2018 - Code of Conduct for Court Personnel

1. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, V.

GILBERT T. INMENZO, CLERK OF COURT III, METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 52, CALOOCAN CITY, RESPONDENT. A.M.
No. P-16-3617, June 06, 2018.

FACTS:

Inmenzo, Clerk of Court III, acknowledged receiving from PO2

Bagting, “ONE (1) .38 CALIBER PISTOL marked as Exhibit E, 9MM”
(firearm), among the evidence in Criminal Case No. 229179, entitled, People
v. Hidalgo. Judge Sasondoncillo later on found out that the firearm, and thus,
wrote the OCA requesting for an investigation.

The investigation team found that Inmenzo received in custodia legis

the missing firearm from PO2 Bagting. He denied receiving the firearm and
he claimed that he inadvertently signed the acknowledgement receipt and
without reading its contents due to heavy workload. On 15 July 2015,
Inmenzo resigned from the service. After the investigation of the
administrative complaint against Inmenzo, the investigating Judge
recommended the imposition of the penalty of six months suspension on
Inmenzo for simple neglect of duty.

The OCA adopted the findings of the Investigating Judge, except as to

the penalty, and imposed the penalty of FINE in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (Php 10,000.00), in lieu of suspension.

ISSUE: Whether or not Inmenzo is liable under the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel?

RULING: Yes, Inmenzo is liable.

The Manual for Clerks of Court provides that the clerk of court is the
administrative officer of the court who controls and supervises the
safekeeping of court records, exhibits, and documents, among others.

Rule 136, Section 7 of the Rules of Court further provides that the clerk
of court shall safely keep all records, papers, files, exhibits, and public
property committed in his charge. Section I of Canon IV of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel stresses that court personnel shall at all times
perform official duties properly and diligently. A simple act of neglect
resulting to loss of funds, documents, properties or exhibits in custodia legis
ruins the confidence lodged by litigants or the public in our judicial process.

In the present case, Inmenzo, while he was clerk of court, clearly

received the firearm from PO2 Bagting and marked it as an exhibit, based on
the acknowledgment receipt Inmenzo himself admittedly signed. He,
however, failed to explain the whereabouts of the firearm after receiving it
and consequently, lost it under his custody. As court custodian, it was his
responsibility to ensure that exhibits are safely kept and the same are readily
available upon the request of the parties or order of the court. Having a
heavy workload and mentioning the dilapidated state of storage facilities of
the court are unavailing defenses. Being the chief administrative officer, he
plays a key role in the complement of the court and cannot be permitted to
slacken off in his job under one pretext or another. It is likewise his duty to
inform the judge of the necessary repair of the dilapidated storage facilities
of the court. His attempt to escape responsibility over the loss of the exhibit
under his care and custody must therefore fail.

PENALTY/FINE: FINE in the mount of P20,000 to be deducted from his

separation benefits, if any.

2. HON. DENNIS PATRICK Z. PEREZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH

67, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BINANGONAN, RIZAL, Complainant, v.
ALMIRA L. ROXAS, CLERK III, BRANCH 67, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BINANGONAN, RIZAL, A.M. No. P-16-3595 (Formerly OCA
I.P.I. No. 15-4446-P), June 26, 2018.

FACTS:

The instant case stemmed from an administrative complaint for

oppression and grave abuse of authority docketed as OCA I.P.I. No. 14-4190-
RTJ, entitled, “Almira Roxas vs. Presiding Judge Dennis Patrick Z. Perez.”

In her Complaint, Almira Roxas (Roxas), Clerk III of Branch 67,

Regional Trial Court, Binangonan, Rizal, averred that she was removed from
office without due process of law by Judge Dennis Patrick Z. Perez (Judge
Perez), who allegedly conspired with Atty. Nadia S. Diumano (Atty.
Diumano), then Clerk of Court V.

Judge Perez filed a Comment (with Counter-Complaint for grave

misconduct, dishonesty, violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and CSC
Memorandum Circular 13, s. 2007 on absences without approved leave
against Roxas). Allegedly, Roxas has not been removed from employment as
she was still an employee of the court, albeit on absence without leave
(AWOL). She filed her resignation letter on August 31, 2013, effective on
December 31, 2013. Roxas, however, stopped coming to work on October 14,
2013, and returned only on November 13, 2013, asking Judge Perez her leave
application and daily time record (DTR) for October 2013 but the latter
refused. On the same day, Roxas withdrew her resignation. Judge Perez
recommended that Roxas be dropped from the rolls and that her position be
declared vacant. Judge Perez countered that Roxas actually deserved the
administrative complaint filed against her because of her admission of
corruption, i.e., accepting tokens of gratitude from the bondsman.

Meantime, Roxas was removed from the rolls for being on AWOL.

In her Comment to the Counter-Complaint, Roxas insisted that

accepting tokens of gratitude has been a long practice already in their office.
She insisted that there was no concrete and convincing evidence that she
asked or demanded money from the bondsmen in exchange of any favor.
She prepared the documents promptly and expeditiously and no bondsman
had ever complained that she did not act accordingly because of lack of
consideration. If she ever received any amount from them, it was because the
same was voluntarily given as it has become an accepted practice, and that it
just so happened that she was the one who had direct dealing with them. She
further insisted that if she ever received money from them, it was intended
for the office and not for her.

ISSUE: Whether or not Roxas is liable under the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel?

RULING: Yes, Roxas is liable under the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel.

Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,

provides that "court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or
benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor
or benefit shall influence their official actions," while Section 2 (e), Canon III
states that "court personnel shall not x x x solicit or accept any gift, loan,
gratuity, discount, favor, hospitality or service under circumstances from
which it could reasonably be inferred that a major purpose of the donor is to
influence the court personnel in performing official duties."

In the instant case, the fact that Roxas received money from bondsmen
is beyond dispute as she categorically admitted the same in her pleadings,
albeit insisting that said receiving of money from bondsmen was a common
practice in their office, and that it was not for herself but for the office'
common fund.

It is irrelevant whether the money was not intended to be given to

Roxas alone, the fact remains that she received money from bondsmen. The
sole act of receiving money from litigants, whatever the reason may be, is
antithesis to being a court employee. Roxas' act of collecting or receiving
money, no matter how nominal the amount involved, erodes the respect for
law and the courts. Roxas should, thus, be held accountable even for mere
receiving money from bondsmen, more so, considering that she admitted
that she is the one who had direct dealings with them by virtue of her
position. It is also apparent that the purpose of giving money is to show
gratitude for allowing the bondmen to facilitate the posting of bail in Branch
67. Clearly, Roxas' condemnable act of receiving money from bondsmen was
in relation to actions or proceedings with the Judiciary and the performance
of her official duties which, thus, constitute grave misconduct.

Further, money given voluntarily is not a defense. Alleged good

intentions to help party-litigants are self-serving and will not absolve the
misconduct committed by court employees. There is no defense in receiving
money from party-litigants. The act itself makes court employees guilty of
grave misconduct. They must bear the penalty of dismissal.
 Finally, it must be emphasized anew that the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel requires that court personnel avoid conflicts of interest in
performing official duties. It mandates that court personnel should not
receive tips or other remunerations for assisting or attending to parties
engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the
Judiciary. The Court has always stressed that all members of the Judiciary
should be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their
duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior outside the court as
private individuals, in order that the integrity and good name of the courts
of justice shall be preserved.

PENALTY/FINE: DISMISSAL from service. Her retirement and other

benefits, except accrued leave credits, are FORFEITED. She is
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from re-employment in any government
agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled
corporation or government financial institution.

3. ANTONIO K. LITONJUA, Complainant, v. JERRY R. MARCELINO,

SHERIFF III, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 71, PASIG
CITY, Respondent, A.M. No. P-18-3865 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3735-P),
October 09, 2018.

FACTS:

Complainant Antonio K. Litonjua (Antonio), as president of Fruehauf

Electronics Phil. Corp. (Fruehauf), wrote a letter to the Clerk of Court of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City, stating that Fruehauf was the
winning party in Civil Case No. 10652, an ejectment case entitled, "Fruehauf
Electronic Phil. Corp v. Capitol Publishing House, Inc." that was resolved by the
MeTC of Pasig City, Branch 71.

Allegedly, upon execution of the trial court's judgment, respondent

Jerry R. Marcelino (Marcelino), Sheriff III, charged Fruehauf the amount of
P100,000.000 as sheriff's fees. Antonio attached in the Complaint the two
vouchers dated May 13, 20052 and July 14, 20053 each for the amount of
P50,000.00, which bore the name and signature of Marcelino as payee.
However, when the trial court's decision in Fruehauf's favor was eventually
declared null and void by the Court of Appeals, Fruehauf demanded
Marcelino to return the fees that it had previously paid.

Atty. Reynaldo V. Bautista (Atty. Bautista), Clerk of Court of the

MeTC of Pasig City replied to Fruehauf's letter, stating that his office had not
received the amount of P100,000.00 that was allegedly paid by the company
directly to Marcelino.

In his Comment, Marcelino denied having received P50,000.00

covered by the voucher dated May 13, 2005, admitted receiving the
P50,000.00 that was covered by the July 14, 2005 voucher. Allegedly, the son
of Antonio and a lawyer of Fruehauf, Atty. Benedict Litonjua (Benedict),
allegedly voluntarily handed check to him and escorted him to iBank.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcelino is liable under the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel?

RULING: Yes, Marcelino is liable under the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel.

Time and again, the Supreme Court has ruled against the acceptance
by sheriff's of voluntary payments from parties in the course of the
performance of their duties. Doing so would be inimical to the best interests
of the service, as it might create the suspicion that the payments were made
for less than noble purposes.

Here, Marcelino himself admitted that he received the amount of

P50,000.00 from Fruehauf through the latter's counsel, Benedict. To his mind,
the amount was a voluntary payment of the winning litigant and thus, he
did not turn over the money to the court and instead appropriated the
amount for himself. For its part, on the other hand, Fruehauf believed that
the total amount of P100,000.00 that was directly paid to Marcelino would be
applied as partial payments for the required sheriff's fees, and would then be
remitted to the office of the Clerk of Court in accordance with applicable
rules. Regardless of the amount actually received by Marcelino and the
purpose for which it was paid, whether as sheriff's fees or as a gratuitous
payment, the commission of an act that was prohibited from him as a sheriff
was patent.

A sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a

party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps otherwise, it
would amount to dishonesty and extortion. And any amount received in
violation of Section 10, Rule 141 1 of the Rules of Court constitutes
unauthorized fees. Even as the Rules of Court allows payments to sheriff's, it
limits the amounts they could receive from parties in relation to the
execution of writs, and likewise prescribes the manner by which the sums
should be handled.

1 Sec. 10. Sheriffs, process servers and other persons serving processes.
xxxx
With regard to sheriff's expenses in executing writs issued pursuant to court orders or
decisions or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including
kilometrage for each kilometer of travel, guards' fees, warehousing and similar charges,
the interested party shall pay said expenses in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject
to the approval of the court. Upon approval of said estimated expenses, the interested
party shall deposit such amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff, who shall
disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the process, subject to
liquidation within the same period for rendering a return on the process. The liquidation
shall be approved by the court. Any unspent amount shall he refunded to the party
making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with
his return, and the sheriff's expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor.
 Sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from
parties in the course of the performance of their duties. To do so would be
inimical to the best interest of the service because even assuming arguendo
such payments were indeed given in good faith, this fact alone would not
dispel the suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble
purposes. Sheriffs cannot receive gratuities or voluntary payments from
parties they are ordered to assist. Court personnel shall not accept any fee or
remuneration beyond what they are entitled to in their official capacity.

The claim of gratuity or mere appreciation for the efforts Marcelino

undertook during execution was also inconsistent with the fact that
proceedings were still ongoing at the time the payments were made to him.

Further, Marcelino's failure to observe the procedural rules further

classifies as dereliction of duty. The rule requires the sheriff executing writs
or processes to estimate the expenses to be incurred. Upon the approval of
the estimated expenses, the interested party has to deposit the amount with
the Clerk of Court and ex-officio Sheriff. The expenses shall then be
disbursed to the executing Sheriff subject to his liquidation within the same
period for rendering a return on the process or writ. Any unspent amount
shall be refunded to the party who made the deposit. This procedure was not
observed in this case.

PENALTY/FINE: As regards Marcelino's penalty of dismissal, Section 50 of

the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that
"(i)f the respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more charges or counts, the
penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious
charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances." This
particularly applies in this case because under the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel, "(a)ll provisions of law, Civil Service rules, and issuances of the
Supreme Court governing or regulating the conduct of public officers and
employees applicable to the Judiciary are deemed incorporated into (the)
Code."

Marcelino's dismissal from the service is thus correct because it is the

appropriate penalty in cases of serious dishonesty considering that
Marcelino received a total of P100,000.00 without any intention of remitting
the same to the court or to apply to expenses in relation to the execution.
There was also a patent grave abuse of his authority that allowed him to
commit the dishonest act.

The Supreme Court noted that this is not the first time that he is found
guilty of an offense as an employee of the court. In Paredes v. Marcelino,
docketed as A.M. No. P-00-1370, he was found guilty of abuse of authority
and fined P1,000.00. In another case docketed as A.M. No. P-15-3323 and
entitled Judge Marina Gaerlan Mejorada v. Jerry Marcelino, Marcelino was
found to have failed to deposit garnished money and to observe the proper
procedure in the handling of a money judgment. Hence, the repeated
infractions of Marcelino clearly demonstrate that he has lost the character of
a person worthy to proceed with the demands of his office.
4. INVESTIGATING JUDGE JAIME E. CONTRERAS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 25, NAGA CITY, COMPLAINANT, VS. PATRICIA DE
LEON, CLERK III, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, NAGA CITY; EDGAR HUFANCIA, SHERIFF,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21, NAGA CITY; EDGAR
SURTIDA IV, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 25,
NAGA CITY; AND PELAGIO J. PAPA, JR., SHERIFF, OFFICE OF THE
CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NAGA CITY,
RESPONDENTS, A.M. No. P-15-3400 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3896-P),
November 06, 2018.

FACTS:

This administrative complaint stemmed from a complaint filed by

Eleanor Olivan (Olivan) with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
against Arnel Jose A. Rubio (Rubio), Sheriff IV, Office of the Clerk of Court
(OCC), RTC of Naga City, for malversation.

Allegedly, on April 27, 2006, Rubio received P20,000.00 from Olivan as

partial payment for the sheriffs incidental expenses for the implementation
of the writ, after which he issued a handwritten receipt which Olivan signed.
Subsequently, on May 10, 2006, Rubio filed a Manifestation pursuant to Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, detailing the Sheriffs Expenses in the amount of
P150,000.00 as incidental expenses and P3,000.00 as the court's commission
fee, or a total of P153,000.00 for the implementation of the said writ. The
Manifestation contained Olivan's conformity and the recommending
approval of Atty. Egmedio C. Blacer, Clerk of Court VI and Ex-Officio Sheriff
of the RTC, which was approved by Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr., then
Executive Judge of the RTC. On the same day, Olivan deposited P153,000.00
with the OCC of the RTC, which Rubio withdrew in full thereafter on the
same day. Rubio, however, failed to implement the writ despite receipt of a
total sum of P173,000.00, and failed to return to the OCC or to Olivan the
remaining amount of P22,866.00 as indicated in his Liquidation of Sheriffs
Expenses dated December 20, 2008. The said report showed that the total
amount spent in attempting to implement the writ was only P150,134.00,
thereby leaving a balance of P22,866.00.

After his investigation, Judge Contreras found that, aside from Rubio,
herein respondents Papa, Surtida, De Leon and Hufancia were involved in
the anomalous transactions.

The OCA found that De Leon is guilty of Dishonesty and Grave

Misconduct for accepting P9,500.00 from Olivan in exchange for a promise to
expedite the implementation of the writ in the subject case. As for Hufancia,
he was found guilty of Serious Dishonesty for his act of unilaterally receiving
P24,000.00 from Olivan for the execution of the Alias Writ without issuing a
receipt therefor. With regard to Surtida, he was found guilty of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service in his act of travelling with
Rubio and the other sheriffs to Pasacao, Camarines Sur around ten (10) times
in order to implement the writ, all without any authority issued by the
Executive Judge. It also found that Surtida had received allowances
therefrom, brought along his own security, and had continued to assist
Rubio even though the only thing they had accomplished was the service of
the writ and the notice to vacate, thereby also causing Olivan to suffer
additional and needless expenses. Finally, as to Papa, he was also found
guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. It held that,
like Surtida, Papa also travelled with Rubio and the other sheriffs to Pasacao,
Camarines Sur around the same number of times in order to implement the
writ, and received allowances therefrom, all without any authority issued by
the Executive Judge.

Meanwhile, the Court dismissed the case as against Hufancia in view

of his death.

ISSUE: Whether or nor De Leon, Papa, and Surtida are liable under the Code
of Conduct for Court Personnel?

RULING: Yes, De Leon, Papa, and Surtida are liable under the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel.

Dishonesty has been defined as "the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,

defraud, or betray; unworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity,
or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness" which
renders a person unfit to serve in the judiciary.

Misconduct, on the other hand, involves a "transgression of some

established and definite rule of action, [specifically] unlawful behavior or
gross negligence" by a public officer or employee, which should be grave,
serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. Moreover, to be
characterized as gross, such misconduct must be attended by corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule.25

Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service pertains to any

conduct, whether an act or omission, which violates the norm of public
accountability, as well as diminish - or threaten to diminish - public faith in
the judiciary.

Finally, insubordination is a willful or intentional disregard of, or

refusal to obey, lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer. This
includes, among others, failure to comply with a directive issued by the
Court, whether directly or through the OCA, to submit a comment to a
complaint or a report regarding an offense allegedly committed by the court
personnel concerned.

The Supreme Court has emphasized that "[c]ourt personnel,

regardless of position or rank, are expected to conduct themselves in
accordance with the strict standards of integrity and morality." Any
deviation from such standards would adversely reflect on the image of the
judiciary to the public, as well as their trust and confidence in this branch of
government.

Here, De Leon intentionally extorted money from Olivan by making

her falsely believe that the execution of the writ would be expedited in
exchange for P9,500.00 and actually accepting the said amount. Such display
of dishonesty and misconduct not only gravely endangers the trust and
confidence of the people in the judiciary, but also violates Section 3(b) of RA
3019 - an offense which, when committed by an official or personnel of the
judiciary, would be a serious affront to the image of this hallowed branch of
government.

With regard to Papa and Surtida, their unauthorized acts of

accompanying Rubio and the other sheriffs in enforcing the writ and
employing additional security had caused an additional and unnecessary
financial burden on Olivan, who had been patiently waiting for a long time
for the writ to be fully implemented, and thus, they are considered
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Finally, it bears emphasizing that De Leon's and Surtida's failure to

file their respective comments, despite the Court's directive for them to do
so, shows their utter indifference thereto, and is tantamount to
insubordination.

PENALTY/FINE: As for the imposable penalty, grave misconduct is

punishable by dismissal from the service for the first offense, while
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service are
punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year
for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for the second offense,
under Rule 10, Section 46(A) and (B) of the RRACCS, respectively, all of
them being grave offenses. On the other hand, insubordination is a less grave
offense which is punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day
to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for the
second offense, under Section 46(0) thereof. Moreover, Section 50 provides
that if the respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more charges or counts,
the penalty for the most serious charge shall be imposed, and the others shall
be considered as aggravating circumstances.

In this regard, since this is not the first time that De Leon has been
held administratively liable and had already been dropped from the rolls,
the Court can only impose a fine of P40,000.00 or forfeiture of benefits to her.
As for Surtida, the Court had also previously reprimanded him for conduct
unbecoming of an employee of the court, and thus, the Court imposed a fine
of P20,000.00 and is suspended from service without pay for one (1) year.
Finally, as to Papa, it appears that he has not been previously held
administratively liable for any other offense. Nevertheless, the Court also
finds the fine of P5,000.00, as recommended by the OCA, too light, and is
suspended from the service without pay for six (6) months and one (1) day.
5. MA. CECILIA FERMINA T. ROXAS, Complainant vs. ALLEN
FRANCISCO S. SICAT, Sheriff III, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Angeles City, Pampanga, Respondent,
A.M. No. p-17-3639, January 23, 2018.

FACTS:

A letter-complaint was filed against respondent Allen Francisco S.

Sicat, Sheriff III, Office of the Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Angeles City, Pampanga, charging him with gross inefficiency and
gross misconduct relative to Civil Case No. 10-826, entitled, “ROTA
Creditline Finance Corp. v. Arnold Cruz, et al.”

Meanwhile, on November 12, 2010, the trial court rendered a Decision

approving the Compromise Agreement entered into by parties in the said
case. Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued, ordering respondent Sheriff
Sicat to cause the execution of the judgment, to levy on the goods and
chattels of the defendant. After seven months, respondent issued a Levy on
Execution/Attachment Replevin, attaching a real property with a land area
of 10,841 square meters located in Magalang, Pampanga. The subject
property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 502474-R (and
registered in the names of defendant Renato Nunag and his wife Juanita
Nunag). After more than a year, respondent finally issued the Notice of
Sheriffs Sale and set the Sheriffs Sale on December 10, 2013.

Allegedly, when respondent learned that the property being

auctioned for bidding was a resort, he expressed interest to purchase it.
Complainant told respondent that he cannot do so because of conflict of
interest. In order that respondent would not be able to purchase the
property, complainant increased the bid price to ₱2 million. Respondent
issued the Certificate of Sale at the bid price of ₱200,539.63, which was the
principal amount in the Compromise Agreement approved by the trial court
on November 12, 2010. Complainant stated that the price was damaging to
her, because the outstanding balance of the loan was ₱715,223.57.
Complainant said that respondent did not ask her the outstanding balance of
the loan before the auction sale.

Moreover, respondent allegedly delayed the issuance of the Certificate

of Sale, which she had annotated on the title of the property without reading
that the sale price was only ₱200,539.63. When she received the certified true
copy of the title, that was the only time she saw that the sale price of the said
property was only ₱200,539.63, so she called respondent's attention to the
fact that the outstanding balance of the loan was ₱715,223.57. Respondent
told her that she should have her lawyer amend the Writ of Execution and
that she should send another formal offer. On March 3, 2014, she sent
another formal offer with a bid price of ₱720,000.00, since the outstanding
balance of the loan was ₱715,223.57. Complainant stated that she was
disappointed, because respondent has not issued a new Certificate of Sale for
the amendment of the annotation on the title of the property.
 In his Comment, respondent Sicat stated that based on the Decision of
the MTCC, the amount of the judgment obligation was ₱200,539.63 and there
was no stipulation of interest. He explained why the implementation of the
writ of execution was delayed because defendant (Miradora Mejia) has no
available personal properties, asked for additional time to amicably settle the
obligation and failed to attend the auction sale despite due notice.
Complainant Roxas manifested that plaintiff ROTA was willing to bid ₱2
million. Respondent Sicat then advised complainant that should plaintiff
ROTA bid at ₱2 million, she will be obligated to refund whatever amount is
in excess of the judgment obligation, which complainant was not willing to
do. Since there were no other bidders during the auction sale, respondent
Sicat awarded the winning bid to the complainant in the amount only of the
judgment obligation (₱200,539.63) and issued the Certificate of Sale.

Thereafter, complainant filed a letter, amending the amount of her

previous bid (to ₱720,000.00) and stating that that the Sheriff must satisfy the
judgment obligation based on the decision.

The OCA referred the administrative complaint to the Executive

Judge. In her Report, Executive Judge Katrina Nora S. Boan Factora found
that respondent failed to follow the steps for the proper implementation of
the writ of execution, since there was (1) no estimate of expenses; (2) no
return on the writ of execution; hence, there was no copy of the sheriffs
report furnished to the defendants involved; (3) no liquidation of sums
received; (4) no notice given to the judgment obligor on the sale of the
property; and (5) no filing system of the publication and other
documentation. In regard to the auction sale, there are discrepancies on the
date and circumstances of the auction sale showing a simulated auction sale.
Moreover, the discharge of levy on the subject property was without proper
motion or court order.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Sicat is liable under the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel?

RULING: Yes, respondent Sicat is liable under the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel.

Respondent failed to follow the procedures laid down by Section 14 of

Rule 39 and Section 10 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court in the proper
implementation of the writ of execution. Such failure makes respondent
liable for gross neglect of duty and inefficiency in the performance of official
duties.

The rule above enumerates the steps to be followed in the payment

and disbursement of fees for the execution of a writ: (1) the sheriff must
prepare and submit to the court an estimate of the expenses he would incur;
(2) the estimated expenses shall be subject to court approval; (3) the
approved estimated expenses shall be deposited by the interested party with
the Clerk of Court, who is also the ex-officio sheriff; (4) the Clerk of Court
shall disburse the amount to the executing sheriff; (5) the executing sheriff
shall thereafter liquidate his expenses within the same period for rendering a
return on the writ; and (6) any amount unspent shall be returned to the
person who made the deposit.68 It is clear from the enumeration that sheriffs
are not authorized to receive direct payments from a winning party.

In this case, respondent did not submit an estimate of the expenses he

would· incur in the execution of the writ to the trial court for its approval.
Instead, he received money from the plaintiff to defray his expenses in the
implementation of the writ. Moreover, he did not submit a liquidation report
to the OCC-MTCC.

The Supreme Court held that acceptance of any other amount is

improper, even if it were to be applied for lawful purposes. Good faith on
the part of the sheriff, or lack of it, in proceeding to properly execute its
mandate would be of no moment, for he is chargeable with the knowledge
that being the officer of the court tasked therefor, it behooves him to make
due compliances. In the implementation of the writ of execution, only the
payment of sheriffs fees may be received by sheriffs. They are not allowed to
receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the
performance of their duties. To do so would be inimical to the best interests
of the service because even assuming arguendo that such payments were
indeed given and received in good faith, this fact alone would not dispel the
suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble purposes.

Further, respondent Sicat never made a return of the writ in violation

of Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The Rules clearly provide that it
is mandatory for sheriffs to execute and make a return on the writ of
execution within 30 days from receipt of the writ and every 30 days
thereafter until it is satisfied in full or its effectivity expires. Even if the writs
are unsatisfied or only partially satisfied, sheriffs must still file the reports so
that the court, as well as the litigants, may be informed of the proceedings
undertaken to implement the writ.Periodic reporting also provides the court
insights on the efficiency of court processes after promulgation of judgment.
Overall, the purpose of periodic reporting is to ensure the speedy execution
of decisions.

Moreover, irregularities were found in the conduct and

documentation of the auction sale. Respondent failed to give the judgment
debtor a notice on the sale of the property; there was no proof of publication
of the notice and of the raffle among the accredited publishing companies for
the selection of the newspaper that would publish the notice of sale of
property. All of the foregoing are in disregard of Section 15, Rule 39.

Further, respondent discharged the wrongful levy on the property of

Renato Nunag without proper court order.

Based on the foregoing, respondent is guilty of gross neglect of duty

and inefficiency in the performance of official duties and for misconduct for
the irregularities in the conduct of the auction sale and his circumvention of
the established rule on motions.

PENALTY/FINE: Allen Francisco S. Sicat is found GUILTY of gross neglect

of duty, inefficiency in the performance of official duties and misconduct and
is ORDERED DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.