BPI vs.

IAC, 164 SCRA 630

FACTS: Zshornack and Commercial Bank and Trust Co. Of the Phils. (COMTRUST) were the original parties to this
case. BPI absorbed COMTRUST through a corporate merger and substituted as party to the case. Zshornack entrusted to
COMTRUST the amount of 3,000 US dollars for safekeeping. After sometime, Zshornack ask the bank to release his
money back to him. However, the bank claimed that they do not enter into a contract of deposit, and that the 3,000 US
dollars was sold and the peso proceeds were deposited in petitioners account. The bank prayed it be totally absolved from
any liability to Zshornack.

ISSUE: Whether the claim is a deposit.

HELD: The transaction between Zshornack and COMTRUST is of a deposit. Since, the agreement stated that the 3000
US dollars given to the bank were for safekeeping. Article 1962 states that “a deposit is constituted the moment a person
receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and for returning the same. The parties did
not intend to sell the US dollars to the Central Bank, otherwise, the contract of deposit never had been entered into.

But, since the mere safekeeping of the US dollars, without selling them to the Central Bank within one business day from
receipt, is prohibited, the contract of deposit is void. Thus, both parties are in pari delicto, they have no cause of action
against each other.

Chan vs. Maceda, 402 SCRA 352

FACTS: Bonifacio Maceda Jr, obtained a 7.3M loan from DBP for the construction of his New Gran Hotel Project.
Maceda then had a construction contract with Moreman Builders. Maceda bought construction materials and equipments
which Moreman deposited in the warehouse of Wilson and Liliy Chan free of charge. Due to Moreman͛ s failure to
complete the project, Maceda filed a case for rescission and damages against them.

RTC ruled in favor of Maceda. While pending appeal in CA, Maceda demanded from the Chan͛ s the deposited materials
but Chan said that these materials had already been withdrawn by Moreman in 1977. Thus, Maceda now filed a an action
for damages and preliminary attachment against the Chan͛ s.

After four years, the RTC dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Five years after, a motion for reconsideration was
filed but was denied by RTC. On appeal, the RTC granted the Motion for Reconsideration. m Chan filed a motion to
dismiss, while Maceda filed a motion to declare Chan in default. RTC declared Chan in default. CA affirmed the decision.
Thus on the RTC, Maceda presented his witnesses to show that indeed bags of cement were deposited in the warehouse of
Chan. RTC then ruled in favor of Maceda. RTC stated that since the bags were stored by Moreman builders without any
lien or encumbrance, Chan was duty bound to release it.

ISSUE: Whether there was a contract of deposit.

HELD: No In a contract of deposit, the burden of proof on proving the contract is on the plaintiff. In the case at hand, the
record is bereft of any contract of deposit between the parties. The delivery receipts presented also lack probative value so
as to prove the existence of the contract for they are unsigned and not duly authenticated by Moreman or by Maceda.
Moreover, Maceda also failed to prove that there were construction materials and equipment in petitioners' warehouse at
the time he made a demand for their return.

In relation to the claim of damages, actual damages must be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, which in this
case, Maceda failed to present.

Triple –V Food Services, Inc. vs. Filipino Merchants Insurance Company, Inc. GR 160544, February 21, 2005

FACTS: Mary Jo-Anne De Asis dined at petitioner's Kamayan Restaurant. De Asis was using a Mitsubishi Galant Super
Saloon Model 1995 issued by her employer Crispa Textile Inc.. On said date,
De Asis availed of the valet parking service of petitioner and entrusted her car key to petitioner's valet counter.
Afterwards, a certain Madridano, valet attendant, noticed that the car was not in its parking slot and its key no longer in
the box where valet attendants usually keep the keys of cars entrusted to them. The car was never recovered. Thereafter,
Crispa filed a claim against its insurer, herein respondent Filipino Merchants Insurance Company, Inc. Having
indemnified Crispa for the loss of the subject vehicle, FMICI, as subrogee to Crispa's rights, filed with the RTC at Makati
City an action for damages against petitioner Triple-V Food Services, Inc.

Petitioner claimed that the complaint failed to adduce facts to support the allegations of recklessness and negligence
committed in the safekeeping and custody of the subject vehicle. Besides, when De Asis availed the free parking stab
which contained a waiver of petitioner’s liability in case of loss, she had thereby waived her rights.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner Triple-V Food Services, Inc. is liable for the loss.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. In a contract of deposit, a person receives an object belonging to
another with the obligation of safely keeping it and returning the same. A deposit may be constituted even without any
consideration. It is not necessary that the depositary receives a fee before it becomes obligated to keep the item entrusted
for safekeeping and to return it later to the depositor. Petitioner cannot evade liability by arguing that neither a contract of
deposit nor that of insurance, guaranty or surety for the loss of the car was constituted when De Asis availed of its free
valet parking service.

CA Agro-industrial Devt. Corp. vs. CA, 219 SCRA 426

FACTS: Petitioner and the spouses Ramon and Paula Pugao entered into an agreement whereby the former purchased
from the latter two (2) parcels of land. Among the terms and conditions of the agreement were that the titles to the lots
shall be transferred to the petitioner upon full payment of the purchase price and that the owner's copies of the certificates
of titles thereto, and that title shall be deposited shall be deposited in a safety deposit box of any bank. Petitioner and the
Pugaos then rented Safety Deposit Box of private respondent Security Bank and Trust Company.

Thereafter, a certain Mrs. Margarita Ramos offered to buy from the petitioner the two (2) lots. Mrs. Ramos demanded the
execution of a deed of sale which necessarily entailed the production of the certificates of title. In view thereof, Aguirre,
accompanied by the Pugaos, then proceeded to the respondent Bank to open the safety deposit box and get the certificates
of title. However, when opened in the presence of the Bank's representative, the box yielded no such certificates.

ISSUE: Whether the contract entered into by Ca-Agro Industrial Development Corp. and Security Bank and Trust
Company is a contract of rent.

HELD: No, the SC held that the contract for the rent of the safety deposit box executed by the parties is not an ordinary
contract of lease as defined in Article 1643 of the Civil Code which states that, in the lease of things, one of the parties
binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and for a period which may be definite
or indefinite. It cannot be characterized as an ordinary contract of lease under Article 1643 because the full and absolute
possession and control of the safety deposit box was not given to the joint renters - the petitioner and the Pugaos. The
guard key of the box remained with the respondent Bank; without this key, neither of the renters could open the box. On
the other hand, the respondent Bank could not likewise open the box without the renter's key.

Javellana vs. Lim, 11 Phil. 141

FACTS: Jose, Ceverino and Domingo Lim, defendants, executed a document in favor of Angel Javellana, plaintiff-
appellee, wherein it states that: “they, defendants, have received, as a deposit, without interest, money from plaintiff-
appellee and agreed upon a date when they will return the money. Upon the stipulated due date, defendants asked for an
extension to pay and binding themselves to pay 15% interest per annum on the amount of their indebtedness, to which the
plaintiff-appellee acceded.”

The defendants were not able to pay the full amount of their indebtedness notwithstanding the request made by plaintiff-
appellee. As they were able to pay P1,000,on May 15, 1900 while the plaintiff incurred damages amounting to P830 since
Jaunary 20, 1898.
The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiff-appellee for the recovery of the amount of P5,714.44. While a motion for new
trial was granted.

ISSUE: Whether the agreement entered into by the parties is one of loan or of deposit?
HELD: No, the contract executed by Angel and Jose and others was not a deposit. Instead, it was a contract of
simple loan or mutuum.

It must be understood that Jose and others were lawfully authorized to make use of the amount deposited, which they have
done as subsequently shown when they asked for an extension of the time for the return thereof. They were
conscious that they had used, for their own profit and gain, the money which they apparently received as a “deposit”.
Moreover, they engaged to pay interest to Angel from the stipulated date until the time when the refund should have
been made.

Where money, consisting of coins of legal tender, is deposited with a person and the latter is authorized by the
depositor to use and dispose of the same, the agreement is not a contract of deposit, but a loan. Moreover, Article
1768 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1978 of the New Civil Code) provides thatwhen the depository has per-mission to
make use of the thing deposited, the contract loses the character of a de-posit and becomes a loan or bailment

A subsequent agreement between the parties as to interest on the amount said to have been deposited, because the
same could not be returned at the time fixed therefore, does not constitute a renewal of an agreement of deposit, but it
is the best evidence that the original contract entered into between them was for a loan under the guise of a deposit.

Baron vs. David, 51 Phil 1 (1927)

FACTS: Defendant Pablo David has been running a rice mill in Pampanga. One day a fire occurred that destroyed the mill
and its contents. Silvestra Baron, the plaintiff in the first action, is an aunt of the defendant; while Guillermo Baron, the
plaintiff in the other action; is his uncle. In the months of March, April, and May, 1920,Silvestra Baron placed a
quantity of palay in the defendant's mill. During the same period Guillermo Baron also placed palay in the mill.

Both plaintiffs claim that the palay delivered by them to defendant was sold to defendant; while defendant
claims that the palay was eposited subject to future withdrawal by the depositors or subject to some future sale which
was never effected. He therefore supposes himself to be relieved from all responsibility by virtue of the fire, already
mentioned

ISSUE: Whether the palay was a deposit or a sale and if the defendants are liable to plaintiffs.

HELD: In view of the nature of the defendant's activities and the way in which the palay was handled in the
defendant's mill, it is quite certain that all of the plaintiffs' palay, which was put in before June 1, 1920, been milled
and disposed of long prior to the fire of January17, 1921.

Considering the fact that the defendant had thus milled and doubtless sold the plaintiffs' palay prior to the date of the fire,
it result that he is bound to account for its value, and his liability was not extinguished by the occurrence of the fire.

Even supposing that the palay may have been delivered in the character of deposit, subject to future sale or withdrawal at
plaintiffs' election, nevertheless if it was understood that the defendant might mill the palay and he has in fact
appropriated it to his own use, he is of course bound to account for its value.

Under art 1768 of the Civil Code when the depository has permission to make use of the thing deposited, the contract
loses the character of mere deposit and becomes a loan or a commodatum; and of course by appropriating the
thing, the bailee becomes responsible for its value.

In this connection we wholly reject the defendant's pretense that the palay delivered by the plaintiffs or any part of
it was actually consumed in the fire of January, 1921. Nor is the liability of the defendant in any wise affected by
the circumstance that, by a custom prevailing among rice millers in this country, persons placing palay with them
without special agreement as to price are at liberty to withdraw it later, proper allowance being made for storage and
shrinkage, a thing that is sometimes done, though rarely.
People vs. Ong, 204 SCRA 942

FACTS: Accused Ong opened a savings account from which he was allowed to withdraw against uncleared checks and
uncollected deposits on several occasions with the approval of his co-accused, the bank’s branch manager and cashier.
When the bank presented eleven checks issued and deposited by the accused, they were all dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds.

ISSUE: Whether the bank deposits are irregular deposits.

HELD: Yes, they are really loans because they earn interest. All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current
are to be treated as loans and are to be covered by the law on loans. Current and savings deposits are loans to a bank
because it can use the same.

Guingona vs. City Fiscal of Manila, 128 SCRA 577

FACTS: Private respondent Clement David invested with the National Savings and Loan Association (NSLA) placed on 9
deposits through the inducement of an Australian national who was allegedly a close associate of petitioners herein.
NSLA was then placed under receivership by the Central Bank. David filed claims for his and his sister’s investments and
received a report that only a portion of the investments they claim were entered in the records of NSLA. David alleged
that there was misappropriation of funds and violation of Central Bank circulars, hence charged petitioners herein with
estafa. Petitioners moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that David’s claims comprised a purely civil obligation
which was itself novated.

ISSUE: Whether or not the criminal complaint for estafa will prosper.

HELD: No, it must be pointed out that when private respondent David invested his money on nine and savings deposits
with the aforesaid bank, the contract that was perfected was a contract of simple loan or mutuum and not a contract of
deposit.

Hence, the relationship between the private respondent and the Nation Savings and Loan Association is that of creditor
and debtor; consequently, the ownership of the amount deposited was transmitted to the Bank upon the perfection of the
contract and it can make use of the amount deposited for its banking operations, such as to pay interests on deposits and to
pay withdrawals. While the Bank has the obligation to return the amount deposited, it has, however, no obligation to
return or deliver the same money that was deposited. And, the failure of the Bank to return the amount deposited will not
constitute estafa through misappropriation punishable under Article 315, par. l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but it will
only give rise to civil liability over which the public respondents have no- jurisdiction.

But even granting that the failure of the bank to pay the time and savings deposits of private respondent David would
constitute a violation of paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, nevertheless any incipient criminal
liability was deemed avoided, because when the aforesaid bank was placed under receivership by the Central Bank,
petitioners Guingona and Martin assumed the obligation of the bank to private respondent David, thereby resulting in the
novation of the original contractual obligation arising from deposit into a contract of loan and converting the original trust
relation between the bank and private respondent David into an ordinary debtor-creditor relation between the petitioners
and private respondent. Consequently, the failure of the bank or petitioners Guingona and Martin to pay the deposits of
private respondent would not constitute a breach of trust but would merely be a failure to pay the obligation as a debtor.