for legal
separation was filed. As amended, it described their marriage
performed in 1938, and the commission of adultery by Serafina, in
March 1951 with Jose Arcalas, and in June 1955 with Nelson Orzame.

Because the defendant made no answer, the court defaulted her, and
pursuant to Art. 101 above, directed the provincial fiscal to
investigate whether or not collusion existed between the parties.

The fiscal examined the defendant under oath, and then reported to the
Court that there was no collusion.

The plaintiff presented his evidence consisting of the testimony of

Vicente Medina, Ernesto de Ocampo, Cesar Enriquez, Mateo Damo, Jose de
Ocampo and Capt. Serafin Gubat. ART. 100.—The legal separation may be
claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.

Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed

by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal
separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.

ART. 101.—No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a

stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-
appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties
exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for
the plaintiff is not fabricated.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the period to file legal separation has already
prescribed
2. Whether or not there is collusion between the parties
3. Whether or not there is condonation/consent on the part of the
husband
RULING:

1. The Court of Appeals held that the husband's right to

legal separation on account of the defendant's adultery with Jose
Arcalas had prescribed, because his action was not filed within
one year from March 1951 when plaintiff discovered her infidelity.
(Art. 102, New Civil Code)
As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, the appellate court found that
in the night of June 18, 1955, the husband upon discovering
the illicit connection, expressed his wish to file a petition
for legal separation and defendant readily agreed to such filing.

2. No. Collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the

guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party
to procure evidence necessary to prove it. And proof that the
defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself
collusion.

3. No. We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for

defendant and take her home constituted condonation or consent to her
adulterous relations with Orzame. It will be remembered that she
"left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he
had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his
duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to
return.

Almacen v. Baltazar, G. R. No. L- 10028

Facts:
 plaintiff and defendant were legally married on March 24, 1923
 plaintiff committed adultery with one named Jose Navarro, a
cousin of defendant.
 prior to the infidelity of the wife, the defendant himself has
not been loyal to her,  he having been once confined at the
hospital suffering from venereal disease(A disease that is
contracted and transmitted by sexual contact, caused by microorganisms
that survive on the skin or mucus membranes, or that are transmitted via
semen, vaginal secretions, or blood during intercourse)
 the defendant separated from the plaintiff after the latter's
infidelity and while estranged from her he lived maritally with
another woman by the name of Lourdes Alvarez;
 after their separation there has been a reconciliation between
them or at least a condonation by defendant of the acts committed
by the wife as shown by the fact that he has been sending her
money for her support
 husband and wife were in pari delicto(in equal fault) and,
therefore, defendant is bound to support the plaintiff because he
has likewise been unfaithful to her.
 Appellant contends that the lower court erred:

-in not taking plaintiff's adulterous act of infidelity as defense

against her claim for support and in not exempting him from the
obligation to give such support; and

-in finding that the evidence on record was sufficient to establish a

condonation of plaintiff's adulterous act and reconciliation between
plaintiff and defendant.

Rulling:

(1)As to the first assignment of error, we find that by the provisions

of Art. 303 of the new Civil Code, the obligation to support shall
cease "when the recipient has committed some act which gives rise to
disinheritance;" that under Art. 921 (k) of the same Code, a spouse
may be disinherited when she has given cause for legal separation,"
and under Art. 97, one of the causes for legal separation is "adultery
on the part of the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband",
as defined in the Penal Code. Accordingly, if the plaintiff was the
only one who committed adultery which is a good cause for
disinheritance and legal separation, defendant's theory would seem to
be correct; but, in the present case, we agree with the lower court's
ruling that defendant is still bound to support his wife

firstly, because plaintiff and defendant were both guilty of

infidelity and before the filing of the action they had a
reconciliation or, at least, defendant had pardoned plaintiff's
unfaithfulness, for which reason we may apply Art. 922 of the
aforesaid Code which provides that "a subsequent reconciliation
between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of
the right to disinherit, aid renders ineffectual any disinheritance
that may have been made;"

secondly, the law on support (Title IX, Book I, Arts. 290-304, Civil
Code) contains no provision squarely applicable to the present case in
which both parties had committed infidelity, neither is there any
provision to the effect that when both spouses committed marital
offenses against one another, one can no longer ask support from the
other;

thirdly, there is the general principle that when two persons acted in
bad faith, they should be considered as having acted in good faith,
which principle may be applied to the instant case to the effect that
plaintiff and defendant being in pari delicto, the latter cannot claim
the adultery of the former as defense to evade the obligation to give
her support.

(2)As to the second assignment of error, we find it also groundless,

for the lower court declared that there has been a condonation by the
defendant of the acts committed by the wife because of the latter's
testimony and documentary evidence submitted (Exhibits A, B, C, F and
J), which show that the defendant had given money to the plaintiff on
several occasions through third persons and, in our opinion, such
evidence is really sufficient to show condonation or reconciliation
between plaintiff and defendant, for had there been no condonation of
plaintiff's infidelity and no reconciliation between her and
defendant, the latter would not certainly have given any amount of
money for her support.
Defendant argues, however, that he and plaintiff never resumed their
conjugal relationship and, therefore, there has been no legal
condonation of the acts of the erring wife; but it cannot be disputed
that the act of giving money to an erring wife and the fact proven in
the case that no action was taken against her before the courts of
justice are sufficient to establish forgiveness amounting to
condonation, for "condonation is the forgiveness of one of the married
parties of an offense which he knows the other has committed against
the other." (Words & Phrases 8A, pp. 19-20} At any rate, pardon or
condonation does not require sexual intercourse and it may be express
or implied.
"Wherefore, finding no errors in the decision appealed from, the same
is hereby affirmed with costs against the defendant

Pacete v. Carriaga

G.R. No. 53880

March 17, 1994
Facts:
Enrico Pacete and Concepcion Alanis were married in 1938.
Pacete contracted another marriage to Clarita de la Concepcion, which
Alanis knew about only on August 1, 1979.
During the marriage, Pacete acquired properties that he registered
either under his name or Clarita or in the names of his children with
Clarita or with other dummies.
Thus, on October 29, 1979, Alanis filed a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between Pacete and de la Concepcion
as well as for legal separation between her and her husband.
The defendants were served with summons on November 15, 1979. They
filed a motion for extension of 20 days, which the court granted. On
December 18, 1979, the defendants again filed a motion for extension
through a new counsel. The court granted the motion, setting the
deadline to January 9, 1980. Although the court’s order was mailed to
the defendants’ counsel on January 11, 1980, they again filed a motion
for extension on February 5, 1980. The next day, the court denied the
motion for extension and granted petitioner Alanis’ motion to declare
the defendants in default.
The Court of First Instance, in its decision on March 17, 1980,
decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis as well as declared
null and void ab initio the marriage between Pacete and de la
Concepcion.

Issue:
WON the court of first instance erred in  rendering its decision
decreed the legal separation of petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and
private respondent.
Held:
Yes. A petition for certiorari is applicable when grave abuse of
discretion attended the declaration of the decision. Article 101 of
the Civil Code, which was later reproduced in Article 60 of the Family
Code, provides No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon
a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney
shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence
for the plaintiff is not fabricated

The court did not follow the procedure mandated by the said procedure.
Furthermore, Article 3 of the Civil Code,

now Article 58 of the Family Code, mandates that an action for legal
separation shall in no case be tried before 6 months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition to allow the parties to have
a cooling-off period.

In addition, Section 6 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides

If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties
exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in
order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.

The State is interested in the integrity of marriage as evidenced by

the provisions of law mentioned. There is no excuse for non-compliance
with the procedures required by statute.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the
proceedings below, including the Decision of 17 March 1980 appealed from,
are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Sabalones v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 106169

February 14, 1994

Facts:
The subject of this petition is the preliminary injunction issued by
the respondent court pending resolution of a case on appeal. We deal
only with this matter and not the merits of the case.
Samson Sabalones was married to Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, who
managed the couple’s properties while the former was away at work.
In 1981, Samson contracted a bigamous marriage with Thelma Cumareng.
In 1985, upon his retirement, Samson came back to the Philippines and
stayed with Cumareng.
Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to
sell a building and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership with
Remedios.
He claimed that he was 68 years old and sick and needed the proceeds
of the sale for his hospitalization and medical treatment.
Remedios opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal
separation because of his adultery. She also prayed that it enjoin the
petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the
Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the
conjugal properties.. She alleged that the property her husband was
trying to sell was being occupied by her and their six children and
that they were depending for support on the rentals from another
conjugal property.
The court decreed the legal separation and declared the forfeiture of
Samson’s share in the conjugal properties.
The court further ordered that he was not entitled to support by his
wife.
While the decision was on appeal, Remedios filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Samson from
interfering with the administration of their properties.
She further stated that her husband threatened their tenant that the
contract would not be renewed. The writ was granted by the Court of
Appeals.
Issue:
Was the Court of Appeals correct in granting the writ of preliminary
injunction?
Ruling:
Yes. Article 61 of the Family Code states that after a petition for
legal separation, the trial court shall appoint either one of the
spouses or a third person to be the administrator of the conjugal
properties if there was no written agreement between the spouses.
Although there was no formal declaration by the trial court, it was
implicitly provided in the decision that the administration would go
to the wife since the court denied the husband any share in the
conjugal properties.
As observed by Francisco, "Injunction is primarily a preventive
remedy. Its province is to afford relief against future acts which are
against equity and good conscience and to keep and preserve the thing
in the status quo, rather than to remedy what is past or to punish for
wrongful acts already committed. It may issue to prevent future wrongs
although no right has yet been violated."
The primary purpose of the injunction is to preserve the status quo of
the things subject of the action or relations between the parties. The
requirements for injunction are the existence of a right and its
actual or threatened violation, which was both present in the case.

Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed

the respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal
assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the
properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner,
pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance
with Article 61 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. It is so ordered.

 Macadangdang vs CA
GR No. 38287, October 23, 1981

FACTS:

Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio

Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived together for two
years and had 6 children. 
They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao
City.  Through hard work and good fortune, their business grew and
expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn
mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. 
Their relationship became complicated and both indulged in
extramarital relations. 
Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965 when private
respondent left for Cebu for good.  When she returned in Davao in
1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. 
She then decided to take the initial action.  In April 1971, she
instituted a complaint for legal separation.
On February 6, 1980, counsel for petitioner, through a notice of death
and motion to dismiss, informed this Court that petitioner Antonio
Macadangdang died on November 30, 1979 and as a consequence thereof,
this case and Civil Case No. 109 of the Court of First Instance of
Davao have become moot and academic
Private respondent, when required to comment on the aforesaid motion,
moved for a resolution of this case
Petitioner had averred that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
holding that respondent Judge's incomplete decision of January 4, 1973
had become final and executory and that the same Court committed an
error in holding that the appointment of an administrator in the case
below was proper.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of

legal separation has effect on the legal separation.
HELD:

The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no

effect on the legal separation. 
When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is
complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a
higher court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the
property, have not yet been commenced nor terminated.   

The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal
separation on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation
and distribution conformably with the effects of such final decree,
the law on intestate succession should take over the disposition of
whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased
spouse.

Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the

final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the
Family Code provides the effects of the decree of legal separation. 
These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as an
inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for
the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal
assets.