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Fire Department
Analysis Report
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Springfield, Illinois
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Final Report,
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January 2022
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CENTER FOR PUBLIC SAFETY MANAGEMENT, LLC

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475 K STREET NW, STE. 702 • WASHINGTON, DC 20001

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WWW.CPSM.US • 716-969-1360
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Exclusive Provider of Public Safety Technical Services for

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International City/County Management Association

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THE ASSOCIATION & THE COMPANY
The International City/County Management Association is a 103-year old, nonprofit professional
association of local government administrators and managers, with approximately 13,000
members located in 32 countries.

Since its inception in 1914, ICMA has been dedicated to assisting local governments and their
managers in providing services to its citizens in an efficient and effective manner.
ICMA advances the knowledge of local government best practices with its website
(www.icma.org), publications, research, professional development, and membership. The ICMA
Center for Public Safety Management (ICMA/CPSM) was launched by ICMA to provide support
to local governments in the areas of police, fire, and emergency medical services.

ICMA also represents local governments at the federal level and has been involved in numerous
projects with the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security.

In 2014, as part of a restructuring at ICMA, the Center for Public Safety Management (CPSM)
was spun out as a separate company. It is now the exclusive provider of public safety technical
assistance for ICMA. CPSM provides training and research for the Association’s members and
represents ICMA in its dealings with the federal government and other public safety professional
associations such as CALEA, PERF, IACP, IFCA, IPMA-HR, DOJ, BJA, COPS, NFPA, and others.

The Center for Public Safety Management, LLC, maintains the same team of individuals
performing the same level of service as when it was a component of ICMA. CPSM’s local
government technical assistance experience includes workload and deployment analysis using
our unique methodology and subject matter experts to examine department organizational
structure and culture, identify workload and staffing needs, and align department operations
with industry best practices. We have conducted 341 such studies in 42 states and provinces
and 246 communities ranging in population from 8,000 (Boone, Iowa) to 800,000 (Indianapolis,
Ind.).

Thomas Wieczorek is the Director of the Center for Public Safety Management.
Leonard Matarese serves as the Director of Research & Program Development. Dr. Dov Chelst is
the Director of Quantitative Analysis.

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CENTER FOR PUBLIC SAFETY MANAGEMENT
PROJECT CONTRIBUTORS
Thomas J. Wieczorek, Director
Leonard A. Matarese, Director, Research & Project Development
Dov Chelst, Ph.D. Director of Quantitative Analysis
Pete Finley, Senior Associate
Leah Balter, Data Analyst
Dennis Kouba, Senior Editor

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CONTENTS
Tables ............................................................................................................................ vi
Figures ......................................................................................................................... viii
Section 1. Executive Summary .................................................................................... 1
Recommendations ................................................................................................................................. 2
Capital Assets ...................................................................................................................................... 2
Training ................................................................................................................................................. 2
Community Risk Reduction ................................................................................................................ 3
Response Times ................................................................................................................................... 4
Fire Operations .................................................................................................................................... 4
Planning Objectives ............................................................................................................................ 5
Section 2. Agency Review and Characteristics......................................................... 7
Department Overview and Organizational Structure ........................................................................ 7
Emergency Medical Services ............................................................................................................ 8
Service Area ............................................................................................................................................ 8
Section 3. Fire Department Programs and Services ................................................ 11
Budget .................................................................................................................................................... 11
Capital Assets ........................................................................................................................................ 11
Facilities .............................................................................................................................................. 11
Fleet .................................................................................................................................................... 13
Training Programs and Performance Improvement ......................................................................... 16
Community Risk Reduction Programs ................................................................................................ 22
Section 4. All Hazards Risk Assessment of the Community..................................... 30
Population and Community Growth .................................................................................................. 30
Risks and Hazards .................................................................................................................................. 31
Environmental Factors ...................................................................................................................... 31
Building and Target Hazards ............................................................................................................ 31
Human-Caused Risk .......................................................................................................................... 33
Transportation Factors ...................................................................................................................... 33
Fire and Fire-Related Risk ................................................................................................................. 36
EMS Risk .............................................................................................................................................. 36
Fire and EMS Demand .......................................................................................................................... 37
ISO Rating .............................................................................................................................................. 42
Community Loss and Save Information ............................................................................................. 43
Resiliency................................................................................................................................................ 44

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 Risk Categorization ............................................................................................................................... 48
Section 5. Emergency Deployment and Performance ........................................... 57
Evaluation of Current Deployment and Performance ..................................................................... 57
SFD Response Times .............................................................................................................................. 63
Response Times by Fire Management Zones .................................................................................... 67
Staffing Levels and Staffing Patterns .................................................................................................. 80
Fire and EMS Operations and Response Metrics .............................................................................. 86
NFPA 1710 .......................................................................................................................................... 86
Code of Federal Regulations, NFPA 1500, and Two-In/Two Out ................................................. 88
Critical Tasking and Effective Response Force .............................................................................. 89
Fire Operations .................................................................................................................................... 106
Fire Preplanning ............................................................................................................................... 114
EMS Operations ................................................................................................................................... 117
Technical Rescue Response .............................................................................................................. 123
Mutual Aid ........................................................................................................................................... 124
Principal Findings: Community Risk / Critical Tasking for Standards of Cover ............................. 127
Current State of the Fire and EMS Delivery System ......................................................................... 128
Section 6. Sustainability Alternatives....................................................................... 131
Fire Staffing and Deployment............................................................................................................ 132
Alternative 1: Convert One Truck into a Quint and Close One Engine ................................... 132
Alternative 2: Convert Two Trucks into Quints and Close Two Engines………………………….132
Alternative 2A: Convert Teo Trucks into Quints and Close Two Engines………………………..133
Alternative 3: Eliminate Battalion Safety Officers ........................................................................ 133
Alternative 4: Close a Station ........................................................................................................ 134
Alternative 5: Brownout Fire Stations/Companies as Needed .................................................. 137
Fire Station Relocation........................................................................................................................ 138
EMS Delivery System ........................................................................................................................... 148
Alternative 1 – Create a Municipal Based System ...................................................................... 150
Alternative 2 – Franchise Fee EMS Service ................................................................................... 155
Alternative 3 – Franchise Fee EMS Service with City Billing ........................................................ 156
Alternative 4 - City EMS Service Ordinance…………………………………………………………..157
Recommendations and Planning Objectives...……………………………………………….158
Section 7. Data Analysis ........................................................................................... 161
Methodology ....................................................................................................................................... 161
Aggregate Call Totals and Runs ....................................................................................................... 163
Calls by Type.................................................................................................................................... 163
Calls by Type and Duration ........................................................................................................... 166

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 Average Calls by Month and Hour of Day .................................................................................. 168
Units Arrived at Calls ....................................................................................................................... 170
Workload: Runs and Total Time Spent .............................................................................................. 173
Runs and Deployed Time – All Units .............................................................................................. 173
Workload by Fire Protection District .............................................................................................. 177
Workload by Unit ............................................................................................................................. 179
Analysis of Busiest Hours ..................................................................................................................... 183
Response Time ..................................................................................................................................... 186
Response Time by Type of Call ...................................................................................................... 187
Response Time by Hour .................................................................................................................. 190
Response Time Distribution ............................................................................................................. 192
Response Time by Fire Protection District ..................................................................................... 195
Attachment I: Actions Taken ............................................................................................................. 197
Attachment II: Additional Personnel................................................................................................. 198
Attachment III: Fire Loss ...................................................................................................................... 199
Attachment IV: Trend in Service ....................................................................................................... 200
Trends in Call Volume ..................................................................................................................... 200
Trends in Workload .......................................................................................................................... 203
Trends in Station Availability ........................................................................................................... 204
Trends in Response Time ................................................................................................................. 205
Attachment V: Assignment of EMS Call Type .................................................................................. 207

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TABLES
TABLE 3-1: SFD Budget, FY 2019 through FY 2022 ................................................................................... 11
TABLE 3-2: SFD Facility Information .......................................................................................................... 13
TABLE 3-3: SFD Front-Line Fleet ................................................................................................................. 14
TABLE 3-4: EMS Certificates Requiring Continuing Education.............................................................. 19
TABLE 3-5: Office of State Fire Marshal Certificates Requiring Continuing Education...................... 19
TABLE 4-1: Fire Call Types .......................................................................................................................... 36
TABLE 4-2: EMS Call Types ......................................................................................................................... 36
TABLE 4-3: Community Loss in Springfield, 2016–2020 ........................................................................... 44
TABLE 4-4: Station Availability to Respond to Calls ............................................................................... 45
TABLE 4-5: Top 10 Hours with the Most Calls Received ......................................................................... 45
TABLE 4-6: Call Workload by Station and Unit ....................................................................................... 46
TABLE 4-7: Frequency Distribution of the Number of Calls ................................................................... 47
TABLE 4-8: Event Probability ..................................................................................................................... 49
TABLE 4-9: Consequence to Community Matrix ................................................................................... 49
TABLE 4-10: Impact on SFD ....................................................................................................................... 50
TABLE 5-1: Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type ............................................... 64
TABLE 5-2: 90th Percentile Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type ..................................... 65
TABLE 5-3: Comparison of Average Response Time of First Arriving SFD Unit in 2019 and 2020 ...... 66
TABLE 5-4: Comparison of 90th Percentile Response Time of First Arriving SFD Unit, 2019, 2020 ...... 66
TABLE 5-5: Deployed Resources from Springfield Fire Department Station Locations ...................... 68
TABLE 5-6: Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Fire Protection District .......................... 79
TABLE 5-7: Normal SFD Staffing/Deployment Model............................................................................. 84
TABLE 5-8: Effective Response Force for Single-Family Dwelling Fire .................................................. 95
TABLE 5-9: Structure Fire – Moderate Risk ............................................................................................... 96
TABLE 5-10: Structure Fire – High Risk ....................................................................................................... 97
TABLE 5-11: Springfield High Rises by Occupancy Type ....................................................................... 98
TABLE 5-12: Structure Fire – High Rise .................................................................................................... 100
TABLE 5-13: Vehicle Fire .......................................................................................................................... 101
TABLE 5-14: Outside Fire – Grass/Brush/Rubbish ................................................................................... 101
TABLE 5-15: Fire Alarm System – Low Risk .............................................................................................. 101
TABLE 5-16: Fire Alarm System – Moderate Risk ................................................................................... 102
TABLE 5-17: Fire Alarm System – High-Risk/High-Rise............................................................................ 102
TABLE 5-18: Motor Vehicle Crash – No Entrapment ............................................................................ 103
TABLE 5-19: Motor Vehicle Crash – With Entrapment ......................................................................... 103
TABLE 5-20: Natural Gas Leak – Interior and Exterior ........................................................................... 103
TABLE 5-21: Hazardous Materials Incident............................................................................................ 104
TABLE 5-22: Water Rescue Incident ...................................................................................................... 105
TABLE 5-23: Technical Rescue Incident ................................................................................................ 105
TABLE 5-24: Fire Calls by Type and Number, and Percent of All Calls .............................................. 111
TABLE 5-25: Fire Calls by Type and Durations ....................................................................................... 112

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TABLE 5-26: Calls by Number of Units Arriving – Fire ............................................................................ 112
TABLE 5-27: Annual Runs and Deployed Time by Run Type ............................................................... 113
TABLE 5-28: Total Fire Loss Above and Below $25,000 ........................................................................ 113
TABLE 5-29: Content and Property Loss – Structure and Outside Fires .............................................. 113
TABLE 5-30: EMS Calls by Type and Number, and Percent of All Calls ............................................. 119
TABLE 5-31: EMS Calls by Type and Duration ....................................................................................... 122
TABLE 7-1: Fire Protection Districts Serviced by SFD ............................................................................. 162
TABLE 7-2: Call Types ............................................................................................................................... 163
TABLE 7-3: Calls by Type and Duration ................................................................................................. 166
TABLE 7-4: Calls by Call Type and Number of Units Arriving ............................................................... 170
TABLE 7-5: Annual Runs and Deployed Time by Run Type ................................................................. 173
TABLE 7-6: Average Deployed Minutes by Hour of Day .................................................................... 175
TABLE 7-7: Annual Workload by Fire Protection District ...................................................................... 177
TABLE 7-8: Runs for Structure and Outside Fires by Fire Protection District ....................................... 177
TABLE 7-9: Call Workload by Unit ........................................................................................................... 179
TABLE 7-10: Total Annual Runs by Run Type and Unit ......................................................................... 180
TABLE 7-11: Daily Average Deployed Minutes by Run Type and Unit .............................................. 181
TABLE 7-12: Frequency Distribution of the Number of Calls ............................................................... 183
TABLE 7-13: Top 10 Hours with the Most Calls Received ..................................................................... 183
TABLE 7-14: Frequency of Overlapping Calls ....................................................................................... 184
TABLE 7-15: Station Availability to Respond to Calls ........................................................................... 185
TABLE 7-16: Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type ........................................... 187
TABLE 7-17: 90th Percentile Response Time of Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Call
Type .......................................................................................................................................................... 189
TABLE 7-18: Average and 90th Percentile Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Hour of Day ... 190
TABLE 7-19: Cumulative Distribution of Response Time – First Arriving Unit – EMS ............................ 193
TABLE 7-20: Cumulative Distribution of Response Time – First Arriving Unit – Outside and Structure
Fires ........................................................................................................................................................... 194
TABLE 7-21: Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Fire Protection District ...................... 195
TABLE 7-22: Actions Taken Analysis for Structure and Outside Fire Calls .......................................... 197
TABLE 7-23: Workload of Administrative Units ...................................................................................... 198
TABLE 7-24: Total Fire Loss Above and Below $25,000 ........................................................................ 199
TABLE 7-25: Content and Property Loss – Structure and Outside Fires .............................................. 199
TABLE 7-26: Calls by Year and Grand Call Type .................................................................................. 200
TABLE 7-27: EMS Calls by Year and Type .............................................................................................. 200
TABLE 7-28: Fire Calls by Year and Type ............................................................................................... 200
TABLE 7-29: Unit Runs and Workload by Year ...................................................................................... 203
TABLE 7-30: Station Availability to Respond to Calls by Year ............................................................. 204
TABLE 7-31: Comparison of Average Response Time of First Arriving SFD Unit in 2019 and 2020 .. 205
TABLE 7-32: Comparison of 90th Percentile Response Time of First Arriving SFD Unit, 2019, 2020 .. 206
TABLE 7-33: Assignment of EMS Type Based on CAD Incident Type ................................................. 207

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FIGURES
FIGURE 2-1: SFD Organizational Chart ...................................................................................................... 8
FIGURE 2-2: City of Springfield Municipal Boundary Map ...................................................................... 9
FIGURE 2-3: SFD Fire Station Locations with Municipal and Fire District Response Areas ................. 10
FIGURE 3-1: Remote Video Inspection (RVI) Components .................................................................. 28
FIGURE 4-1: Springfield Major Roads and Highways ............................................................................. 34
FIGURE 4-2: Springfield Rail Lines ............................................................................................................. 35
FIGURE 4-3: Fire Incident Demand Density (Structure and Outside Fires) .......................................... 38
FIGURE 4-4: Other Fire-Related Incident Demand Density .................................................................. 39
FIGURE 4-5: False Alarm Incident Demand Density .............................................................................. 40
FIGURE 4-6: EMS Incident Demand Density ........................................................................................... 41
FIGURE 4-7: PPC Ratings in the United States ........................................................................................ 43
FIGURE 4-8: Calls by Hour of Day............................................................................................................. 47
FIGURE 4-9: Three-Axis Risk Calculation (RC) ......................................................................................... 52
FIGURE 4-10: Low Risk ................................................................................................................................ 53
FIGURE 4-11: Moderate Risk ..................................................................................................................... 54
FIGURE 4-12: High Risk ............................................................................................................................... 55
FIGURE 4-13: Special Risk .......................................................................................................................... 56
FIGURE 5-1: Incident Cascade of Events ............................................................................................... 58
FIGURE 5-2: Fire Propagation Curve ....................................................................................................... 59
FIGURE 5-3: Fire Growth from Inception to Flashover ........................................................................... 60
FIGURE 5-4: Cardiac Arrest Survival Probability by Minute ................................................................... 61
FIGURE 5-5: Cerebrovascular Emergency (Stroke) Chain of Survival ................................................. 62
FIGURE 5-6: Sudden Cardiac Arrest Chain of Survival .......................................................................... 62
FIGURE 5-7: SFD Fire Station Locations with Municipal and Fire District Response Areas ................. 69
FIGURE 5-8: SFD Fire Station Locations with First Due Response Areas ............................................... 70
FIGURE 5-9: SFD Station Locations, Showing 1.5- and 1.97-Square Mile Response Area Polygons . 72
FIGURE 5-10: SFD 240-Seconds Travel Time Bleeds from SFD Stations ................................................. 74
FIGURE 5-11: SFD 360-Seconds Travel Time Bleeds from SFD Stations ................................................. 75
FIGURE 5-12: SFD 480-Seconds Travel Time Bleeds from SFD Stations ................................................. 76
FIGURE 5-13: SFD 610-Seconds Travel Time Bleeds from SFD Stations ................................................. 77
FIGURE 5-14: SFD Ladder Company Station Locations Showing 2.5-Mile Square Response Area
Polygons ..................................................................................................................................................... 78
FIGURE 5-15: Staffing and Deploying Fire and EMS Departments ....................................................... 82
FIGURE 5-16: Two-In/Two-Out Interior Firefighting Model* .................................................................... 89
FIGURE 5-17: Effective Response Force for Single-Family Dwelling Fire .............................................. 95
FIGURE 5-18: Typical Springfield 2.5-Story Wood Frame Residential Fires ........................................... 96
FIGURE 5-19: View of High-rise Buildings in Springfield .......................................................................... 98
FIGURE 5-20: Springfield High-Rise Locations ......................................................................................... 99
FIGURE 5-21: Typical EMS ERF ................................................................................................................. 106

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FIGURE 5-22: SFD Structure Fire: May 2021 ........................................................................................... 108
FIGURE 5-23: Fire Calls by Type and Percentage ................................................................................ 111
FIGURE 5-24: SFD Completed Pre-plan Locations ............................................................................... 116
FIGURE 5-25: SFD Unsafe Structures Locations ..................................................................................... 117
FIGURE 5-26: Cardiac Arrest Survival Timeline ..................................................................................... 118
FIGURE 5-27: EMS Calls by Type and Percentage ............................................................................... 120
FIGURE 5-28: EMD Dispatch Matrix ........................................................................................................ 121
FIGURE 5-29: Calls by Number of SFD Units Arriving – EMS ................................................................. 122
FIGURE 5-30: SFD, Chatham, and Sherman Station Locations with Response Time Bleeds ........... 125
FIGURE 5-31: SFD and Chatham FPD Automatic Aid ......................................................................... 126
FIGURE 6-1: SFD Travel Time Bleeds and Diamonds with Station 10 .................................................. 135
FIGURE 6-2: SFD Travel Time Bleeds and Diamonds without Station 10 ............................................ 136
FIGURE 6-3: Travel Time Diamonds for Relocated Stations 6 and 8, and New Station 13 .............. 140
FIGURE 6-4: Travel Time Diamonds for Relocated Stations 6, 8, and 9………………………………..141
FIGURE 6-5: Travel Time Diamonds for Relocated Stations 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9…………………….……142
FIGURE 6-6: Travel Time Diamonds for Reloated Stations 6, 7, 8, and 9……………………………….143
FIGURE 6-7: Typical Squad (Rescue Pumper) Type Apparatus…………………………………..…….144
FIGURE 6-8: Travel Time Diamonds for Consolidated Stations 4/10 and New Station 13………….145
FIGURE 6-9: Travel Time Diamonds for Relocated Stations 6, 7, 8, and 9, and Consolidated
Stations 4/10………………………………………………………………………………………………………146
FIGURE 6-10: ISO 2.5 Mile Ladder Coverage Diamonds for Stations 1, 2, 4, 12 (stations 2, 4, 12 -
Quints)……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..148
FIGURE 6-11: Types of EMS Delivery Systems ........................................................................................ 149
FIGURE 6-12: Springfield Medicare Rate Structure .............................................................................. 151
FIGURE 6-13: Midwest versus National Medicare Comparison ......................................................... 152
FIGURE 6-14: EMS Call Determinants ..................................................................................................... 154
FIGURE 7-1: EMS Calls by Type ............................................................................................................... 164
FIGURE 7-2: Fire Calls by Type ................................................................................................................ 164
FIGURE 7-3: Average Calls by Month.................................................................................................... 168
FIGURE 7-4: Calls by Hour of Day........................................................................................................... 169
FIGURE 7-5: Calls by Number of Units Arriving – EMS ........................................................................... 171
FIGURE 7-6: Calls by Number of Units Arriving – Fire ............................................................................ 171
FIGURE 7-7: Average Deployed Minutes by Hour of Day .................................................................. 176
FIGURE 7-8: Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type – EMS ................................ 188
FIGURE 7-9: Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type – Fire ................................. 188
FIGURE 7-10: Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Hour of Day .................................... 191
FIGURE 7-11: Cumulative Distribution of Response Time – First Arriving Unit – EMS .......................... 192
FIGURE 7-12: Cumulative Distribution of Response Time – First Arriving Unit – Outside and Structure
Fires ........................................................................................................................................................... 193
FIGURE 7-13: Calls per Day by Month of Year ..................................................................................... 202
FIGURE 7-14: Calls per Hour by Year and Time of Day ....................................................................... 202
FIGURE 7-15: Comparison of Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Hour of Day ......... 205

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SECTION 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Center for Public Safety Management LLC (CPSM) was contracted by the City of Springfield
to complete an analysis of the city’s Fire Department and EMS ground transport service.

The Springfield Fire Department (SFD) is responsible for providing services from four divisions that
include Operations (fire suppression, first response emergency medical services, technical
rescue and Haz-Mat response, and fleet maintenance); Fire Safety (fire code enforcement, fire
investigation, firework safety, public education and juvenile intervention, and plans review);
Training (all department training, promotional exams, equipment testing, health and safety); and
Technical Services (information systems and equipment, data collection and reporting, radio
systems and equipment, computer-aided dispatch systems).

The service demands of this community are numerous for the department and include EMS first
response, fire, technical rescue, hazardous materials, and transportation emergencies to include
extensive rail and vehicle traffic, mass transit system utilizing bus transportation, and other non-
emergency responses typical of urban and suburban fire departments. A significant component
of this report is the completion of an All-Hazard Risk Assessment of the Community. The All-
Hazard Risk Assessment of the Community contemplates many factors that cause, create,
facilitate, extend, and enhance risk in and to a community.

The response time and staffing components discussion of this report are designed to examine
the current level of service provided by the SFD compared to national best practices. As well,
these components provide incident data and relevant information to be utilized for future
planning and self-review of service levels for continued improvement designed to meet
community expectations and mitigate emergencies effectively and efficiently.

Other significant components of this report are an analysis of the current deployment of
resources and the performance of these resources in terms of response times and the twelve SFD
fire management zones; current staffing levels and patterns; department resiliency (ability to
handle more than one incident); critical tasking elements for specific incident responses and
assembling an effective response force; and private EMS ground transport system. CPSM
analyzed these items and is providing recommendations where applicable to improve service
delivery and for future planning purposes.

In summation, a comprehensive risk assessment and review of deployable assets are critical
aspects of a fire department’s operation. First, these reviews will assist the SFD in quantifying the
risks that it faces. Second, the SFD will be better equipped to determine if the current response
resources are sufficiently staffed, equipped, trained, and positioned. The factors that drive the
service needs are examined and then link directly to discussions regarding the assembling of an
effective response force and when contemplating the response capabilities needed to
adequately address the existing risks, which encompasses the component of critical tasking.

This report also contains a series of observations and planning objectives and recommendations
provided by CPSM which are intended to help the SFD deliver services more efficiently and
effectively.

Recommendations and considerations for continuous improvement of services are presented

here. CPSM recognizes there may be recommendations and considerations offered that first
must be budgeted and/or bargained, or for which processes must be developed prior to
implementation.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Capital Assets
1. CPSM recommends as a planning objective that, over a three-year period, the SFD conduct
a facility assessment of all fire facilities. (See pp. 11-13.)
2. CPSM recommends the SFD develop, over a one-year period, a fire apparatus replacement
plan that includes replacement according to recommendations in accordance with
NFPA 1901, Standard for Automotive Fire Apparatus. (See pp. 13-15.)
Planning objectives should include:
□ First-line apparatus should not exceed 15 years of service on the front line, and once they
reach this age, should be replaced with a new apparatus and then rotated to reserve
status. This replacement schedule should be inserted into the SFD fleet capital replacement
plan. (2A)
□ Apparatus in reserve status and which have not been properly maintained as evidenced by
maintenance records, or that are not operationally or roadworthy as evidenced by
maintenance records, should be placed out of service. (2B)
□ Apparatus in reserve status in excess of 20 years old should comply with NFPA 1901 and be
upgraded in accordance with NFPA 1912 if the department plans to continue to use this
apparatus. (2C)
□ Apparatus and major apparatus components such as the motor, fire pump, aerial ladder
assembly and hydraulics, chassis, and chassis components such as brakes, wheels, and
steering equipment should be maintained in accordance with manufacturer and industry
specifications and standards. (2D)
□ Apparatus components requiring annualized testing either fixed or portable such as fire
pumps, aerial ladder and aerial ladder assemblies, ground ladders, self-contained
breathing apparatus to include personnel fit-testing, and fire hose should be tested in
accordance with manufacturer and industry specifications and standards. (2E)

Training
3. CPSM recommends the SFD make it a priority to fill the position of EMS Training Coordinator as
soon as possible for reasons delineated in this analysis. (See p. 18.)
4. The SFD should make a concerted effort to send as many officers as possible to the National
Fire Academy (NFA). Any officer who meets the admissions criteria should be encouraged to
enroll in the academy’s Executive Fire Officer Program. (See p. 18.)
5. CPSM recommends the SFD make it a priority to continue to develop and budget for a
company fire officer training and development program that is competency-based on
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC),
International Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA), and Illinois state fire training standards.
The program should focus on contemporary fire service issues including community fire
protection and emergency services delivery approaches, fire prevention practices, firefighter
safety and risk management and labor/staff relations; reviewing, approving, or preparing
technical documents and specifications, departmental policies, standard operating
procedures and other formal internal communications; improving organizational

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 performance through process improvement and best practices initiatives; and having a
working knowledge of information management and technology systems. (See p. 20.)
6. CPSM recommends the SFD develop task books for firefighter, engineer, and battalion chief,
in addition to the program under development for captain. Firefighters should be required to
complete their book as part of their probationary period. For other ranks, all personnel
aspiring for promotion to a higher rank should be required to successfully complete all
elements of that rank’s task book to be eligible to participate in the formal promotional
testing process. (See p. 20.)
7. The SFD should continue to develop training programs that lead to the following rank-
appropriate certifications becoming mandatory job requirements for supervisory and
command levels within the department: (N/A)
□ Captain.
o Fire Instructor I.
o Fire Officer (or Company Fire Officer) I and II.
o IMS I-300.
o Illinois Fire Inspector (so companies can perform in-service inspections).
□ Battalion Chief.
o Fire Instructor II.
o Fire Officer III and/or Chief Fire Officer.
o IMS- I-400.
o Incident Safety Officer.
□ Division Chief
o Fire Officer IV.
8. CPSM recommends the SFD develop and institute written and practical skills testing and
proficiency evaluations as part of the department’s comprehensive fire training program.
(See p. 20.)
9. The SFD should provide all companies and personnel with high-intensity training on various
subjects, including periodic live fire training on at least a semi-annual basis at an appropriate
location where appropriate training facilities, structures, and props are available. (N/A)
10. CPSM recommends that the City of Springfield should make it a high priority to provide
funding for the SFD to procure an appropriate training facility where it can safely perform
NFPA 1403-compliant live fire training evolutions for all personnel on at least a semi-annual
basis. (N/A)

Community Risk Reduction

11. CPSM recommends that the SFD implement an in-service company inspection program at
residential, office, manufacturing, and retail business occupancy types throughout the city.
(See p. 24.)
12. CPSM recommends that the SFD provide appropriate training in conducting routine fire
prevention inspections to all field personnel, particularly company officers who will be
responsible for supervising these company programs. (N/A)

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13. CPSM recommends that the SFD complete a comprehensive review of the city’s actual costs
for providing fire prevention services. The review should include a full costing of providing all
fire prevention services, reviewing the city’s fire code(s), as well as a comparative analysis of
the fees charged for similar services by other fire departments. The review should be designed
to capture the full range of services provided and capture the full scope of the operational
permits and certain inspections required as part of a comprehensive fire prevention program.
(See p. 25.)
14. CPSM recommends that to fund the SFD’s fire prevention and safety activities the city should
consider the adoption of registration, inspection, and/or permit fees to offset the actual costs
of providing these services in the city. These fees should include inspections conducted by in-
service fire companies. (See p. 25.)
15. CPSM recommends that the SFD should evaluate the feasibility and give serious consideration
to replacing uniformed personnel in the Fire Safety Division with certified civilian staff
members. (See p. 26.)
16. CPSM recommends the City of Springfield consider the adoption of a more recent edition of
the International Fire Code (2009 or later) and adopt a city ordinance that requires the
installation of an automatic fire suppression (sprinkler) system in all new construction, including
one and two-family dwellings. CPSM further recommends that the SFD develop a compelling
public education program that includes discussing the significant life-saving benefits of
installing residential fire sprinklers in all new one- and two-family dwellings. (See pp. 26-27.)
17. CPSM recommends that the SFD explore the feasibility of utilizing Remote Video Inspections
(RIV) to assist with managing the Community Risk Reduction fire inspection workload. (See
pp. 27-28.)
18. CPSM recommends that the SFD implement a company/community level voluntary home
inspection and education program that targets vulnerable populations (young, elderly, and
disabled) with a goal of reducing fires and civilian casualties. (See pp. 28-29.)
19. CPSM recommends that the SFD consider restructuring how fire investigations are performed,
with two investigators assigned to each shift with fire investigations as an ancillary duty.
Recommended rank for the investigators should be engineer. CPSM further recommends
maintaining one Senior Fire Investigator in the Fire Safety Division with the rank of Captain who
would coordinate and oversee fire investigation activities. (See p. 29.)
20. CPSM recommends that all SFD Battalion Chiefs and Captains should receive additional
training in fire origin and cause determination and be assigned primary initial responsibility for
this process. (See p. 29.)

Response Times
21. CPSM recommends that as a planning objective the SFD should take steps to definitively
improve both the dispatch time and incident turnout times for both fire and EMS incidents in
order to reduce overall response times to emergency incidents. (See pp. 63-66.)

Fire Operations
22. The SFD should build at least a portion of its training regimens and tactical strategies around
the exterior or transitional attack for when the fire scenario and the number of available
units/responding personnel warrant this approach. (See pp. 106-108.)
23. In acknowledgement of the fact that SFD engines operate in a minimal staffing mode and
recognizing the potential for rapid fire spread particularly in the more densely developed

4
 areas of the city, the SFD should equip all its apparatus with the appropriate appliances and
hose as described herein. It should develop standardized tactical operations that will enable
arriving crews to quickly deploy high-volume fire flows of 1,200 to 1,500 gallons per minute (if
the water supply will permit this), utilizing multiple hose lines, appliances, and master stream
devices. This flow should be able to be developed within four to five minutes after arrival of
an apparatus staffed with three personnel. (See pp. 106-108.)
24. CPSM recommends that as a planning objective, the SFD should continue to make pre-plan
development a high priority until such time as plans have been developed for all high- and
medium-hazard occupancies located in the city, placing a high priority on those identified
structures that are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems. (See pp. 114-116.)
25. CPSM recommends that the SFD include mutual aid from the Chatham and Sherman FPDs on
their box assignments/running cards when appropriate for major/multiple alarm incidents that
occur within the city. (See pp. 124-126.)
26. CPSM recommends that the SFD work with both the Chatham and Sherman FPDs to conduct
joint training exercises to assist with creating familiarity of both operations and personnel. (See
pp. 124-126.)

Planning Objectives
See following discussions:
■ Principal Findings, pp. 127-128.
■ Current State of the Fire and Ems Delivery System, pp. 128-130.
■ Fire Staffing and Deployment, pp. 132-137.
■ Fire Station Relocation, pp. 138-148.
■ EMS Delivery System, pp. 148-157.

27. CPSM recommends that the City of Springfield and SFD create a 5-, 10-, and 15-year strategic
plan for the fire department that integrates with existing city land-use, master, capital
improvement, and strategic plans.
□ The strategic plan should create a “standard of response” cover that outlines what service
levels are expected when a call for service is received. Response areas should include
urban, suburban, and unincorporated areas. Response time metrics should include
emergency and non-emergency response profiles. (27A)
□ The capital improvement component of the strategic plan should include the plan and
timeline for the relocation and replacement of stations, 6, 7, 8, and 9 and the consolidation
of Stations 4 and 10. (27B)
□ The capital improvement component of the strategic plan should include the plan and
timeline for replacement of fire apparatus commensurate with its use and in accordance
with NFPA and industry recommendations. Part of this process should include the purchase
and deployment of Quints and Squads as identified in this report. (27C)
□ The capital improvement component of the strategic plan should include a plan for
equipment replacement to meet existing NFPA standards on equipment replacement. This
should include but not be limited to firefighter PPE, SCBA, cardiac monitors, and other high-
cost items. (27D)

5
 □ Consideration should be given to a type of “lease-purchase” program that would stage
acquisition of equipment in the department, pay the yearly “lease” fee to the manufacturer
and in turn, have the option to purchase the equipment at the end of the lease term or
return it for a newer model. Many agencies, such as Plymouth, Michigan, have used this
process to stabilize the yearly costs of equipment replacement as well as provide the best
equipment to responders and avoid large repair/maintenance costs. (27E)
28. CPSM recommends that at this time the city consider EMS Alternative 2 as presented in this
report and each of its components as the best immediate option for the city to include:
(Recommendation 28)
□ As part of reconfiguring the EMS response system in the city, the SFD should implement a
true EMD or Priority Dispatch system of only having an ambulance respond to Alpha and
Bravo or BLS criterion calls unless there is no ambulance available, then an SFD fire
apparatus should respond. The SFD should continue to respond the closest available
resources in fire suppression units to Charlie, Delta, and Echo, or ALS criterion calls. (28A)
□ CPSM further recommends that the City of Springfield and SFD should explore the feasibility
of implementing some type of community-based mobile integrated health care or
paramedicine program in an attempt to provide better service to the community, and to
the extent possible, attempt to minimize the recurring demand on the service from
continual and repeated use of critical resources for non-emergency responses. The city
should also explore the feasibility of introducing telemedicine as part of this program and if
funding for non-transport of patients would be available. (28B)
29. CPSM strongly recommends that with the majority of SFD responses being EMS related that
the position of EMS Coordinator be filled ASAP independent of future decisions regarding the
overall EMS delivery system.
30. CPSM recommends that as a planning objective the SFD should explore the possibility of
enhancing their technological capabilities to provide increased service to the community for
serious cardiac incidents such as through the iPhone PulsePoint® app or other similar
programs or apps.
31. CPSM recommends that the City of Springfield explore all possible options to increase
revenues that could be used to offset the cost of providing fire and EMS services to the city
and FPDs, such as additional PILOT payments from the State of Illinois and other tax exempt
and non-profit entities, public safety assessment for commuters, hotel tax, fire prevention fees,
etc. before considering service reductions.
32. CPSM recommends as a planning objective that SFD leadership work with the firefighters
bargaining unit to develop a policy for monitoring and verification of personnel who are on
sick or injury leave. Examples of things that can be discussed include requiring a location
where they will be for in-person verification by a chief officer, providing a doctor’s note,
being required to see a city-arranged doctor, and not being eligible for overtime until they
have worked a regular shift after a sick call out.
33. CPSM recommends as a planning objective that once the SFD accomplishes some of the
pressing strategic plan recommendations contained in this report, it should, with support from
the elected officials of the City of Springfield, consider undertaking the accreditation process.

§§§

6
SECTION 2. AGENCY REVIEW AND
CHARACTERISTICS
DEPARTMENT OVERVIEW AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The Springfield Fire Department (SFD) is responsible for providing services from four divisions:

■ Operations (fire suppression, first response emergency medical services, technical rescue and
Haz-Mat response, and fleet maintenance).
■ Fire Safety (fire code enforcement, fire investigation, firework safety, public education and
juvenile intervention, and plans review).
■ Training (all department training, promotional exams, equipment testing, health and safety).

■ Technical Services (information systems and equipment, data collection and reporting, radio
systems and equipment, computer-aided dispatch systems).

Other programs include a department health and safety program, professional development
programs, and apparatus and station design committees. As well, the SFD participates in the
statewide Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS) for specialty and technical rescue response.

The SFD is led by a Fire Chief. This position serves as a member of the elected Mayor’s cabinet.
The organizational structure includes senior and middle manager level positions (Division Chiefs,
Deputy Division Chiefs, and Battalion Chiefs), first-line supervisors, engineers, firefighters, and
civilian support staff. The largest contingent of personnel in the organization is comprised of
company-level officers and firefighters.

The SFD provides emergency services from twelve stations located throughout the city. Response
is primarily made through twelve engine companies, three ladder companies, and various other
operational support vehicles. In addition to in-city mitigation of fire and emergency service
incidents, the SFD services nine unincorporated fire districts including the Illinois State Fairgrounds
and the University of Illinois-Springfield. Two Battalion Chiefs (one north and one south) provide
day-to-day company and station oversight, along with incident command on certain responses.
As the SFD is a member of the state’s Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS), it is subject to be
dispatched to incidents throughout the state and potentially nationally if its services are needed.

The SFD operates with three operational shifts and works a 24/48 schedule (24 hours on/48 hours
off). Because this schedule makes for an average 56-hour workweek for firefighters, and as 29
U.S.C 207(k) firefighters working in excess of 53-hours/week must be compensated for the three
additional hours worked each week or scheduled off, the SFD schedules operational non-
exempt personnel off to maintain the 53-hour work week.

The City of Springfield is governed under the mayor-aldermanic form of government. The
elected mayor serves as the head of the government. Chapter 34 of the city’s code of
ordinances establishes the fire department within the office of the mayor. Under the code of
ordinances, a Fire Chief is appointed by the Mayor with the consent of the City Council and
serves as the head of the department. All powers and duties of the fire department are outlined
and codified in Chapter 34.

7
Emergency Medical Services
EMS ground transportation is provided in Springfield by three private ambulance services. The
SFD responds to EMS incidents as a first responder agency. Every SFD engine company has a
minimum of one person per unit trained to an advanced EMS level (EMT-Intermediate or
Paramedic). Through this response, SFD can provide Advanced Life Support (ALS) skills on those
patients requiring such care.

The private EMS ground transportation companies bill for transports to an Emergency
Department (ED), and collect revenue for the transports. A study of the current Springfield payer
mix and revenue collections from each private company would have to be conducted to
determine overall available revenues for this service (this is not included in the statement of work
for this report). The SFD does provide additional personnel when requested by the ground
transport unit to ride along and assist with patient care. The SFD does not collect any revenue for
its EMS service.

The following figure illustrates the SFD’s chart of organization.

FIGURE 2-1: SFD Organizational Chart

Battalion 1
Stations 1,3,4,5,8,10

Battalion 2
Stations 2, 6,7,9,11,12

SERVICE AREA
The City of Springfield is the state capital of Illinois and also the county seat of Sangamon
County. Springfield is located in the central portion of the county. The SFD provides fire and
protective services within the municipal boundaries of the city and to nine unincorporated fire
districts. The city boundaries encompass an area of 66 square miles of which 59.5 square miles is
land area.

8
The following figure illustrates the municipal boundaries and unincorporated areas within the
municipal boundaries of the city to which the SFD responds.

FIGURE 2-2: City of Springfield Municipal Boundary Map1

The next figure shows the municipal boundaries with SFD fire station locations and the fire districts
to which the SFD provides service under contract.

1. 2017-2037 City of Springfield Comprehensive Plan.

9
FIGURE 2-3: SFD Fire Station Locations with Municipal and Fire District Response
Areas

10
SECTION 3. FIRE DEPARTMENT PROGRAMS
AND SERVICES
BUDGET
The SFD operating budgets for FY 2019 and FY 2020, the FY 2021 approved budget, and the
FY 2022 requested budget are shown in the following table.

TABLE 3-1: SFD Budget, FY 2019 through FY 2022

FY 2022 Requested
FY 2019 Final Budget FY 2020 Final Budget FY 2021 Budget
Budget
$39,586,816 $40,399,118 $41,755,113 $42,941,684

Much like every other career fire department in the nation, the SFD’s budget is primarily
consumed by personnel costs. This includes salary, benefit, and retirement costs, as well as other
customary costs in this budget area. For the SFD, this budget area consistently represents
approximately 92 percent to 94-percent of the total budget. The next largest budget areas are
contractual services (largely for the operation and repair of facilities and equipment) and
automotive operational/repair costs. This leaves little discretionary funding for day-to-day service
delivery and other supplies, training and education, employee uniforms and protective clothing,
station improvements, and overall new programs/improvements of the department.

CAPITAL ASSETS

Facilities
Fire facilities must be designed and constructed to accommodate both current and forecast
trends in fire service vehicle type and manufactured dimensions. A facility must have sufficiently-
sized bay doors; circulation space between garaged vehicles; departure and return aprons of
adequate length and turn geometry to ensure safe response; and floor drains and oil separators
to satisfy environmental concerns. Station vehicle bay areas should also consider future tactical
vehicles that may need to be added to the fleet to address forecast response challenges, even
if this consideration merely incorporates civil design that ensures adequate parcel space for
additional bays to be constructed in the future.

Personnel-oriented needs in fire facilities must enable performance of daily duties in support of
response operations. For personnel, fire facilities must have provisions for vehicle maintenance
and repair; storage areas for essential equipment and supplies; space and amenities for
administrative work, training, physical fitness, laundering, meal preparation, and personal
hygiene/comfort; and—where a fire department is committed to minimize “turnout time”—
bunking facilities.

A fire department facility may serve as a de facto “safe haven” during local community
emergencies, and also serve as likely command center for large-scale, protracted, campaign
emergency incidents. Therefore, design details and construction materials and methods should
embrace a goal of having a facility that can perform in an uninterrupted manner despite

11
prevailing climatic conditions and/or disruption of utilities. Programmatic details, such as the
provision of an emergency generator connected to automatic transfer switching—even going
so far as to provide tertiary redundancy of power supply via a “piggyback” roll-up generator
with manual transfer (should the primary generator fail)—provide effective safeguards that
permit the fire department to function fully during local emergencies when response activity
predictably peaks.

Personnel/occupant safety is a key element of effective station design. This begins with small
details such as the quality of finish on bay floors and nonslip treads on stairwell steps to decrease
tripping/fall hazards, or use of hands-free plumbing fixtures and easily disinfected
surfaces/countertops to promote infection control. It continues with installation of specialized
equipment such as an exhaust recovery system to capture and remove cancer-causing by-
products of diesel fuel exhaust emissions. A design should thoughtfully incorporate best practices
for achieving a safe and hygienic work environment.

An ergonomic layout and corresponding space adjacencies in a fire station should seek to limit
the travel distances between occupied crew areas to the apparatus bays. Likewise, facility
design should carefully consider complementary adjacencies, such as lavatories/showers in
proximity of bunk rooms, desired segregations, and break rooms or fitness areas that are remote
from sleeping quarters. Furnishings, fixtures, and equipment selections should provide thoughtful
consideration of the around-the-clock occupancy inherit to fire facilities. Durability is essential,
given the accelerated wear and life cycle of systems and goods in facilities that are constantly
occupied and operational.

Sound community fire-rescue protection requires the strategic distribution of fire station facilities
to ensure that effective service area coverage is achieved, that predicted response travel times
satisfy prevailing community goals and national best practices, and that the facilities are
capable of supporting mission-critical personnel and vehicle-oriented requirements and needs.
Additionally, depending on a fire-rescue department’s scope of services, size, and complexity,
other facilities may be necessary to support emergency communications, personnel training,
fleet and essential equipment maintenance and repair, and supply storage and distribution.

National standards such as NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety,
Health, and Wellness Programs, outlines standards that transfer to facilities such as infection
control, personnel and equipment decontamination, cancer prevention, storage of protective
clothing, and employee fitness. NFPA 1851, Standard on Selection, Care, and Maintenance of
Protective Ensembles for Structural Firefighting and Proximity Fire Fighting, further delineates
laundering standards for protective clothing and station wear. Laundry areas in fire facilities
continue to evolve and are being separated from living areas to reduce contamination. Factors
such as wastewater removal and air flow need to be considered in a facility design.

The SFD operates out of twelve operational facilities strategically located throughout the city.
Each station houses around-the-clock crews, 365 days a year. Nine stations house one crew and
one piece of first response apparatus (an engine), while three stations house more than one
crew and two primary first response apparatus (engine and truck companies). Additionally, five
stations house auxiliary response rolling stock such as specialty response apparatus, which is
cross-staffed with engine or truck company personnel, and trailers, reserve fire apparatus, and
support vehicles. Two stations also house the on-duty Battalion Chief (district commanders) and
their response vehicle. The SFD makes efficient use of apparatus bay space.

A profile of each of the SPD’s fire facilities is provided in the following table.

12
TABLE 3-2: SFD Facility Information
Year Number of
Station Number Address
Built Apparatus Bays
1 825 E. Capital St. 1995 4
2 2810 Stevenson Dr. 1966 1 (Double Deep)
3 801 North Grand Ave. W. 1954 1
4 1900 Converse Ave. 1954 1
5 1723 Clay St. 1954 2
6 2156 S. 9th St. 1954 2
7 1428 Glenwood Ave. 1958 1
8 2051 W. Monroe Ave. 1969 2
9 2405 S. Chatham Rd. 1974 2
10 2401 Peoria Rd. 1987 2 (Double Deep)
11 1805 Toronto Rd. 1991 2
12 2925 S. Koke Mill 1996 2

Seven SFD facilities are in excess of 50 years of age and lack sufficient space and
accommodations for assigned crews and apparatus. Four facilities are 67 years old and one is
63 years old. The remaining five stations are from 25 to 47 years old. As more than 50 percent of
the facilities are in excess of 50 years old, they are susceptible to issues that are inherent in older
buildings; as well, they lack the space and modern amenities of contemporary public fire
facilities as outlined above. The SFD has plans to replace stations 6 (67 years old) and 8 (52 years
old) in the next 18 months.

Recommendation:
■ CPSM recommends as a planning objective that, over a three-year period, the SFD conduct a
facility assessment of all fire facilities. (Recommendation No. 1.)

This recommended assessment should entail a comprehensive inspection of fire facilities and
should include all building system components for evidence of movement, deterioration,
structural failure, probable useful life, need for repair and maintenance, need for replacement,
and associated replacement costs. CPSM further recommends the city and department retain
an engineering firm/consultant to conduct a comprehensive review of all SFD facilities, and
develop several options in a Comprehensive Fire Department Facilities Plan that will guide the
officials of the City of Springfield and the SFD in determining the necessity for
improvements/station replacements over the next five to ten years. Included in this plan should
be a budgetary and funding plan with facility prioritization, as well as what facilities are viable
based on structural and mechanical system usefulness, size/space for crew accommodations
and apparatus, and what facilities should be replaced.

Fleet
The provision of an operationally ready and strategically located fleet of mission-essential fire-
rescue vehicles is fundamental to the ability of a fire-rescue department to deliver reliable and
efficient public safety within a community.

The SFD currently operates a fleet of front-line fire apparatus as outlined in the following table.

13
TABLE 3-3: SFD Front-Line Fleet
Vehicle Description Year Age
2007 Pierce Quantum Engine 2007 14
2002 Pierce Dash (Refurb) Engine 2002 19
1999 Pierce Dash(Refurb) Engine 1999 22
2016 Pierce Arrow XT Engine 2016 5
2007 Pierce Quantum Engine 2007 14
2007 Pierce Quantum Engine 2007 14
2009 Pierce Quantum Engine 2009 12
2007 Pierce Quantum Engine 2007 14
2001 Pierce Quantum (Refurb) Engine 2001 20
2019 Pierce Enforcer Engine 2019 2
2005 Pierce Quantum Engine 2005 16
2019 Pierce Enforcer Engine 2019 2
2013 Pierce Aerial 2013 8
2013 KME Aerial 2013 8
2001 Pierce Aerial 2001 20

The SFD also has an assortment of reserve engine apparatus, specialty response apparatus, and
various command and light-response vehicles to include watercraft and special equipment
trailers.

The procurement, maintenance, and eventual replacement of response vehicles is one of the
largest expenses incurred in sustaining a community’s fire-rescue department. While it is the
personnel of the SFD who provide emergency services within the community, the department’s
fleet of response vehicles is essential to operational success. Reliable vehicles are needed to
deliver responders and the equipment/materials they employ to the scene of dispatched
emergencies within the city. Maintenance is performed by department fleet mechanics.

Replacement of fire-rescue response vehicles is a necessary, albeit expensive, element of fire

department budgeting that should reflect careful planning. A well-planned and documented
emergency vehicle replacement plan ensures ongoing preservation of a safe, reliable, and
operationally capable response fleet. A plan must also include a schedule for future capital
outlay in a manner that is affordable to the community.

NFPA 1901, Standard for Automotive Fire Apparatus, serves as a guide to the manufacturers that
build fire apparatus and the fire departments that purchase them. The document is updated
every five years using input from the public/stakeholders through a formal review process. The
committee membership is made up of representatives from the fire service, manufacturers,
consultants, and special interest groups. The committee monitors various issues and problems
that occur with fire apparatus and attempts to develop standards that address those issues. A
primary interest of the committee over the years has been improving firefighter safety and
reducing fire apparatus crashes.

The Annex Material in NFPA 1901 (2016) contains recommendations and work sheets to assist in
decision-making in vehicle purchasing. With respect to recommended vehicle service life, the
following excerpt is noteworthy:

14
 “It is recommended that apparatus greater than 15 years old that have been
properly maintained and that are still in serviceable condition be placed in
reserve status and upgraded in accordance with NFPA 1912, Standard for Fire
Apparatus Refurbishing (2016), to incorporate as many features as possible of the
current fire apparatus standard. This will ensure that, while the apparatus might
not totally comply with the current edition of the automotive fire apparatus
standards, many improvements and upgrades required by the recent versions of
the standards are available to the firefighters who use the apparatus.”

A primary impetus for these recommended service life thresholds is continual advances in
occupant safety. Despite good stewardship and maintenance of emergency vehicles in sound
operating condition, there are many advances in occupant safety, such as fully enclosed cabs,
enhanced rollover protection and air bags, three-point restraints, antilock brakes, higher visibility,
cab noise abatement/hearing protection, and a host of other improvements as reflected in
each revision of NFPA 1901. These improvements provide safer response vehicles for those
providing emergency services within the community, as well those “sharing the road” with these
responders.

The SFD does not have a structured replacement plan for first-line fire apparatus as outlined in
NFPA 1901. Because the SFD currently has in service first-line and reserve engine apparatus that
are approaching or at 20 years of service, due consideration should be given to planning now
to replace these vehicles.

Recommendations:
■ CPSM recommends the SFD develop, over a one-year period, a fire apparatus replacement
plan that includes replacement according to recommendations in accordance with
NFPA 1901, Standard for Automotive Fire Apparatus. (Recommendation No. 2.)
■ Planning objectives should include:

□ First-line apparatus should not exceed 15 years of service on the front line, and once they
reach this age, should be replaced with a new apparatus and then rotated to reserve
status. This replacement schedule should be inserted into the SFD fleet capital replacement
plan.
□ Apparatus in reserve status and which have not been properly maintained as evidenced by
maintenance records, or that are not operationally or roadworthy as evidenced by
maintenance records, should be placed out of service.
□ Apparatus in reserve status in excess of 20 years old should comply with NFPA 1901 and be
upgraded in accordance with NFPA 1912 if the department plans to continue to use this
apparatus.
□ Apparatus and major apparatus components such as the motor, fire pump, aerial ladder
assembly and hydraulics, chassis, and chassis components such as brakes, wheels, and
steering equipment should be maintained in accordance with manufacturer and industry
specifications and standards.
□ Apparatus components requiring annualized testing either fixed or portable such as fire
pumps, aerial ladder and aerial ladder assemblies, ground ladders, self-contained
breathing apparatus to include personnel fit-testing, and fire hose should be tested in
accordance with manufacturer and industry specifications and standards.

15
TRAINING PROGRAMS AND PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT
Training is, without question, one of the most important functions that a fire department should
be performing on a regular basis. One could even make a credible argument that training is, in
some ways, more important than emergency responses because a department that is not well-
trained, prepared, and operationally ready will be unable to fulfill its emergency response
obligations and mission. Education and training are vital at all levels of fire service operations to
ensure that necessary functions can be completed correctly, safely, and effectively. A
comprehensive, diverse, and ongoing training program is critical to the fire department’s level of
success.

An effective fire department training program must cover all the essential elements of that
department’s core missions and responsibilities. The level of training or education required, given
a set of tasks, varies with the jobs to be performed. The program must include an appropriate
combination of technical/classroom training, manipulative or hands-on/practical evolutions,
and training assessment to gauge the effectiveness of these efforts. Most of the training, but
particularly the practical, standardized, hands-on training evolutions should be developed
based upon the department’s own operating procedures and operations while remaining
cognizant of widely accepted practices and standards that could be used as a benchmark to
judge the department’s operations for any number of reasons.

Certain Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations dictate that
minimum training must be completed on an annual basis, covering various topics that include:

■ A review of the respiratory protection standard, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)

refresher and user competency training, SCBA fit testing (29 CFR 1910.134).
■ Blood Borne Pathogens Training (29 CFR 1910.1030).

■ Hazardous Materials Training (29 CFR 1910.120).

■ Confined Space Training (29 CFR 1910.146).

■ Structural Firefighting Training (29 CFR 1910.156).

In addition, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards contain recommendations for
training on various topics such as a requirement for a minimum of 24 hours of structural
firefighting training annually for each fire department member.

Since so much depends upon the ability of the emergency responder to effectively deal with an
emergency, education and training must have a prominent position within an emergency
responder’s schedule of activities when on duty. Education and training programs also help to
create the character of a fire service organization. Agencies that place a real emphasis on their
training tend to be more proficient in carrying out day-to-day duties. The prioritization of training
also fosters an image of professionalism and instills pride in the organization. Overall, the SFD has
an excellent robust and comprehensive training program and there is a dedicated effort
focused on a wide array of training activities.

The SFD Training Division is a stand-alone unit within the department; it is commanded by a
Division Chief. At the time of this analysis the incumbent commander was preparing to retire so
there will be a change of command/leadership. The Division Chief is assisted by two Battalion
Chiefs and one civilian support staff member. The position of EMS training coordinator was
vacant at the time of this analysis. Each of the training personnel have a portfolio of multiple
duties and responsibilities assigned them that are related to various operations, programs, and

16
liaison duties. They also work closely with the department’s safety officers to develop solutions
and remedial programs based upon relevant factors identified in accident and injury
investigations.

The SFD has a training program for fire, EMS, and technical responses that includes, but is
certainly not limited to:

■ Six-month new-hire academy that includes certification in Firefighter Level 1 and Emergency
Medical Technician–Intermediate training.
■ Haz-mat materials training.

■ Vehicle Extrication, Technical Rescue (rope rescue, water response, trench collapse, confined
space, building collapse), both basic and advanced.
■ On-going EMS basic and continuing education training.

■ Daily company in-service training.

During 2020 (despite the limitations imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic) the SFD Training
Division provided more than 60,000 staff hours of training to the department, an average of 306
hours per member. The SFD is to be commended for this commitment to training, which CPSM
considers to be a Best Practice.

All members of the SFD are certified to a minimum of the Firefighter I, Firefighter II, and EMT-Basic
levels. As will be discussed later in this section, many members have earned additional
certifications. The in-service training is usually topic-specific to either teach or practice important
skills and/or to allow crews to work together in simulated emergency situations.

The SFD utilizes Target Solutions as its platform for all department in-service training. Target
Solutions is a robust course catalog system for fire and EMS training that can be utilized to meet
all federal, state, and local public safety training mandates. Its inventory is comprised of more
than 1,000 online courses. Training personnel (and really any officer of member so authorized)
can post training and information materials online for personnel to reference. The training
schedule is posted prominently on Target Solutions and accessible to all personnel. Target
Solutions can also provide the platform for managing all training records and reports. The use of
this program helps to ensure that there is a reliable and accurate database for tracking and
retrieval of all department level training and for recording and tracking the status of
certifications for all personnel.

By department policy, all personnel and shifts are required to complete two training drills per
day. This training is intended to be a combination of the training that is assigned by the training
division augmented by additional training on topics identified by the Captains and Battalion
Chiefs. This has resulted in more flexibility in the training that is completed. With any good fire
department training program, at least 50 percent of the drills should include manipulative
(hands on) training to allow for the development of proficiency and to review critical skills.

CPSM was informed that the training standard is “difficult to meet” regarding the required 18
hours of documented training each month as required by ISO for maximum credit during an
evaluation. It is clearly reasonable that some days it will be difficult to complete the required
training as various time demands throughout the duty day, including emergency responses,
pose a competing demand for training time. Yet in many fire departments less-than-efficient
time management and even past practice can hinder attempts to provide training for on-duty
personnel. We believe that this is at least partially true in Springfield. Every effort should be made
to continue to make completion of the daily training task a priority.

17
Additional daily opportunities for training can be found during related activities such as
daily/weekly apparatus and equipment inspections and building pre-planning activities. Annual
inspection and testing requirements such as for hose, pumps, hydrant flow testing, etc. can also
provide additional training credits for personnel who participate. Training can and should also
be conducted during evening hours and on weekends.

On the EMS side of operations, the training programs and requirements are primarily driven by
the mandatory nature of continuing education and recertification requirements for various levels
of practitioners. If individual personnel or the agency were to not keep up with required training
and/or certification requirements they could lose the ability to practice or provide the
prescribed levels of service.

EMS training is also conducted through the Training Division and delivered by department
personnel certified to provide various levels of EMS certification. Much of the EMS training is
conducted in partnership with the Center for Learning and Innovation at Memorial Medical
Center. The SFD is to be commended for this partnership to deliver state-of-the-art EMS training,
which CPSM considers to be a Best Practice.

All levels of EMS training require continuing education credits on a multiyear cycle for
recertification. Whenever possible, fire training should be tied into EMS continuing education
credits, providing dual discipline benefit for personnel. As EMS incidents make up a large
percentage of the department’s responses, ensuring that these certifications continue to be
maintained should remain a significant component and priority of the department’s training
focus.

One area of major concern to CPSM was the fact that the EMS Coordinator position was
vacant.

EMS incidents comprise the largest percentage of calls that the SFD responds to, calling for EMS
training to be a priority. The vacancy in this position leaves the department without a lead EMS
instructor to coordinate and deliver critical EMS training. The other members of the Training
Division possess only EMT-Basic certification, so they lack the necessary certifications to teach
advanced EMS classes. Finally, the absence of the coordinator hinders the department’s ability
to complete quality assurance and quality improvement in EMS delivery as the coordinator is
responsible for reviewing reports, completing case studies, and acting as a liaison with the
resource hospital on a regular basis.

The SFD appears to be a well-educated organization, with approximately 60 percent of the

department reported to have at least an associate degree, with many also having earned
bachelor’s degrees. This is a much higher percentage than we find in most departments. In
addition, a number of members have earned their master’s degree, with a few also possessing
doctorate-level degrees. The members of the SFD are to be commended for this commitment to
furthering their professional education.

Professional development for fire department personnel, especially officers, is also an important
part of overall training. There are numerous, excellent opportunities for firefighters and officers to
attend training on a wide range of topics outside of Springfield, including those offered at
various state firefighting academies and at the National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland.
Beyond the practical benefits to be gained from personnel participating in outside training,
encouraging personnel to earn and/or maintain various specialized certifications such as Fire
Instructor or Fire Officer increases the positive professional perception of the organization and
can help to demonstrate a commitment to continued excellence.

18
As of the time of this assessment the SFD has no formal professional development program in
place. While many department officers have earned various professional certifications, both fire-
and EMS-related, some as the result of mandatory training, it has primarily been through their
own pursuit of professional development. Supervisors are not required to hold fire officer
certifications and there is no system for professional development in anticipation of promotion.

The following tables show the number of SFD personnel who possess various practitioner and
officer certifications.

TABLE 3-4: EMS Certificates Requiring Continuing Education

SFD Personnel
EMS Certificate
w/Cert.
AEMT / EMTI 74
EMT - Basic 98
EMT - Paramedic 34
Lead EMS Instructor 10
ACLS 107
BLS / CPR 205
PALS 107
PHTLS 107

TABLE 3-5: Office of State Fire Marshal Certificates Requiring Continuing

Education
SFD Personnel
OSFM Certificate
w/Cert.
Basic Operations Firefighter 87
Advanced Technician Firefighter 57
Fire Apparatus Engineer 204
Fire Officer I 41
Company Fire Officer 16
Fire Department Incident Safety Officer 19
Fire Officer II 17
Chief Fire Officer 1
Fire Service Instructor I 92
Fire Service Instructor II 39
Fire Service Instructor III 5
Training Program Manager 3
Basic Fire Prevention Officer 5
Fire Inspector I 6
Youth Firesetter Intervention Specialist 2
Fire Inspector II 3
Public Fire and Life Safety Educator I 6

19
 SFD Personnel
OSFM Certificate
w/Cert.
Advanced Fire Prevention Officer 2
Fire Investigator 6
Arson Investigator 3
Hazardous Materials First Responder−Operations 207
Hazardous Materials Technician 41
Hazardous Materials Incident Command 26
Rescue Specialist–Confined Space 38
Trench Operations 42
Trench Technician 36
Structural Collapse Operations 37
Structural Collapse Technician 26
Vehicle and Machinery Operations 199
Vehicle and Machinery Technician 1
Rope Operations 55
Fire Service Vehicle Operator 201
Rope Technician 26
Water Operations 1

SFD officers typically provide feedback to personnel regarding their performance but there is no
formal testing or skills assessments for fire training in the department. Training is a required activity
in the fire service and the ability to incorporate a formal testing process as part of the learning
effort is essential. EMS skills assessments, both practical and written, are regularly incorporated
into EMS training. Traditionally, fire departments are reluctant to incorporate skills testing into their
fire training components. However, an increasingly common way to evaluate the department’s
training program is through annual skills proficiency evaluations where all members of the
department are required to successfully perform certain skills and/or complete standardized
evolutions, either individually, or as part of a team.

The ability to monitor and record training test scores is beneficial from an overall proficiency
standpoint. In addition, training scores should be incorporated into the annual performance
appraisal process for both the employee, his or her supervisor, and the training staff. In addition,
the concept of adding a testing process to each training evolution adds to the importance and
seriousness in which these activities are carried out.

The SFD does not currently utilize a formal task book process to provide training guidance and
new rank orientation. A growing number of fire departments are employing task books for
personnel who aspire to (or in some cases have already been promoted to) higher rank. For the
SFD, task books would be appropriate for firefighter, engineer, captain, and battalion chief. The
successful completion of any task book can be considered as a prerequisite for promotion to
higher rank including captain or battalion chief, or alternatively, can be a required element of
the post promotional evaluation process.

The SFD is in the process of developing a 120-hour Company Fire Officer Course for members of
the department. Once completed, the course will be submitted to the state Fire Marshal’s Office
for approval. This would equate to an approximately three-week company officer academy.

20
Part of this program also involves the development of a Company Fire Officer Task Book, which
would be comprised of JPRs that personnel would complete following the classroom portion of
the academy. Personnel would have three years to complete the task book. The SFD is to be
commended for this endeavor and should make its implementation a priority.

The SFD should also consider conducting a formal one- or two-week engineer (apparatus
operator) academy to assist candidates with completing their task book requirements. This effort
can help provide newly promoted personnel with the tools needed to operate both
administratively and in field settings. The completion of the task book could also qualify
individuals to assume acting engineer and officer assignments in which they receive practical
experience and on-the-job training.

Beyond the establishment of requirements to achieve certain levels of certification for

promotion, the department should consider the implementation of a formal professional
development program for all department personnel. The program should attempt to strike an
appropriate balance between technical/practical task books, simulator training, formal
certifications, mentor relationship, and outside influences. Where practical, best practices
identified by the NFPA, ISO, IFSTA, IFSAC, Illinois State Fire Marshal, and the Center for Public
Safety Excellence (CPSE) should be incorporated.

Recommendations:
■ CPSM recommends the SFD make it a priority to fill the position of EMS Training Coordinator as
soon as possible for reasons delineated in this analysis. (Recommendation No. 3.)
■ The SFD should make a concerted effort to send as many officers as possible to the National
Fire Academy (NFA). Any officer who meets the admissions criteria should be encouraged to
enroll in the academy’s Executive Fire Officer Program. (Recommendation No. 4.)
■ CPSM recommends the SFD make it a priority to continue to develop and budget for a
company fire officer training and development program that is competency-based on
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC),
International Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA), and Illinois state fire training standards.
The program should focus on contemporary fire service issues including community fire
protection and emergency services delivery approaches, fire prevention practices, firefighter
safety and risk management and labor/staff relations; reviewing, approving, or preparing
technical documents and specifications, departmental policies, standard operating
procedures and other formal internal communications; improving organizational performance
through process improvement and best practices initiatives; and having a working knowledge
of information management and technology systems. (Recommendation No. 5.)
■ CPSM recommends the SFD develop task books for firefighter, engineer, and battalion chief, in
addition to the program under development for captain. Firefighters should be required to
complete their book as part of their probationary period. For other ranks, all personnel aspiring
for promotion to a higher rank should be required to successfully complete all elements of that
rank’s task book to be eligible to participate in the formal promotional testing process.
(Recommendation No. 6.)
■ The SFD should continue to develop training programs that lead to the following rank-
appropriate certifications becoming mandatory job requirements for supervisory and
command levels within the department: (Recommendation No. 7.)
□ Captain.

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 o Fire Instructor I.
o Fire Officer (or Company Fire Officer) I and II.
o IMS I-300.
o Illinois Fire Inspector (so companies can perform in-service inspections).
□ Battalion Chief.
o Fire Instructor II.
o Fire Officer III and/or Chief Fire Officer.
o IMS- I-400.
o Incident Safety Officer.
□ Division Chief
o Fire Officer IV.
■ CPSM recommends the SFD develop, and institute written and practical skills testing and
proficiency evaluations as part of the department’s comprehensive fire training program.
(Recommendation No. 8.)
■ The SFD should provide all companies and personnel with high-intensity training on various
subjects, including periodic live fire training on at least a semi-annual basis at an appropriate
location where appropriate training facilities, structures, and props are available.
(Recommendation No. 9.)
■ CPSM recommends that the City of Springfield should make it a high priority to provide
funding for the SFD to procure an appropriate training facility where it can safely perform
NFPA 1403-compliant live fire training evolutions for all personnel on at least a semi-annual
basis. (Recommendation No. 10.)

COMMUNITY RISK REDUCTION PROGRAMS

Community Risk Reduction activities are important undertakings of a modern-day fire
department. A comprehensive fire protection system in every jurisdiction should include, at a
minimum, the key functions of fire prevention, code enforcement, inspections, and public
education. Preventing fires before they occur, and limiting the impact of those that do, should
be priority objectives of every fire department. Fire investigation is a mission-important function
of fire departments, as this function serves to determine how a fire started and why the fire
behaved the way it did, providing information that plays a significant role in fire prevention
efforts. Educating the public about fire safety and teaching people appropriate behaviors on
how to react should they be confronted with a fire is also an important life safety responsibility of
the fire department.

Fire suppression and response, although necessary to protect property, have little impact on
preventing fire deaths. Rather, it is public fire education, fire prevention, and built-in fire
protection systems that are essential elements in protecting citizens from death and injury due to
fire, smoke inhalation, and carbon monoxide poisoning. The fire prevention mission is of utmost
importance, as it is the only area of service delivery that dedicates 100 percent of its effort to the
reduction of the incidence of fire.

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Fire prevention is a key responsibility of every member of the fire department, and fire prevention
activities should include all personnel. On-duty personnel can be assigned the responsibility for
“in-service” inspections to identify and mitigate fire hazards in buildings, to familiarize firefighters
with the layout of buildings, identify risks that may be encountered during firefighting operations,
and to develop pre-fire plans. On-duty personnel in many departments are also assigned
responsibility for permit inspections and public fire safety education activities.

Fire prevention should be approached in a truly systematic manner, and many community
stakeholders have a vested interest and/or responsibility in these endeavors. It has been
estimated that 70 percent to 75 percent of all the requirements found in building/construction
and related codes are related in some way to fire protection and safety. Various activities such
as plan reviews, permits, and inspections are often spread among different departments in the
municipal government and are often not coordinated nearly as effectively as they should be.
This lack of close interaction often results in friction between personnel with overlapping
authorities, and can allow important issues to “slip through the cracks.” It is critical that these
important functions are coordinated with similar activities in the city’s building inspection or
code enforcement and/or planning departments.

The Fire Safety Division in the SFD is commanded by a Division Chief. In addition to the Division
Chief, the division is staffed by eleven personnel. Of these, nine are Captains, of which one is a
senior arson investigator and eight are fire inspectors who also serve as fire investigators. There is
also a public education officer and a civilian administrative clerk.

The SFD Fire Safety Division has a wide-ranging portfolio of duties and responsibilities that it must
fulfill. These include plans review, witnessing fire prevention system tests, and ensuring code
compliance through inspections regarding both new buildings while under construction, as well
as ongoing maintenance inspections after the building or business is occupied. A significant
percentage of these responsibilities are mandated as part of the Illinois State building,
residential, and fire codes. The remainder are performed in accordance with nationally
recognized standards and best practices.

At the time of this assessment the City of Springfield and SFD were utilizing the following fire
prevention codes:

■ The International Fire Code – 2006 edition.

■ NFPA 101 Life Safety Code.

■ Chapter 94 of the Municipal Code of Ordinances.

The city is also utilizing the following building related codes:

■ The International Building Code.

■ The International Residential Code.

■ The international Existing Building Code.

■ The International Property Maintenance Code.

■ The National Electric Code.

■ Illinois State Plumbing Code.

■ International Mechanical Code.

23
■ Illinois Accessibility Code.

■ NFPA 101 Life Safety Code.

■ Chapter 170 –177 of the Municipal Code of Ordinances.

From 2018 through the 2020 the Fire Safety Division conducted the following number of
inspections:

■ 2021 (through 6/30) 860

■ 2020 1,818
■ 2019 1,818
■ 2018 3,309

While most fire departments experienced a significant drop in in-person inspections during the
height of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is unclear why the number of SFD inspections dropped
significantly from 2018 to 2019, which was pre-pandemic. With eight personnel assigned as
inspectors the 2019 and 2020 totals mean each inspector averaged just 227 inspections, down
from 414 in 2018. Based on the first six months of 2021, the number will drop even more this year.

There are many reasons why existing buildings should be inspected for fire code compliance.
The obvious purpose is to ensure that occupants of the building are living, working, or occupying
a building that is safe for them to do so. Some buildings are required to have specific inspections
conducted based on the type of occupancy and the use of the buildings such as but not
limited to healthcare facilities (hospitals, nursing homes, etc.), schools, restaurants, and places of
assembly. These inspections are mandated by various statutes, ordinances, and codes. The
inspections themselves are often limited to specific areas within the building and to specific time
frames. The fire inspectors will also witness tests of required fire protection systems and
equipment. Conversely, many businesses are not required to have any type of periodic fire
safety inspections.

Fire inspections can also identify violations and make follow-up inspections to ensure that
violations are addressed and that the fire code is enforced. In fire prevention, the term
"enforcement" is most often associated with inspectors performing walk-throughs of entire
facilities, looking for any hazards or violations of applicable codes. Educating the owner as to
the requirements, as well as the spirit and intent, of the code can also attain positive benefits for
fire and life safety.

With several thousand business located in Springfield, many of them large, along with numerous
schools, multifamily residential complexes, and other hazards, CPSM could not identify a
consistent or comprehensive program that ensures that all businesses and commercial
occupancies receive a routine “maintenance” fire prevention inspection on a regular, periodic
basis.

In many departments, on-duty firefighters can be assigned with the responsibility for “in-service”
inspections to identify and mitigate fire hazards in buildings, to identify risks that may be
encountered during firefighting operations, and to develop pre-fire plans (which the SFD already
does). On-duty personnel in many departments are also assigned responsibility for permit
inspections and public fire safety education activities. Fire department personnel are often able
to recognize hazards or violations, whereas inspectors are often able to identify features of a
specific property that could prove important during an emergency. Effective information sharing
enhances the ability of the fire department to protect the community.

24
Performing complex, technical inspections can be a very time-consuming, but necessary
endeavor. Nationwide, communities that have proactive fire inspection and code enforcement
programs in place often have a lower incidence of fire loss because many potential fire and life
safety hazards are identified and corrected before they cause or contribute to a fire.

Of course, having sufficient personnel to perform fire prevention inspections can be a costly
proposition. To help offset these costs, many jurisdictions are now assessing registration or
inspection fees for businesses. The fees assessed often vary widely by jurisdiction. As an example,
New Jersey has enacted a uniform statewide fee structure for different types of businesses, with
the annual registration fees for businesses ranging from $108 to $4,781. Fees for various permits
range from $54 to $641. Kern County, Calif., has established a fee schedule that covers a wide
range of permits, inspections, and services such as plans reviews. The fee schedule includes:

■ Operating Permits: $500 to $520.

■ Construction Permits: $35 to $1,000.

■ Fireworks Permit: $325.

■ Plan Review: $130 to $195.

■ Special Inspections: $450 to $520 and $140/hour (minimum two hours).

■ Fire Safety Inspections and Stand-bys (all two-hour minimum): $140/hour to $455/hour.

■ Administrative Fees: $10 to $1,000.

Some jurisdictions also assess a reinspection fee if an inspector must make a return visit to
determine if code violations have been abated.

At the time of our analysis, the SFD did not have in place any significant fees for fire prevention
and safety functions, and services.

Recommendations:
■ CPSM recommends that the SFD implement an in-service company inspection program at
residential, office, manufacturing, and retail business occupancy types throughout the city.
(Recommendation No. 11.)
■ CPSM recommends that the SFD provide appropriate training in conducting routine fire
prevention inspections to all field personnel, particularly company officers who will be
responsible for supervising these company programs. (Recommendation No. 12.)
■ CPSM recommends that the SFD complete a comprehensive review of the city’s actual costs
for providing fire prevention services. The review should include a full costing of providing all
fire prevention services, reviewing the city’s fire code(s), as well as a comparative analysis of
the fees charged for similar services by other fire departments. The review should be designed
to capture the full range of services provided and capture the full scope of the operational
permits and certain inspections required as part of a comprehensive fire prevention program.
(Recommendation No. 13.)
■ CPSM recommends that to fund the SFD’s fire prevention and safety activities the city should
consider the adoption of registration, inspection, and/or permit fees to offset the actual costs
of providing these services in the city. These fees should include inspections conducted by in-
service fire companies. (Recommendation No. 14.)

25
One trend that is being seen in a growing number of fire departments is the replacement of
many of the uniformed personnel assigned to fire prevention with civilian personnel. The use of
civilian personnel could make the Fire Safety Division much more fiscally efficient to operate.
Because there would still be a need for these personnel to have fire department experience so
they can apply the code requirements with a practical understanding of the “hows” and
“whys,” these positions might be an opportunity to continue to benefit from the experience of
retired personnel who are still interested in serving but in a different capacity. Should this staffing
model be adopted in whole or in part, the Fire Safety Division should continue to be
commanded by a Division Chief.

Recommendation:
■ CPSM recommends that the SFD should evaluate the feasibility and give serious consideration
to replacing uniformed personnel in the Fire Safety Division with certified civilian staff members.
CPSM strongly recommends that the Fire Safety Division remains an operational unit of the SFD.
(Recommendation No. 15.)

■■■■■

As previously mentioned, fire suppression and response, although necessary to minimize property
damage, have little impact on preventing fires. Rather, public fire education, fire prevention,
and built-in fire protection and notification systems are essential elements in protecting citizens
from death and injury due to fire. Automatic fire sprinklers have proven to be very effective in
reducing fire loss and minimizing fire deaths in residential structures. However, many
communities, Springfield among them, have been reluctant to impose code provisions that
require these installations. The city’s current fire code, the 2009 edition of the International Fire
Code, does not mandate the installation of these life safety systems.

Automatic sprinklers are highly effective elements of total system design for fire protection in
buildings, including one and two-family dwellings. Sprinklers help prevent fires from reaching
flashover in a compartment fire, which is key to reducing fire deaths and injuries. They save lives
and property, producing large reductions in the number of deaths per thousand fires, in average
direct property damage per fire, and especially in the likelihood of a fire with large loss of life or
large property loss. They do so much quicker and often more effectively and with less damage
than firefighters do.

No fire safety improvement strategy has as much documented life safety effectiveness as
fire sprinklers because they actually extinguish the fire or, at a minimum, hold it in check
and prevent flashover, until the arrival of the fire department.

The National Fire Protection Association reports that from 2010 to 2014, in fires in all types of
structures, when sprinklers were present in the fire area of a fire large enough to activate
sprinklers in a building not under construction, sprinklers operated 92 percent of the time.2 When
they operated, they were effective 96 percent of the time, resulting in a combined performance
of operating effectively in 88 percent of reported fires where sprinklers were present in the fire
area and the fire was large enough to activate sprinklers.3

In homes (including apartments), wet-pipe sprinklers operated effectively 89 percent of the time.
When wet-pipe sprinklers were present in the fire area in homes that were not under

2. Sprinklers in Reported U.S. Fires during 2010-2014. (2017). National Fire Protection Association.
3. Ibid.

26
construction, the fire death rate per 1,000 reported structure fires was lower by 81 percent.4 In all
structures, not just homes, when sprinklers of any type failed to operate, the reason most often
given (59 percent of failures) was shut-off of the system before the fire began.5

The effectiveness of residential sprinklers is proven by the data. According to the National Fire
Protection Association, the average cost nationally for installing automatic fire sprinklers in new,
single family residential structures is estimated to be $1.35 per square foot.6 For a 2,000 square-
foot home, the estimated cost would be approximately $2,700. This can be less than the cost of
granite countertops or a carpeting upgrade. In addition, many homeowner insurance policies
provide a discount for homes equipped with residential fire sprinklers. For these reasons and
because of superior residential fire sprinkler performance, CPSM recommends the city and fire
department consider a residential sprinkler requirement ordinance in all new one- and two-
family dwellings.

Recommendations:
■ CPSM recommends the City of Springfield consider the adoption of a more recent edition of
the International Fire Code (2009 or later) and adopt a city ordinance that requires the
installation of an automatic fire suppression (sprinkler) system in all new construction, including
one and two-family dwellings. CPSM further recommends that the SFD develop a compelling
public education program that includes discussing the significant life-saving benefits of
installing residential fire sprinklers in all new one- and two-family dwellings. (Recommendation
No. 16.)
■■■■

A growing development in fire prevention inspections is the use of Remote Video Inspection
(RVI). According to the NFPA, “RVI provides an effective alternative means for building
inspection, enabling one or more parties to remotely perform an inspection of a building or
building component.”7 The NFPA has released a new infographic that emphasizes the five key
considerations for an RVI inspection program: procedures, communication, technology,
verification, and completion (see following figure).

§§§

4. Ibid
5. Sprinklers in Reported U.S. Home Fires during 2010-2014. (2017.) National Fire Protection Association.
6. Home Fire Sprinkler Cost Assessment. The Fire Protection Research Foundation, 2013.
7. https://www.nfpa.org/News-and-Research/Publications-and-media/Press-Room/News-
releases/2020/New-infographic-from-NFPA-highlights-remote-inspection

27
FIGURE 3-1: Remote Video Inspection (RVI) Components

Image credit: National Fire Protection Association.

Until recently, use of RVI was limited and sporadic. The current COVID-19 pandemic and remote
work conditions combined with the typical extensive workload have pushed more jurisdictions to
consider alternatives to traditional inspection procedures and processes. Long term, the use of a
program such as this can help any community risk reduction program better manage often
unrealistic inspection workloads.

Recommendation:
■ CPSM recommends that the SFD explore the feasibility of utilizing Remote Video Inspections
(RIV) to assist with managing and modernizing the Community Risk Reduction fire inspection
workload. (Recommendation No. 17.)
■■■■

The SFD has a very active public fire education program, which is an important component of
an overall Community Risk Reduction program, particularly in the residential areas of the city.
This effort is very commendable and results in time and resources well spent. Nearly 75 percent
of all fires, fire deaths, and injuries occur in the home, an area where code enforcement and
inspection programs have little to no jurisdiction. Public education is the area where the fire
service will make the greatest impact on preventing fires and subsequently reducing the
accompanying loss of life, injuries, and property damage through adjusting people’s attitudes
and behaviors regarding fires and fire safety. This program should also include the aggressive
distribution and installation of smoke detectors, particularly in areas of the city with high
proportions of at-risk populations.

28
Recommendation:
■ CPSM recommends that the SFD implement a company/community level voluntary home
inspection and education program that targets vulnerable populations (young, elderly, and
disabled) with a goal of reducing fires and civilian casualties. (Recommendation No. 18.)
■■■■

The investigation of the cause and origin of fires is also an important part of a comprehensive fire
prevention system. Determining the cause of fires can help with future prevention efforts. At the
time of this evaluation, Battalion Chiefs and Captains are charged with initiating the fire origin
and cause determination process. When possible, they can make those determinations. When
needed, particularly when the fire involves a significant loss, injury, or fatality, a fire investigator
responds to perform an in-depth investigation. Based upon the number of actual fires that
occurred in Springfield during the period evaluated, CPSM believes the number of investigators
can be reduced to two on each shift who perform investigations as an ancillary duty.

Recommendations:
■ CPSM recommends that the SFD consider restructuring how fire investigations are performed,
with two investigators assigned to each shift with fire investigations as an ancillary duty.
Recommended rank for the investigators should be engineer. CPSM further recommends
maintaining one Senior Fire Investigator in the Fire Safety Division with the rank of Captain who
would coordinate and oversee fire investigation activities. (Recommendation No. 19.)
■ CPSM recommends that all SFD Battalion Chiefs and Captains should receive additional
training in fire origin and cause determination and be assigned primary initial responsibility for
this process. (Recommendation No. 20.)

29
SECTION 4. ALL HAZARDS RISK ASSESSMENT
OF THE COMMUNITY
POPULATION AND COMMUNITY GROWTH
The U.S. Census Bureau estimated the 2019 City of Springfield population to be 114,230. This is a
2.4 percent decrease from the 2010 decennial population of 116,250. As the city is about
59.5-square miles in land area, the population density based on the Census Bureau population
data is 1,920/square mile. Thus, Springfield has urban density.

The age and socio-economic profiles of the population can have an impact on the number of
requests for fire and EMS service. Evaluation of the number of seniors and children by fire
management zones can provide insight into trends in service delivery and quantitate the
probability of future service requests. In a 2018 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) report
on residential fires, the following key findings were identified for the period 2011–2015:8

■ Males were more likely to be killed or injured in home fires than females, and accounted for
larger percentages of victims (57 percent of the deaths and 54 percent of the injuries).
■ The largest number of deaths (19 percent) in a single age group was among people ages 55
to 64.
■ Half (50 percent) of the victims of fatal home fires were between the ages of 25 and 64, as
were three of every five (62 percent) of the non-fatally injured.
■ One-third (33 percent) of the fatalities were age 65 or older; only 15 percent of the non-fatally
injured were in that age group.
■ Children under the age of 15 accounted for 12 percent of the home fire fatalities and
10 percent of the injuries. Children under the age of 5 accounted for 6 percent of the deaths
and 4 percent of the injuries.
■ Adults of all ages had higher rates of non-fatal fire injuries than children.

■ While smoking materials were the leading cause of home fire deaths overall, this was true only
for people in the 45 to 84 age group.
■ For adults 85 and older, fire from cooking was the leading cause of fire death.

In Springfield the following age and socioeconomic factors should be considered when
assessing and determining risk for fire and EMS preparedness and response: 9

■ Children under the age of five represent 6.1 percent of the population.

■ Persons under the age of 18 represent 21.9 percent of the population.

■ Persons over the age of 65 represent 17.6 percent of the population.

■ Female persons represent 52.6 percent of the population.

8. M. Ahrens, “Home Fire Victims by Age and Gender”, Quincy, MA: NFPA, 2018.
9. https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/springfieldcityillinois

30
■ There are 2.20 persons per household in Springfield.

■ The median household income in 2019 dollars is $54,648.

■ Persons living in poverty make up 18.6 percent of the population.

■ Black or African-American alone represents the 19.9 percent of the population. The remaining
percentage of population by race includes White alone at 72.9 percent, American Indian or
Alaska Native alone at 0.1 percent, Asian alone at 3.1 percent, two or more races at 3.5
percent, and Hispanic or Latino at 2.8 percent.

RISKS AND HAZARDS

Environmental Factors10
The City of Springfield is prone to and will continue to be exposed to certain environmental
hazards that may impact the community. These include drought, extreme temperature (cold
and hot), river flooding, thunderstorms (some severe), tornadoes, and winter storms. A detail of
environmental risks include:

■ Because Springfield, like all other Midwestern cities, is exposed to eastern-moving fronts, it is
prone to strong thunderstorms that produce heavy winds, rain, and lightning. Accompanying
these storms is the potential for tornadic activity. The Illinois tornado season spans March
through May, although a tornado can occur at any time if the conditions exist to produce
these weather events. Sangamon County is a high-frequency tornado area according to the
Sangamon County Emergency Operations Plan.
■ Flooding from heavy rain (urban flooding due to poor drainage), the melting of snow,
presence of rivers and creeks, and the failure of dams or levees. Lake Springfield, Spaulding
Dam, and the Sangamon River with its many tributaries, more specifically Sugar Creek, expose
the city to these risks.
■ Although not a high risk, Springfield is exposed to earthquakes. Tremors have been
experienced in the county due to proximity to the New Madrid Fault Zone, which extends into
southern Illinois, and the Wabash Valley Fault Zone, which extends into southeastern Illinois. The
largest risk is interruption to natural gas lines and the electric grid from earthquakes distant to
the city.
■ Severe winter storms that produce high winds, snow and drifting snow, ice, extreme low
temperatures, as well as power outages and carbon monoxide emergencies.
■ Drought and extreme high temperatures causing dry brush, grass, and other vegetation which
leads to outside brush fires.

Building and Target Hazards

A community risk and vulnerability exercise evaluates the community as a whole, and with
regard to buildings, measures all buildings and the risks associated with each property and then
segregates the property as either a high-, medium-, or low-hazard depending on factors such as
the life and building content hazard, and the potential fire flow and staffing required to mitigate

10. Sangamon County Emergency Operations Plan

31
an emergency in the specific property. According to the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, these
hazards are defined as:

High-hazard occupancies: Schools, hospitals, nursing homes, explosives plants, refineries, high-
rise buildings, and other high life-hazard (vulnerable population) or large fire-potential
occupancies.

Medium-hazard occupancies: Apartments, offices, and mercantile and industrial occupancies

not normally requiring extensive rescue by firefighting forces.

Low-hazard occupancies: One-, two-, or three-family dwellings and scattered small business and
industrial occupancies.11

The construction type for residential structures in Springfield is a mix of wood frame with wood or
composite siding, and wood frame with brick veneer built on slab and crawl space with some
having basements.

Townhomes, condos, and apartments are also common in Springfield. Typical construction
includes wood frame with wood or composite siding, wood frame with brick veneer, and
ordinary (block/brick) construction. Some are high-rise structures that create vertical density.
Some apartment complexes include multistory structures and/or those in a campus footprint.

Other construction types for residential structures are present in Springfield as well and may
include masonry non-combustible and fire resistive. The city does have an assortment of
manufactured homes as well, which are typically made of light metal/wood construction with
various exterior coverings. The commercial/industrial structure building inventory is ordinary
(block/brick) construction, wood frame with composite siding, and masonry non-combustible.

Springfield has the following building types:

■ Single-family homes.

■ Condos, lofts, townhomes.

■ Apartment buildings.

■ Apartments above commercial.

■ Commercial/industrial structures.

■ Professional business/educational structures.

■ Strip malls.

■ Hotel structures.

■ Rooming/lodging structures.

■ Assisted living/long-term care structures.

■ Housing/commercial/professional business structures over 75 feet in height (high rise).

■ Public education structures.

11. Cote, Grant, Hall & Solomon, eds., Fire Protection Handbook (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection
Association, 2008), 12.

32
■ Public government buildings.

■ Correctional institutions (Springfield Jail, Sangamon County Jail, Sangamon County Juvenile
Center).
■ Hospitals/medical centers.

In terms of identifying target hazards, consideration must be given to the activities that take
place (public assembly, life safety vulnerability, manufacturing, processing, etc.), the number
and types of occupants (elderly, youth, handicapped, imprisoned, etc.), and other specific
aspects related to the construction of the structure.

Springfield has a variety of target hazards that include:

■ Hospital/medical center target hazards (St. Johns Hospital, Memorial Medical Center), as well
as Springfield Clinic and SIU Medical.
■ Hotel target hazards (life safety). There are four major hotels, all of which are high-rise
structures.
■ Correctional instituion target hazard (life safety/access).

■ Educational/school/public assembly target hazard (life safety).

■ Mercantile/Business/Industrial (life safety, hazardous storage and or processes).

■ Long-term care target hazard (life safety, vulnerable population).

■ Government infrastructure target hazard (hazardous storage/processes and continuity of

operations).
■ Government business target hazards (life safety, continuity of operations).

■ Private business target hazards (life safety).

■ High-rise target hazards (life safety) of which there are thirty of mixed occupancy types and
include housing units.

The city has a mix of low- and medium-risk structures that make up the majority of the target
hazard risk. High-hazard building risks are noted in this section as well. These include correctional
institutions, assisted/long-term care facilities, residential structures housing a vulnerable
population, hospital/medical centers, residential high-rise structures, public assembly structures
when occupied, and those that have hazardous materials used in processes or that are stored in
large quantities.

Human-Caused Risk
Human-caused or generated risks include civil unrest, large mass gatherings, cyber-attacks,
school violence, threats of violence with the potential of weapons of mass destruction use, As
Springfield is the state capital and county seat, there are several state and local government
buildings which could be targeted. Springfield also has two military bases within the city.

Transportation Factors
The road network in Springfield is typical of cities across the country and includes arterial streets,
which carry high volumes of traffic; collector streets, which provide connection to arterial roads

33
and local street networks as well as residential and commercial land uses; and local streets,
which provide a direct road network to property and move traffic through neighborhoods and
business communities. Springfield also has limited access highways that penetrate the city
boundaries (Interstates 55 and 72) and which include a series of on and off ramps, as well as
state and county roads that carry high volumes of traffic in and out of the city.

The Sangamon Mass Transit District operates fixed bus routes that provide service in the city
Monday through Saturday, as well as night routes until 9:45 p.m., Monday through Saturday. The
fixed-route buses provide service to medical facilities, major employment centers, tourist
attractions, major retail shopping centers, schools, colleges, professional buildings, the central
business district, and all major points of interest.12 Bus accidents when populated pose a mass
casualty response risk if multiple riders are injured.

The road network described herein poses risks for a vehicular accident, some at medium to high
speeds, as well as vehicular-versus-pedestrian risks. There are additional transportation risks since
tractor-trailer and other commercial vehicles traverse the roadways of Springfield to deliver
mixed commodities to businesses and residential locations. Fires involving these products can
produce smoke and other products of combustion risks that may be hazardous to health.

FIGURE 4-1: Springfield Major Roads and Highways

There are several active railroad lines that pass through the city, as well as the presence of
active rail freight yards. Rail traffic includes passenger and freight. Active rail lines include Norfolk
Southern, Union Pacific, Canadian National/Illinois Central, Illinois & Midland, Kansas City
Southern, and Amtrak. Primary freight commodities include containerized consumer goods,
transport of intermodal containers, grain, coal, chemicals and petroleum products, wastes, and
scraps. While not all of these commodities may be considered hazardous materials, fires

12. http://www.smtd.org/

34
involving these commodities can produce smoke and other products of combustion risks that
may be hazardous to health. Hazardous materials themselves present hazards to health risks.
There are also many at-grade crossings on connector and local roads, and these create
transportation risks. Other arterial streets and highways may not intersect directly with rail traffic,
which helps neutralize rail/vehicular traffic accidents.

FIGURE 4-2: Springfield Rail Lines13

13. Economic Corridor and Freight Study, Springfield - Sangamon Regional Planning Commission, 2010

35
Fire and Fire-Related Risk
An indication of the community’s fire risk is the type and number of fire-related incidents the fire
department responds to. CPSM conducted a data analysis for this project that analyzed SFD
incident responses and workload. During the period studied, the SFD responded to 6,476 fire-
related calls for service. The following table details the call types and call type totals for these
types of fire-related risks.

TABLE 4-1: Fire Call Types

Number of Calls per Call
Call Type
Calls Day Percentage
False alarm 2,363 6.5 12.0
Good intent 829 2.3 4.2
Hazard 476 1.3 2.4
Outside fire 233 0.6 1.2
Public service 2,311 6.3 11.8
Structure fire 264 0.7 1.3
Fire Total 6,476 17.7 32.9

Key takeaways from the data in this table are:

■ Fire calls for the year totaled 6,476 (33 percent of all calls when EMS responses are included),
an average of 17.7 calls per day.
■ False alarm calls were the largest category of fire calls at 36 percent of fire calls, an average
of 6.5 calls per day.
■ Structure and outside fire calls combined made up 7.7 percent of fire calls (2.5 percent of all
calls), an average of 1.4 calls per day.

EMS Risk
As with fire risks, an indication of the community’s pre-hospital emergency medical risk is the
type and number of EMS calls to which the fire department responds. During the CPSM data
analysis study period, the SFD responded to 11,466 EMS-related calls for service. The following
table outlines the call types and call type totals for these types of EMS risks.

TABLE 4-2: EMS Call Types

Number of Calls per Call
Call Type
Calls Day Percentage
Breathing difficulty 2,124 5.8 10.8
Cardiac and stroke 1,408 3.9 7.2
Fall and injury 937 2.6 4.8
Illness and other 5,140 14.1 26.1
MVA 670 1.8 3.4
Overdose and psychiatric 453 1.2 2.3
Seizure and unconsciousness 734 2.0 3.7
EMS Total 11,466 31.4 58.3

36
Key takeaways from the data in this table are:

■ EMS calls for the year totaled 11,466 (58 percent of all calls), an average of 31.4 calls per day.

■ Illness and other calls were the largest category of EMS calls at 45 percent of EMS calls, an
average of 14.1 calls per day.
■ Cardiac and stroke calls made up 12 percent of EMS calls, an average of 3.9 calls per day.

■ Motor vehicle accidents made up 6 percent of EMS calls, an average of 1.8 calls per day.

Aggregately (Fire, EMS, canceled calls, and mutual aid), the department received an average
of 53.9 calls per day, including 4.4 canceled calls (8 percent of all calls) and 0.2 mutual aid calls.

FIRE AND EMS DEMAND

The fire and EMS risk in terms of numbers and types of incidents is important when analyzing a
community’s risk, as outlined above. Analyzing where the fire and EMS incidents occur, and the
demand density of fire and EMS incidents, helps to determine adequate fire management zone
resource assignment and deployment. The following figures illustrate fire and EMS demand in the
SFD fire management zones. Figure 4-3 illustrates fire incidents (structural and outside fires, alarm
activations etc.); Figure 4-4 illustrates other types of fire-related incidents such as good intent
and public service calls, which are calls for service such as smoke scares (no fire), wires down,
lock outs, water leaks, etc.; Figure 4-5 illustrates the call density of false alarms; and Figure 4-6
illustrates EMS incident demand.

The following four demand maps (with current fire station locations shown) tell us that:

■ Structure/outside fire-related and EMS incident demand is highest in the central portion of the
city.
■ Fire/false alarm demand and other types of fire incidents (hazardous conditions, service calls)
is highest in the central portion of the city, with some intensity in other specific areas of the city
as illustrated.

§§§

37
FIGURE 4-3: Fire Incident Demand Density (Structure and Outside Fires)

38
FIGURE 4-4: Other Fire-Related Incident Demand Density

39
FIGURE 4-5: False Alarm Incident Demand Density

40
FIGURE 4-6: EMS Incident Demand Density

41
ISO RATING
The ISO is a national, not-for-profit organization that collects and evaluates information from
communities across the United States regarding their capabilities to combat building fires. The
data collected from a community is analyzed and applied to ISO’s Fire Suppression Rating
Schedule (FSRS) from which a Public Protection Classification (PPC™) grade is assigned to a
community (1 to 10).

A Class 1 represents an exemplary community fire suppression program that includes all of the
components outlined below. A Class 10 indicates that the community’s fire suppression program
does not meet ISO's minimum criteria. It is important to understand the PPC is not just a fire
department classification, but rather a compilation of community services that include the fire
department, the emergency communications center, and the community’s potable water
supply system operator.14

A community's PPC grade depends on:

■ Needed Fire Flows (building locations used to determine the theoretical amount of water
necessary for fire suppression purposes).
■ Emergency Communications (10 percent of the evaluation).

■ Fire Department (50 percent of the evaluation).

■ Water Supply (40 percent of the evaluation).

The City of Springfield has an ISO rating of Class 1, the highest rating. This rating was designated
in April 2018. The final rating included the following credit by category:

■ Emergency Communications: 9.64 earned credit points/10.00 credit points available.

■ Fire Department: 41.48 earned credit points/50.00 credit points available.

■ Water Supply: 35.22 earned credit points/40.00 credit points available.

■ Community Risk Reduction (Fire Prevention/Inspection, Public Education, and Fire Investigation
activities): 4.77 earned credit points/5.50 credit points available.

Overall, the community PPC rating yielded 90.09 earned credit points/105.50 credit points
available. There was a 1.02 point diversion reduction assessed as well, which is automatically
calculated based on the relative difference between the fire department and water supply
scores. 90.00 points or more qualify a community for a rating of 1.

The SFD component received significant point deficiency in the following area:

■ Credit for Company Personnel: 8.30/15.00

According to the City of Springfield, April 2018 PPC Summary Report, credit for company
personnel reviews the average number of on-duty firefighters and company officers available to
respond to reported first alarm structure fires in the city. The on-duty strength is determined by
the yearly average of total firefighters and company officers on duty considering vacations, sick
leave, holidays, “Kelley” days, and other absences. Station placement, response times, and
staffing will be reviewed later in this report.

14. SFD ISO PPC report; November 2019.

42
The following figure illustrates the dispersion of PPC ratings across the United States.

FIGURE 4-7: PPC Ratings in the United States15

COMMUNITY LOSS AND SAVE INFORMATION

Fire loss is an estimation of the total loss from a fire to the structure and contents in terms of
replacement. Fire loss includes contents damaged by fire, smoke, water, and overhaul. Fire loss
does not include indirect loss, such as business interruption.

In a 2019 report published by the National Fire Protection Association on trends and patterns of
U.S. fire losses, it was determined that home fires still cause the majority of all civilian fire deaths,
civilian injuries, and property loss due to fire. Key findings from this report include:16

■ Public fire departments responded to 1,318,500 fires in 2018, virtually the same as the previous
year.
■ Every 24 seconds, a fire department in the United States responds to a fire somewhere in the
nation. A fire occurs in a structure at the rate of one every 63 seconds, and a home fire occurs
every 87 seconds.
■ Seventy-four percent of all fire deaths occurred in the home.

■ Home fires were responsible for 11,200 civilian injuries, or 74 percent of all civilian injuries, in
2018.

15. https://www.isomitigation.com/ppc/program-works/facts-and-figures-about-ppc-codes-around-the-
country/
16. https://www.nfpa.org/News-and-Research/Data-research-and-tools/US-Fire-Problem/Fire-loss-in-the-
United-States

43
■ An estimated $25.6 billion in property damage occurred as a result of fire in 2018, a large
increase, as this number includes a $12 billion loss in wildfires in Northern California.
■ An estimated 25,500 structure fires were intentionally set in 2018, an increase of 13 percent
over the year before.
For the five-year period of 2016 to 2020, the SFD reports the following community loss information
as recorded from incidents the department responded to.

TABLE 4-3: Community Loss in Springfield, 2016–2020

Year Loss in Dollars as Recorded by the SFD
2016 $5,384,023
2017 $5,412,480
2018 $7,194,614
2019 $4,755,882
2020 $7,369,283

RESILIENCY
Resiliency as defined by the Center for Public Safety Excellence (CPSE) in the FESSAM 9th edition
is: “an organization’s ability to quickly recover from an incident or events, or to adjust easily to
changing needs or requirements.” Greater resiliency can be achieved by constant review and
analysis of the response system and focuses on three key components:

■ Resistance: The ability to deploy only resources necessary to safely and effectively control an
incident and bring it to termination, which is achieved through the development and
implementation of critical tasking and its application to the establishment of an effective
response force for all types of incidents.
■ Absorption: The ability of the agency to quickly add or duplicate resources necessary to
maintain service levels during heavy call volume or incidents of high resource demand.
■ Restoration: The agency’s ability to quickly return to a state of normalcy.

Resistance is controlled by the SFD through staffing and response protocol, and with SFD
resources dependent on the level of staffing and units available at the time of the alarm.

Absorption is accomplished through initial responding units available to respond by the SFD.

Restoration is managed by SFD unit availability as simultaneous calls occur, recall of staff to staff
fire units during campaign events when warranted, and efficient work on incidents for a quick
return to service.

Regarding restoration, the following four tables analyze the station availability to respond to
calls, and the frequency by number of hours that units are dedicated to a single or multiple
incidents.

44
TABLE 4-4: Station Availability to Respond to Calls
Calls in First Due Percent First Due Percent First Due Percent
Station
Area Responded Responded Arrived Arrived First First
1 1,875 1,583 84.4 1,566 83.5 1,522 81.2
2 987 784 79.4 780 79.0 747 75.7
3 866 801 92.5 798 92.1 782 90.3
4 1,384 1,306 94.4 1,301 94.0 1,285 92.8
5 1,873 1,788 95.5 1,781 95.1 1,749 93.4
6 1,199 1,045 87.2 1,043 87.0 1,018 84.9
7 2,362 1,799 76.2 1,785 75.6 1,717 72.7
8 2,073 1,407 67.9 1,386 66.9 1,324 63.9
9 1,268 988 77.9 958 75.6 916 72.2
10 1,158 1,001 86.4 997 86.1 978 84.5
11 1,817 1,519 83.6 1,510 83.1 1,478 81.3
12 1,957 1,564 79.9 1,555 79.5 1,499 76.6
Total 18,819 15,585 82.8 15,460 82.2 15,015 79.8
Note: For each station, we count the number of calls within its first due area where at least one SFD unit
arrived. Next, we focus on units from the first due station to see if any unit responded, arrived, or arrived first.

TABLE 4-5: Top 10 Hours with the Most Calls Received

Number Number Deployed
Hour
of Calls of Runs Hours
6/28/2019, 1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. 11 17 4.0
8/10/2019, 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. 11 13 2.8
1/16/2019, 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. 10 14 6.0
8/15/2019, 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. 10 11 3.1
6/18/2019, 11:00 p.m. to midnight 10 11 2.8
5/9/2019, 9:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. 10 11 2.5
1/12/2019, 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. 9 20 4.6
4/14/2019, 4:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. 9 19 8.9
1/28/2019, 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. 9 16 4.0
12/26/2019, 1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. 9 15 3.6
Note: Total deployed hours is a measure of the total time spent responding to calls received in the hour,
and which may extend into the next hour or hours. The number of runs and deployed hours only includes
SFD units.

45
TABLE 4-6: Call Workload by Station and Unit
Deployed Deployed Runs
Total Total Total
Station Unit Unit Type Minutes Minutes per
Hours Pct. Runs
per Run per Day Day
B01 Battalion chief 21.3 347.2 4.2 57.1 976 2.7
E01 Engine 16.1 690.4 8.4 113.5 2,576 7.1
Haz1 Special Response 67.2 3.4 0.0 0.6 3 0.0
1 Haz2 Trailer 67.2 3.4 0.0 0.6 3 0.0
Sq1 Squad 16.3 59.7 0.7 9.8 220 0.6
T01 Platform/truck 17.3 423.4 5.2 69.6 1,468 4.0
Total 17.5 1,527.3 18.6 251.1 5,246 14.4
E02 Engine 18.8 609.3 7.4 100.2 1,948 5.3
2 T02 Ladder 16.5 311.3 3.8 51.2 1,131 3.1
Total 17.9 920.6 11.2 151.3 3,079 8.4
3 E03 Engine 17.3 478.6 5.8 78.7 1,663 4.6
4 E04 Engine 17.1 646.4 7.9 106.3 2,262 6.2
5 E05 Engine 16.4 561.5 6.8 92.3 2,056 5.6
B02 Battalion chief 17.7 295.6 3.6 48.6 1,003 2.7
6 E06 Engine 15.3 395.3 4.8 65.0 1,555 4.3
Total 16.2 690.9 8.4 113.6 2,558 7.0
7 E07 Engine 16.2 475.9 5.8 78.2 1,762 4.8
8 E08 Engine 18.7 646.4 7.9 106.3 2,070 5.7
E09 Engine 20.8 658.0 8.0 108.2 1,894 5.2
9 M01 Mobile Ventilation 238.7 4.0 0.0 0.7 1 0.0
Total 21.0 662.0 8.1 108.8 1,895 5.2
E10 Engine 20.9 435.8 5.3 71.6 1,251 3.4
10 Haz3 Hazmat Supply 71.1 5.9 0.1 1.0 5 0.0
Total 21.1 441.7 5.4 72.6 1,256 3.4
11 E11 Engine 19.9 329.2 4.0 54.1 992 2.7
E12 Engine 20.0 530.0 6.4 87.1 1,592 4.4
12 T03 Truck 16.5 267.7 3.3 44.0 976 2.7
Total 18.6 797.7 9.7 131.1 2,568 7.0
E15 Reserve Engine 15.1 0.5 0.0 0.1 2 0.0
E18 Reserve Engine 7.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 1 0.0
Special
EMS1 20.0 25.0 0.3 4.1 75 0.2
SFD Designation
Special
EMS2 18.1 15.4 0.2 2.5 51 0.1
Designation
Total 19.1 41.0 0.5 6.7 129 0.4
Total 17.9 8,219.2 100.0 1,351.1 27,536 75.4

46
TABLE 4-7: Frequency Distribution of the Number of Calls
Calls in an Hour Frequency Percentage
0 1,279 14.6
1 2,093 23.9
2 2,104 24.0
3 1,413 16.1
4 910 10.4
5 540 6.2
6 259 3.0
7+ 162 1.8
Total 8,760 100.0

The next figure illustrates the calls by hour of day, and shows the peak times of the day a call is
likely to occur.

FIGURE 4-8: Calls by Hour of Day

Regarding the SFD’s resiliency to respond to calls, analysis of these tables and figure tells us:

■ On average the SFD made 75.4 runs per day.

■ On average, calls had a duration of 18 minutes per run.

■ On a station level, Station 1 made the most runs (5,246, or an average of 14.4 runs per day)
and had the highest total annual deployed time (1,527.3 hours, or an average of 4.2 hours per
day).

47
■ On a unit level, Engine 1 made the most runs (2,576, or an average of 7.1 runs per day), and
had the highest total annual deployed time (690.4 hours, or an average of 113.5 minutes per
day).
■ 38.5 percent of the time there was no call or a single call (no call overlap).

■ 24.0 percent of the time a call was overlapped with one other call.

■ 16.1 percent of the time there were three or more calls in an hour.

■ 21.4 percent of the time there were 4 or more calls in an hour.

■ 82.2 percent of the time the first due unit responded to calls in its first due area.

■ 79.8 percent of the time the first due unit arrived first in its first due area.

■ Hourly deployed time was highest during the day from 9:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.

■ The deployed time peaked between 11:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. (3.0 calls per hour).

■ The deployed time was lowest between midnight and 6:00 a.m.

Although 61.5 percent of the time there are overlapping SFD calls for service, on average 82.8
percent of the time, a first due SFD unit was available to respond to a call arriving in its first due
fire management zone first 79.8 percent of the time. The SFD has resiliency in its deployment
model based on its current deployment model. This may change based on the analysis that will
occur in the remaining portion of this report, particularly when the report contemplates the
assembling of an Effective Response Force and the critical tasks that must be completed
simultaneously rather than concurrently on the fireground.

RISK CATEGORIZATION
A comprehensive risk assessment is a critical aspect of creating standards of cover and can
assist the SFD in quantifying the risks that it faces. Once those risks are known, the department is
better equipped to determine if the current response resources are sufficiently staffed,
equipped, trained, and positioned. In this component, the factors that drive the service needs
are examined and then link directly to discussions regarding the assembling of an effective
response force (EFR) and when contemplating the response capabilities needed to adequately
address the existing risks, which encompasses the component of critical tasking.

The risks that the department faces can be natural or man-made and may be affected by the
changing demographics of the community served. With the information available from the
CPSM data analysis, the SFD, the city, and public research, CPSM and the SFD can begin an
analysis of the city’s risks, and can begin working towards recommendations and strategies to
mitigate and minimize their effects. This section contains an analysis of the various risks
considered within the SFD’s service area.

Risk is often categorized in three ways: consequence of the event on the community, the
probability the event will occur in the community, and the impact on the fire department. The
following three tables look at the probability of the event occurring (Table 4-8) which ranges
from unlikely to frequent; consequence to the community (Table 4-9), which is categorized as
ranging from insignificant to catastrophic; and the impact to the organization (Table 4-10),
which ranges from insignificant to catastrophic.

48
TABLE 4-8: Event Probability
Chance of Risk
Probability Occurrence Description Score
2%-25% Event may occur only in exceptional
Unlikely 2
circumstances.
Event could occur at some time and/or no
Possible 26%-50% recorded incidents. Little opportunity, reason, or 4
means to occur.
Event should occur at some time and/or few,
infrequent, random recorded incidents or little
Probable 51%-75% 6
anecdotal evidence. Some opportunity, reason,
or means to occur; may occur.
Event will probably occur and/or regular recorded
Highly incidents and strong anecdotal evidence.
76%-90% 8
Probable Considerable opportunity, means, reason to
occur.
Event is expected to occur. High level of recorded
Frequent 90%-100% 10
incidents and/or very strong anecdotal evidence.

TABLE 4-9: Consequence to Community Matrix

Impact Risk
Impact Categories Description Score
Life Safety ■ 1 or 2 people affected, minor injuries, minor
Insignificant 2
property damage, and no environmental impact.
Life Safety ■ Small number of people affected, no fatalities, and
small number of minor injuries with first aid
Economic and treatment. Minor displacement of people for <6
Minor Infrastructure hours and minor personal support required. 4
■ Minor localized disruption to community services or
Environmental infrastructure for <6 hours. Minor impact on
environment with no lasting effects.
Life Safety ■ Limited number of people affected (11 to 25), no
fatalities, but some hospitalization and medical
Economic and treatment required. Localized displacement of small
Infrastructure number of people for 6 to 24 hours. Personal support
satisfied through local arrangements. Localized
Environmental damage is rectified by routine arrangements.
Moderate 6
■ Normal community functioning with some
inconvenience.
■ Some impact on environment with short-term
effects or small impact on environment with long-
term effects.
Life Safety ■ Significant number of people (>25) in affected area
Significant impacted with multiple fatalities, multiple serious or 8
extensive injuries, and significant hospitalization.

49
 Impact Risk
Impact Categories Description Score
Economic and ■ Large number of people displaced for 6 to 24 hours
Infrastructure or possibly beyond. External resources required for
personal support. Significant damage that requires
Environmental external resources. Community only partially
functioning, some services unavailable.
■ Significant impact on environment with medium- to
long-term effects.
Life Safety ■ Very large number of people in affected area(s)
impacted with significant numbers of fatalities, large
Economic and number of people requiring hospitalization; serious
Infrastructure injuries with long-term effects. General and wide-
spread displacement for prolonged duration;
Environmental extensive personal support required. Extensive
damage to properties in affected area requiring
major demolition.
Catastrophic 10
■ Serious damage to infrastructure. Significant
disruption to, or loss of, key services for prolonged
period.
■ Community unable to function without significant
support.
■ Significant long-term impact on environment
and/or permanent damage.

TABLE 4-10: Impact on SFD

Impact Risk
Impact Categories Description Score
Personnel One apparatus out of service for period not to
Insignificant and exceed one hour. 2
Resources
Personnel More than one but not more than two apparatus
Minor and out of service for a period not to exceed one hour. 4
Resources
Personnel
More than 50 percent of available resources
Moderate and 6
committed to incident for over 30 minutes.
Resources
Personnel More than 75 percent of available resources
Significant and committed to an incident for over 30 minutes. 8
Resources
More than 90 percent of available resources
Personnel,
committed to incident for more than two hours or
Catastrophic Resources, 10
event which limits the ability of resources to
and Facilities
respond.

50
This section also contains an analysis of the various risks considered in the city. In this analysis,
information presented and reviewed in this section (All-Hazards Risk Assessment of the
Community) have been considered. Risk is categorized as Low, Moderate, High, or Special.

Prior risk analysis has only attempted to evaluate two factors of risk: probability and
consequence. Contemporary risk analysis considers the impact of each risk to the organization,
thus creating a three-axis approach to evaluating risk as depicted in the following figure.
A contemporary risk analysis now includes probability, consequences to the community, and
impact on the organization, in this case the SFD.

§§§

51
FIGURE 4-9: Three-Axis Risk Calculation (RC)

10 Magnitude of the Risk

8
Greater the surface area,
6 the greater the risk
4
RC=√𝑷𝑪𝟐 +𝑪𝑰𝟐 + 𝑰𝑷𝟐
2 2

The following factors/hazards were identified and considered:

■ Demographic factors such as age, socio-economic, vulnerability.

■ Natural hazards such as flooding, snow and ice events, wind events, wild land fires.

■ Man-made hazards such as rail lines, roads and intersections, target hazards.

■ Structural/building risks.

■ Fire and EMS incident numbers and density.

The assessment of each factor and hazard as listed below took into consideration the likelihood
of the event, the impact on the city itself, and the impact on SFD’s ability to deliver emergency
services, which includes automatic aid capabilities as well. The list is not all inclusive but includes
categories most common or that may present to the city and the SFD.

§§§

52
Low Risk
■ Automatic fire/false alarms.

■ BLS EMS Incidents.

■ Low-risk environmental event.

■ Motor vehicle accident (MVA).

■ Good intent/hazard/public service fire incidents with no life-safety exposure.

■ Outside fires such as grass, rubbish, dumpster, vehicle with no structural/life-safety exposure.

FIGURE 4-10: Low Risk

Low Risk
P
10
8
6
4
2
0

I C

§§§

53
Moderate Risk
■ Fire incident in a single-family dwelling where fire and smoke or smoke is visible, indicating a
working fire.
■ Suspicious substance investigation involving multiple fire companies and law enforcement
agencies.
■ ALS EMS incident.

■ MVA with entrapment of passengers.

■ Grass/brush fire with structural endangerment/exposure.

■ Low angle rescue involving ropes and rope rescue equipment and resources.

■ Surface water rescue.

■ Good intent/hazard/public service fire incidents with life-safety exposure.

■ Rail event with no release of product or fire, and no threat to life safety

FIGURE 4-11: Moderate Risk

Moderate Risk
P
10
8
6
4
2
0

I C

§§§

54
High Risk
■ Working fire in a target hazard.

■ Cardiac arrest.

■ Mass casualty incident of more than 10 patients but fewer than 25 patients.

■ Confined space rescue.

■ Structural collapse involving life-safety exposure.

■ High-angle rescue involving ropes and rope rescue equipment.

■ Trench rescue.

■ Suspicious substance incident with multiple injuries.

■ Industrial leak of hazardous materials that causes exposure to persons or threatens life safety.

■ Weather event that creates widespread flooding, heavy snow, heavy winds, building
damage, and/or life-safety exposure.

FIGURE 4-12: High Risk

High Risk
P
10
8
6
4
2
0

I C

§§§

55
Special Risk
■ Working fire in a structure of more than three floors.

■ Fire at an industrial building or complex with hazardous materials.

■ Fire in an occupied targeted hazard with special life-safety risks such as age, medical
condition, or other identified vulnerabilities.
■ Mass casualty incident of more than 25 patients.

■ Rail or transportation incident that causes life-safety exposure or threatens life safety through
the release of hazardous smoke or materials and evacuation of residential and business
occupancies.
■ Explosion in a building that causes exposure to persons or threatens life safety or outside of a
building that creates exposure to occupied buildings or threatens life safety.
■ Massive river/estuary flooding, fire in a correctional or medical institution, high-impact
environmental event, pandemic.

■ Mass gathering with threat fire and threat to life safety or other civil unrest, weapons of mass
destruction release.

FIGURE 4-13: Special Risk

§§§

56
SECTION 5. EMERGENCY DEPLOYMENT AND
PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION OF CURRENT DEPLOYMENT AND PERFORMANCE
Response times are typically the primary measurement for evaluating fire and EMS services.
Response times can be used as a benchmark to determine how well a fire department is
currently performing, to help identify response trends, and to predict future operational needs.
Achieving the quickest and safest response times possible should be a fundamental goal of
every fire department.

However, the actual impact of a speedy response time is limited to very few incidents. For
example, in a full cardiac arrest, analysis shows that successful outcomes are rarely achieved if
basic life support (CPR) is not initiated within four to six minutes of the onset. However, cardiac
arrests occur very infrequently; on average they are 1 percent to 1.5 percent of all EMS
incidents.17 There are also other EMS incidents that are truly life-threatening and the time of
response can clearly impact the outcome. These involve cardiac and respiratory emergencies,
full drownings, obstetrical emergencies, allergic reactions, electrocutions, and severe trauma
(often caused by gunshot wounds, stabbings, and severe motor vehicle accidents, etc.). Again,
the frequencies of these types of calls are limited.

An important factor in the whole response time question is what we term “detection time.” This is
the time it takes to detect a fire or a medical situation and notify 911 to initiate the response. In
many instances, particularly at night or when automatic detection systems (fire sprinklers and
smoke detectors) are not present or are inoperable, the detection process can be extended.
Fires that go undetected and are allowed to expand in size become more destructive and are
difficult to extinguish.

For the purpose of this analysis, response time is a product of three components: dispatch time,
turnout time, and travel time.

Dispatch time (alarm processing time) is the difference between the time a call is received and
the time a unit is dispatched. Dispatch time includes call processing time, which is the time
required to determine the nature of the emergency and types of resources to dispatch. Turnout
time is when the emergency response units are notified of the incident and ends when travel
time begins. Travel Time is the difference between the time the unit is en route and arrival on
scene. Response time is the total time elapsed between receiving a call to arriving on scene.

According to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 1710, Standard for the
Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations
and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments, 2020 edition (National Fire
Protection Association, Quincy, Mass.), the alarm processing time or dispatch time should be less
than or equal to 60 seconds 90 percent of the time. NFPA 1710 also states that turnout time
should be less than or equal to 80 seconds (1.33 minutes) for fire and special operations
90 percent of the time and 60 seconds (1.0 minute) for EMS. As noted above, turnout time is the
segment of total response time that the fire department has the most ability to control. Travel

17. Myers, Slovis, Eckstein, Goodloe et al. (2007). ”Evidence-based Performance Measures for Emergency
Medical Services System: A Model for Expanded EMS Benchmarking.” Pre-hospital Emergency Care.

57
time shall be less than or equal to 240 seconds for the first arriving engine company, 90 percent
of the time and, for the second due engine, 360 seconds 90 percent of the time. The standard
further states the initial first alarm assignment should be assembled on scene in 480 seconds, 90
percent of the time for low/medium hazards, and 610 seconds for high-rise or high hazards. Note
that NFPA 1710 response time criterion is a benchmark for service delivery and not necessarily a
CPSM recommendation.

The following figure provides an overview of response time performance and identifies
responsibility of the key components of the emergency communications center and the fire and
rescue department.

FIGURE 5-1: Incident Cascade of Events

State of Total Response Time

Incident Begins

Normalcy
Alarm

Alarm Handling Time-NFPA 1221

Event Transfer
Initiation Time
Turnout Time

Fire Department-NFPA 1710

Discovery of Alarm Travel Time
Event Answering Initiate On-

Incident Terminates
Time Scene
Action
Alarm Intervention
Processing Time
Time
Control and
Mitigate
Event

Regarding response times for fire incidents, the criterion is linked to the concept of “flashover.”
This is the state at which super-heated gasses from a fire are released rapidly, causing the fire to
burn freely and become so volatile that the fire reaches an explosive state (simultaneous ignition
of all the combustible materials in a room). In this situation, usually after an extended period
(often eight to twelve minutes after ignition but at times as quickly as five to seven minutes), and
a combination of the right conditions (fuel and oxygen), the fire expands rapidly and is much
more difficult to contain. When the fire does reach this extremely hazardous state, initial
firefighting forces are often overwhelmed, larger and more destructive fire occurs, the fire
escapes the room and possibly even the building of origin, and significantly more resources are
required to affect fire control and extinguishment.

Flashover occurs more quickly and more frequently today and is caused at least in part by the
introduction of significant quantities of plastic- and foam-based products into homes and
businesses (e.g., furnishings, mattresses, bedding, plumbing and electrical components, home
and business electronics, decorative materials, insulation, and structural components). These
materials ignite and burn quickly and produce extreme heat and toxic smoke.

58
NFPA 1710 outlines recommended organization and deployment of operations by career, and
primarily career fire and rescue organizations.18 It is the benchmark standard that the United
States Department of Homeland Security utilizes when evaluating applications for staffing grants
under the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) grant program.

As a benchmark, paragraph 4.1.2.1(3) of NFPA 1710 recommends the first arriving engine at a
fire suppression incident have a travel time of 240 seconds or less. Paragraph 4.1.2.1(4)
recommends that other than for a high-rise incident, the entire initial response of personnel be
on scene within eight minutes (480 seconds) travel time. It is also important to keep in mind that
once units arrive on scene, they will need to get set up to commence operations. NFPA 1710
recommends that units be able to commence an initial attack within two minutes of arrival, 90
percent of the time.

Although trying to reach the NFPA benchmark for travel time may be laudable, the question is,
at what cost? What is the evidence that supports such recommendations? NFPA 1710’s travel
times are established for two primary reasons: (1) the fire propagation curve; and (2) sudden
cardiac arrest, where brain damage and permanent brain death occurs in four to six minutes.

The following figure shows the fire propagation curve relative to fire being confined to the room
of origin or spreading beyond it and the percentage of destruction of property by the fire.

FIGURE 5-2: Fire Propagation Curve

Source: John C. Gerard and A. Terry Jacobsen, "Reduced Staffing: At What Cost?" Fire Service Today
(September 1981), 15–21.

According to fire service educator Clinton Smoke, the fire propagation curve establishes that
temperature rise and time within in a room on fire corresponds with property destruction and
potential loss of life if present.19 At approximately the ten-minute mark of fire progression, the fire
flashes over (due to superheating of room contents and other combustibles) and extends
beyond the room of origin, thus increasing proportionately the destruction to property and

18. NFPA 1710 is a nationally recognized standard, but it has not been adopted as a mandatory regulation
by the federal government or the State of Illinois. It is a valuable resource for establishing and measuring
performance objectives for the City of Springfield but should not be the sole determining factor when
making local decisions about the city’s fire and EMS services.
19. Clinton Smoke, Company Officer, 2nd ed. (Clifton Park, NY: Delmar, 2005).

59
potential endangerment of life. The ability to quickly deploy adequate fire staff prior to flashover
thus limits the fire’s extension beyond the room or area of origin.

Regarding the risk of flashover, the authors of an International Association of Firefighters (IAFF)
report conclude:

Clearly, an early aggressive and offensive initial interior attack on a working

structural fire results in greatly reduced loss of life and property damage.
Consequently, given that the progression of a structural fire to the point of
"flashover" (the very rapid spreading of the fire due to super-heating of room
contents and other combustibles) generally occurs in less than 10 minutes, two of
the most important elements in limiting fire spread are the quick arrival of
sufficient numbers of personnel and equipment to attack and extinguish the fire
as close to the point of its origin as possible. 20

The following figure illustrates the time progression of a fire from inception through flashover. The
time versus products of combustion curve shows activation times and effectiveness of residential
sprinklers (approximately one minute), commercial sprinklers (four minutes), flashover (eight to
ten minutes), and firefighters applying first water to the fire after notification, dispatch, response,
and set up (ten minutes). It also illustrates that the fire department’s response time to the fire is
one of the only aspects of the timeline that the fire department can exert direct control over.

FIGURE 5-3: Fire Growth from Inception to Flashover21

20. Safe Fire Fighter Staffing: Critical Considerations, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: International Association of
Fire Fighters), 5.
21. Source: Northern Illinois Fire Sprinkler Advisory Board.

60
EMS response times are measured differently than fire service response times. Where the fire
service uses NFPA 1710 and 1720 as response time benchmarking documents, EMS’ focus is and
should be directed to the evidence-based research relationship between clinical outcomes and
response times. Much of the current research suggests response times have little impact on
clinical outcomes outside of a small segment of call types. These include cerebrovascular
accidents (stroke), injury or illness compromising the respiratory system, injury or illness
compromising the cardiovascular system to include S-T segment elevation emergencies, and
certain obstetrical emergencies. Each require rapid response times, rapid on-scene treatment
and packaging for transport, and rapid transport to the hospital.

Paragraph 4.1.2.1(7) of NFPA 1710 recommends that for EMS incidents a fire unit with first
responder or higher-level trained personnel and equipped with an AED should arrive on scene
within four minutes of travel time (time after call is processed, dispatched, and the unit turns out).
An advanced life support (ALS) unit should arrive on scene within eight minutes travel time,
provided the fire department responded first with first responder or higher-level trained personnel
and equipped with an AED. According the NFPA 1710, “This requirement is based on
experience, expert consensus, and science. Many studies note the role of time and the delivery
of early defibrillation in patient survival due to heart attacks and cardiac arrest, which are the
most time-critical, resource-intensive medical emergency events to which fire departments
respond.” The next figure illustrates the chance of survival for a victim in cardiac arrest who does
not have access to critical emergency defibrillation.

FIGURE 5-4: Cardiac Arrest Survival Probability by Minute

Typically, a low percentage of 9-1-1 patients have time-sensitive and advanced life support
(ALS) needs. But, for those patients that do, time can be a critical issue of morbidity and
mortality. For the remainder of those calling 9-1-1 for a medical emergency, though they may
not have a medical necessity, they still expect rapid customer service. Response times for
patients and their families are often the most important measurement of the EMS department.
Regardless of the service delivery model, appropriate response times are more than a clinical
issue; they are also a customer service issue and should not be ignored.

In addition, a true emergency is when an illness or injury places a person’s health or life in serious
jeopardy and treatment cannot be delayed. Examples include severe trauma with
cardiovascular system compromise, difficulty breathing, chest pain with S-T segment elevation
(STEMI), a head injury, or ingestion of a toxic substance.22 The next figure illustrates the out-of-

22. Mills-Peninsula Health Blog, Bruce Wapen, MD.

61
hospital chain of survival for a stroke emergency, which is a series of actions that, when put in
motion, reduce the mortality of a stroke emergency.

FIGURE 5-5: Cerebrovascular Emergency (Stroke) Chain of Survival

If a person is experiencing severe pain, that is also an indicator of an emergency. Again, the
frequencies of these types of calls are limited as compared to the routine, low-priority EMS
incident responses. In some cases, these emergencies often make up no more than 5 percent of
all EMS calls.23

Cardiac arrest is one emergency for which EMS response times were initially built around. The
science tells us that the brain begins to die without oxygenated blood flow at the four- to six-
minute mark. Without immediate cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and rapid defibrillation,
the chances of survival diminish rapidly at the cessation of breathing and heart pumping
activity. For every minute without CPR and/or defibrillation, chances of survival decrease 7 to 10
percent. Further, only 10 percent of victims who suffer cardiac arrest outside of the hospital
survive.24

The following figure illustrates the out of hospital chain of survival, which is a series of actions that,
when put in motion, reduce the mortality of sudden cardiac arrest. Adequate EMS response
times coupled with community and public access defibrillator programs potentially can impact
the survival rate of sudden cardiac arrest victims by deploying early CPR, early defibrillation, and
early advanced life support care provided in the prehospital setting.

FIGURE 5-6: Sudden Cardiac Arrest Chain of Survival

From: “Out of Hospital Chain of Survival,”

https://cpr.heart.org/en/resources/cpr-facts-and-stats/out-of-hospital-chain-of-survival

23. www.firehouse.com/apparatus/article/10545016/operations-back-to-basics-true-emergency-and-due-
regard
24. American Heart Association. A Race Against the Clock, Out of Hospital Cardiac Arrest. 2014

62
SFD RESPONSE TIMES
There is no “right” amount of fire protection and EMS delivery. It is a constantly changing level
based on such things as the expressed needs of the community, community risk, and population
growth. So, in looking at response times it is prudent to design a deployment strategy around the
actual circumstances that exist in the community and the fire problem that is identified to exist.
The strategic and tactical challenges presented by the widely varied hazards that the
department protects against need to be identified and planned for through a community risk
analysis planning and management process as identified in this report. It is ultimately the
responsibility of elected officials to determine the level of risk that is acceptable to their
respective community. Once the acceptable level of risk has been determined, then
operational service objectives can be established. Whether looking at acceptable risk, or level
of service objectives, it would be imprudent, and probably very costly, to build a deployment
strategy that is based solely upon response times.

For this study, and unless otherwise indicated, response times and travel times measure the first
arriving unit only. The primary focus of this section is the dispatch and response time of the first
arriving units for calls responded to with lights and sirens (Code 3).

According to NFPA 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression
Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career
Departments, 2016 Edition:

■ Alarm processing time or dispatch time should be less than or equal to 60 seconds 90 percent
of the time.
■ Turnout time should be less than or equal to 60 seconds for EMS incidents, and 80 seconds
(1.33 minutes) for fire and special operations 90 percent of the time. As noted above, turnout
time is the segment of total response time that the fire department has the most ability to
control.
■ Travel time shall be less than or equal to 240 seconds for the first arriving fire suppression or EMS
unit, 90 percent of the time. The standard further states the initial full first alarm assignment for
structure fires should be assembled on scene in 480 seconds, 90 percent of the time.

It should be noted that NFPA 1710 response time criterion is a nationally accepted benchmark
for service delivery but not necessarily a CPSM recommendation. However, CPSM was informed
that the City of Springfield desires to meet the NFPA 1710 recommended benchmarks as much
as possible, and that maintaining acceptable response times are an important priority for the
mayor, governing body, and citizens of the city.

In 2019, SFD responded to 19,668 non-administrative calls. Of these, 264 were structure fire calls
and 233 were outside fire calls. In the response time analysis, CPSM included all calls within the
primary response area of the Springfield Fire Department to which at least one non-
administrative unit from SFD was dispatched and at least one unit from SFD arrived, while
excluding canceled calls. In addition, calls with a total response time of more than 30 minutes
were excluded. Finally, the data team focused on units that had complete time stamps, that is,
units with all components recorded, so that we could calculate each segment of response time.

Based on the methodology above, CPSM excluded 138 mutual aid given calls, 1,588 canceled
calls, 504 non-emergency calls, 10 calls where no units recorded a valid on-scene time, 44 calls
where the first arriving unit response was greater than 30 minutes, and 478 calls where one or

63
more segments of the first arriving unit’s response time could not be calculated due to missing or
faulty data. As a result, a total of 16,906 calls are included in the response time analysis.

The following table provides the average dispatch, turnout, travel, and total response time for
the first arriving unit to calls in the city.

TABLE 5-1: Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type
Time in Minutes Number
Call Type
Dispatch Turnout Travel Total of Calls
Breathing difficulty 1.4 1.3 3.5 6.2 2,086
Cardiac and stroke 1.4 1.2 3.5 6.1 1,375
Fall and injury 1.9 1.2 3.2 6.4 819
Illness and other 2.1 1.2 3.6 6.9 4,742
MVA 3.0 1.2 3.1 7.3 565
Overdose and psychiatric 2.2 1.3 3.5 7.0 440
Seizure and unconsciousness 1.3 1.2 3.3 5.8 718
EMS Total 1.8 1.2 3.5 6.6 10,745
False alarm 1.5 1.5 3.7 6.7 2,288
Good intent 2.1 1.4 3.9 7.4 763
Hazard 1.7 1.4 4.5 7.7 438
Outside fire 1.5 1.3 4.1 7.0 219
Public service 1.7 1.4 4.4 7.4 2,206
Structure fire 1.1 1.3 2.9 5.4 247
Fire Total 1.6 1.4 4.0 7.1 6,161
Total 1.8 1.3 3.7 6.7 16,906

Analysis of the data in this table tells us:

■ The average dispatch time for all calls was 1.8 minutes.

■ The average turnout time for all calls was 1.3 minutes.

■ The average travel time for all calls was 3.7 minutes.

■ The average total response time for all calls was 6.7 minutes.

□ The average total response time was 6.6 minutes for EMS calls and 7.1 minutes for fire calls.
□ The average total response time was 7.0 minutes for outside fires and 5.4 minutes for
structure fires.

A more conservative and stricter measure of total response time is the 90th percentile
measurement, that is, 90 percent of calls had a response time at or below a given number. The
following table includes the 90th percentile times for dispatch, turnout, travel, and total response
time to calls in Springfield, broken down by call type. The table shows a 90th percentile response
time of 9.8 minutes, which means that 90 percent of the time a call had a response time of no
more than 9.8 minutes.

64
TABLE 5-2: 90th Percentile Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type
Time in Minutes Number
Call Type
Dispatch Turnout Travel Total of Calls
Breathing difficulty 2.2 2.1 5.6 8.6 2,086
Cardiac and stroke 2.3 2.0 5.4 8.4 1,375
Fall and injury 3.1 1.9 5.3 9.0 819
Illness and other 3.4 2.1 5.9 10.0 4,742
MVA 5.4 1.9 5.4 11.3 565
Overdose and psychiatric 3.9 2.1 5.4 10.2 440
Seizure and unconsciousness 2.2 2.0 5.1 8.0 718
EMS Total 3.0 2.0 5.6 9.3 10,745
False alarm 2.4 2.4 6.6 10.0 2,288
Good intent 3.4 2.2 6.7 11.2 763
Hazard 2.8 2.3 8.0 11.7 438
Outside fire 2.6 2.2 7.5 11.1 219
Public service 2.7 2.3 7.3 10.8 2,206
Structure fire 2.1 2.1 4.8 7.6 247
Fire Total 2.7 2.3 6.9 10.5 6,161
Total 2.9 2.1 6.1 9.8 16,906

Observations that can be derived from data in the table tell us:

■ 90th percentile dispatch time was 2.9 minutes. Both fire (2.7 minutes) and EMS (3.0 minutes)
dispatching times are well above the recommended NFPA benchmark. At just under three
minutes for fire, and three minutes for EMS, this is totally inadequate and needs to be
addressed.
■ 90th percentile turnout time was 2.1 minutes and well above the NFPA 1710 benchmark of 1.0
minutes for EMS and 1.33 minutes for fire. This is equally inadequate and the one aspect of
total response time the fire department has the most direct control over.
■ Aggregate fire and EMS 90th percentile travel time was 6.1 minutes (well above the NFPA 1710
benchmark). In addition to the above concerns regarding dispatch and turnout times, the
extended 90th percentile travel time is most likely also partially a result of some significant
areas of the city, mainly around the outer perimeter of the city, along with several of the large
fire protection districts, that are outside of the 240-seconds first unit travel time benchmark.
■ 90th percentile total response time for all calls was 9.8 minutes, significantly exceeding the
NFPA 1710 benchmarks of 6.0 and 6.33 minutes, respectively.
■ 90th percentile response time was 9.3 minutes for EMS calls and 10.5 minutes for fire calls.

■ 90th percentile response time was 11.1 minutes for outside fires and 7.6 minutes for structure
fires.

The following table compares 2019 and 2020 average dispatch, turnout, travel, and total
response time for calls in SFD’s jurisdiction. The subsequent table compares the 90th percentile
response time components for the same two years.

65
TABLE 5-3: Comparison of Average Response Time of First Arriving SFD Unit in
2019 and 2020
2019 2020

Call Type Time in Minutes Time in Minutes

Total Total
Dispatch Turnout Travel Dispatch Turnout Travel
Response Response
EMS Total 1.8 1.2 3.5 6.6 1.8 1.3 3.8 6.9
Structure Fire 1.1 1.3 2.9 5.4 0.9 1.3 2.7 4.9
Outside Fire 1.5 1.3 4.1 7.0 1.4 1.4 4.0 6.9
Other Fire 1.7 1.4 4.1 7.2 1.5 1.4 4.1 7.0
Fire Total 1.6 1.4 4.0 7.1 1.5 1.4 4.0 6.9
Total 1.8 1.3 3.7 6.7 1.7 1.3 3.9 6.9

TABLE 5-4: Comparison of 90th Percentile Response Time of First Arriving SFD Unit
in 2019 and 2020
2019 2020

Call Type Time in Minutes Time in Minutes

Total Total
Dispatch Turnout Travel Dispatch Turnout Travel
Response Response
EMS Total 3.0 2.0 5.6 9.3 3.0 2.1 6.2 9.9
Structure Fire 2.1 2.1 4.8 7.6 1.7 2.0 4.4 6.6
Outside Fire 2.6 2.2 7.5 11.1 2.5 2.1 7.0 10.5
Other Fire 2.7 2.3 7.0 10.6 2.5 2.3 6.8 10.2
Fire Total 2.7 2.3 6.9 10.5 2.5 2.2 6.8 10.1
Total 2.9 2.1 6.1 9.8 2.8 2.2 6.4 10.0

Observations that can be derived from data in these tables tell us:

■ The average response times of 2019 and 2020 did not change significantly.

■ The 90th percentile response time for structure fires decreased by 1 minute from 2019 to 2020.

■ The 90th percentile total response times of 2019 and 2020 did not change significantly.

The call processing (at dispatch) and turnout (in the station) times for the SFD are much higher
than recommended by NFPA 1710 benchmarks. The latter time is the one area where the fire
department has the most control over and can serve to reduce overall response times.

Recommendation:
■ CPSM recommends that as a planning objective the SFD should take steps to definitively
improve both the dispatch time and incident turnout times for both fire and EMS incidents in
order to reduce overall response times to emergency incidents. (Recommendation No. 21.)

66
RESPONSE TIMES BY FIRE MANAGEMENT ZONES
Travel time is key to understanding how fire and EMS station location influences a community’s
aggregate response time performance. Travel time can be mapped when existing and
proposed station locations are known. The location of responding units is one important factor in
response time; reducing response times, which is typically a key performance measure in
determining the efficiency of department operations, often depends on this factor. The goal of
placement of a single fire station or creating a network of responding fire stations in a single
community is to optimize coverage with short travel distances, when possible, while giving
special attention to natural and manmade barriers, and avoiding response routes that can
create response-time problems.25 This goal is generally budget-driven and based on demand
intensity of fire and EMS incidents, which for this report were mapped earlier.

As already discussed, the SFD responds from twelve stations. As also discussed above, NFPA 1710
outlines national consensus travel time benchmarks of less than or equal to 240 seconds for the
first arriving engine company 90 percent of the time and the arrival of the second due engine in
360 seconds, 90 percent of the time. NFPA further outlines that the initial first alarm assignment
should be assembled on scene in 480 seconds, 90 percent of the time, for low/medium hazards
and 610 seconds for high-rise or high hazards. Hazards are outlined above as well in the
community risk analysis section.

This section expands the discussion on the travel times outlined above, depicting how travel
times of 240-, 360-, 480-, and 610-seconds look when mapped from the current fire station
locations. Illustrating response time is important when considering the location from which assets
should be deployed. When historic demand is coupled with risk analysis, more informed
decisions can be made about station locations. The following figures use GIS mapping to
illustrate 240-second, 360-second, 480-second, and 610-second travel time bleed estimates,
utilizing the existing street network from each current SFD station.

The GIS data for streets includes speed limits for each street segment and allows for “U-turns” for
dead-end streets and intersections. This analysis is not all-inclusive as it does not contemplate
traffic, weather, and such things as road obstructions caused by construction, public
transportation movement, and the like.

It is, however, important to note that while GIS-drawn, theoretical travel times do reflect
favorably on the adequacy of station facilities and their corresponding locations within the city
to support efficient fire and EMS response. Keep in mind, the benefits of favorable travel time
findings are only meaningfully realized when apparatus can be predictably staffed for response
and the department has aggressive turnout times.

The following table lists the locations of the city’s fire stations and the staffed resources deployed
from each.

25. NFPA 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency
Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Departments, 2010 Edition, 122.

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TABLE 5-5: Deployed Resources from Springfield Fire Department Station
Locations
Specialty
Station Address Staffed Operational Units
Units/Functions
Engine 1 Squad 1
Station 1 825 E. Capital St. Truck 1 Rescue 1
Battalion 1 HM-2
Engine 2
Station 2 2810 Stevenson Dr. Marine 1
Truck 2
Station 3 801 North Grand Ave. W. Engine 3 1
Station 4 1900 Converse Ave. Engine 4 1
Station 5 1723 Clay St. Engine 5 Fire Investigation Unit
Engine 6
Station 6 2156 S. 9th St.
Battalion 2
Station 7 1428 Glenwood Ave. Engine 7 1
Station 8 2051 W. Monroe Ave. Engine 8 Engine 18
Station 9 2405 S. Chatham Rd. Engine 9 MVU
Brush 1
Dive 3
Station 10* 2401 Peoria Rd. Engine 10 HM-3
Air Trailer
Foam Trailer
Dive 1
Station 11 1805 Toronto Rd. Engine 11
Dive 2
Engine 12
Station 12 2925 S. Koke Mill
Truck 3
Note: Station 10 is located outside of the city on the Illinois State Fairground.

The SFD provides fire and protective services within the municipal boundaries of the city and to
nine fire districts located in unincorporated areas of Sangamon County. Some of these
unincorporated areas are “islands” surrounded by the city. The city boundaries include an area
of 66 square miles of which approximately 59.5 square miles is land area.

The next figure illustrates the city’s municipal boundaries, fire station locations, and the fire
districts served by the SFD. The subsequent figure illustrates the first due area of each city fire
station along with response districts within those first due areas.

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FIGURE 5-7: SFD Fire Station Locations with Municipal and Fire District Response
Areas

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FIGURE 5-8: SFD Fire Station Locations with First Due Response Areas

In a 2011 Performance Measurement Data Report on fire and EMS, ICMA tabulated survey
information from 76 municipalities with populations ranging from 25,000 to 100,000 people. In this
grouping the average fire station service area was 11 square miles. 26 The median service area
for this grouping of communities was 6.67 square miles per fire station. 27 The SFD protects a
diverse, urban community of 66 square miles. Based upon the city’s area, this equates to a

26. Comparative Performance Measurement, FY 2011 Data Report - Fire and EMS, ICMA Center for
Performance Measurement, August 2012.
27. Ibid.

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service area of 5.5 square miles for each of the twelve current city stations from which fire
suppression units are deployed.

NFPA and ISO have established different indices in determining fire station distribution. The ISO
Fire Suppression Rating Schedule, section 560, indicates that first-due engine companies should
serve areas that are within a 1.5-mile travel distance. The placement of fire stations that
achieves this type of separation creates service areas that are approximately 4.5 square miles in
size, depending on the road network and other geographical barriers (rivers, lakes, railroads,
limited access highways, etc.). NFPA references the placement of fire stations in an indirect way.
It recommends that fire stations be placed in a distribution that achieves the desired minimum
response times. NFPA Standard 1710, section 4.1.2.1(3) and (6), suggests an engine placement
that achieves a 240-second (four-minute) travel time for the first arriving unit. Using an empirical
model called the “piece-wise linear travel time function” the Rand Institute has estimated that
the average emergency response speed for fire apparatus is 35 mph. At this speed, the distance
a fire engine can travel in four minutes is approximately 1.97 miles. 28 A polygon based on a 1.97-
mile travel distance results in a service area that, on average, is 7.3 square miles.29

It is important to make several notes regarding the polygon models and the associated travel
distances and times. First, the model often assumes that resources are distributed equally
throughout the service area, which is generally not the case. In addition, the road network, and
geographical barriers such as a railroad or limited access highways, can impact the distance
that units can cover over the same amount of time. That said, the formulas do provide a useful
reference when attempting to benchmark travel distances and response times.

The following figure illustrates 1.5- and 1.97-square mile polygons, along with 240-second travel
time bleeds around each SFD station. There is significant overlap in the station coverage areas,
particularly in the older areas of Springfield in and around downtown. This situation is not
uncommon in developed urban areas where fire can spread rapidly, and being able to rapidly
assemble an effective response force to handle all of the crucial tasks necessary for fire
suppression is mission critical. There is only limited overlap between station 12 and other response
areas. Stations 2 and 11 illustrate what an optimal situation would look like if all stations could be
ideally located with no overlap between their respective response areas.

28. University of Tennessee Municipal Technical Advisory Service, Clinton Fire Location Station Study,
Knoxville, TN, November 2012. p. 8.
29. Ibid., p.9

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FIGURE 5-9: SFD Station Locations, Showing 1.5- and 1.97-Square Mile Response
Area Polygons

Illustrating response time is important when considering the location from which assets should be
deployed. When historic demand is coupled with risk analysis, a more informed decision can be

72
made. The following figure uses GIS mapping to illustrate 240-second travel time bleed
estimates, utilizing the existing street network from each current SFD station. As currently
deployed, the majority of the City of Springfield appears to fall within the first unit travel time
benchmark of 240 seconds. In the more developed urban core of the city, there are locations
where there is an overlap of this benchmark response time as the stations are situated closer
together. This is not unusual as station location criterion have changed drastically over the years.

Conversely, there are some areas of the city, mainly around the outer perimeter of the city,
along with several of the large fire protection districts, that are outside of the 240-seconds travel
time benchmark. Some of these areas, particularly in the southern and southwestern areas of the
city, are experiencing growth and development which will invariably increase requests for
service into those neighborhoods. While the use of automatic aid, which will be discussed later,
can help significantly in these areas, it does not provide an overall solution to this challenge.

One of the key decisions the leadership of the City of Springfield will need to make going
forward is if the city’s goal is to continue to have the department meet recommended response
time benchmarks for the first unit on location time. If so, there will likely need to be long-term
revisions made to the deployment configuration to continue to achieve that target, particularly
as the city continues to grow and develop.

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FIGURE 5-10: SFD 240-Seconds Travel Time Bleeds from SFD Stations

The benchmark NFPA 1710 standard recommends that for structure fire responses the second
engine should arrive on the scene within 360 seconds of travel time, while the entire first alarm
assignment of resources and personnel for most types of occupancies (excluding high-risk and
high-rise incidents) be on the scene within 480 seconds of travel time. The following figure
illustrates the 360-seconds travel time bleed estimates utilizing the existing street network from

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each current SFD station. While there are a few pockets of the city that are not within a travel
time of 360 seconds, these are mostly in areas that are not developed and outside of the
existing street network.

FIGURE 5-11: SFD 360-Seconds Travel Time Bleeds from SFD Stations

Figure 5-12 illustrates the 480-seconds travel time bleeds. The entire city is within a travel time of
480 seconds and in some areas this extends into surrounding areas of the county. Although they

75
are primarily rural in character and have limited road networks and calls, large parts of the
Curran, Western, and North Side FPDs remain outside of even 480 seconds of travel time.

FIGURE 5-12: SFD 480-Seconds Travel Time Bleeds from SFD Stations

Finally, the NFPA 1710 standard recommends that for high-hazard and high-rise structure fire
responses the entire first alarm assignment of resources and personnel should be on the scene

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within 610 seconds of travel time. The following figure illustrates the 610-seconds travel time
bleed estimates utilizing the existing street network from each SFD station.

Although the 610-seconds travel time benchmark is primarily targeted at the full first alarm
response for fires in high-hazard and high-rise buildings, in this case it can also help to illustrate
some of the potential response travel times to the more remote areas of the SFD’s coverage
area. In this case, the entire SFD response area, except for the most remote part of the North
Side FPD, is within 610 seconds of travel time from a SFD station.

FIGURE 5-13: SFD 610-Seconds Travel Time Bleeds from SFD Stations

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The ISO Fire Suppression Rating Schedule also indicates that first-due ladder companies should
serve areas that are within a 2.5-mile travel distance. The placement of fire stations that
achieves this type of separation creates service areas that are approximately 6.25 square miles
in size, depending on the road network and other geographical barriers.

The following figure illustrates 2.5 mile-square polygons around SFD stations 1, 2, and 12, from
which ladder trucks are deployed.

FIGURE 5-14: SFD Ladder Company Station Locations Showing 2.5-Mile Square
Response Area Polygons

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The following table breaks down the average dispatch, turnout, travel, total response times, and
90th percentile response times by each fire protection district serviced by SFD, including the City
of Springfield, for EMS and fire calls, respectively.

TABLE 5-6: Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Fire Protection District
Time in Minutes
Call Fire Protection 90th Number
Type District Response Percentile of Calls
Dispatch Turnout Travel
Time Response
Time
Curran 3.3 1.3 5.8 10.4 18.0 35
East Side 1.6 1.2 3.9 6.8 9.2 379
Lake Springfield 1.9 1.1 5.2 8.2 12.2 50
North Side 1.6 1.1 4.3 7.0 11.7 283
South Lawn 1.7 1.1 2.9 5.7 7.6 82
EMS South Oak Knolls 1.7 1.2 3.1 6.1 7.9 34
South Side 1.7 1.1 3.8 6.7 9.2 219
Springfield (City) 1.9 1.2 3.4 6.5 9.2 9,293
Western 2.0 1.3 5.6 8.8 12.8 113
Woodside 1.7 1.2 3.8 6.7 8.9 257
Subtotal 1.8 1.2 3.5 6.6 9.3 10,745
Curran 1.6 2.0 7.3 10.9 14.3 16
East Side 1.6 1.2 4.6 7.4 10.9 157
Lake Springfield 1.9 1.1 5.7 8.7 13.1 20
North Side 1.5 1.5 5.4 8.5 14.6 126
South Lawn 1.4 1.1 3.7 6.2 9.0 65
Fire South Oak Knolls 1.5 1.2 4.2 6.8 8.7 23
South Side 1.6 1.3 5.3 8.2 11.5 119
Springfield (City) 1.6 1.4 3.9 6.9 10.2 5,437
Western 1.9 1.4 7.2 10.6 14.0 91
Woodside 1.8 1.4 4.7 7.9 10.9 107
Subtotal 1.6 1.4 4.0 7.1 10.5 6,161
Total 1.8 1.3 3.7 6.7 9.8 16,906

Conclusions that can be derived from the data in this table are:

■ Average response times varied significantly between fire protection districts.

■ Overall, the average response time was fastest to South Lawn at 5.7 minutes for EMS calls and
6.2 minutes for fire calls. This was 0.8 minutes faster (48 seconds) for EMS calls and 0.7 minutes
faster (42 seconds) for fire calls than the city proper.
■ The average response time was slowest to Curran.

■ The average response time within the City of Springfield was slightly faster than the overall
average.

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■ 90th percentile response times also varied significantly among fire protection districts.

■ Overall, the 90th percentile response time was fastest to South Lawn at 7.6 minutes for EMS
calls and South Oak Knolls at 8.7 minutes for fire calls. This was 1.6 minutes faster for EMS calls
and 1.5 minutes faster for fire calls than the city proper. However, the limited number of calls in
these areas can have an impact their average.
■ The 90th percentile response time was slowest to Curran for EMS incidents and to North Side for
fire calls.
■ The 90th percentile response time within the City of Springfield was slightly faster than the
overall 90th percentile, at 0.1 minutes (6 seconds) for EMS incidents and 0.3 minutes (18
seconds) for fire calls.

The table also displays the dispatch and turnout time issues as discussed earlier, both of which
need to be a focus for improvement department-wide.

Th department must consider all of the fire management zone variables that assist or hamper
response times to include how and where personnel and companies are located, and how
quickly they can arrive on scene, which play major roles in controlling and mitigating
emergencies.

STAFFING LEVELS AND STAFFING PATTERNS

The staffing of fire and EMS companies is a never-ending focus of attention among fire service
and governmental leadership. While NFPA 1710 and OSHA provide guidelines (and to some
extent the law, specifically OSHA in OSHA states) as to the level of staffing and response of
personnel, the adoption of these agency documents varies from state to state and department
to department. NFPA 1710 addresses the recommended staffing in terms of specific types of
occupancies. The needed staffing to accomplish the critical tasks for each specific occupancy
are determined to be the Effective Response Force (ERF). The ERF for each of these
occupancies is detailed in NFPA 1710 (2020 edition), section 5.2.4, Deployment.

The fire service has experienced tremendous technological advances in equipment,

procedures, and training over the past 50 years. Better personal protective equipment (PPE), the
widespread use of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), large diameter hose, better and
lighter hand lines and nozzles, and thermal imaging cameras are just a few of the numerous
advances in equipment and procedures that have allowed firefighters to perform their duties
more effectively, efficiently, safely, and with fewer personnel. However, the fact remains that the
emergency scene in general, and especially the fireground involving a structure fire, is a
dynamic, dangerous, frequently unpredictable, and rapidly changing environment where
conditions can deteriorate very quickly and can place firefighters in extreme personal danger,
particularly if there are not enough personnel on scene to handle all the critical tasks.

The operations necessary to successfully extinguish a structure fire, and do so effectively,

efficiently, and safely, requires a carefully coordinated and controlled plan of action where
certain operations such as venting ahead of the advancing interior hose line(s) must be carried
out with a high degree of precision and timing. Multiple operations, frequently where seconds
count, such as search and rescue operations and trying to cut off a rapidly advancing fire, must
also be conducted simultaneously. If there are not enough personnel on the incident initially to
perform all the critical tasks, some will, out of necessity, be delayed. This can result in an

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increased risk of serious injury or death to building occupants and firefighters, as well as
increased property damage.

Staffing and deployment of fire services is not an exact science. While there are many
benchmarks that communities and management utilize in justifying certain staffing levels, there
are certain considerations that are data driven and reached through national consensus that
serve this purpose as well. CPSM has developed metrics it follows and recommends that
communities consider when making recommendations regarding staffing and deployment of
fire resources.

Staffing is one component and the type of apparatus the personnel are deployed on and from
where (station locations) are the other two components that determine how fire and EMS
services are delivered. Linked to these components of staffing and deployment are eleven
critical factors that drive various levels and models from which fire and EMS departments staff
and deploy. These factors are:

Fire Risk and Vulnerability of the Community: A fire department collects and organizes risk
evaluation information about community risk (population and demographics; environmental;
transportation; fire and EMS call demand and call types), and individual property types. Based
on the rated factors, the assessment then derives a “fire risk score” and response strategy for
each community risk and property type. The all-hazard community risk and community
assessment is used to evaluate the community. Regarding individual property types, the
assessment is used to measure all property and the risk associated with that property and then
segregate the property as either a high-, medium-, or low-hazard/risk depending on factors such
as the life and building content hazard, the potential fire flow, and the staffing and apparatus
types required to mitigate an emergency in the specific property. The factors such as fire
protection systems are considered in each building evaluation. Included in this assessment
should be both a structural and nonstructural (weather, wildland-urban interface, transportation
routes, etc.) analysis. All factors are then analyzed and the probability of an event occurring, the
impact on the fire department, and the consequences on the community are measured and
scored.

Population, Demographics, and Socioeconomics of a Community: Population and population

density drives calls for local government service, particularly public safety. The risk from fire is not
the same for everyone, with studies telling us age, gender, race, economic factors, and what
region in the country one might live in contribute to the risk of death from fire. Studies also tell us
these same factors affect demand for EMS, particularly population increase and the more
frequent use of hospital emergency departments as many uninsured or underinsured patients
rely on EDs for their primary and emergency care, utilizing prehospital EMS transport systems as
their entry point.

Call Demand: Demand is made up of the types of calls to which units are responding and the
location of the calls. This drives workload and station siting considerations. Higher population
centers with increased demand require greater resources.

Workload of Units: The types of calls to which units are responding and the workload of each unit
in the deployment model. This defines what resources are needed and where; this links to
demand and station location, or in a dynamic deployed system, where to post units.

Travel Times from Fire Stations: Analyzes the ability to cover the fire management zone/response
area in a reasonable and acceptable travel time when measured against national benchmarks.
Links to demand and risk assessment.

NFPA Standards, ISO, OSHA requirements (and other national benchmarking).

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EMS Demand: Community demand; demand on available units and crews; demand on non-
EMS units responding to calls for service (fire/police units); availability of crews in departments
that utilize cross-trained EMS staff to perform fire suppression.

Critical Tasking: On-scene capabilities to control and mitigate emergencies is determined by

staffing and deployment of certain resources for low-, medium-, and high-risk responses. Critical
tasking is the individual or team level task that is required to be performed by on-scene
personnel based on the type of incident the firefighting and EMS force is responding to. These
are department-developed and measured against national benchmarks. Links to risk and
vulnerability analysis.

Effective Response Force: The ability of the jurisdiction to assemble the necessary personnel on
the scene to perform the critical tasks necessary in rapid sequence to mitigate the emergency.
The speed, efficiency, and safety of on-scene operations are dependent upon the number of
firefighters performing the tasks. If fewer firefighters are available to complete critical on-scene
tasks, those tasks will require more time to complete.

Innovations in Staffing and Deployable Apparatus: The fire department’s ability and willingness to
develop and deploy innovative apparatus (combining two apparatus functions into one to
maximize available staffing, as an example). Deploying quick response vehicles (light vehicles
equipped with medical equipment and some light fire suppression capabilities) on those calls
(typically the largest percentage) that do not require heavy fire apparatus.

Community Expectations: The gathering of input and feedback from the community, then
measuring, understanding, and developing goals and objectives to meet community
expectations.

Ability to Fund: The community’s ability and willingness to fund all local government services and
understanding how the revenues are divided up to meet the community’s expectations.

These factors are further illustrated in the following figure.

FIGURE 5-15: Staffing and Deploying Fire and EMS Departments

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While each component presents its own metrics of data, consensus opinion, and/or discussion
points, aggregately they form the foundation for informed decision-making geared toward the
implementation of sustainable, data- and theory-supported, effective fire and EMS staffing and
deployment models that fit the community’s profile, risk, and expectations. The City of Springfield
had not completed a comprehensive analysis of all these elements prior to this study. However,
part of CPSM’s analysis involved the completion of a basic community fire risk and target hazard
analysis.

The SFD currently has an authorized staff of 209 sworn/uniformed emergency response
personnel. Of these, 190 are assigned to field operations and are primarily responsible for the
delivery of both fire and EMS services, The remaining 19 uniformed personnel perform a variety of
administrative and support functions as their primary responsibility. The department also employs
five non-uniformed support personnel, primarily civilian office staff.

The department delivers field operations and emergency response services through a clearly
defined division of labor that includes middle managers (Battalion Chiefs), first-line operational
supervisors (Captains), technical specific staff (fire apparatus drivers/operators), and firefighters.
The city is divided into two operational battalions, north and south, each commanded daily by
a Battalion Chief. Field personnel work a three-platoon, 50.4-hours average work week that is
comprised of 24-hour long duty days. Personnel work 24 hours on duty, followed by 48 hours off
duty. Every tenth duty day is assigned as a Kelly Day, an additional day off, which reduces the
average work week below the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) overtime threshold for firefighters
of 53 hours per week.

The SFD operates out of twelve stations, staffing twelve engines, three ladders, and two
command vehicles. When staffing permits, a squad is also placed in service at station 1. The
department also has several specialty units such as a dive unit, marine unit, and hazardous
materials response unit along with several other staff and utility vehicles. In addition, the
department maintains three reserve engines, one reserve ladder, and two reserve rescues.

When fully staffed, and with the current resource deployment, each of the department’s three
shifts should optimally have a minimum of 64 personnel on duty each day. This would consist of
two Battalion Chiefs, 17 Captains (which includes two Battalion Chief aides), and 45 firefighters.
This would allow each fire suppression company to be adequately staffed with four personnel.
However, at the time of this study, minimum on-duty staffing was 49 personnel, with the engines
and ladders all staffed with three personnel consisting of an officer and two firefighters. This
staffing level can result in reduced operational effectiveness and efficiency, particularly during
the critical early minutes of a fire incident. It can also have an impact on firefighter safety. When
the number of personnel on duty falls below 49, overtime is utilized to bring it back to that level.

The following table shows SFD station/unit staffing.

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TABLE 5-7: Normal SFD Staffing/Deployment Model
Unit Normal Staffing
Station 1
Engine 1 1 Captain, 2 Firefighters
Truck 1 1 Captain, 2 Firefighters
Battalion 1 1 Battalion Chief, 1 Captain
Station 2
Engine 2 1 Captain, 2 Firefighters
Truck 2 1 Captain, 2 Firefighters
Station 3
Engine 3 1 Captain, 2 Firefighters
Station 4
Engine 5 1 Captain, 2 Firefighters
Station 6
Engine 6 1 Captain, 2 Firefighters
Battalion 2 1 Battalion Chief, 1 Captain
Station 7
Engine 7 1 Captain, 2 Firefighters
Station 8
Engine 8 1 Captain, 2 Firefighters
Station 9
Engine 9 1 Captain, 2 Firefighters
Station 10
Engine 10 1 Captain, 2 Firefighters
Station 11
Engine 11 1 Captain, 2 Firefighters
Station 12
Engine 12 1 Captain, 2 Firefighters
Truck 3 1 Captain, 2 Firefighters

Like many urban fire departments, and particularly those such as Springfield that protect state
capitols and are fiscally challenged, the SFD has not been able to maintain its authorized
staffing levels for several years. As of the field visit for this study in summer 2021, the department
had 22 vacancies in the Operations Division, which included seven personnel on light duty and
three personnel on long-term military leave. Several additional personnel are projected to retire
in the latter part of 2021 and early 2022.

All members of the department are entitled to various types of leave, including vacation,
personal, sick, injured on duty, and military (if applicable). Additional temporary vacancies are
created by personnel who are attending various types of training or participate in other
endeavors such as the members of state task forces.

Leave allotments to individual members, and the leave allowances per shift are specified in the
current collective bargaining agreement between the city and Springfield Firefighters, Local 37
of the International Association of Firefighters. Personal time off allowance per shift/per day

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includes 5/6 vacation day slots, 2 personal day slots, along with comp time and other
accrued/allowed benefit time.

One of the types of leave that often contributes to vacancies in the on-duty strength of a fire
department is the use of unscheduled sick leave, or in the context of concern over it, misuse or
even abuse of unscheduled sick leave. While personnel should have the right to use sick leave
when they are legitimately unable to perform their duties due to illness or injury, or for other
accepted uses as spelled out in the collective bargaining agreement and/or department
policy, they do not have the right to just consider it to be another bank of leave hours that they
can use whenever it is convenient for them. While there were some differences of opinion
among various stakeholders regarding whether there is a sick leave abuse problem in the SFD,
this is an issue that the department leadership should monitor closely and enact measures to
investigate and take appropriate action against personnel who misuse or abuse this type of
leave. Injured-on-duty leave should also be monitored for the same reasons.

While not every hour of leave taken by a department member results in the need to back fill, or
hire back to fill that position, with staffing already low, most of the time this is the case. The SFD
does have “floating” Captains who fill officer vacancies as needed. They also staff a two-person
squad at Station 1 when the daily staffing level is at 51 or above. However, when staffing falls
below that number, these personnel are detailed to other stations to maintain minimum staffing.
Once the staffing level falls below 49, the department uses overtime “hire back” personnel to
maintain 49 on duty.

While the COVID-19 pandemic created and continues to create some unique staffing
challenges for many fire departments, including Springfield, the number of vacant positions in
the SFD suggests that the use of significant overtime would still be a regular occurrence in order
to maintain staffing even in more “normal” times. In addition to the financial implications to the
municipality of the need for personnel to work additional overtime shifts, there is growing
evidence to suggest there are very real health and safety implications for firefighters as well, and
which could end up having tragic consequences.

Chief Don Abbott is a well-known fire service leader, author, and instructor who is regarded as a
leading authority regarding MAYDAY facts in the fire service in North America. Chief Abbott’s
analysis of data submitted to him by career fire departments noted a 35 percent increase in
MAYDAYS during a 13-week period from March through June 2020. This was during the initial
surge of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as during social issues and related civil emergencies.
Based upon interviews conducted with 156 personnel (primarily those firefighters who transmitted
the MAYDAY) Chief Abbot identified some trends, several of which have applicability to many
departments, Springfield included. These are:

1). Lack of control over excessive overtime, relaxing the rules because of civil, COVID, or related
situations and conditions. One incident noted was where a firefighter had a MAYDAY during his
71st straight hour of being on duty.

2). There have been several MAYDAYS (39 percent) where crews were working short-handed.

3). 81 percent occurred between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.

4). 77 percent occurred during an overtime shift, 43 percent while working a 24 hour + hour shift.

5). Average number of runs prior to MAYDAY (24-hour period) were 16 runs/or standby on protest
rallies (low 9 runs / high 26 in 24 hours).

6). 37 percent of the MAYDAY victims reported working short a crew member.

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7). 15 percent reported they did not remember the dispatch information (address, reason for the
run).

8). 37 percent reported using more air than normal.

9). THE NUMBER ONE cause of a MAYDAY was becoming lost or separated from a hose line.

10). 43 percent reported difficulty sleeping during their overtime shift.

11). Overtime ranged from working 48 hours (36%), 60 hours (23%), and 72 hours (17%) straight.

The critical message here related to staffing practices, and personnel working extended
amounts of overtime to fill vacancies, is that while each community challenge is different, and
Springfield is no exception, the fact is that firefighters require adequate rest (on and off duty) to
ensure they are physically and mentally prepared for duty. Thus, adequate staffing must be
planned for in advance based upon the unique needs of the community.

Staffing and deployment options for the city and the SFD are discussed in additional detail later
in this section of the report.

FIRE AND EMS OPERATIONS AND RESPONSE METRICS

Fire, rescue, and emergency medical system (EMS) incidents, and the fire department’s ability to
respond to, manage, and mitigate them effectively, efficiently, and safely, are mission-critical
components of the emergency services delivery system. In fact, fire, rescue, and EMS operations
provide the primary, and certainly most important, basis for the very existence of the fire
department.

Nationwide, fire departments are responding to more EMS calls and fewer fire calls, particularly
fire calls that result in active firefighting operations by responders. This is well documented in both
national statistical data as well as CPSM fire studies. Improved building construction, code
enforcement, automatic sprinkler systems, and aggressive public education programs have
contributed to a decrease in serious fires in many communities and, more importantly, fire
deaths among civilians. However, these trends are not as evident in older, densely developed
northeastern cities, particularly those that struggle with a high percentage of their population
comprised of at-risk groups socio-economically.

These trends and improvements in the overall fire protection system notwithstanding, fires still do
occur, occur with greater frequency in older, poorer urban areas, and the largest percentage of
those occur in residential occupancies where they place the civilian population at risk. Although
they occur with less frequency than they did several decades ago, when they occur today,
they grow much quicker and burn more intensely than they did in the past. As will be discussed
next, it is imperative that the fire department is able to assemble an effective response force
(ERF) within a reasonable time period in order to successfully mitigate these incidents with the
least amount of loss possible.

NFPA 1710
NFPA 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations,
Emergency Medical Operations and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire
Departments, 2020 edition (National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Mass.) outlines
organization and deployment of operations by career, and primarily career, fire and rescue

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organizations.30 It is the benchmark standard that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
utilizes when evaluating applications for staffing grants under the Staffing for Adequate Fire and
Emergency Response (SAFER) grant program. The ability to get enough personnel, along with
appropriate apparatus, to the scene of a structure fire is critical to operational success and
firefighter safety. Accomplishing this within the eight-minute time frame specified in NFPA 1710 is
an important operational benchmark.

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards are consensus standards and not the law.
Many cites and countries strive to achieve these standards to the extent possible without
generating an adverse financial impact to the community. Cities and communities must decide
on the level of service they can deliver based on several factors as discussed herein, including
budgetary considerations. Questions of legal responsibilities are often discussed in terms of
compliance with NFPA standards. Again, these are national consensus standards, representing
best practices and applied science and research.

NFPA 1710 was the first organized approach to defining levels of service, deployment
capabilities, and staffing levels for substantially career departments. Research work and
empirical studies in North America were used by NFPA committees as the basis for developing
response times and resource capabilities for those services as identified by the fire department.31

According to NFPA 1710, a fire department should base its capabilities on a formal all-hazards
community risk assessment, as discussed earlier in this report, and taking into consideration: 32

■ Life hazard to the population protected.

■ Provisions for safe and effective firefighting performance conditions for the firefighters.

■ Potential property loss.

■ Nature, configuration, hazards, and internal protection of the properties involved.

■ Types of fireground tactics and evolutions employed as standard procedure, type of

apparatus used, and results expected to be obtained at the fire scene.

According to NFPA 1710, if a community follows this standard, engine companies shall be
staffed with a minimum of four on-duty members33 and ladder companies shall be staffed with
five and six based on geographical isolation and tactical hazards.34 This staffing configuration is
designed to ensure a fire department can complete the critical tasking necessary on building
fires and other emergency incidents simultaneously rather that consecutively, and efficiently
assemble an effective response force. While CPSM is not necessarily recommending the City of
Springfield follow this standard, as this is a local jurisdictional decision, CPSM does support NFPA
staffing and deployment of resources benchmarking regarding the assembling of an adequate
Effective Response Force to control and mitigate the emergencies to which the SFD responds.

30. NFPA 1710 is a nationally recognized standard, but it has not been adopted as a mandatory regulation
by the federal government or the State of Illinois. It is a valuable resource for establishing and measuring
performance objectives for the City of Springfield but should not be the sole determining factor when
making local decisions about the city’s fire and EMS services.
31. NFPA, Origin and Development of the NFPA 1710, 1710-1
32. NFPA 1710, 5.2.1.1, 5.2.2.2
33. NFPA 1710, 5.2.3.1.1
34. NFPA 1710, 5.2.3.1.2, 5.2.3.1.2.1.,5.2.3.2.2.,5.3.2.3.2.2.1

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Code of Federal Regulations, NFPA 1500, and Two-In/Two Out
Another consideration, and one that links to critical tasking and assembling an Effective
Response Force, is that of two-in/two-out regulations. Essentially, prior to initiating any fire attack
in an immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) environment [with no confirmed rescue in
progress], the initial two-person entry team shall ensure that there are sufficient resources on-
scene to establish a two-person initial rapid intervention team (IRIT) located outside of the
building.

This critical tasking model has its genesis with the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, specifically 29 CFR 1910.134(g)(4).

CFR 1910.134: Procedures for interior structural firefighting. The employer shall ensure that:

(i) At least two employees enter the IDLH atmosphere and remain in visual or voice contact with
one another at all times;

(ii) At least two employees are located outside the IDLH atmosphere; and

(iii) All employees engaged in interior structural firefighting use SCBAs.35

According to the standard, one of the two individuals located outside the IDLH atmosphere may
be assigned to an additional role, such as incident commander in charge of the emergency or
safety officer, so long as this individual is able to perform assistance or rescue activities without
jeopardizing the safety or health of any firefighter working at the incident.

NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Health, Safety, and Wellness, 2018
Edition has similar language as CFR 1910.134)g)(4) to address the issue of two-in/two-out, stating
the initial stages of the incident where only one crew is operating in the hazardous area of a
working structural fire, a minimum of four individuals shall be required consisting of two members
working as a crew in the hazardous area and two standby members present outside this hazard
area available for assistance or rescue at emergency operations where entry into the danger
area is required.36

NFPA 1500 also speaks to the utilization of the two-out personnel in the context of the health and
safety of the firefighters working at the incident. The assignment of any personnel including the
incident commander, the safety officer, or operations of fire apparatus, shall not be permitted
as standby personnel if by abandoning their critical task(s) to assist, or if necessary, perform
rescue, this clearly jeopardizes the safety and health of any firefighter working at the incident. 37

In order to meet CFR 1910.134(g)(4), and NFPA 1500, the SFD must utilize two personnel to
commit to interior fire attack while two firefighters remain out of the hazardous area or
immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) area to form the IRIT, while attack lines are
charged and a continuous water supply is established.

However, NFPA 1500 allows for fewer than four personnel under specific circumstances. It states:
Initial attack operations shall be organized to ensure that if on arrival at the emergency scene,
initial attack personnel find an imminent life-threatening situation where immediate action could

35. CFR 1910.134 (g) 4

36. NFPA 1500, 2018, 8.8.2.
37. NFPA 1500, 2018, 8.8.2.5.

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prevent the loss of life or serious injury, such action shall be permitted with fewer than four
personnel.38

CFR 1910.134(g)(4) also states that nothing in section (g) is meant to preclude firefighters from
performing emergency rescue activities before an entire team has assembled.39

It is also important to note that the OSHA standard (and NFPA 1710) specifically references
“interior firefighting.” Firefighting activities that are performed from the exterior of the building
are not regulated by this portion of the OSHA standard. However, in the end, the ability to
assemble adequate personnel, along with appropriate apparatus, on the scene of a structure
fire, is critical to operational success and firefighter safety.

FIGURE 5-16: Two-In/Two-Out Interior Firefighting Model*

Note: *Four-person staffing, with single engine arrive at scene, or

Two 2-person staffed units (engine/engine; engine/ambulance) arrive at scene.

It was consistently reported to CPSM that the SFD does try to follow the provisions of the OSHA
Two-In/Two-Out regulation regarding waiting to initiate an interior fire attack until four personnel
are assembled when there are no rescues to be made. The fact that other units usually arrive
quickly to assist is also an important consideration. The department is to be commended for this
adherence.

Critical Tasking and Effective Response Force

Critical tasks are those activities that must be conducted in a timely manner by responders at
emergency incidents to control the situation and stop loss. Critical tasking for fire operations is

38. NFPA 1500, 2018 8.8.2.10.

39. CFR 190.134, (g).

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the minimum number of personnel needed to perform the tasks required to effectively control a
fire. The same is true for EMS as there are specific patient care tasks that must be completed in
succession and often together to support positive prehospital care. The specific number of
people required to perform all the critical tasks associated with an identified risk is referred to as
an Effective Response Force (ERF). The goal is to deliver an ERF within a prescribed time frame.
NFPA 1710, as a nationally recognized consensus standard on staffing and deployment for
career fire departments, provides a benchmark for ERF.40

To effectively respond to and mitigate requests for emergency services, an agency must have a
thorough understanding of its community’s risk factors, both fire and EMS. Once identified and
understood, each category or level of risk is associated with the necessary resources and actions
required to mitigate it. This is accomplished through a critical task analysis. The exercise of
matching operational asset deployments to risk, or critical tasking, considers multiple factors
including national standards, performance measures, and the safety of responders.

During fire incidents, to be effective, critical tasking must assign enough personnel so that all
identified functions can be performed simultaneously. However, it is important to note that
secondary support functions may be handled by initial response personnel once they have
completed their primary assignment. Thus, while an incident may end up requiring a greater
commitment of resources or a specialized response, a properly executed critical task analysis will
provide adequate resources to immediately begin bringing the incident under control.

The Center for Public Safety Excellence (CPSE) has also established benchmarks regarding
staffing and deployment. CPSE sets standards for agencies seeking and achieving accreditation
through the Commission on Fire Accreditation International (CFAI). CFAI uses standards set forth
in the Community Risk Assessment Manual: Standards of Cover, 6th edition, to provide guidance
in staffing and deployment to agencies desiring accreditation through Core Competencies.

Core Competency 2C.4 requires that “the agency conduct a critical task analysis of each risk
category and risk class to determine the first due and effective response force capabilities, and
to have a process in place to validate and document the results.” The process considers the
number of personnel needed to perform the necessary emergency scene operations.
Completion of the process also helps to identify any gaps in the agency’s emergency scene
practices.

Regarding the implementation of an ERF and its aggregate effect on fireground operations,
there has been much research done by several fire departments on the effects of various
staffing levels. These studies have consistently confirmed that company efficiency and
effectiveness decrease substantially and injuries increase when company staffing falls below
four personnel. A comprehensive yet scientifically conducted, verified, and validated study
titled Multiphase Study on Firefighter Safety and the Deployment of Resources was performed by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Worcester Polytechnic Institute
(WPI), in conjunction with the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the International
Association of Fire Fighters, and the Center for Public Safety Excellence. For the first time,
quantitative evidence has been produced regarding the impact of crew size on accomplishing
critical tasks. Additionally, continual research from UL has provided tactical insights that shed
further light on the needs related to crew size and firefighter safety. This body of research
includes:

40. It is important to note that compliance with NFPA 1710 has not been mandated in the State of Illinois or
by the federal government. It is considered a “best practice” that fire departments strive to achieve.

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■ An April 2010 report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments from the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST).
■ A December 2010 report on the Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and
Contemporary Residential Construction (UL).

■ An April 2013 report on High-Rise Fireground Field Experiments from the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST-HR).

Additional collaborative efforts such as the Governor’s Island (July 2012) and Spartanburg Burns
(January 2013) continue to expand upon and reinforce the findings of NIST and UL.

As stated, some of these studies’ findings have a direct impact on the exercise of critical tasking.
For example, as UL studied the impact of ventilation on fire behavior, it was able to obtain
empirical data about the effect of water application on fire spread and occupant tenability.
The research clearly indicates that the external application of a fire stream, especially a straight
stream, does not “push fire” or decrease tenability in any adjacent rooms. Therefore, during the
deployment of resources for the critical task of fire attack, consideration must be given to the
option of applying water to the fire from the exterior when able. This approach enables a fire
attack that can begin prior to the establishment of an IRIT as well as decreases the time to
getting water on the fire, which has the greatest impact on occupant survivability.

The NIST studies examined the impact of crew size and stagger on the timing of fireground task
initiation, duration, and completion. Although each study showed crew size as having an impact
on time-to-task, consideration must be given to what tasks were affected and to what extent.
For example, four-person crews operating at a low-hazard structure fire completed all fireground
tasks (on average) 5.1 minutes or 25 percent faster than three-person crews.

■ Four-person firefighting crews were able to complete 22 essential firefighting and rescue tasks
in a typical residential structure 30 percent faster than two-person crews and 25 percent faster
than three-person crews.
■ The four-person crews were able to deliver water to a similar sized fire 15 percent faster than
the two-person crews and 6 percent faster than three-person crews, steps that help to reduce
property damage and reduce danger/risks to firefighters. The latter time represents a 34-
second difference.
■ Four-person crews were able to complete critical search and rescue operations 30 percent
faster than two-person crews and 6 percent faster than three-person crews. The latter time
represents a 23-second difference. The “rescue time” difference from a four-person to a three-
person crew is seven seconds.

When considering critical tasking for the deployment of an ERF for fire suppression operations,
the SFD will be able to handle most incidents with just its own resources. For larger, more
significant, or complex incidents, the department will need to consider resources from
surrounding automatic and mutual aid partners. However, being primarily comprised of
volunteer organizations, the availability of surrounding departments to provide a sufficient
number of properly trained, fully qualified firefighters for a major fire may be an option that has
limited operational value.

It is also unlikely that the SFD would be capable of handling two simultaneous or significantly
overlapping major structure fires. It is also important to note that the impact of crew size as it
relates to high-risk categories is greater than its low-risk implications and should be considered
when staffing units that cover a greater amount of risk. As SFD’s engine and truck companies are

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staffed with just three personnel, this will ultimately present some significant operational
challenges and concerns (as it does in many other communities that utilize similar staffing
models).

From a practical standpoint, staffing engines and ladders with three personnel rather than four
forces the captain to be actively involved in hands-on tasks such as stretching a line or raising a
ladder, rather than performing size-up and other important initial fireground actions. Captains
are working supervisors. They form an integral part of their company, and it is often necessary for
them to assume hands-on involvement in operations, particularly with companies that are
minimally staffed, while simultaneously providing oversight and direction to their personnel
(incident command functions). During structure fires and other dangerous technical operations,
it is imperative that these officers accompany and operate with their crew to monitor conditions,
provide situation reports, and assess progress toward incident mitigation. During structure fires
they operate inside of the fire building. Captains need to be able to focus on the completion of
specific tasks that have been assigned to their respective companies, such as interior fire attack,
rescue, ventilation, and/or water supply.

When engine companies are staffed with three rather than four personnel, the Captain often
needs to either function as the nozzle person while the other firefighter backs him/her up and
helps with advancing the line, or, if the roles are reversed and the Captain is assisting with line
advancement they cannot monitor the conditions at the nozzle—and closest to the fire—as they
should. Ideally, one firefighter should be the nozzle operator, the captain should be right
alongside of, or behind the nozzle, providing direction and evaluating conditions, and the third
firefighter can be further back assisting with advancing the line. This is particularly important for
fires on the second and third floors of buildings where the lines must frequently be advanced up
narrow and winding stairways. When short staffed in fire conditions such as this, two companies
often must be deployed to get a single line in service, which can then impact the completion of
additional critical tasks.

CPSM advocates structural fire tactics and strategies that are both safe and effective, but
sometimes staffing levels can make that dual goal difficult to achieve. Initiating offensive
operations with fewer than four firefighters will place firefighters at a high level of risk; delaying
operations until additional staffing arrives places occupants in greater danger and can increase
property damage.

Ultimately overall, on-duty fire department staffing is a local government decision. It is also
important to note that the OSHA standard (and NFPA 1500/1710/1720) specifically references
“interior firefighting.” Firefighting activities that are performed from the exterior of the building
are not regulated by this portion of the OSHA standard. However, in the end, the ability to
assemble adequate personnel, along with appropriate apparatus to the scene of a structure fire,
is critical to operational success and firefighter safety. How and where personnel and resources
are located and how quickly they can arrive on scene play major roles also.

All of these factors must be taken into consideration as Springfield reaches consensus on the
acceptable community fire safety risk level, affordable levels of expenditure for fire protection,
and appropriate levels of staffing. The city will need to consider the cost-benefit of various
deployment strategies, such as continuing the current staffing and deployment model, or
adopting a different one based upon options presented within this report.

For the SFD, emergency responses are based on caller information provided to dispatchers at
the Sangamon County Central Dispatch System (SCCDS); responses depend on the nature and
type of call for service. The dispatch center provides dispatch services to 22 police departments,
17 fire departments, and three private ambulance companies that also provide 9-1-1 transport

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services. The SCCDS is the public safety answering point (PSAP) for the city. SFD details out its
response procedures through a response plan in the dispatch center. This response plan covers
both high- and low-frequency incidents that range from low to high risk. Structure fire responses
represent the type of high-risk/low-frequency incidents that present the greatest challenges.

For any given emergency to which SFD responds, there are critical tasks that must be
completed. These tasks can range from the immediate rescue of trapped occupants within a
burning structure to vehicle or water rescue when needed. A set of critical tasks have been
developed in an effort to identify what resources are needed for each incident type. SFD has
developed response matrixes detailing the initial levels of response for varying incident types.
The following critical task analysis was performed independent of these policies; however, a
comparison is provided.

The intent of the risk management process is for the department to develop a standard level of
safety while strategically aligning its resources with requests for service. Thus, the critical tasking
presented herein will consider the EFR in relation to either a low-, moderate-, or high-risk
classification.

Critical tasking has been identified for the following incident types:

■ Structure Fire–Low Risk.

■ Structure Fire–Moderate Risk.

■ Structure Fire–High Risk.

■ Structure Fire–High-Rise.

■ Vehicle Fire.

■ Outside Fire Grass/Brush/Rubbish Fire.

■ Fire Alarm–Low Risk.

■ Fire Alarm–Moderate Risk.

■ Fire Alarm–High Risk.

■ Motor Vehicle Crash–No Entrapment.

■ Motor Vehicle Crash–With Entrapment.

■ Natural Gas Leak–Interior and Exterior.

■ Hazardous Materials Incident.

■ Water Rescue Incident.

■ Technical Rescue Incident.

SFD utilizes a standard alarm assignment for most reported structure fire responses. An initial
response to this type of incident includes the following:

■ 4 engines, 12 total staff.

■ 2 trucks, 6 total staff.

■ 1 battalion chief, 2 total staff.

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This response matrix places 20 personnel on the scene assuming that the SFD engines and trucks
are staffed each with three personnel.

Once the incident has smoke showing, or is determined to be a “working fire,” and the alarm is
made a Code 1 then the Department Safety Officer (DSO) and Staff Duty Officer (SDO) who will
be a division/deputy chief or higher, are notified.

If the alarm is upgraded to a Code 2 the following additional resources are dispatched:

■ 2 engines, 6 total staff.

■ 1 battalion chief, 2 total staff.

This would bring staffing to 28 personnel, however, since they are not dispatched at the time of
initial dispatch their arrival will be delayed. At this point all staff personnel are notified.

Code 3 alarms will have the following additional resources dispatched:

■ 2 engines, 6 total staff.

■ 1 truck, 3 total staff.

This will bring staffing on the scene up to 37 personnel.

At least one ambulance with two personnel will also be dispatched to each fire incident.
However, the ambulance personnel can only provide medical care, not engage in firefighting
operations, so they cannot be included in the number of personnel available for firefighting
operations.

The following discussion and tables will outline how critical tasking and assembling an effective
response force is first measured in NFPA 1710 and how the SFD is benchmarked against this
standard.

The initial full alarm assignment to a structural fire in a typical 2,000 square-foot, two-story, single-
family dwelling without a basement and with no exposures must provide for a minimum of
16 members (17 if an aerial device is used). The following figure illustrates this and the
subsequent table outlines the critical task matrix.

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FIGURE 5-17: Effective Response Force for Single-Family Dwelling Fire

TABLE 5-8: Effective Response Force for Single-Family Dwelling Fire

Critical Tasks Personnel
Incident Command 1
Continuous Water Supply 1
Fire Attack via Two Handlines 4
Hydrant Hook Up - Forcible Entry - Utilities 2
Primary Search and Rescue 2
Ground Ladders and Ventilation 2
Aerial Operator if Aerial is Used 1
Establishment of IRIC (Initial Rapid Intervention Crew) 4
16
Total Effective Response Force
(17 If aerial is used)
SFD Initial Effective Response Force 20

These tasks meet the minimum requirements of NFPA 1710 for the initial full alarm assignment to a
typical low-risk, 2,000 square-foot, two-story residential structure fire. These are the proverbial
“bread and butter” structural fire incidents that fire departments respond to, and which are, by
far, the most common type of structure fire. Personnel requirements for fires involving large, more
complex structures such as commercial or industrial facilities or multifamily residential
occupancies will require a significantly greater commitment of personnel.

It should be noted at this point that at least a portion of the building risk in Springfield does not fit
into this type of “typical” residential structure. Our observation was that many of the detached

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residential units are large, multistory and multifamily types of occupancies (see following figure).
In these types of structures, the fire challenges are going to be much more complex and
conducive to rapid fire spread through such areas as attics and basements. Fire extension
between closely spaced, wood-frame dwellings is also a significant concern. For this reason, a
significant percentage of Springfield’s residential occupancies expand to the moderate risk
category.

FIGURE 5-18: Typical Springfield 2.5-Story Wood Frame Residential Fires

The 2020 edition of NFPA 1710 recommends a minimum of 27/28 personnel on the initial response
for fires involving moderate hazard garden-style apartments and strip shopping centers (see
following table).

TABLE 5-9: Structure Fire – Moderate Risk

Critical Task Needed Personnel
Incident Command 2
2 – Independent Water Supply Lines/Pump Operators 2
Fire Attack via Three Handlines 6
Support Firefighter for each Handline 3
2 - Search and Rescue Teams 4
2 - Ground Ladders and Ventilation Teams 4
Aerial Operator (if Aerial is Used) 1
Rapid Intervention Team (1 Officer/3 Firefighters) 4
EMS/Medical 2
Effective Response Force 27/28
SFD Initial Response Provided 20

The following table identifies critical tasking for fires involving high-risk structures such as hospitals,
nursing homes, and assisted living facilities.

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TABLE 5-10: Structure Fire – High Risk
Critical Task Needed Personnel
Incident Command 2
2 – Independent Water Supply Lines/Pump Operators 2
Investigation/Initial Fire Attack Line 3
Backup Line 3
Secondary Attack Line 3
3 - Search/Rescue Teams 6
2 – Ground Ladder and Ventilation teams 4
Water Supply/Fire Department Connection 2
Aerial Operators (if Aerials are Used) 2
Safety/Accountability 2
Rapid Intervention Team (1 Officer/3 Firefighters) 4
EMS/Medical 4
Effective Response Force 35/37
SFD Initial Response Provided 20

Based upon needed personnel for establishment of an ERF, and due to Springfield’s unique risks
as an older, densely populated urban community, while also operating all units with three
personnel, consideration should be given to an initial response for all reported moderate and
high-risk structure fires of:
■ 6 engines, 18 total staff.

■ 2 trucks, 6 total staff.

■ 2 battalion chiefs, 4 total staff.

If all units are staffed with three personnel, this would provide an initial response of 28 personnel.

Since they are relatively rare occurrences, for fires that require additional resources and
personnel, Springfield should consider the following option for second (or greater) alarms.

■ 4 engines, 12 total staff.

■ 2 trucks, 6 total staff.

■ 2 battalion chiefs, 2 total staff (with BC aid-4).

This option would require response of at least one ladder from either Chatham or Sherman FDs.
This option would provide at least 20 to 22 additional personnel, assuming the fire units are all
staffed with three personnel. Additional personnel returning to work on a recall of off-duty
personnel could staff additional units and respond if necessary. It is anticipated that additional
Springfield chief officers would also respond; they could assist at the fire or provide city
coverage.

It should be stressed that the large responses of apparatus that CPSM is recommending to
establish an ERF based upon the hazard of the occupancy type (low, medium and high hazard)
is intended for instances where the caller(s) are reporting visible smoke or fire within the building.

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As part of a risk management strategy, for incidents within structures such as an appliance, a
heater, a sparking electrical outlet, an odor or smoke, etc., consideration should be given to the
initial dispatch of a “Tactical Box” comprised of:

■ 2 engines, 6 total staff.

■ 1 truck, 3 total staff.

■ 1 battalion chief, 2 total staff.

If additional information is received indicating an active fire in progress, the assignment can
then be upgraded to a “Full Box.”

Fires involving high-rise structures, which are generally considered to be any building more than
six stories in height or more than 75 feet tall, present fire departments with significant operational
challenges, particularly in buildings that are not equipped throughout with automatic fire
suppression systems. The City of Springfield has a total of 30 buildings that meet this classification
including one that is 30 stories in height. The city also has multiple additional buildings that are
between four and six stories in height, which can present some of the same challenges in an
emergency as a high-rise building. The following figure provides a view of a number of these
types of buildings in the city.

FIGURE 5-19: View of High-rise Buildings in Springfield

The following table breaks down the occupancies of the city’s high-rise buildings.

TABLE 5-11: Springfield High Rises by Occupancy Type

Occupancy Number of
Type Buildings
Office 15
Apartments 9
Medical 2
Hotel 4
Total 30

The 2020 edition of NFPA 1710 recommends a minimum of 42/43 personnel on the initial response
for fires involving high-rise buildings. These personnel should arrive on location within a 10-minute

98
(600 second) travel time. Some chief officers with considerable high-rise fire experience suggest
that the actual number of personnel needed for a significant high-rise fire will be around 100
firefighters within about 30 minutes.

FIGURE 5-20: Springfield High-Rise Locations

The following table identifies critical tasking for a high-rise fire.

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TABLE 5-12: Structure Fire – High Rise
Critical Tasks Personnel
Incident Command 2
Continuous Water Supply 1 FF for continuous
water; if fire pump
exists, 1 additional FF
required.
Fire Attack via Two Handlines 4
One Handline above the Fire Floor 2
Establishment of IRIC (Initial Rapid Intervention Crew) 4
Primary Search and Rescue Teams 4
Entry Level Officer with Aide near entry point of Fire 2
Floor
Entry Level Officer with Aide near the entry point 2
above the Fire Floor
Two Evacuation Teams 4
Elevator Operations 1
Safety Officer 1
FF Two Floors below Fire to Coordinate Staging 1
Rehabilitation Management 2
Officer and FFs to Manage Vertical Ventilation 4
Lobby Operations 1
Transportation of Equipment below Fire Floor 2
Officer to Manage Base Operations 1
Two ALS Medical Care Teams 4
42
Total Effective Response Force (43 If building is
equipped with pump)

Based upon needed personnel for establishment of an ERF for high-rise fires, while also taking into
account that all SFD units operate with three personnel, consideration should be given to an
initial response for a reported fire in a high-rise of:

■ 9 engines, 27 total staff.

■ 3 trucks, 9 total staff.

■ 2 battalion chiefs, 4 total staff.

If all units are staffed with three personnel, the initial response would be 40 personnel. While this
initial response may be viewed as excessive, there is an adage regarding staffing and apparatus
that “it is better to have them responding and not need them, then to need them and not have
them.” If the first arriving units determine that the incident is minor in nature, units that will not be
needed can quickly be returned to service.

Initial SFD response to vehicle fires is one engine for most incidents. Once on scene the officer
may special call additional companies based on vehicle type (semi-truck, RV, etc.).

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Initial response to outside grass/brush fires is a single engine company. Once the company is on
scene the officer may special call Brush 1 (or additional needed resources), which would
respond with E10.

Initial response to outside trash/rubbish fires is one engine company.

TABLE 5-13: Vehicle Fire

Needed Personnel
Needed Personnel
Critical Task With Exposures/Life
No Exposures
Hazards*
Incident Command 1 1
Pump Operator 1 1
Fire Attack Line 2 2
Backup Line/Secondary Attack Line - 2
Water Supply - 1
Check Fire Extension - 2
Effective Response Force 4 9
SFD Response Provided 3 3
Note: *A reasonable alternative in this scenario is the dispatch/response of an initial first alarm structural fire
assignment, or at a minimum, a “tactical box” of two engines, one truck, and one battalion chief. The
same type of enhanced response assignment should also be considered for semi-trucks, buses, trains, etc.

TABLE 5-14: Outside Fire – Grass/Brush/Rubbish

Critical Task Needed Personnel
Incident Command 1
Pump Operator 1
Fire Attack Line 2
Effective Response Force 4
SFD Response Provided 3

The SFD dispatches different assignments to automatic fire alarm systems based on the type of
occupancy. These range from a response of one engine in a cold response (no lights/sirens) for
single family residential alarms to one engine, one ladder, and one battalion chief for all other
types of occupancies. These types of responses need to be considered in the context of risk
assessment and management. On one hand, consideration must be given to the potential risks,
hazards, and even investigative complexity associated with various types of occupancies.
Conversely, data and experience show that these system activations are rarely for an actual fire
incident, and of those that are, they are often backed up by a phone call reporting a fire.

TABLE 5-15: Fire Alarm System – Low Risk

Critical Task Needed Personnel
Incident Command 1
Investigation 3
Effective Response Force 4
SFD Response Provided 3

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Based upon needed personnel for an ERF for a low-risk fire alarm system, consideration should
be given to maintaining the current initial response of:

■ 1 engine, 3 total staff.

TABLE 5-16: Fire Alarm System – Moderate Risk

Critical Task Needed Personnel
Incident Command 1
Pump Operator 1
Investigation 4
Forcible Entry/Ventilation (if necessary) 2
Effective Response Force 8
SFD Response Provided 8

Based upon needed personnel for an ERF for a moderate risk fire alarm system, consideration
should be given to maintaining the current initial response of:

■ 1 engine, 3 total staff.

■ 1 truck, 3 total staff.

■ 1 battalion chief, 2 total staff.

TABLE 5-17: Fire Alarm System – High-Risk/High-Rise

Critical Task Needed Personnel
Incident Command 1
Pump Operator 1
Water Supply/Fire Department Connection 1
Investigation 4
Search and Rescue (if necessary) 2
Annunciator Panel 2
Effective Response Force 11
SFD Response Provided 8

Based upon needed personnel for an ERF for a high-risk/ high-rise fire alarm system,
consideration should be given to an initial response of:

■ 2 engines, 6 total staff.

■ 1 truck, 3 total staff.

■ 1 battalion chief, 2 total staff.

SFD response to a motor vehicle crash with no potential/reported entrapment includes the
following resources:

■ 2 engines, 6 total staff.

■ 1 truck (only on interstate highways), 3 total staff.

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TABLE 5-18: Motor Vehicle Crash – No Entrapment
Critical Task Needed Personnel
Incident Command 1
Hazard Abatement 1
Patient Evaluation/Care 2
Effective Response Force 4
SFD Response Provided 6/9*
Note: *Does not include EMS personnel.

SFD response to a motor vehicle accident with potential/reported entrapment includes the
following resources:
■ 2 engines, 6 total staff.
■ 1 truck, 3 total staff.
■ 1 battalion chief, 2 total staff.

TABLE 5-19: Motor Vehicle Crash – With Entrapment

Critical Task Needed Personnel
Incident Command 1
Pump Operator 1
Scene Protection Line 2
Hazard Abatement 2
Patient Extrication 4
Patient Evaluation/Care 4
Effective Response Force 14
SFD Response Provided 11*
Note: *Does not include EMS personnel.

SFD response to both interior and exterior gas leak includes the following resources:
■ 1 engine, 3 total staff.
■ 1 truck, 3 total staff.
■ 1 battalion chief, 2 total staff.

TABLE 5-20: Natural Gas Leak – Interior and Exterior

Critical Task Needed Personnel
Incident Command 1
Investigation/Air Monitoring 2
Pump Operator/Water Supply (If needed) 1
Protection Line (If needed) 2
Forcible Entry, Utility Control, Ventilation 2
Search and Rescue (If needed) 2
Establishment of an IRIT 2
Effective Response Force 12
SFD Response Provided 8

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Based upon needed personnel for an ERF for a natural gas leak, consideration should be given
to an initial response of:
■ 2 engines, 6 total staff.

■ 1 truck, 3 total staff.

■ 1 battalion chief, 2 total staff.

SFD initial response to a possible hazardous materials incident includes the following resources:
■ 2 engines, 6 total staff.

■ 1 truck, 3 total staff.

■ 1 battalion chief, 2 total staff.

■ Squad 1, HM2, HM3, 4 total staff.

TABLE 5-21: Hazardous Materials Incident

Critical Task Needed Personnel
Incident Command/Safety 2
Entry Team (Haz. Mat. Technician) 2
Back-up Team (Haz. Mat. Technician) 2
Decontamination Personnel 4
Research (Haz. Mat. Technician) 1
Support Personnel 6
Medical 2
Effective Response Force 19
SFD Response Provided 15-17*
Note: *Does not include EMS personnel.

SFD initial response to a water rescue incident includes the following resources:
■ 2 engines, 6 total staff.

■ 1 truck, 3 total staff.

■ 1 battalion chief, 2 total staff.

■ Engine 11 with Dive 1 and Dive 2, 3 total staff.

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TABLE 5-22: Water Rescue Incident
Critical Task Needed Personnel
Incident Command 1
Rescue Team (Technical Rescue Technician) 2
Back-up Team (Technical Rescue
2
Technician)
Shore Support 6
Safety 1
Medical 2
Effective Response Force 13
SFD Response Provided 14*
Note: *Does not include EMS.

SFD initial response to a technical rescue incident includes the following resources:

■ 2 engines, 6 total staff.

■ 1 truck, 3 total staff.

■ 1 battalion chief, 2 total staff.

■ Rescue 1, Rescue 2-2, 3 total staff.

TABLE 5-23: Technical Rescue Incident

Critical Task Needed Personnel
Incident Command 1
Rescue Team (Technical Rescue Technician) 4
Back-up Team (Technical Rescue 4
Technician)
Support 8
Safety 1
Accountability 2
Medical 2
Effective Response Force 22
SFD Response Provided 14*
Note: *Does not include EMS personnel and other SFD technical rescue personnel.

Establishing an ERF for medical emergencies is significantly less labor intensive than it is for fire
incidents. NFPA 1710 provides guidance regarding staffing levels for units responding to EMS
incidents; however, the provision does not specify a minimum staffing level for EMS response
units. Instead, section 5.3.32 of the standard states: “EMS staffing requirements shall be based on
the minimum levels needed to provide patient care and member safety.” It further recommends
that resources should be deployed to provide “for the arrival of a first responder with AED within
a 240-second travel time to 90 percent of the incidents,” and, “when provided, the fire
department’s EMS for providing ALS shall be deployed to provide for the arrival of an ALS unit
within a 480-second travel time to 90 percent of the incidents provided a first responder with
AED or BLS unit arrived in 240 seconds or less travel time.”

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EMS calls are typically managed with fewer personnel, and most EMS calls can be handled with
a single ambulance staffed with two personnel. In the call-screening process, those calls that
require additional personnel are typically identified at the dispatch level and additional
personnel can be assigned when needed. These types of incidents could include cardiac and
respiratory arrest, unconscious persons, and other incidents where the initial call seems to
indicate a severe and imminent threat to life.

NFPA 1710 suggests for these types of emergencies that “personnel deployed to ALS emergency
responses shall include a minimum of two members trained at the emergency medical
technician–paramedic level and two members trained at the emergency medical technician–
basic level arriving on scene within the established travel time.” However, these types of
emergencies constitute a small percentage of overall EMS incidents as identified herein.

FIGURE 5-21: Typical EMS ERF

FIRE OPERATIONS
With a population density estimated to be around 1,875 people per square mile, Springfield is an
urbanized city. Multiple areas in the city area have older, multistory structures sited closely
together, in many cases directly abutting, or even interconnecting with each other. Many of
these structures date to the later part of the 19th and early years of the 20th century; however,
some historic structures date back as far as the early to mid-19th century. Interspersed
throughout the city are newer and refurbished buildings and facilities. Outside of the central
core of the city the structures reflect the era in which they were built as the city grew and
developed.

Much of the city’s house stock is comprised of older, wood frame dwelling units that are
susceptible to rapid fire spread particularly when they are spaced closely together. In this
environment, if a fire grows to an area more than 2,000 square feet, or extends beyond the
building of origin, initial response personnel will be taxed beyond their available resources and
additional buildings can quickly become involved as the fire spreads in multiple directions. From
this perspective it is critical that enough SFD units respond quickly and initiate extinguishment
efforts as rapidly as possible after notification of an incident. It is, however, difficult to determine

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in every case the effectiveness of the initial response in limiting the fire spread and fire damage.
Many variables will impact these outcomes, including:

■ The time of detection, notification, and ultimately response of fire units.

■ The age and type of construction of the structure. Being primarily a community in which much
of the development occurred many years ago, the maintenance and condition of structures
in Springfield will be a consideration and part of the risk benefit analysis the Battalion Chiefs
must undertake at fire incidents.
■ The presence of any built-in protection (automatic fire sprinklers) or fire detection systems.

■ The contents stored in the structure and its flammability.

■ The presence of any flammable liquids, explosives, or compressed gas canisters.

■ Weather conditions and the availability of water for extinguishment.

Subsequently, in those situations in which there are extended delays in the extinguishment effort
or the fire has progressed sufficiently upon arrival of fire units, there is actually very little that can
be done to limit the extent of damage to the entire structure and its contents. In these situations,
suppression efforts may need to focus on the protection of nearby or adjacent structures
(exterior exposures) with the goal being to limit the spread of the fire beyond the building of
origin, and sometimes the exposed building. This is often termed protecting exposures. When the
scope of damage is extensive, and the building becomes unstable, firefighting tactics typically
move to what is called a defensive attack, or one in which hose lines and more importantly
personnel are on the outside of the structure and their focus is to merely discharge large
volumes of water until the fire goes out. In these situations, the ability to enter the building is very
limited and if victims are trapped in the structure, there are very few safe options for making
entry.

Today’s fire service is actively debating the options of interior firefighting vs. exterior firefighting.
These terms are self-descriptive in that an interior fire attack is one in which firefighters enter a
burning building in an attempt to find the seat of the fire and from this interior position extinguish
the fire with limited amounts of water. An exterior fire attack, also sometimes referred to as a
transitional attack, is a tactic in which firefighters initially discharge water from the exterior of the
building, either through a window or door and knock down the fire before entry in the building is
made. The concept is to introduce larger volumes of water initially from the outside of the
building, cool the interior temperatures, and reduce the intensity of the fire before firefighters
enter the building. A transitional attack is most applicable in smaller structures, typically single-
family, one-story detached units which are smaller than approximately 2,500 square feet in total
floor area. For fires in larger structures, the defensive-type, exterior attacks generally involve the
use of master streams capable of delivering large volumes of water for an extended period of
time.

Recent studies by UL have evaluated the effectiveness of interior vs. exterior attacks in certain
simulated fire environments. These studies have found the exterior attack to be equally effective
in these simulations.41 This debate is deep-seated in the fire service and traditional tactical
measures have always proposed an interior fire attack, specifically when there is a possibility that
victims may be present in the burning structure. The long-held belief in opposition to an exterior

41. “Innovating Fire Attack Tactics,” U.L.COM/News Science, Summer 2013.

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attack is that this approach may push the fire into areas that are not burning or where victims
may be located. The counterpoint supporting the exterior attack centers on firefighter safety.

FIGURE 5-22: SFD Structure Fire: May 2021

The exterior attack limits the firefighters from
making entry into those super-heated
structures that may be susceptible to collapse.
From CPSM’s perspective, there is at least some
likelihood that a single SFD crew of three
personnel will encounter a significant and
rapidly developing fire situation. This situation
can occur during times of high incident activity
when other units may be committed on other
emergencies, or in fringe areas of the city
where other units responding to the incident
may have longer response times to arrive on
the scene and may all be coming from the
same direction. These situations can also occur
due to incorrect information provided to the dispatch center by the initial 9-1-1 caller, or
because of incidents that begin as an investigation of an automatic fire alarm system.

It is prudent, therefore, that the SFD build at least a component of its training and operating
procedures around the tactical concept of the exterior fire attack when the situation warrants
such an approach. In addition, with engine companies currently staffed with three personnel,
unless there is a potential life hazard concern of trapped occupants, engines arriving on scene
first—and with no other companies immediately available—will be limited to initiating these
tactics until the arrival of additional units and personnel.

Recommendations:
■ The SFD should build at least a portion of its training regimens and tactical strategies around
the exterior or transitional attack for when the fire scenario and the number of available
units/responding personnel warrant this approach. (Recommendation No. 22.)
■ In acknowledgement of the fact that SFD engines operate in a minimal staffing mode and
recognizing the potential for rapid fire spread particularly in the more densely developed
areas of the city, the SFD should equip all its apparatus with the appropriate appliances and
hose as described herein. It should develop standardized tactical operations that will enable
arriving crews to quickly deploy high-volume fire flows of 1,200 to 1,500 gallons per minute (if
the water supply will permit this), utilizing multiple hose lines, appliances, and master stream
devices. This flow should be able to be developed within four to five minutes after arrival of an
apparatus staffed with three personnel. (Recommendation No. 23.)
■■■■

The ability to quickly develop an adequate and sustainable water supply is key to successful
mitigation of almost every fire incident. Springfield has a good municipal water supply system for
fire department use. However, as in many older cities the system is more than a century old and
experiences occasional maintenance issues. In addition, several of the Fire Protection Districts
that the SD protects do not have municipal water systems, and this requires that water needed
for firefighting be trucked in. If a sufficient water supply cannot be established, this can certainly
slow and hamper initial firefighting operations.

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As currently staffed, the SFD should be able to handle most of the fires it encounters without the
need for automatic or mutual aid. However, as has been mentioned previously, the city’s engine
companies being staffed with three personnel rather than four will limit their tactic options until
the arrival of additional resources and personnel. Fire incidents in larger structures often require
additional personnel and resources to successfully mitigate.

Critical staffing necessary to successfully mitigate various types of incidents has been discussed
in detail earlier in this section of the report. In most cases, fires occurring when there are no other
incidents in progress (which would reduce the immediately available number of personnel), and
the fire department can arrive at the fire incident and take definitive action to mitigate the
situation prior to flashover occurring, will impact how effectively and quickly incidents can be
mitigated. If flashover has occurred, holding the fire to the building of origin is highly achievable
as well.

A critical component of the incident command system is the establishment of the role of safety
officer to monitor conditions at fires and emergency incident scenes to ensure that appropriate
safety procedures are being followed. The incident safety officer is an important member of the
incident command team. The safety officer works directly under and with the incident
commander to help recognize and manage the risks that personnel take at emergencies.

The concept of a command team recognizes that there is a shared responsibility for the proper
and safe performance of personnel operating on the emergency scene. The fact is that one of
the roles that the safety officer needs to play is that of challenging and confirming the incident
commander's actions. The safety officer should be included in the development and monitoring
of the incident action plan. In simple terms, the incident commander and the safety officer
command team provide a system of checks and balances designed to keep all personnel on
the emergency scene safe. Once the incident action plan is established, the safety officer
monitors the plan for effectiveness and efficiency.

Fire departments in the Phoenix, Ariz., metro area are leaders in this regard and place a high
priority on the assignment of a qualified officer to fill the safety officer position during a wide
range of incidents. According to Phoenix Regional Standard Operating Procedures “Incident
Safety Officer System,” for most incidents, the safety officer provides the following functions:

■ Incident recon.

■ Assess the risk/benefit of operations.

■ Assess and address safety concerns on the incident scene.

■ Communicate and report safety issues to command.

■ Intervene as necessary to provide for safety.

During larger scale incidents, the safety officer reviews the incident action plan and specific
details of the safety plan. As appropriate, the safety officer confirms that a safety plan is in
effect, reviews it, and provides recommendations. The incident commander may request that
the safety officer develop a proposed safety plan and recommendations for command.

Beyond the specific emphasis on safety, the role of incident commander is a dynamic and
highly stressful position with numerous critical responsibilities that must be handled simultaneously
and in a time-critical manner.

In the Phoenix area, multiple fire departments utilize Field Incident Technicians (FIT), or Battalion
Safety Officers (BSO) paired with a Battalion Chief as part of a permanent incident

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management team. These are company level officers, so in the case of Springfield, these would
be Captains working in tandem with the command level officer, a Battalion Chief. This is a
concept that the SFD has adopted so as to provide for more effective, efficient, and safer
incident command operations. The SFD is to be commended for the use of FIT/BSO personnel,
which CPSM considers to be a Best Practice.

When teamed with a battalion chief, in addition to normal safety officer functions, the FIT/BSO
also fulfills the following roles and responsibilities:

■ Assist with managing the incident.

■ Define, evaluate, and recommend changes to the incident action plan.

■ Provide direction on tactical priorities and specific critical fireground factors.

■ Become the Incident Safety Officer.

■ Manage personnel accountability on the incident.

■ Evaluate the need for additional resources.

■ Assign logistics responsibilities.

■ Assist with the tactical worksheet for control and accountability.

■ Evaluate the fireground organization and span of control.

■ Assist with personnel air management.

■ Manage crew work/rest cycles and rehab.

■ Other duties as necessary.

The following table and figure show the fire call totals for the 12-month period evaluated by
CPSM, including number of calls by type, average calls per day, and the percentage of calls
that fall into each call type category. During the year studied, SFD responded to 19,668 calls, an
average of 53.9 calls per day, including 4.4 canceled calls and 0.2 mutual aid calls. Of these,
6,476 were fire calls, of which 264 were structure fire calls and 233 were outside fire calls. Fire call
types were 32.9 percent of the total calls for service, a somewhat higher percentage than we
normally see in departments that are heavily involved in the provision of EMS services in their
community. Actual fire calls (structural and outside) were 2.5 percent of the overall calls for
service (approximately 1.4 calls per day or one actual fire-type incident every 17.1 hours). The
497 actual fires represent 7.6 percent of the fire-related incidents. False alarms, public service,
and good intent calls represent the largest percentage of fire-type calls for service. This
experience is typical in CPSM data and workload analyses of other fire departments.

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TABLE 5-24: Fire Calls by Type and Number, and Percent of All Calls
Number of Calls per Call
Call Type
Calls Day Percentage
False alarm 2,363 6.5 12.0
Good intent 829 2.3 4.2
Hazard 476 1.3 2.4
Outside fire 233 0.6 1.2
Public service 2,311 6.3 11.8
Structure fire 264 0.7 1.3
Fire Total 6,476 17.7 32.9

FIGURE 5-23: Fire Calls by Type and Percentage

The data in this table and figure tell us that:

■ Fire calls for the year totaled 6,476 (32.9 percent of all calls), an average of 17.7 per day.

■ Structure and outside fires combined for a total of 497 calls during the year, an average of 1.4
calls per day or one actual fire-type incident every 17.1 hours. These accounted for
7.6 percent of fire calls and 2.5 percent of total calls.
■ A total of 264 structure fire calls accounted for 4.1 percent of the fire calls.

■ A total of 233 outside fire calls accounted for 3.6 percent of the fire calls.

■ False alarm calls made up the highest percentage fire category calls at 36.5 percent. This was
an average of 6.5 calls per day and 12 percent of total calls.
■ The second highest number of calls was public service calls, at 35.7 percent of fire calls.

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An additional analysis of fire response was conducted regarding the workload of incident types.
The following table shows that the largest percentage of fire responses (88.8 percent) lasted less
than 30 minutes. This suggests that most fire incidents were relatively minor in nature. However, it
can also suggest that a rapid and adequate response by the fire department allowed the
incident to be mitigated before it escalated into a larger, more serious situation. The second
largest amount of fire responses (8.0 percent) lasted 30 minutes to an hour. Just 2.6 percent of
fire incidents lasted between one and two hours, while 0.6 percent were two hours or longer in
duration. These longer incidents would indicate more significant events. Overall, the SFD has
about 17 fire incidents per month—3.9 per week or about 0.6 per day—which last longer than
one hour.

TABLE 5-25: Fire Calls by Type and Durations

Less than 30 Minutes One to Two More Than
Call Type Total
30 Minutes to One Hour Hours Two Hours
False alarm 2,185 160 18 0 2,363
Good intent 776 47 6 0 829
Hazard 314 111 40 11 476
Outside fire 175 40 17 1 233
Public service 2,209 90 10 2 2,311
Structure fire 92 73 76 23 264
Fire Total 5,751 521 167 37 6,476

The following figure shows the workload of fire responses by number of units that arrived on
scene to these incident types.

TABLE 5-26: Calls by Number of Units Arriving – Fire

Number of Units
Call Type Total Calls
One Two Three Four or More
False alarm 1,677 421 249 16 2,363
Good intent 735 34 13 47 829
Hazard 332 37 71 36 476
Outside fire 196 16 12 9 233
Public service 2,230 57 19 4 2,310
Structure fire 15 38 35 176 264
Fire Total 5,185 603 399 288 6,475

The data in this table tells us that:

■ On average, 1.4 units arrived at each fire call.

■ For fire calls, one unit arrived 80.0 percent of the time, two units arrived 9.3 percent of the time,
three units arrived 6.2 percent of the time, and four or more units arrived 4.4 percent of the
time.
■ For outside fire calls, three or more units arrived 9.0 percent of the time.

■ For structure fire calls, three or more units arrived 79.9 percent of the time. An average of 5.0
units arrived at a structure fire call.

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TABLE 5-27: Annual Runs and Deployed Time by Run Type
Deployed Percent Deployed
Annual Annual Runs
Call Type Minutes of Total Minutes
Hours Runs per Day
per Run Hours per Day
False alarm 12.9 1,096.6 13.3 180.3 5,120 14.0
Good intent 13.4 316.4 3.8 52.0 1,416 3.9
Hazard 27.0 445.7 5.4 73.3 990 2.7
Outside fire 20.8 143.2 1.7 23.5 413 1.1
Public service 14.6 617.2 7.5 101.5 2,533 6.9
Structure fire 39.8 1,197.6 14.6 196.9 1,806 4.9
Fire Total 18.7 3,816.7 46.4 627.4 12,278 33.6

Analysis of the data found in this table tells us that:

■ Fire runs accounted for 46 percent of the total department workload. In other words, although
fire calls accounted for just about one-third of incidents, they accounted for nearly one-half
the total hours that units were deployed.
■ The average deployed time for fire runs was 18.7 minutes. The deployed time for all fire runs
averaged 10.5 hours per day.
■ There were 2,219 runs for structure and outside fire calls combined, with a total workload of
1,340.9 hours. This accounted for 16 percent of the total department workload.

■ Accounting for 12 engines and 3 ladder trucks operating for a total of 131,400 hours annually,
structure and outside fire calls amounted to 1.02 percent of available time.
Of the 497 fires in Springfield, both structure and outside, 178 (35.8 percent) resulted in no
reported loss. Two hundred sixty-two fires (52.7 percent) reported damage of under $25,000. This
includes 87 outside fires and 175 structure fires. Fifty-seven fires (11.5 percent) comprised of 51
structure fires and six outside fires saw damage in excess of $25,000 each.

The following two tables break down the loss due to fire in Springfield during the period
analyzed.

TABLE 5-28: Total Fire Loss Above and Below $25,000

Call Type No Loss Under $25,000 $25,000 plus
Outside fire 140 87 6
Structure fire 38 175 51
Total 178 262 57

TABLE 5-29: Content and Property Loss – Structure and Outside Fires
Property Loss Content Loss
Call Type
Loss Value Number of Calls Loss Value Number of Calls
Outside fire $765,781 90 $337,625 33
Structure fire $2,678,431 186 $860,148 174
Total $3,444,212 276 $1,197,773 207

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Other information derived from the fire loss data for Springfield includes:

■ Out of 264 structure fires, 186 recorded property losses, with a combined $2,678,431 in losses.

■ 174 structure fires recorded content losses, with a combined $860,148 in losses.

■ The average total loss for all structure fires was $15,657.

■ The highest total loss for a structure fire was $220,000.

■ Out of 233 outside fires, 90 recorded property losses, with a combined $765,781 in losses.

■ 33 outside fires recorded content losses, with a combined $337,625 in losses.

■ The average total loss for outside fires with loss was $11,865.

■ The highest total loss for an outside fire was $600,000.

In terms of fire loss comparisons nationwide for structure fires, the NFPA estimates that in 2020, the
average community in the United States with a population between 100,000 and 249,999 had
an average of 3.4 actual fires per 1,000 residents. For Springfield, this would equate to
approximately 388 actual fires. With the number of actual fires amounting to 497, Springfield’s
fire experience is 28 percent greater than average for its population size. Overall, the average
fire department in communities with this size range averaged 191 fires. While Springfield’s fire loss
is relatively low compared to the risks in the community it protects, it is important to keep in mind
that at any time a single fire can occur that results in millions of dollars in fire loss.

Fire Preplanning
An important part of risk management in the fire service is pre-fire planning inspections by fire
companies of large, high hazard, and complex buildings in each fire response zone. Conducting
pre-fire surveys by fire companies can have a significant impact on both potentially reducing
structural fire loss and on reducing firefighter injuries. By improving firefighters’ understanding of
complex building layouts, standpipe locations, etc., as well as by identifying any structural
changes and possible code violations, suppression ground activities can be improved and
potential firefighter injuries avoided.

The process of identifying target hazards and pre-incident planning are basic preparedness
efforts that have been key functions in the fire service for many years. In this process, critical
structures are identified based on the risk they pose. Then, tactical considerations are
established for fires or other emergencies in these structures. Consideration is given to the
activities that take place (manufacturing, processing, etc.), the number and types of occupants
(elderly, youth, handicapped, imprisoned, etc.), and other specific aspects relating to the
construction of the facility or any hazardous or flammable materials that are regularly found in
the building. Target hazards are those occupancies or structures that are unusually dangerous
when considering the potential for loss of life or the potential for property damage. Typically,
these occupancies include hospitals, nursing homes, and high-rise and other large structures.
Also included are arenas and stadiums, industrial and manufacturing plants, and other buildings
or large complexes.

NFPA’s 1620, Recommended Practice for Pre-Incident Planning, identifies the need to utilize both
written narrative and diagrams to depict the physical features of a building, its contents, and
any built-in fire protection systems. Information collected for pre-fire/incident plans includes, but
is certainly not limited to, data such as:

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■ The occupancy type.

■ Floor plans/layouts.

■ Building construction type and features.

■ Fire protection systems (sprinkler system, standpipe systems, etc.).

■ Utility locations.

■ Hazards to firefighters and/or firefighting operations.

■ Special conditions in the building.

■ Apparatus placement plan.

■ Fire flow requirements and/or water supply plan.

■ Forcible entry and ventilation plan.

The information contained in pre-incident fire plans allows firefighters and officers to have a
familiarity with the building/facility, its features, characteristics, operations, and hazards, thus
enabling them to conduct firefighting and other emergency operations more effectively,
efficiently, and safely. Pre-incident fire plans should be reviewed regularly and tested by
periodic table-top exercises and on-site drills for the most critical occupancies.

The Springfield Fire Department has an active, ongoing pre-fire planning program that has
resulted in the development of plans for a significant number of the identified target hazard
structures in the city. Each company is required to do one pre-plan per quarter, so with 15
companies, each shift is doing approximately 60 pre-plans per year, or 180 department-wide.
The pre-plans have traditionally been completed on paper but more recently they are being
loaded into computers and the CAD system so they will be more readily available to personnel
on the incident scene.

§§§

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FIGURE 5-24: SFD Completed Pre-plan Locations

Recommendation:
■ CPSM recommends that as a planning objective, the SFD should continue to make pre-plan
development a high priority until such time as plans have been developed for all high- and
medium-hazard occupancies located in the city, placing a high priority on those identified
structures that are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems. (Recommendation No. 24.)
■■■■

An increasingly important part of fire department risk identification, assessment, and

management is the identification of unsafe structures in the city that could pose an increased,
and often unnecessary, risk to firefighters during a fire situation. Once these buildings have been
identified they should be marked as being unsafe. In the event of a fire, unless the fire is still a
small, incipient fire, which can be extinguished quickly and safely, operations at these structures
should be limited to exterior, defensive operations. The SFD has compiled an inventory of the
locations of these buildings throughout the city.

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FIGURE 5-25: SFD Unsafe Structures Locations

EMS OPERATIONS
Emergency medical service (EMS) operations are an important component of the
comprehensive emergency services delivery system in any community. Together with the
delivery of police and fire services, it forms the backbone of the community’s overall public
safety net. As will be noted in several sections of this report, the SFD, like most fire departments,
responds to significantly more emergency medical incidents and low acuity incidents than
actual fires or other types of emergency incidents.

The EMS component of the emergency services delivery system is more heavily regulated than
the fire side. In addition to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 1710,
Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations,
and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments (2020 edition), NFPA 450
Guidelines for Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and Systems, (2017 edition), provides a
template for local stakeholders to evaluate an EMS system and to make improvements based
on that evaluation. The Commission on Accreditation of Ambulance Services (CAAS) 42 also
promulgates standards that are applicable to their accreditation process for ambulance
services. In addition, the Illinois Department of Public Health, Division of Emergency Medical

42. The Commission on Accreditation of Ambulance Services (CAAS) is an independent commission that
established a comprehensive series of standards for the ambulance service industry.

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Systems (EMS) & Highway Safety43 regulates EMS agencies. Certain federal Medicare regulations
are also applicable.

As a percentage of overall incidents responded to by the emergency agencies in most

communities, it could be argued that EMS incidents constitute the greatest number of “true”
emergencies, where intervention by trained personnel does truly make a difference, sometimes
literally between life and death.

Heart attack and stroke victims require rapid intervention, care, and transport to a medical
facility. The longer the time duration without care, the less likely the patient is to fully recover.
Numerous studies have shown that irreversible brain damage can occur if the brain is deprived
of oxygen for more than four minutes. In addition, the potential for successful resuscitation during
cardiac arrest decreases exponentially with each passing minute that cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR), or cardiac defibrillation, is delayed (see following figure).

FIGURE 5-26: Cardiac Arrest Survival Timeline

The figure illustrates that the potential for successful resuscitation during cardiac arrest decreases
exponentially, by 7 percent to 10 percent, with each passing minute that cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation (CPR) or cardiac defibrillation and advanced life support intervention is delayed.
The figure also illustrates few attempts at resuscitation after 10 minutes are successful.

First-tier emergency medical services (EMS) for the City of Springfield are provided at the
Intermediate Life Support (ILS) first responder level by the SFD. The SFD is also responsible for the
oversight of EMS operations citywide. Three private, for-profit ambulance companies, America,
Life Star, and AMT/Medics First, provide the second tier (ground transport) at the ILS/ALS level.
Intermediate/Advanced Life Support or I/ALS-level care refers to prehospital interventions that
can be brought into the field by intermediate level emergency medical technicians (EMT-I) or
paramedics. Typically, this service level includes the ability to bring much of the emergency
room capability to the patient. Intermediate EMT-I personnel can administer intravenous fluids
and certain drugs, manage/intubate a patient’s airway, utilize the capabilities of a 12-lead
cardiac monitor, and provide a vital communication link to the medical control physician who

43. https://dph.illinois.gov/topics-services/emergency-preparedness-response/ems.html

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can provide specific medical direction based on the situation. Paramedics can provide more
advanced interventions and additional drug therapy.

All SFD personnel are minimally trained and certified to the emergency medical technician–
basic level (EMT-B). All new firefighters are required to be certified to at least the EMT-I level and
a few who are paramedics. All SFD engines and the squad (when staffed) operate with EMT-I or
paramedic capabilities 24/7. The three trucks only have BLS capabilities.

At the time of this study, each of the three private companies that provide transport service to
the city were nominally staffing a total of six units on a 24/7 basis; they respond from their
respective stations or deployment locations. All the EMS units are equipped with an automatic
vehicle location (AVL) system that allows the nearest available unit to be dispatched. However,
these ambulances are not necessarily dedicated just to the city; they cover the entire county.
The ambulance companies are also simultaneously doing interfacility and non-emergency
transports, which often reduce the number of units available for 9-1-1 coverage.

In most cases, except for critical, life-threatening emergencies, once the ambulance arrives on
scene, SFD transfers patient care to the ambulance personnel. However, with critical patients
such as significant trauma, serious cardiac, and other high-risk medical calls, SFD personnel often
continue to assist the ambulance personnel with administering care on the way to the hospital.
In addition, the SFD also provides “riders” for ALS companies from out-of-town or local ALS units
when a patient’s condition deteriorates while transporting to the hospital. In these cases, SFD
personnel meet with the ambulance unit and assist for the remainder of the transport.

During the period analyzed for this study, the SFD responded to 11,466 EMS calls, which
accounted for 58.3 percent of all incidents the department responded to. This percentage is
lower than what CPSM typically sees in our studies of fire departments, which is typically
between 70 percent and 80 percent of calls. Springfield is an older, urban area where there
tends to be a higher number of fire-related incidents. Conversely, if false alarms, good intent,
and public service calls for service that are listed under fire are factored out, it increases the
percentage of workload in EMS considerably. The following table and figure show the EMS call
totals for the 12-month period evaluated for this study, including number of calls by type,
average calls per day, and the percentage of calls that fall into each call type category.

TABLE 5-30: EMS Calls by Type and Number, and Percent of All Calls
Calls
Number Call
Call Type per
of Calls Percentage
Day
Breathing difficulty 2,124 5.8 10.8
Cardiac and stroke 1,408 3.9 7.2
Fall and injury 937 2.6 4.8
Illness and other 5,140 14.1 26.1
MVA 670 1.8 3.4
Overdose and psychiatric 453 1.2 2.3
Seizure and unconsciousness 734 2.0 3.7
EMS Total 11,466 31.4 58.3

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FIGURE 5-27: EMS Calls by Type and Percentage

The EMS call data tells us that:

■ EMS calls for the year totaled 11,466 (58 percent of all calls), an average of 31.4 calls per day.

■ Illness and other calls were the largest category of EMS calls at 45 percent of EMS calls, an
average of 14.1 calls per day.
■ Cardiac and stroke calls made up 12 percent of EMS calls, an average of 3.9 calls per day.

■ Motor vehicle accidents made up 6 percent of EMS calls, an average of 1.8 calls per day.

Regarding cardiac and related emergencies, some communities have started pilot programs
that incorporate trained volunteers into the emergency medical response system. The American
Heart Association continues to recognize the chain of survival by early recognition, early CPR,
early defibrillation, and rapid transport. PulsePoint ® is an iPhone app that can be downloaded
by anyone in the community who is willing to participate in this program, enabling them to be
notified when someone is having a cardiac arrest in their vicinity. Fifty-seven percent of adults in
the United States say they have had CPR training. Utilizing new technology, bystander
performance, and active citizen involvement can enhance the care provided to the
community and potentially increase survivability.

The public safety answering point (PSAP) for 9-1-1 calls in the City of Springfield is the Sangamon
County Central Dispatch System (SCCDS). The county utilizes the New World Computer-Aided
Dispatch (CAD) system along with Priority Dispatch for call screening and classification; however,
it is not fully triaging the calls for Emergency Medical Dispatch (EMD) to classify emergency
medical calls as to their severity. In an EMD system, trained telecommunicators—using locally
approved EMD guide cards—quickly and properly determine the nature and priority of the call,
dispatch the appropriate response, then if necessary give the caller instructions to help treat the
patient until the responding EMS unit(s) arrive(s). It also allows the dispatch of the appropriate

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number and type of response units based upon the severity of the call and upon resource
availability. Current practice in Springfield is for the SFD to be dispatched along with the
ambulance to all EMS calls, except for those originating from a doctor’s office, regardless of
severity. The SCCDS indicated that it would be willing to do true EMD provided that the New
World and Priority Dispatch systems have that capability. The following figure indicates a typical
EMD dispatch matrix.

FIGURE 5-28: EMD Dispatch Matrix

The following figure shows the number of SFD units that arrived at various types of EMS-related
incidents. This analysis does not examine the number of ambulances or units from the transport
companies on a call. On average, 1.1 units arrived on the scene of each EMS call. This figure tells
us that single fire unit responses to EMS incident types (91.0 percent) make up the largest EMS
response workload. Two units arrived just 8.0 percent of the time and three or more units did so
on 1.0 percent of incidents. The data analysis shows us that Engine 1 has the highest fire
apparatus EMS response workload with 1,410 calls out of 2,576 total responses (54.7 percent).
Engine 11 had the lowest fire apparatus EMS response workload with 449 calls out of 992 total
responses (45.3 percent).

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FIGURE 5-29: Calls by Number of SFD Units Arriving – EMS

An additional analysis of fire response was conducted regarding the workload of incident types.
The following table shows that the largest amount of EMS responses (89.7 percent) lasted less
than thirty minutes.

TABLE 5-31: EMS Calls by Type and Duration

Less than 30 Minutes One to Two More Than
Call Type Total
30 Minutes to One Hour Hours Two Hours
Breathing difficulty 1,965 144 15 0 2,124
Cardiac and stroke 1,342 62 4 0 1,408
Fall and injury 822 100 14 1 937
Illness and other 4,584 505 48 3 5,140
MVA 504 133 30 3 670
Overdose and psychiatric 404 48 1 0 453
Seizure and
665 64 5 0 734
unconsciousness
EMS Total 10,286 1,056 117 7 11,466

The preponderance of short-duration deployments is most likely directly related to the fact that
the SFD generally provides just initial patient care or supports and assists the EMS crew and then
transfers care to the transport ambulance crew. However, more than one in ten, or 10.3 percent
of EMS calls, lasted more than 30 minutes. Overall, the SFD has about 3.2 EMS incidents per day
that last longer than 30 minutes. The categories of incidents with the most calls longer than 30
minutes are illness and other with 1,061, an average of 2.9 per day; MVAs with 166 (0.45 per
day); and breathing difficulty with 159 (0.44 per day).

In Springfield, EMS operations are referenced under Article XL in the city code. Although the fire
department is ultimately responsible for the EMS delivery system, the current process allows any

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company to seek a permit to operate an EMS service within the city limits. However, the code
contains no provisions for performance evaluations, metric reporting, cost sharing, or any other
requirements. No request for proposal (RFP) is issued and none of the companies operate under
a formally awarded contract with the city. Article XL provides for “six ambulances” that have
been determined to be necessary but does not further look at whether those numbers can be
adjusted up or down on non-peak, overnight hours in favor of additional units during the peak
periods during the daytime.

In discussions with both SFD staff and ambulance providers, we found there is an increasing
number of times when non-emergency transports and other activity occupies available units
and thus lowers the number of units immediately available to handle 9-1-1 transports in the city.
The ambulance companies transport 100 percent of all city and county FPD calls, then bill for all
procedures performed, regardless of which agency (ambulance company or SFD) performed
them. The SFD usually (but not always) receives replacement for the medical supplies used on
calls; however, beyond that the SFD receives no compensation from any ambulance company
or receiving hospitals for the treatments it performs prior to or during transport.

CPSM’s recommendations on EMS will be provided later in this section because many are
dependent on other changes to the existing system.

TECHNICAL RESCUE RESPONSE

By virtue of its position as the largest fire department in the area, along with the wide range of
incidents it may experience that would require much more specialized training, skills, and
capabilities, the SFD has multifaceted technical incident operational capabilities. The special
operations teams represent a group of firefighter personnel that in addition to their firefighting
duties and training have elected to diversify and train to meet the challenges and dangers of
specific rescue environments.

The department’s special operations capabilities are scattered throughout the city. These
capabilities include high angle, confined space, and trench collapse technical rescue
capabilities, in addition to normal vehicle extrication. There is also a marine rescue unit with dive
capabilities. The department also has a certified level A hazardous materials response team. All
these special operations capabilities are available for response to assist on incidents throughout
Sangamon and surrounding counties.

Because of the specialized, often complex, and dangerous nature of special operations, it is
imperative that the personnel who engage in these endeavors are well-trained and given
opportunities to maintain their skills at the highest level possible. This requires training on a regular
basis. The following list indicates the number of SFD personnel who have obtained technician
level training and certification in various specialty disciplines:

■ Hazardous Materials Technician: 41.

■ Trench Technician: 36.

■ Structural Collapse Technician: 26.

■ Rope Technician: 26.

■ Vehicle and Machinery Technician: 1.

■ Rescue Specialist–Confined Space: 38.

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MUTUAL AID
Mutual aid is an essential component of almost every fire department’s operation. Except for the
largest cities, no municipal fire department can, or should, be expected to have adequate
resources to respond to and safely, effectively, and efficiently mitigate large-scale and complex
incidents. Mutual aid is shared between communities when their day-to-day operational fire,
rescue, and EMS capabilities have been exceeded, and this ensures that the citizens of the
communities are protected even when local resources are overwhelmed.

Automatic aid is an extension of mutual aid, wherein the resources from adjacent communities
are dispatched to respond at the same time as the units from the jurisdiction where the incident
is occurring. There are two basic principles for automatic aid, the first being that all jurisdictional
boundaries are essentially erased, which allows for the closest, most-appropriate unit to respond
to an incident, regardless of which jurisdiction it belongs to. The second is to provide,
immediately and at the time of initial dispatch, additional personnel or resources that may be
needed to mitigate the reported incident.

Automatic and mutual aid are generally provided without charge among the participants.

The SFD is a participant in the MABAS (Mutual Aid Box Alarm System), a statewide mutual aid
response system for fire, EMS, and specialized incident operational teams. More locally, the SFD
participates in limited automatic and mutual aid with its surrounding departments. This is primarily
because of the city’s somewhat isolated location and the fact that most of its surrounding
departments are all-volunteer units whose availability and capabilities are often limited.
However, the SFD does engage in more frequent mutual aid with both the Chatham FPD and
the Sherman FPD. Both departments have small career or in-station staffs who provide 24/7
coverage and thus can better assure availability when needed.

The following figure illustrates the location of SFD stations along with the location of the Chatham
and Sherman stations and the response time bleeds in the City of Springfield and FPDs the SFD
covers.

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FIGURE 5-30: SFD, Chatham, and Sherman Station Locations with Response Time
Bleeds

The SFD does engage in automatic aid for incidents located in the southwestern corner of the
city and northern part of the Chatham FPD due to the proximity and response times from their
respective stations. The SFD is to be commended for the use of automatic aid into the southwest
area of the city to provide improved response times, which CPSM considers to be a Best
Practice.

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FIGURE 5-31: SFD and Chatham FPD Automatic Aid

Both the Chatham and Sherman chiefs expressed a willingness to provide additional mutual aid
to the SFD when needed, particularly for large or significant incidents. The most likely resource
these departments would provide to Springfield other than the current joint responses between
the SFD and Chatham would be ladder trucks for major/multiple alarm fires. Both Chatham and
Sherman informed CPSM that their departments do not train jointly with the SFD on a regular
basis. Both felt that more interaction through training would be mutually beneficial.

Recommendations:
■ CPSM recommends that the SFD include mutual aid from the Chatham and Sherman FPDs on
their box assignments/running cards when appropriate for major/multiple alarm incidents that
occur within the city. (Recommendation No. 25.)
■ CPSM recommends that the SFD work with both the Chatham and Sherman FPDs to conduct
joint training exercises to assist with creating familiarity of both operations and personnel.
(Recommendation No. 26.)
■■■■

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PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: COMMUNITY RISK / CRITICAL TASKING FOR
STANDARDS OF COVER
■ What are normally considered to be low-risk occupancies—that is, single family dwellings—
represent a significant share of the occupancy risk in Springfield. A significant part of the
housing stock consists of residential units that are large, multistory, and multifamily types of
occupancies. In this type of structure, the fire challenges are going to be much more complex
and conducive to rapid fire spread through areas such as attics and basements. Fire
extension between closely spaced, wood-frame dwellings is also a significant concern. For this
reason, CPSM considers at least a portion of Springfield’s residential occupancies to be more
in the moderate-risk category.
■ Medium-risk occupancies consist of multiple apartment complexes and multifamily dwellings.
Commercial and mixed-use type occupancies that combine both commercial and residential
use occupancies are located throughout the city. There are also several moderately sized
industrial occupancies located throughout the city.
■ The lowest number of occupancy risk sites, but those with the highest potential fire and life
safety loss, are high-risk occupancies. There are two hospitals, multiple nursing homes, assisted
living facilities, and schools in the city. The state capitol building could also be classified as a
high-risk occupancy.
■ There are 30 high-rise buildings in Springfield, and these present many more operational
challenges than other types of structures. Consequently, reported fires in these buildings will
require a significant commitment of personnel and should receive a larger initial response.
■ In the critical tasking for structure fires, the SFD responds a higher effective response force
(ERF) to low-risk calls for service when benchmarked against NFPA 1710 (low risk) and current
research.
■ For medium- and high-risk occupancies, and high-rise buildings, the SFD responds a lower
effective response force when benchmarked against NFPA 1710 recommendations (Tables
5-9, 5-10, and 5-12). Consideration as to the number of resources to dispatch to these types of
incidents is listed after the respective tables.
■ For automatic fire alarm systems in low-risk occupancies the SFD responds with an appropriate
apparatus complement but slightly less than a recommended ERF (Table 5-15).
■ For automatic fire alarm systems in medium-risk occupancies the SFD responds with the
recommended ERF (Table 5-16).
■ For automatic fire alarm systems in high-risk occupancies the SFD responds less than a
recommended ERF (Table 5-17). Consideration as to the number of resources to dispatch to
these types of incidents is included after the respective tables.
■ Of the remaining critical tasking categories not identified above, the SFD responds a greater
ERF than recommended on two. While SFD responds a greater initial ERF than the critical
tasking suggests may be necessary, many of these incidents can be complicated and require
a large commitment of personnel and resources to mitigate successfully. As such, CPSM does
not believe that any of the initial ERFs dispatched by SFD are unreasonably large and we are
not recommending any reductions.
■ Although risk management processes and appropriate call screening are important parts of
determining the appropriate number of resources that should be initially dispatched to various

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 types of emergency incidents, it is also important that enough personnel and resources be
initially available to handle all critical tasks in a timely manner should they need to be
performed. For this reason, it is the widespread practice in the fire service to send multiple
resources to incidents and which ultimately may not be utilized if the incident turns out to be a
minor one that is easily mitigated. Even today, this remains a prudent approach. It is in support
of this concept that CPSM recommends modifications to the SFD’s initial dispatch of resources
to reported structure fire incidents.
■ Of the remaining critical tasking categories not identified above, the SFD responds with the
recommended ERF to three categories of incidents and responds a smaller than
recommended ERF to five.
■ It should be noted that the numbers in these tables for SFD response do not reflect response
by EMS personnel from the ambulance companies that can fill in EMS and patient care
positions in the ERF, so once these are calculated in, the total response force may be higher.
■ The SFD has implemented an important safety initiative utilizing Battalion Safety Officers (BSO)
paired with a Battalion Chief as part of a permanent incident management team. This is a
concept that the SFD has adopted to provide for more effective, efficient, and safer incident
command operations. These are company level officers, so in the case of Springfield, these
are Captains, who work in tandem with the command level officer, a Battalion Chief. The SFD
is to be commended for the use of FIT/BSO personnel, which CPSM considers to be a Best
Practice.

■ At the time of this assessment the SCCDS used Priority Dispatch rather than a true EMD call
screening and triaging/classification system. This results in the SFD responding to almost all
medical incidents regardless of severity. This is not an optimal use of resources or personnel
when many of these incidents would be classified as minor in nature.
■ The SFD and the ambulance companies are facing a growing challenge with having sufficient
ambulances available to provide timely response to all 9-1-1 medical calls that require a
patient transport.

CURRENT STATE OF THE FIRE AND EMS DELIVERY SYSTEM

The current state of the fire and EMS delivery system in Springfield, from the operational
perspective of the SFD, which includes external factors such as available staffing, risk, future city
growth, development and redevelopment, available funding, and demand for service is, as
analyzed and observed by CPSM, as follows:

■ During this study, we observed a highly functional fire and EMS organization that strives to
provide an exceptional level of service to the community and the region.
■ The SFD is an excellent organization that provides a high-level of service to the city. The entire
command staff work as a team to provide critical, and it appears effective, leadership to the
department. Members of the department work as a team to produce a high-quality,
effective, and efficient response that serves the city well. The SFD is clearly one of the better
organizations that we have evaluated. It should also be noted that the department has
implemented several Best Practices as noted herein.
■ From all accounts, once they arrive on the scene of an emergency, SFD personnel perform
their duties in an exceptional manner and can be counted upon to complete effectively and

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 efficiently the assignments given to them. They should be commended for their efforts and
given the support they need to continue to try to be successful.
■ The City of Springfield has an ISO rating of Class 1, the highest rating achievable. This rating
was most recently designated in April 2018.
■ The above opinions of the CPSM team notwithstanding, the SFD is confronted by many of the
challenges that are facing fire service organizations across America. As the fire service has
entered an all-hazards environment, the public has come to expect increased knowledge,
skill, and ability from their firefighters, as well as a higher level of service and responsiveness.
■ Based on the SFD’s current deployment model, most of the city is within a 240 seconds of
travel time for the first responding unit as recommended in NFPA 1710. In the more developed
urban core of the city, there are locations where there is an overlap of this benchmark
response time as the stations are situated closer together. Conversely, there are some areas of
the city, mainly around the outer perimeter, along with several of the large fire protection
districts, that are outside of the 240-second travel time benchmark. The city’s unusual shape
created by occasional annexation of additional land makes it difficult to optimally place
resources for response.
■ While there are a few pockets of the city that are not within 360 seconds of travel time for the
second arriving engine, these are mostly in areas that are not developed and outside of the
existing street network.
■ The entire city is within a travel time of 480 seconds for the entire first alarm assignment for
structure fire responses, and in some areas this time extends into surrounding areas of the
county.
■ With the current minimum staffing level of 49 personnel on duty at a time, the department’s
twelve engine companies and three ladders operate at what is considered to be
understaffed with three personnel on each. In its most recent ISO evaluation, the SFD received
significant point deficiency in Credit for Company Personnel, receiving only 8.30 out of 15.00
possible points.
■ When responding to any incident with the potential for personnel to encounter an IDLH, units
with staffing of three personnel have fewer tactical fire options until the arrival of additional
personnel and resources.
■ When units respond with just three personnel, the officers must assist with tasks such as
stretching a line and therefore cannot properly perform duties such as initial size-up. In
addition, the crews of two companies may need to be combined to accomplish tasks that a
single engine should be able to perform, such as advancing a line to the upper floors of a
building.
■ The city averages about 1.4 actual fires per day. Although a limited number of these fires are
significant, as detailed in this report, the city does have a high level of risk.
■ With the current staffing on all companies, the SFD would be unable to meet NFPA 1710
recommended minimum personnel benchmarks for a second fire without the need for mutual
aid if simultaneous, moderate risk or higher structure fires should occur.
■ The current staffing levels necessitate the department must send a higher number of resources
(engines and ladders) to assemble an ERF within an appropriate amount of time.

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■ The SFD provides the primary initial care and treatment for most EMS calls that occur in the
city, yet it receives no revenue for the private ambulance companies which perform the
transports to the hospital and then third-party bill the patient or their insurance company.
■ The city does not have formal contracts with any of the three private ambulance companies
that provide service to the city. As such there are no provisions for performance evaluations,
metric reporting, cost sharing, or any other requirements that these companies must adhere
to.
■ There are an increasing number of times when non-emergency transports and other activity
occupies the available ambulance transport units and thus lowers the number of units
immediately available to handle 9-1-1 transports in the city. This results in SFD units spending
extended periods of time committed on scene awaiting an ambulance.
■ The current practice of dispatching SFD units to all medical calls except those originating from
doctor’s offices does not take advantage of proper call screening and classification and
results in what are arguably unnecessary responses by SFD engine companies.
■ Call processing (at dispatch) and turnout (in the station) times are much higher than
recommended NFPA 1710 benchmarks.
■ The heaviest demand for both fire and EMS services are concentrated in the areas closest to
downtown Springfield.
■ The first due unit was available to respond 82.8 percent of the time and arrived first on the
scene of an incident 79.8 percent of the time.
■ Thousands of people commute to Springfield to work each day, particularly when the
legislature is in session (state workforce). In addition, thousands of others work in the city in
order to be in proximity to the state government and those on state and related business,
along with the medical facilities and institutions of higher learning. Estimates place these daily
commuters at between 20,000 and 50,000.
■ The city is the seat of Sangamon County government, which also has a major presence in the
city including the county courthouse.
■ The city is also the host to a federal building and U.S. Courthouse for the Central District of
Illinois.
■ 23.7 percent of the population of the city falls into higher risk categories of 65 years old or
older (17.6 percent) and under age 5 (6.1 percent).
■ Nearly one in five Springfield residents (18.6 percent) live below the poverty line.
■ A significant percentage of property in the city is tax exempt. As the Illinois capital, Springfield
must provide emergency services to many tax-exempt facilities but does not receive
adequate funding through PILOT programs to provide them at recommended levels.
■ Funding needs were prominently mentioned by many of the SFD stakeholders as a major
obstacle for them moving forward. Conversely, the city has fiscal challenges that could
impact its ability to provide the desired level of service.
■ The city will need to make major investments in fire department capital infrastructure needs
including facilities, apparatus, and equipment over the next several years.
■ The city provides fire and EMS services to the Illinois State Fair which is located just outside the
city. During its 11-day run in mid-August each year approximately 500,000 visit the fair.

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SECTION 6. SUSTAINABILITY ALTERNATIVES
During the on-site visit in Springfield, CPSM was asked multiple times to provide
recommendations for the creation of a “modern fire department.” When questioned as to what
this meant to the requestor, a variety of definitions for “modern” were provided by participants.
These included one that operated more efficiently, one that followed NFPA 1710 regarding
staffing, one that provided safety to citizens and visitors, as well as its members, more efficient
station locations, one that utilized technology and so on.

There is no “right” amount of fire protection and EMS delivery for a community. It is a dynamic
model based on such things as the expressed needs of the community, community risk,
population growth, and ability/willingness of the community to fund the desired level of service.
Providing the right amount of fire protection and EMS service, and by extension the number and
status of personnel for a fire department, is based on several factors. First, the community must
decide how to manage its level of risk based upon what resources it can afford to commit, and
thereby avoid making the community vulnerable to an undesirable event. Fire departments also
calculate risk levels for the community and their personnel in the form of a Community Risk
Reduction Analysis, and Standards of Coverage (SOC). It is the responsibility of elected officials
to translate community needs into reality through direction, oversight, and the budgetary
process. It is their unenviable task to maximize fire and emergency medical services within the
reality of the community’s ability and willingness to pay, particularly in today’s economic
environment.

As mentioned previously, during this study, CPSM observed a highly functional fire and EMS
organization that strives to provide an exceptional level of service to the community and the
region. The entire command staff work as a team to provide critical and effective leadership to
the department. Members of the department work in unison to produce a high-quality,
effective, and efficient response that serves the city well. The SFD is clearly one of the better
organizations that we have evaluated. It should also be noted that the department has
implemented several best practices, as outlined herein.

The City of Springfield and SFD has earned an ISO rating of Class 1, the highest rating available,
one secured by only about 400 fire departments nationwide (out of more than 40,000 rated).
From all accounts, once they arrive on the scene of an emergency, SFD personnel perform their
duties in an exceptional manner and can be counted upon to complete assignments
effectively and efficiently. They should be commended for their efforts and given the support
they need to continue to try to be successful.

In formulating our recommendations CPSM has relied on several widely accepted references for
benchmarks and standards, industry best practices, as well as experience drawn from projects
across the United States. These references include:

■ The 9th Edition of the Fire and Emergency Service Self-Assessment Manual (FESSAM), @2015 by
the Center for Public Safety Excellence Inc., Chantilly Virginia.
■ Managing Fire and Emergency Services, @2012 by the International City-County Management
Association, 777 N. Capitol Street NE, Washington, DC.
■ National Fire Protection Association standards for deployment, EMS, safety, etc.

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FIRE STAFFING AND DEPLOYMENT
When considering ways to fine-tune the fire and EMS delivery system in Springfield that focusses
on keeping pace with the evolving needs of the city, understanding the associated financial
challenges, while still providing the outstanding service that the SFD’s stakeholders now enjoy,
CPSM offers several possible planning recommendation options for consideration by the city in
the areas of staffing and deployment. We believe that several of these options can result in
efficiencies in service delivery without loss of function. Several of these options have already
been presented to the city by the fire chief. It is also important to emphasize that all SFD fire units
are currently staffed with three personnel.

Alternative 1: Convert One Truck into a Quint and Close One Engine
While this option results in the elimination of an engine company at either Station 2 or Station 12,
it does not result in the closure of a fire station so overall the level of fire management zone
service – and initial response times - may not be impacted. There would still be a company
responding from this location that can function as an engine or ladder as a Quint44 staffed with
a recommended crew of four. For fire incidents, if this unit was first due, the crew would function
as an engine, for all others they would function as a truck company handling those mission
critical duties including search and rescue, and ventilation. Although Quints are often touted as
multifunctional vehicles—and in many respects they are—for any specific incident they are one
company and can therefore perform only one job or function, that is engine or truck.

This option would potentially result in savings that includes personnel services and
operations/maintenance of one response apparatus (engine) and will allow minimum staffing to
be adjusted from 49 to 47 per shift or six overall (two per shift).

CPSM considers this alternative sensible as the city continues to examine potential efficiencies in
city departments, and this alternative results in no loss of function and recommends a staffing of
four on this unit. This alternative may require bargaining with the collective bargaining unit as this
alternative may affect minimum staffing articles/clauses.

Alternative 2: Convert Two Truck into Quints and Close Two Engines
While this option results in the elimination of a company at both Station 2 and Station 12, it does
not result in the closure of either fire station so overall the level of service in the fire management
zone – and initial response times - may not be impacted. There would still be a company
responding from both locations with a recommended crew of four on each apparatus. For fire
incidents, when these units are first due, the crew would function as an engine, for all others they
would function as a truck company handling those mission critical duties including search and
rescue, and ventilation. Although Quints are often touted as multifunctional vehicles—and in
many respects they are—for any specific incident they are one company and can therefore
perform only one job or function, that is engine or truck.

44A quint is a fire service apparatus that serves the dual purpose of an engine and a ladder truck. This type
of fire apparatus provides the ability to perform five functions: pump, water tank, fire hose, aerial device,
and ground ladders. For Springfield CPSM recommends that the quints have a minimum of a 100’ aerial
ladder, 1500 GPM pump, 500-gallon water tank, large diameter supply hose, and NFPA 1901 engine and
ladder equipment compliments.

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This option would potentially result in savings that includes personnel services and
operations/maintenance of two response apparatus (engines) and will allow minimum staffing
to be adjusted from 49 to 45 per shift or twelve overall (four per shift).

CPSM considers this alternative sensible as the city continues to examine potential efficiencies in
city departments, and this alternative results in no loss of function and recommends a staffing of
four on these units. This alternative may require bargaining with the collective bargaining unit as
this alternative may affect minimum staffing articles/clauses.

Alternative 2A: Convert Two Truck into Quints and Close Two Engines
This alternative is the same as Alternative 2, above, except that it also would increase the
staffing on Truck 1 to four personnel per shift. This would put staffing at all three companies that
function as truck companies at four personnel.

This option maintains the city’s theme of modernization of city departments and finding
efficiencies in service level delivery and achieves a level of savings in personnel services and
operations/maintenance of two response apparatus (engines), and also allows minimum staffing
to be adjusted from 49 to 46 per shift or nine overall (three per shift).

CPSM considers this alternative sensible as the city continues to examine potential efficiencies in
city departments, and this alternative and it results in no loss of function, and, recommends a
staffing level of four per shift on each Quint/aerial apparatus. This alternative may require
bargaining with the collective bargaining unit as this alternative may affect minimum staffing
articles/clauses.

Alternative 3: Eliminate Battalion Safety Officers

This option does not result in the closure of any companies although it would allow minimum
staffing to be reduced from 49 to 47 along with some cost savings. In long-gone eras in the fire
department the Battalion Chief’s aides were often referred to as drivers and did little more than
that and helping the chief monitor the radio. Today, in progressive departments such as the SFD,
these positions have evolved into an important incident management “team.”

As discussed in more detail earlier in the report, a critical component of the incident command
system is the establishment of the role of safety officer to monitor conditions at fires and
emergency incident scenes to ensure that appropriate safety procedures are being followed.
The incident safety officer is an important member of the incident command team. The safety
officer works directly under and with the incident commander to help recognize and manage
the risks that personnel take at emergencies. The concept of a command team recognizes that
there is a shared responsibility for the proper and safe performance of personnel operating on
the emergency scene. When teamed with a Battalion Chief, in addition to normal safety officer
functions, the Captain also fulfills multiple other important roles and responsibilities on the fire
ground to include continual 360 degree size-up and crew/scene accountability.

CPSM does not recommend this as an alternative because of the scene safety functions this role
fulfills, which are integrated with the overall incident command system. An additional alternative
to consider is, through attrition of company level Captains, replace the rank of this position with
firefighter. Although not an elimination of the six Captain positions, this alternative will result in
cost savings (difference between firefighter and Captain). This alternative may require
bargaining with the collective bargaining unit as this alternative may affect minimum staffing
articles/clauses.

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Alternative 4: Close a Station
Whenever municipalities discuss modernizing or streamlining the operations of their fire
department, the subject of station closings usually occurs. Officials ask, Do we have too many
stations? or Could we move certain stations so that we do not need as many? The criterion for
placement of stations has evolved over the last 125 years from how far horses could run while
pulling a heavy steamer to today’s GIS-based travel time analysis that is based upon
recommended consensus benchmarks. Also considered these days are the building and other
risks in a fire management zone, as well as the fire and EMS incident demand in a particular fire
management zone.

In Springfield, as in many communities, the fire stations are less than optimally located. They were
often constructed based upon population and building growth, with little thought toward the
future, availability of suitable land, etc. Although stations may have been correctly located
when first constructed, communities often change considerably in the ensuing years, often
making the location of a station operationally lacking for current needs and suggested resource
deployments. This can result in uneven response districts, which can be seen with GIS mapping in
Springfield. There is overlap in the response districts closer to downtown Springfield; this is normal
in many communities as this is where the greatest risk and most incidents are usually located.
Conversely, the more outlying areas have less overlap and there are still areas of the city that
are outside of the recommended 240 seconds of travel time from the nearest station.

Closing almost any station is likely to result in uneasiness by those in the impacted area and will,
in some way, negatively impact service delivery and response times at least for a portion of the
response area. It can also have a domino effect on response time and incident
management/mitigation to other areas by increasing travel distances and times for other
companies, as well as increasing call volume. Permanently closing a station can have varying
political consequences as well, as residents and business owners tend to value a certain level of
protection that comes from having a staffed fire company close by that can respond quickly in
the event of an emergency.

In Springfield, if there were to be a discussion regarding closing a station, Station 10 would be

considered a primary candidate for the following reasons:

■ Station 10 is not physically located in the city. It is located on the Illinois State Fairgrounds
which lies just outside the city limits.
■ Station 10 is not owned by the city. However, it is one of the newest and largest of the SFD
stations.
■ There were 1,158 calls in Engine 10’s first due area during the period studied, which ranks 10th
of the 12 first due districts.
■ Engine 10 responded to 1,251 runs during the period studied, which ranked 11th of the
12 engines.
Figure 6-1 shows the current station configuration and response bleeds and diamonds with
Station 10. Figure 6-2 shows a hypothetical station configuration wherein Station 10 is closed.

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FIGURE 6-1: SFD Travel Time Bleeds and Diamonds with Station 10

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FIGURE 6-2: SFD Travel Time Bleeds and Diamonds without Station 10

Area affected by closure of

Station 10 at the 240 second
, 1.5 and 1.97 response
benchmarks

Eliminating Station 10 would create a gap in the benchmark travel distances and times in the
northern and northwestern areas of the city. Since this station is located near the perimeter of
the SFD response area, times could be impacted even more since units that would need to pick
up those responses, and multiple units responding on fire incidents, would all be responding from
the same direction. This coverage gap and response time increase would become even more
significant should Station 4 be relocated further to the east as discussed herein.

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CPSM does not recommend this as an immediate alternative. However, this could become a
future alternative once a final determination is made regarding any planned station facility
realignment. This alternative may require bargaining with the collective bargaining unit as this
alternative may affect minimum staffing articles/clauses.

Alternative 5: Brownout Fire Stations/Companies as Needed

One strategy that can be deployed by city officials in lieu of permanently closing a fire station is
to implement a rolling brownout. A brownout is when one of more companies are temporarily
closed to reduce daily staffing and operations/maintenance costs as a stop-gap measure for
budget shortfalls. An entire firehouse does not close—just certain engines or ladder companies
rotating on a daily basis. Through this model, a fire station is not permanently closed.

Cities or counties often rotate browned out companies throughout the municipality so that no
community is impacted more than another. These are referred to as rolling brownouts. Some
cities or counties may, as an option, only brownout firehouses with two companies, such as an
engine and ladder, so there’s always still one company ready to roll.

While the incidence of fire or medical emergencies (for those fire departments that also respond
to medical calls) may be greater in some areas of some cities, the occurrence of fires or
medical emergencies is not completely predictable, which could mean a longer amount of
time before crews arrive to the scene. When a fire company or station is browned out, risk
increases. This includes risk to the citizens, risk to businesses owners, risk to visitors, and risk to
firefighters. If the nearest fire company to a fire or medical issue is browned out, another crew
will have to respond which may increase response times,

Cities or counties that consider brownouts as an alternative to reduce operating costs can
benefit from looking at the decision from a perspective of risk management. Managing risk is all
about probabilities, not possibilities. The decision to brown out a fire company or station should
be rooted in risk management. This is where data can aid in the decision-making process.

Browning out a company, when done with deference to risk management, can be an effective
way to reduce operating costs while reducing the impact of putting a company or station out of
service. Browning out a company or station can reduce overtime costs by not filling vacancies
primarily caused by personnel out on unscheduled sick leave. This can, in turn, prevent the
permanent closure of a company or fire station and may also prevent a reduction in staff.

Browning out a fire company or a fire station, which is an alternative that is used to close a
budget shortfall, does impact service levels and increases response times. However, when all
other possible cost-reduction and revenue producing measures have been taken, or at least
considered, brownouts are an alternative that may reduce operating costs, avoid station
closings, and prevent layoffs.

CPSM recommends this option as a last resort when all other possible cost-reduction and
revenue producing measures have been taken, or at least considered. If circumstances require
this alternative to be implemented, the city should attempt to do so only in the stations that
house more than one company (which may not be practical if alternatives above are
considered and implemented). This alternative may require bargaining with the collective
bargaining unit as this alternative may affect minimum staffing articles/clauses.

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FIRE STATION RELOCATIONS
The appropriate deployment of resources is critical to any fire and rescue service being able to
effectively, efficiently, and safely fulfill its core public safety and fire protection/emergency
medical services mission(s) within the community that it serves. One of the most important risk
management decisions—how much risk they are willing to assume—that elected officials in
every community must make on behalf of their constituents is how many fire and EMS resources:
1) do we need; 2) can we afford; and 3) how should they be stationed/ positioned/deployed to
provide maximum benefit to the community as a whole? These are never easy decisions,
especially when one considers the fact that virtually any decisions on emergency service
deployment that involve moving and/or relocating a resource, even for the considerable
benefit of the community as a whole, may have a negative effect on at least a small
percentage of the population.

In the past 22 years the City of Springfield has undertaken two fire station location studies. The
first study by Outsource Management in 1999 recommended additional stations should be
constructed in the Western and Southwestern parts of the city. In addition, it was recommended
the growth in the Northeast section of the city be monitored for the possible need for an
additional station in that area.

In 2012, the Ludwig Group study recommended relocating Stations 3, 8, and 10. Ludwig also
recommended continuing to monitor the potential need for new stations in the Northeast and
Southwest areas of the city that are not served with acceptable response times.

The SFD has also studied the fire station locations and needs of the city several times, most
recently updating its conclusions and recommendations in 2020.

As previously discussed in Section 3 of this report, seven SFD facilities are in excess of 50 years of
age and lack sufficient space and accommodations for assigned crews and apparatus. Four of
these facilities are 67 years old and one is 63 years old. As more than 50 percent of the
department’s facilities are in excess of fifty years old, they are subject to the issues inherent in
older buildings and as well lack the space and modern amenities of contemporary public fire
facilities. The lack of space in many of the stations could be a significant factor in future
decisions to expand the role of the SFD in EMS patient transport.

At the time of this study, the city and SFD have plans to replace stations 6 (67 years old) and 8
(52 years old) in the next eighteen months (projected by early to mid-2023). There have also
been discussions on the potential relocations of stations 4 (67 years old) and 9 (47 years old). The
latter would occur after the relocation of stations 6 and 8. Finally, there has been discussion on
the need for a new/additional Station 13 to cover the growing residential and commercials
areas in the far southern part of the city.

As part of this study, the city asked CPSM to look at various potential station configurations that
could assist with modernizing the deployment of personnel and resources while simultaneously
creating possible efficiencies in the overall fire protection and first response EMS delivery system.
The following figures illustrate several “what if” scenarios in which various stations are relocated
(or in one case consolidated) to provide better overall deployment coverage to the city and
reduce much of the current response overlaps. It is important for us to note that there are many
factors that go into decisions to move, consolidate, or close fire stations. While many of those
factors can be data driven as completed in this report, there are often intangibles as well. To
that end, any discussions regarding which potential service delivery modifications the city may
give further consideration to, particularly with regard to fire stations, should involve a wide cross
section of both internal and external stakeholders, including citizens of the community.

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The first map (Figure 6-3) illustrates the following:

■ Station 6 relocated to the area of 2111 S. 11th St.

■ Station 8 relocated to the area of 2820 W. Lawrence Ave..

■ A new Station 13 located in the vicinity of 3054 Spaulding Orchard Drive.

Even though this option increases the number of stations by 1 to 13, it would not necessarily
require any increase in personnel as it is anticipated that one of the companies currently
deployed from Station 12 would be relocated to this station if the city elects not to convert the
engine/ladder combination at station 12 to a single apparatus-Quint.

§§§

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FIGURE 6-3: Travel Time Diamonds for Relocated Stations 6 and 8, and New Station 13
Current Station Configuration Configuration with Stations 6 and 8 Relocated and
new Station 13

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Figure 6-4 shows the same map as Figure 6-3 but with the exception that in this scenario there is no new Station 13. Instead, the
existing Station 9 is moved to the proposed Station 13 location in the vicinity of 3054 Spaulding Orchard Road. This option maintains a
12-station deployment.

FIGURE 6-4: Travel Time Diamonds for Relocated Stations 6, 8, and 9

Current Station Configuration Configuration with Stations 6, 8, 9 Relocated

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Figure 6-5 shows the same map as Figure 6-4 but with the exception that in this scenario Station 4 and Station 5 are both also moved
east from their current locations. Maintains a 12-station deployment.

FIGURE 6-5: Travel Time Diamonds for Relocated Stations 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9

Current Station Configuration Configuration with Stations 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 Relocated

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Figure 6-6 shows the same map as Figure 6-4 with Stations 6, 8, and 9 all relocated. However, in this map, Station 7 is also relocated
south and west of its current location to the vicinity of S. Wiggins Ave. and W. Laurel St. which keeps it within the city limits. The purpose
of this relocation is to reduce some of the potential impacts of relocating Station 9. Maintains a 12-station deployment.

FIGURE 6-6: Travel Time Diamonds for Relocated Stations 6, 7, 8, and 9

Current Station Configuration Configuration with Stations 6, 7, 8, 9 Relocated

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In this scenario, CPSM would recommend that the SFD design an apparatus for Station 7 that has a Squad body that will allow it to
function as a Rescue Engine. The engine should have a minimum of a 1500 GPM pump, a minimum of a 500- gallon water tank, carry
standard SFD attack and large diameter hose compliments, along with a full complement of vehicle extrication and tactical rescue
equipment. Figure 6-7 shows examples of squad apparatus. Notice the high side and additional compartments that have been
added for additional equipment storage.

FIGURE 6-7: Typical Squad (Rescue Pumper) Type Apparatus

As was previously discussed in this section, in Springfield, if there were to be a discussion regarding closing a station, Station 10 would
be considered a primary candidate for the following reasons:

■ Station 10 is not physically located in the city. It is located on the Illinois State Fairgrounds which lies just outside the city limits.

■ Station 10 is not owned by the city and the state’s annual contribution to the city for staffing and operations has been declining
each year. The city currently receives just a fraction of annual operating costs from the state.
■ There were 1,158 calls in Engine 10’s first due area during the period studied, which ranks 10th of the 12 first due districts.

■ Engine 10 responded to 1,251 runs during the period studied, which ranked 11th of the
12 engines.
To that end, CPSM looked at two station configuration options that consolidate Stations 4 and 10 into a single station, at or near the
location of the current Station 4. In either of these configurations, there would be an area around Station 10 where there would be
longer travel distances and thus response times (Figure 6-2, page 136). Figure 6-8 illustrates a station deployment model that

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consolidates Stations 4 and 10 into a single station while adding a new Station 13 in the south end of the city. This configuration would
maintain a 12-station deployment.

FIGURE 6-8: Travel Time Diamonds for Consolidated Station 4/10 and New Station 13
Current Station Configuration Configuration with Stations 4/10 Consolidated and
new Station 13

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The map in Figure 6-9 illustrates the station configuration with Stations 6, 7, 8, and 9 all relocated, and Station 4 and Station 10
consolidated into a single station at or near the current location of Station 4. This would result in an 11-station deployment model.

FIGURE 6-9: Travel Time Diamonds for Relocated Stations 6, 7, 8, and 9, and Consolidated Station 4/10
Current Station Configuration Configuration with Stations 4/10 Consolidated and
Stations 6, 7, 8, 9 Relocated

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While CPSM does not explicitly endorse or recommend this option, as there are many factors
herein for the city to analyze, after our analysis, long term it does appear to be the most efficient
regarding the optimal placement of stations not including a Station 5 relocation to the East.
Should the city decide to explore this option as part of their long- term planning process, CPSM
would strongly suggest that the following considerations also be included in the discussions.

■ Merge the engines at Station 4 and 10 into a Quint with minimum staffing of four personnel.
o This will provide better ladder coverage in the north end of the city, as well, as
maintain three available truck companies for fire operations even when one of
the quints is first due at a fire and therefore functioning as an engine.
o Figure 6-10 illustrates the ISO 2.5-mile travel distance diamond for ladder
company deployment. This deployment actually places a second ladder within a
2.5-mile travel distance from the downtown area where the greatest fire risk and
most of the larger/taller buildings are located.
o If not previously done, relocate one firefighter position to Tower 1 to also provide
that unit with minimum staffing of four personnel.
o This option would potentially result in savings that includes personnel services and
operations/maintenance of one additional response apparatus (engines) (also
assuming Quints are deployed from Stations 2 and 12) and would potentially
allow minimum staffing to be adjusted from 49 to 44 per shift or 15 overall (five per
shift).
o CPSM views this alternative as a reasonable long range planning option for the
city as it works to increase efficiency with the SFD in that it results in no loss of
function, but with a staffing level of four per shift on each Quint/aerial apparatus,
the SFD would now have four units strategically located throughout the city that
are staffed with four personnel.
o This alternative may require bargaining with the collective bargaining unit as this
alternative may affect minimum staffing articles/clauses.

■ In this scenario, CPSM would recommend that the SFD purchase and deploy Squad or
Rescue Engine apparatus to Stations 3 and 11, in addition to the previously recommended
Station 7. By placing these companies in close proximity to the Quints at Stations 2, 4, and
12 (and to a lesser extent Station 1) the squad companies can be used as a force
multiplier for the quints and vice versa.

§§§

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Figure 6-10: ISO 2.5 Mile Ladder Coverage Diamonds for Stations 1, 2, 4, 12
(Stations 2, 4, 12-Qunit Apparatus)

EMS DELIVERY SYSTEM

CPSM has been engaged with multiple cities and EMS entities, particularly since the start of the
COVID-19 crises, that have transformed, or are in the process of transforming, their EMS service
delivery models. Many have either sought bids for providing service, or moved patient transport
in-house, so the entire system is operated by a single entity. In the past, fire departments
occasionally made EMS calls for service; today many fire departments are primarily EMS service
providers that also perform fire duty. This is in no way meant to understate the importance of a
robust fire protection delivery system commensurate with risk in a community. However, the fact
is that it is not uncommon for 70 percent to 80 percent of the calls for service received by most
fire departments in the United States to be EMS-related.

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Like many fire department’s today, a greater percentage of SFD requests for service are EMS
related rather than fire-type incidents. When analyzing the calls for Springfield, we found 58.3
percent of the calls for service are for EMS while 32.9 percent of the calls are fire-related.
Factoring out false alarms, good intent, and public service calls for service would considerably
increase the percentage of workload devoted to EMS.

Cities across the United States are looking at ways to deliver EMS services in an environment that
continues to refine itself. One of the first challenges for EMS is that the service is normally not
specified as a requirement in city charters; is not covered under most state enabling legislation
for cities; and does not receive a cabinet-level focus at the federal level (usually can be found
under the Department of Transportation). As a result, some communities have taken the position
that it is not a mandated service and have allowed the free market to respond.

FIGURE 6-11: Types of EMS Delivery Systems

There are five basic ways to provide EMS services to community:

■ Private for-profit.

■ Private Non-profit.

■ Public Third Service (separate from fire or other city services).

■ Hospital-Based.

■ Fire-Based.

In Springfield, EMS operations are referenced under Article XL in the city code. Although the fire
department is ultimately responsible for the EMS delivery system, the current process allows any
company to seek a permit to operate an EMS service within the city limits. However, the code
contains no provisions for performance evaluations, metric reporting, cost sharing, or any other
requirements. No request for proposal (RFP) is issued and none of the companies operate under
a formally awarded contract with the city. Article XL provides for “six ambulances” that have
been determined to be necessary, but does not further look at whether those numbers can be
adjusted up or down on nonpeak, overnight hours in favor of additional units during the peak
hours of the daytime.

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In our discussions with both SFD staff and ambulance providers, we learned there is an increasing
number of times when non-emergency transports and other activity occupies the available
ambulance units and thus lowers the number of units immediately available to handle 9-1-1
transports in the city. The ambulance companies transport 100 percent of all city and county
FPD calls, then bills for all procedures performed, regardless of which agency (ambulance
company or SFD) performed them. The SFD usually (but not always) receives replacement for
the medical supplies used on calls; however, beyond that the SFD receives no compensation
from any ambulance company or the receiving hospitals for the treatments it performs prior to or
during transport. This is not unique to Springfield.

Currently three different firms provide transport EMS services to the City of Springfield: America,
Life Star, and AMT/Medics First provide patient transport after initial care is provided by the SFD.

With the transport component of the EMS delivery system facing timely service delivery
challenges (a situation not unique to Springfield and which is faced by cities and counties across
the county as EMS demand increases), CPSM recommends that the City of Springfield consider
one of the following four options for modifications and enhancements to the comprehensive
EMS delivery system.

■ Create a new municipal based system, either fire department or third service, using civilian
EMTs and Paramedics who are not sworn/fire or police certified.
■ Create a franchise for EMS services in the city that would provide Springfield reimbursement
for first-response services.
■ Franchise EMS services in the city with a strict metric and provide reduced first responder (SFD)
services to only those EMS calls of the highest priority, or when a EMS unit is not available.
■ City EMS Service Ordinance where the city establishes performance metrics and licensing for
EMS agencies to provide 9-1-1 ground transport services.

Alternative 1 – Create a Municipal Based System

The first option, in terms of high-quality service delivery, is the option that involves creation of a
municipal-based system for EMS transport. Under this system a new division would be created
within the fire department or a separate third service would be created for Springfield with
ambulance units stationed across the city at existing fire stations. In a single-role system in the fire
department, the department has an EMS division or section, but its personnel, and often
management, are kept separate from fire suppression and perform EMS duties only. Employees
in the new fire department division or third service would only be trained to the EMT and
advanced-EMT (paramedic level) and would not be sworn SFD employees.

Advantages of this option include:

■ Fire stations are already part of neighborhoods and positioned to meet response time and
demand.
■ Firefighters and civilian EMS personnel employed by fire departments are highly respected
within the community and provide a high degree of comfort to citizens for sustainability of
EMS.
■ Fire/EMS department/division managers are directly responsible to local government senior
management and elected officials, thus allowing oversight to ensure accomplishment of key
performance goals.

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■ Facilitates day-to-day management oversight.

■ Enhances versatility of workforce, providing flexibility for management.

■ Greater employee job satisfaction; lower attrition rate.

Disadvantages include:
■ Measured on level of effort (LOE) rather than performance results.

■ Uses fixed-base (static) resource deployment model, which may limit efficiency in managing
the system status during peak times when applicable.
■ Use of 24-hour unit schedule results in excessive resources during nonpeak hours and
inadequate resources during peak hours.
■ Fire service heavily organized, resulting in competitive compensation and retirement
programs; adds degree of complexity, often limiting organization’s ability to manage system.
■ As with most government models, only serves patients who request care through 9-1-1 systems.
Nonemergency patient transport needs are usually delegated to local private providers.

■ While the city will recover some of the cost of providing the service through ground transport
fees, the return on investment to operate this service when you consider additional staffing
costs, which at a minimum with six units deployed around the clock (current number) is forty-
eight additional staff using a constant staffing model, the initial investment of eight
ambulances (six front-line and two reserve), and operations and maintenance costs.

The following figures outline what the allowable rates are for various EMS calls for service. If the
city adopts alternative 1, it should regularly review rates and charge the maximum allowable for
the Diagnostic Related Groups (DRG).

FIGURE 6-12: Springfield Medicare Rate Structure

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FIGURE 6-13: Midwest versus National Medicare Comparison

The collection amounts for calls in the Midwest are lower than in other parts of the country,
which is also reflected in the average cost of paramedics and EMTs.

■ Paramedic – The 90th percentile for paramedic wages in Illinois is $57,676 per year. The
median for Illinois is $46,745. Assuming a fringe benefit percentage of 40 percent would result
in cost per employee of approximately $65,447 to $80,746.
■ EMT wages in Illinois range from $34,000 to $42,000 resulting in cost per employee – including
40 percent fringe benefits - of $47,600 to $58,800. Both assume the lower pension premiums
and not the fire pensions.

If the city opted to use a four-platoon, 12-hour shift schedule (recommended in high-volume
EMS systems), employees would work an average of 42 hours of regular time with every other
weekend off. However, under this schedule, personnel work 36 hours one week and 48 hours the
following week, creating an automatic eight hours of overtime per pay period (assuming a two
week pay period). A three-platoon, 24-hour shift would require fewer employees, but the
workload may exhaust employees working that type of shift configuration because it assumes
an opportunity for rest that EMS personnel do not often get because of call volume. In addition,
for non-firefighter EMS personnel the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) mandates they be paid
overtime for any hours worked in a week over 40 (the threshold for firefighters is 53 hours).
Therefore a 24-hour schedule creates automatic overtime as well.

If the city were to utilize all-Paramedic crews with a total of 48 personnel (six ambulances with
two personnel per unit requires 12 per shift x four shifts), the annual cost would be $3,791,456 to
$4,525,808 per year for ambulance personnel. This includes an estimated $650,000 in automatic
overtime based upon the shift schedule.

Many municipalities utilize a system where each ambulance is staffed with one Paramedic and
one EMT-B or EMT-I. If the city were to use this system it would require a minimum of 24
paramedics and 24 EMTs. Under this scenario, the annual base personnel cost would be
between $3,213,128 and $3,849,104 which includes an estimated $500,000 in automatic
overtime for the shift schedule.

Additional fiscal considerations:

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 ▪ The above estimates do not include overtime to cover shift vacancies that will
need to be filled anytime personnel are on any type of leave (vacation, personal,
sick, injury, comp time, training, military, etc.).

▪ The above minimum staffing requirements do not include any extra or pad
personnel on any shift to fill vacancies created by leave. Budgeting one or two
additional personnel per shift for this purpose may be more cost effective than
paying overtime for every vacancy.

▪ The above calculations do not include the need for an agency chief (if a
standalone department) and a 24/7 EMS supervisor in a command/chase/quick
response vehicle. If the supervisors’ salary was 10 percent to 15 percent more
than a top paramedic the cost of each position would be between $88,820 and
$92,858 for a total between $355,280 and $371,431 annually for four supervisors.

▪ The above calculations do not include any clerical/administrative support.

▪ The above calculations do not include any training costs for classes, overtime
and/or shift coverage for personnel to attend, materials, etc.

▪ Maintenance contracts on stretchers, defibrillators, etc. are approximately

$50,000 to $75,000 per year.

▪ Costs for medications and other consumable/disposable supplies are estimated

at approximately $200,000 per year.

Medstar Ambulance, which serves Dallas-Ft. Worth area communities using a public utility
model, recently purchased 65 Demers Type 1 ambulances using the Dodge 4500 chassis at a
cost of $250,000 per ambulance or $350,000 complete cost with all equipment and supplies. If
the city starts with deploying six ambulances 24/7 until good data can be developed that would
support adjusting that model, the city will need a minimum of eight ambulances (nine or ten
would be better) to keep six units on the street. This would result in an initial startup capital cost of
between $2,000,000 and $2,800,000. Funding would also need to be allocated to replace each
ambulance every five to seven years, or an average of one or two annually once the cycle
begins. Annual maintenance costs, even for new ambulances that are being properly
maintained are estimated at $50,000 per year.

As mentioned earlier, it is recommended billing be provided by a third-party billing company;

these companies normally charge a percentage of revenue collected as fee for service. A
collection rate of 65 - 75 percent on billed amounts is a good standard to adopt.

Several additional benefits of this option, which would assist with modernizing how fire units are
dispatched to EMS calls are:

■ Should the city progress to service provided by cutting-edge agencies across the country
using true EMD, ambulances could be dispatched alone to Alpha and Bravo calls (unless
there are no ambulances available) and reduce the demands on fire first responders.
Applying a general overview to the calls for service in Springfield showed about 54 percent of
the EMS calls for service were for ALS-related causes; meaning the remaining 46 percent
should have been handled by the ambulance alone and likely did not require lights and siren
response or first responders. That is a significant reduction in calls for service to the fire
department and reduces the risk of exposure to loss responding to and from those calls.

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■ CPSM recommends that dispatch be reconfigured to screen calls and first responders only be
dispatched to the more serious calls for service, that is, Charlie, Delta, and Echo emergencies.
The next figure illustrates an example of the priority levels of all EMS call determinants.

FIGURE 6-14: EMS Call Determinants

At this time, CPSM does not recommend that the City of Springfield consider the expansion of its
EMS service provision into the ground transport of patients to the hospital, unless the additional
alternatives listed below are not deemed to be viable after the completion of due diligence or
the issuance of an RFP that results in either no, or inadequate responses.

Mobile Integrated Health Care and Community Paramedicine (MIH/CP) present a new way for
agencies to manage their EMS call demand, particularly with regard to frequent users of the
system. Mobile Integrated Healthcare is defined by the National Association of EMTs (NAEMT) as
“the provision of healthcare using patient-centered, mobile resources in the out-of-hospital
environment.” It can be provided through community paramedicine programs, which are
programs that use EMTs and paramedics to provide this out-of-hospital health care. MIH/CP
programs help facilitate more appropriate uses of emergency care resources and enhance
access to primary care, particularly for underserved populations, by focusing on chronic disease
management, post-discharge follow-up, and transport to non-emergency care settings.

The benefits of MIH/CP are therefore two-fold. These programs potentially help provide more
appropriate health care to community residents, and if reimbursement arrangements can be
agreed upon, also offer a substitute funding stream, separate from emergency transport, for
community-based EMS transport programs.

It should also be noted that changes in EMS reimbursements adopted during COVID-19 now
provide reimbursement to EMS providers in certain circumstances for non-transport of patients as
if they were transported (treatment via telemedicine). This may provide a new source of

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revenue for the city that should be explored as part of a comprehensive overhaul of the city’s
EMS response system. At this time, first responders are dispatched to the scene and only the
ambulance provider is reimbursed for these calls despite the fire department performing initial
triage. As more and more providers adopt tele-medicine concepts that pay for non-transport,
the City of Springfield costs may continue to increase while they receive no reimbursement.

Alternative 2 – Franchise Fee EMS Service

The current EMS “system” dispatches firefighters on every call for EMS service. The firefighters
triage the patient, package the patient, and then turn transport over to one of three private
providers that then perform transport to the medical care facility.

National studies conducted by the IAFC and NAEMT have shown that only about 20 percent of
calls for service to EMS providers require Advanced Life Support (ALS) Intervention, meaning that
about 80 percent of the calls should require no further support than what is provided by the
ambulance crew (exceptions being obese patient loading and unloading or situations that
require movement up and down buildings).

Applying a general overview to the calls for service in Springfield showed about 54 percent of
the EMS calls for service were for ALS-related causes; this means the remaining 46 percent should
have been handled solely by an ambulance crew and likely did not require lights and siren
response or first responders. This would represent a significant reduction in calls for service to the
fire department and would reduce the risk of exposure to loss responding to and from those
calls.

In many communities that CPSM has studied, the community offers a (often) sole-source
contract for emergency EMS services, although some communities do have multiple entities that
provide service. As with the fire service, these contracts may be level of effort or performance-
based, with a focus on results. Management and oversight of clinical care, day-to-day
operations, assets, and capitalization are all accomplished in the private sector, and the level of
involvement and financial support of local government is completely negotiable. Note that the
franchise is for emergency services and so existing providers could continue inter-hospital
transports and other scheduled work (but should be licensed to do so).

Advantages of this alternative include:

■ Local government not directly tied to day-to-day operations of the service. Focus is on solid
contracting, established performance results, and quality assurance.
■ No investment in physical resources, e.g., buildings, ambulances, equipment, or staff; no
maintenance or replacement costs.
■ Clear scorecards with which to assess the performance of contractors, thus facilitating
benchmarking efforts against similar communities.
■ Local officials can hold contractors accountable and replace if warranted.

■ Motivated by satisfying customers and making profit, private for-profit companies focus on
practices that increase efficiency and keep costs down. Usually heavily engaged in
nonemergency market as well to help offset costs of serving the emergency market.

Disadvantages include:
■ Locating a private third-party contractor interested in providing service in the local
government’s location.

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■ Aggressive billing procedures.

■ Lack of accountability and transparency.

■ Performance data may not be accessible.

□ Follow-up on complaints and inquiries may be inconsistent.

□ Financial oversight often limited.
□ Unregulated competition—especially true within nonemergency transport market, where
ability to pay mix is more lucrative than in emergency environment. Clear local regulation
and contracting can curtail problems.
■ Sudden withdrawal of the provider from the market is also a potential concern. This may occur
if provider decides the market doesn’t provide enough revenue to support its service, or it can
be due to internal financial issues that force downsizing. The community needs to clearly
address this in the contract and remain alert to the potential need for another contractor if
one is available and willing to take on the contract to provide service on short notice.
■ Less attractive for field providers. Lower wages, less opportunity for advancement, and higher
expectations for productivity are all factors that may contribute to turnover. The exclusive
franchise should provide payment to the city for first responder services with the amount in the
range as if the city were providing the service (Option 1). Other considerations for the city
include:

■ Any franchise should include specific metrics for performance by any provider and not be
limited simply to response time. Key performance Indicators are regularly cited by many
agencies when structuring service levels and should be part of any franchise.
o City will probably require between six ambulances 24/7 and eight ambulances
during high activity hours. These numbers can be adjusted as reliable data is
developed on actual needs.
o Key Metric: Require ambulance response time from call received to on location
of eight minutes and 59 seconds (00:08:59) at the 90th percentile for high acuity
(Charlie, Delta, and Echo) EMS incidents.
o Require monthly reporting of statistical data to city with detailed explanation for
all incidents where benchmark response time was exceeded even if overall
performance achieved 90th percentile.
■ Excessive time for response should lead to monthly fines/penalties by the providers. Tulsa, San
Diego, and other communities set a range of response times necessary for specific call types.

■ Franchise operators should have the option to co-locate at fire stations and reimburse the City
of Springfield for use of stations. As an example, in CSA-17 outside of San Diego, cities are
provided up to $50,000 by ambulance providers for the ability to co-locate.

Alternative 3 – Franchise Fee EMS Service with City Billing

Alternative 3 is much like alternatives 1 and 2 but would involve the City of Springfield creating
an EMS service, selecting an exclusive franchise holder that provides transport services at a set
fee, while the city bills for service.

This option is like the arrangement in the link found under Option 2 by EMSA in California.

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In this scenario, the city establishes rates and oversees billing (through its finance department or
third party). The selected transport entity provides staffing, equipment, and operations oversight
for transport with units co-located at city stations for a fee.

The benefits of this option are that the city avoids purchasing ambulance units, the employee
hiring process, employment costs, and operation oversight for transport.

Alternative 4 – City EMS Service Ordinance

As an alternative to the franchise fee model that usually offers a sole-source contract for
emergency EMS services, the City of Springfield could adopt a city ordinance regarding the
licensing of EMS ground transport providers in the city that sets specific criterion for those who
wish to be included in the 9-1-1 delivery system (ambulance services must already have city
approval to operate). As with the other alternatives listed, these requirements may be level of
effort or performance-based, with a focus on results. Management and oversight of clinical
care, day-to-day operations, assets, and capitalization are all still accomplished in the private
sector with accountability provided to the city through monthly reports. The level of involvement
and financial support of local government would be negotiable. The requirements specified in
the ordinance would be for emergency (9-1-1) services and so existing providers could continue
inter-hospital transports and other scheduled work (remaining licensed to do so) that don’t
interfere with their 9-1-1 obligations, or, even decline to participate in the 9-1-1 EMS system.

As with Option 2 or 3, the ordinance should include the provisions and key metrics expected of
any companies that are providing 9-1-1 EMS transport services including, but not necessarily
limited to:

■ The licensed provider(s) should provide payment to the city for first responder services with the
amount in the range as if the city were providing the service.

■ Any licensed provider should be required to meet specific metrics for performance and not
be limited simply to response time. Key performance Indicators are regularly cited by many
agencies when structuring service levels and should be part of any ordinance requirements.
o City will probably require between six ambulances 24/7 and eight ambulances
during high activity hours. These numbers can be adjusted as reliable data is
developed on actual needs.
o Key Metric: Require ambulance response time from call received to on location
of eight minutes and 59 seconds (00:08:59) at the 90th percentile for high acuity
(Charlie, Delta, and Echo) EMS incidents.
o Require monthly reporting of statistical data to city with detailed explanation for
all incidents where benchmark response time was exceeded even if overall
performance achieved 90th percentile.
■ Excessive time for response should lead to monthly fines/penalties by the providers.

■ EMS providers should still have the option to co-locate at fire stations and reimburse the City of
Springfield for use of stations.

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Recommendations and Planning Objectives:
■ CPSM recommends that the City of Springfield and SFD create a 5-, 10-, and 15-year strategic
plan for the fire department that integrates with existing city land-use, master, capital
improvement, and strategic plans. (Recommendation No. 27.)
□ The strategic plan should create a “standard of response” cover that outlines what service
levels are expected when a call for service is received. Response areas should include
urban, suburban, and unincorporated areas. Response time metrics should include
emergency and non-emergency response profiles. (27A)
□ The capital improvement component of the strategic plan should include the plan and
timeline for the relocation and replacement of stations, 6, 7, 8, and 9 and the consolidation
of Stations 4 and 10. (27B)
□ The capital improvement component of the strategic plan should include the plan and
timeline for replacement of fire apparatus commensurate with its use and in accordance
with NFPA and industry recommendations. Part of this process should include the purchase
and deployment of Quints and Squads as identified in this report. (27C)
□ The capital improvement component of the strategic plan should include a plan for
equipment replacement to meet existing NFPA standards on equipment replacement. This
should include but not be limited to firefighter PPE, SCBA, cardiac monitors, and other high-
cost items. (27D)
□ Consideration should be given to a type of “lease-purchase” program that would stage
acquisition of equipment in the department, pay the yearly “lease” fee to the manufacturer
and in turn, have the option to purchase the equipment at the end of the lease term or
return it for a newer model. Many agencies, such as Plymouth, Michigan, have used this
process to stabilize the yearly costs of equipment replacement as well as provide the best
equipment to responders and avoid large repair/maintenance costs. (27E)
■ CPSM recommends that at this time the city primarily consider EMS Alternative 2 as presented
in this report and each of its components as the best immediate option for the city to include:
(Recommendation No. 28.)
□ As part of reconfiguring the EMS response system in the city, the SFD should implement a
true EMD or Priority Dispatch system of only having an ambulance respond to Alpha and
Bravo or BLS criterion calls unless there is no ambulance available, then an SFD fire
apparatus should respond. The SFD should continue to respond the closest available
resources in fire suppression units to Charlie, Delta, and Echo, or ALS criterion calls. (28A)
□ CPSM further recommends that the City of Springfield and SFD should explore the feasibility
of implementing some type of community-based mobile integrated health care or
paramedicine program in an attempt to provide better service to the community, and to
the extent possible, attempt to minimize the recurring demand on the service from
continual and repeated use of critical resources for non-emergency responses. The city
should also explore the feasibility of introducing telemedicine as part of this program and if
funding for non-transport of patients would be available. (28B)

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■ CPSM strongly recommends that with the majority of SFD responses being EMS related that the
position of EMS Coordinator be filled ASAP independent of future decisions regarding the
overall EMS delivery system. (Recommendation No. 29.)
The City of Springfield has numerous large buildings where even once emergency responders
arrive on the scene they may have to travel an extended distance, which takes valuable
minutes, to reach the patient. Several communities have implemented programs that
incorporate trained volunteers into the emergency medical response system. Like Springfield, the
driving factors behind these programs are often the dense population along with numerous
high-rises where this type of response force can speed initial life-saving care to those in need,
particularly where it may take emergency personnel some time to make their way to the patient
even after arriving on location.

The American Heart Association continues to recognize the chain of survival by early
recognition, early CPR, early defibrillation, and rapid transport. PulsePoint® is an app for iPhones
that can be downloaded by anyone in the community who is willing to participate in this
program, enabling them to be notified when someone is having a cardiac arrest in their vicinity.
Fifty-seven percent of adults in the United States say they have had CPR training. Utilizing new
technology, bystander performance, and active citizen involvement enhances the care
provided to the community.

■ CPSM recommends that as a planning objective the SFD should explore the possibility of
enhancing their technological capabilities to provide increased service to the community for
serious cardiac incidents such as through the iPhone PulsePoint® app or other similar programs
or apps. (Recommendation No. 30.)
■ CPSM recommends that the City of Springfield explore all possible options to increase
revenues that could be used to offset the cost of providing fire and EMS services to the city
and FPDs, such as additional PILOT payments from the State of Illinois and other tax exempt
and non-profit entities, public safety assessment for commuters, hotel tax, fire prevention fees,
etc. before considering service reductions. (Recommendation No. 31.)

One of the keys to being able to maintain current minimum staffing levels and reduce the
amount of overtime being utilized is to monitor and attempt to minimize the amount of
unscheduled leave—primarily sick and injury—that personnel utilize. CPSM is not suggesting that
personnel are not entitled to legitimate use of both these types of leave; however, we are also
very cognizant of the fact that there are personnel in every department who misuse, and in fact
abuse this type of leave and the system. The larger the department, the more of these personnel
there likely are. Monitoring these types of leave and personnel who are suspected of misusing it
can assist with keeping the need for overtime down and reduce staffing costs.

■ CPSM recommends as a planning objective that SFD leadership work with the firefighters
bargaining unit to develop a policy for monitoring and verification of personnel who are on
sick or injury leave. Examples of things that can be discussed include requiring a location
where they will be for in-person verification by a chief officer, providing a doctor’s note, being
required to see a city-arranged doctor, and not being eligible for overtime until they have
worked a regular shift after a sick call out. (Recommendation No. 32.)

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Accreditation is a comprehensive self-assessment and evaluation model that enables
organizations to examine past, current, and future service levels and internal performance and
compare them to industry best practices. This process leads to improved service delivery. The
Center for Public Safety Excellence’s (CPSE) accreditation program, administered by the
Commission on Fire Accreditation International (CFAI) allows fire and emergency service
agencies to compare their performance to industry best practices in order to:
o Determine community risk and safety needs and develop community-specific
Standards of Cover.
o Evaluate the performance of the Department.
o Establish a method for achieving continuous organizational improvement.
Particularly for emergency services, local officials need criteria to assess professional
performance and efficiency. The CFAI accreditation process provides a well-defined,
internationally recognized benchmark system to measure the quality of fire and emergency
services.
As noted in several sections of this report, the SFD is operationally and administratively a very
good fire department. Based upon that premise, once the department accomplishes some of
the pressing strategic plan recommendations contained in this report, the SFD with support from
the City of Springfield, should consider undertaking the accreditation process. Although time
consuming and labor intensive it would allow the SFD to be recognized for its excellence.
■ CPSM recommends as a planning objective that once the SFD accomplishes some of the
pressing strategic plan recommendations contained in this report, it should, with support from
the elected officials of the City of Springfield, consider undertaking the accreditation process.
(Recommendation No. 33.)

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SECTION 7. DATA ANALYSIS
This data analysis was prepared as a key component of the study of the Springfield Fire
Department (SFD). This analysis examines all calls for service between January 1, 2019, and
January 1, 2021, as recorded in the Sangamon County Central Dispatch System’s (SCCDS)
computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system and National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS).

This analysis is made up of four parts. The first part focuses on call types and dispatches. The
second part explores the time spent and the workload of individual units. The third part presents
an analysis of the busiest hours in the year studied. The fourth and final part provides a response
time analysis of SFD units.

During the year covered by this study, the Springfield Fire Department provided several types of
life safety service to about 115,900 city residents within 61 square miles land area and 6.3 square
miles water area, along with nine unincorporated areas in and around Springfield known as Fire
Protection Districts. The SFD operates at least 49 personnel daily, including two battalion chiefs.
The SFD operated out of 12 stations. The frontline apparatus includes 12 engines, three ladder
trucks, a multiple-purpose squad, and two special event designated units (EMS units designated
for large public events). The SFD also operated two spare rigs that were occasionally in service
when other frontline engines were out of service and a spare truck as a backup when another
ladder truck was out of service.

In 2019, the Springfield Fire Department responded to 19,668 calls, of which 58 percent were EMS
calls. The total combined workload (deployed time) for SFD units was 8,219.2 hours. The average
dispatch time was 1.8 minutes and the average total response time was 6.7 minutes. The 90th
percentile dispatch time was 2.9 minutes and the 90th percentile total response time was 9.8
minutes.

In 2020, SFD responded to 19,224 calls, of which 57 percent were EMS calls. The total combined
workload (deployed time) for SFD units was 7,888.5 hours. The average dispatch time was 1.7
minutes and the average total response time was 6.9 minutes. The 90th percentile dispatch time
was 2.8 minutes and the 90th percentile total response time was 10.0 minutes.

METHODOLOGY
In this report, CPSM analyzes calls and runs. A call is an emergency service request or incident.
A run is a dispatch of a unit (i.e., a unit responding to a call). Thus, a call may include multiple
runs.

We received CAD data and NFIRS data for the Springfield Fire Department. We first matched the
NFIRS and CAD data based on the incident numbers provided. Then, we classified the calls in a
series of steps. We first used the NFIRS incident type to identify canceled calls and to assign EMS,
motor vehicle accident (MVA), and fire category call types. EMS calls were then assigned
detailed categories based on their detailed CAD incident call types shown in Attachment V.

We received records for 39,494 total calls in 2019 and 2020. We removed 602 calls for various
reasons. Based on their call type descriptions, 32 test calls were removed. An additional 36 calls
lacking a responding SFD unit were removed. Finally, we removed all runs that did not have at
least an en route or an arrival time. This led us to exclude another 308 calls. In addition, 226 calls
that only involved administrative or inspection units were not included in the analysis. However,

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the work associated with these calls is included in the analysis of additional personnel in
Attachment II.

In this report, canceled and mutual aid (given) calls are included in all analyses other than the
response time analyses. To assign mutual aid calls, we used each call’s recorded latitude and
longitude to determine the fire protection district where a call was made. SFD serves the fire
protection districts presented in the following table. All calls responded by SFD units but located
in areas not primarily covered by SFD were classified as “mutual aid” calls.

TABLE 7-1: Fire Protection Districts Serviced by SFD

Fire Protection District
Curran
East Side
Lake Springfield
North Side
South Lawn
South Oak Knolls
South Side
Springfield (City)
Western
Woodside

The analysis results are primarily presented for 2019. The results for 2020 are presented along with
the corresponding 2019 results in Attachment IV for comparison.

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AGGREGATE CALL TOTALS AND RUNS
In 2019, SFD responded to 19,668 non-administrative calls. Of these, 264 were structure fire calls
and 233 were outside fire calls.

Calls by Type
The following table and two figures show the number of calls by call type, average calls per
day, and the percentage of calls that fall into each call type category for the 12 months
studied.

TABLE 7-2: Call Types

Number Calls Call
Call Type
of Calls per Day Percentage
Breathing difficulty 2,124 5.8 10.8
Cardiac and stroke 1,408 3.9 7.2
Fall and injury 937 2.6 4.8
Illness and other 5,140 14.1 26.1
MVA 670 1.8 3.4
Overdose and psychiatric 453 1.2 2.3
Seizure and unconsciousness 734 2.0 3.7
EMS Total 11,466 31.4 58.3
False alarm 2,363 6.5 12.0
Good intent 829 2.3 4.2
Hazard 476 1.3 2.4
Outside fire 233 0.6 1.2
Public service 2,311 6.3 11.8
Structure fire 264 0.7 1.3
Fire Total 6,476 17.7 32.9
Canceled 1,588 4.4 8.1
Mutual aid 138 0.4 0.7
Total 19,668 53.9 100.0

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FIGURE 7-1: EMS Calls by Type

FIGURE 7-2: Fire Calls by Type

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Observations:
Overall
■ The department received an average of 53.9 calls per day, including 4.4 canceled calls
(8 percent of all calls) and 0.2 mutual aid calls.

EMS
■ EMS calls for the year totaled 11,466 (58 percent of all calls), an average of 31.4 calls per day.

■ Illness and other calls were the largest category of EMS calls at 45 percent of EMS calls, an
average of 14.1 calls per day.
■ Cardiac and stroke calls made up 12 percent of EMS calls, an average of 3.9 calls per day.

■ Motor vehicle accidents made up 6 percent of EMS calls, an average of 1.8 calls per day.

Fire
■ Fire calls for the year totaled 6,476 (33 percent of all calls), an average of 17.7 calls per day.

■ False alarm calls were the largest category of fire calls at 36 percent of fire calls, an average
of 6.5 calls per day.
■ Structure and outside fire calls combined made up 8 percent of fire calls, an average of
1.4 calls per day.

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Calls by Type and Duration
The following table shows the duration of calls by type using four duration categories: less than
30 minutes, 30 minutes to one hour, one to two hours, and more than two hours.

TABLE 7-3: Calls by Type and Duration

Less than 30 Minutes One to More Than
Call Type Total
30 Minutes to One Hour Two Hours Two Hours
Breathing difficulty 1,965 144 15 0 2,124
Cardiac and stroke 1,342 62 4 0 1,408
Fall and injury 822 100 14 1 937
Illness and other 4,584 505 48 3 5,140
MVA 504 133 30 3 670
Overdose and psychiatric 404 48 1 0 453
Seizure and
665 64 5 0 734
unconsciousness
EMS Total 10,286 1,056 117 7 11,466
False alarm 2,185 160 18 0 2,363
Good intent 776 47 6 0 829
Hazard 314 111 40 11 476
Outside fire 175 40 17 1 233
Public service 2,209 90 10 2 2,311
Structure fire 92 73 76 23 264
Fire Total 5,751 521 167 37 6,476
Canceled 1,580 7 0 1 1,588
Mutual aid 101 21 13 3 138
Total 17,718 1,605 297 48 19,668

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Observations:
EMS
■ On average, there were 0.3 EMS calls per day that lasted more than one hour.

■ A total of 11,342 EMS calls (99 percent) lasted less than one hour, 117 EMS calls (1 percent)
lasted one to two hours, and 7 EMS calls (less than1 percent) lasted two or more hours.
■ A total of 1,404 cardiac and stroke calls (100 percent) lasted less than one hour, and
4 cardiac and stroke calls (less than 1 percent) lasted one to two hours.
■ A total of 637 motor vehicle accidents (95 percent) lasted less than one hour, 30 motor vehicle
accidents (4 percent) lasted one to two hours, and 3 motor vehicle accidents (1 percent)
lasted two or more hours.

Fire
■ On average, there were 0.6 fire calls per day that lasted more than one hour.

■ A total of 6,272 fire calls (97 percent) lasted less than one hour, 167 fire calls (3 percent) lasted
one to two hours, and 37 fire calls (1 percent) lasted two or more hours.
■ A total of 2,345 false alarm calls (99 percent) lasted less than one hour, and 18 false alarm calls
(1 percent) lasted one to two hours.
■ A total of 215 outside fire calls (92 percent) lasted less than one hour, 17 outside fire calls
(7 percent) lasted one to two hours, and 1 outside fire call (less than 1 percent) lasted two or
more hours.
■ A total of 165 structure fire calls (62 percent) lasted less than one hour, 76 structure fire calls
(29 percent) lasted one to two hours, and 23 structure fire calls (9 percent) lasted two or more
hours.

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Average Calls by Month and Hour of Day
The following figure shows the monthly variation in the average daily number of calls handled by
the SFD in 2019. Similarly, the subsequent figure illustrates the average number of calls received
each hour of the day for the year.

FIGURE 7-3: Average Calls by Month

Observations:
■ Average EMS calls per day ranged from 29.5 in November 2019 to 34.7 in August 2019.

■ Average fire calls per day ranged from 16.1 in March 2019 to 19.5 in January 2019.

■ Average other calls per day ranged from 3.4 in February 2019 to 5.9 in August 2019.

■ Average calls per day overall ranged from 49.9 in March 2019 to 59.0 in August 2019.

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FIGURE 7-4: Calls by Hour of Day

Observations:
■ Average EMS calls per hour ranged from 0.7 between 5:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. to 1.9 between
4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m.
■ Average fire calls per hour ranged from 0.4 between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. to 1.0 between
5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.
■ Average other calls per hour ranged from 0.1 between 5:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. to 0.3
between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.
■ Average calls per hour overall ranged from 1.1 between 4:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. to
3.2 between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m.

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Units Arrived at Calls
The following table and two figures detail the number of calls with one, two, three, and four or
more units arriving to a call, broken down by call type. In this section, we limit ourselves to calls
where a unit arrives. There were 711 calls where an SFD unit recorded an en route time but no
unit recorded an arrival time. Of these 711 calls, 710 were canceled calls and 1 was a public
service call.

TABLE 7-4: Calls by Call Type and Number of Units Arriving

Number of Units
Call Type Total Calls
One Two Three Four or More
Breathing difficulty 2,062 60 2 0 2,124
Cardiac and stroke 1,388 20 0 0 1,408
Fall and injury 785 149 1 2 937
Illness and other 4,792 304 40 4 5,140
MVA 305 311 33 21 670
Overdose and psychiatric 384 68 0 1 453
Seizure and unconsciousness 722 11 1 0 734
EMS Total 10,438 923 77 28 11,466
False alarm 1,677 421 249 16 2,363
Good intent 735 34 13 47 829
Hazard 332 37 71 36 476
Outside fire 196 16 12 9 233
Public service 2,230 57 19 4 2,310
Structure fire 15 38 35 176 264
Fire Total 5,185 603 399 288 6,475
Canceled 831 35 3 9 878
Mutual aid 110 7 10 11 138
Total 16,564 1,568 489 336 18,957
Percentage 87.4 8.3 2.6 1.8 100.0
Note: Only calls with arriving units were considered. Therefore, the number of calls is less than that
presented in Table 7-1.

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FIGURE 7-5: Calls by Number of Units Arriving – EMS

FIGURE 7-6: Calls by Number of Units Arriving – Fire

171
Observations:
Overall
■ On average, 1.2 units arrived at all calls; for 87 percent of calls, only one unit arrived.

■ Overall, four or more units arrived at 2 percent of calls.

EMS
■ On average, 1.1 units arrived per EMS call.

■ For EMS calls, one unit arrived 91 percent of the time, two units arrived 8 percent of the time,
and three or more units arrived 1 percent of the time.

Fire
■ On average, 1.4 units arrived per fire call.

■ For fire calls, one unit arrived 80 percent of the time, two units arrived 9 percent of the time,
three units arrived 6 percent of the time, and four or more units arrived 4 percent of the time.
■ For outside fire calls, three or more units arrived 9 percent of the time.

■ For structure fire calls, three or more units arrived 80 percent of the time. An average of
5.0 units arrived at structure fire calls.

172
WORKLOAD: RUNS AND TOTAL TIME SPENT
The workload of each unit is measured in two ways: runs and deployed time. The deployed time
of a run is measured from the time a unit is dispatched through the time the unit is cleared.
Because multiple units respond to some calls, there are more runs than calls, and the average
deployed time per run varies from the total duration of calls.

Runs and Deployed Time – All Units

Deployed time, also referred to as deployed hours, is the total deployment time of all units
deployed on all runs. The following table shows the total deployed time, both overall and broken
down by type of run, for SFD units in 2019. Table 7-6 and Figure 7-7 present the average
deployed minutes by hour of day.

TABLE 7-5: Annual Runs and Deployed Time by Run Type

Deployed Percent Deployed
Annual Annual Runs
Call Type Minutes of Total Minutes
Hours Runs per Day
per Run Hours per Day
Breathing difficulty 17.5 649.0 7.9 106.7 2,221 6.1
Cardiac and stroke 16.8 403.5 4.9 66.3 1,445 4.0
Fall and injury 17.9 341.4 4.2 56.1 1,146 3.1
Illness and other 18.8 1,798.6 21.9 295.7 5,754 15.8
MVA 20.9 455.8 5.5 74.9 1,311 3.6
Overdose and psychiatric 18.2 165.6 2.0 27.2 547 1.5
Seizure and
18.2 233.4 2.8 38.4 768 2.1
unconsciousness
EMS Total 18.4 4,047.5 49.2 665.3 13,192 36.1
False alarm 12.9 1,096.6 13.3 180.3 5,120 14.0
Good intent 13.4 316.4 3.8 52.0 1,416 3.9
Hazard 27.0 445.7 5.4 73.3 990 2.7
Outside fire 20.8 143.2 1.7 23.5 413 1.1
Public service 14.6 617.2 7.5 101.5 2,533 6.9
Structure fire 39.8 1,197.6 14.6 196.9 1,806 4.9
Fire Total 18.7 3,816.7 46.4 627.4 12,278 33.6
Canceled 7.5 228.7 2.8 37.6 1,828 5.0
Mutual aid 31.8 126.3 1.5 20.8 238 0.7
Other Total 10.3 355.0 4.3 58.4 2,066 5.7
Total 17.9 8,219.2 100.0 1,351.1 27,536 75.4

173
Observations:
Overall
■ The total deployed time for the year was 8,219.2 hours. The daily average was 22.5 hours for all
units combined.
■ There were 27,536 runs, including 1,828 runs dispatched for canceled calls and 238 runs
dispatched for mutual aid given calls. The daily average was 75.4 runs.

EMS
■ EMS runs accounted for 49 percent of the total workload.

■ The average deployed time for EMS runs was 18.4 minutes. The deployed time for all EMS runs
averaged 11.1 hours per day.

Fire
■ Fire runs accounted for 46 percent of the total workload.

■ The average deployed time for fire runs was 18.7 minutes. The deployed time for all fire runs
averaged 10.5 hours per day.
■ There were 2,219 runs for structure and outside fire calls combined, with a total workload of
1,340.9 hours. This accounted for 16 percent of the total workload.
■ Accounting for 12 engines and 3 ladder trucks operating for a total of 131,400 hours annually,
structure and outside fire calls amounted to 1.02 percent of available time.
■ The average deployed time for outside fire runs was 20.8 minutes per run, and the average
deployed time for structure fire runs was 39.8 minutes per run.

174
TABLE 7-6: Average Deployed Minutes by Hour of Day
Hour EMS Fire Other Total
0 18.5 20.6 1.4 40.6
1 17.6 26.2 1.5 45.3
2 16.1 20.9 1.7 38.7
3 16.1 16.8 1.9 34.8
4 14.6 16.1 1.2 32.0
5 14.5 17.6 1.7 33.8
6 16.2 20.8 1.3 38.3
7 21.4 23.2 1.2 45.8
8 27.3 26.0 1.8 55.1
9 30.5 23.4 2.4 56.3
10 33.0 29.2 2.7 64.8
11 36.6 33.2 3.6 73.4
12 35.9 32.5 3.2 71.6
13 36.3 36.0 4.2 76.5
14 37.0 30.2 3.2 70.3
15 38.1 30.0 3.0 71.1
16 41.5 28.2 2.7 72.3
17 36.5 35.2 3.2 75.0
18 36.2 31.0 3.0 70.1
19 33.7 29.7 3.3 66.7
20 33.5 32.5 2.5 68.4
21 26.1 25.1 2.8 54.0
22 25.4 22.8 2.6 50.8
23 22.5 20.1 2.4 45.1
Daily Avg. 665.2 627.4 58.4 1,351.0

175
FIGURE 7-7: Average Deployed Minutes by Hour of Day

Observations:
■ Hourly deployed time was highest during the day from 11:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., averaging
between 70 and 76 minutes.
■ Average deployed time peaked between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m., averaging 76 minutes.

■ Average deployed time was lowest between 4:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m., averaging 32 minutes.

176
Workload by Fire Protection District
The following table breaks down the workload of SFD by fire protection district of the call.
Table 7-8 provides further detail on the workload associated with structure and outside fires calls,
also broken down by fire protection district in and around Springfield. All calls outside of SFD’s
service area are listed as “other.”

TABLE 7-7: Annual Workload by Fire Protection District

Pct. Runs Pct.
Fire Protection Minutes Annual Minutes
Calls Annual Runs Per Annual
District Per Run Hours Per Day
Calls Day Work
Springfield (City) 16,983 86.3 23,925 65.5 17.5 6,968.9 84.8 1,145.6
East Side 620 3.2 841 2.3 18.7 261.9 3.2 43.1
North Side 513 2.6 686 1.9 20.7 236.1 2.9 38.8
Woodside 419 2.1 507 1.4 17.7 149.4 1.8 24.6
South Side 394 2.0 513 1.4 16.1 137.5 1.7 22.6
Western 225 1.1 318 0.9 22.9 121.5 1.5 20.0
South Lawn 154 0.8 183 0.5 19.3 58.9 0.7 9.7
Lake Springfield 74 0.4 112 0.3 41.4 77.3 0.9 12.7
Curran 60 0.3 91 0.2 33.6 50.9 0.6 8.4
South Oak Knolls 60 0.3 81 0.2 18.7 25.2 0.3 4.1
Other 166 0.8 279 0.8 28.3 131.6 1.6 21.6
Total 19,668 100.0 27,536 75.4 17.9 8,219.2 100.0 1,351.1

TABLE 7-8: Runs for Structure and Outside Fires by Fire Protection District
Structure Outside Pct. of
Total Annual
Fires Outside Fires Structure
Fire Protection Structure Hours for
Deployed Fire Deployed and Outside
District Fire Runs Structure and
Minutes Runs Minutes Fire
Outside Fires
per Run per Run Workload
Springfield
1,594 39.5 336 19.0 1,155.8 85.2
(City)
East Side 68 41.3 27 26.9 58.9 4.3
North Side 28 64.5 15 35.8 39.0 2.9
Woodside 23 24.6 6 22.2 11.7 0.9
Western 22 58.8 6 47.7 26.3 1.9
South Lawn 22 26.0 7 35.8 13.7 1.0
South Side 21 10.5 13 15.1 6.9 0.5
South Oak
15 9.9 0 NA 2.5 0.2
Knolls
Curran 7 152.1 3 23.7 18.9 1.4
Lake Springfield 6 71.1 0 NA 7.1 0.5
Other 12 60.5 6 28.9 15.0 1.1
Total 1,818 39.9 419 20.9 1,355.9 100.0

177
Observations:
Springfield (City)
■ Total deployed time for the year was 6,968.9 hours or 85 percent of the total annual workload.
The daily average was 19.1 hours for all units combined.
■ There were 23,925 runs, including 1,601 runs dispatched for canceled calls. The daily average
was 65.5 runs.

Other Fire Protection Districts Covered by SFD

■ Total deployed time for the year was 1,118.7 hours or 14 percent of the total annual workload.
The daily average was 3.1 hours for all units combined.
■ There were 3,332 runs, including 186 runs dispatched for canceled calls. The daily average was
9.1 runs.

Other
■ Total deployed time for the year was 131.6 hours or 2 percent of the total annual workload.
The daily average was 21.9 minutes for all units combined.
■ There were 279 runs, including 41 runs dispatched for canceled calls and 238 runs for mutual
aid given calls.

178
Workload by Unit
The following table provides a summary of each unit’s workload. Tables 7-10 and 7-11 provide a
more detailed view of workload, showing each unit’s runs broken out by run type (Table 7-10)
and its daily average deployed time by run type (Table 7-11).

TABLE 7-9: Call Workload by Unit

Deployed Deployed Runs
Total Total Total
Station Unit Unit Type Minutes Minutes per
Hours Pct. Runs
per Run per Day Day
B01 Battalion chief 21.3 347.2 4.2 57.1 976 2.7
E01 Engine 16.1 690.4 8.4 113.5 2,576 7.1
Haz1 Special Response 67.2 3.4 0.0 0.6 3 0.0
1 Haz2 Trailer 67.2 3.4 0.0 0.6 3 0.0
Sq1 Squad 16.3 59.7 0.7 9.8 220 0.6
T01 Platform/truck 17.3 423.4 5.2 69.6 1,468 4.0
Total 17.5 1,527.3 18.6 251.1 5,246 14.4
E02 Engine 18.8 609.3 7.4 100.2 1,948 5.3
2 T02 Ladder 16.5 311.3 3.8 51.2 1,131 3.1
Total 17.9 920.6 11.2 151.3 3,079 8.4
3 E03 Engine 17.3 478.6 5.8 78.7 1,663 4.6
4 E04 Engine 17.1 646.4 7.9 106.3 2,262 6.2
5 E05 Engine 16.4 561.5 6.8 92.3 2,056 5.6
B02 Battalion chief 17.7 295.6 3.6 48.6 1,003 2.7
6 E06 Engine 15.3 395.3 4.8 65.0 1,555 4.3
Total 16.2 690.9 8.4 113.6 2,558 7.0
7 E07 Engine 16.2 475.9 5.8 78.2 1,762 4.8
8 E08 Engine 18.7 646.4 7.9 106.3 2,070 5.7
E09 Engine 20.8 658.0 8.0 108.2 1,894 5.2
9 M01 Mobile Ventilation 238.7 4.0 0.0 0.7 1 0.0
Total 21.0 662.0 8.1 108.8 1,895 5.2
E10 Engine 20.9 435.8 5.3 71.6 1,251 3.4
10 Haz3 Hazmat Supply 71.1 5.9 0.1 1.0 5 0.0
Total 21.1 441.7 5.4 72.6 1,256 3.4
11 E11 Engine 19.9 329.2 4.0 54.1 992 2.7
E12 Engine 20.0 530.0 6.4 87.1 1,592 4.4
12 T03 Truck 16.5 267.7 3.3 44.0 976 2.7
Total 18.6 797.7 9.7 131.1 2,568 7.0
E15 Reserve Engine 15.1 0.5 0.0 0.1 2 0.0
E18 Reserve Engine 7.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 1 0.0
SFD EMS1 Special Designation 20.0 25.0 0.3 4.1 75 0.2
EMS2 Special Designation 18.1 15.4 0.2 2.5 51 0.1
Total 19.1 41.0 0.5 6.7 129 0.4
Total 17.9 8,219.2 100.0 1,351.1 27,536 75.4

179
TABLE 7-10: Total Annual Runs by Run Type and Unit
Structure Outside Other Mutual
Station Unit EMS Canceled Total
Fire Fire Fire Aid
B01 73 158 17 693 29 6 976
E01 1,410 141 33 667 322 3 2,576
Haz1 0 0 0 2 0 1 3
1 Haz2 0 0 0 2 0 1 3
Sq1 122 19 2 41 34 2 220
T01 366 211 25 808 55 3 1,468
Total 1,971 529 77 2,213 440 16 5,246
E02 1,115 47 27 614 129 16 1,948
2 T02 285 179 24 583 40 20 1,131
Total 1,400 226 51 1,197 169 36 3,079
3 E03 938 95 26 486 115 3 1,663
4 E04 1,307 101 35 654 158 7 2,262
5 E05 1,220 123 34 463 215 1 2,056
B02 40 110 13 810 13 17 1,003
6 E06 872 123 43 362 150 5 1,555
Total 912 233 56 1,172 163 22 2,558
7 E07 930 110 31 549 133 9 1,762
8 E08 1,208 77 24 658 100 3 2,070
E09 1,026 74 16 687 68 23 1,894
9 M01 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 1,027 74 16 687 68 23 1,895
E10 736 62 30 324 94 5 1,251
10 Haz3 0 0 0 3 0 2 5
Total 736 62 30 327 94 7 1,256
11 E11 449 34 7 379 47 76 992
E12 797 44 18 621 91 21 1,592
12 T03 188 97 8 640 29 14 976
Total 985 141 26 1,261 120 35 2,568
E15 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
E18 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
SFD EMS1 62 0 0 10 3 0 75
EMS2 45 0 0 3 3 0 51
Total 109 1 0 13 6 0 129
Total 13,192 1,806 413 10,059 1,828 238 27,536
Note: The type of each unit is given in Table 7-11. Other fire includes false alarm, good intent, hazard, and
public service calls.

180
TABLE 7-11: Daily Average Deployed Minutes by Run Type and Unit
Structure Outside Other Mutual
Station Unit EMS Canceled Total
Fire Fire Fire Aid
B01 4.6 25.0 1.2 25.1 0.6 0.7 57.1
E01 59.9 16.3 1.4 29.2 6.2 0.3 113.5
Haz1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.6
1 Haz2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.6
Sq1 5.3 2.1 0.1 1.4 0.8 0.2 9.8
T01 14.9 25.4 0.8 27.3 1.1 0.1 69.6
Total 84.7 68.8 3.4 83.6 8.8 1.8 251.1
E02 62.5 4.3 1.8 27.4 2.9 1.3 100.2
2 T02 15.6 12.4 1.0 20.2 0.7 1.3 51.2
Total 78.1 16.6 2.8 47.6 3.6 2.6 151.3
3 E03 43.6 9.4 1.6 20.9 2.8 0.3 78.7
4 E04 61.4 12.8 2.6 26.2 2.8 0.4 106.3
5 E05 52.7 13.2 1.9 20.0 4.5 0.0 92.3
B02 3.7 13.1 0.5 28.4 0.3 2.5 48.6
6 E06 35.9 10.6 2.2 13.1 2.8 0.4 65.0
Total 39.6 23.6 2.8 41.5 3.1 2.9 113.6
7 E07 41.9 9.8 1.1 21.9 2.5 1.0 78.2
8 E08 64.0 8.9 1.5 29.1 2.3 0.3 106.3
E09 63.8 7.6 1.2 31.6 1.4 2.7 108.2
9 M01 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7
Total 64.4 7.6 1.2 31.6 1.4 2.7 108.8
E10 40.5 8.3 2.6 17.5 2.0 0.7 71.6
10 Haz3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.4 1.0
Total 40.5 8.3 2.6 18.1 2.0 1.1 72.6
11 E11 29.6 2.1 0.5 15.8 1.1 4.9 54.1
E12 48.8 5.0 0.9 29.1 1.9 1.5 87.1
12 T03 9.9 10.8 0.6 21.0 0.6 1.2 44.0
Total 58.6 15.8 1.5 50.0 2.5 2.7 131.1
E15 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
E18 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SFD EMS1 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 4.1
EMS2 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 2.5
Total 6.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 6.7
Total 665.3 196.9 23.5 407.0 37.6 20.8 1,351.1
Note: The type of each unit is given in Table 7-11. Other fire includes false alarm, good intent, hazard, and
public service calls.

181
Observations:
■ At the station level, station 1 made the most runs (5,246 or an average of 14.4 runs per day)
and had the highest total annual deployed hours (1,527.3 or an average of 4.2 hours per day).
□ EMS calls accounted for 38 percent of runs and 34 percent of total deployed time.
□ Structure and outside fire calls accounted for 12 percent of runs and 29 percent of total
deployed time.
■ At the station level, station 2 made the second most runs (3,079 or an average of 8.4 runs per
day) and had the second-highest total annual deployed hours (920.6 or an average of 2.5
hours per day).
□ EMS calls accounted for 45 percent of runs and 52 percent of total deployed time.
□ Structure and outside fire calls accounted for 9 percent of runs and 13 percent of total
deployed time.
■ At the unit level, Engine E01 made the most runs (2,576 or an average of 7.1 runs per day) and
had the highest total annual deployed time (690.4 or an average of 1.9 hours per day).
□ EMS calls accounted for 55 percent of runs and 53 percent of total deployed time.
□ Structure and outside fire calls accounted for 7 percent of runs and 16 percent of total
deployed time.
■ At the unit level, Engine E09 made the sixth most runs (1,894 or an average of 5.2 runs per day)
and had the second-highest total annual deployed time (658 or an average of 1.8 hours per
day).
□ EMS calls accounted for 54 percent of runs and 59 percent of total deployed time.
□ Structure and outside fire calls accounted for 5 percent of runs and 8 percent of total
deployed time.

182
ANALYSIS OF BUSIEST HOURS
There is significant variability in the number of calls from hour to hour. One special concern
relates to the resources available for hours with the heaviest workload. We tabulated the data
for each of the 8,760 hours in the year. The following table shows the number of hours in the year
in which there were zero to four or more calls during the hour. Table 7-13 shows the 10 one-hour
intervals which had the most calls during the year. Table 7-14 examines the number of times a
call within a station’s first due area overlapped with another call within the same area.
Table 7-15 examines the availability of a unit at a station to respond to calls within its first due
area.

TABLE 7-12: Frequency Distribution of the Number of Calls

Calls in an Hour Frequency Percentage
0 1,279 14.6
1 2,093 23.9
2 2,104 24.0
3 1,413 16.1
4 910 10.4
5 540 6.2
6 259 3.0
7+ 162 1.8
Total 8,760 100.0

TABLE 7-13: Top 10 Hours with the Most Calls Received

Number Number Deployed
Hour
of Calls of Runs Hours
6/28/2019, 1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. 11 17 4.0
8/10/2019, 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. 11 13 2.8
1/16/2019, 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. 10 14 6.0
8/15/2019, 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. 10 11 3.1
6/18/2019, 11:00 p.m. to midnight 10 11 2.8
5/9/2019, 9:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. 10 11 2.5
1/12/2019, 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. 9 20 4.6
4/14/2019, 4:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. 9 19 8.9
1/28/2019, 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. 9 16 4.0
12/26/2019, 1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. 9 15 3.6
Note: Total deployed hours is a measure of the total time spent responding to calls received in the hour,
and which may extend into the next hour or hours. The number of runs and deployed hours only includes
SFD units.

183
TABLE 7-14: Frequency of Overlapping Calls
Number Percent of Total
Station Scenario
of Calls All Calls Hours
No overlapped call 1,865 94.1 477.6
1 Overlapped with one call 110 5.5 14.7
Overlapped with two calls 7 0.4 0.9
No overlapped call 1,779 92.7 557.6
2 Overlapped with one call 135 7.0 23.5
Overlapped with two calls 6 0.3 0.3
No overlapped call 1,200 96.2 343.1
3
Overlapped with one call 47 3.8 6.9
No overlapped call 2,283 92.3 637.1
4 Overlapped with one call 178 7.2 27.6
Overlapped with two calls 13 0.5 1.4
No overlapped call 2,033 93.2 549.3
5 Overlapped with one call 145 6.6 18.7
Overlapped with two calls 3 0.1 0.5
No overlapped call 1,271 96.2 341.4
6 Overlapped with one call 49 3.7 6.4
Overlapped with two calls 1 0.1 0.0
No overlapped call 1,155 95.9 320.7
7 Overlapped with one call 48 4.0 6.8
Overlapped with two calls 1 0.1 0.1
No overlapped call 1,728 93.2 551.0
8 Overlapped with one call 122 6.6 23.3
Overlapped with two calls 4 0.2 0.6
No overlapped call 1,827 91.7 616.4
9 Overlapped with one call 156 7.8 25.9
Overlapped with two calls 9 0.5 1.2
No overlapped call 959 93.6 336.1
10 Overlapped with one call 63 6.1 11.7
Overlapped with two calls 3 0.3 0.4
No overlapped call 858 96.6 297.9
11
Overlapped with one call 30 3.4 6.0
No overlapped call 1,358 94.2 461.3
12 Overlapped with one call 80 5.5 15.0
Overlapped with two calls 4 0.3 0.3

184
The following table focuses on each station’s availability to respond to calls within its first due
area. At the same time, it focuses on calls where an SFD unit eventually arrived and ignores calls
where no unit arrived. Out of 19,530 calls that are not mutual aid given, there were 711 calls
where an SFD unit went en route but no unit arrived. For this reason, the individual rows and the
total in Table 7-15’s second column do not match the corresponding values for Table 7-14.

TABLE 7-15: Station Availability to Respond to Calls

Calls in First Due Percent First Due Percent First Due Percent
Station
Area Responded Responded Arrived Arrived First First
1 1,875 1,583 84.4 1,566 83.5 1,522 81.2
2 987 784 79.4 780 79.0 747 75.7
3 866 801 92.5 798 92.1 782 90.3
4 1,384 1,306 94.4 1,301 94.0 1,285 92.8
5 1,873 1,788 95.5 1,781 95.1 1,749 93.4
6 1,199 1,045 87.2 1,043 87.0 1,018 84.9
7 2,362 1,799 76.2 1,785 75.6 1,717 72.7
8 2,073 1,407 67.9 1,386 66.9 1,324 63.9
9 1,268 988 77.9 958 75.6 916 72.2
10 1,158 1,001 86.4 997 86.1 978 84.5
11 1,817 1,519 83.6 1,510 83.1 1,478 81.3
12 1,957 1,564 79.9 1,555 79.5 1,499 76.6
Total 18,819 15,585 82.8 15,460 82.2 15,015 79.8
Note: For each station, we count the number of calls within its first due area where at least one SFD unit
arrived. Next, we focus on units from the first due station to see if any unit responded, arrived, or arrived first.

Observations:
■ During 162 hours (1.8 percent of all hours), seven or more calls occurred; in other words, the
department responded to seven or more calls in an hour roughly once every 2 days.
■ The highest number of calls to occur in an hour was 11, which happened twice.

■ The hour with the most calls was 1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. on June 28, 2019. There was a hailstorm
at that time.
□ The hour’s 11 calls involved 17 individual dispatches resulting in 4.0 hours of deployed time.
These 11 calls included four public service calls, two false alarm calls, two illness and other
calls, one breathing difficulty call, one cardiac and stroke call, and one canceled call.
■ Another hour with the most calls was 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on August 10, 2019.

□ The hour’s 11 calls involved 13 individual dispatches resulting in 2.8 hours of deployed time.
These 11 calls included six illness and other calls, two canceled calls, two public service
calls, and one breathing difficulty call.
□ August 10, 2019, had 89 calls which was the most in a single day.

185
RESPONSE TIME
In this part of the analysis, we present response time statistics for different call types. We separate
response time into its identifiable components. Dispatch time is the difference between the time
a call is received and the time a unit is dispatched. Dispatch time includes call processing time,
which is the time required to determine the nature of the emergency and the types of resources
to dispatch. Turnout time is the difference between dispatch time and the time a unit is en route
to a call’s location. Travel time is the difference between the time en route and arrival on scene.
Response time is the total time elapsed between receiving a call to arriving on scene.

In this analysis, we included all calls within the primary response area of the Springfield Fire
Department to which at least one non-administrative unit from SFD was dispatched and at least
one unit from SFD arrived, while excluding canceled calls. In addition, calls with a total response
time of more than 30 minutes were excluded. Finally, we focused on units that had complete
time stamps, that is, units with all components recorded, so that we could calculate each
segment of response time.

Based on the methodology above, we excluded 138 mutual aid given calls, 1,588 canceled
calls, 504 non-emergency calls, 10 calls where no units recorded a valid on-scene time, 44 calls
where the first arriving unit response was greater than 30 minutes, and 478 calls where one or
more segments of the first arriving unit’s response time could not be calculated due to missing or
faulty data. As a result, in this section, a total of 16,906 calls are included in the analysis.

186
Response Time by Type of Call
The following table breaks down the average dispatch, turnout, travel, and total response times
by call type for all calls within the primary service area of SFD, and Table 7-17 does the same for
90th percentile response times. A 90th percentile means that 90 percent of calls had response
times at or below that number. For example, Table 7-17 shows a 90th percentile response time of
9.9 minutes, which means that 90 percent of the time, a call had a response time of no more
than 9.9 minutes. Figures 7-8 and 7-9 illustrate the same information.

TABLE 7-16: Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type
Minutes Number
Call Type
Dispatch Turnout Travel Total of Calls
Breathing difficulty 1.4 1.3 3.5 6.2 2,086
Cardiac and stroke 1.4 1.2 3.5 6.1 1,375
Fall and injury 1.9 1.2 3.2 6.4 819
Illness and other 2.1 1.2 3.6 6.9 4,742
MVA 3.0 1.2 3.1 7.3 565
Overdose and psychiatric 2.2 1.3 3.5 7.0 440
Seizure and unconsciousness 1.3 1.2 3.3 5.8 718
EMS Total 1.8 1.2 3.5 6.6 10,745
False alarm 1.5 1.5 3.7 6.7 2,288
Good intent 2.1 1.4 3.9 7.4 763
Hazard 1.7 1.4 4.5 7.7 438
Outside fire 1.5 1.3 4.1 7.0 219
Public service 1.7 1.4 4.4 7.4 2,206
Structure fire 1.1 1.3 2.9 5.4 247
Fire Total 1.6 1.4 4.0 7.1 6,161
Total 1.8 1.3 3.7 6.7 16,906

187
FIGURE 7-8: Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type – EMS

FIGURE 7-9: Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type – Fire

188
TABLE 7-17: 90th Percentile Response Time of Average Response Time of First
Arriving Unit, by Call Type
Minutes Number
Call Type
Dispatch Turnout Travel Total of Calls
Breathing difficulty 2.2 2.1 5.6 8.6 2,086
Cardiac and stroke 2.3 2.0 5.4 8.4 1,375
Fall and injury 3.1 1.9 5.3 9.0 819
Illness and other 3.4 2.1 5.9 10.0 4,742
MVA 5.4 1.9 5.4 11.3 565
Overdose and psychiatric 3.9 2.1 5.4 10.2 440
Seizure and unconsciousness 2.2 2.0 5.1 8.0 718
EMS Total 3.0 2.0 5.6 9.3 10,745
False alarm 2.4 2.4 6.6 10.0 2,288
Good intent 3.4 2.2 6.7 11.2 763
Hazard 2.8 2.3 8.0 11.7 438
Outside fire 2.6 2.2 7.5 11.1 219
Public service 2.7 2.3 7.3 10.8 2,206
Structure fire 2.1 2.1 4.8 7.6 247
Fire Total 2.7 2.3 6.9 10.5 6,161
Total 2.9 2.1 6.1 9.8 16,906

Observations:
■ The average dispatch time was 1.8 minutes.

■ The average turnout time was 1.3 minutes.

■ The average travel time was 3.7 minutes.

■ The average total response time was 6.7 minutes.

■ The average response time was 6.6 minutes for EMS calls and 7.1 minutes for fire calls.

■ The average response time was 7.0 minutes for outside fires and 5.4 minutes for structure fires.

■ The 90th percentile dispatch time was 2.9 minutes.

■ The 90th percentile turnout time was 2.1 minutes.

■ The 90th percentile travel time was 6.1 minutes.

■ The 90th percentile total response time was 9.8 minutes.

■ The 90th percentile response time was 9.3 minutes for EMS calls and 10.5 minutes for fire calls.

■ The 90th percentile response time was 11.1 minutes for outside fires and 7.6 minutes for
structure fires.

189
Response Time by Hour
Average dispatch, turnout, travel, and total response time by hour for calls in the jurisdiction of
SFD are shown in the following table and figure. The table also shows 90th percentile response
times.

TABLE 7-18: Average and 90th Percentile Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by
Hour of Day
Minutes
Number
Hour Response 90th Percentile
Dispatch Turnout Travel of Calls
Time Response Time
0 1.7 1.8 3.9 7.4 10.6 491
1 1.7 1.8 4.0 7.5 10.5 446
2 1.8 1.9 3.9 7.6 10.8 376
3 1.9 1.9 3.8 7.5 10.6 372
4 1.6 1.9 3.9 7.4 10.5 365
5 1.6 1.9 4.0 7.5 10.1 376
6 1.9 1.4 3.9 7.1 10.1 476
7 2.0 1.0 3.8 6.8 10.3 593
8 2.1 1.1 3.6 6.7 10.1 698
9 1.9 1.1 3.7 6.7 9.8 807
10 2.1 1.1 3.8 6.9 10.4 838
11 2.0 1.1 3.6 6.7 9.7 915
12 1.9 1.1 3.5 6.5 9.3 990
13 2.0 1.2 3.6 6.8 9.7 963
14 1.8 1.3 3.6 6.6 9.6 912
15 1.5 1.3 3.6 6.4 9.5 911
16 1.6 1.2 3.7 6.5 9.7 972
17 1.5 1.2 3.7 6.4 9.5 905
18 1.5 1.2 3.6 6.3 9.3 937
19 1.5 1.2 3.5 6.2 8.9 847
20 1.6 1.2 3.5 6.4 9.2 840
21 1.6 1.3 3.8 6.6 9.5 694
22 1.8 1.4 3.7 6.9 10.1 597
23 1.9 1.6 3.7 7.2 10.4 585
Total 1.8 1.3 3.7 6.7 9.8 16,906

190
FIGURE 7-10: Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Hour of Day

Observations:
■ Average dispatch time was between 1.5 minutes (7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.) and 2.1 minutes
(10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.).
■ Average turnout time was between 1.0 minutes (7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.) and 1.9 minutes
(5:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m.).
■ Average travel time was between 3.5 minutes (8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.) and 4.0 minutes
(1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.).
■ Average response time was between 6.2 minutes (7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.) and 7.6 minutes
(2:00 a.m. to 3:00 a.m.).
■ The 90th percentile response time was between 8.9 minutes (7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.) and
10.8 minutes (2:00 a.m. to 3:00 a.m.).

191
Response Time Distribution
Here, we present a more detailed look at how response times to calls are distributed. The
cumulative distribution of total response time for the first arriving unit to EMS calls is shown in
Figure 7-11 and Table 7-19. Figure 7-11 shows response times for the first arriving unit to EMS calls
as a frequency distribution in whole-minute increments, and Figure 7-12 shows the same for the
first arriving unit to outside and structure fire calls.

The cumulative percentages here are read in the same way as a percentile. In Figure 7-11, the
90th percentile of 9.4 minutes means that 90 percent of EMS calls had a response time of
9.4 minutes or less. In Table 7-19, the cumulative percentage of 81, for example, means that
81 percent of EMS calls had a response time under 8 minutes.

FIGURE 7-11: Cumulative Distribution of Response Time – First Arriving Unit – EMS

192
FIGURE 7-12: Cumulative Distribution of Response Time – First Arriving Unit –
Outside and Structure Fires

TABLE 7-19: Cumulative Distribution of Response Time – First Arriving Unit – EMS
Response Time Cumulative
Frequency
(minute) Percentage
1 3 0.0
2 33 0.3
3 157 1.8
4 744 8.7
5 1,868 26.1
6 2,515 49.5
7 2,079 68.9
8 1,342 81.3
9 773 88.5
10 404 92.3
11 267 94.8
12 153 96.2
13 97 97.1
14 61 97.7
15 50 98.1
16+ 199 100.0

193
TABLE 7-20: Cumulative Distribution of Response Time – First Arriving Unit –
Outside and Structure Fires
Response Time Cumulative
Frequency
(minute) Percentage
1 2 0.4
2 2 0.9
3 15 4.1
4 54 15.7
5 119 41.2
6 88 60.1
7 74 76.0
8 40 84.5
9 23 89.5
10 11 91.8
11 12 94.4
12 10 96.6
13 5 97.6
14 4 98.5
15 0 98.5
16+ 7 100.0

Observations:
■ For 81 percent of EMS calls, the response time of the first arriving unit was less than 8 minutes.

■ For 85 percent of outside and structure fire calls, the response time of the first arriving unit was
less than 8 minutes.

194
Response Time by Fire Protection District
The following table breaks down the average dispatch, turnout, travel, total response times, and
90th percentile response times by the fire protection districts serviced by SFD, for EMS and fire
calls, respectively.

TABLE 7-21: Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Fire Protection District
Minutes
Call Fire Protection 90th Number
Type District Response Percentile of Calls
Dispatch Turnout Travel
Time Response
Time
Curran 3.3 1.3 5.8 10.4 18.0 35
East Side 1.6 1.2 3.9 6.8 9.2 379
Lake Springfield 1.9 1.1 5.2 8.2 12.2 50
North Side 1.6 1.1 4.3 7.0 11.7 283
South Lawn 1.7 1.1 2.9 5.7 7.6 82
EMS South Oak Knolls 1.7 1.2 3.1 6.1 7.9 34
South Side 1.7 1.1 3.8 6.7 9.2 219
Springfield (City) 1.9 1.2 3.4 6.5 9.2 9,293
Western 2.0 1.3 5.6 8.8 12.8 113
Woodside 1.7 1.2 3.8 6.7 8.9 257
Subtotal 1.8 1.2 3.5 6.6 9.3 10,745
Curran 1.6 2.0 7.3 10.9 14.3 16
East Side 1.6 1.2 4.6 7.4 10.9 157
Lake Springfield 1.9 1.1 5.7 8.7 13.1 20
North Side 1.5 1.5 5.4 8.5 14.6 126
South Lawn 1.4 1.1 3.7 6.2 9.0 65
Fire South Oak Knolls 1.5 1.2 4.2 6.8 8.7 23
South Side 1.6 1.3 5.3 8.2 11.5 119
Springfield (City) 1.6 1.4 3.9 6.9 10.2 5,437
Western 1.9 1.4 7.2 10.6 14.0 91
Woodside 1.8 1.4 4.7 7.9 10.9 107
Subtotal 1.6 1.4 4.0 7.1 10.5 6,161
Total 1.8 1.3 3.7 6.7 9.8 16,906

195
Observations:
■ Average response times varied significantly among fire protection districts.

■ The average response time was fastest to South Lawn.

■ The average response time was slowest to Curran.

■ The average response time within Springfield City Protection District was slightly faster than the
overall average.

196
ATTACHMENT I: ACTIONS TAKEN
TABLE 7-22: Actions Taken Analysis for Structure and Outside Fire Calls
Number of Calls
Action Taken
Outside Fire Structure Fire
Action taken, other 9 7
Enforce codes 2 0
Establish safe area 0 1
Extinguishment by fire service personnel 159 161
Extricate, disentangle 1 0
Fire control or extinguishment, other 8 11
Forcible entry 0 1
Incident command 3 35
Information, Investigation & Enforcement 3 1
Investigate 69 80
Provide advanced life support (ALS) 0 1
Provide basic life support (BLS) 1 1
Remove hazard 2 6
Rescue, remove from harm 0 1
Restore fire alarm system 1 4
Restore sprinkler or fire protection system 0 2
Salvage & overhaul 2 62
Search 0 8
Secure property 0 1
Ventilate 1 97
Note: Totals are higher than the total number of structure and outside fire calls because some calls
recorded multiple actions taken.

Observations:
■ Out of 233 outside fires, 159 were extinguished by fire service personnel, which accounted for
68 percent of outside fires.
■ Out of 264 structure fires, 161 were extinguished by fire service personnel, which accounted for
61 percent of structure fires.

197
ATTACHMENT II: ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL
TABLE 7-23: Workload of Administrative Units
Annual Annual
Unit ID Unit Type
Hours Runs
FD1 Fire Chief 31.6 30
DIV1 Division Chief 11.1 9
DIV1A Division Chief 8.5 4
DIV1B Division Chief 29.6 14
DIV2 Fire Safety Officer 39.9 23
DIV3 Fire Training Officer 17.9 7
DS01 Health and Safety Officer 57.3 61
INS1 Inspector 86.3 34
INS2 Inspector 108.5 43
INS3 Inspector 63.4 34
INS4 Inspector 78.2 29
INS5 Inspector 80.9 33
INS6 Inspector 137.8 59
INS24 Inspector 54.6 23

198
ATTACHMENT III: FIRE LOSS
TABLE 7-24: Total Fire Loss Above and Below $25,000
Call Type No Loss Under $25,000 $25,000 plus
Outside fire 140 87 6
Structure fire 38 175 51
Total 178 262 57

TABLE 7-25: Content and Property Loss – Structure and Outside Fires
Property Loss Content Loss
Call Type
Loss Value Number of Calls Loss Value Number of Calls
Outside fire $765,781 90 $337,625 33
Structure fire $2,678,431 186 $860,148 174
Total $3,444,212 276 $1,197,773 207
Note: The table includes only fire calls with a recorded loss greater than 0.

Observations:
■ 140 outside fires and 38 structure fires had no recorded loss.

■ Six outside fires and 51 structure fires had $25,000 or more in losses.

■ Structure fires:

□ The highest total loss for a structure fire was $220,000.

□ The average total loss for all structure fires was $15,657.
□ 174 structure fires recorded content losses with a combined $860,148 in losses.
□ Out of 264 structure fires, 186 recorded property losses, with a combined $2,678,431 in losses.
■ Outside fires:

□ The highest total loss for an outside fire was $600,000.

□ The average total loss for outside fires with loss was $11,865.
□ 33 outside fires recorded content losses with a combined $337,625 in losses.
□ Out of 233 outside fires, 90 recorded property losses, with a combined $765,781 in losses.

199
ATTACHMENT IV: TREND IN SERVICE
In this analysis, we examine the historical trends of EMS and fire responses based on two years of
data from 2019 through 2020 for the Springfield Fire Department. We present trends in calls by
type, unit workload, service availability, and response time over these two years. This analysis
illustrates that the department’s activity in 2020 closely resembles the corresponding results in
2019. For this reason, our detailed analysis focusing on 2019 is sufficient.

Trends in Call Volume

The following table shows the number of calls by grand call type for both 2019 and 2020.
Tables 7-27 and 7-28 detail calls for each EMS and fire call type. Figure 7-13 shows the monthly
variation in the average daily number of calls in two years. Similarly, Figure 7-14 illustrates the
average number of calls received each hour of the day in the two years.

TABLE 7-26: Calls by Year and Grand Call Type

Number of Calls Calls per Day
Grand Call Type
2019 2020 2019 2020
EMS 11,466 10,980 31.4 30.1
Fire 6,476 6,524 17.7 17.9
Other 1,726 1,720 4.7 4.7
Total 19,668 19,224 53.9 52.7

TABLE 7-27: EMS Calls by Year and Type

Number of Calls Calls per Day
Call Type
2019 2020 2019 2020
Breathing Difficulty 2,124 2,124 5.8 5.8
Cardiac and Stroke 1,408 1,168 3.9 3.2
Fall and Injury 937 780 2.6 2.1
Illness and Other 5,140 5,191 14.1 14.2
MVA 670 599 1.8 1.6
Overdose and Psychiatric 453 463 1.2 1.3
Seizure and Unconsciousness 734 655 2.0 1.8
Total 11,466 10,980 31.4 30.1

TABLE 7-28: Fire Calls by Year and Type

Number of Calls Calls per Day
Call Type
2019 2020 2019 2020
False Alarm 2,363 2,171 6.5 5.9
Good Intent 829 880 2.3 2.4
Hazard 476 481 1.3 1.3
Outside Fire 233 329 0.6 0.9
Public Service 2,311 2,412 6.3 6.6
Structure Fire 264 251 0.7 0.7
Total 6,476 6,524 17.7 17.9

200
Observations:
■ The average number of EMS and fire calls per day in two years was 30.5.

■ The number of EMS calls per day decreased four percent from 31.4 in 2019 to 30.1 in 2020.

■ The total number of fire calls did not change significantly from 2019 to 2020.

□ False alarm calls per day decreased from 6.5 in 2019 to 5.9 in 2020.
□ Outside fire calls per day increased 43 percent from 0.6 in 2019 to 0.9 in 2020.

201
FIGURE 7-13: Calls per Day by Month of Year

FIGURE 7-14: Calls per Hour by Year and Time of Day

202
Trends in Workload
The following table compares the runs and workload for responding SFD units in 2019 and 2020.
The total workload decreased from 2019 to 2020.

TABLE 7-29: Unit Runs and Workload by Year

2019 2020
Station Unit Unit Type
Runs Hours Runs Hours
B01 Battalion chief 976 347.2 921 309.6
E01 Engine 2,576 690.4 2,449 653.1
1 Sq1 Squad 220 59.7 150 36.9
T01 Platform/truck 1,468 423.4 1,332 363.6
Total 5,240 1,520.6 4,852 1363.3
E02 Engine 1,948 609.3 1,903 569.8
2 T02 Ladder 1,131 311.3 1,027 291.2
Total 3,079 920.6 2,930 861.0
3 E03 Engine 1,663 478.6 1,741 485.0
4 E04 Engine 2,262 646.4 2,362 707.5
Frontline
Units 5 E05 Engine 2,056 561.5 2,071 596.1
B02 Battalion chief 1,003 295.6 940 274.6
6 E06 Engine 1,555 395.3 1,632 448.9
Total 2,558 690.9 2,572 723.5
7 E07 Engine 1,762 475.9 1,736 487.0
8 E08 Engine 2,070 646.4 2,026 589.9
9 E09 Engine 1,894 658.0 1,735 547.1
10 E10 Engine 1,251 435.8 1,256 421.5
11 E11 Engine 992 329.2 934 342.2
E12 Engine 1,592 530.0 1,502 514.2
12 T03 Truck 976 267.7 873 245.6
Total 2,568 797.7 2,375 759.8
Total 27,395 8161.6 26,590 7,883.9
Special Response Unit Total 141 57.6 7 4.7
Total 27,536 8,219.2 26,597 7,888.5
Note: Special response units include Brush1, E15, E18, EMS1 and EMS2, HAZ1, HAZ2, and HAZ3, M01, and T04.

203
Trends in Station Availability
The following table examines the availability of each SFD station’s units to respond to calls within
its first due area by year. Availability to respond, arrive, and arrive first is shown.

TABLE 7-30: Station Availability to Respond to Calls by Year

2019 2020
Station Pct. Pct. Pct. Pct. Pct. Pct.
Response Arrive First Response Arrive First
1 84.4 83.5 81.2 81.4 80.2 78.8
2 95.5 95.1 93.4 95.7 95.4 94.6
3 87.2 87.0 84.9 87.6 87.2 85.8
4 76.2 75.6 72.7 76.5 75.9 73.0
5 67.9 66.9 63.9 70.5 70.1 67.2
6 77.9 75.6 72.2 79.6 78.2 74.5
7 86.4 86.1 84.5 87.4 87.4 85.4
8 83.6 83.1 81.3 83.3 83.0 81.1
9 79.9 79.5 76.6 81.2 80.8 78.1
10 79.4 79.0 75.7 91.0 90.9 89.3
11 92.5 92.1 90.3 93.6 93.3 92.3
12 94.4 94.0 92.8 92.8 92.5 90.6
Total 82.8 82.2 79.8 83.6 83.1 81.0

Observations:
■ For most of the stations, their availability increased from 2019 to 2020.

■ Station 10 displayed the largest increase. For example, from 2019 to 2020, the availability of
Station 10’s units to arrive first at calls increased from 76 to 89 percent.

204
Trends in Response Time
Figure 7-15 compares 2019 and 2020 dispatch, turnout, travel, and total response time by hour
for calls in SFD’s jurisdiction. Tables 7-31 and 7-32 compare the average and 90th percentile
response time components in two years.

FIGURE 7-15: Comparison of Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Hour
of Day

TABLE 7-31: Comparison of Average Response Time of First Arriving SFD Unit in
2019 and 2020
2019, Minutes 2020, Minutes
Station Total Total
Dispatch Turnout Travel Dispatch Turnout Travel
Response Response
EMS Total 1.8 1.2 3.5 6.6 1.8 1.3 3.8 6.9
Structure Fire 1.1 1.3 2.9 5.4 0.9 1.3 2.7 4.9
Outside Fire 1.5 1.3 4.1 7.0 1.4 1.4 4.0 6.9
Other Fire 1.7 1.4 4.1 7.2 1.5 1.4 4.1 7.0
Fire Total 1.6 1.4 4.0 7.1 1.5 1.4 4.0 6.9
Total 1.8 1.3 3.7 6.7 1.7 1.3 3.9 6.9

205
TABLE 7-32: Comparison of 90th Percentile Response Time of First Arriving SFD Unit
in 2019 and 2020
2019 2020
Station Total Total
Dispatch Turnout Travel Dispatch Turnout Travel
Response Response
EMS Total 3.0 2.0 5.6 9.3 3.0 2.1 6.2 9.9
Structure Fire 2.1 2.1 4.8 7.6 1.7 2.0 4.4 6.6
Outside Fire 2.6 2.2 7.5 11.1 2.5 2.1 7.0 10.5
Other Fire 2.7 2.3 7.0 10.6 2.5 2.3 6.8 10.2
Fire Total 2.7 2.3 6.9 10.5 2.5 2.2 6.8 10.1
Total 2.9 2.1 6.1 9.8 2.8 2.2 6.4 10.0

Observations:
■ The average response times of 2019 and 2020 did not change significantly.

■ The 90th percentile response time for structure fires decreased by 1 minute from 2019 to 2020.

■ The 90th percentile total response times of 2019 and 2020 did not change significantly.

206
ATTACHMENT V: ASSIGNMENT OF EMS CALL TYPE
When available, NFIRS data serves as our primary source for assigning call categories. For 17,715
of the 38,892 calls in the two years, NFIRS incident types were used to assign call types for MVA,
fire, canceled, and mutual aid calls. However, EMS calls (including NIFIRS incident types 300, 311,
320, and 321) do not have corresponding EMS types; we instead used the incident type from the
computer-aided dispatch (CAD) data to assign a call category. Table 7-33 describes the
method of EMS type assignment based on available CAD incident types. The count column in
the table reflects the number of calls that were assigned call types from a specific CAD incident
type.

TABLE 7-33: Assignment of EMS Type Based on CAD Incident Type

Count
CAD Incident Type EMS Type
2019 2020 Total
<new call> illness and other 0 6 6
9 1 1 investigation illness and other 5 8 13
accident prop damage illness and other 8 10 18
accident unknown injury illness and other 1 2 3
accident w/injuries illness and other 0 69 69
accident w/injuries z illness and other 154 49 203
aid call unclassified illness and other 3,223 3,147 6,370
alarm investigation illness and other 1 2 3
ambulance only illness and other 21 38 59
animal problem illness and other 1 1 2
armed robbery fall and injury 9 3 12
assist motorist illness and other 7 6 13
assist other agency illness and other 0 106 106
assist person up illness and other 131 201 332
attempted suicide illness and other 39 34 73
automatic fire alarm illness and other 1 0 1
battery fall and injury 98 66 164
breathing difficulty breathing difficulty 2,124 2,124 4,248
burglar alarm illness and other 1 2 3
Burglary illness and other 1 2 3
cardiac problem cardiac and stroke 43 34 77
check on welfare illness and other 83 72 155
chest pain cardiac and stroke 1,062 848 1,910
code red illness and other 1 0 1
coroner case illness and other 5 8 13
criminal damage illness and other 1 2 3
criminal damage in
illness and other 1 0 1
progress
diabetic illness and other 272 261 533

207
 Count
CAD Incident Type EMS Type
2019 2020 Total
disturbance illness and other 165 109 274
domestic disturbance illness and other 0 1 1
drug law violation illness and other 1 2 3
electric arc/sparks Illness and other 1 0 1
elevator entrapment illness and other 40 29 69
er transport - private illness and other 45 34 79
fight fall and injury 23 3 26
follow up investigation illness and other 0 2 2
hit & run illness and other 18 11 29
home invasion illness and other 5 5 10
intoxicated driver overdose and psychiatric 1 0 1
kidnapping fall and injury 1 0 1
lines down illness and other 0 1 1
lock out illness and other 11 15 26
loud music/party illness and other 1 0 1
medical alert alarm illness and other 448 455 903
mental subject overdose and psychiatric 92 97 189
notification illness and other 0 1 1
odor investigation illness and other 1 2 3
other type fire illness and other 2 3 5
overdose overdose and psychiatric 355 365 720
panic duress alarm overdose and psychiatric 3 1 4
patrol investigation illness and other 14 19 33
person down fall and injury 706 614 1,320
person exposing self illness and other 1 0 1
person w/weapon illness and other 13 9 22
possible deceased illness and other 99 156 255
pregnancy illness and other 109 85 194
premise check illness and other 1 0 1
reckless driving overdose and psychiatric 2 0 2
remove property illness and other 1 1 2
remove subject illness and other 6 5 11
robbery fall and injury 7 5 12
seizure seizure and unconsciousness 732 653 1,385
sexual assault illness and other 2 2 4
shooting fall and injury 38 33 71
shoplifting illness and other 4 1 5
shots fired fall and injury 2 3 5
sick person illness and other 58 76 134

208
 Count
CAD Incident Type EMS Type
2019 2020 Total
slumped driver illness and other 76 76 152
special detail illness and other 1 1 2
special duty illness and other 5 15 20
stabbing fall and injury 49 48 97
stroke cardiac and stroke 302 286 588
suicide illness and other 3 6 9
suspicious person illness and other 8 5 13
suspicious vehicle illness and other 4 5 9
theft over illness and other 0 2 2
theft under illness and other 0 1 1
trespass illness and other 2 0 2
ts illness and other 5 2 7
unknown medical illness and other 33 35 68
vicious animal illness and other 4 0 4
warrant service illness and other 2 0 2

- END

209