Legal Dispute:

The State charged the accused for taking, with intent to gain, a motorcycle in violation of the Anti-
Carnapping Act and the accused’s denial of the charge.

Preliminary Principal Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED TOOK, WITH INTENT TO GAIN, A MOTORCYCLE IN VIOLATION OF THE
ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT.

Outline of Relevant Facts:

I. ZENNY AGUIRRE’S VERSION

 an account officer of Bayan Development Corporation or BDC. BDC extends loans to Sakbayan
members and the members of Tricycle Operators and Drivers Associations or TODA
 BDC extended a loan to Ma. Teresa Lacsamana through a group loan of P480,000.00 but her
share in it was P80,000.00
 after you granted that loan released the tricycle
 when Ms. Lacsamana defaulted in her loan after July 2007, BDC pulled out the tricycle from her
on October 2, 2007 based on the Kasunduan, if the borrower was unable to pay, the tricycle
could be pulled out from him.
 We gave it to the treasurer of the group, Mr. Ricardo Marasigan, for him to manage.
 the Official Receipt and the Car Registration of the tricycle registered in the name of Ma. Teresa
Lacsamana.
 I agreed with Ms. Lacsamana to give her until October 17 within which to redeem the tricycle
and, if not, we will permanently repossess the tricycle. Ms. Lacsamana failed to comply with her
undertaking
 On October 18 we got the tricycle from the treasurer of their group.
 On October 22, Ms. Lacsamana and Mr. Takad went to our office. They wanted to pay the
outstanding balance of her loan so we could release the tricycle. Did not allow them to pay her
the outstanding balance
 Thereafter, Takad said, “Huwag na huwag kong makikita ang tricycle sa Pasig.”
 Kept the tricycle for a while until November 20. We gave the tricycle to Carlos Parlade, the new
assignee
 after November 20 gave the tricycle to Carlos Parlade, the new assignee.
 No documents to show this assignment to Mr. Parlade because, before we could draw up one,
at 1:00 o’clock on the early morning of November 21, Mr. Parlade told me that the tricycle was
 missing. He called the office in the morning.
 He told me that he saw the tricycle being driven away by someone. He described the man as
small, with short hair, and with a face towel on his shoulder.
 No court order transferring ownership of the tricycle from Ms. Lacsamana to BCD before you
took the tricycle.
 A. No, sir.

Relevant Laws and Jurisprudence:

I. ANTI-CARNAPPING
A. LAWS
1. REPUBLIC ACT No. 6539 AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING
Section 1. This Act shall be known and may be cited as the "Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972."

Section 2. Definition of terms. The terms "carnapping", "motor vehicle", "defacing or tampering
with", "repainting", "body-building", "remodeling", "dismantling", and "overhauling", as used in
this Act, shall be understood, respectively, to mean

"Carnapping" is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without
the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things.

"Motor vehicle" is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power using the
public highways, but excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn
mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts, amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on public
highways, vehicles, which run only on rails or tracks, and tractors, trailers and traction engines
of all kinds used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels,
when propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be classified
as separate motor vehicle with no power rating.

B. JURISPRUDENCE
1. (Izon v. People, G.R. No. L-51370, [August 31, 1981], 194 PHIL 110-116)
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972; CARNAPPING; TERM
"MOTOR VEHICLE"; MEANING AND INTENT, CONSTRUED. — Any vehicle which is motorized
using the streets which are public, not exclusively for private use comes within the concept
of motor vehicle. There is nothing in the law that requires a license to use a public highway
to make the vehicle a "motor vehicle" within the definition given in the anti-carnapping law.
If a vehicle uses the streets with or without the required license, same comes within the
protection of the law, for the severity of the offense is not to be measured by what kind of
streets or highway the same is used, but by the very nature of the vehicle itself and the use
to which it is devoted. Otherwise, cars using the streets but still unlicensed or unregistered,
may be stolen without the penal sanction of the anti-carnapping statute, but as simple
robbery punishable under the provision of the Revised Penal Code. This obviously could not
have been the intention of the anti-carnapping law.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTORIZED TRICYCLE, FALLS WITHIN THE DEFINITION GIVEN
THEREUNDER; CASE AT BAR. — A tricycle which is not included in the enumeration of
excepted vehicles, is thus deemed to be that kind of motor vehicle as defined in the law, the
stealing of which comes within its penal sanction. In any event, it is a matter of judicial
notice that motorized tricycles are seen running in droves along highways admittedly public,
as those going to the north like Baguio City. Those motorized tricycles certainly come within
the definition of the law even under the restricted construction that petitioners would want
 given to it. If these tricycles are "motor vehicles" then, there is no cogent reason to treat the
tricycle in case at bar which is not licensed to operate on the "public highways", differently.

2. (People v. Santos, G.R. No. 127500, [June 8, 2000], 388 PHIL 993-1009)
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; WHEN SUFFICIENT. — For
circumstantial evidence to convict, the Rules of Court require that: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. On the latter, decided cases expound that the circumstantial evidence
presented and proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.

3. (Tan y Lagamayo v. People, G.R. No. 135904, [January 21, 2000], 379 PHIL 999-1014)
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT. — The mere absence of a written contract of sale in this case does not necessarily
mean that SEE did not also consent to the taking nor that TAN's possession of the car was
unlawful. The prosecution still has the onus probandi of showing that TAN's taking was
unlawful. What took place in these proceedings was that the appellate court magnified the
weakness of the defense and overlooked the prosecution's failure to discharge the onus
probandi - to show beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of carnapping was indeed
perpetrated. In short, the Court of Appeals and the trial court simply believed and accepted
the prosecution's tale. It ignored the basic legal precepts that conviction rests upon the
strength of evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the
defense; and assuming that the evidence of the accused is weak, the same is no reason to
convict, especially, as in this case, where the case of the prosecution is not strong enough to
sustain a conviction. To reiterate, the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution, and
unless the State succeeds in proving by overwhelming evidence the guilt of the accused, the
constitutional presumption of innocence applies. A conviction in criminal cases must rest on
nothing less than the moral certainty of guilt.

4. (People v. Lobitania, G.R. No. 142380, [September 5, 2002], 437 PHIL 213-232)
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS THEREON BY TRIAL
COURT, GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL. — [W]ell-settled is the rule that the
assessment of the witnesses' credibility and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by
the trial court. Thus, appellate courts will not usually interfere with the judgment of trial
courts on the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which the trial court has overlooked or the
significance of which it has misapprehended or misinterpreted. In the present case, the
findings of the trial court are amply supported by the evidence.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN SWORN

STATEMENTS AND DIRECT TESTIMONY GIVEN IN OPEN COURT. — This Court has repeatedly
ruled that inconsistencies between the sworn statements and direct testimony given in
 open court do not necessarily discredit the witness since affidavits are oftentimes
incomplete and are generally inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court.

4. ID.; ID.; DENIAL AND ALIBI; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF
ACCUSED AS PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME. — The categorical testimony of Sanchez
positively identifying accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime prevails over the
accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi. This Court has repeatedly ruled that the
defense of alibi is always considered with suspicion or caution, not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable but also because it can be fabricated easily to suit the ends
of those who propound it. Denial and alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence and bear no weight in law.

5. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; TO PROSPER, IT MUST BE SHOWN THAT IT WAS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE
FOR ACCUSED TO HAVE BEEN AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME AT THE TIME OF ITS
COMMISSION; CASE AT BAR. — [F]or alibi to prosper, it must be shown that it was physically
impossible for the accused-appellant to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission. The fact that accused-appellant reported for work in Navotas, Metro Manila
at eight o'clock in the morning on December 6, 1998, several hours after the incident, did
not at all negate the possibility that he could have been in Pangasinan at two o'clock in the
morning perpetrating the carnapping and killing of de Guzman. Accused-appellant's wife
Valeriana testified that her husband left their house in Commonwealth, Quezon City at six
thirty o'clock in the morning of December 6, 1998, the day of the incident. The distance
from Urdaneta, Pangasinan (where accused-appellant boarded a bus to Manila around three
o'clock in the morning) to Commonwealth Avenue (where accused-appellant lived) is
approximately 200 kilometers, a distance that can easily be covered in three-and-a-half (3
1/2) hours, especially in the wee hours of the morning when traffic is extremely light.

5. (People v. Faustino, G.R. No. 129220, [September 6, 2000], 394 PHIL 236-260)
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION; WHERE ONLY PICTURES OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ARE PRESENTED FOR IDENTIFICATION, THE SUPPOSED POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION IS REGARDED AS BEING TAINTED LIKE AN UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION. —
The identification of an accused by an eyewitness is a vital piece of evidence and most
decisive of the success or failure of the case for the prosecution. But even while significant,
an eyewitness identification, which authors not infrequently would describe to be
"inherently suspect," is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of
identification evidence like by fingerprint or by DNA testing. In cases where only pictures of
accused-appellant are presented for identification, the supposed positive identification is
regarded as being tainted almost like an uncounselled confession. Regrettably neither bank
teller Tina Ocampo nor security guard Wilfredo Novilla who supposedly had described the
gunman to the cartographer was put to the witness stand.

2. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; ACQUIRES COMMENSURATE STRENGTH WHEN THE PROSECUTION

EVIDENCE ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF AN ACCUSED ENFEEBLES; CASE AT BAR. — True, the
defense of alibi can easily be fabricated and is thus a weak defense but it should not be an
 excuse for at once looking at it with a biased mind. Alibi is not always undeserving of merit,
for at times, it can only be the possible defense that can be offered by an accused. Where
the prosecution evidence on the identification of an accused enfeebles, so, also alibi
assumes commensurate strength. Here the time and sequence constituting the alibi
proffered by accused-appellant are corroborated by five witnesses, namely: S/Ins. Amatosa,
SPO2 Datu, Chairmen Neri and Rosales, and Celeste, none of whom appears to be a relative
or possessed with a perceptible reason cause, or motive to give false testimony and to thus
perjure themselves. In fact, the purported positive identification of the prosecution
witnesses pales when juxtaposed against the individual testimony of the defense witnesses.

6. (People v. Fernandez y Gatdula, G.R. No. 239003 (Notice), [December 5, 2019])

On the issue of whether accused-appellant's out-of-court identification is valid, courts have
fashioned out rules to assure fairness and compliance with the requirements of
constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the
time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness
at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6)
the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

But assuming for the sake of argument that accused-appellant's out-of-court identification
was invalid, the same will not overturn his conviction. It is settled that an out-of-court
identification does not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court
identification and that, even assuming that an out-of-court identification was tainted with
irregularity, the subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that might have attended
it.

An affirmative testimony merits greater weight than a negative one, especially when the
former comes from a credible witness. Categorical and positive identification of an accused,
without any showing of ill motive on the part of the witness testifying on the matter,
prevails over alibi and denial, which are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of
real weight in law unless substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.

7. G.R. No. 209342 OCTOBER 4, 2017

To convict an accused, it is not sufficient for the prosecution to present a positive
identification by a witness during trial due to the frailty of human memory. It must also
show that the identified person matches the original description made by that witness when
initially reporting the crime. The unbiased character of the process of identification by
witnesses must likewise be shown.
Criminal prosecution may result in the severe consequences of deprivation of liberty,
property, and, where capital punishment is imposed, life. Prosecution that relies solely on
eyewitness identification must be approached meticulously, cognizant of the inherent frailty
of human memory.
8. (People v. Hernando y Aquino, G.R. No. 186493 (Resolution), [November 25, 2009], 620 PHIL
759-774)
It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court identification by the prosecution
witnesses. This is so because the eyewitness identification is vital evidence and, in most
cases, decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution.

Even assuming arguendo that appellant's out-of-court identification was irregular as

appellant claims, this identification did not foreclose the admissibility of the independent
eyewitnesses' in-court identification. It must be stressed that in convicting appellant of the
crime charged, the courts a quo did not rely solely on the out-of-court identification. Dirige's
August 18, 2004 testimony 38 and David's September 13, 2004 testimony 39 clearly show
that they positively identified appellant independently of the previous identification they
made at the police station. Their testimonies, including their identification of appellant,
were positive, straightforward, and categorical.

In People v. Rivera, 40 this Court, in rejecting a similar contention, held:

Even assuming arguendo that the appellant Alfonso Rivera's out-of-court identification was
tainted with irregularity, his subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have
attended it. Without hesitation, the two prosecution witnesses, Renato Losaria and Juanito
Baylon identified the appellant as one of the assailants. In People v. Timon, the accused
were identified through a show-up. The accused assailed the process of identification
because no other suspect was presented in a police line-up. We ruled that a police line-up is
not essential in identification and upheld the identification of the accused through a show-
up. We also held that even assuming arguendo that the out-of-court identification was
defective, the defect was cured by the subsequent positive identification in court for the
"inadmissibility of a police line-up identification . . . should not necessarily foreclose the
admissibility of an independent in-court identification."

In the face of the credible and reliable positive identification made by Dirige and David,
appellant's defense of alibi is absolutely unavailing. The defense of alibi, being inherently
weak, cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime.

9. (People v. Temblor, G.R. No. 66884, [May 28, 1988], 244 PHIL 639-644)
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR
INCONSISTENCIES. — The minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitness Victoria
Vda. de Cagampang did not diminish her credibility, especially because she had positively
identified the accused as her husband's assailant, and her testimony is corroborated by the
other witnesses. Her testimony is credible, probable and entirely in accord with human
experience.
 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIBI; UNAVAILING IN THE FACT OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION. — Appellant's
self serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by
the prosecution witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse him of the crime.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TO BE ACCEPTABLE AS A DEFENSE ACCUSED MUST ESTABLISH THAT IT
WAS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO BE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME DURING ITS
COMMISSION; CASE AT BAR. — The rule is that in order for an alibi to be acceptable as a
defense, it is not enough that the appellant was somewhere else when the crime was
committed; it must be demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime. Here it was admitted that Perol's house in barrio Camagong,
Nasipit is accessible to barrio Talo-ao in Buenavista by jeep or tricycle via a well-paved
witnesses who had positively identified him could not be overcome by the defendant's alibi.
(People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232; People vs. Venancio Ramilo, 146 SCRA 256.)

5. CRIMINAL LAW; MOTIVE; PROOF THEREOF NOT ESSENTIAL WHEN ACCUSED IS

IDENTIFIED. — Proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively
identified (People vs. Tan, Jr., 145 SCRA 615).

10. (Concha v. People, G.R. No. 208114, [October 3, 2018])

An out-of-court identification such as a police show-up inadmissible if it is tainted with
improper suggestions by police officers.

II. Chattel Mortgage

A. LAWS
1. ACT NO. 1508 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE MORTGAGING OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND FOR
THE REGISTRATION OF THE MORTGAGES SO EXECUTED

Section 1. The short title of this Act shall be "The Chattel Mortgage Law."

Sec. 8. Failure of mortgagee to discharge the mortgage. — If the mortgagee, assign,

administrator, executor, or either of them, after performance of the condition before or after
the breach thereof, or after tender of the performance of the condition, at or after the time
fixed for the performance, does not within ten days after being requested thereto by any person
entitled to redeem, discharge the mortgage in the manner provided by law, the person entitled
to redeem may recover of the person whose duty it is to discharge the same twenty pesos for
his neglect and all damages occasioned thereby in an action in any court having jurisdiction of
the subject-matter thereof.

Sec. 13. When the condition of a chattel mortgage is broken, a mortgagor or person holding a
subsequent mortgage, or a subsequent attaching creditor may redeem the same by paying or
delivering to the mortgagee the amount due on such mortgage and the reasonable costs and
expenses incurred by such breach of condition before the sale thereof. An attaching creditor
who so redeems shall be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee and entitled to foreclose the
mortgage in the same manner that the mortgagee could foreclose it by the terms of this Act.
 Sec. 14. Sale of property at public auction; Officer's return; Fees; Disposition of proceeds. — The
mortgagee, his executor, administrator, or assign, may, after thirty days from the time of
condition broken, cause the mortgaged property, or any part thereof, to be sold at public
auction by a public officer at a public place in the municipality where the mortgagor resides, or
where the property is situated, provided at least ten days' notice of the time, place, and purpose
of such sale has been posted at two or more public places in such municipality, and the
mortgagee, his executor, administrator, or assign, shall notify the mortgagor or person holding
under him and the persons holding subsequent mortgages of the time and place of sale, either
by notice in writing directed to him or left at his abode, if within the municipality, or sent by mail
if he does not reside in such municipality, at least ten days previous to the sale.

The officer making the sale shall, within thirty days thereafter, make in writing a return of his
doings and file the same in the office of the register of deeds where the mortgage is recorded,
and the register of deeds shall record the same. The fees of the officer for selling the property
shall be the same as in the case of sale on execution as provided in Act Numbered One hundred
and ninety, 4 and the amendments thereto, and the fees of the register of deeds for registering
the officer's return shall be taxed as a part of the costs of sale, which the officer shall pay to the
register of deeds. The return shall particularly describe the articles sold, and state the amount
received for each article, and shall operate as a discharge of the lien thereon created by the
mortgage. The proceeds of such sale shall be applied to the payment, first, of the costs and
expenses of keeping and sale, and then to the payment of the demand or obligation secured by
such mortgage, and the residue shall be paid to persons holding subsequent mortgages in their
order, and the balance, after paying the mortgages, shall be paid to the mortgagor or person
holding under him on demand.

If the sale includes any "large cattle," a certificate of transfer as required by section sixteen of
Act Numbered Eleven hundred and forty-seven 5 shall be issued by the treasurer of the
municipality where the sale was held to the purchaser thereof.

2. A.M. No. 99-10-05-0||| (Procedure in Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, A.M. No. 99-10-
05-0, [August 7, 2001])

B. URISPRUDENCE

1. G.R. No. 199852 November 12, 2014

As We have repeatedly held, the only right of a mortgagee in case of non-payment of debt
secured by mortgage would be to foreclose the mortgage and have the encumbered property
sold to satisfy the outstanding indebtedness. The mortgagor’s default does not operate to
automatically vest on the mortgagee the ownership of the encumbered property, for any such
effect is against public policy, as earlier indicated.

Issues:

Arguments: