The Public Officials Bond—A Statutory Obligation

Requiring “Faithful Performance,” “Fidelity,”

and Flexibility
Jeffrey S. Price
Dennis E. McDonnell
Rebecca B. Howald

I. Introduction

This article discusses the various forms of and issues relating to

public officials bonds. This relatively generic term relates to bonds that
are issued by the public official and the surety jointly in favor of the
governmental entity that the public official serves. These bonds are
commonly required by statute and create a three-party relationship more
common in the context of surety bonds. Also frequently discussed in the
context of public officials are public employee dishonesty coverages and
similar fidelity policies. These instruments typically include the
traditional two-party relationship where the insurer issues a policy or
bond agreeing with the insured to indemnify the insured for certain
losses arising from the dishonesty or other enumerated conduct of its
employees. The distinctions in terminology and coverages are important
when considering and addressing the issues that arise upon the insured or
assured public entity’s loss arising from the conduct of a covered public
official or employee.

II. Public Officials Bond—General

A. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

A public officials bond refers to an instrument “by which a

public officer and a secondary obligor undertake to pay up to a fixed sum
of money if the officer does not faithfully discharge the duties of his or

Jeffrey S. Price is a principal and Rebecca B. Howald an associate with

Manier & Herod in Nashville, Tennessee. Dennis E. McDonnell is managing
director with Travelers in Exton, Pennsylvania.

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152 Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

her office.”1 A statutory public officials bond is thus a public officials

bond mandated by statute. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “official
bond” as “a bond given by a public officer, conditioned on the faithful
performance of the duties of office.”2 In the three-party surety structure,
the public official is the principal, the bonding company is the surety
(sometimes called the secondary obligor), and the government or, in
many cases, the public being served by the official is the obligee.

Statutory bond requirements are found within the individual state

codes.3 They are typically interspersed throughout the code, although
there is typically a “Public Officials” or “Public Office” chapter that has
the general bond requirements and procedures as well as the authority for
the issuance of such bonds. The requirements for the various individual
officials, however, are found within the specific chapter relating to their
office.4 As seen in Appendix A, there are a multitude of bonds that are
either required or authorized under the various state statutes.5

In general, bonds for public officials that are required by statute

(hereinafter, “Official Bond[s]” or “Public Officials bond[s]”) are
mandatory for all elected and most public officials. This can range from
the governor to local school board members. Statutes may require an
Official Bond for an individual public official or may allow a blanket
bond for a group of officials, such as the members of the board of

1
Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty § 71 cmt. c (1996).
2
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 171 (7th ed. 1999).
3
Although all fifty states have statutory bond requirements, there is a
statutory prohibition against requiring or obtaining surety bonds for officers or
employees of the Federal Government in carrying out their official duties. See
31 U.S.C. § 9302 (2006).
4
Included in Appendix A of this Article is a chart citing the statutory
authority for the issuance of public officials bonds. The chart is limited to the
code provision stating the over-arching requirement for public officials. Citing
every statute that either requires or authorizes the issuance of a bond for every
given public official would necessitate an appendix approaching 100 pages. For
example, in California alone, there are at least 58 code provisions either
requiring or authorizing the procurement of a bond to cover a public official or
employee. In Arkansas, there are at least 50 such provisions.
5
As this article discusses, there can be a difference in how the courts
interpret bonds that “shall be issued” and bonds that “may be issued.”

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 The Public Officials Bond 153

directors.6 Depending on the statutory language, an Official Bond may

be a “faithful performance bond,” “fidelity bond,” “public employees
blanket bond,” or “public employee dishonesty policy.” While “faithful
performance” bonds are by far the most common Official Bonds, the
others may also be statutorily required. Each of the types of bonds listed
above, whether statutory or non-statutory, are discussed herein.

B. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

“Statutory bonds” by definition, Official Bonds are required

when a statute so dictates. Often, the bond is required to be effective
before or upon the taking of the oath of office by the employee or
official. In other cases, an official bond may run indefinitely, covering
each successive employee or official as they take office. The statutes
will either mandate7 or authorize8 the procurement of a bond. If the
controlling statutory language merely “authorizes” the issuance of a
bond, that bond will only be a statutory Official Bond to the extent the
language of the bond reflects the requirements and intent of the statute.9
In Price v. Arrendale, discussed herein,10 a bond was procured by the
governmental entity to protect itself from losses caused by the
employee’s failure to perform his duties. Because the bond did not meet
the criteria set forth in the authorizing statute, it was held to be a non-

6
Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 19-4207 (2005) (excluding county
treasurer from officials that may be bonded with a blanket bond) with KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 19-4203 (2005) (stating that for county officers and employees, a
blanket bond may be purchased to cover both elected and appointed officers and
employees).
7
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-16-502 (2005) (“[T]he Auditor of
State shall execute and deliver to the Governor a bond to the State of
Arkansas . . . .”) (emphasis added).
8
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-105 (2005) (“The [Income Tax
Director] may require such of the officers, agents, and employees as he may
designate to give bond for the faithful performance of their duties . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
9
See Price v. Arrendale, 168 S.E.2d 193 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969).
10
See discussion infra Part IV.A.

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154 Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

statutory bond, not subject to the provisions of the code affecting official
bonds.11

1. What Does the Bond Protect Against?

The Public Officials bond is commonly issued to protect against

conduct or omissions by the named public official that constitutes a
breach of the public official’s duties of office. As is discussed in more
detail below, these bonds guarantee against more than the public
official’s fraud or dishonesty and, in certain cases, can cover loss arising
from neglect or omissions.

2. Who Does the Bond Protect?

A Public Officials bond may be issued for the benefit of the

governmental unit in which the principal holds office, but also it can
provide coverage to the general public.12 The Bond is “in the nature of
an Indemnity Bond rather than a Penal or Forfeiture Bond; it is, in effect,
a contract between the officer and the government, binding the officer to
discharge the duties of his or her office.”13 The Official Bond is not
intended to protect the principal or the public official himself but rather
is intended to protect the city or the entire citizenship served by the
official.14

The Official Bond indemnifies those who have suffered a loss as

a result of the official’s misconduct, and in many cases the state statute
will include a provision specifically allowing a member of the public to
bring suit against the bond, if that individual has suffered a loss resulting
from the official’s misconduct.15 To that end, while there is some

11
Id. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
12
See Hugh E. Reynolds, Jr. & James Dimos, Fidelity Bonds and the
Restatement, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1249 (Summer 1993); 63C AM. JUR. 2D
Public Officers & Employees § 130 (2005).
13
63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers & Employees § 130 (2005).
14
Id.
15
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 59-815 (2005) (“Every official bond
executed by any officer pursuant to law is in force and obligatory upon the
principal and sureties therein to and for the state of Idaho, and to and for the use
and benefit of all persons who may be injured or aggrieved by the wrongful act

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varying degree of specificity in the statutory requirements, almost all

satisfy the general purpose of requiring an official to issue a bond for the
faithful performance of his or her duties.16 An Official Bond is taken “as
assurance of compliance with the law.”17 It is designed to ensure that the
official or employee will faithfully perform his or her duties while in
office.

C. STATUTORY OFFICIALS BONDS—FIDELITY BONDS V. FAITHFUL

PERFORMANCE BONDS

Often using the word “fidelity bond” to describe a “faithful

performance” bond, the state statutes vary in their description of the
Official Bonds that are required for their state employees and public
officials.18 Although the intent almost invariably is to require a faithful
performance bond, many statutes use the term “fidelity bond.” It may be
a matter of mere semantics to legislatures drafting the statutes, but these
terms are not interchangeable.

A fidelity bond is one designed to guarantee honesty. It typically

consists of a contract “whereby one agrees, for consideration, to
indemnify another against a loss arising from the want of honesty,
integrity, or fidelity of an employee or other person holding a position of
trust.”19 Bonding companies typically define “fidelity bonds” as

or default of such officer in his official capacity, and any person so injured or
aggrieved may bring suit on such bond, in his own name, without an assignment
thereof.”).
16
Some statutes require bonds conditioned upon the fidelity or honesty
of the public official.
17
12 AM. JUR. 2D Bonds § 6 (2005).
18
See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 22259 (West 2005) (stating that, for the
State Teacher’s Retirement System, “[a]ll board members and officers and
employees of the system shall execute a fidelity bond, in an amount determined
by the board to be prudent, conditioned upon the faithful performance of the
duties of the board member or employee”).
19
35A AM. JUR. 2D Fidelity Bonds & Insurance § 1 (2005).

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156 Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

guaranteeing the honesty of employees and any losses arising from the
dishonest actions of its employees.20

Conversely, a faithful performance bond is designed to guarantee

that a public official or employee will act with honesty and/or in faithful
performance of his or her official duties.21 It can be issued as an
individual bond for a specific public official, or, if the statutes so allow,
it can come in the form of an employee blanket bond, covering all
employees of a designated office or department. Although the states
often use “fidelity bond” and “faithful performance bond”
interchangeably, there is in fact a distinction between providing fidelity
coverage and providing faithful performance coverage.

Simply put, a fidelity bond indemnifies a loss whereas a faithful

performance bond guarantees the faithful performance of duties. Faithful
performance of duties also, necessarily, includes fidelity and honesty to
the public entity. A faithful performance bond covers the same
dishonesty as a fidelity bond. In addition, it covers situations such as a
loss of funds resulting from an employee’s malfeasance, willful neglect
of duty, bad faith or negligence. The two concepts get confused because
the fidelity of a public employee is presumed by his “faithful
performance” of his official duties. In other words, a faithful
performance official bond would include coverage for dishonesty of a
public employee or official while a typical fidelity bond would only
cover losses resulting from dishonesty, and would not cover situations
involving neglect or malfeasance.

20
See CNA Surety—Glossary, http://www.cnasurety.com/resources/
glossary.htm (last visited May 19, 2006) (defining “fidelity bond”); Rupp’s
Insurance & Risk Management Glossary (2002), available at http://insurance.
cch.com/rupps/fidelity-bond.htm.
21
CNA Surety—Glossary, http://www.cnasurety.com/resources/
glossary.htm (last visited May 19, 2006) (defining “public official bonds”);
Rupp’s Insurance & Risk Management Glossary (2002), available at
http://insurance.cch.com/rupps/public-official-bond.htm (defining public official
bond as: “A surety bond that guarantees that a public official will faithfully
perform his or her official duties and honestly manage funds entrusted to them.
A law usually requires such a bond and prescribes the coverage.”).

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Some states recognize this distinction. For example, the Code of

Laws of South Carolina provides as follows:

(A) When bonding of county officials or employees is

statutorily required, the governing body of a county may
purchase a fidelity bond to cover all or a portion of the
county officials and employees. A fidelity bond may be
used instead of specific statutory bond requirements
including, but not limited to, those found in Sections 12-
39-10, 12-45-10, 14-17-40, 14-17-60, 14-17-350, 14-23-
1050, 17-5-20, 17-5-70, 22-1-150, 22-1-160, 23-11-30,
and 23-13-20. Any officials or employees not covered by
a fidelity bond must be bonded as required by statute.

(B) The purchase of a fidelity bond as provided in

subsection (A) or the replacement of an existing bond
with a fidelity bond covering one or more county
officials or employees must be evidenced by passage of
a resolution by the county’s governing body. A fidelity
bond must meet or exceed the minimum value of the
bond required by the statute or statutes for the covered
officials or employees.22

Most states are not as clear in defining the terms and standards of
care for “dishonesty” and “faithful performance” as South Carolina. For
the states that do not make the distinction so clear, a comparison of the
actual terms and conditions of a fidelity bond to the terms of a faithful
performance bond illustrates the distinction. Before tackling the policies
themselves, a brief definitional clarification is warranted.

As the mathematical adage goes, “all squares are rhombuses, but

not all rhombuses are squares.” In the context of this article, a similar
proverb might read: “all ‘faithful performance’ bonds necessarily
incorporate a dishonesty standard, but not all ‘dishonesty’ policies
necessarily incorporate ‘faithful performance.’” An issue created by this
lack of parallelism arises not in cases where an employee acts
dishonestly and the governmental entity carries a faithful performance

22
S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-11-65 (2005).

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158 Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

bond; instead, a question arises where an employee or public official acts

negligently, or is somehow hampered from performing his duties, but the
governmental entity carries only a fidelity bond. While in the first
situation the act would almost certainly be covered, in the latter case, the
employee’s act may not be covered because the employee did not act
fraudulently or dishonestly.

The ordinary meaning of the words “fraud” and “dishonesty”

refer to acts which “show a breach of trust or of financial integrity,
coupled with deceit and concealment exercised in a position of trust and
confidence and causing financial loss.”23 Couch further defines
dishonesty, in general terms, as “a want of integrity in principle; a want
of fairness and straightforwardness; a disposition to defraud, deceive, or
betray; faithlessness, or a course of conduct generally characterized in
the common speech of men as lacking in principle.”24 Faithful
performance, on the other hand, does not include the additional
requirements of deceit or concealment or want of integrity. Rather, a
lack of faithful performance simply means the failure to do one’s job—
whether intentionally or negligently.

In 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained

that an insured could recover under a faithful performance bond for the
negligent acts of an employee.25 In M.B.A.F.B. Federal Credit Union v.
Cumis Insurance Society, a credit union’s general manager recommended
a loan to the board of directors without any evidence of value of
collateral. The general manager apparently failed to check out the
collateral and directed another employee to process the loan, knowing
that it had not been approved by the credit committee. A loss resulted
and the lower court found that, based upon his acts, the general manager
had been negligent.26

23
COUCH ON INSURANCE § 46:54 (2d ed. 1982).
24
Id. (quoting Am. Sur. Co. v. Jay Lodge No. 87, F. & A.M., 196 N.E.
356 (Ind. 1935)).
25
See M.B.A.F.B. Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc., 681
F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1982).
26
Id. at 931.

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The policy covered the “direct loss of, or damage to, any
property, as defined herein, caused by the fraud or dishonesty of any of
the Insured’s employees, as herein defined, . . . or through the failure on
the part of such employee . . . to well and faithfully perform his duties.”27
Cumis argued that an employee’s failure “to well and faithfully perform
his duties” necessarily required a showing of intentional or willful
misconduct.28 The Fourth Circuit disagreed and held as follows:

The condition of an official bond, that the officer who

gives it, shall “well and truly” execute the duties of his
office, includes not only honesty, but reasonable skill
and diligence. If the duties are performed negligently
and unski[ll]fully; if they are violated from want of
capacity or want of care; they can never be said to have
been “well and truly executed.”29

Applying this reasoning, the Fourth Circuit held that a lack of faithful
performance included the negligent acts of employees in the carrying out
of their duties.30

III. Statutory Bonds—“Faithful Performance Official Bonds”

In order to understand why a municipality or a government entity

might want to purchase a fidelity bond, it is necessary to analyze the
Faithful Performance Official Bond31 as statutorily required by most
states.

Faithful Performance Official Bonds are generally written for the

benefit of the governmental unit in which the principal or employee
holds office.32 In effect, a Faithful Performance Official Bond is akin to
a surety bond because it maintains the tri-partite relationship of the
27
Id. at 932 (emphasis added).
28
Id. at 931.
29
Minor v. Mechanics’ Bank of Alexandria, 26 U.S. 46, 69 (1828).
30
Id. at 932.
31
As used in herein, “Faithful Performance Official Bond” refers to a
bond that is statutorily required (an Official Bond) and is conditioned upon the
faithful performance of the official or employee’s duties.
32
Reynolds & Dimos, supra note 12, at 1251.

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160 Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

parties. The public officer or employee is the principal, the government

entity is the obligee, and the bonding company is the surety/secondary
obligor.33

The statutes requiring the Official Bond will often use phrases
such as “the bond of each public officer required by law to give Bond
must . . . be made payable to the [State].”34 Other Official Bonds that
may be procured are those given by an employer or officer of a local
agency and will be made payable to the head of that particular local
municipality or agency.35 As seen throughout the various statutory
provisions, Official Bonds are not issued for the protection of a public
official or employee himself, but rather to protect the entity that is
employing that officer or to protect the public from any injuries caused
by the public official or employee’s acts while in office. For example,
the Tennessee Code provides as follows:

Every official bond executed under this code is

obligatory on the principal and sureties thereon:

....

(3) For the use and benefit of every person who is

injured.36

Most often is the case that an Official Bond ensures the faithful
performance of the official’s duties while in office. The standard of
“faithful performance” provides a broad range of coverage from lapses in
fidelity through ordinary negligence. The above-cited Tennessee Code
provision states in full as follows:

33
Reynolds & Dimos, supra note 12, at 1253.
34
ALA. CODE § 36-5-5 (2006). See also, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 49-12
(2006) (“Every bond required by law . . . shall be made payable to the
Commonwealth of Virginia.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 177.010 (2006) (stating that
the Secretary of State “give a bond, with sufficient sureties, to the State of
Oregon”).
35
See, e.g., TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.075 (Vernon 2006)
(treasurer of a municipality shall execute a bond “in favor of the municipality”).
36
TENN CODE ANN. § 8-19-301 (2006) (emphasis added).

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 The Public Officials Bond 161

Every official bond executed under this code is

obligatory on the principal and sureties thereon:

(1) For any breach of the condition during the time the
officer continues in office or in the discharge of any of
the duties of such office;

(2) For the faithful discharge of the duties which may be

required of such officer by any law passed subsequently
to the execution of the bond, although no such condition
is expressed therein;

(3) For the use and benefit of every person who is

injured, as well by any wrongful act committed under
color of such officer’s office as by the failure to perform,
or the improper or neglectful performance, of the duties
imposed by law.37

The motives of a public official, as far as coverage under a

Faithful Performance Official Bond is concerned, are irrelevant38 and the
liability of the surety is directly linked to the liability of the public
official it covers.39 In the case of an Official Bond, the surety and the
governmental entity are prohibited from providing for limitations and
contravention of any statutory requirements, such as limiting the statute
of limitations or limiting the extent of coverage.40 On the other hand, if
an Official Bond includes coverage in addition to that which the statute

37
Id.
38
Reynolds & Dimos, supra note 12, at 1250. However, the actions (or
inactions) of the official are requisite. Even though a public official under a
faithful performance bond may not be able to utilize his own “good faith” as a
defense, in order to recover on a claim, the public official must have done (or
not done) something in the performance of his official duties to cause an injury
or loss.
39
See McIntyre Square Assoc. v. Evans, 827 A.2d 446, 456 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2003).
40
63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers & Employees § 133 (2005).

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162 Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

requires, that additional coverage will be treated as a voluntary bond and

will be enforceable as a common-law bond.41

A. STANDARD OF CARE—“FAITHFUL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES”

In an Official Bond, “faithful performance” is what the

correlating statute defines it to be. However, as the authors of an article
published in 1997 aptly state, “[t]he statute . . . may be singularly
unhelpful.”42 For example, sometimes the statute simply requests a bond
“conditioned on the faithful performance of his or her duties.”43 On the
other hand, sometimes the statutes include further language such as “for
the faithful performance of the duties of their office and faithfully to
account for all moneys coming into their hands.”44 Other states go even
further; for example, in Iowa, the bond required for public officials must
state as follows:

That as . . . (naming the office), in . . . (city, township,

county, or state of Iowa), the officer will render a true
account of the office and of the officer’s doings therein
to the proper authority, when required thereby or by law;
that the officer will promptly pay over to the officer or
person entitled thereto all moneys which may come into
the officer’s hands by virtue of the office; that the officer

41
Id.
42
H. Bruce Shreves & Charles C. Coffee, Faithful Performance Under
Fidelity, Public Official and Statutory Bonds, III FID. L. ASSOC. J. 97, 98 (1997).
The article by Mssrs. Shreves and Coffee focuses on the subtle nuances of
interpreting the phrase “faithful performance” as undertaken by a variety of
courts. It reviews several cases analyzing a mix of statutory bonds (both public
officials bonds and other statutorily required “faithful performance” bonds), and
concludes that the only rule of thumb when it comes to the interpretation of
faithful performance in a statutory bond is to “(1) analyze the bond; (2) analyze
the statute calling for the bond’s issuance; (3) analyze any statutes governing the
conduct of the bonded official; and (4) analyze the applicable case law.” Id. at
113.
43
ALA. CODE § 36-17-1 (2005) (regarding bond for the State
Treasurer).
44
GA. CODE ANN. § 45-8-2 (2005) (regarding bond for “all collecting
officers and all officers to hold public funds”).

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 The Public Officials Bond 163

will promptly account for all balances of money

remaining in the officer’s hands at the termination of the
office; that the officer will exercise all reasonable
diligence and care in the preservation and lawful
disposal of all money, books, papers, securities, or other
property appertaining to that office, and deliver them to
the officer’s successor, or to any other person authorized
to receive the same; and that the officer will faithfully
and impartially, without fear, favor, fraud, or oppression,
discharge all duties now or hereafter required of the
office by law.45

Alternatively, the statutes can provide more insight by

specifically detailing the duties of the officer or employee, which can aid
in determining whether duties have been faithfully performed. Where
the statute does not specify the definition of “faithful performance,” the
language of the bond will control so long as the statutory intent is not
thwarted.

In its broadest and most common-sense interpretation, faithful

performance means an officer or employee has performed his or her
official duties without dishonesty, malfeasance, or negligence. As
discussed below, although the officer or employee’s motives may be
determinative with respect to coverage under a voluntary fidelity bond,
they are irrelevant for a coverage determination under an Official Bond.46
Notably, there must be an action or omission on the part of the bonded
official in order to trigger coverage. A mere loss to a governmental
entity which is in no way related to a public official’s action or omission
would not necessarily result in coverage. In other words, a loss caused
by the negligence of an employee or official—even in the case where
that official believed he was faithfully performing his duties—will be
covered by a statutory bond, but a loss that results for some reason

45
IOWA CODE § 64.2 (2006).
46
See Reynolds & Dimos, supra note 12, at 1250 (“[T]he failure to
perform faithfully the duties of an office will trigger the surety’s obligation even
though the motive was an honest one or the cause of the loss was merely
negligence or oversight.”); see also Kinzer v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 572
N.E.2d 1151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).

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164 Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

unrelated to the acts of the official will not be covered. Under a Faithful
Performance Official Bond, the official does not necessarily have to act
with intent, but she does have to act to trigger coverage.

As a result, courts have found a lack of faithful performance

when an employee fails to perform statutory duties. For example, in
Centennial School District v. Kerins,47 the school tax collector was
required to provide to his district, by the tenth of each month, the taxes
he collected in the prior month, along with a monthly accounting report
detailing these collections. Although Kerins collected taxes in each
month from August 1999 through January 2000, he did not submit to the
district the collected taxes for that period or the monthly accounting
reports for these collections until February 2000.48 Because the taxes
were not submitted, there was substantial lost interest that the district
could have earned on each monthly sum collected had each been
submitted in a timely fashion. The district sought to collect that
unearned interest from Kerins directly and from his surety, Fidelity &
Deposit Company of Maryland. The surety took the position that its
liability was limited to “situations in which there has been wrongdoing
by the collector, such as absconding with funds.”49 The district disagreed
that wrongdoing was a predicate, noting that “the purpose of obtaining a
surety bond is to ensure, and provide a financial guaranty, for the faithful
performance of the public official’s duties.”50

The statutory provision requiring the tax collector to obtain a

bond stated that the bond shall be “conditioned upon the faithful
performance of his duties as such tax collector.”51 Both the trial court
and the reviewing court agreed that “Kerins did not fulfill his statutory
obligations. He maintained possession of funds after he was required to
pay them and, by doing so, breached his fiduciary responsibility as to the

47
840 A.2d 377 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
48
Id. at 380.
49
Id. at 385.
50
Id. at 385-86.
51
Id. at 386.

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 The Public Officials Bond 165

proceeds” and, therefore, the surety should also be “financially

accountable for the collector’s breach of these duties.”52

In another case discussing statutory duties of bonded officials,

the Texas Supreme Court found that, even though certain public officials
were found to have been unconstitutionally elected, their improper acts
while operating as a de facto board of trustees created liability for the
insurer who issued their bonds. In Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v.
Concerned Taxpayers of Lee County, Inc.,53 the voters of Lee County,
Texas, authorized the formation of a hospital district and a property-tax
assessment for its support.54 The purpose of the hospital district was to
acquire a failing hospital in Lee County. Five trustees for the hospital
district were elected. The surety filed statutory public official bonds for
each of the trustees. These bonds were conditioned on the faithful
performance of duties by the trustees, in compliance with the statute
covering hospital districts.55

There were some issues regarding whether the Commissioner’s

Court of Lee County had satisfied all of the statutory prerequisites for
calling the election, and the board of trustees was put on notice that there
might have been constitutional infirmities in the election. However,
despite the warnings, the board continued to hold meetings and move
forward with plans to acquire the hospital.56 A group called Concerned
Taxpayers of Lee County brought suit to challenge the validity of the
hospital district and the authority of the trustees. In the underlying,
related suit, the trial court found as follows: (1) that the Hospital District
and its trustees were operating in violation of the Texas Constitution;
(2) that the trustees had violated the Open Meetings Act at several of
their meetings; (3) that the Hospital District was permanently enjoined
from operating; and (4) that plaintiffs were entitled to their reasonable
and necessary attorney’s fees.

52
Id.
53
829 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
54
Id. at 924.
55
Id. at 924-925.
56
Id. at 925.

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The surety then brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that

it had no liability for the judgment, which consisted of an award of
attorneys’ fees, because the trustees had not unfaithfully performed any
of their duties while they were operating as a de facto hospital district.
The Texas Supreme Court, however, did not follow the surety’s logic
and instead found as follows:

[T]he trustees acted every time they held meetings and,

therefore, had a duty to do so in the proper manner. The
final judgment in the earlier lawsuit, relied upon by all
parties to this suit, held that three of the board meetings
held by the trustees violated the Open Meetings Act,
constituting unfaithful performance of the trustees’
official duties.57

Whether the employee acted in good faith is irrelevant. For

example, in Kinzer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland,58 a
comptroller allowed non-appropriated funds to be spent on un-approved
city contracts. The surety had issued to the City of Chicago a public
employees blanket bond, in compliance with statutory mandates, which
covered “Loss sustained by the Insured [the City] through the failure of
any of the Employees, acting alone or in collusion with others, to
perform faithfully his duties or to account properly for all monies and
property received by virtue of his position or employment.”59 The
comptroller himself, although found guilty of misappropriating the funds,
was statutorily exempt from liability as to any resulting losses to the City
because, although the expenditures made by the comptroller violated the
Illinois Code, it was found that he had no reason to believe that these
expenditures were illegal.60

The surety argued that, because the comptroller was immune

from liability based on his good faith, the surety could not be liable under
the bond as the comptroller did not fail “to perform faithfully his

57
Id. at 927.
58
572 N.E.2d 1151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
59
Id. at 1152.
60
Id. at 1153.

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 The Public Officials Bond 167

duties.”61 The court, however, relied on the remaining obligation under

the bond, which provided coverage for the employee’s failure to
“account properly for all monies and property received by virtue of his
position or employment” and found that the comptroller’s good faith was
irrelevant. As the court said, “[w]e fail to perceive what [the
comptroller’s] state of mind in so doing, i.e., his ‘good faith,’ had to do
with whether he ‘properly’ accounted for funds under his control.
Therefore, insofar as the language of the contract is concerned, [the
comptroller’s] ‘good faith’ is not relevant to [the surety’s] liability under
the bond.”62

In other words, the fact that the city comptroller may have acted
in good faith when he spent public money did not absolve the insurer
from its duty to indemnify the City. The comptroller’s state of mind—
his good faith—had nothing to do with whether he “properly” accounted
for funds under his control, and nowhere did the bond predicate insurer’s
liability on comptroller’s liability. As discussed supra, the official’s
good faith was irrelevant; it was his actions that were determinative.

B. DISCOVERY AND TERMINATION UNDER AN OFFICIAL BOND

“A fidelity bond may validly limit the liability of the surety or

insurer to losses or defaults discovered within a specified period of
time.”63 Absent a provision in the statute limiting the discovery period
for a default under an Official Bond,64 the Bond language itself will
control any discovery limitations, so long as they do not thwart the
purpose and intent of the statutes themselves.65 It should be simple.
However, confusion as to the discovery element often arises in the
context of statutory bonds—especially where the Official Bond is

61
Id.
62
Id. at 1154.
63
35A AM. JUR. 2D Fidelity Bonds and Insurance § 55 (2005).
64
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134.270 (West 2005).
65
For example, in California, the statute of limitations for bringing a
cause of action on a bond of a public official is three years. See CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 338 (2006) (“Within three years . . . (e) An action upon a bond of a
public official except any cause of action based on fraud or embezzlement is not
to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party or his
or her agent, of the facts constituting the cause of action upon the bond.”).

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conditioned upon “faithful performance.” Consider the dilemma where a

public official fails to faithfully perform his official duty and undertakes
to fraudulently cover his tracks: does the discovery period begin to run
when the failure to perform occurs or when the fraud is discovered? On
the one hand, discovery would relate to the discovery of the fraud under
the theory that the fraud was concealing the failure to perform. But on
the other hand, the failure to perform violates a public official’s statutory
duty to perform and that failure is “just as great without regard to
whether it is actuated by fraud.”66

Likewise, it also appears that issues are developing in Official

Bond cases that have the following basic fact pattern: certain bonded
employees are failing to perform all of their statutory duties; however, no
losses are occurring. It is either generally known or at least suspected
that the employees are not complying with the strict letter of the law as
far as their statutory duties are concerned. After a period of time, a loss
occurs and it arises out of the same or similar conduct that was ongoing
and generally known. When did discovery occur?

Generally, courts have found that discovery in the context of

other fidelity coverages occurs when the insured discovers facts that
would cause a prudent person to conclude that a loss of the nature
covered under the policy or bond has been or will be incurred.67 In the
context of Public Officials bonds, the covered cause of loss is frequently
failure to faithfully discharge the duties of office, not fraud or dishonesty.
Therefore, discovery of the public official’s neglect prior to discovery of
his fraudulent conduct would constitute discovery, absent provisions in
the bond or statute to the contrary.68 As the public entity receives the
benefit of coverage for acts not rising to the level of dishonesty, the
public entity should also be charged with the obligation of discovering
and preventing the conduct before it rises to the level of dishonesty.

66
63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 489 (2005).
67
See e.g., Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. Pauly, 170 U.S. 133, 158 (1898);
FDIC v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 903 F.2d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1990); Kinzer,
652 N.E.2d at 28.
68
Id.

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Additionally, questions arise as to whom has to discover either

the non-statutorily-conforming conduct or the loss. In the hypothetical
fact pattern given above, if the failure to perform is generally known
among the bonded employee’s peers and/or subordinates, but not by his
or her superiors, then can the knowledge of the subordinates be imputed
to the party making the claim under the bond for discovery purposes?
Or, does discovery of a failure to perform have to occur by a person with
authority over the bonded employee for the discovery provision to be
triggered?

Many fidelity policies and bonds contain provisions that address

who must discover conduct in order for the insured to discover the loss.
Cases discussing these provisions and addressing policies that do not
address this issue have found that the relevant facts evidencing actual
misconduct must become known to a “key” employee.69 Since
governmental entities, like private companies, can only act through their
employees, the title and duties of the person or persons discovering the
misconduct is critical to this analysis. The Illinois Appellate Court in
Kinzer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland looked at the general law
of agency to determine whether the public entity had “discovered” the
conduct at issue. The court concluded that the municipality is charged
with knowledge obtained by its “key” agents/employees that is acquired
within the scope of the agent’s/employee’s authority.70

Official Bonds will be interpreted according to their plain

language, subject to any limitations or expansions contained in the
governing statutes.71 Although public insureds or obligees may argue
that the public policy requiring the bond dictates that any limitations on
coverage be viewed with disfavor, courts have disagreed on issues
relating to discovery and have concluded that the public entity is
obligated to take actions to discover and prevent the continuation of
misconduct of the bonded employees.72

69
Kinzer v. Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y., 652 N.E.2d at 29.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 27-28.
72
See, e.g., id. at 27.

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As for an Official Bond providing blanket coverage, some states

will provide specific guidelines as to the discovery and/or termination
period for a blanket Official Bond;73 otherwise, the terms of the bond
itself will determine what discovery issues or termination requirements
are in place. For example, the Official Bond form for notaries in the
state of New Mexico states that the notary “shall faithfully discharge the
duties of the office of Notary Public of the State of New Mexico from the
date of his appointment until the expiration of his commission,” at which
point the bond obligation will become void.74

The key point regarding statutory Faithful Performance Official

Bonds is to focus first on the statutory language and then on the language
of the bond. So long as the statutory requirements are met, the bond may
set its own discovery and termination provisions. Failing to review not
only the provision requiring or authorizing the Official Bond, but also the
provisions of the state code affecting all official bonds for that state is the
proverbial “trap for the unwary.” There may be restrictions on discovery
and termination found elsewhere in a given code.

IV. Other Public Officials Bonds—Blanket Bonds and

Fidelity Bonds

There are other public officials bonds that may or may not be
statutorily mandated. The primary substantive difference between the
statutory Official Bonds and the non-statutory bonds is that the non-
statutory bond will not be bound by any statutory terms. It is an obvious
outcome, but worth mentioning because, as discussed herein, the statutes
controlling Official Bonds will affect how that bond is interpreted. There
are two basic categories of “non-faithful performance” bonds: one is a
public employees blanket bond75 and the other is public employee

73
See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27:1 (2005) (regarding bonds for
county officials, “[b]lanket bonds obtained under this section shall provide for at
least a 2 year discovery period from and after the date of termination of
coverage thereunder”).
74
See New Mexico Notary Public Bond and Oath of Office Sample
Form, http://bondforms.surety.org (last visited May 22, 2006).
75
Note that blanket bonds may be statutorily authorized and therefore
may fall under the purview and restrictions of an Official Bond. When dealing

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dishonesty coverage. Before discussing these “other” bonds, a brief look

at the parties to the bonds is warranted.

A. THE PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT

Aside from looking directly at the statutory language,

determining who are the parties to a given bond or contract can be the
key to ascertaining whether a bond is a statutory or a common-law bond.
Statutory bonds, as discussed above, are typically in a true suretyship, tri-
partite arrangement. They name the public official or employee as the
principal, the governmental entity as the obligee, and the bonding
company as the obligor. Non-statutory bonds, however, are more likely
to be two-party indemnification agreements (often referred to as “fidelity
bonds” or “fidelity policies”) where the governmental entity is the
insured.

For example, in the case of Price v. Arrendale,76 a Georgia

prison inmate sustained an injury as result of an allegedly negligent
operation performed by a physician employed by the Board of
Corrections. The Board of Corrections had procured a public employees
blanket bond indemnifying the Board of Corrections for “Loss caused to
the insured through the failure of any of the employees, acting alone or in
collusion with others, to perform faithfully his duties and to account
properly for all monies and property received by virtue of his position or
employment during the bond period.” 77 The inmate claimed the bond
was a statutory bond required by the Georgia Code section, which
provided in general that, while the chief custodial officer of penal
institutions shall execute a bond to truly and faithfully discharge his
duties, the Board of Corrections may require officials and employees,
such as a prison medical officer, to also give bond.78 If the inmate was
correct that the bond in question was a statutory bond, then he would
have the right as an “injured party” to bring suit on that bond, by virtue
of the Georgia statute.

with these bonds, looking at the statutes that govern the official or employee
involved is imperative. See generally, Shreves & Coffee, supra note 42.
76
168 S.E.2d 193 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969).
77
Id. at 195.
78
Id.

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172 Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

However, the court held that the public employees blanket bond
in this case was not a statutory bond because the bond provided for
indemnification to the Board for any loss caused by the failure of an
employee to faithfully perform his duties. It was a bond “in the nature of
a policy of fidelity insurance insuring only the Board and the Prison
Industries Administration for loss caused to the insured through acts of
the employees.”79 Thus, even though a statute did authorize the Board to
require its employees to post a bond, in this case, it was not the employee
himself that posted the bond and, therefore, the bond was not a “statutory
bond” subject to recovery by injured third parties.

B. THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES BLANKET BOND

Although some Public Employees Blanket Bonds may be

authorized by statute,80 and therefore put into the class of Official Bonds,
subject to all other statutes governing such bonds, “more often they are
chosen to provide prudent protection to secure the governmental
entity.”81 They are purchased by the governmental entity to protect the
governmental entity. They do not protect the public or any other third
party from the acts of public officials or employees. Whether a Public
Employees Blanket Bond operates as a surety bond or as an indemnity
agreement will depend upon the parties to the bond, language of the
bond, the “nature of the coverage,”82 and the precedent of the
jurisdiction. The language of the bond must be analyzed to determine
whether the insurer has assumed any liability for the public employee’s
acts (not a surety arrangement) or whether the primary obligation
remains with the covered employee (a surety arrangement).83 So long as
the bond clearly provides that “it is the principal obligor [the official or

79
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
80
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 38.09 (2005) (“The board of county
commissioners of any county may accept a blanket surety bond issued by a
solvent surety company authorized to do business in this state, conditioned upon
the faithful performance of the duties of the deputy sheriffs appointed by a
sheriff, in a sum to be fixed by the board of county commissioners. If such a
blanket surety bond is accepted, individual surety bonds for each deputy sheriff
are not necessary.”).
81
Reynolds & Dimos, supra note 12, at 1252.
82
Id. at 1254.
83
Id.

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 The Public Officials Bond 173

employee] who ought to perform the underlying obligation or bear the

cost of performance,”84 then the surety bond relationship between the
parties will be maintained.85 Succinctly put, “unless the statute or text of
the bond makes the employee whose act causes the loss the functional
equivalent of an ‘additional insured,’ . . . the surety relationship
remains.”86

As demonstrated by the cases below, a lengthy academic debate

could be had on the “surety versus indemnity” argument.87 In a sense,
the Public Employees Blanket Bond melds the worlds of suretyship and
indemnification. Sometimes these bonds are structured like a surety
bond, with three-party relationships, but are interpreted and applied as
contracts of indemnity. If the bond is issued to protect the government
from losses for which the officer is not liable, then it is not a contract of
surety.88 But if an employee or officer voluntarily purchases a bond89 to
protect the governmental entity that is his employer or the public from
losses due to his acts in public office, the surety on the bond is “primarily
an indemnitor, though to the extent that [it] is liable for defaults for
which the officer can be held,” the surety on the bond is a surety.90 In
other words, “the employee, whether dishonest or negligent, still has the
primary obligation and, hence, the carrier is truly a secondary
obligor . . . . The secondary obligation is assumed solely for purposes of
indemnifying the obligee or third parties against damage.”91

84
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY § 1 (1996).
85
Reynolds & Dimos, supra note 12, at 1255.
86
Id. at 1256.
87
See also 13 AM. JUR. Proof Of Facts 3d § 2 (2005) (discussing
whether a “fidelity bond” is a contract of suretyship or a form of insurance).
88
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF SECURITY § 170 cmt. a (1941).
89
Often, the public official will be reimbursed by the governmental
entity for the cost of purchasing or maintaining a bond. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §
113.04 (2005) (“When any state officer or employee is required by statute or by
the head of any state department to secure and give a fidelity bond, the premium
therefor shall be paid from the necessary and regular expense account of the
department to which such officer or employee shall be attached.”).
90
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF SECURITY § 170 cmt. a (1941).
91
Reynolds & Dimos, supra note 12, at 1255.

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174 Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

In First Virginia Bank-Colonial v. Baker,92 the Virginia Supreme

Court held that a statutory Public Employees Blanket Bond was not a
surety bond, but instead an indemnity bond.93 The case involved a bank
that filed suit against the clerk of the circuit court and her surety
company because a recording clerk had improperly indexed a lien on a
property. The bank made a loan secured by that property without
knowledge of the existence of this improperly indexed lien and
eventually had to pay off the subject lien when it foreclosed on the
property.

The Public Employees Blanket Bond in this case named the clerk
as the “insured,” the county and state as the “obligee,” and the insurer as
“surety.” The bond provided that “[t]he Surety . . . agrees . . . to
indemnify the Obligee for the use and benefit of the Insured for . . . [l]oss
caused to the Insured through the failure of any of the Employees . . . to
perform faithfully his duties . . . .”94 In other words, the bond was not
intended to be a faithful performance bond on the part of the public
official herself, but rather a bond indemnifying the official for any loss
caused by her non-statutorily bonded employees. The court
distinguished this agreement from a surety bond, which (1) allows an
injured third party to bring a direct cause of action against the surety and
(2) obligates the surety to “perform the obligation in the event that the
principal obligor fails to perform.”95 An indemnity agreement, on the
other hand, “is a bilateral agreement between an indemnitor and an
indemnitee in which the indemnitor promises to reimburse his
indemnitee for loss suffered or to save him harmless from liability.”96
Finding the Public Employees Blanket Bond to be a contract of
indemnity, the court determined that the third-party bank had no direct
right of action against the surety on the bond.

In another case, City of Burlington v. Western Surety Co.,97 the

city had obtained a non-statutory blanket bond covering “[l]oss caused to

92
301 S.E.2d 8 (Va. 1983).
93
Id. at 11.
94
Id. at 10-11.
95
Id. at 11.
96
Id.
97
599 N.W.2d 469 (Iowa 1999).

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 The Public Officials Bond 175

the Insured through the failure of any of the Employees . . . to perform

faithfully his duties or to account properly for all monies and property
received by virtue of his position or employment during the Bond
Period.”98 During the bond period, the master key to all the school
buildings in the district was lost. The fire department was responsible
for keeping the master key, but it somehow became misplaced. The city
undertook replacing all the locks to the school buildings and then
submitted a claim to its insurer under the bond for the cost of the
replacements.99

Turning to a brief discussion of the “nature of a fidelity bond,”

the court first stated that “purpose of a [public employees blanket bond]
is to guarantee the honesty and faithful performance of the insured’s
employees by protecting the employer/insured against loss.”100 In a
helpful explanation, the court distinguished fidelity bonds from liability
policies as follows:

A liability policy protects the insured against claims

brought by third parties who have been injured by the
insured’s conduct. The liability insurer essentially
reimburses its insured for any liability it may have to the
third party by paying the third party on the insured’s
behalf and benefit. In contrasting liability insurance
with a fidelity bond, it is helpful to note that in the
liability context, the insured’s loss is indirect; it is a third
party who directly suffers the loss.101

After analyzing the facts of the case, the court found for the
insurer, holding that the “loss” resulting from the disappearance of the
master key was that of the school district, not the city.102 Following the
“well-established rules in interpreting insurance policies,” the court read
the public employees blanket bond to provide coverage to the insured,

98
Id. at 471.
99
Id. at 470.
100
Id. at 471.
101
Id. at 471 (citing ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES,
HOLMES’S APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 3.3 (2d ed. (1996)).
102
City of Burlington, 599 N.W.2d at 472.

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176 Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

the City of Burlington. It then determined that the school district was the
owner of the buildings and therefore the only party responsible for
replacing the locks and the only party against whom a claim could be
brought in the event of a loss related to the missing key. According to
the court, the fact that the city voluntarily stepped forward to pay the cost
of replacing the locks did not change the fundamental fact that the city
did not suffer any loss, as that term was intended in the bond.103

C. THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DISHONESTY POLICY

A more limited form of coverage for the acts of employees is the

Public Employee Dishonesty Policy. This policy typically provides
coverage to “governmental entities and subdivisions, such as cities,
counties, states, fire districts, transit authorities, public hospitals, public
educational institutions, and boards of education”104 for the “for loss of,
and loss from damage to, money, securities and property other than
money and securities caused directly by employee dishonesty.”105 These
true “fidelity bonds” may be statutorily required.106

The Public Employee Dishonesty Policy is all but identical to the

Form A Coverage found in the Commercial Crime Policy but has a few
additional provisions. The standard of care for recovery of a loss under a
Public Employee Dishonesty Policy requires an employee to have acted
with manifest intent and does not provide any coverage for negligent
acts.

103
Id.
104
Rupp’s Insurance & Risk Management Glossary (2002), available
at http://insurance.cch.com/rupps/public-employee-dishonesty-coverage-form-
blanket.htm (defining “public employee dishonesty coverage form (blanket)”).
105
Rupp’s Insurance & Risk Management Glossary (2002), available
at http://insurance.cch.com/rupps/employee-dishonesty-coverage-form.htm (last
visited May 23, 2006) (defining “employee dishonesty coverage form”).
106
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-16-11 (2005) (stating that county
officers must obtain a general fidelity bond or theft or crime insurance “before
the county officials, except the county treasurer, may discharge the duties of
their respective offices”).

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1. The Parties

Public Employee Dishonesty Policies are typically two-party

contracts. They are between the governmental agency, as the insured,
and the insurance carrier. If “written for profit,” these bonds
guaranteeing the fidelity of officers and employees will be construed as
contracts of insurance.107

2. Form O and Form P of the Commercial Crime Policy

Sample forms of the standard Public Employee Dishonesty

Policy are Form O (per loss) and Form P (per employee)108 of the
Commercial Crime Policy (“CCP”). Both Form O and Form P (together
referred to herein as “Form O/P”) are identical to Form A of the CCP,
but include a few additional exclusions, conditions, and definitions that
relate to public office. Excluded under Form O/P are bonded employees
(those public officials or employees required by law to be individually
bonded), treasurers, tax collectors, and any damages resulting from an
employee depriving another person of his civil rights or engaging in
tortious conduct. Another difference in the Public Employee Dishonesty
Policy is that it is written for the sole benefit of the insured, i.e. the
governmental entity. Whereas some statutory Official Bonds inure to the
benefit of any injured party, the Public Employee Dishonesty Policy
ensures that no third parties may bring a cause of action against the
insurer.

3. “Manifest Intent” as the Standard of Care

The other striking difference between a Public Employee

Dishonesty Policy and a faithful performance bond is the standard of
care. In a faithful performance bond, mere negligence on the part of the
bonded employee that results in a loss will be enough to trigger
coverage, whereas under a Public Employee Dishonesty Policy, there
must be “manifest intent” to cause the governmental entity a loss and
also for the employee or a person intended by the employee to obtain a

107
63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers & Employees § 132 (2005).
108
Attached hereto as Appendix B is a copy of Form O (CR 00 16
(10/90)) and Form P (CR 001 17 (10/90)).

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financial benefit.109 While dishonesty and theft are inherently covered in

faithful performance standard of most Official Bonds, the Public
Employee Dishonesty Policy only covers an employee’s dishonest acts
committed with requisite level of “manifest intent.”

Development of the “manifest intent” standard deserves its own

dissertation,110 but on its most rudimentary level, the standard requires
more than mere negligence. The courts are diverse in their opinions on
whether manifest intent should be measured by “specific intent,”
“general intent,” or by a “purely objective” standard.111 Suffice it to say,
when determining coverage under a Public Employee Dishonesty Policy,
the jurisdictional adaptation of the “manifest intent” standard must be
well researched.

4. Codes and Cases

Arkansas Code

Interestingly, at least one state has drafted statutory provisions

that provide for the procurement of a “self-insured fidelity bond” to stand
in the place of any statutorily required public officials bond. The
Arkansas code includes a chapter entitled “Self-Insured Fidelity Bond
Program,”112 which was created because “considerable savings might be
effected by the establishment of a self-insured fidelity bond program for
state officials and employees, county officials and employees, municipal
officials and employees, and school district officials and employees.”113

The program was specifically created and designed “to establish

a governmental bonding board to develop a self-insured fidelity bond
program for those officials and employees.”114 Any of the public
officers, officials, and employees participating in Arkansas’s Self-
109
See Appendix B (definition of “Employee Dishonesty”).
110
See THE “MANIFEST INTENT” HANDBOOK (Samuel J. Arena, Jr. et al.
eds., 2002); Michael Keeley, Employee Dishonesty Claims: Discerning the
Employee’s Manifest Intent, 30 TORT & INS. L. J. 915 (Summer 1995).
111
THE “MANIFEST INTENT” HANDBOOK, supra note 110, at 15.
112
ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-2-701, et seq. (2006).
113
Id. § 21-2-701(b).
114
Id. § 21-2-701(c).

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 The Public Officials Bond 179

Insured Fidelity Bond Program may procure a fidelity bond “in lieu of all
statutorily required bonds.”115 The scope of coverage under this program
parallels that of Form O/P, covering “actual losses sustained by a
participating governmental entity through any fraudulent or dishonest act
or acts committed by any official or employee of the participating
governmental entity”;116 excluding coverage for civil rights violations
and losses resulting from an employee’s tortious conduct;117 and limiting
recovery to the governmental entity only, not third parties.118 Notably,
the Arkansas program does not specify a “manifest intent” standard of
care as is set forth in Form O/P coverage.

City of Concordia v. Am. States Insurance

There are only a few cases addressing the scope of coverage

under Public Employee Dishonesty Policies. The most recent case
discussing coverage under Form O/P of the CCP is City of Concordia v.
American States Insurance Co.,119 an unpublished opinion from the
Kansas Court of Appeals. The case involved the issue of whether the
term “individually bonded” as used in the exclusion language of Form
O/P of the commercial crime policy for losses caused by city employees
was ambiguous such that the city manager, who was required by
ordinance to be bonded, was covered under policy. Specifically, in
Kansas, no statute required that the city manager be bonded with an
individual bond versus a blanket bond, so the question was whether the
language of the policy could be reconciled with the language of the
statutes.120

The City of Concordia applied for a CCP to cover all city

employees. The applications for the policy required the city to list all
officers, officials, and employees to which the insurance would apply.
Notably, the application included the following statement: “Note:
Persons required by law to be individually bonded and treasurers or tax

115
Id. § 21-2-703.
116
Id. § 21-2-704(a).
117
Id. § 21-2-704(d).
118
Id. § 21-2-704(e).
119
No. 89,200, 2003 WL 21948009 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003).
120
Id. at *2.

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180 Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

collectors by whatever title known are automatically excluded from

coverage under Coverage Forms O and P.”121 This warning referred to
exclusion 1(c) of Form O/P, which states as follows: “1. Additional
Exclusions: We will not pay for loss or damages as specified below . . .
c. Bonded Employee: loss caused by any ‘employee’ required by law to
be individually bonded.”122 Under the Kansas statutes, “The [city]
manager shall receive a salary to be fixed by the commission and shall
give bond for the faithful performance of his or her duties in such
amount as may be provided by ordinance.”123 The corresponding city
ordinance regarding the city manager’s bond states as follows:

The city manager shall, before entering upon the duties

of his office, give a good and sufficient bond to the city,
duly approved, conditioned upon the faithful
performance and discharge of his duties, and to properly
account for all public monies coming into his hands.
Such bond shall be in the amount of five thousand
dollars ($5,000.00).124

Neither the state statute nor the city ordinance required that the
city manager’s bond be an individual bond, nor did either prohibit the
city manager’s bond from being included as part of a blanket bond. The
city argued, therefore, that the policy exclusion did not apply because the
city listed the city manager as one of the covered employees under the
policy. The insurer, however argued that the Kansas statutes, taken as a
whole, demonstrate that “when a city official is required to give bond, it
is implied that it should be an individual or separate bond unless a
blanket bond is expressly permitted.”125

The court reviewed the construction of similar Kansas statutes

and ultimately determined that the Kansas legislature could have
121
Id. at *1.
122
Id.
123
Id. at *4 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1013).
124
City of Concordia, 2003 WL 21948009 at *4-5 (quoting
CONCORDIA, KAN., ORDINANCE 2-54).
125
Id. at *5 (citing several Kansas statutes with provisions that
expressly authorize a blanket bond to cover a specific individual officer or
employee).

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 The Public Officials Bond 181

included a restriction against blanket bonding for a city manager, if it had

so desired.126 Therefore, the court ruled that (1) the city manager was
required to give bond; (2) the city disclosed that the manager was to be
included in the CCP issued by the insurer; (3) the insurer did not object
or raise the exclusion when it issued the policy; (4) that the policy
language regarding the term “individually bonded” was ambiguous;
(5) the definition relied upon by the city (i.e., that the city manager’s
bond could be part of a blanket bond) was reasonable; and (6) ”[t]he
insurer has the obligation to protect itself from possible misinterpretation
by careful drafting of its own policy exclusion language.”127 As with any
other common law policy of insurance, the court analyzed the language
of the policy and compared it to the legislative intent surrounding official
bonds.

What is truly curious about this opinion is that the CCP does not
include “faithful performance” as a condition of or endorsement to the
policy. In other words, the court found that the city manager could not
be excluded from coverage under the policy, but in another case with a
different set of facts, one questions whether the CCP would meet the
statutory requirement that the city manager give a bond conditioned upon
the faithful performance of his duties. The facts do not make clear
whether the city manager was covered under any bond or policy other
than the CCP in question. If another Official Bond had been procured to
cover his faithful performance of duties, it is unclear why the city did not
seek recovery under that bond. This case addressed whether the term
“individually bonded” meant that the city manager had to have his own
individual bond and was therefore excluded from the Form O coverage,
not whether the blanket CCP actually met the statutory requirement that
the official give a faithful performance bond. If nothing else, this case
demonstrates the cloud of confusion that hangs over these “similar, but
different” bonds and policies.

126
Id.
127
Id.

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182 Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

Meeker County v. North River Insurance128

Some governmental entities meet the statutory Official Bond

requirements by purchasing a “hybrid” CCP—one that maintains
traditional public employee dishonesty coverage, as described in Form
O/P, but also carries “Faithful Performance” endorsement to meet the
statutory requirements for Official Bonds as to certain officers and
employees. One case involving such a policy is Meeker County v. North
River Insurance. In Meeker, in order to satisfy statutory requirements for
the bonding of public officials, Meeker County purchased a CCP which
included coverage for “Public Employee Dishonesty” and also included
an endorsement, labeled “Faithful Performance of Duty,” that
specifically amended the “Public Employee Dishonesty” coverage.129
The endorsement specifically provided as follows:

1. The following is added as a Covered Cause of Loss:

Failure of any “employee” to faithfully perform his or

her duties as prescribed by law, when such failure has as
its direct and immediate result a loss of your Covered
Property, including inability to faithfully perform those
duties because of a criminal act committed by a person
other than an “employee”.130

Notably, for the purposes of this case, the endorsement to the CCP also
contained an exclusion that stated as follows:

2. The following exclusion is added:

Depository Failure: loss resulting from the failure of any

entity acting as a depository for your property or
property for which you are responsible.131

128
2001 WL 1636245 (D. Minn. 2001).
129
Id. at *1.
130
Id.
131
Id.

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 The Public Officials Bond 183

During the policy term, the county treasurer purchased two

certificates of deposit from a single bank, the total amount of the
certificates being approximately $190,000. The bank failed and was
ultimately placed in receivership by the Comptroller of Currency.132 The
FDIC reimbursed to the county a total of $100,000 on the certificates,
leaving a $90,000 loss. The county sought recovery under the CCP and
its faithful performance endorsement for the total loss, arguing that its
loss was the result of the county treasurer’s failure to faithfully perform
her duties as prescribed by law because the treasurer failed to ensure that
all county funds were fully insured by the FDIC.133 The insurer denied
the claim based on the exclusion stated in the policy endorsement,
asserting that the failed bank was the depository for the county’s
property and therefore any loss resulting from the bank’s failure was
excluded.

The court first set out the standards for the interpretation of an
insurance contract and determined that no ambiguities existed in the
language of the policy or the endorsement. Agreeing with the insurer,
the court found that the exclusion was “clear and unambiguous and must
be given effect.”134 Thus, although the court found that the actions of the
treasurer “certainly [fell] within the purview of the ‘Faithful
Performance’ endorsement,”135 the exclusionary language was also
applicable and, in this case, controlled the outcome.

Fournier v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.136

In another “hybrid” CCP case, a plaintiff tested the

enforceability of the Form O/P exclusion for civil rights violations and
also the condition that the CCP be for the sole benefit of the
governmental entity. The case involved alleged improper employment
decisions by the county sheriff, who was covered under the county’s
blanket CCP for public employee dishonesty. The CCP in question

132
Id.
133
Id. at *2.
134
Id. at *3.
135
Id.
136
862 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ga. 1994).

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184 Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

contained a “faithful performance” endorsement expanding coverage for

loss caused by the following:

Failure of any “employee” to faithfully perform his or

her duties as prescribed by law, when such failure has as
its direct and immediate result a loss of [the insured’s]
Covered Property, including the inability to faithfully
perform those duties because of a criminal act
committed by a person other than an “employee”.137

The plaintiff(s) alleged that the county sheriff transferred and

reassigned plaintiffs to different job duties, in violation of their civil
rights. Hartford asserted that the CCP excluded coverage for civil rights
violations and did not allow the plaintiffs, who were not named insureds,
to bring a direct action against the insurer.138 Interestingly, Hartford also
raised the issue that the sheriff was excluded as an employee “required
by law to be individually bonded”—the same argument raised in the City
of Concordia case discussed infra.139 In a footnote, the court stated as
follows:

Hartford also argues that another policy provision

excludes coverage for employees who are required to
have an individual bond by state law and that, pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 15-16-5, Sheriff Bell was required to have
such a bond. Although it is not clear from the record, it
appears that the policy at issue may have been intended
to fulfill Sheriff Bell’s statutory bond requirement. Thus,
Hartford’s argument with regard to this exclusion seems
strained. The Court need not address the argument,
however, as it concludes that either of the other policy
provisions relied upon by Hartford bars plaintiffs from
maintaining this action against Hartford directly.140

137
Id. at 360.
138
Id. at 361.
139
See infra text and accompanying notes 121-29.
140
Fournier, 862 F. Supp. at 361 n.2.

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 The Public Officials Bond 185

The crux of the plaintiffs’ argument for coverage involved their

interpretation that the sheriff was not an “employee” as that term is used
in the policy’s exclusion provision. In making their argument, plaintiffs
relied upon the definition of “employee” in the policy, which provides
that the County Commission must “direct and control” the activities of
an individual in order for that individual to be an “employee” of the
insured. The plaintiffs attempted to argue that the sheriff was an elected
official, not subject to the direction and control of the County
Commission and therefore not an “employee” contemplated by the civil
rights exclusion.141 Hartford responded that, if the sheriff is not an
“employee,” he would not be covered by the CCP in the first place.
Agreeing with the response of Hartford, the court aptly noted:
“Essentially, plaintiffs argue that Sheriff Bell is an ‘employee’ for
purposes of determining coverage under the policy but he is not an
‘employee’ for purposes of construing the exclusion for civil rights
violations by employees. Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways.”142

As for the “sole benefit” condition of the policy, the court simply
reasoned as follows:

[P]laintiffs argue that they should be able to sue [the

sheriff’s] insurer directly for damages allegedly caused
by [the sheriff]. Plaintiffs’ brief is, however, void of any
authority to support the proposition that an injured party
has a right to maintain suit against an insurance company
for the alleged misconduct of an individual covered by
an insurance policy. In absence of any authority to
support plaintiffs’ arguments, the Court cannot conclude
that the policy provision at issue contravenes the public
policy of the state of Georgia.143

As a result, the civil rights exclusion and the sole benefit

condition of Form O/P of the CCP have been upheld as valid and
enforceable.

141
Id. at 361-62.
142
Id. at 362.
143
Id.

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186 Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

D. TERMINATION OF COVERAGE

The period of coverage under a CCP is set by the policy itself.

Generally, there are no statutory provisions that would affect the
language of the policy, although it is conceivable that a “hybrid” policy
that contains a faithful performance endorsement may be subject to
statutory conditions, if that endorsement is meant to stand as a public
officer or employee’s Official Bond. Also, there are some statutes
specifically requiring the procurement of a “fidelity bond” covering theft
and dishonesty of a public official. In such cases, termination will
depend on the applicable statutory provisions.

An important contrast between Official Bonds and Public

Employee Dishonesty Policies is that while the Official Bond has a
termination standard that is usually tied to the official’s term in office, a
Public Employee Dishonesty Policy has a much more specific
termination clause. Cancellation of a coverage as to any employee
covered under the Public Employee Dishonesty Policy will occur
immediately upon discovery by the governmental entity or by any
“official or employee authorized to manage, govern or control [the
insured’s] employees” of any dishonest act committed by that employee
“whether before or after becoming employed” by the insured.144 The
discovery is specifically tied to the dishonest acts of the covered
employee and termination of coverage is automatic. The standard for
termination of a Public Employee Dishonesty Policy as to a given
employee is higher than that for an Official Bond, but the penalty is
harsher.

V. Commonality of Policies and Claims

Official Bonds and Public Employee Dishonesty Policies are

exceedingly common. Public officials are either required by statute or by
their supervising governmental entity to obtain a bond as a condition of
their holding office. For officials and employees that are not statutorily
required to give bond, their supervising office would be remiss, if not
foolish, not to carry some protection for the acts of the their employees.
Many insurers offer insight into the kinds of public official policies that

144
Form O/P, “Additional Conditions,” attached hereto as Appendix B.

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 The Public Officials Bond 187

are available and what level of coverage a given municipality or entity

might need.145

VI. Conclusion

Unfortunately, there is no strict uniformity in the kinds of bonds

that are statutorily required for public officials. No mnemonic adage or
term of art can be applied. Predominantly, most bonds required of a
public official are conditioned upon his or her “faithful performance” of
his duties; however, a statute may also require a bond specifically
ensuring the fidelity of its public officials. Regardless of the kind of
bond that is statutorily required, the effect of the provision remains the
same—all statutes relating to the official bond must be considered.
Where a non-statutory or voluntary bond will be interpreted by its terms
and conditions, a statutory bond will have the additional oversight of the
provisions affecting its issuance.

Municipalities and other governmental entities are faced with

many options when it comes to protecting the public and themselves
from the acts of its public officials and employees. Where a statute
controls, the type of bond to be procured should be obvious. However,
bonding companies may offer policies that go above and beyond the
statutory requirements, or, in some cases, may fall short of those
requirements. Whether issuing the policy or purchasing a bond,
familiarity with the state code and what statutory provisions are required
cannot be over-emphasized. Both the bonding companies and the
governmental entities must be clear about who are the parties to the bond
and what obligations, whether statutory or not, are covered.

145
For a good example of a Q&A brochure offered to municipalities,
see LMCIT Risk Management Information, available at http://www.lmnc.org/
pdfs/Bond.pdf (last visited May 24, 2006).

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 APPENDIX A
188

SURVEY OF GENERAL STATE LAWS REGARDING OFFICIAL BONDS146

STATE: CITATION: TITLE/CHAPTER: CHAPTER/SUB-

CHAPTER/PART:
ALABAMA ALA. CODE §§ 36-5-1, et Public Officers and Official Bonds
seq. Employees
ALASKA ALASKA STAT. § 39.05.050 Public Officers and Qualifications, Appointment and
Employees Tenure: Surety Bonds
ALASKA ALASKA STAT. Public Officers and Official Bonds
§§ 39.15.010, et seq. Employees
ARIZONA ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Public Officers and Qualification and Tenure:
§§ 38-251, et seq. Employees Official Bond

www.fidelitylaw.org
ARKANSAS ARK. CODE ANN. Public Officers and Commission, Oath and Bond
§ 21-2-101, et seq. Employees

146
This Appendix provides only the general statutes that govern official bonds for the listed state. Every state has
specific statutes (in some cases voluminous in number) authorizing and setting the terms for the officers or employees that
Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

are required to give an “official” bond. These would include state-level officers and employees as well as county and
municipal workers. This Appendix is only meant to direct users to the general provisions governing the broad category of
official bonds.
 APPENDIX A

STATE: CITATION: TITLE/CHAPTER: CHAPTER/SUB-

CHAPTER/PART:
ARKANSAS ARK. CODE ANN. Public Officers and Commission, Oath and Bond—
§ 21-2-701, et seq. Employees Self-Insured Fidelity Bond
Program
CALIFORNIA CAL. GOV’T CODE Gov’t Code—General Official Bonds
§§ 1450 TO 1653 Public Officers and
Employees
CALIFORNIA CAL. GOV’T CODE Gov’t Code—Gov’t of Officers Generally – Bonds
§ 24150, et seq. Counties Officers
COLORADO COLO. REV. STAT. Government—State Official Bonds
§ 24-13-101, et seq.

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The Public Officials Bond

COLORADO COLO. REV. STAT. Government—County County Officers—Bonds of

§ 30-10-110 Officers
189
 APPENDIX A
190

STATE: CITATION: TITLE/CHAPTER: CHAPTER/SUB-

CHAPTER/PART:
CONNECTICUT CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-20 Management of State State Appointive Officers
Agencies
DELAWARE147 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, State Government Public Officers and Employees
§ 5107 Cancellation of Bond on
Expiration of Term
DELAWARE DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, Insurance Code Insurance for Protection of State
§ 6543 Self-Insured Fidelity Bond
FLORIDA FLA. STAT. § 113.01, et seq. Public Officers, Commissions
Employees and Records

www.fidelitylaw.org
GEORGIA GA. CODE ANN. § 45-4-1, Public Officers and Official Bonds
et seq. Employees

147
DELAWARE—no general provisions regarding public official’s bonds, although an official bond may be
required for a given office.
Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006
 APPENDIX A

STATE: CITATION: TITLE/CHAPTER: CHAPTER/SUB-

CHAPTER/PART:
HAWAII148
IDAHO IDAHO CODE ANN. 59-801, Public Officers in Bonds of Officers and Public
et seq. General Employees
ILLINOIS 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. Government—General Official Bond Act
260/0.01, et seq. Provisions
ILLINOIS 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. Government—General Holdover Official Bond Act
265/0.01, et seq. Provisions
ILLINOIS 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. Government—General Official Bond Payment Act
270/0.01, et seq. Provisions

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The Public Officials Bond

IOWA IOWA CODE § 64.1, et seq. Elections and Official Public Officers and Employees
Duties Official and Private Bonds

148
HAWAII—no general provisions regarding public official’s bonds, although an official bond may be required for
a given office.
191
 APPENDIX A
192

STATE: CITATION: TITLE/CHAPTER: CHAPTER/SUB-

CHAPTER/PART:
KANSAS KAN. STAT. ANN. State Departments; Surety Bonds and Insurance
§ 75-4101, et seq. Public Officers And
Employees
KENTUCKY KY. REV. STAT. ANN. Offices and Officers Oaths and Bonds
§ 62.050, et seq.
LOUISIANA LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Public Officers and Qualification by Taking Oath
§ 42:181, et seq. Employees and Giving Bond
MAINE149
MARYLAND150 MD. CODE ANN., STATE Miscellaneous Executive Maryland State Employees

www.fidelitylaw.org
GOV’T § 9-1704 Agencies Surety Bond Committee

149
MAINE—no general provisions regarding public official’s bonds, although an official bond may be required for
a given office.
150
MARYLAND—no general provisions regarding public official’s bonds, but the state does have a designated
Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

“State Employees Surety Bond Committee” to oversee the issuance of official bonds for given officers/employees.
 APPENDIX A

STATE: CITATION: TITLE/CHAPTER: CHAPTER/SUB-

CHAPTER/PART:
MASSACHUSETTS MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30 Laws Relating To State General Provisions Relative To
§§ 14 TO 20 Officers State Departments,
Commissions, Officers And
Employees
MICHIGAN MICH. COMP. LAWS Public Officers and Bonds of State Officers and
§§ 15.1 TO 15.6 Employees Employees
MINNESOTA MINN. STAT. ANN. Compensatory and Bonds, Fines & Forfeitures
§§ 574.01, et seq. Collection Remedies
MISSISSIPPI MISS. CODE ANN. Public Officers and Public Officers; General
§§ 25-1-13 TO 25-1-41 Employees; Public Provisions

www.fidelitylaw.org
The Public Officials Bond

Records
MISSOURI MO. REV. STAT. Public Officers and Bonds of Officers and
§ 170.010, et seq. Employees, Bonds and Contractors for Public Works
Records
193
 APPENDIX A
194

STATE: CITATION: TITLE/CHAPTER: CHAPTER/SUB-

CHAPTER/PART:
MONTANA MONT. CODE ANN. Government Structure Liability Exposure and
§ 2-9-501, ET. SEQ. and Administration Insurance Coverage—General
Provisions Related to Official
Bonds
NEBRASKA NEB. REV. STAT. Bonds and Oaths,
§ 11-101, et seq. Official
NEVADA NEV. REV. STAT. Public Officers and Official Bonds and Oaths
§ 282.010, et seq. Employees
NEW HAMPSHIRE N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. Public Officers and Officials and Employees Bonds
§ 93-B:1, et seq. Employees

www.fidelitylaw.org
NEW JERSEY N.J. STAT. ANN. State Government, General Provisions—Bonding of
§ 52:14-17.16 Departments and State Officers and Employees
Officers—Executive and
Administrative
Departments, Officers
Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

and Employees
 APPENDIX A

STATE: CITATION: TITLE/CHAPTER: CHAPTER/SUB-

CHAPTER/PART:
NEW MEXICO N.M. STAT. § 10-2-1 TO Public Officers and Bonds
10-2-17 Employees
NEW YORK N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW Appointment and Official Undertakings
§ 11, et seq. Qualification of Public
Officers
NEW YORK N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW Appointment and Actions on Official Bonds or
§ 21, et seq. Qualification of Public Undertakings
Officers
NORTH CAROLINA N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-72-1, Insurance Official Bonds
et seq.

www.fidelitylaw.org
The Public Officials Bond

NORTH DAKOTA N.D. CENT. CODE Insurance State Bonding Fund

§ 26.1-21-01, et seq.
OHIO OHIO REV. CODE ANN. General Provisions Officer; Oaths; Bonds
§ 3.30, et seq.
195
 APPENDIX A
196

STATE: CITATION: TITLE/CHAPTER: CHAPTER/SUB-

CHAPTER/PART:
OKLAHOMA OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 591, State Government Official Bonds
et seq.
OREGON151 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. Insurance Insurance Policies Generally;
§ 740.352, et seq. Property and Casualty Policies
OREGON OR. REV. STAT. ANN. Public Financial State Financial Administration—
§ 291.011 Administration Fiscal Duties of Department—
Blanket fidelity bonds for state
officers and personnel
PENNSYLVANIA 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 634 State Government Powers and Duties of the
Department of General Services

www.fidelitylaw.org
and Its Departmental
Administrative and Advisory
Boards and Commissions—
Bonds and liability insurance
Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

151
OREGON—general provisions regarding public official’s bonds, although an official bond may be required for a
given office.
 APPENDIX A

STATE: CITATION: TITLE/CHAPTER: CHAPTER/SUB-

CHAPTER/PART:
RHODE ISLAND R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-20-9 State Affairs & Administration of State
Government Departments
SOUTH CAROLINA S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-3-10, Public Officers and Commissions, Oaths And Bonds
et seq. Employees
SOUTH DAKOTA S.D. CODIFIED LAWS Public Officers and Official Bonds
§ 3-5-1, et seq. Employees
TENNESSEE TENN. CODE ANN. Public Officers and Bonds of Officers
§ 8-19-101, et seq. Employees
TEXAS TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. Public Officers and Official Bonds

www.fidelitylaw.org
The Public Officials Bond

§ 604.001, et seq. Employees

UTAH UTAH CODE ANN. Public Officers Official Oaths and Bonds
§ 52-1-1, et seq.
VERMONT VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, Executive State Officers and Employees
§§ 251, 252 Bonded Officials
197
 APPENDIX A
198

STATE: CITATION: TITLE/CHAPTER: CHAPTER/SUB-

CHAPTER/PART:
VIRGINIA VA. CODE ANN. Administration of General Provisions Bonds of
§§ 2.2-2809 TO 2811 Government certain officers required
VIRGINIA VA. CODE ANN. Administration of Department of the Treasury
§§ 2.2-1840, 1841 Government Blanket surety bond plan for
state and local employees
WASHINGTON WASH. REV. CODE Public Officers and Official Bonds
§ 42.08.005, et seq. Agencies
WEST VIRGINIA W. VA. CODE § 6-2-1, General Provisions Official and Other Bonds
et seq. Respecting Officers

www.fidelitylaw.org
WISCONSIN WIS. STAT. § 19.01, et seq. General Duties Of Public Oaths and Official Bonds
Officials
WYOMING WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-102 Administration of the State Officers – Generally
Government
Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006
The Public Officials Bond 199

APPENDIX B

www.fidelitylaw.org
200 Fidelity Law Association Journal, Vol. XII, October 2006

APPENDIX C

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The Public Officials Bond 201

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