GUJARAT NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

Attalika Avenue, Knowledge Corridor, Koba, Gandhinagar- 382007.

PROJECT REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS & INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN

LAW
Topic: Urban Warfare and International Humanitarian Law: Legal and Operational
Challenges.

Date of Submission: 13th April, 2020

Submitted to: Dr. Vikas Gandhi,
Faculty of Law,
Gujarat National Law University, Submitted by:
Venkata Supreeth.K (17B175),
Batch of 2017-2022.

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I avail this opportunity to extend my heartfelt gratitude, firstly to our faculty, Human Rights and
International Humanitarian Law, Dr. Vikas Gandhi, Associate Professor, Gujarat Nationall Law
University. He was most solicitous in allowing a broad ambit for us to work on the interested
topics. Further I extend my gratitude to my friends, colleagues and seniors who have assisted me
in making this project report. Lastly, I extend my gratitude to the University Administration for
providing the resources and opportunity to pursue this project.

Venkata Supreeth.K

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................4

II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK APPLICABLE TO URBAN WARFARE:.............................................7

1. The Hague Convention on Land Warfare, 1907...................................................................7

2. Additional Protocol I to Geneva Conventions......................................................................7

III. LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE CONTEXT OF URBAN WARFARE ...........10

1. Use of Conventional methods and weapons in Urban areas...............................................10

2. The Problem with Intelligence............................................................................................12

3. Embargos and Destruction of Infrastructure: Yemen’s perspective...................................13

4. Destruction of Cultural Heritage........................................................................................14

5. Safety of health workers providing service in conflict-zones............................................15

IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS.....................................................................................................16

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 I. INTRODUCTION

Modern armed conflicts are increasingly fought in urban environments, where millions of people
are bearing the losses of their tragic consequences. This trend has a disastrous impact on the
civilian population and poses serious legal and operational challenges that need to be addressed
to ensure that people living in such environments are protected and their needs cared for.1

Increasingly, war is being fought in urban areas. Because it is where the centres of power are
based, where resources are concentrated and where the civilian population can be held hostage.
A situation that questions the law of war and the intervention strategies adopted by humanitarian
organisations.

Mosul, Gaza, Aleppo, Sanaa. Many cities have recently experienced deadly and destructive
conflict, and some are still the theatre of complex and violent military operations. The
destruction of civilian property, the collapse of healthcare infrastructure and the terror brought by
bombing have led to thousands of civilian deaths and caused many survivors to flee. 2 The data
compiled suggests that urban warfare currently affects over 50 million civilians worldwide, and
kills on average eight times more than a conflict in a rural environment. The complex nature of
urban sites is a major challenge for military and humanitarian aid operations given the population
density and the fact that civilians and combatants intermingle.3

1
Civilians are defined broadly as persons “who are not members of the armed forces.” The
protection that IHL grants to individual civilians is subject to one condition, namely that they do

2
not “take a direct part in hostilities.” The direct participation in hostilities, as defined by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), refers to “acts which by their nature and
purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the armed forces.”
This definition implies that any other acts, e.g. providing food or water to armed militants, that
fall short of causing harm to the enemy’s armed forces do not amount to direct participation in
hostilities. A civilian who partakes in direct hostilities becomes a legitimate target of attack for
1
Leila Rharade, Israel/Palestine, Operation Protective Edge (Gaza, 13 June - 26 August 2014),
https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/israelpalestine-operation-protective-edge-gaza-13-june-26-august-2014
2
http://alternatives-humanitaires.org/en/2019/03/25/urban-warfare-challenge-humanitarian-law-action/
3
ICRC press release upon publication of the ICRC report “I saw…”, 14 June
2017. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/new-research-shows-urban-warfare-eight-times-more-deadly-civilians-
syria-iraq

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as long as he or she participates in the hostilities. (See the briefing note on Direct Participation of
Civilians in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law on IHLRI thematic pages.4

New research conducted in follow up to a 2017 report, I Saw My City Die5, underscores the
impact upon civilians of fighting in cities and towns in Syria and Iraq.

• Urban offensives account for eight times more conflict-related civilian fatalities in four
governorates in Iraq and Syria (March 2017 - July 2018) than ongoing fighting or fighting in
other areas.

• War in cities in these governorates caused an estimated 6,485 civilian fatalities between March
2017 and July 2018, accounting for 78% of all civilian loss of life, according to the best
estimates.

These updated figures further reinforce the findings of last year's report, which showed that cities
in Yemen, Iraq and Syria had become the world's main and most deadly battlefields. Urban
offensives cause devastation and quickly lead to sharp spikes in casualties – both because of the
fighting itself, and because of these battles' compounding effects.6

In the post-Cold War era, a new type of warfare emerged, and cities have become the key sites of
it; “Warfare, like everything else, is being urbanized”. Wars are now entering cities from within;
city spaces, public and private spheres, places of everyday life and urban services have emerged
as the new sites of war. New military theorists speak of a new (fourth) generation of warfare
based on “unconventional wars” where state armies fight against informal combatants or
mobilized civilians. This new generation of war has led to a perception of the city as the “very
medium of warfare- a flexible, almost liquid medium that is forever contingent and in flux.”7

4
Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research International Humanitarian Law Research
Initiative, Briefing paper on the Rules of IHL Applicable t0 Urban Warfare,
https://hhi.harvard.edu/publications/rules-ihl-applicable-conduct-military-operations-urban-areas
5
https://cityatwar.icrc.org/
6
Supra note 3.
7
KU Leuven, City Resillience Amidst Modern Warfare: The case of Nablus, Palestine, 3 17th IPHS Conference,
Delft 2016, 424.

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II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK APPLICABLE TO URBAN WARFARE:

1. The Hague Convention on Land Warfare, 1907: Though there are only 38 signing parties
to the 1907 Convention, the rules codified therein are considered to be Customary
International Law and thus binding upon all the state parties by the application of Jus
Cogens
Pursuant to Article 278, belligerents must take all necessary steps during sieges and
bombardments “to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science,
or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and
wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military
purposes.” Under the rules of land warfare applicable at the time, defended localities
were open to bombardment in their entirety. There could be little hope, therefore, that an
attacking party would spare protected buildings and places unless that party was aware of
their exact location within the besieged locality. No doubt for this very reason, Article 27
imposes a duty on the besieged party to indicate the presence of protected buildings and
places by marking them with distinctive and visible signs.

2. Additional Protocol I to Geneva Conventions : The Additional Protocol I to Geneva

Conventions impose a duty of proportionality, precaution and distinction on the parties
engaging in warfare.
a. Distinction: According to the first basic IHL principle of distinction, civilians are
generally immune from attack. Article 519, which has gained a customary status in
international law, states that civilians “shall enjoy general protection against dangers
arising from military operations.” They are not to be an object of attack as per the
basic rule, unless the situation is such where such a civilian and/or civilian instalment
is employed for a military objective by the adverse party.

8
Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October
1907.https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?
action=openDocument&documentId=3C43C56CFC87D4E3C12563CD005167AA
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Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.

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b. Proportionality: The second basic IHL principle concerning the conduct of hostilities
is the principle of proportionality, which holds that force should be sufficient to
destroy a given military objective without resulting in excessive civilian casualties
and damages. For instance, Article 51 of Additional Protocol I prohibits attacks
“which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” It implies that even
if a given target fulfils the requirements of the principle of distinction, its destruction
may still be illegal if it may be expected to cause excessive damages to individuals
and assets protected by the law.

c. Precaution: The third basic principle under the Additional Protocol I is precautions, as
provided in Article 57, IHL requires parties to conflict to take a range of precautions
in attack and against the effects of attacks to protect civilians and civilian objects.
With regard to precautions in attack, all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid or
at least minimize incidental civilian harm. Feasible precautions are those that are
possible in practice, taking into account all of the circumstances ruling at the time,
including humanitarian and military considerations. The understanding of what
precautions are feasible may evolve over time, depending on a number of factors,
including technological developments, or with the identification of new techniques,
tactics or procedures that make it possible to minimize incidental civilian harm

Article 57 of Additional Protocol I offers further guidance about the proportionate use of
force, in the context of the precautions that an armed force should take before an attack.
Under Article 57, those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:

􀂃 do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians
nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives;
􀂃 take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack in order to
avoid, or minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to
civilians objects; and

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 􀂃 refrain from deciding to launch any attack on a target which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.10

Article 58 of Additional Protocol I provides specific obligations on the defending party to

take basic precautionary measures against the effects of attacks, such as removing the
civilian population and civilian objects from the vicinity of military objectives and
avoiding locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas. In this
context, the use of human shields constitutes a grave breach of IHL.11
Article 58(b) directs the parties to avoid locating military objectives within or near
densely populated areas. More specifically however, this particular rule is hotly contested
by contracting parties, since, with latest developments in military technology and the
increasing trend of urbanization of warfare eventually puts a defending/offending states
to place an urban attack in order to obtain the intended military objectives. In such cases,
the only question then remains is the modus operandi employed in attaining the said
objective.

10
The ICRC Commentary to Art. 51 at p.624
11
Aurel Sari, Urban Wrfate: The obligation of the Defenders, (Jan. 24, 2019) https://www.lawfareblog.com/urban-
warfare-obligations-defenders

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III. LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE CONTEXT OF URBAN WARFARE .

1. Use of Conventional methods and weapons in Urban areas

In the context of urban attacks, the defending state has several duties such as marking off
essential civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, water/food supplies and refugee camps and
other such sites which are designated civilian establishments. In such a cohabitation or a setup,
the presence of military targets or combatants does not preclude the belligerent parties to adopt a
carte blanche method of military action, as seen to be an increasing trend, which has a high
impact radius and can result in massive potential loss of life/casualty and damage to
infrastructure. The chief concern is the preciseness of military action which is an important
requirement under the Protocol I. However with rapid urbanization in the preceding decades,
cities are largely the hotbeds for military planning, resource and insurgency/counter-insurgency
operations. The changing scenario, at times places insurmountable challenges before command
bodies of the belligerent parties as well as law-enforcement to ensure compliance with the rules
of IHL.

Paragraph 5 of Article 51 of the Additional Protocol I reads as follows:

5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate:

(a) An attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military
objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city,
town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian
objects; and
(b) An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

The damage caused by the use of means and methods of warfare that were designed for use in
open battlefields. These include the use of explosive weapons in densely populated areas; these
are often indiscriminate in that they have a wide “impact area” due to their relatively inaccurate

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delivery system, their explosive power or the number of sub-munitions they contain. The ICRC,
many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and even States jointly condemn these practices,
the use of which is steadily rising and which cause major damage among civilian populations.
The NGO coalition, Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) 12, which documents such use, claims
that their deployment in an urban area kills on average twenty-eight people (90% of whom are
civilians) compared with just three in a non-populated area. 13

IHL prohibits attacks directed at civilians and civilian objects, as well as indiscriminate attacks –
that is, attacks that strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.
IHL also prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental civilian harm that would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. While the
existence of the principle of proportionality is uncontested and is applied daily by military
commanders, the key concepts on which it relies (“incidental civilian harm”, “military
advantage”, and “excessiveness”) would benefit from further clarification, which the ICRC has
sought to support.14 In its 2015 report, the ICRC noted that the inherent inaccuracy of certain
types of explosive weapon systems such as many of the artillery, mortar and multiple-rocket
launcher systems in use today, in particular when using unguided munitions, as well as unguided
air-delivered bombs and rockets – raises serious concerns under the prohibition against
indiscriminate attacks. Their low accuracy makes it very difficult to direct these weapons against
a specific military objective as required by this rule: there is a high risk therefore that they will
strike military objectives and civilians and civilian objects without distinction. While increasing
the accuracy of delivery systems would help reduce the weapons’ wide-area effects in populated
areas, their accuracy could be obviated by the use of large-calibre munitions – i.e. munitions that
have a large destructive radius relative to the size of the military objective – which might still be
contrary to IHL.

2. The Problem with Intelligence

12
AOAV, “Explosive Truths: Monitoring Explosive Violence in 2016” (April 2017), 17.
13
Julien Antoly, Urban warfare: a challenge for humanitarian law and action, HUMANITARIAN ALTERNATIVES (
http://alternatives-humanitaires.org/en/2019/03/25/urban-warfare-challenge-humanitarian-law-action/
14
ICRC Report on International Humanitarian Law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts -
Recommitting To Protection In Armed Conflict On The 70th Anniversary Of The Geneva Conventions, ( November
22nd, 2019) https://reliefweb.int/report/world/international-humanitarian-law-and-challenges-contemporary-armed-
conflicts-recommitting

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Most importantly, this information should be up-to-date and should not rely on outdated data
from old census figures or city maps, especially when information that is more accurate can be
collected. This is why the Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to
Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 15 explained
that ‘A military commander must set up an effective intelligence gathering system to collect and
evaluate information concerning potential targets’.

The first problem is the uncertainty of combat conditions. Intelligence is incomplete at best.
Even sophisticated tools, such as pilotless drones and satellites, are of limited use when the
fighting takes place on city streets, since buildings and ruins serve as cover for enemy fighters.
Any army advancing through a residential area must anticipate enemy snipers lurking behind
every window, wall, or pile of rubble. Every house is a potential deathtrap Urban conditions,
moreover, complicate every aspect of command and control. Combat takes place on two or three
levels simultaneously: Above ground (in and on top of buildings), at ground level, and even
below ground (in tunnels and sewers). And while coordination becomes that much more
difficult, the cost of mistakes goes up dramatically, since they are much more likely to result in
friendly-fire casualties. In addition, fighting takes place in streets and alleys at close range—
normally less than fifty yards—making it difficult for invading forces to identify and react
quickly to an armed threat.

Additionally, the complexity of the urban operating environment makes it ever more important to
have actionable intelligence. A military force can only succeed in urban combat operations if its
warfighters have heightened situational awareness. This allows infantry to keep civilian
casualties at a minimum and maintain legitimacy throughout the fighting.16

Some technological advances, such as surveillance systems and precision weaponry, are lauded
for their ability to mitigate the suffering and damage that conflict brings. But in urban combat,
even the best resourced armies find it difficult to determine who they can lawfully target and
how they can carry out attacks in a manner that avoids, or at least minimizes, civilian harm.

15
Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, https://www.icty.org/en/press/final-report-
prosecutor-committee-established-review-nato-bombing-campaign-against-federal
16
Niksch, Christian Aditya, The Strategic Challenges of Urban Warfare (2017) ELECTRONIC THESES AND
DISSERTATIONS 1285, https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/1285

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Meanwhile, civilian city dwellers are often at a loss to know how to distance themselves from
the locations and activities that would put them in a fighter’s crosshairs.17

The information that a commander has at their disposal has a decisive influence over what
Article 57(1) and 57(2)(a) measures they will take when planning an attack. Knowing how and
when an enemy navigates through the city; where their headquarters are located; where civilians
reside and what times they frequent certain locations over others; and, where protected places—
such as hospitals and places of worship—are located, are just a few of the things that can help a
commander verify who, or what, can (or cannot) be targeted and how an attack can be designed
to spare civilians and civilian objects.18

At the same time, the battle tempo of urban warfare is often high, the locations of civilians and
fighters can rapidly change, and enemies that refuse to wear uniforms easily blend into the
civilian population. Situations may arise when, for example, a commander orders defensive air or
ground operations in response to troops that unexpectedly come under fire in urban areas. This
can leave commanders with limited time to collect and analyse information about, say, the
presence of civilians and identifying civilian buildings in relation to the enemy threat.19

3. Embargos and Destruction of Infrastructure: Yemen’s perspective

The urban infrastructure often serves the surrounding region and can be critically important to
the continuous and efficient functioning of the entire nation, and even neighboring countries. For
instance, in November 2018, the International Crisis Group warned that a decisive UAE-backed
attack on the port city of Hodeida in Yemen would not only harm the local population but leave
“an estimated 18 million highland Yemenis without supplies of staples like wheat and rice, or
fuel, which Yemen imports by sea,” predominantly though the Hodeida port.

But the overall situation in Yemen is dire, Human Rights Watch said. The United Nations Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) humanitarian coordinator for Yemen,
Johannes van der Klaauw, stated on April 23 that Yemen’s “airports and seaports constitute a

17
Jonathan Horowitz, Precautionary measures in urban warfare: A commander’s obligation to obtain information,
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND POLICY (JAN. 10, 2019), https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2019/01/10/joint-blog-
series-precautionary-measures-urban-warfare-commander-s-obligation-obtain-information/
18
Id.
19
Id.

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lifeline given that Yemen relies on imports for 90 percent of its food and most of its fuel. 20
However, these lifelines have been hampered as most of Yemen’s airports are not open to
civilian traffic, and transports by sea are subject to the coalition’s inspection regime related to the
arms embargo mandated by the UN Security Council.”

Because of the intricacy and interconnectedness of urban services and public facilities, damage,
disruption, or destruction of any portion of the urban infrastructure has a significant and
cascading effect on other systems and services upon which thousands if not hundreds of
thousands of people depend. Damage to essential infrastructure and services such as the water
supply or electricity, for instance, has an immediately destabilizing and life- threatening impact
on the city’s residents. 21

Apart from the practical inspection challenges at sea, another issue concerning the implemented
measures has been the negative effect that the blockade is felt to have on the civilian population
in Yemen. The naval measures taken by the coalition are seen as severely detrimental to the
humanitarian situation on land. The view was born that as an immediate result of the
establishment of the measures a growing humanitarian disaster developed. It has been widely
reported that the naval enforcement measures had a massive impact on the civilian population
and Yemen was on the brink of a famine. Since its establishment there has been a continued call
to lift the blockade in order to relieve the civilian population. 22

4. Destruction of Cultural Heritage

The recent judgment by ICC in the case of Al Mahdi v. The prosecutor, decided by the
International Criminal Court in the context of Hisbah rebellion in the State of Mali offers an
important perspective into the extent of intangible damage that can be meted out on population
of the adverse parties. As per the Rome Statute Article 8(2)(e)(iv)23 as well as Article 52 of the
Additional Protocol I which precludes a belligerent nation from attacking a religious place of
worship or places of cultural heritage. Recent examples of destruction of world heritage sites in
Damascus, Aleppo in Syria, Bamiyan in Afghanistan, and Mosul in Iraq offer a stark example
20
Elem Khairullin, Yemen, Naval Blockade, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/yemen-naval-blockade-0
21
Margarita Konaev, “The Future of Urban Warfare in the age of Megacities” Focus stratégique, No. 88, Ifri,
March 2019.
22
Fink, M.D. “Naval Blockade and the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen” 64 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW
REVIEW 291, 302.
23
Uzma S. Bishop-Burney, Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, 111 Am. J. Int'l L. 126 (2017).

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and a case in point regarding wanton acts of destruction pre-mediated by hatred towards the
culture of the adverse party. 24

5. Safety of health workers providing service in conflict-zones

In 2016 the World Health Organization (WHO) published a first report with consolidated data on
attacks on healthcare facilities and workers. According to the report:

Over the two-year period from January 2014 to December 2015, there were 594 reported
attacks on health care that resulted in 959 deaths and 1561 injuries in 19 countries with
emergencies. More than half of the attacks were against health care facilities and
another quarter of the attacks were against health care workers. Sixty-two per cent of the
attacks were reported to have intentionally targeted health care.25

The WHO report indicates that 64 per cent of attacks took place in Iraq, Libya, Syria, the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, and Yemen in 2014–15. Almost 40 per cent of the total number of
recorded attacks took place in Syria alone. More generally, the Geneva Conventions form the
basis of the frame- work that legitimizes the engagement of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in
humanitarian assistance in conflict locations. However, the legal protection of healthcare
facilities and workers in conflict is based on principles of humanitarianism, which include
providing care and assistance on an impartial basis to those in need. Humanitarian organizations
must often negotiate with local warring parties in order to deliver assistance, but they must do so
in ways that avoid compromising their impartiality in case they forfeit legal protection. The
number of humanitarian organizations that offer assistance in conflict zones has expanded over
time, and new guidance is needed on how diverse actors gain the consent of warring parties to
operate on the ground.26

The 2016 ICRC guidance indicates that over 130 countries have introduced domestic legislation
to prevent the misuse of the distinctive emblems that provide protection while also pointing to

24
Adela Suliman, How can we protect cultural landmarks from war?, (Sept. 9, 2019)
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/protect-property-in-war-to-save-culture/
25
World Health Organization, Attacks on Health Care: Prevent, Protect, Provide, Report on Attacks on Health Care
in Emergencies Based on Consolidated Secondary Data, 2014 and 2015, Geneva, 2016.
26
Ian Anthony, International humanitarian law: ICRC guidance and its application in urban warfare,
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL 545, 547, /https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB17c14sI.pdf

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the need for non-legislative measures such as instruction in the proper use of distinctive
emblems.27

IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Undoubtedly, urban warfare brought a paradigm shift in the collective perception of war, and the
manner in which it is executed. Development of technology, if left unguided can inflict
catastrophic damages on cities, which are rapidly becoming the hotspots for violence and host of
military targets. It is an unlikely scenario that war, as we understand it, can totally be alienated
from thee urban theatre. On the contrary, regular armies, special-operations units, spy agencies
and even guerilla warriors will have to adapt to ever-changing landscapes of the concrete
warzone. The context of urban warfare poses a menacing problem to tacticians, commanders and
law-enforcement agencies wherein, given the extent of weaponry and technology, strict
compliance with the rules of IHL is a herculean task. Nevertheless, nations have a binding
responsibility to wage a lawful war and reduce the extent of damage on civilian casualties by
adopting the cardinal principles of proportionality, distinction and precaution in the military
strategies. At the same time, adoption of high-end technology and its innovation in Research and
Development is leading to novel military applications that aids and assist tacticians and
commanders in faster evacuation, distinction of military targets and precision-bombing to reduce
civilian casualties. However, a strict technological enhancement may be inadequate to solve the
challenges of urban warfare unless international enforcement is strengthened and armies of the
belligerent states undergo capacity-building/training in incorporating the rules of warfare into
their medium of operation. A much larger question of national policy still remains, which is
crucial to address the plight of vulnerable groups, refugees, health workers and persons
unlawfully detained.

27
ICRC (note 2), Art. 54: ‘Prevention of misuse of the emblem’.

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