G.R. No.

139794 : February 27, 2002

MARTIN S. EMIN,, Petitioner, v. CHAIRMAN CORAZON ALMA G. DE LEON,

COMMISSIONERS THELMA P. GAMINDE and RAMON P. ERENETA, JR., of the
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition to review the decision dated October 30, 1998 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 46549, affirming Civil Service Commission
Resolution Nos. 96-3342 and 97-4049 finding petitioner Martin Emin, guilty
of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service, and dismissing him from the service as Non-Formal Education
(NFE) Supervisor of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS), Kidapawan, Cotabato.

The facts are as follows:

Sometime in the year 1991, appointment papers for a change of status from
provisional to permanent under Republic Act No. 6850 of teachers were
submitted to the Civil Service Field Office-Cotabato at Amas, Kidapawan,
Cotabato. Attached to these appointment papers were photocopies of
certificates of eligibility of the teachers.

Director Gantungan U. Kamed noticed that the certificates of eligibility were

of doubtful authenticity. He called the Head Civil Service Field Officer. While
the certificates seemed to be authentic, the signature of Civil Service
Commission Director Elmer R. Bartolata and the initials of the processors of
said certificates were clearly forgeries. Director Kamed initially forwarded
five (5) appointments to Civil Service Regional Office No. XII for verification
of their R.A. 6850 eligibilities and for appropriate action through an
indorsement letter dated September 26, 1991. The appointment papers of
the same nature subsequently submitted to the Field Office were likewise
forwarded to the CSRO No. XII.

Upon verification of the records of CSRO No. XII, it was found that said
applications for civil service eligibility under R.A. 6850 were disapproved.
However, the certificates of eligibility they submitted were genuine as their
control number belonged to the batch issued to CSRO No. XII by the CSC
Central Office. But the records showed that these certificates were never
issued to any one.

Two separate investigations1 were conducted by Director Cesar P. Buenaflor

of Regional Office No. 12 of the Civil Service Commission in Cotabato City:
(1) on how the R.A. 6850 certificates were issued/released from the Office,
and (2) on how the teachers got said certificates. The teachers concerned
were asked to report to the Office and bring the original copies of their
certificates of eligibility. On several dates, the teachers appeared and gave
their sworn statements pointing to petitioner as the person who gave them
the R.A. 6850 certificates of eligibility they had attached to their
appointments for a fee. Upon finding a prima facie case, petitioner was
formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.2 cräläwvirtualibräry

In his sworn letter dated April 8, 1992 to the CSC Regional Director,

petitioner denied the accusation.3 He filed a motion to dismiss, dated June
5, 1992,4 but the motion was denied on July 8, 1992.

During the hearing, the six teachers cited in the charge sheet, namely:
Eufrocina Sicam, Ma. Elisa Sarce, Lilia Millondaga, Merla Entiero, Lourdes
Limbaga and Florida P. Alforjas were presented as witnesses for the
prosecution. Felixberta Ocho and Araceli G. Delgado who were also holders
of fake certificates of eligibility were likewise presented as witnesses.

Alforjas and Delgado identified petitioner and a certain Teddy Cruz as the
persons who facilitated their applications for R.A. 6850 eligibility. The other
witnesses corroborated Alforjas and Delgados testimonies. They all
identified petitioner as the person who helped them obtain the fake
certificates of eligibility.

On June 29, 1994, Director Buenaflor submitted a report5 to the Chairman

of the Civil Service Commission. The CSC found that there was sufficient
evidence to warrant the conviction of petitioner. On May 14, 1996, the Civil
Service Commission in its resolution decreed:

WHEREFORE, Martin S. Emin is hereby found guilty of Grave Misconduct.

Accordingly, the penalty of dismissal from the service including all its
accessory penalties is imposed upon him.6 cräläwvirtualibräry

Not satisfied with the abovecited resolution, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration,7 but it was denied.

On January 16, 1998, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
but it was dismissed for failure to comply with Section 5, Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.8cräläwvirtualibräry

However, the CA granted petitioners motion for reconsideration9 and time to

amend his petition.10 In his amended petition, he raised before the CA the
twin issues of (1) whether the CSC had original jurisdiction over the
administrative cases against the public school teachers; and (2) whether
petitioner was accorded due process.11 cräläwvirtualibräry

Finding the petition unmeritorious, the appellate court ruled on the appeal,
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition (appeal) is DISMISSED,
hereby affirming public respondents assailed appealed resolutions
(Resolution No. 963342, dated May 14,1996; and Resolution No. 974049,
dated October 14, 1997).

SO ORDERED.12 cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner is now before us raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES AGAINST PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING

THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT ACCORDED HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT

THERE WAS SUFFICIENT GROUND TO DISMISS THE PETITIONER FROM
SERVICE.

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING

THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.13 cräläwvirtualibräry

Notwithstanding petitioners formulation, we find that the issues to be

resolved are: (1) whether or not the CSC has original jurisdiction over the
present case; and (2) whether or not petitioner was accorded due process.

Petitioner avers that as a teacher, original jurisdiction over the

administrative case against him is lodged with a committee and not with the
CSC, as provided for by Republic Act 4670 otherwise known as the Magna
Carta  for Public School Teacher, specifically, Section 9 thereof, which
provides:

Sec. 9. Administrative Charges.- Administrative charges against

a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the
corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized
representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor,
where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local, or, in
its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization and a
supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of
Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings:
Provided, however, That where the school superintendent is the complainant
or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed
by the Secretary of Education.

For public respondent CSC, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that
original jurisdiction over the present case is with the CSC pursuant to the
Constitution and P.D. 807 (Civil Service Law) which provide that the civil
service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of
the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
whether performing governmental or proprietary function.

We find merit in petitioners contention that R.A. 4670 is good law and is
applicable to this case. R.A. 4670 has not been expressly repealed by the
general law P.D. 807, nor has R.A. 4670 been shown to be inconsistent with
the presidential decree.14 Section 2 thereof specified those who are covered
by the term teacher as follows:

SEC. 2. Title Definition. - This Act shall be known as the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers and shall apply to all public school teachers except
those in the professorial staff of state colleges and universities.

As used in this Act, the term teacher shall mean all persons engaged in
classroom teaching, in any level of instruction, on full-time basis, including
guidance counselors, school librarians, industrial arts or vocational
instructors, and all other persons performing supervisory and/or administrative
functions in all schools, colleges and universities operated by the Government or its
political subdivisions; but shall not include school nurses, school physicians,
school dentists, and other school employees.

Petitioner is the Non-Formal Education Supervisor of the DECS, in

Kidapawan, Cotabato, in-charge of the out-of-school programs.15 The 1993
Bureau of Non-formal Education Manual16 outlines the functions of a NFE
Division Supervisor which include, (5) implementation of externally assisted
NFE programs and projects; (6) monitoring and evaluation of NFE programs
and projects (8) supervision of the implementation of NFE
17
programs/projects at the grassroots level.  Clearly, petitioner falls under
the category of all other persons performing supervisory and/or
administrative functions in all schools, colleges and universities operated by
the government or its political subdivisions.

Under Section 2 of R.A. 4670, the exclusions in the coverage of the term
teachers are limited to: (1) public school teachers in the professorial staff of
state colleges and universities; and (2) school nurses, school physicians,
school dentists, and other school employees under the category of medical
and dental personnel. Under the principle of ejusdem generis,  general words
following an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and
specific meaning, are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to
be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as
those specifically mentioned.18 Too, the enumeration of persons excluded
from the coverage of the term teachers is restricted, limited and exclusive
to the two groups as abovementioned. Where the terms are expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be
extended to other matters.19 Exclusio unios est inclusio alterius.  Had Congress
intended to exclude an NFE Division Supervisor from the coverage of R.A.
4670, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.

As petitioner is covered by R.A. 4670, it is the Investigating Committee that

should have investigated his case conformably with Section 9 of R.A. 4670,
now being implemented by Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS Order No. 33, S.
1999, otherwise known as the DECS Rules of Procedure.20 cräläwvirtualibräry

However, at this late hour, the proceedings conducted by the public

respondent CSC can no longer be nullified on procedural grounds. Under the
principle of estoppel by laches, petitioner is now barred from impugning the
CSCs jurisdiction over his case.

But we must stress that nothing herein should be deemed as overriding the
provision in the Magna Carta  for Teachers on the jurisdiction of the
Committee to investigate public school teachers as such, and the
observance of due process in administrative proceedings involving them, nor
modifying prior decided cases of teachers on the observance of the said
Magna Carta such as Fabella vs. Court of Appeals.21 cräläwvirtualibräry

Here what is crucial, in our view, is that the Civil Service Commission had
afforded petitioner sufficient opportunity to be heard and defend himself
against charges of participation in faking civil service eligibilities of certain
teachers for a fee. Not only did he answer the charges before the CSC
Regional Office but he participated in the hearings of the charges against
him to the extent that we are left with no doubt that his participation in its
proceedings was willful and voluntary.

As held previously, participation by parties in the administrative proceedings

without raising any objection thereto bars them from raising any
jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against
them.22 In the case at bar, petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction
for the first time in his amended petition for review23 before the CA. He did
not raise this matter in his Motion to Dismiss24 filed before the CSC Regional
Office. Notably, in his Counter-Affidavit, he himself invoked the jurisdiction
of the Commission by stating that he was open to further investigation by
the CSC to bring light to the matter25 and by further praying for any remedy
or judgment which under the premises are just and equitable.26 It is an
undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings, submitting
his case for decision, and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.27
cräläwvirtualibräry

Equally unmeritorious is petitioners contention that he was denied due

process. He avers that he was not allowed cross-examination. It is well to
remember that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot
be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.28 cräläwvirtualibräry
Nothing on record shows he asked for cross-examination as most of the
submissions were written. In our view, petitioner cannot argue that he has
been deprived of due process merely because no cross-examination took
place. The rule is well established that due process is satisfied when the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.29 In the present case, the record clearly
shows that petitioner not only filed his Counter-Affidavit30 during the
preliminary investigation, and later his Motion to Dismiss.31 He also filed a
Motion for Reconsideration32 of the October 19, 1993 Order of the
Commission. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.33
cräläwvirtualibräry

Neither is there merit in petitioners assertion that he was denied the right to
due process when the CSC Regional Office, according to him, acted as
investigator, prosecutor, judge and executioner. He laments that Director
Buenaflor who formally filed the charge nominally was also the hearing
officer, and that prosecutor Atty. Anabelle Rosell was also the one who
submitted the recommendation to the CSC for the dismissal of petitioner.
Recall, however, that it was ultimately the Civil Service Chairman who
promulgated the decision. The report submitted by Atty. Rosell based on the
hearing where Director Buenaflor sat as hearing officer, was merely
recommendatory in character to the Civil Service Commission itself. Such
procedure is not unusual in an administrative proceeding.

Petitioner claims that there was no valid case to dismiss him as Director
Elmer Bartolata was not presented to ascertain the alleged forged signature
contained in the questioned certificates of eligibility. The Court of Appeals
and the Civil Service Commission made a finding on this fact of forgery. It is
not this Courts function now to evaluate factual questions all over again.
This is particularly true in this case, where the Commission and the
appellate court agree on the facts.34
cräläwvirtualibräry

Lastly, petitioner contends that the affidavit of Teodorico Cruz35 should have

been admitted as newly discovered evidence. Petitioner raised this issue for
the first time on appeal, when he filed his Motion for New Trial and to Admit
Newly Discovered Evidence before the CA. For a particular piece of evidence
to be regarded as newly discovered for purposes of a new trial, it is
essential that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in
seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless
failed to secure it. The OSG36 observed that despite the knowledge of the
importance of Mr. Cruzs testimony on the matter, petitioner did not ask for
a subpoena duces tecum  to obtain said newly discovered evidence. Neither
did petitioner, on his own, secure said affidavit or testimony during the
proceedings to support his cause. We note too, that the said affidavit
attempts to exonerate the petitioner and Cruz and points to someone else
(Jing) as the culprit, leaving the impression that the idea of the affidavit was
a mere afterthought, a last ditch effort to clear petitioners name. Thus, we
are not persuaded by petitioners claim of newly discovered evidence, for it
appears to us as a dilatory contrivance for petitioners benefit.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the Court of

Appeals and the respondent officials of the CSC, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October 30, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 46549 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,

Panganiban, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-
Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

CASE DIGEST:
 WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals and the respondent officials
of the CSC, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October 30, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 46549 is AFFIRMED