Monistic Theory of Sovereignty

The monistic theory of sovereignty which goes back to Hobbes and Bentham found elaborate treatment in the writings of the analytical
school of jurists of which John Austin was the most prominent representative. His notable treatise on "The Province of Jurisprudence
Determined" (1832) contains a brilliant and precise exposition of the monistic or legal theory of sovereignty.
"We must ceaselessly remember", says Laski, “that the monistic theory of the state was born in an age of crisis and that each period of its re-
verification has synchronized with some momentous event which has signalized a change in the distribution of political power.Originally
the sovereign state emerged to vindicate the supremacy of the political authority against ecclesiastical claims. Subsequently, it extended its
supremacy to every department of human activity, religious or otherwise. Austin's most famous statement of the doctrine of sovereignty is as
follows: "If a determinate human superior not in a habit of obedience to a like supcrior receives habitual obedience from the bulk of a given
society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the society (including the superior) is a society political and independent".
Laws are defined simply as the command of a superior to an inferior. Austin's legal view of sovereignty carries with it a certain scientific
precision and finality which is highly impressive. His analytical view of sovereignty and law has some implications:
First, as Laski says, the state for Austin is a legal order in which there is a determinate authority acting as the ultimate source of' power.
Hence, neither the people, which is indeterminate, nor the general will (Rousseau's conception), which is impersonal and abstract, can be
designated as sovereign.
Secondly, its authority is absolute and incapable of limitation. The sovereign receives habitual obedience from the people but not in the habit
of obedience to a like superior.
Thirdly, whatever the sovereign commands is law, and without him there can be no law. Law is a command of the state obliging the subject
to do, or to refrain from doing, certain acts, failure to obey being visited by punishment.
Fourthly, sovereignty is indivisible. To divide sovereignty between two or more persons or bodies of persons is to limit it, while sovereign
power s by definition incapable of limitation.

Criticism: The first proposition was attacked by English scholar Sir Henry Maine in his "Early History of Institutions", in which he
illustrates that ill many of the Empires of the East there is nothing to correspond with the 'determinate superior' of Austin. He urges that
Austin's conception is inapplicable to underdeveloped communities where custom is a powerful force.2. according to these thinkers
sovereignty is located respectively in: "(1) the people of the state; (2) the organization which has
a legal right to make or amend the constitution of the state; (3) the sum total of the legal law making bodies in the government of the state".
The two possible meanings that can be given to the term "people" in defining popular sovereignty are (a) "the total unorganizing
indeterminate mass", and (b) the electorate.3. In the United States, on account of its rigid constitution and federal character, it is not easy to
locate sovereignty. Neither the President, nor the legislatures of federal or State, enjoy absolute legal powers. Judicial review limits their
constitutional powers. Sovereignty therefore, is not vested in them but rests in that body which has the power to amend the constitution.4.
Austin's legalistic view breaks down on the rock of political realities. As Laski observes: "In practice legally unlimited power turns out to be
power exercised under conditions fairly well-known to each generation."5. Austin's third proposition is that the, sovereign in the sense of a
"determinate human superior" is the supreme law-maker. Whatever he commands is law. This view has been criticised by the historical
jurists on the ground that it ignores the great body of customary law which has grown up through usage and interpretation and which never
had its source in the will of a determinate superior.

Pluralistic Theory of Sovereignty

The pluralistic theory of state is opposed to the monistic theory. In his work "Political Pluralism", Hsiao defines the monistic--state as "one
which possesses, or which should possess, a single source of authority that is theoretically comprehensive and unlimited in its exercise". By
contrast the pluralist state is defined by him as "one in which there exists no single authority that is all competent and comprehensive, no
unified system of law, no centralised organ of administration, no generation of political will". Pluralists view modern society as a web of
associations. These associations which emerge naturally to fulfil the diverse needs and aspirations of the members of a society must have
functional freedom and the state which is but one among numerous associations must not claim monopoly over sovereignty. Thus in contrast
to the features of monistic theory of sovereignty, pluralistic theory advocates division or sharing of sovereignty on group basis, and limited
sphere of state action.
Factors Responsible for the Rise of Pluralism
It is commonly held that pluralism is a reaction to the absolutist conception of the state as held by Hegel and his followers and as it
influenced the militarists and fascists. Hegel's glorification of the state was a threat to individual freedom and the autonomy of associations.
Both individualists and pluralists challenged the legal and moral supremacy of the state.

The rigid legal view of sovereignty known as monism is often regarded by pluralists as the principal (actor responsible for the rise of
pluralism. The pluralists discredit the idea that the state habitually exercises any sort of authority which can be properly designated as
sovereign. They consider the legal view of sovereignty as a dangerous and futile doctrine.

The sociological and historical schools of law object to the approach of the analytical school of law which is closely connected with the
legal approach to sovereignty.

It has also been argued that the urgent need for an effective international law and international morality provides sufficient reason for
limiting state sovereignty and modifying it in the direction of pluralism.
Crticism:Pluralistic theory of sovereignty contains a large element of truth, but it grossly exaggerates it. Critics argue that pluralism suffers
from logical contradiction. While in theory they plead for the reduction of state activities, in practice they assign to. the state much power
for implementing their schemes.2. The dividing line between pluralism and anarchism is very thin. Rejection of the monistic theory of
sovereignty leads to logical position of the anarchists and syndicalists. If the state is an association like other associations it ceases to be a
state and the way is wide open for anarchy and disorder.3. The numerous groups and associations do not run along parallel lines, nor do they
operate in water-tight compartments. There is overlapping of functions, the clash of interests and the conflict of loyalties in society. The
supreme power of the state is needed for "the special function of adjusting and adjudicating such clashes as well as of caring for certain
common interest". If the state is merely one association among many, have more or less similar power and status. It is difficult to see how it
can satisfactorily fulfil its unique function of adjustment and adjudication. The innumerable groups which function in the community do not
exhaust all the functions required for the well-being of man. They serve only partial interests. In the great society of today the state is the
only organization which is in possession of an elaborate mechanism and vast personnel to deal with the universal needs of human beings.4.
The objections of pluralists to Austinian concept of law tends to confuse the substance with the form of law. It is true that the substance of
law is derived from usages, practices and needs of a community. Austin's chief interest is in the form of law -its legal source. No law,
however good substantially, is valid unless it is formally recognized by the state. The terms 'social solidarity' and 'sense of right' do not have
the precision conveyed by the term 'legal sovereignty'. These terms are incapable of giving us specific laws that can be interpreted and
enforced by the courts of law.
Value:Notwithstanding some valid objections to the pluralist contention, the doctrine has made valuable contribution to cotemporary
political thought. As a theory which corrects the excesses of the monistic doctrine of sovereignty and supplements what is lacking in it,
pluralism is valuable. Pluralism was positive, humanistic and democratic reaction against state absolutism.2. Pluralism has rendered a great
service to modern political theory by inviting the pointed attention of states to the reality of group life. They highlight the vital and unique
part played by economic, social, professional, cultural and religious groups in the life of the community. '3. In her book, The New State,
Miss Follett sums up the value of Pluralism as follows: (1) The pluralists prick the bubble of the present State's right to supremacy. (2) They
recognize the value of the group and see that the variety of our group life today has a significance which must be immediately reckoned
within a political way. (3) They plead for a revivification of local life. (4) They see that the interest of the State is not always identical with
the interest of its parts. (5) Pluralism is the beginning of the disappearance of the crowd. (6) It has seized upon the problem of identity, of
association, and of federalism. Conclusion:We may conclude with Laski: "However much we may reduce the direct administrative capacity
of the political state, the fact remains that once it is charged with the provision of services which men stand in common need, it has their
interests in trust to it degree with which no other body can in temporal sense at least compete. Even if we abstract from the modern state the
final control of international affairs, the civic area of internal matters that is left, seems overwhelming".