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Sample – Indian Evidence Act

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Sample:    INDIAN    EVIDENCE     ACT      [Section

17 – 27]                                   
Section 17                   Admission de ned

An admission is a statement

 oral or documentary or contained in electronic form
which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact
which is made by speci ed persons under speci ed circumstances

Comments by DLA on section 17:

Q: What is an admission?

Ans:

Admission has been de ned to be a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests

any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact and which is made by any of the
persons, and under the circumstances, mentioned in sections 18 to 21.

[Supreme Court in Central   Bureau   of   Investigation   v.   V.C. Shukla]

Section 18                   Admission by party to proceeding or his agent

Statements made by party to proceeding

or by an agent to any such party
whom Court regards as expressly or impliedly authorized to make them
are admissions

Section 19                   Persons whose position must be proved

Statements made by persons

whose position or liability it is necessary to prove as against any party to
suit
are admissions
if such statements would be relevant as against such persons
in relation to such position or liability in a suit brought by or against
them
and if they are made whilst the person making them occupies
such position or is subject to such liability

Illustration

A undertakes to collect rents for B

B sues A for not collecting rent due from C to B
 A denies that rent was due from C to B
 Statement by C that he owed B rent
is an admission
and is a relevant fact as against A
if A denies that C did owe rent to B

Section 20                   Persons expressly referred to by party to suit

Statements made by persons

to whom party to suit has expressly referred
for information in reference to a matter in dispute
are admissions

Illustration

The question is
whether a horse sold by A to B is sound
A says to B
” Go and ask C, he knows all about it“
C’s statement is an admission

Section 21                   Proof of admissions against persons making them

Admissions are relevant

and may be proved
as against the person who makes them
or his representative in interest

but they cannot be proved

by or on behalf of the person who makes them
or by his representative in interest
except in following cases:

(1)

An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it

when it is of such a nature that
if the person making it were dead
it would be relevant as between third persons u/s 32


 (2)

An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it

when it consists of a statement of existence of any state of mind or body,
relevant or in issue
made at or about the time when such state of mind or body  existed
and is accompanied by conduct rendering its falsehood improbable

(3)

An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it

if it is relevant otherwise than as an admission

Illustration (a)

The question between A and B is

whether a certain deed is or is not forged
A af rms that it is genuine, B that it is forged

A may prove a statement by B that the deed is genuine

and B may prove a statement by A that the deed is forged
but A cannot prove a statement by himself that the deed is genuine
nor can B prove a statement by himself that the deed is forged

Illustration (b)

A, the Captain of a ship, is tried for casting her away

Evidence is given to show that the ship was taken out of her proper course
A produces a book kept by him in ordinary course of his business
showing observations taken by him from day to day
indicating that the ship was not taken out of her proper course
A may prove these statements
because they would be admissible between third parties, if he were dead,
u/s 32 clause (2)

Comments by DLA on section 21:

Section 17 de nes  ‘admission’, Ss. 18 to 20 lay down what statements are

admissions, and s. 21 deals with proof of admissions against persons making

 them.

Statements may be proved as admissions under Section 18 read with Section

21 of the Act provided they relate to ‘any fact in issue or relevant fact.’

Q: What is the impact of an admission?

Ans 1:

An admission by a party is substantive evidence if it ful ls the requirements of

Section 21 of the Evidence Act

Admissions are usually telling against the maker unless reasonably explained.

There is no necessary requirement of the statement containing the admission

having to be put to the party because it is evidence proprio vigore.

[Supreme Court in Bishwanath  Prasad  v.  Dwarka  Prasad]

Ans 2:

“Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of Sections 17 and 21

of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters
admitted.
Admissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the
party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party
when appearing as witness was confronted with those statements in case it
made a statement contrary to those admissions.

[Supreme Court in Bharat Singh case]

Ans 3:

It is not disputed that statements made by persons may be used as admissions

against them even though they may not have been communicated to any other
person. For example, statements in the Account books of a person showing
that he was indebted to another person are admissions which can be used
against him even though these statements were never communicated to any
other person

 [Supreme Court in Bhogilal Chunilal Pandya v. State of Bombay]

Q: Can part only of an admission be used against the maker of such admission?

Ans:

No.
If an admission of an accused is to be used against him, the whole of it should be
tendered in evidence, and if part of the admission is exculpatory and part
inculpatory, the prosecution is not at liberty to use in evidence the inculpatory part
only.

[Supreme Court in Aghnoo Nagesia  v. State of Bihar]

Section 22                   Oral admissions as to contents of documents

Oral admissions as to contents of a document

are not relevant
unless party proposing to prove them shows that
he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents
or unless genuineness of a document produced is in question

Section 24                   Confession caused by inducement, threat or promise

A confession made by an accused person

is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding
if the confession was caused by any inducement, threat for promise
having reference to the charge against the accused person
proceeding from a person in authority
suf cient to give the accused person reasonable grounds for supposing
that
by making it he would gain an advantage or avoid an evil of temporal
nature
in reference to the proceedings against him

Comments by DLA on section 24

Q: What is a confession?

 Ans 1:
 “A confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all
the facts which constitutes the offence.

An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact,

is not of itself a confession, e.g. an admission that the accused is the owner of
and was in recent possession of the knife or revolver which caused a death
with no explanation of any other man’s possession.”

          [Privy Council in Pakala Narayana v. Emperor [1939]

Ans 2:

Only voluntary and direct acknowledgement of guilt is a confession.

          [Supreme Court in Central   Bureau   of   Investigation   v.   V.C. Shukla    [1998]

Ans 3:

 A statement which contains an exculpatory assertion of some fact, which if true,

would negative the offence alleged cannot amount to a confession.

          [Supreme Court in Veera Ibrahim  v.  State of Maharashtra  [1976]

Q: When is a person said to be “accused of an offence” as used in section 24?

Ans:

“Normally a person stands in the character of an accused when a rst information

report is lodged against him in respect of an offence before an of cer competent to
investigate it, or when a complaint is made relating to the commission of an offence
before a magistrate competent to try or send to another magistrate for trial of the
offence.

          [Supreme Court in  R.C. Mehta v. State of West Bengal [1970]

Q: When is the prohibition enacted u/s 24 attracted?

Ans:

To attract the prohibition enacted in Section 24 Evidence Act, these facts

 must be established:
 (i)         that the statement in question is a confession;

(ii)        that such confession has been made by an accused person;

(iii)       that it has been made to a person in authority;

(iv)       that the confession has been obtained by reason of any inducement, threat
or promise proceeding from a person in authority;

(v)       such inducement, threat or promise, must have reference to the charge

 against the accused person;

(vi)      the inducement, threat or promise must in the opinion of Court be suf cient
 to give the accused person grounds, which would appear to him reasonable, for
supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a
temporal nature in reference to proceedings against him.

          [Supreme Court in Veera Ibrahim  v.  State of Maharashtra  [1976]

Q: Whether the oath administered by a custom of cer to state the truth can
vitiate the confession?

Ans:

While it may be conceded that a person summoned by an of cer of customs to

make a statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act is under compulsion
of law to state the truth, the compulsion thereunder, assuming it amounts to a
threat, does not proceed “from a person in authority” within the contemplation
of Section 24 but emanates from law.

So, the confession if made is not vitiated

          [Supreme Court in Veera Ibrahim  v.  State of Maharashtra  [1976]

Section 25                   Confession to police of cer not to be proved

No confession made to a police of cer

shall be proved
as against a person accused of any offence

 Section 26                  Confession while in custody of police

No confession made by any person

whilst he is in the custody of a police of cer
unless it be made in immediate presence of a Magistrate
shall be proved as against such person

Comments by DLA on section 26:

Q: Can a confessional FIR be used against the informant-accused?

Ans:

If the rst information is given by the accused himself, the fact of his giving the
information is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct under
Section 8 of the Evidence Act.

If the information is a non-confessional statement, it is admissible against the

accused as an admission under Section 21 of the Evidence Act and is relevant.

But a confessional rst information report to a police of cer cannot be used

against the accused in view of Section 25 of the Evidence Act.

          [Supreme Court in Aghnoo Nagesia  v. State of Bihar [1966]

Section 27                   Information received from accused, proved

Provided that when any fact is deposed to as discovered

in consequence of information
received from a person accused of any offence in custody of a police
of cer
so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not
as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered
may be proved

Comments by DLA on section 27

 Section 27 provides an exception to the prohibition imposed by the preceding

section, and enables certain statements made by a person in Police custody to be
 proved.
 The condition necessary to bring the section into operation is that the discovery of a
fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in
the custody of a Police Of cer must be deposed to, and thereupon so much of the
information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved.

The section seems to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in
consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the
information was true, and accordingly, can be safely allowed to be given in evidence

          [Sir John Beaumont, Privy Council, in Pulukuri Kottaya   v.  Emperor  [1947

PC]

Q: What exactly is the meaning and scope of “fact discovered” in section 27?

Ans:

 It is fallacious to treat the “fact discovered” within the section as equivalent to the
object produced;
the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the
knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate
distinctly to this fact.
Information as to past user or the past history of the object produced is not
related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered.

           [Sir John Beaumont, Privy Council, in Pulukuri Kottaya   v.  Emperor  [1947

PC]

An illustration to understand the scope of section 27

Information supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce a knife

concealed in the roof of my house” does not lead to the discovery of a knife;
knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that
a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife
is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact
discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added “with
which I stabbed A”, these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to
the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant.


 Note:  This illustration has been taken from Privy Council’s judgment in Pulukuri
Kottaya   v.  Emperor and therefore is authentic.

Q: Which confessions are not admissible?

Ans:

Confessions made under the circumstances speci ed under section 24 and

before persons speci ed in sections 25 and 26 are not admissible except
under circumstances speci ed in section 27.

Rationale behind their inadmissibility

That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the Legislature that a person under
Police in uence might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure
[Pulukuri Kottaya   v.  Emperor]

Q: What is the difference between an admission and a confession?

Ans 1:

“The distinction between admissions and confessions is of considerable

importance for two reasons.

Firstly, a statement made by an accused person, if it is an admission, is

admissible in evidence under Section 21 of the evidence Act, unless the
statement amounts to a confession and was made to a person in authority in
consequence of some improper inducement, threat or promise, or was made
to police of cer, or was made at a time when the accused was in custody of a
police of cer. If a statement was made by the accused in the circumstance just
mentioned its admissibility will depend upon the determination of the
question whether it does not amount to a confession. It will be inadmissible,
but if it does not amount to a confession, it will be admissible under Section 21
of the Act as an admission, provided that it suggests an inference as to a fact
which is in issue in, or relevant to, the case and was not made to a police
of cer in the course of an investigation under Chapter XIV of CrPC.

Secondly, a statement made by an accused person is admissible against others

who are being jointly tried with him only if the statement amounts to a

 confession. Where the statement falls short of a confession, it is admissible
only against its maker as an admission and not against those who are being
jointly tried with him. Therefore, from the point of view of Section 30 of the
Evidence Act also the distinction between admission and a confession is of
fundamental importance.”

           [Monir’s Law of Evidence]

Ans 2:

Only voluntary and direct acknowledgement of guilt is a confession, but when a

confession falls short of actual admission of guilt it may nevertheless be used
as evidence against the person who made it as an ‘admission’ under section
21.

          [Supreme Court in Central   Bureau   of   Investigation   v.   V.C. Shukla    [1998]

***********

Case Law on sections 17-27 Evidence Act

1.    Bishwanath Prasad     v.        Dwarka Prasad               [1974 SC]

2.    Central  Bureau  of  Investigation   v.   V.C. Shukla   [1998 SC]

3.    Veera Ibrahim            v.         State of Maharashtra    [1976 SC]

4.    Aghnoo Nagesia          v.         State of Bihar                 [1966 SC]

5.    Pulukuri    Kottaya      v.       Emperor                          [1947 PC]

Case Law on section 21 Evidence Act

Bishwanath Prasad     v.      Dwarka Prasad     [1974 SC]


 This appeal arises out of a suit for partition. The rst two of the three points
formulated for determination by the High Court re ect the controversy raised
before us:

Whether the entire properties mentioned in Schedule C to the plaint are joint
family       properties liable to partition….

The case of the rst (contesting) defendant, who is the rst respondent before us
now, is that these items of property exclusively belonged to him. The trial Court
has accepted this case and the High Court has af rmed this nding. The
foundation for these concurrent ndings is the admissions made by the rst plaintiff
and the eighth defendant, the father of the plaintiff, in depositions in an earlier suit,
Title Suit No. 61 of 1945, as well as similar admissions made in the written statement
led in that suit by the present eighth defendant (who was rst defendant there)
together with the present plaintiffs. The inference uently drawn by the Courts
below from these admissions is that the said property belongs to the rst
defendant.

Admissions are usually telling against the maker unless reasonably explained, and no
acceptable ground to extricate the appellants from the effect of their own earlier
statements has been made out.

Counsel for the appellants strenuously urged that the fatal admissions used
against him have prejudiced him for many reasons. His further grievance is that
these admissions were not put to his client, the rst plaintiff, when he was in the
witness box; nor was the eighth defendant summoned for examination by the rst
defendant to give him an opportunity to explain the admissions.

Therefore, Counsel contended that he was seriously harmed by the surprise

reliance on statements attributed to his clients without extending a fair
opportunity to them to offer their explanation and neutralise the effect of the
admissions. Counsel drew our attention to Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act

There is a cardinal distinction between a party who is the author of a prior

statement and a witness who is examined and is sought to be discredited by use of
his prior statement. In the former case an admission by a party is substantive evidence
if it ful ls the requirements of Section 21 of the Evidence Act; in the latter case a prior
statement is used to discredit the credibility of the witness and does not become
 substantive evidence. In the former there is no necessary requirement of the
 statement containing the admission having to be put to the party because it is
evidence proprio vigore: in the latter case the Court cannot be invited to
disbelieve a witness on the strength of a prior contradictory statement unless it
has been put to him, as required by Section 145 of the Evidence Act.

This distinction has been clearly brought out in the ruling in Bharat Singh case
[1966 SC]. This Court disposed of a similar argument with the following
observations:

“Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of Sections 17 and 21 of

the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted.
We are of opinion that the admissions duly proved are admissible evidence
irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not
and whether that party when appearing as witness was confronted with those
statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions. The
purpose of contradicting the witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act is
very much different from the purpose of proving the admission. Admission is
substantive evidence of the fact admitted while a previous statement used to
contradict a witness does not become substantive evidence and merely serves
the purpose of throwing doubt on the veracity of the witness. What weight is to be
attached to an admission made by a party is a matter different from its use as
admissible evidence.”

The appeal must, therefore, fail and is hereby dismissed.

*****

Case Law on section 21 Evidence Act

Central   Bureau   of   Investigation   v.   V.C. Shukla         [1998 SC]

Section 3 [Evidence Act] declares that a fact is relevant to another when it is

connected with the other in any of the ways referred to in the provisions of the
Act relating to the relevancy of facts; and those provisions are to be found in
Sections 6 to 55 appearing in Chapter II. Section 5, with which Chapter II opens,


 expressly provides that evidence may be given in any suit or proceeding of the
existence or non-existence of every fact in issue and the facts declared relevant in
the aforesaid sections, and of no others.

Lastly, comes the question whether the entries are ‘admissions’ within the
meaning of Section 17 of the Act so as to be admissible as relevant evidence
under Section 21; and if so, as against whom can the entries be proved.

In Section 17, admission has been de ned to be a statement, oral or documentary,

which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact and which is made
by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, mentioned in the subsequent
Sections (Sections 18 to 21). Section 18 provides that statements made by a party
to the proceeding or by an agent to any such party, whom the Court regards has
expressly or impliedly authorised by him to make them are admissions.

From a combined reading of the above Sections it is manifest that an oral or

documentary statement made by a party or his authorised agent, suggesting any
inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact may be proved against a party to
the proceeding or his authorised agent as ‘admission’ but, apart form exceptional
cases (as contained in Section 21), such a statement cannot be proved by or on
their behalf.

While on this point the distinction between ‘admission’ and ‘confession’ needs to be
appreciated. In absence of any de nition of ‘confession’ in the Act, judicial opinion,
as to its exact meaning, was not unanimous until the judicial Committee made an
authoritative pronouncement about the same in Pakala Narayana v. Emperor [1939
PC] with these words:-

“[A] confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all
the facts which constitutes the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact,
even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not of itself a confession, e.g. an admission
that the accused is the owner of and was in recent possession of the knife or
revolver which caused a death with no explanation of any other man’s possession.”

It is thus seen that only voluntary and direct acknowledgement of guilt is a confession
but when a confession falls short of actual admission of guilt it may nevertheless
be used as evidence against the person who made it as an ‘admission’ under
section 21.

 The law in this regard has been clearly – and in our considered view correctly –
explained in Monir’s Law of Evidence. The relevant passage reads as under:-

“The distinction between admissions and confessions is of considerable

importance for two reasons.

Firstly, a statement made by an accused person, if it is an admission, is admissible

in evidence under Section 21 of the evidence Act, unless the statement amounts
to a confession and was made to a person in authority in consequence of some
improper inducement, threat or promise, or was made to police of cer, or was
made at a time when the accused was in custody of a police of cer. If a statement
was made by the accused in the circumstance just mentioned its admissibility will
depend upon the determination of the question whether it does not amount to a
confession. It will be inadmissible, but if it does not amount to a confession, it will
be admissible under Section 21 of the Act as an admission, provided that it
suggests an inference as to a fact which is in issue in, or relevant to, the case and
was not made to a police of cer in the course of an investigation under Chapter
XIV of CrPC.

Secondly, a statement made by an accused person is admissible against others

who are being jointly tried with him only if the statement amounts to a
confession. Where the statement falls short of a confession, it is admissible only
against its maker as an admission and not against those who are being jointly tried
with him. Therefore, from the point of view of Section 30 of the Evidence Act also
the distinction between admission and a confession is of fundamental
importance.”

Mr. Altaf Ahmed urged that it being a settled principle of law that statements in
account books of a person are ‘admissions’ and can be used against him even
though those statements were never communicated to any other person, the
entries would be admissible as admission of J.K. Jain, who made them. In support
of his contention he relied upon the following passage from the judgment of his
Court in Bhogilal Chunilal Pandya v. State of Bombay [1959  SC]:

“The rst group of sections in the Act in which the word ‘statement’ occurs, are Ss.
17 to 21, which deal with admissions. Section 17 de nes the word ‘admission’, Ss.
18 to 21 lay down what statements are admissions, and s. 21 deals with proof of


 admissions against persons making them. The words used in Ss. 18 to 21 in this
connection are ‘statements made by’.

It is not disputed that statements made by persons may be used as admissions against
them even though they may not have been communicated to any other person. For
example, statements in the Account books of a person showing that he was
indebted to another person are admissions which can be used against him even
though these statements were never communicated to any other person.
Illustration (b) of s. 21 also shows that the word ‘statement’ used in these sections does
not necessarily imply that they must have been communicated to any other person. In
the Illustration in question entries made in the book kept by a ship’s captain in the
ordinary course of business are called statements, though these entries are not
communicated to any other person. An examination, therefore, of these sections
show that in this part of the Act the word ‘statement’ has been used in its primary
meaning namely, ‘something that is stated’ communication is not necessary in
order that it may be a statement.”.

Even if we are to accept the above contentions, the entries, which are statements
as held by this Court in Bhogilal Chunilal and, being ‘admissions’ – and not
‘confession’ – cannot be used as against Shri Advani or Shri Shukla. However, as
against Jains the statements may be proved as admissions under Section 18 read
with Section 21 of the Act provided they relate to ‘any fact in issue or relevant fact.’
Needless to say, what will be ‘facts in issue’ or ‘relevant facts’ in a criminal trial will
depend upon, and will be delineated by, the nature of accusations made or
charges levelled against the person indicated.

In the two cases with which we are concerned in these appeals, the gravamen of
the charges which were framed against Jains in one of them and were to be
framed in the other, pursuant to the order of the trial Court, is that they entered
into two separate agreements; one with Shri Shukla and the other with Shri
Advani, in terms of which they were to make certain payments to them as a
grati cation other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward for getting their
favour while they were ‘public servants’ and in pursuance of the said agreements
payments were actually made to them. Thereby the Jains committed the offence
of conspiracy under Section 120B of the Indian Penal code; and under Section 12
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (P.C. Act for short), in that, they
abetted the commission of offences under Section 7 of the Act by Shri Shukla and
 Shri Advani.
 It is seen that the prosecution sought to prove that there were two separate
conspiracies, in both of which Jains together gured as the common party and
Shri Advani or Shri Shukla, as the other. Since we have already found that the
prosecution has not been able to make out a prima facie case to prove that Shri
Advani and Shri shukla were parties to such conspiracies, the charges of
conspiracy, as framed/sought to be framed, cannot stand also against the Jains, for
the simple reason that in a conspiracy there must be two parties. Resultantly, the
statements cannot be proved as admission of Jains of such conspiracy.

*****

Case Law on section 24 Evidence Act

Veera Ibrahim     v.     State of Maharashtra    [1976 SC]

Veera Ibrahim, appellant was accused No. 2 in the complaint led by Assistant
Collector of Customs, Bombay before the Chief Presidency Magistrate for his
prosecution in respect of offences under Section 135 (a) and 135 (b) of the
Customs Act, 1962. The trial Magistrate convicted both the accused on all the
three charges.

The rst contention canvassed by the Counsel is that on the facts and
circumstances of the case, the appellant’s statement recorded under Section 108
of the Customs Act, 1962, on the foot of which the appellant has been convicted,
was hit by clause (3) of Article 20 because at the time of making that statement,
the appellant was “accused of an offence” under Section 124 of the Bombay Police
Act, and the statement was obtained under compulsion of law.

Stress has been placed on the fact that the appellant was, in fact, arrested by the
police on a charge under Section 124 of the Bombay Police Act and the goods
were seized under a panchnama, prepared by them in the course of investigation.

Clause (3) of Article 20 provides:

“No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against

himself.”


 From an analysis of this clause, it is apparent that in order to claim the bene t of
the guarantee against testimonial compulsion embodied in this clause, it must be
shown, rstly, that the person who made the statement was “accused of any
offence”; secondly, that he made this statement under compulsion.  By now it is
well settled that only a person against whom a formal accusation relating to the
commission of an offence has been levelled which in the normal course may result
in his prosecution, would fall within its ambit.

In R.C. Mehta v. State of West Bengal [1970 SC], this point came up for
consideration in the context of a statement recorded by an of cer of customs in
an enquiry under Section 171-A of the Sea Customs Act. One of the contentions
raised was, that a person against whom such an enquiry is made is a “person
accused of an offence’, and on that account, he cannot be compelled to be a
witness against himself and the statement obtained or evidence collected under
the aforesaid provision by the of cer of customs is inadmissible.

The Court pointed out the circumstances, the existence of which is ordinarily
necessary to clothe a person with the character of a “person accused of an
offence” :

“Normally a person stands in the character of an accused when a rst information

report is lodged against him in respect of an offence before an of cer competent to
investigate it, or when a complaint is made relating to the commission of an offence
before a magistrate competent to try or send to another magistrate for trial of the
offence. Where a customs of cer arrests a person and informs that person of the
grounds of his arrest [which he is bound to do under Article 22(1) of the
Constitution] for the purpose of holding an enquiry into the infringement of the
provisions of the Sea Customs Act which he has reason to believe has taken place,
there is no formal accusation of an offence. In the case of an offence by
infringement of the Sea Customs Act and punishable at the trial before a
magistrate, there is an accusation when a complaint is lodged by an of cer
competent in that behalf before the Magistrate.”

The abovementioned observations are a complete answer to the contention of

the appellant. In the light of these principles, it is clear that when the statement of
the appellant was recorded by the Customs Of cer under Section 108, the
appellant was not a person “accused of any offence” under the Customs Act,
 1962. An accusation which would stamp him with the character of such a person
 was levelled only when the complaint was led against him, by the Assistant
Collector of Customs complaining of the commission of offences under Section
135(a) and Section 135(6) of the Customs Act.

True, that the appellant was arrested by the police on December 12, 1967 on
suspicion of having committed an offence under Section 124 of the Bombay
Police Act and a panchnama of the packages in the truck was also prepared. But
the factual ingredients of that offence are materially different from those of an
offence under the Customs Act.

Even in respect of that offence, the police did not register any case or enter any
F.I.R. which normally furnishes a foundation for commencing a police
investigation. The police did not open the packages or prepare inventories of the
goods packed therein. Indeed, the police appear to have dropped further
proceedings. They informed the customs authorities, who opened the packages,
inspected the goods and on nding them contraband goods, seized them under a
panchnama. The customs authorities called the appellant and his companion to
the customs house, took them into custody, and after due compliance with the
requirements of law, the Inspector of Customs questioned the appellant and
recorded his statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act. Under the
circumstances it was manifest that at the time when the customs of cer recorded
the statement of the appellant, the latter was not formally “accused of any
offence. The High Court was therefore right in holding that the statement
recorded by the Inspector of Customs was not hit by Article 20(3) of the
Constitution.

The next question to be considered is, whether this statement was hit by Section
24 of the Evidence Act. The contention is that this statement was obtained under
compulsion of law inasmuch as he was required to state the truth under threat of
prosecution for perjury.

To attract the prohibition enacted in Section 24, Evidence Act, these facts must be
established:

(i)         that the statement in question is a confession;

(ii)        that such confession has been made by an accused person;

 (iii)       that it has been made to a person in authority;

 (iv)       that the confession has been obtained by reason of any inducement, threat
or promise proceeding from  a person in authority;

(v)        such inducement, threat or promise, must have reference to the charge
 against the accused person;

(vi)       the inducement, threat or promise must in the opinion of Court be

suf cient  to give the accused person grounds, which would appear to him
reasonable,  for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid
any evil of a temporal nature in reference to proceedings against him.

In the present case, facts (i), (iv) and (vi) have not been established. Firstly, the
statement in question is not a “confession” within the contemplation of Section 24.
It is now

well-settled that a statement in order to amount to a “confession” must either admit in

terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence.
An admission of an incriminating fact, howsoever grave, is not by itself a
confession. A statement which contains an exculpatory assertion of some fact, which if
true, would negative the offence alleged cannot amount to a confession.

A perusal of the statement Ex. I made by the appellant before the Inspector of
Customs would show that it contained exculpatory matter. Therein, the deponent
claimed that he was not aware that the packages which were loaded in the truck
were contraband goods, and alleged that the goods were not loaded under his
instructions. The deponent claimed to be an innocent traveller in the truck when
he said:

I did not ask Mullaji (driver) what goods were being loaded in his lorry … Mullaji
was      only my friend and I was not aware of any of his mala de activities.

Moreover, the incriminating facts admitted in this statement, do not, even if taken
cumulatively amount to admission of all the facts which constitute any offence. To
bring home an offence under Section 135 of the Customs Act, in addition to the
facts admitted in Ex. I, it had to be established further that these goods were
dutiable or contraband goods.

For these reasons, it could be said beyond doubt, that the statement Ex. I was not
 a “confession” within the meaning of Section 24, Evidence Act.
 Secondly, it has not been shown that the customs of cer – though a person in
authority – had offered any inducement or held out any threat or promise to the
appellant.

While it may be conceded that a person summoned by an of cer of customs to

make a statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act, is under compulsion of
law to state the truth, the compulsion thereunder, assuming it amounts to a
threat, does not proceed “from a person in authority” within the contemplation of
Section 24 but emanates from law.

Thirdly, the mere fact that the Inspector of Customs had before recording the
statement, warned the deponent of the possibility of his prosecution for perjury
in case he did not make the statement truthfully, cannot be construed as a threat
held out by the of cer which could have reasonably caused the person making the
statement to suppose that he would by making that statement, gain any
advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings
against him for smuggling.

In view of what has been said above, we have no hesitation in holding that the
statement Ex. I, was not barred under Section 24, Evidence Act. The statement Ex.
P-1 was clearly admissible under Section 21, Evidence Act as an admission of
incriminating facts.

Lastly, Mr Chaudhury tried to contend that the incriminating facts admitted in Ex.
I taken along with the other facts appearing in the evidence of prosecution
witnesses, were insuf cient to establish an offence under Section 135, Customs
Act against the appellant.

We are unable to accept this contention. In Ex. I which was proved by PW 4, it is

admitted that these packages which were later found to contain contraband
goods by the customs authorities, were surreptitiously loaded in the truck under
cover of darkness , in the presence of the appellant, and thereafter the rst
accused took the wheel, while the appellant sat by his side in the truck.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.

*****

  
 Case Law on sections 25-27

Aghnoo Nagesia     v.     State of Bihar                 [1966 SC]

The appellant was charged under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for
murdering his aunt, Ratni, her daughter, Chamin, her son-in-law, Somra and Dilu,
son of Somra. He was convicted and sentenced to death by the Judicial
Commissioner of Chotanagpur. The High Court of Patna accepted the death
reference, con rmed the conviction and sentence and dismissed the appeal
preferred by the appellant.

The prosecution case is that on August 11, 1963 between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m. the
appellant murdered Somra in a forest known as Dungijharan Hills and later Chamin in
Kesari Garha eld and then Ratni and Dilu in the house of Ratni at Village Jamtoli.

The rst information of the offences was lodged by the appellant himself at Police
Station Palkot on August 11, 1963 at 3.15 p.m. The information was reduced to
writing by the of cer-in-charge, Sub-Inspector and the appellant af xed his left
thumb impression on the report. The Sub-Inspector immediately took cognisance
of the offence, and arrested the appellant. The next day, the Sub-Inspector in the
company of the appellant went to the house of Ratni, where the appellant pointed
out the dead bodies of Ratni and Dilu and also a place in the orchard of Ratni
covered with bushes and grass, where he had concealed a tangi. The appellant
then took the Sub-Inspector and witnesses to Kasiari garha khet and pointed out
the dead body of Chamin lying in a ditch covered with Ghunghu. The appellant
then took the Sub-Inspector and the witnesses to Dungijharan Hills, where he
pointed out the dead body of Somra lying in the slope of the hills to the north. The
Sub-Inspector also recovered from the appellant’s house a chadar stained with
human blood. The evidence of PW 6 shows that the appellant had gone to the
forest on the morning of August 11, 1963.

The medical evidence discloses incised wounds on all the dead bodies. The
injuries were caused by a sharp-cutting weapon such as a tangi. All the four
persons were brutally murdered.

There is no eyewitness to the murders. The principal evidence against the

appellant consists of the rst information report, which contains a full confession
of guilt by the appellant. If this report is excluded, the other evidence on the

 record is insuf cient to convict the appellant. The principal question in the appeal is
whether the statement or any portion of it is admissible in evidence.

The rst information report reads as follows:

“My name is Aghnu Nagesia. (1) My father’s name is Lodhi Nagesia. I am a resident
of Lotwa, Tola Jamtoli, Thana Palkot, District Ranchi. Today, Sunday, date not
known, at about 3 p.m. I having come to the P.S. make statement before you the
S.I. of Police (2) that on account of my Barima (aunt) Mussammat having given
away her property to her daughter and son-in-law quarrels and troubles have
been occurring among us. My Barima has no son and she is a widow. Hence on her
death we shall be owners of her lands and properties and daughter and son-in-law
of Barima shall have no right to them. She lives separate from us, and lives in her
house with her daughter and son-in-law and I live with my brother separately in
my house. Our lands are separate from the time of our father.

(3) Today in the morning at about 7-8 a.m. I had gone with a tangi to Duni Jharan
Pahar to cut shrubs for fencing. I found Somra sitting alone there who was grazing
cattle there. (4) Seeing him I got enraged and dealt him a tangi blow on the lli
(calf) of right leg, whereby he toppled down on the ground. Thereupon I dealt him
several Chheo (blows) on the head and the face, with the result that he became
speechless and died. At that time there was none near about on that Pahar. (5)
Thereafter I came to the Kesari Garu eld where Somra’s wife Chamin was
weeding out grass in the eld. (6) I struck her also all of a sudden on the head with
the said tangi whereby she dropped down on the ground and died then and there.
(7) Thereafter I dragged her to an adjoining eld and laid her in a ditch to the
north of it and covered her body with Gongu (Pala ke Chhata) so that people
might not see her. There was no person then at that place also.

(8) Thereafter I armed with that tangi went to the house of my Barima to kill her.
When I reached there, I found that she was sitting near the hearth which was
burning. (9) Reaching there all of a sudden I began to strike her on the head with
tangi whereupon she dropped down dead at that very place. (10) Near her was
Somra’s son aged about 3-4 years. (11) I also struck him with the tangi. He also fell
down and died. (12) I nished the line of my Barima so that no one could take
share in her properties. (13) I hid the tangi in the jhari of my Barima’s house.


 (14) Later on I narrated the occurrence to my chacha (father’s brother) Lerha that
I killed the aforesaid four persons with tangi. After sometime (15) I started for the
P.S. to lodge information and reaching the P.S. I make this statement before you.
(16) My Barima had all along been quarrelling like a Murukh (foolish woman) and
being vexed, I did so. (17) All the dead bodies and the tangi would be lying in those
places. I can point them out. (18) This is my statement. I got it read over to me and
nding it correct, I af xed my left thumb-impression.”

We have divided the statement into 18 parts. Parts 1, 15 and 18 show that the
appellant went to the police station to make the report. Parts 2 and 16 show his
motive for the murders. Parts 3, 5, 8 and 10 disclose the movements and
opportunities of the appellant before the murders. Part 8 also discloses his
intention. Parts 4, 6, 9 and 11 disclose that the appellant killed the four persons.
Part 12 disclose the killing and the motive. Parts 7, 13 and 17 disclose
concealment of a dead body and a tangi and his ability to point out places where
the dead bodies and the tangi were lying. Part 14 discloses the previous
confession by the appellant. Broadly speaking, the High Court admitted in
evidence parts 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18.

On behalf of the appellant, it is contended that the entire statement is a

confession made to a police of cer and is not provable against the appellant,
having regard to Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. On behalf of the
respondent, it is contended that Section 25 protects only those portions of the
statement which disclose the killings by the appellant and the rest of the
statement is not protected by Section 25.

Section 25 of the Evidence Act is one of the provisions of law dealing with
confessions made by an accused. The law relating to confessions is to be found
generally in Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and Sections 162 and 164 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Sections 17 to 31 of the Evidence Act are
to be found under the heading “Admissions”. Confession is a species of admission,
and is dealt with in Sections 24 to 30. A confession or an admission is evidence against
the maker of it, unless its admissibility is excluded by some provision of law.

Section 24 excludes confessions caused by certain inducements, threats and

promises. Section 25 provides: “No confession made to a police of cer, shall be
proved as against a person accused of an offence.” The terms of Section 25 are
 imperative. A confession made to a police of cer under any circumstances is not
 admissible in evidence against the accused. It covers a confession made when he
was free and not in police custody, as also a confession made before any
investigation has begun. The expression “accused of any offence” covers a person
accused of an offence at the trial whether or not he was accused of the offence
when he made the confession. Section 26 prohibits proof against any person of a
confession made by him in the custody of a police of cer, unless it is made in the
immediate presence of a Magistrate. The partial ban imposed by Section 26 relates
to a confession made to a person other than a police of cer. Section 26 does not
qualify the absolute ban imposed by Section 25 on a confession made to a police
of cer.

Section 27 is in the form of a proviso, and partially lifts the ban imposed by Sections 24,
25 and 26. It provides that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in
consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the
custody of a police of cer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a
confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be
proved. Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure forbids the use of any
statement made by any person to a police of cer in the course of an investigation
for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of the offence under
investigation, save as mentioned in the proviso and in cases falling under sub-
section (2), and it speci cally provides that nothing in it shall be deemed to affect
the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The words of Section 162 are
wide enough to include a confession made to a police of cer in the course of an
investigation. A statement or confession made in the course of an investigation
may be recorded by a Magistrate under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure subject to the safeguards imposed by the section.

Thus, except as provided by Section 27 of the Evidence Act, a confession by an

accused to a police of cer is absolutely protected under Section 25 of the
Evidence Act, and if it is made in the course of an investigation, it is also protected
by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and a confession to any other
person made by him while in the custody of a police of cer is protected by Section
26, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. These provisions
seem to proceed upon the view that confessions made by an accused to a police
of cer or made by him while he is in the custody of a police of cer are not to be
trusted, and should not be used in evidence against him. They are based upon
grounds of public policy, and the fullest effect should be given to them.

 Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the recording of the
rst information. The information report as such is not substantive evidence. It
may be used to corroborate the informant under Section 157 of the Evidence Act
or to contradict him under Section 145 of the Act, if the informant is called as a
witness. If the rst information is given by the accused himself, the fact of his
giving the information is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct under
Section 8 of the Evidence Act. If the information is a non-confessional statement, it is
admissible against the accused as an admission under Section 21 of the Evidence Act
and is relevant. But a confessional rst information report to a police of cer
cannot be used against the accused in view of Section 25 of the Evidence Act.

The Indian Evidence Act does not de ne “confession”. In Pakala Narayanaswami v.

King-Emperor [1939 IA] Lord Atkin [Judicial Committee] observed:

“(N)o statement that contains self exculpatory matter can amount to confession,
if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which if true would negative the
offence alleged to be confessed. Moreover, a confession must either admit in
terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the
offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating
fact, is not of itself a confession, e.g., an admission that the accused is the owner of
and was in recent possession of the knife or revolver which caused a death with
no explanation of any other man’s possession.”

Shortly put, a confession may be de ned as an admission of the offence by a

person charged with the offence. A statement which contains self-exculpatory
matter cannot amount to a confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some
fact which, if true, would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. If an
admission of an accused is to be used against him, the whole of it should be tendered in
evidence, and if part of the admission is exculpatory and part inculpatory, the
prosecution is not at liberty to use in evidence the inculpatory part only.

The accused is entitled to insist that the entire admission including the
exculpatory part must be tendered in evidence. But this principle is of no
assistance to the accused where no part of his statement is self-exculpatory, and
the prosecution intends to use the whole of the statement against the accused.


 Now, a confession may consist of several parts and may reveal not only the actual
commission of the crime but also the motive, the preparation, the opportunity, the
provocation, the weapons used, the intention, the concealment of the weapon
and the subsequent conduct of the accused. If the confession is tainted, the taint
attaches to each part of it. It is not permissible in law to separate one part and to
admit it in evidence as a non-confessional statement. Each part discloses some
incriminating fact, i.e., some fact which by itself or along with other admitted or
proved facts suggests the inference that the accused committed the crime, and
though each part taken singly may not amount to a confession, each of them being
part of a confessional statement partakes of the character of a confession. If a
statement contains an admission of an offence, not only that admission but also every
other admission of an incriminating fact contained in the statement is part of the
confession.

If proof of the confession is excluded by any provision of law such as Section 24,
Section 25 and Section 26 of the Evidence Act, the entire confessional statement
in all its parts including the admissions of minor incriminating facts must also be
excluded, unless proof of it is permitted by some other section such as Section 27
of the Evidence Act. Little substance and content would be left in Sections 24, 25
and 26 if proof of admissions of incriminating facts in a confessional statement is
permitted.

Sometimes, a single sentence in a statement may not amount to a confession at

all. Take a case of a person charged under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code
and a statement made by him to a police of cer that “I was drunk; I was driving a
car at a speed of 80 miles per hour; I could see A on the road at a distance of 80
yards; I did not blow the horn; 1 made no attempt to stop the car; the car knocked
down A.” No single sentence in this statement amounts to a confession, but the
statement read as a whole amounts to a confession of an offence under Section
304-A of the Indian Penal Code, and it would not be permissible to admit in
evidence each sentence separately as a non-confessional statement.

Again, take a case where a single sentence in a statement amounts to an

admission of an offence. ‘A’ states “I struck ‘B’ with a tangi and hurt him.” In
consequence of the injury ‘B’ died. ‘A’ committed an offence and is chargeable
under various sections of the Indian Penal Code. Unless he brings his case within
one of the recognised exceptions, his statement amounts to an admission of an
 offence, but the other parts of the statement such as the motive, the preparation,
 the absence of provocation, concealment of the weapon and the subsequent
conduct, all throw light upon the gravity of the offence and the intention and
knowledge of the accused, and negative the right of private defence, accident and
other possible defences. Each and every admission of an incriminating fact contained
in the confessional statement is part of the confession.

If the confession is caused by an inducement, threat or promise as contemplated

by Section 24 of the Evidence Act, the whole of the confession is excluded by
Section 24. Proof of not only the admission of the offence but also the admission of
every other incriminating fact such as the motive, the preparation and the subsequent
conduct is excluded by Section 24. To hold that the proof of the admission of other
incriminating facts is not barred by Section 24 is to rob the section of its practical
utility and content. Similarly, Sections 25 and 26 bar not only proof of admissions
of an offence by an accused to a police of cer or made by him while in the custody
of a police of cer but also admissions contained in the confessional statement of
all incriminating facts related to the offence.

A little re ection will show that the expression “confession” in Sections 24 to 30

refers to the confessional statement as a whole including not only the admissions
of the offence but also all other admissions of incriminating facts related to the
offence. Section 27 partially lifts the ban imposed by Sections 24, 25 and 26 in
respect of so much of the information whether it amounts to a confession or not,
as relates distinctly to the fact discovered in consequence of the information, if
the other conditions of the section are satis ed. Section 27 distinctly
contemplates that an information leading to a discovery may be a part of the
confession of the accused and thus fall within the purview of Sections 24, 25 and
26. Section 27 thus shows that a confessional statement admitting the offence may
contain additional information as part of the confession. Again, Section 30 permits
the Court to take into consideration against a co-accused a confession of another
accused affecting not only himself but the other co-accused. Section 30 thus shows
that matters affecting other persons may form part of the confession.

If the rst information report is given by the accused to a police of cer and
amounts to a confessional statement, proof of the confession is prohibited by
Section 25. The confession includes not only the admission of the offence but all
other admissions of incriminating facts related to the offence contained in the
confessional statement. No part of the confessional statement is receivable in
 evidence except to the extent that the ban of Section 25 is lifted by Section 27.
 We think, therefore, that save and except Parts 1, 15 and 18 identifying the
appellant as the maker of the rst information report and save and except the
portions coming within the purview of Section 27, the entire rst information report
must be excluded from evidence.

Section 27 applies only to information received from a person accused of an

offence in the custody of a police of cer. Now, the Sub-Inspector stated he
arrested the appellant after he gave the rst information report leading to the
discovery. Prima facie therefore, the appellant was not in the custody of a police of cer
when he gave the report, unless it can be said that he was then in constructive custody.
On the question whether a person directly giving to police of cer information
which may be used as evidence against him may be deemed to have submitted
himself to the custody of the police of cer within the meaning of Section 27,
there is con ict of opinion.

For the purposes of the case, we shall assume that the appellant was constructively in
police custody and therefore the information contained in the rst information report
leading to the discovery of the dead bodies and the tangi is admissible in evidence. The
entire evidence against the appellant then consists of the fact that the appellant
gave information as to the place where the dead bodies were lying and as to the
place where he concealed the tangi, the discovery of the dead bodies and the
tangi in consequence of the information, the discovery of a blood-stained chadar
from the appellant’s house and the fact that he had gone to Dungi Jharan Hills on
the morning of August 11, 1963.

This evidence is not suf cient to convict the appellant of the offences under
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the
conviction and sentence passed by the Courts below are set aside, and the
appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith.

*****

Case Law on sections 27

Pulukuri    Kottaya      v.       Emperor        [1947 PC]

 Sir John Beaumont

 This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras, dated October 22, 1945, dismissing an appeal
against the judgment and order of the Court of Sessions, dated August 2, 1945.

The offence charged was of a type common in many parts of India in which there
are factions in a village, and the members of one faction are assaulted by
members of the other faction and, in the prosecution which results, the Crown
witnesses belong to the party hostile to the accused; which involves that their
evidence requires very careful scrutiny.

The question which involves construction of S.27 of the Indian Evidence Act will
now be considered.

Section 27, which is not artistically worded, provides an exception to the

prohibition imposed by the preceding section, and enables certain statements
made by a person in Police custody to be proved. The condition necessary to bring
the section into operation is that the discovery of a fact in consequence of information
received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a Police Of cer must be
deposed to, and thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact
thereby discovered may be proved.

The section seems to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in
consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the
information was true, and accordingly, can be safely allowed to be given in evidence;
but clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact
nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate.
Normally the section is brought into operation when a person in Police custody
produces from some place of concealment some object, such as a dead body, a
weapon, or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the
informant is accused.

Mr. Megaw, for the Crown, has argued that in such a case the “fact discovered” is
the physical object produced, and that any information which relates distinctly to
that object can be proved. Upon this view information given by a person that the
body produced is that of a person murdered by him, that the weapon produced is
the one used by him in the commission of a murder or that the ornaments


 produced were stolen in a dacoity would all be admissible. If this be the effect of S.
27, little substance would remain in the ban imposed by the two preceding
sections on confessions made to the Police or by persons in Police custody.

That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the Legislature that a person under
Police in uence might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. But if all
that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion in the confession of information
relating to an object subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that
the persuasive powers of the Police will prove equal to the occasion, and that in
practice the ban will lose its effect.

On normal principles of construction their Lordships think that the proviso to S.

26, added by S. 27, should not be held to nullify the substance of the section. In
their Lordships’ view, it is fallacious to treat the “fact discovered” within the section as
equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which
the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the
information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user or the
past history of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in
which it is discovered.

Information supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce a knife concealed

in the roof of my house” does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were
discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is
concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to
have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very
relevant. But if to the statement the words be added “with which I stabbed A”,
these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife
in the house of the informant.

The dif culty, however great, of proving that a fact discovered on information
supplied by the accused is a relevant fact can afford no justi cation for reading
into S. 27 something which is not there, and admitting in evidence a confession
barred by S. 26. Except in cases in which the possession or concealment of an
object constitutes the gist of the offence charged, it can seldom happen that
information relating to the discovery of a fact forms the foundation of the
prosecution case. It is only one link in the chain of proof and the other links must be
forged in manner allowed by law.

 Statement made by accused Inala Sydayya on being arrested.

“About 14 days ago, I Kotayya and people of my party lay in wait for Sivayya and
others at about sunset time at the corner of Pulipad tank. We all beat Boddupati
China Sivayya and Subayya to death. The remaining persons, Pullayya, Kotayya
and Narayana ran away. Dondapati Ramayya who was in our party received blows
on his hands. He had a spear in his hands. He gave it to me then. I hid it and my stick
in the rick of Venkatanarasu in the village, I will show if you come. We did all this at
instigation of Pulukuri Kotayya”.

The whole of that statement except the passage “I hid it (a spear) and my stick in
the rick of Venkatanarasu in the village, I will show if you come” is inadmissible.

A confession of accused No. 3 was deposed to by the Police Sub-Inspector, who

said that accused No. 3 said to him:-

“I stabbed Sivayya with a spear. I hid the spear in a yard in my village. I will show
you the place.”

The rst sentence must be omitted.

The position therefore, is that in this case evidence has been admitted which ought
not to have been admitted, and the duty of the Court in such circumstances is
stated in S. 167 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was therefore, the duty of the High
Court in appeal to apply its mind to the question whether, after discarding the
evidence improperly admitted, there was left suf cient to justify the convictions.
The Judges of the High Court did not apply their minds to this question because
they considered that the evidence was properly admitted, and their Lordships
propose therefore, to remit the case to the High Court of Madras, with directions
to consider this question.

* * * ****

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 R E F U N D P O L I C Y ( H T T P : // W W W. D E L H I L A WA C A D E M Y. C O M / H O M E / R E F U N D - P O L I C Y/ )
T E R M S O F S E R V I C E ( H T T P : // W W W. D E L H I L AWA C A D E M Y. C O M / H O M E / T E R M S - O F - S E R V I C E / )

D e s i g n e d a n d d e v e l o p e d b y D e l h i L a w A c a d e m y, C o p y r i g h t 2 0 1 7
D e l h i L a w A c a d e m y i s I n d i a' s n e s t o n l i n e l a w c o a c h i n g i n s t i t u t e .
O u r a w a r d - w i n n i n g f a c u l t y i s f r o m I I T B o m b a y, I I M A h m e d a b a d , B I T S P i l a n i a n d
D e l h i U n i v e r s i t y.