Cisco Asa/Asav Hardening Guide: Prepared by Logicalis For Nats
Cisco Asa/Asav Hardening Guide: Prepared by Logicalis For Nats
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Contents
2.1.. .Introduction.............................................................................................................5
3.2.5. HTTPS 8
6.9.. .Filter BGP Prefixes with Autonomous System Path Access Lists..........................17
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Section 7. Data Plane Hardening 19
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Section 1. Document Control
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Cisco ASA/ASAv Hardening Guide
Section 2. Cisco ASA Hardening
Section 3.Introduction
The functions of network devices are structured around three planes: management, control,
and data. The three functional planes of a network each provide different functionality that
needs to be protected.
Management plane: The management plane manages traffic that is sent to the Cisco
firewall device and is composed of applications and protocols such as SSH and
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
Control plane: The control plane of a network device processes the traffic that is
paramount to maintaining the functionality of the network infrastructure. The control
plane consists of applications and protocols between network devices, which include
the interior gateway protocols (IGPs) such as the Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing
Protocol (EIGRP) and Open Shortest Path First (OSPF).
Data plane: The data plane forwards data through a network device. The data plane
does not include traffic that is sent to the local Cisco firewall device.
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Section 4. Management Plane Hardening
Section 5.Security Levels
A security-level value from 0 through 100 defines the trustworthiness of networks reachable
through an interface of ASA. A value of 0 indicates the least trusted, and a value of 100
indicates the most trusted. The following are the key points:
By default, all outbound traffic from higher-security-level interfaces to lower-security-
level interfaces is allowed.
By default, all inbound traffic from lower-security-level interfaces to higher-security-
level interfaces is denied; to pass, this traffic needs to be allowed in an ACL applied
inbound on the lower-security-level interface.
Traffic between interfaces with the same security level is denied by default and can
be allowed to pass by enabling the same security-traffic permit inter-
interface command globally on the appliance.
Traffic entering the appliance via one interface and exiting it via the same interface,
known as a "U-turn," is denied by default and can be allowed to pass by enabling
the same-security-traffic permit intra-interface command globally on the
appliance.
hostname <device_hostname>
domain-name <domain-name>
crypto key generate rsa modulus 2048
The default modulus size is 1024. To restrict the version of SSH accepted by the ASA, use
the ssh version command in global configuration mode. To restrict ASA to only use version 2
can be done using below command.
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ASA(config)#ssh version 2
Configure SSH for Remote Device Access. Ensure access is restricted to Bastion
Host/Subnet only:
Notice that the system is to be logged into or used only by specifically authorized
personnel
Notice that any unauthorized use of the system is unlawful and can be subject to civil
and criminal penalties
Notice that any use of the system can be logged or monitored without further notice
and that the resulting logs can be used as evidence in court Specific notices required
by local laws
From a security point of view, a login banner should not contain any specific information
about the device name, model, software, or ownership because this information can be
abused by malicious users.
asdm: The Firewall displays a banner after you successfully log in to ASDM.
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exec: The Firewall displays a banner before displaying the enable prompt.
login: The Firewall displays a banner before the password login prompt when accessing
the security appliance using Telnet.
motd: This is the Message of the Day banner. It is displayed when you first connect.
banner login ** W A R N I N G **
banner login Unauthorized access prohibited. All access is
banner login monitored, and trespassers shall be prosecuted
banner login to the fullest extent of the law.
6.1.5. HTTPS
To use ASDM, HTTPS server on ASA should be enabled, and HTTPS connections to the
ASA should be permitted via management interface:
http server enable <port>
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aaa authorization http console ISE1
aaa authorization command ISE1 LOCAL
To obtain Date, time and Zone from NTP server, configure following command on ASA
Command Purpose
Step 1 ntp authenticate Enables authentication with an NTP
Example: server.
hostname(config)# ntp authenticate
Step 2 ntp trusted-key key_id Specifies an authentication key ID
Example: to be a trusted key, which is
hostname(config)# ntp trusted-key required for authentication with an
1 NTP server.
ASA(config)#dns-guard
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Section 12. ARP cache additions for non-connected subnets
As a security device, Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) will not populate its Address
Resolution Protocol (ARP) table with entries from non-directly-connected subnets.
Furthermore, the ASA will not issue ARP requests for hosts on such subnets. This secure
behavior may cause issues with suboptimal network configurations where a device is
expected to process ARP packets to and from non-directly-connected subnets (as configured
locally).
This enhancement request is filed to request a configuration command that would disable
this security check and allow the ASA to process ARP packets to and from non-directly-connected
subnets. This command should be used with caution as it reduces the level of protection that the ASA
provides.
arp permit-nonconnected
It is always recommended to have the correct routing on upstream and downstream devices
for NAT to work without enabling the above command.
failover
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Section 14. Securing Configuration
Section 15. Securing Configuration
Calculates and displays the MD5 value for the specified software image. Compare this value
with the value available on Cisco.com for this image.
no service password-recovery
service password-encryption
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Section 19. Logging & Monitoring
Section 20. Configure SNMP
The ASA provides support for network monitoring using SNMP Versions 1, 2c, and 3, and
supports the use of all three versions simultaneously. SNMP Version 3 provides security
enhancements that are not available in SNMP Version 1 or SNMP Version 2c. SNMP
Versions 1 and 2c transmit data between the SNMP server and SNMP agent in clear text.
SNMP Version 3 adds authentication and privacy options to secure protocol operations. The
ASA also support the creation of SNMP groups and users, as well as hosts, which is
required to enable transport authentication and encryption for secure SNMP
communications. SNMPv3 supports three primary configurations:
no auth: This mode does not require authentication or encryption of SNMP packets.
auth: This mode requires authentication of the SNMP packet without encryption.
priv: This mode requires both authentication and encryption (privacy) of each SNMP
packet.
Following command configures a Cisco ASA device for SNMPv3:
Step 1 snmp-server group group-name v3 [auth | noauth | priv]
Example:
hostname(config)# snmp-server group testgroup1 v3 priv
Step 2
snmp-server user username group-name {v3 [encrypted]] [auth {md5 | sha]} auth-password
[priv [des | 3des | aes] [128 | 192 | 256] priv-password
Example:
hostname(config)# snmp-server user testuser1 testgroup1 v3 auth md5
testpassword priv aes 128 mypassword
Step 3
snmp-server host interface {hostname | ip_address} [trap | poll] [community community-
string] [version {1 |2c | 3 username}] [udp-port port]
Example:
hostname(config)# snmp-server host mgmt 10.7.14.90 version 3
testuser1!
Step 5 (optional)
snmp-server {location | Contact}
Example:
snmp-server location NOC
snmp-server contact admin@NOC
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Section 21. SNMP Traps
A recommended minimum list of MIBs and traps to monitor that focus on device health,
resources, and normal operation includes:
cpmCPURisingThresholdValu
CISCO-PROCESS-MIB cpmCPURisingThreshold CPU threshold
e
Memory
DISMAN-EVENT-MIB mteHotValue mteTriggerFired
threshold
Power supply
ceSensorExtThresholdValue, failure,
CISCO-ENTITY- ceSensorExtThresholdNotificatio
entPhySensorValue, fan failure,
SENSOR-EXT-MIB n
entPhySensorType CPU
temperature
Interface
IF-MIB ifIndex, ifOperStatus linkup, linkdown
up/down
To enable all recommended traps including above, add following command in the
configuration:
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Section 24. Enable Syslog
Check if state of event logging on the firewall is enabled. Logging a firewall's activities and
status offers several benefits. Using the information in a log, the administrator can tell
whether the firewall is working properly or whether it has been compromised. If the logging is
disabled, the events that happen on the firewall are not logged anywhere. This may make it
harder to troubleshoot any network issues. This may also cause some of the problems,
including attempted attacks, to go unnoticed, as well as prevent collection of evidence about
any unauthorized activity.
logging enable
logging timestamp
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Section 28. Control Plane Hardening
Section 29. Disable Proxy ARPs
Proxy ARP allows the security appliance to reply to an ARP request on behalf of hosts
behind it. It does this by replying to ARP requests for the static NAT/mapped addresses of
those hosts. The security appliance responds to the request with its own MAC address, then
forwards the IP packets to the appropriate inside host. Disable this feature on interfaces
where it is not required by adding following command.
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Section 33. BGP TTL-based Security Protections
router bgp <asn>
neighbor <ip-address> remote-as <remote-asn>
neighbor <ip-address> ttl-security hops <hop-count>
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router ospf <process-id>
network 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 area 0
area 0 authentication message-digest
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Section 40. Data Plane Hardening
Section 41. Unicast Reverse-Path Forwarding
uRPF guards against IP spoofing by ensuring that all packets have a source IP address that
matches the correct source interface according to the routing table.
Normally, the security appliance examines only the destination address when determining
where to forward the packet. uRPF instructs the security appliance to look also at the source
address. For any traffic to be allowed through the security appliance, the security appliance
routing table must include a route back to the source address
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