State vs. Scopel Digest
State vs. Scopel Digest
SCOPEL
This is a civil action in equity instituted on behalf of the State by the Prosecuting
Attorney of Jackson County, acting in his official capacity to enjoin the unlicensed
practice of medicine by defendant, William Scopel, on the ground that such practice
is "a continuing public nuisance detrimental to the public welfare and dangerous to
the public health, contrary to and against the public policy of the State."
Defendant admittedly has neither sought nor obtained a license to practice medicine
in this State but his contention is "that he is a naturopath and as such does not
practice medicine and that his business is not subject to the licensing or control of
any board or agency under the laws of Missouri." Defendant's loose definition of
naturopathy is "a system of medicine that utilizes properties required by the body to
bring about a natural reaction — that is as near as possible that we define
ourselves."
Defendant in the case at bar operates at 1410 Central in Kansas City, Missouri, "a
school of naturopathic medicine" which he calls the American College of
Naturopathic Medicine and Laboratory Technic. At the same address, defendant has
"my clinic" which, as he says, "I must have" in connection with the "school."
According to defendant, his "institution is under the supervision of a medical
director" and "we have five doctors there all the time."
Defendant is "part of the clinic" and maintains a large office there, with his name
inscribed on the door as "Dr. William Scopel, N.D., Dean Diagnosis." His office
furnishings include "a standard examination table * * * used by all physicians" and a
number of glass cases containing surgical instruments and what appear to be "pills
and other medicine."
The insistence of defendant, whose practice obviously was not drugless, that
"everything that was prescribed from that clinic that required the prescription by a
physician, it was so done by said physician" finds no independent support in the
record. On the contrary, the evidence persuasively indicates that defendant, in fact,
prescribed although he sometimes did so over the signature of his "medical
director."
It is clear that, for protection of the public health and welfare, the legislature is
empowered to regulate the practice of medicine in such manner as it reasonably
may believe to be proper and wise.
In the valid exercise of such authority, our general assembly has seen fit to require
that "(a)ll persons desiring to practice medicine or surgery in this state, or to treat
the sick or afflicted," shall furnish satisfactory evidence of certain educational
qualifications and shall attain a specified average grade upon medical examination
conducted by the State Board of Medical Examiners and has made it unlawful for
any person, other than a registered physician "to practice medicine or surgery in any
of its departments, or to profess to cure and attempt to treat the sick and others
afflicted with bodily or mental infirmities.
None of the rights or privileges of naturopaths have been infringed or denied by
reason of the fact that they have not been accorded similar legislative recognition by
name, for the general assembly is under no duty or compulsion to recognize and
deal with every school of medicine and to provide for the licensing of the followers
of each such school by requiring of them only such education or knowledge as that
particular school may demand.
Our statutes do not prohibit the practice of naturopathy, but the general assembly
has, established certain requirements which must be met and satisfied by any
person who undertakes the practice of medicine. One so licensed to practice may, if
he desires, apply the tenets and principles of naturopathy in his practice.
For, since naturopathy has not been recognized by our general assembly, it cannot
be recognized by our courts.
And, it may be added that defendant's legal position is not altered or improved by
the fact that there was a medical doctor in his clinic and that he (defendant) issued
prescriptions signed by such doctor.
Without holding that unlicensed medical practice constitutes a public nuisance per
se, we are satisfied that the record before us, taken in its totality, conclusively
demonstrates defendant's utter inadequacy and incompetence for the role he has
assumed and satisfactorily establishes that his extensive and unlicensed practice is,
in fact, a public nuisance within the above-quoted definition of that term. So finding,
we should not stay the strong arm of equity because there is no specific statutory
authorization for injunctive relief against unlicensed medical practice or because
defendant might be prosecuted criminally particularly where, as here, defendant has
violated the applicable statutes openly, arrogantly and persistently and also has
manifested contempt for the process of the court by examination and treatment of
patients while the temporary restraining order was in effect.