CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY.

PUNO

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be INVIOLABLE except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall BE
INADMISSIBLE for ANY PURPOSE in ANY PROCEEDING.

Emails, Facebook, messages.

General rule: The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be INVIOLABLE

Exception:
1. upon lawful order of the court; or
-Probable cause in Sec. 2
2. when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
- There must be a law that allows for it.
Ex. A. Anti-wiretapping law
B. RA 9372: repealed by RA 11479 anti-terrorism act
C. Rules by Supreme Court; Habeas Corpus
D. Data Privacy Act

Whenever the court allows the intrusion, the court must specify.

1. Salcedo-Ortañez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110662, August 4, 1994.

FACTS:
Respondent Ortanez filed a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner
Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the
petitioner. Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made
and obtained when the private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home
telephone. The cassette tapes were admitted as evidence.

A petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner in the CA assailing the admission in evidence of
the cassette tapes. CA dismissed the petition stating that the tape recordings are not inadmissible per se.
They and any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how
they are presented and offered and on how the trial purposes, depending on how they are presented and
offered and on how the trial

Thus, this petition for review.

ISSUE:
WON the tape recordings are admissible as evidence.

RULING:
No, the tape recordings are not admissible as evidence.

Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence.
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In this case, respondent trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted law in
admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the
telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is
mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

Transcript of Phone Conversation to be used for annulment. It is still inadmissible in Evidence.

RA 4200 expressly prohibits without consent

2. Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.

FACTS:

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.

But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that
the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent
hurtful attacks on the system.

(1)

Petitioners assail the validity of Section 4(b)(3) which states:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:

xxxx

b) Computer-related Offenses:

xxxx

(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer,
possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural
or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable
shall be one (1) degree lower.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights
to due process and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.

ISSUE:

WoN Sec 4(b)(3) is valid? YES

RULING:

Yes, Sec. 4 (b)(3) is valid and does not violate right to privacy. The law punishes those who
acquire or use such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply
fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy
and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.
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Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold water
since the specific conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. Clearly, what
this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying
data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire another’s personal data.

(2) Petitioners also assail the validity of Sec. 12 of RA 10175 which states:

Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement authorities, with due cause,
shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time
associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.

Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration,
or type of underlying service, but not content, nor identities.

All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.

Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection
or recording of the above-stated information.

The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he
may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the
crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be
committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is
essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such
crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be
protected from government snooping into the messages or information that they send to one another.
Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, "with due cause," to collect or record by technical or
electronic means traffic data in real-time. Petitioners point out that the phrase "due cause" has no
precedent in law or jurisprudence and that whether there is due cause or not is left to the discretion of the
police.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The Solicitor General asserts that Congress is not required to define
the meaning of every word it uses in drafting the law.

ISSUE:

W/N Sec. 12 is invalid as it violates rights to privacy? - YES

RULING:

(2.) YES. Sec. 12 is invalid as it violates the right to privacy. Section 12 empowers law
enforcement authorities, "with due cause," to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic
data in real-time. Petitioners point out that the phrase "due cause" has no precedent in law or
jurisprudence and that whether there is due cause or not is left to the discretion of the police. Replying
to this, the Solicitor General asserts that Congress is not required to define the meaning of every word it
uses in drafting the law.

The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint.
While it says that traffic data collection should not disclose identities or content data, such restraint is
but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies holding these data in their
hands from looking into the identity of their sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will
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unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to extortion from certain bad elements
in these agencies.

Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified
communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law
enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually limitless,
enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified
communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy.

Sec 12 which allowed the gathering of data.

“Due Cause” – has never been defined. It is too broad, thus, prone to abuse. Gives too much discretion
on law enforcement.

3. Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999.

Facts:

On February 4, 1990, inside the Lucena police headquarters, Petitioner Navarro assaulted Ike
Lingan which caused of the latter’s death. Before the said incident, Lingan and Jalbuena went to the
police station to actually report the commotion happened in the Entertainment City.

However, Navarro after learning that Lingan and Jalbuena intends to file a blotter against Sioco
and Liquin, he assaulted Jalbuena. It is the time when Lingan intervened and a heated conversation
between Navarro and Lingan happened.

Navarro claim that it is Lingan who challenged him to have a fist fight, so he gave a blow.
Unknown to him, Jalbuena was able to record the conversation between Navarro and Lingan. This tape
recording was admitted to the court as evidence. Navarro question the admissibility of the tape recording
presented.

Issue:
Whether or not tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping

Ruling:

Yes, the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200

It was ruled that where the exchange between two persons is not private, its tape recording is not
prohibited. The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications.
Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not
prohibited.

A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness

(1) that he personally recorded the conversations;

(2) that the tape played in the court was the one he recorded; and
(3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.
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In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in
the court was the one he recorded; and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan.

Criminal Case for Homicide. There was a recording by a witness. Presented in court

There was no violation of RA 4200 because it was a PUBLIC CONVERSATION. Thus, admissible.

4. Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996.

Facts:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a
driver and private respondent’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic
and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martinand his alleged
paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which the petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:

Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence

Ruling:

No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who
is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed bylaw.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.” A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available
to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes
to the other.

The wife used the personal letter and documents of the husband. The SC said that privacy of
communication and correspondence is absolute. Exception (1) and (2).

5. People of the Philippines vs. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991.

FACTS:

The appellant Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the
"Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with
them four gift-wrapped packages for delivery to a friend in Zurich Switzerland. Anita Reyes, the
proprietress, attended to them and asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages.
However, Appellant refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves
and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. Anita Reyes then no longer insisted on inspecting the packages.

Before delivery of the appellant's box, Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency,
made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating
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procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau
of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. Upon inspection, opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took
samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business.

In the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps and took out the cellophane wrappers from
inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane
wrappers. The package which allegedly contained books turned out to be bricks or cake-like dried
marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained cigars turned out that dried marijuana leaves
were neatly stacked underneath the cigars. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the
box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects.
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the evidence obtained is violative of constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure and privacy of communication.

RULING:

No, the evidence obtained is not violative of constitutional rights against unreasonable search and
seizure and privacy of communication.

The Court held that The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the
state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other
individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere
inaccessible to any power holder.

In the case at bar, mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected
by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and
look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.

Therefore, constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as
a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.

There was intrusion in the personal effects of the person. There are drugs.
Issue : the court erred in admitting the evidence. PRIVATE

Evidence is admissible because the discovery was done by private individual. There was no
intervention by the government of state.

If there is violation of the private individual, CIVIL CASE.

6. Pollo vs. David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011.

FACTS:
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also
the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the "Mamamayan
Muna Hindi Mamaya Na" program of the CSC.
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An unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David

marked "Confidential" was sent through a courier service. Acting upon the letter-complaint, Chairperson
David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information technology (IT),
and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically "to back up all the files in
the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions."

The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division
(LSD) was witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely
monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to the petitioner and the
head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of
computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair. Petitioner replied also through text
message that he was leaving the matter to Director Unite and that he will just get a lawyer.

The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was
found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and
being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters in
connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding,
Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended
leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.

Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-
complaint which had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he "lawyering" for
people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting a "fishing expedition" when they
unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer, and subsequently asking him to submit his
comment which violated his right against self-incrimination. He asserted that he had protested the
unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, that the files in his computer were his
personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing
their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy
and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure.

The CSC then issued Resolution No. 070382 finding prima facie case against the petitioner and
charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees).

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing
the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority
of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner is entitled to avail the right to privacy over his computer and electronic files as a
government employee

RULING:

YES. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only
of “unreasonable” searches and seizures.

Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons for warrantless searches
involving public employees for work related reasons to the case at bar, we now address the following
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questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?
(2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair reasonable in its inception and scope?

The petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files for he
failed to prove that he had an actual expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued
computer which contained his personal files. He did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office
which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees
or visitors. He did not use passwords nor adopted any means to prevent access by others of his computer
files. The CSC also implemented a policy which implies on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure
that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.

The search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair was reasonable since it was conducted in
connection with investigation of work-related misconduct. A search by a government employer of an
employee’s office is justified when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

Thus, the petitioner's claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail.
His other argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also undefended considering the recognition accorded to certain
legitimate intrusions.

Pollo, employee of CSC. Letter was sent to the head of CSC. CSC instructed to go to the office and
search for the computer. Evidence WAS Used against Pollo.

The SC said that there was no violation of privacy.

REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY:

1. Subjective part – has the person exhibited an expectation of privacy.

2. Objective part – this expectation of privacy if it is generally recognized by society.

-It was dictation by customs, community norms and practices.

In this case, the SC said that Mr. Pollo failed to prove that he has expectation of privacy.

7. Spouses Hing vs. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013.

Facts:

Petitioner herein is the owner of a parcel of land in Mandaue, Cebu. Their property is in adjacent to the
property of Aldo Development & Resources Inc (ALDO). Aldo filed a civil case against the petitioner
alleging that they were constructing a fence without a valid permit and the construction would destroy
the wall of its building. The case filed by Aldo was dismissed due to failure to substantiate the
allegations. To remedy this, Aldo set-up two Video Surveillance Cameras facing the petitioner's property.
That its employees without the consent of the petitioners took pictures of their on going construction.
Thus, the petitioner prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and
enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.

Issue:
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WON the installation of video surveillance cameras by respondents violates the right to privacy of
petitioners.

Ruling:

Yes. The installation of video surveillance cameras by respondents violates the right to privacy of
petitioners.

Article 26 of the Civil Code - Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute
a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence

The court held that an individual's right to privacy under Article 26 (1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public
or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another's residence," therefore, covers places,
locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy.

The court used tha "reasonable expectation of privacy" test to determine if there is a violation of the right
to privacy.

(1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and

(2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and
practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy."

The court ruled that based on the foregoing, the petitioner has the reasonable expectation of privacy in
their property, whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video
surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners' property or covering a significant portion thereof,
without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy.

The right to privacy is basically the right to be alone.

Right to privacy only cover houses or affects?

Art 26, par 1 covers offices.

In this case, REASONABLE EXPECTION OF PRIVACY TEST.

8. Vivares vs. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014.

Facts:

Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures
of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero,
through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s
Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action. Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s
handbook and banned them from “marching” in their graduation ceremonies.
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The Mother of Angela Tan filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City
against STC, et al. despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the
school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.

Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita joined as intervenor, filed a petition for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data against the school. The Petitioners argued, among others, that:

1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have
a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.

2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by
subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were
intruded upon;

3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital
images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory;

They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of
the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to
privacy. The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper on the ground that there is an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in the
case.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools,
and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right
to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and protected.

In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy tools.
Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as “Public”.

Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his “wall” (profile
page):

a. Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

b. Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;

c. Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

d. Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user;
and

e. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

If the Petitioners’ daughters want to have some privacy, then the uploader of the subject photos must
choose any setting other than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject
of this case so much so that only five people can see them as they claim, then how come most of their
classmates were able to view them. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of
Facebook.
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Hence, the writ of habeas data is not proper on the ground that there is an actual or threatened violation
of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in the case.

The privacy settings is the manifestation of the users invocation of the right of privacy.

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the (1) freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press,
(2) or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.

Song, Movie, Poem, Film, Symbolic type of speech, Peaceful picketing and any form of expression

Do all type of speech enjoy the same degree of protection?

No. Religious, social and political are the highest form of expression. (CORE SPEECH)

Level below the core speech

Film, theater-forms of speech not as high

TYPES OF PROHIBITION
1. Prior restraint
- any form of restraint on any form or speech impose prior to the expression.

2 Type of Regulations- (Cases: Chaves vs. Gonzales; Diocese of Bacolod vs. Comelec)

1. Content Neutral Regulation

- Any type of regulation concerned only with time, place or manner of the
speech.
- Ex. permits for rallies (allways favors the free speech but if
2. Content-based Restraint
- concentrates the subject matter of the speech.
- unconstitutional

2. Subsequent punishment
- Produces a chilling effect that curtail freedom of expression

IS THE PROHIBITION ABSOLUTE? No. There are exceptions

1. When the nation is at war.
2. When a particular publication is considered obscene.
3. When the security of the state against incitement or to overthrow the government.

Test to allow prohibition:

1. Dangerous Tendency Test
- Speech may be curtailed or punished when the it creates the danger. There should be a
rational connection between the speech and evil apprehended
- Used during early jurisprudence
2. Clear and Present Danger Rule
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- Speech may be curtailed when the words used in a particular circumstance are a such as
nature as to create a clear and present danger that may bring about a present danger that
will bring about the substantive evil that congress has a right to prevent
- Must itself whether the gravity of the evil will justify the invasion of the free speech so as
it necessary to avoid the danger
- Question of proximity and degree
3. Balancing of Interest Rule
- There is a recognition of different rights or interest that would seem to clash with free
speech.

TYPES OF SPEECH NOT PROTECTED:

1. Libel
Elements: Article 353

2. Obscenity

Test for obscenity

1. Whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary standards’ would find the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest
2. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
3. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.”

No law shall be passed abridging the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
- Historically,
1. the right to petition is the primary right, and
2. the right peaceably to assemble is a subordinate and instrumentality right
- You peaceably to assemble is the way to petition the government.

- The right to assembly and to petition is EQUALLY FUNDAMENTAL as the freedom of

expression.
- So the standard for allowable impairment of speech and press is also applicable to right to
assembly and to petition

1. Chavez vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008.

FACTS:
After the 2004 national and local elections, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye disclosed to the public
how the opposition planned to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone
conversation allegedly between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Commissioner Garcillano of the
Cl validity of the "fair warning" issued by respondent NTC, is that broadcast media enjoy lesser
constitutional guarantees compared to print media, and the warning was issued pursuant to the NTC’s
mandate to regulate the telecommunications industry.

ISSUE:
WON the acts of the respondents abridge freedom of speech and of the press.

RULING:
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YES. The restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination
of three tests which are (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine, which limits speech once a rational
connection has been established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; (b) the
balancing of interests tests, a standard when courts balance conflicting social values and individual
interests, and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be
restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government
has a right to prevent.

A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given
the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media,
including broadcast media. It appears that the great evil which the government wants to prevent is the
airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. However, respondents’
evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test.

● Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the
tape recording.
● Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to
the public two versions, one supposed to be a “complete” version and the other, an “altered”
version.
● Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping act is
ambivalent, especially considering the tape’s different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers,
the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of
this case.
● Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would
violate the anti-wiretapping law.

Therefore, not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech
and of the press. The need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and
free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents
alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the
exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-
wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State. The petition is GRANTED.

(a) the dangerous tendency doctrine, -whenever we talk about abridgement of free speech. Ex.
Seditious speech
(b) the balancing of interests tests, (whenever there is public__)
(c) the clear and present danger rule - mababa requirement.
HINDI DAW TO ITATANONG YUNG TEST ON RESTRAINTS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
WALA DAW KWENTA TO

2. Iglesia ni Cristo vs.Court of Appeals, G.R.No.119673, July 26, 1996.

FACTS:

Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television program entitled
"Ang Iglesia ni Cristo". The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and
practices often times in comparative studies with other religions.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

The respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program
Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on
the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited
by law."

Petitioner went to Court to question the action of the respondent Board. RTC ordered respondent Board
of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (BRMPT) to grant petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo the necessary
permit for all the series of 'Ang Iglesia ni Cristo' program.Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
Respondent Board appealed to the Court of Appeals after its motion for reconsideration was denied.

The respondent Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. It ruled that: (1) the respondent board has
jurisdiction and power to review the TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and (2) the respondent Board
did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three
series of "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another
religion. It also found the series "indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs."

ISSUE:

WoN respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious
program.

RULING:

Yes, respondent Board gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious
program.

In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: "The constitutional guaranty of free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate
religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of
expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State
has the right to prevent." In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union the Court ruled that ". . . it is
only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the
smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.

The television episode in question is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and
expression under Article III, section 4 of the 1987 Constitution. Freedom of religion has been accorded
a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present. The Court have affirmed the
preferred status that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each
man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good.

Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including
religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and
should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this
presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down.

3. Jovito R. Salonga vs. Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño. G.R. No. 59524, February 18, 1985.

Facts:

On October 19, 1980, after the President delivered his speech, a small bomb exploded at Philippine
International Convention Center. An arrest, search and seizure order were issued against persons who
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

were implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Manila, which includes petitioner Salonga.
The court charge Salonga was charged for violation of Revised Anti-Subversion Act.

Victor Lovely as a state witness reveals that Salonga was actually involved in violence and terrorism
happened in Manila. Victor also tagged Salonga as the leader in the subversive organizations for two
reasons (1) Salonga’s house was used as a “contact point”; (2) Salonga mentioned some kind of violent
struggle in the Philippines being most likely should reforms be not instituted by President Marcos
immediately.

Salonga on his part argued that no prima facie case has been established to justify the filing of information
against him.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a prima facie case that had been established for the filing of information against
Salonga

Ruling:

No, there is no prima facie that has been established.

Justice Holmes says in the case of US vs Schwimmer “if there is any principle of the Constitution that
more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought—not free thought
for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.”

In the case at bar, the alleged opinion of Salonga about the likelihood of a violent struggle here in the
Philippines if reforms are not instituted, is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and
expression. It was settled that no man deserves punishment for his thoughts

The alleged remark is not a threat against the government nor is it even the uninhibited, robust, caustic,
or unpleasantly sharp attack which is protected by the guarantee of free speech. Parenthetically, the
American case of Brandenburg v. Ohio states that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action. The words which petitioner allegedly used according to the best recollections of
Victor Lovely are light years away from such type of proscribed advocacy.

Hence, no prima facie has been established.

_____________________

The term “prima facie evidence” denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient
to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counterbalance the presumption of
innocence to warrant a conviction.

4. National Press Club vs. Comelec , G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992.

FACTS:

Petitioner herein consists of representatives of the mass media and individuals running for a local and
national position. They primarily argue that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition
imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and
repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based
election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is
in derogation of the media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information
and public opinion relevant to election issues.

Petitioner further contends that Section 11 (b) abridge the freedom of speech of the candidates, and that
the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec
space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a
substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the
election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

The assailed Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987
provides that:

“Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – In addition to the forms of election propaganda
prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:
xxx
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any person making
use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other
political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Section 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any
elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period.”

Issue: WON Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is constitutional.

Ruling:

Yes. Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is constitutional.

The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the equalizing, as far as practicable, the situations of rich
and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge
campaign "war chests." Section 11 (b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time "for
campaign or other political purposes" except to the Commission on Elections ("Comelec"). Upon the
other hand, Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code require the Comelec to procure "Comelec
space" in newspapers of general circulation in every province or city and "Comelec time" on radio and
television stations.The court held that the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of
expression and freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken in conjunction with
Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period
— i.e., "during the election period”. The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be
seen to be that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory
authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for
political office, although such supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free
speech and free press.

More so the assailed provision is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. It is
applicable only during the election period. Sec 11 (b) is also limited in its scope of application, that it
purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a donation of
print space and air time for "campaign or other political purposes.". It does not restrict either the reporting
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment upon the qualifications and programs and activities
of any and all candidates for office. Section 11 (b) does limit the right of free speech and of access to
mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable
connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C) (4) and Article II (26) of the
Constitution.

Therefore, Sec 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is held to be valid and constitutional.

SEC 11 DOES NOT ABRIDGE FREE PRESS AND FREE SPEECH

5. Diocese of Bacolod vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015.

FACTS:

Petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the
front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH
Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin
is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists
candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an
"X" mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic
Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team
Buhay":

Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a
Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra.
The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being
oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two feet (2’) by three
feet (3’).

Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated
this case through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order. They question respondents’ notice to remove the tarpaulins.

Petitioners contend that the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violate their
fundamental right to freedom of expression.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to their
regulation pursuant to their mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
notice and letter ordering its removal for being oversized are valid and constitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether the assailed notice and letter for removal issued by the respondent violates freedom of
expression of the petitioners.

RULING:

Yes, Under Article III section 4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states that: “No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances”.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

In the case at bar, While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an opinion by the
COMELEC Law Department, this court has applied Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution even to
governmental acts.

The arguments of respondents are untenable. The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda"
refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or exhibited, in any medium, which
contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic
representation that is capable of being associated with a candidate or party, and is intended to draw the
attention of the public or a segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of
the said candidate or candidates to a public office.

It is clear that this paragraph suggests that personal opinions are not included. Petitioners not being
candidates neither do they belong to any political party, the subject tarpaulins are therefore personal
opinion of the Petitioners. The tarpaulin was their statement or expression of approval and appreciation
of the named public officials’ act of voting against the RH Law, and their criticism toward those who
voted in its favor. It was "part of their advocacy campaign against the RH Law.

Also, there is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as
to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize
the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the
tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

Therefore, the assailed notice and letter for removal issued by the respondent violates freedom of
expression of the petitioners.

6. Rubin vs. Coors Brewing Company, 574 US 476 (1995)

Facts:

In 1987, respondent applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) for approval of
proposed labels and advertisements that disclosed the alcohol content of its beer. BATF rejected it on the
ground that it is in violation of 5(e)(2) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (FAAA) which
prohibits disclosure of the alcohol content of beer on labels or in advertising.

Respondent filed suit for relief on the ground that the relevant provisions of the Act violated the First
Amendment's protection of commercial speech. The Government took the position that the ban was
necessary to suppress the threat of "strength wars" among brewers, who, without the regulation, would
seek to compete in the marketplace based on the potency of their beer.

Issue:

Whether or not the FAAA violates the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech

Ruling:

Yes, it violates the protection to commercial speech

The Court held that for the government to regulate commercial speech, the government must have a
substantial interest that the regulation directly affects.

In this case, the interest the government to impose FAAA is to curb “Strength war” of competing beer
companies. According to the Government, the FAAA's restriction prevents a particular type of beer
drinker - one who selects a beverage because of its high potency - from choosing beers solely for their
alcohol content.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

However, the Court concluded that this interest was not substantial enough, since there was no reason to
believe that banning the alcoholic content on beer labels would prevent such social harms. The regulation
also does not directly advance the suppression of strength wars, especially since other provisions of the
FAAA directly counteract its effects. Finally, the Court held the regulation was more extensive than
necessary, since there were available and effective alternatives that would not violate the First
Amendment.

COMMERCIAL SPEECHES is any type of communication which proposes a commercial

transaction.
Ex. Advertisement in TV, radio, and in Social Media.

They are not ask in the same level of speech, they still enjoy some protection.

In order to enjoy protection, commercial speech must not:

3. Must not be false or misleading
4. Shall not propose illegal transactions.

Even if it is truthful and lawful speech, it can be REGULATED.

1. Government has substantial interest to protect
2. The regulation directly advances government interest
3. Must not be extensive than what is more necessary

7. Borjal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999.
Facts:
During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988 undertaken
by the House Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy, those who attended agreed to organize the First
National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by the private sector in the
transport industry and government agencies concerned in order to find ways and means to solve the
transportation crisis. More importantly, the objective of the FNCLT was to draft an omnibus bill that
would embody a long-term land transportation policy for presentation to Congress. On 28 February 1989,
at the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected
Executive Director. As such, he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business community for the
support of the conference. Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal
was published on different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous
activities of an "organizer of a conference" without naming or identifying private respondents. Neither
did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned. Quoted hereunder are excerpts from the
articles of petitioner together with the dates they were published. Private respondent filed a complaint
with the National Press Club (NPC) against petitioner Borjal for unethical conduct apparently not
satisfied with his complaint with the NPC, private respondent filed a criminal case for libel against
petitioners Borjal and Soliven, among others.

Issue:

WON private respondent has a valid cause of action for libel against petitioners although he failed
to prove actual malice on their part?

Ruling:
No. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not
necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the
object of the libelous publication. The questioned articles written by Borjal do not identify private
respondent Wenceslao as the organizer of the conference. The first of the Jaywalker articles which
appeared in the 31 May 1989 issue of The Philippine Star yielded nothing to indicate that the private
respondent was the person referred to therein. Neither did the FNCLT letterheads disclose the identity of
the conference organizer since these contained only an enumeration of names where private respondent
Francisco Wenceslao was described as Executive Director and Spokesman and not as a conference
organizer. The printout and tentative program he printout which contained an article entitled "Who
Organized the NCLT?" did not even mention private respondent's name, while the tentative program
only denominated private respondent as "Vice Chairman and Executive Director," and not as organizer.
Petitioner Borjal's questioned writings are not within the exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal
Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court, they are neither private communications nor fair
and true report without any comments or remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are
not privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged
communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule
on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of
the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. As early as 1918, in United States v.
Cañete, this Court ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected
by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the
mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the statute punishing libels

CONSIDERED PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

8. Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 26549, July 31, 1970.

Facts:
This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by petitioner Juan T. Gatbonton,
devoted a pictorial article to it in its issue of January 15, 1956. Mention was made that while the Fidel
Cruz story turned out to be false if brought to light the misery of the people living in that place, with
almost everybody sick, only two individuals able to read and write, food and clothing being scarce. Then
in the January 29, 1956 issue of This Week Magazine, the "January News Quiz'' included an item on the
central figure in what was known as the Calayan Hoax, who nevertheless did the country a good turn by
calling the government's attention to that forsaken and desolate corner of the Republic. Earlier in its
Special Year End Quiz appearing in its issue of January 13, 1956, reference was made to a health
inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story about a murderer running
loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization. He was given the
appellation of "Hoax of the Year." The magazine on both occasions carried photographs of the person
purporting to be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the pictures that were published on both occasions were that
of private respondent Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out
that the photographs of respondent Cruz and that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file in the
library of the Manila Chronicle in accordance with the standard procedure observed in other newspaper
offices, but when the news quiz format was prepared, the two photographs were inadvertently switched.
Respondent Fidel G. Cruz sued petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of
damages alleging the defamatory character of the above publication of his picture

Issue:
WON such error is sufficient ground for an action for libel to prosper?
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

Ruling:
Yes. It was held in Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui, that "the repeal of the old Libel Law (Act No.
277) did not abolish the civil action for libel." A libel was defined in that Act as a "malicious defamation,
expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, * * *, tending to blacken the
memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or
natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." The
first decision cited by Newell is a decision of Justice Holmes. The case is Peck v. Tribune Co. Plaintiff
there complained of her picture being published in an advertisement in defendant's newspaper. The
Chicago Sunday Tribune, with certain words of commendation for a brand of liquor attributed to her
when in fact she did not make such a statement at all and could not have made it, as she was a total
abstainer. The defendant was held liable, for as Justice Holmes pointed out: “There was some suggestion
that the defendant published the portrait by mistake, and without knowledge that it was the plaintiff's
portrait, or was not what it purported to be. But the fact, if it was one, was no excuse. If the publication
was libelous, the defendant took the risk. As was said of such matters by Lord Mansfield, 'Whenever a
man publishes, he publishes at his peril.' * * * The reason is plain. A libel is harmful on its face. If a man
sees fit to publish manifestly hurtful statements concerning an individual, without other justification than
exists for an advertisement or a piece of news, the usual principles of tort will make him liable if the
statements are false, or are true only of someone else The correction promptly made by petitioners would
thus call for a reduction in the damages awarded. It should be noted that there was no proof of any actual
pecuniary logs arising from the above publication. It is worthwhile to recall what Justice Malcolm
referred to as the tolerant attitude on the part of appellate courts on this score, the usual practice being
"more likely to reduce damages for libel than to increase them

9. In Re Emil Jurado, A.M. 93-2-037 SC, April 6, 1995.

FACTS:
Emiliano P. Jurado, a lawyer and journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation wrote
about alleged improprieties and irregularities in the judiciary over several months.

What was particularly given attention by the Supreme Court in his column entitled, "Who will
judge the Justices?" referring to a report that six justices, their spouses, children and grandchildren (a
total of 36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong Kong, and that luxurious hotel accommodations and all
their other expenses were paid by a public utility firm and that the trip was arranged by the travel agency
patronized by this public utility firm. This column was made amidst rumors that a Supreme Court
decision favorable to the public utility firm appears to have been authored by a lawyer of the public utility
firm.

The Chief Justice issued an administrative order creating an ad hoc committee to investigate the
said reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter affidavit was also received from the public utility,
denying the allegations in Jurado's column. The Supreme Court then issued a resolution ordering that the
matter dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted upon as
an official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations made by Jurado are
true.

ISSUE:
WON Jurado can invoke freedom of the press to justify his published writings.

RULING:
No, Jurado cannot invoke freedom of the press to justify his published writings.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

To resolve the issue raised by those facts, application of fairly elementary and self-evident
postulates is all that is needed, these being:

1) that the utterance or publication by a person of falsehood or half-truths, or of slanted or distorted

versions of facts — or accusations which he made no bona fide effort previously to verify, and which he
does not or disdains to prove — cannot be justified as a legitimate exercise of the freedom of speech and
of the press guaranteed by the Constitution, and cannot be deemed an activity shielded from sanction by
that constitutional guaranty;

2) that such utterance or publication is also violative of "The Philippine Journalist's Code of
Ethics" which inter alia commands the journalist to "scrupulously report and interpret the news, taking
care not to suppress essential facts nor to distort the truth by improper omission or emphasis," and makes
it his duty "to air the other side and to correct substantive errors promptly;"

3) that such an utterance or publication, when it is offensive to the dignity and reputation of a
Court or of the judge presiding over it or degrades or tends to place the courts in disrepute and disgrace
or otherwise to debase the administration of justice, constitutes contempt of court and is punishable as
such after due proceedings; and

4) that prescinding from the obvious proposition that any aggrieved party may file a complaint to
declare the utterer or writer in contempt, the initiation of appropriate contempt proceedings against the
latter by the court is not only its prerogative but indeed its duty, imposed by the overmastering need to
preserve and protect its authority and the integrity, independence and dignity of the nation's judicial
system.

In this Case,The principle of press freedom is invoked by Jurado in justification of these published
writings. That invocation is obviously unavailing in light of the basic postulates and the established
axioms or norms for the proper exercise of press freedom earlier set forth in this opinion

10. Leo Pita vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989.

Facts:

Pursuant to Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of Manila, seized and confiscates reading
materials which are believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent. Among the materials seized was
Pinoy Playboy magazines published by petitioner.

Petitioner filed a writ of preliminary injunction and claimed that the said magazine is a decent, artistic
and educational and the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech
and of the press. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:

Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.

Ruling:

Yes, there is a violation of freedom of expression of the petitioner. Furthermore, the search and seizure
is also unconstitutional.

In the case of Reyes v. Bagatsing the court ruled:

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

“There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the
existence of such clear and present danger.” “It is essential for the validity of . . . previous
restraint or censorship that the . . . authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of
what the public welfare, peace or safety may require.”

“To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy
the clear and present danger test.”

The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban
and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First
of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order:

(1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and

(2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.

It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant otherwise; they become
unreasonable and subject to challenge.

Difficult to determine on what is obscene or not

Test for obscenity

4. Whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary standards’ would find the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest
5. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
6. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.”

11. Bayan vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006.

Background story:

BAYAN’s rally was violently dispersed; 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when,
in a peaceful mass action, they were preempted and violently dispersed by the police. Kilusang Mayo
Uno (KMU) asserts that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the
policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim
that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but the
police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries
to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which
KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the UST and going
towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from
proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other
rallyists were arrested.

Facts:

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them
in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to
stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy announced on
Sept. 21, 2005. Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the
Philippines is a signatory.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

(1) They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice
of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a
public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought.

(2) Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it
is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances
because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public
assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its
provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy,
it is void for being an act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No.
880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication.

(3) KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and
therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even
assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable:
First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and
present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit
is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue
would possibly weaken. As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the
government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law,
ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum
tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on
the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: It argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-
routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of
commerce and trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public
assemblies. According to Atienza, RA.7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of
B.P. No. 880 and that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and
that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.

Issue:

1. Whether or Not BP 880 is constitutional?

2. W/N CPR Policy is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. Yes BP 880 is valid. BP 880 is valid and constitutional as it does not curtail or unduly restrict
freedom. It is NOT AN ABSOLUTE BAN OF PUBLIC ASSEMBLIES.

It merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. The
delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard. The permit can only be denied on the ground
of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to
be for lawful causes; otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the
expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not
relevant to the regulation.

2. No. The Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from
maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID. It has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down
as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to
justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, this was
declared null and void.

The Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves
no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something
else.

CONTENT NEUTRAL REGULATION- IT ONLY REGULATED TIME AND MANNER.

RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND PETITION- THE ONLY RIGHT THAT CANNOT BE

EXERCISED BY YOURSELF.
THE PRIMARY RIGHT IS THE RIGHT OF PETITION- TO ASK FOR RELIEF TO THE
GOVERNMENT.
RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE- TO ASSEMBLE IN ORDER TO PETITION

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

TWO PRINCIPAL PARTS OF SECTION 5:

1. NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
- The state or government cannot set-up a church or pass a law or regulation that aid one church
or prefer one church over another.
- The church itself cannot participate, openly or secretly, in the affairs of religious organizations.

PROVISIONS EXPRESS NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:

1. Article VI, Section 29(2)

“No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher minister, or dignitary
is assigned to the Armed Forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage
or leprosarium”

2. Article II, Section 6

"The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

3. Article IX, C, Section 2(5)

“(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions
which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution,
or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.”

GOVERNMENT AID:
GENERAL RULE: Public funds cannot be applied to favor or benefit any religion or sects.

Exception to be allowable:
REQUISITES:
1. It must have a secular legislative purpose.
- Not religious (Manosca vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996
2. Its primary effect is neither advances nor inhibits religion
3. It must not require excessive entanglement with recipient institutions.

PROVISIONS CREATED EXCEPTIONS TO NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:

1. Article VI, Section 28(3)

“Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques,
and non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxation”

2. Article VI, Section 1(2)

"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the Armed Forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium."

3. Article XIV, Section 3(3)

"At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed
to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within
the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of
the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the
Government."
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

2. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

- No person shall be compelled to believe or take part in a particular believe or religion.

TWO ASPECTS:
1. FREEDOM TO BELIEVE
- Set of beliefs that are in the mind of a person.
- It is absolute.
2. FREEDOM TO ACT ON YOUR BELIEF
- It is not absolute.
- The state can restrain someone from acting if the state believes that there is a public issue,
safety or morals that have to be protected.

1. Aglipay vs. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

FACTS:

Petitioner Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, sought from the
Supreme Court the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent, Juan Ruiz, Director of
Posts from issuing and selling commemorative stamps of the 33rd International Congress (of the Catholic
Church).

The petitioner alleged that the action of respondent violates Section 13, subsection 3, Article VI of the
constitution which provides as follows:

“No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system
of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned
to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.”

Respondent Director issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 (AN
ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME
AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE
APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH
NEW DESIGNS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES) of the Philippine Legislature which appropriated
sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs. The
respondent alleges that the government would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted from the
revenue to be derived from the sale of stamps.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issuing of commemorative postage stamps by the respondent is in violation of the
Constitution.

RULING:

No. The issuing of the postage stamps in question does not violate the Constitution.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

The Philippine Constitution guarantees religious liberty and not merely religious toleration. Religious
freedom, as a constitutional mandate, is not inhibition of reverence for religion and is not a denial of its
influence in human affairs.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be “advantageous
to the government”. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or
property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. The stamps were not issued and
sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Also, the money derived from the sales of the stamps
was not given to the Church. What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the
capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that Congress.

The SC said that the postage stamp commemorates not exactly the Eucharistic Congress or the Catholic
Church but the Philippines as a venue for the event. It is only meant to advertise the Philippines and to
attract more tourist to the country which is the primary purpose. The advancement of Catholic church is
a secondary purpose. Thus, the stamp does not violate the separation of church and state.

2. Garces vs. Estenzo, G.R. No. 53487, May 25, 1981

FACTS:
Barangay resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:

Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided
for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for
the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.

Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of
San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election
of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of
the saint’s feast day.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was
temporarily placed on the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father
Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the church’s
property since church funds were used in its acquisition.

Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the
priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a
representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions.
The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends the constitutional
provisions regarding separation of church and state and freedom of worship were violated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution was violated?

RULING:
No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image.

The image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose
of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any
activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

Practically, the image was placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available to any
family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena.

It was the council’s funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the
determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no
violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government activity which
involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the
constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the
use of public money or property.

Thus, said resolutions were not violative of the freedom of religion clause in the Constitution.

3. Manosca vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996.

FACTS:
The case is about a petition for review on certiorari to resolve whether or not the public use requirement
of Eminent Domain is applicable in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-meter
parcel of land so declared by the National Historical Institute (NHI) as a national historical landmark
which the petitioners inherited located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila. The NHI
ascertained that the said parcel of land is the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo
through the passage of Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Such resolution was approved by the
Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and also affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.

The petitioner primarily argues that such expropriation does not satisfy the requirement of Public Use.

Issue:
Whether or not the property can be expropriated.

Ruling:

YES. The argument of the petitioner that the public use requirement is not satisfied as it will only benefit
the members of the INC is untenable.

The court furthered that the purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive
contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his
founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived
by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage
still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually
benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of the
public.

Thus the expropriation of the subject parcel of land is a valid exercise of Eminent Domain.

The SC held that the setting up the historical marker commemorating the birthplace of Felix Manalo is
to recognize the contribution to the Philippine culture. It is not really meant to commemorate the founding
of the Iglesia ni Cristo. While it may be true that it may advance the Iglesia ni Cristo as a Church, it is
only a secondary. Thus, there is a secular legislative purpose that is acceptable. Hence, expropriation can
be proceeded.

4. School District of Abington Township vs. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

FACTS:
The Schempp family consisting of Edward, Sidney, and their three children were Unitarians and
members of their local church in Germantown, PA. Their eldest child, Ellory, attended school at
Abingtown High School.

The Schempp Family in this case, brought suit against the State of Pennsylvania because of their state
policy that stated, the school day must begin with the recitation of ten verses of the Holy Bible, followed
by the Lord’s Prayer, and ending with the Pledge of Allegiance, all over the school’s loudspeaker.
Classrooms without a speaker to hear the morning recitation would feature the exercise from a teacher
who would either conduct the recitation him/herself, or would have a student volunteer to do it. Any child
shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of
his parent or guardian.

One morning, Ellory was asked to do a recitation, and in protest, he read from the Koran, which resulted
in his suspension. His parents asked the ACLU to represent them for legal action against the school.
Given that attendance at school was compulsory as well as the prayer reading, the trial court struck down
the statute.

THE SCHEMPP FAMILY CONTENDS: that their rights to freedom of religion under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments' and in violation of 'the principle of separation between church and state. The
petition particularized the petitioners' atheistic beliefs and stated that the rule, as practiced, violated their
rights.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Pennsylvania statute requiring students to open the school day by reading Bible
passages and the Lord’s Prayer violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

RULING:
YES. The court ruled in favor of the Schempp family because of the first amendment prohibition against
“an establishment of religion”. They reasoned “the readings and recitations were essentially religious
ceremonies and were ‘intended by the State to be so.’”

In its decision the court gave a test that may be applied. The test may be stated as follows: what are the
purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion
then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is
to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.

The Court also reinforces that in Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court bound the Establishment Clause to
the states, and lists off a series of cases in which similar school prayer laws have been stricken. States
cannot set up their own churches, aid any forms of religion, nor may it prefer one over another. He also
cites Engel v. Vitale, reinforcing that the exercise of reading from the Bible and reciting the Lord’s Prayer
is a religious exercise. When referencing Engle, Clark makes a distinction between the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause - students can choose to pray at their discretion, but the school
cannot mandate them to engage in what the courts see as a religious exercise, despite the statute allowing
the student(s) to be excused from the exercise.

Relying on both Cantwell and Vitale cases, the Court justifies invalidating two statutes that required
school children to recite Bible verses and the Lord’s Prayer at the beginning of the school day on the
grounds that it violates their religious beliefs. In the case of the statute in Pennsylvania, the Schempp
objected to their children reading from and being subject to a Bible whose teachings were contrary to
what was taught at home.

There are two laws being questioned: (1) Pennsylvania statute that require the recitation of ten verses
of the Holy Bible, followed by the Lord’s Prayer (2) Maryland
ISSUE:
Whether or not those laws violated the First Amendment.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

RULING:
The SC laid down the requirements:
1. It must have a secular legislative purpose.
2. Its primary effect is neither advances nor inhibits religion
3. It must not require excessive entanglement with recipient institutions.
The SC said that it violated and infringe the rights of the complainants.

In those laws, the students can excuse themselves but the court said that the fact that there’s this type of
provision does not fixed the problem with the law. It still violates the freedom of religion.

5. Austria vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382, August 16, 1999.

DOCTRINE:

An ecclesiastical affair is "one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the
adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the
government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed
unworthy of membership.

FACTS:

Austria the petitioner, was the Director of the SDA, who were terminated of his position, for being
allegedly failed to remit collection from tithes and offerings to the SDA, the allegation was supplemented
by the ill-feelings of Pastor Rodrigo, when the petitioner asked the former of his payment to the repair
of his motorcycle by Diamada, a friend of the petitioner. The petitioner contested the allegation and stated
that it was his wife who was assigned to the collection of offering and tithes as at that time he was sick.
He then immediately requested for a committee to convene to investigate the allegation, but was denied.
He was later on, dismissed in his position.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such,
involves the separation of church and state.

RULING:

NO. The termination of the services of petitioner is an not ecclesiastical affair. The principle of separation
of church and state finds no application in this case. An ecclesiastical affair is "one that concerns doctrine,
creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association
of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from
such associations those deemed unworthy of membership.

Simply stated, what is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as
an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or
doctrines of the church. In this case, petitioner was not ex-communicated or expelled from the
membership of the SDA but was terminated from employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an
employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member
from the religious congregation.

As pointed out by the OSG in its memorandum, the grounds invoked for petitioner's dismissal, namely:
misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual
neglect of duties and commission of an offense against the person of his employer's duly authorized
representative, are all based on Article 282 of the Labor Code which enumerates the just causes for
termination of employment.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

Therefore, the termination of the services of petitioner is an not ecclesiastical affair.

Mr. Austria filed a case for illegal dismissal but the church contends that NLRC should not have the
jurisdiction because this involves ecclesiastical affair.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC has the actual jurisdiction of the case?

The SC said there was error in the dismissal ruled by the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter should have
jurisdiction of the case because the main issue is not an ecclesiastical affair. The issue pertains to
employer-employee relationship (Church-Mr. Austria), thus, a labor issue or secular issue.

An ecclesiastical affair is "one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the
adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the
government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed
unworthy of membership

6. Islamic Da’wah Council vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003

FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-governmental organization internationally accredited to issue halal certifications in
the Philippines. To carry out its functions, it formulated internal rules and procedures based on the Qur’an
and Sunnah for food analysis and inspection, and began to issue certifications to qualified products and
food manufacturers for a fee.

Later, the respondent Office issued Executive Order 46 which created the Philippine Halal
Certification Scheme. Such order vested exclusive authority on the Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to
issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. OMA then warned Muslim
consumers to buy only products with its official halal certification since those without said certification
had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork. It also began to send letters
to food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they violate the
order. As a result, the IDCP lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from
it.

Hence, petitioner filed a petition to nullify EO 46, contending that it is unconstitutional for the
government to formulate policies & guidelines on the halal certification scheme because it is a function
that only religious organizations can lawfully & validly perform for the Muslims.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 46 is unconstitutional for violating the non-establishment and free exercise
clauses guaranteed under Art. III, Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
Yes. EO 46 is unconstitutional for violating Art. lll, Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution.

Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn
from the Qur’an & Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as
halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations to interpret for Filipino
Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption; by arrogating to itself the task of issuing
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur’an
& Sunnah on halal food.

Only the prevention of an immediate & grave danger to the security and welfare of the community
can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness &
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.

In the case at bar, the Court finds no compelling justification for the government to deprive
Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even
on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos right
to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged
with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled
and safe.

Thus, EO 46 is unconstitutional.

7. Taruc et al vs. Bishop dela Cruz, G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005.

DOCTRINE:
The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter
best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons of said institution/organization.

FACTS:
Petitioner, Taruc, clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano moved to another parish due to the political
party, opposed to petitioner Taruc’s, of Fr. Florano’s wife. Respondent Bishop De la Cruz, however,
found no reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another parish.

Petitioner organized an open mass to be celebrated by a certain Fr. Ambong, who was not a member of
the clergy of the diocese of Suricao. Respondent tried to dissuade him from pushing through and appealed
to petitioner to refrain from committing acts inimical and prejudicial to the best interests of the PIC. He
also advised the petitioners to air their complaints before the higher authorities of PIC if they believed
they had valid grievances against him, the parish priest, the laws and canons of the PIC.

Respondent, Dela Cruz, declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent
Church for reasons of: (1) disobedience to duly constituted authority in the Church; (2) inciting
dissension, resulting in division in the Parishes when they celebrated an open Mass at the Plaza on June
19, 1996; and (3) for threatening to forcibly occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety and fear among
the general membership.

Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with
preliminary injunction against Bishop De la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch
32.

Petitioner contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their
right to due process of law.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the case before the lower court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
but it was denied
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the expulsion/excommunication of
members of a religious institution.

RULING:
No, the courts have NO jurisdiction to hear a case involving the expulsion/excommunication of members
of a religious institution.
The Court agreed to the CA that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of
said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the
performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/ organizations to conform to just church regulations.

The issue is about the membership in the PIC.

The SC said pertains to ecclesiastical affair. The court is clear that when it comes to doctrinal and
disciplinary differences, they will not handle by the court because it is ecclesiastical affair.

8. American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-9637, April 30, 1957.

DOCTRINE:
The constitutional guarantee of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious, profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be
justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present
danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.

FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant, American Bible Society, is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit religious, missionary
corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine Agency
established in Manila. It has been distributing and selling bibles/ gospel portions throughout the
Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects.

Respondent, City Treasurer of the City of Manila, requires plaintiff to secure Mayor’s permit and
Municipal license fees in accordance with Ordinances No. 3000 as amended, Ordinance No.2529, 3028
and 3364 since it was conducting business of general merchandise.

Plaintiff-appellant contends that Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as respectively amended, are
unconstitutional and illegal in so far as its society is concerned, because they provide for religious
censorship and restrain the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession, to wit: the distribution
and sale of bibles and other religious literature to the people of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ordinances Nos. 3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364 are applicable to the
alleged business of distribution and sale of bible by a religious corporation like the American Bible
Society.

RULING:
No, the Ordinances are not applicable to the alleged business of distribution and sale of bible by a
religious corporation like the American Bible Society.

The constitutional guarantee of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

justified like other restraints of freedom of expressions on the grounds that there is a clear and present
danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.

In the case at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its distribution and sale
of bibles and other religious literature. The Court believed that the provisions of the questioned
ordinances cannot be applied to plaintiff-appellant for in doing so it would impair the free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its right to disseminate religious information.

The ordinance is not applicable because the fee found in the ordinance was imposed in the exercise of
distribution and sale of bible.

9. Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995.

FACTS:
This pertains to a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court Decision dismissing the
petition to assail the constitutionality of RA 7716. Otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax
Law.

The PPI, one of the petitioners, contend that by removing the exemption of the press from the
VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is
averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."
Citing the case of Murdock vs. Pennsylvania:

"The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The protection afforded by the
First Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax certainly does not acquire constitutional validity
because it classifies the privileges protected by the First Amendment along with the wares and
merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save
the ordinance. Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in preferred positions."

ISSUE:
WON RA 7716 (Expanded Value Added Tax Law) violates the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship.

RULING:
NO. RA 7716 (Expanded Value Added Tax Law) does not violate the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship.

In the case of Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, the court is speaking of a LICENSE TAX (not VAT) which,
unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it
lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right

The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much
less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or
the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the
press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income
tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.

Thus, RA 7716 (Expanded Value Added Tax Law) does not violate the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

Sec 107 which proposes an amount of 1,000.00 imposed for the exercise of privilege of selling a religious
materials.

The fee imposed is not on the exercise of religion but more on to defray the cost of registration in the
system which is an essential aspect of VAT law.

The fee is not imposed to allow you to exercise the freedom of religion.

Any act that will prohibit or restraint any person or entity from exercising religion is not valid.

10. Ebralinag et al. vs. The Division of Superintendent of School of Cebu, G.R. No, 95770, March
1, 1993.

DOCTRINE:
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national
sovereignty, of national cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and
protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag
is utterly devoid of any religious significance. . Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any
religious ceremony. HOWEVER, the Supreme Court reversed this in Ebralinag v. Division
Superintendent of Schools ofCebu, 219 SCRA 256 (1993) saying that freedom of religion requires that
protesting members be exempted from the operation of the law
.

FACTS:

The petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge
as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting
the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions) issued by the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.

Petitioner Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they taught their children not to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or
"religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God". They
consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities
in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and
invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects against official control.

OSG contends that The flag salute is devoid of any religious significance; instead, it inculcates respect
and love of country, for which the flag stands.

ISSUE:
Whether or not school children who are members of a religious sector may be expelled from school for
disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8

RULING:

No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest
protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator.The right to
religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on
one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second
is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

In this case, while petitioners' children do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not
engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their
love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the
flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn
proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

Hence, the school children who are members of a religious sector must not be expelled from school for
the disobedience of R.A No.1265 and Department Order No. 8 for being exempted from the operation of
the law.

The SC emphasize the importance of religious freedom as a fundamental right.

It has two aspects: freedom to believe (absolute) and freedom to act on one’s belief (not absolute). It is
not absolute when it affects public welfare and interest.

In prior restraints or the limitation to your freedom to act on one’s belief, prior restraint can only be
allowed when the state is able to show that there is grave and present danger to public safety, moral and
health or any other public legitimate interest.

In this case, the regulation failed to present any substantial danger if these students will not be allowed
to take part. Anyway, the petitioners only asking not to take part in the flag ceremony but they still will
have to go through a regular classes in public school.

11. Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003.

FACTS:
In a sworn letter filed by Petitioner Estrada requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent
Escritor, court interpreter in said court, is living with another man and not her husband and allegedly has
a child. Estrada filed the charge against Escritor as he believed that employees of the judiciary should be
respectable and Escritor's live-in arrangement did not command respect. Respondent Escritor admitted
the above mentioned allegations. She testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was
already a widow, she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for
twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's
Witnesses and the WatchTower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity
with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," in accordance with her religion which allows members of
Jehovah’s Witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The
Declaration makes the union moral and binding within the congregation throughout the world except in
countries where divorce is allowed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent Escritor is guilty of immoral conduct for her right to religious freedom should
carve out an exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government
employees are held administratively liable.

RULING:
Respondent is charged with committing "gross and immoral conduct" under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI,
Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code which provides, viz: “(5) Disgraceful and immoral
conduct; xxx.” Not represented by counsel, respondent, in layman's terms, invokes the religious beliefs
and practices and moral standards of her religion, the Jehovah's Witnesses, in asserting that her conjugal
arrangement with a man not her legal husband does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for
which she should be held administratively liable. While not articulated by respondent, she invokes
religious freedom under Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides, viz:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.

The investigating judge acknowledged that "religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to
the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of
man to his Creator (at p. 270, EBRALINAG supra, citing Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate
opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531)" and thereby recommended the dismissal of
the complaint against Escritor. Pursuant to the Freedom of Religion clause of the Constitution, the law
recognizes actions which are in accordance to religious beliefs. Escritor executed a Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness inconformity with her religion, Jehovah’s Witness. Escritor is not guilty of
immoral conduct and her conjugal agreement with Quilapio is valid.

When it comes to the exercise of the freedom of religion cases, whenever there is an restraint on the
exercise of religion, the obligation is on the state to prove that there is a valid reason on why they are
restraining such exercise.

The Court remanded the case and ordered the OSG to intervene and required to:
a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice;
b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief
and practice; and
c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's
religious freedom.

12. Estrada vs., Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006

Facts:

Estrada requested the Presiding Judge of RTC Las Piñas for an investigation of the court interpreter,
Escritor, for living with a man not her husband. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral
act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should be terminated from his employment.

Escritor on her part testified that she was already a widow and she started living with Quilapio without
the benefit of marriage, but this arrangement is in conformity with her religious sect known as Jehovah’s
Witnesses and her congregation. Thus, Escritor asserts and invoking her religious beliefs such
arrangement does not constitute immoral conduct for which she should be held administratively liable.

Issue:
Whether or not Escritor should be held administratively liable

Ruling:
No, Escritor is not administratively liable

U.S. history has produced two identifiably different, even opposing, strains of jurisprudence on the
religion clauses—

1. Standard of separation, which may take the form of either:

(a) strict separation or

(b) the tamer version of strict neutrality or separation
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

2. the benevolent neutrality or accommodation

The Strict Separationist believes that the Establishment Clause was meant to protect the state from the
church, and the state’s hostility towards religion allows no interaction between the two. While the strict
neutrality view, believes that the “wall of separation” does not require the state to be their adversary—
rather, the state must be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers. “

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government’s favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance.

In the case at bar, the OSG failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality standard. Escritor’s conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her
fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in
order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed.

The SC is clear that when it comes to conduct involving free exercise of religion clause, the
Compelling Interest Test is used.

In Compelling Interest Test, the state has to answer/satisfy the following:

a. Do the actions of the government of the state or statute create a burden on the free exercise of
religion?
b. Does the state prove that there is a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify the infringement
or abridgement of the particular right?
c. In achieving its legitimate purposes, does the state use the least intrusive means possible?

In this case, there is no compelling state interest established and the state did not prove that that is the
least intrusive means of infringing the particular right.

13. Perfecto vs. Esidera, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417, July 22, 2015.

DOCTRINE: Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within
flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.

FACTS: Perfecto, the petitioner, instituted a complaint against Judge Esidera for falsification of public
documents and dishonesty and that her wrongful act will taint the image of the judiciary. Perfecto alleged
that Esidera maintained an illicit relationship with Renato Esidera and thus produced a child. In order
that the child became legitimate, they falsified their marriage certificate. Her marriage with Tepace was
later on declared void. Judge Esidera contended that she did not participate in the accomplishment of the
birth certificate, and she had planned to correct her daughter’s birth certificate, but she and her husband
decided against it for the best interest of her daughter.

ISSUE: WON the Judge may be held administratively liable for misconduct.

RULING: NO. the Judge cannot be held liable administratively, however, she will be liable in violation
of Canons of Professional Responsibility. The non-establishment clause bars the State from establishing,
through laws and rules, moral standards according to a specific religion. Prohibitions against immorality
should be based on a purpose that is independent of religious beliefs. When it forms part of our laws,
rules, and policies, morality must be secular. Laws and rules of conduct must be based on a secular
purpose. Thus, unless respondent judge’s act of participating in a marriage ceremony according to her
religious beliefs violates other peoples’ rights or poses grave and imminent danger to the society, we
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

cannot rule that respondent judge is administratively liable for her participation in her religious marriage
ceremony. In Estrada, this court ruled that in religious freedom cases, the test of benevolent neutrality
should be applied. Under the test of benevolent neutrality, religious freedom is weighed against a
compelling state interest: Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals
and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within
flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. We find that there is no compelling state interest that may limit respondent
judge’s right to participate in religious and merely ceremonial acts that are non-violative of other people’s
rights and with no legally binding effect. The institution of marriage is not threatened when we
accommodate respondent judge’s freedom to participate in such ceremonies even if they have secular
counterparts under our laws. Therefore, Judge Esidera violated the Canons of Professional
Responsibility.