Coverage

a. Basic principles
b. JEMAA
c. ISL
d. Service of sentence
e. Effect of death of accused
f. Crimes against persons
g. Crimes against property
h. Crimes against liberty
i. Crimes against public interest
j. Vawc
k. R.A. 7610
l. RA11313
m. RA 10173

When answering bar questions, do the following:

1. Read the question very carefully. For example, the
question asking what are the different acts of child
abuse under R.A. 7610 is different from what are the
acts punishable under R.A. 7610. Child abuse is only
one of the latter.
2. If the question is about problem solving or decision
making, read the question first before reading the
facts, so you will know what are the relevant facts in
the narration.
3. Your answer should be brief and concise. Do not give
what is not asked. Do not clutter the answer with
unnecessary details. The examiner has no time to
read long answers. For example, if you are given a
problem that calls for murder as the answer,

 immediately identify what qualifying circumstance is

present and what facts show that said element is
present rather than enumerating all the elements
before discussing why it is murder. Just imply that you
know the elements.
4. Do not abbreviate unless the abbreviation is accepted
like “no.”; “%.” For example, if the answer calls for a
“representative of the DOJ or NPS” in drug cases,
spell out the words Department of Justice for DOJ
“National Prosecution Service” for NPS.
5. Do not give the article number just say the penal code
provides …; do not give the case title, say
jurisprudence or recent decision, unless you are very
sure.
6. If you do not know the answer, write something
relevant to the question. Do not live a number blank
for you will not receive any credit. If you have
something written you probably be given some points.

I.

1. What are the four ways of committing the crime of child

abuse penalized by Republic Act No. 7610?

Suggested answer:
Pursuant to Section 3 (b) in conjunction with
Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610, "child abuse" is committed
by the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the
child by inflicting any of the following: (1) psychological
and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and

 emotional maltreatment; (2) any act by deeds or words

which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3)
unreasonable deprivation of the child’s basic needs for
survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) failure to
immediately give medical treatment to an injured child
resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
However, jurisprudence declares that sexual
abuse is not included in child abuse for it is separately
punished under Section 5 of the same law.

Notes: a. Sexual abuse is different from child abuse

according to one decision. It should not be included in
child abuse. But since the answer includes the
definition under Section 3 then there should be a
clarification, as stated in the second 2.
Alternative answer to eliminate the second paragraph:
Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610 provides that "child abuse"
is committed by the maltreatment, whether habitual or
not, of the child by inflicting any of the following: (1)
psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty,
sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) any act
by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being; (3) unreasonable deprivation of the
child’s basic needs for survival, such as food and
shelter; or (4) failure to immediately give medical
treatment to an injured child resulting in serious

 impairment of his growth and development or in his

permanent incapacity or death.
b.. If you just enumerate 1 to 4, the answer is correct
but not complete. The introductory phrase “committed
by the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the
child” is important for it makes the answer complete.

2. Is criminal intent material in deciding whether or not

child abuse by inflicting physical injuries on a minor
has been committed?

This question calls for the application of the malum

prohibitum vis-a-vis malum in se distinction. Is child
abuse malum in se even if R.A. 7610 is malum
prohibitum? The RPC has malum prohibitum provision
- Article 222 on illegal use of public funds a.k.a.
technical malversation; R.A. 3019 has a malum in se
provision - Sec. 3(e) which is committed by gross
inexcusable negligence (culpa), evident bad faith and
manifest partiality (dolo).

Suggested answer:
Yes, for notwithstanding that R.A. 7610 has been
declared as a malum prohibitum, in a recent decision,
the Supreme Court held that, When the acts
complained of are inherently immoral, they are
deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a
special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly
established with the other elements of the crime;

 otherwise, no crime is committed. The accused was

convicted of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of
R.A. 7610, a special law. However, physical abuse of
a child is inherently wrong, rendering material the
existence of a criminal intent on the part of the
offender.
The crime committed therefore could be physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code, rather than
child abuse under R.A. 7610.

Alternative answer:
No, for child abuse is punished in a special law, hence
the mere infliction of physical injuries on a child
constitutes a violation of the law against child abuse,
with or without criminal intent to commit child abuse
on the part of the offender.

3. Karen threw hot cooking oil on her neighbor Carol with

whom she had an altercation earlier. The hot oil also
hit Carol’s three-year old son. For the injury to the
minor, she was charged with child abuse penalized by
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. In her
defense, she countered that she should only be held
liable for physical injuries, for she had no intention to
inflict harm on the minor but on her mother. And she
had no intention to demean the child’s intrinsic worth
and dignity. Is Karen’s defense tenable?

No, because her act of throwing boiling oil on

Carol which likewise fell on Carol’s child caused

 physical injuries on the baby, who was merely three

years old. This is prejudicial to the child’s development
for her act practically burned the skin of the baby that
left visible scars that are most likely to stay on its body
for the rest of its life.

Anent her defense that she did not intend to

demean the intrinsic worth of the baby as a human
being, suffice it to say that such qualification pertains
to the second way of committing child abuse viz.,
“any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades
or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as
a human being” whereas her crime is included in the
first act of child abuse, that is, physical abuse, neglect,
cruelty, and emotional maltreatment which have no
qualification attached. These acts are separate and
distinct from each other as shown by the qualifier
“any” in the provision defining child abuse. She is
therefore liable for the graver crime of child abuse
rather than physical injuries under the Revised Penal
Code.

Notes. a. This gives rise to the question that, if a felony

resulted to collateral offense punishable under a special
law, will Art. 4 (1) apply of the RPC?
b.. The recent cases of Patulot, Tacolod, Mabunot and
Bongalon gives seemingly conflicting answers:

1. Patulot implies that child abuse by inflicting physical

injuries is malum in se, thus Art. 4(1) may apply (citing

 Mabunot). This is analogous to RA 3019, a malum

prohibitum, but 3(e) in particular is malum in se,
because committed by dolo and culpa.
2. Talocod sticks to the malum prohibitum nature of the
entire RA 7610. Note: there are crimes that are evil per
se but are mala prohibita like carnapping which is theft
or robbery of vehicles just like stealing large cattle
which is malum in se.
3. The information in Patulot has no allegation of intent
“to demean, …”; there is in Bongalon cited by Tacolod,
where the information does not state “to demean…”.
Instead, the information in Tacolod states “thereby
subjecting said minor to psychological abuse, cruelty
and emotional maltreatment prejudicial to his natural
development.”
4. Patulot emphasizes that the 4 acts are distinct and
separate, hence any one can constitute child abuse.
Note that intent to demean …” is present in no 2
whereas “prejudicial to development” is in no.4. Can
the qualification be interchanged or should it be
confined to the particular act? No, for criminal law is
pro reo, strictly construed against the government.

II

1. Is the sweetheart theory or consent to a sexual

relationship by a minor with an adult a defense against
the charge of sexual abuse of a minor under Republic
Act No. 7610?

 This depends on the age of the minor. If the

minor is less than 12 years old, consent is not a
defense as the crime is statutory rape where consent
or lack of it is immaterial. For, existing laws punish
carnal knowledge with a minor under 12 without more.
However, in a recent decision of Supreme Court
the sweeping doctrine that sweetheart defense is
unavailable in sexual act with a minor has been
overturned. The rule now is that a minor over 12 but
less than 18 years old can give valid consent to sexual
relationships provided that (1) she is not abused for
profit or (2) not subjected to other acts of sexual abuse
by the employment of intimidation, undue influence or
abuse of moral ascendancy by the minor. This is
because the Court view the law as taking into
consideration the sexual and emotional maturity of a
minor as shown by the inclusion of the two above-
stated requirements for sexual abuse.

2. Is lewd intent material in a charge of statutory sexual

assault of a minor?
Take note that the question specified statutory.
This differentiates the law violated - for Section 5(b)
provides that when the victim is under 12, the offender
should be prosecuted under the RPC but always add in
relation to R.A. 7610.
Suggested answer:
No, a recent decision shows that there is no
requirement for the o ender to have sexual desire
when inserting an object to a child’s genital or anal

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 ori ce to be convicted for sexual abuse or sexual

assault. In the said decision, the o ender’s act of
poking a welding rod on 6-year old minor’s organ
constitutes statutory rape by sexual assault under
Article 266-A(2) of the RPC in relation to R.A. 7610.
For, only two requisites are necessary to successfully
prosecute for statutory sexual assault: (1) the victim is
a child, male or female, under 12 years of age, and (2)
the accused inserted any instrument or object into the
genital or anal ori ce of the victim. There is no
mention there of lewd designs.

3. Benigno has a live-in partner, Azon, who was over 12

years old. At the time of the filing of the information,
she was three months pregnant, and she admitted
having had sexual encounters before with Benigno.
Three years later, she gave birth to their second child.
She then filed an affidavit of desistance stating their
live-in relationship and that they have two children.
The court ordered the social worker assigned to make
a case study on her. Rule on the motion of Azon to
withdraw the case against Benigno.

The motion to withdraw the case should be

granted. Jurisprudence distinguished the emotional
maturity and predisposition of a juvenile, and
recognized the significant difference between a child
whose age is close to the threshold age of 12 to one
aged between 15-18 who may be expected to be more


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 mature and to act with consciousness of the
consequences of sexual intercourse.

The special circumstances reveal the presence of

consent of Azon for her sexual congress with Benigno
was not limited to just one incident. They were in a
relationship even after the incident subject of the
complaint and had even produced two children. These
are not acts of a child who is unable to discern good
from evil and did not give consent to the sexual act.

Ursua v. People, G.R. No. 218575, Oct. 4, 2017

For the guidance of public prosecutors and the courts,
the following guidelines in designating or charging the
proper offense in case lascivious conduct is committed
under Sec. 5(b) of R.A. 7610, and in determining the
imposable penalty:
1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration
in designating the offense, and in determining the
imposable penalty.
2. If the victim is under 12 years of age, the
nomenclature of the crime should be “Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC
Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610.’’ Pursuant to the second proviso in Section

 5(b) of R.A.7610, the imposable penalty is

reclusion temporal in its medium period.
3. If the victim is exactly 12 years of age, or more
than 12 but below 18 years of age, or is 18 years
or older but is unable to fully take care of herself/
himself or protect herself/himself from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or
condition, the crime should be designated as
“Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610,” and the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua.

III

1. What are the two ways of committing malversation?

This question calls for the ways of committing

malversation. This is di erent from the kinds of
malversation which are malversation de ned in Article
217 and technical malversation under Article 222.

Answer:

Malversation is committed in two ways: (1)

intentionally by misappropriating, appropriating or
taking public funds or property; or (2) by negligence

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 — thru consent, or by negligence or abandonment,

allowed another to take public funds or property.
Misappropriation by negligence carries the same
penalty as intentional negligence and is not covered
by Article 365.

Note: if the answer ends with the no. 2 kind, it is

correct, but the second sentence shows thorough
knowledge of the distinction between dolo and culpa.
This will impress the examiner.

2. When will the presumption of malversation arise?

The law penalizing malversation provides for the

prima facie presumption that the accountable public
o cer has put public funds to his personal use when
the following elements are present: (1) the public
o cer has received the public funds; (2) such o cer
failed to account for the said funds upon demand by
an authorized o cer; and (3) he cannot produce the
missing fund and cannot o er a justi able explanation
for the shortage.

3. Irma was a low ranking BIR collecting o cer. Her

supervisor Liza asked for her collections. Irma allowed
Liza to take her total collections of P188,671.40.
When her cash and accounts were examined by the
auditor, the latter established a total shortage of the
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 same amount. Upon demand, Irma failed to produce
the amount and was unable to explain why there was
a shortage. What crime was committed by Irma, if
any.

Irma committed malversation of public funds

through negligence. Malversation is committed
intentionally by the public o cers taking of public
funds for his personal use, or by negligence when
such o cer allows another to take the public funds by
consent, abandonment or negligence. As the facts
show that Irma allowed her supervisor to take her
collections, her crime is malversation through
negligence.

IV.

1. What is the rule, the exception and the exception to

the exception to the e ectivity of penal laws?

The rule is that every new law has a prospective

e ect for the Constitution prohibits the retroactive
application of penal law under the ex post facto rule.
The Revised Penal Code, however, provides the
exception — that a penal law that is favorable or
advantageous to the accused shall be given
retroactive e ect. The exception to this exception is
when the o ender is a habitual criminal, in which case
he is prohibited from bene ting from the favorable law
by the same provision.

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2. Who are disquali ed from the grant of good conduct
allowances under the amendment to the provision
thereon in the Revised Penal Code?

R.A. 10592 disquali es from the bene t of good

conduct allowances those who are also disquali ed
from credit for preventive imprisonment. They are
recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees, and those
charged with heinous crimes.

3. The Inmates of Bilibid Prison led a petition to assail

the IRR prepared by the DOJ making the amendments
on the good conduct allowance, credit for preventive
imprisonment, and special time allowance for loyalty
to have prospective application only. They invoke
Article 22 as the basis for the retroactive application of
Republic Act No. 10952. The respondents countered
that said amendatory law is not a penal law, thus
Article 22 does not apply. Rule on the petition.

Article 22 applies to Republic Act No. 10952.

While R.A. 10592 does not de ne a crime or provide a
penalty as it addresses the rehabilitation component of
our correctional system, its provisions have the
purpose and e ect of diminishing the punishment
attached to the crime. The further reduction on the
length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the
ultimate analysis, bene cial to the detention and
convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for the
application of Article 22. For if a prejudicial law that is
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 not penal like reducing the evidence necessary to
convict an o ender cannot be applied retroactively,
then a bene cial law that is not penal should also call
for the retroactive application of the law.
Depriving them of time o to which they are
justly entitled as a practical matter results in extending
their sentence and increasing their punishment.
Evidently, this transgresses the clear mandate of
Article 22 of the RPC.

Note: the italicized sentence is meant to impress the

examiner. Even if you do not include it, the answer
will still be correct.

V.

1. What are the elements of treachery as a qualifying

circumstance?

To constitute treachery, two conditions must be

present: 1) the employment of means of execution
that gave the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and 2) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.

2. Will the fact that the attack was frontal or the victim
was able to retaliate negate the presence of
treachery?

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 Note: there are actually two situations here that must
be addressed - frontal attack and ability to retaliate.
Both should be discussed.

Answer:

It depends upon when the decision to kill was made,.

If the decision to kill was made all of a sudden and the
victim's helpless position was accidental, treachery
cannot be appreciated. So even if the attack was
frontal it could be treacherous if sudden and
unexpected. Conversely if the attack is at the back
but was unplanned or the mode not deliberately
chosen, it is not treachery. On the other hand, even if
the victim was able to retaliate but it was due to his
re exes, and the initial attack was treacherous, the
retaliation has no e ect on the presence of treachery.

Note: in treachery, what is important is that the initial

attack must be treacherous, otherwise, even if during
the course of the ght, treachery is employed like
hurling sand in the eyes of the victim, it is not
treachery.

3. Mulong entered the room of the sleeping Benny and

stabbed the latter. Benny was jolted by the pain from
his sleep and grappled with Mulong; he was able to
wrest the bolo and in ict a super cial wound on
Mulong. Benny died nevertheless due to the wound
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 that pierced his lung. What crime was committed, if
any?

The sudden attack on Mulong while asleep amply

demonstrates treachery in the commission of the
crime. Mulong was not able to put up an e ective
defense. Although he was able to wound the o ender,
this did not negate the presence of treachery.
Treachery must still be appreciated even if the victim
was able to retaliate as a result of his re exes, so long
as he did not have the opportunity to repel the initial
assault.

The essence of treachery is the deliberate and

unexpected attack on the victim without any warning
and without giving him the opportunity to defend or
repel the initial assault.

VI

1. What are the elements of the crime of illegal marriage?

The elements of the crime of illegal marriage are: (1)

the authority of the solemnizing o cer; and (2) his
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

From said elements, it is clear that this is a crime of

the solemnizing o cer. [Optional since the answer is
short, for purposes of impressing the examiner]
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 2. When is a marriage ceremony considered to have
occurred? Why is it important that a marriage
ceremony actually occurred?

A marriage ceremony is considered to have

occurred when the minimum requirements set by law
are present: rst, there should be the personal
appearance of the contracting parties before a
solemnizing o cer; and second, their declaration in
the presence of not less than two witnesses that they
take each other as husband and wife.

The existence of a marriage ceremony is

important to determine whether a contracting party
has committed bigamy, for if the rst marriage was
contracted without a marriage ceremony, then there is
no subsisting rst marriage. Likewise, a marriage
ceremony is important to determine whether an illegal
marriage was committed by the o ciating minister for
it is an element thereof.

3. Del n is a pastor of his fundamentalist church. He is

authorized by the government to o ciate marriages
for his church members. On a day chosen by the
couple, he blessed the union of Sheila and William in
front of two witnesses where the couple promised to
be faithful and true to each other for the rest of their
lives. There was no marriage license authorizing them
to marry. Thereafter, to celebrate the blessing, the ve
went to a restaurant for a private dinner. (a). Did a
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 marriage ceremony happen? (b). Was a crime
committed, if any, and who could be liable?

Note: when the answer in (a) is yes, the answer in (b)

should also be yes. If no, both should be no.

(n) Yes, for while Article 352 of the RPC does not
speci cally de ne a "marriage ceremony" the
Family Code merely requires that the contracting
parties appear personally before the solemnizing
o cer and declare in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age that they take each
other as husband and wife. Their promise to be
faithful to each other for the rest of their life is
tantamount to taking each other as husband and
wife.

(o) Yes, for there was no marriage license, thus Del n

commits the crime of illegal marriage. It is
obligatory on the part of the o ciating minister to
require a marriage license, for it is a formal
requisite of marriage, the absence of which will
make the marriage void. Del n’s cavalier attitude
to the requirements of the law on marriage makes
a mockery of the stability of marriage, an
institution which the State through the Constitution
seeks to preserve.

Alternative answer.

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 a. No, because the law requires that the couple
declare before the o ciating minister and their
witnesses that they take each other as husband
and wife. Merely promising to be faithful to each
other does not amount to an express declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife.
Therefore, no marriage ceremony has taken place.

b. No crime was committed. Since there was no

marriage ceremony, then there is no crime of
illegal marriage, for the law requires as an element
of said crime that the o ciating minister perform a
marriage ceremony that is illegal.

VII
1. What is the liability of the second spouse of the
offender in bigamy, if any?

In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second

spouses may be the offended parties depending on the
circumstances, as when the second spouse married
the accused without being aware of his previous
marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of
the previous undissolved marriage of the accused
could she be included in the information as a co-
accused.

2. When the first marriage is void ab initio because the

spouse was a minor at the time of the marriage, will a
party to said marriage be free to remarry?

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 A party can remarry subject to the condition

precedent that the first marriage be judicially declared
null and void, for a party cannot decide that his
marriage is void. The Family Code requires that for
purposes of remarriage, there must be such judicial
declaration. It is settled that marriage is a protected
institution whose incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation. A party who remarries without first
having his marriage declared null by the court is liable
for bigamy.
3. Jose has been missing for 10 years and despite
diligent search by Josefa, she was unable to locate his
whereabouts and there is no news about him during
the said period. She then decided to marry Pepe as
she honestly believe in good faith that Jose is dead. Is
Josefa liable for bigamy? Why or why not?

Josefa is liable for bigamy because of lack of judicial

declaration of presumptive death of Jose. The law on
bigamy provides that said crime is committed when the
present spouse remarries without having the absent
spouse declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered on the proceedings.

To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first

because one of the parties believed the other to be
dead would make the existence of the marital relation
determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily
capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the
subjective condition of individuals. Only with such proof

 can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit

second marriages. Thus, the Revised Penal Code has
made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only
upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain
objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial
cognizance, namely, a judgment of the presumptive
death of the absent spouse.

VIII
1. Does the law increasing the values on which the
penalty is based applicable to violations of special
penal law like the anti-fencing law?

No, the amendatory law that increased the values

of the object of crimes apply only to felonies under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for that law amended
specific provisions of the RPC but did not include
special penal laws. Consequently, in case of a fence,
his penalty could be greater than that of the stealer,
although if charged as an accessory to theft or
robbery, his penalty should have been two degrees
lower than the principal. [The last sentence beautifies
and completes the answer for the question implies that
the examiner has in mind the latest jurisprudence on
fencing in relation to the amendatory law.]

 2. When is an offender who benefited in the loot without

participating in the commission of the offense of theft
or robbery (1) a principal and (2) an accessory?

He is a principal for the offense of fencing when

charged in a separate information for fencing. If he is
charged in the same information as the principal of theft
or robbery, he is merely an accessory under the first
paragraph of Article 19. His liability as an accessory is
two degrees lower than that of the principal.

3. Ernie was convicted of violation of Section 68 of P.D.

705 which is penalized as qualified theft. Simple theft
carries the penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods if the amount involved exceeds
P20,000 but does not exceed P600,000. How should
his penalty be determined considering that the value of
timber he cut amounted to P50,000.00?

Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended refers to Articles

309 and 310 of the RPC for the penalties to be
imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of P.D.
705 is punished as qualified theft. Thus, the law
increasing the values of the penalties must apply.

The law treats cutting, gathering collecting and

possessing timber or forest products without license as
an offense as grave and as equivalent to the felony of
qualified theft which is two degrees higher than the
imposable penalty for the simple theft. Simple theft is

 punished with prision correccional in its medium and

maximum periods if the amount involved exceeds
P20,000 but does not exceed P600,000. Hence, the
imposable penalty should be two degrees higher or
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period. (Talabis v. People, G.R.
No. 214647, March 4, 2020)

4. Compare the crimes of cattle-rustling and carnapping.

Why is cattle rustling considered malum in se, whereas
carnapping is malum prohibitum?

Carnapping and cattle-rustling are both forms of

qualified theft before. However, due to the enactment
of special laws punishing the taking of motor vehicles
and large cattle, the provision on qualified theft has
been modified. Cattle rustling has remained malum in
se, whereas carnapping has become malum
prohibitum? The distinction lies in the nomenclature of
penalties used. Cattle rustling continued the use of
nomenclatures of penalties under the Revised Penal
Code, whereas carnapping uses the nomenclatures of
special law penalties. Thus, jurisprudence has
declared that cattle rustling is a mere amendment of
the qualified theft provision, whereas carnapping is
purely an offense punished by special penal law
because of such penalties in the law.

 5. Compare the following terms (a) asportation (b)

appropriation and (c) taking. How do they figure in
the crime of theft or robbery?

(a) Asportation is defined as carrying away; (b)

taking is putting the thing into one’s possession and
control; and (c) appropriation is depriving the lawful
owner of the property.
As to the concept of “taking,” the only requirement for
a personal property to be the object of theft under the
penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It
need not be capable of “carrying away.” Jurisprudence
is settled that to “take” under the theft provision of the
penal code does not require asportation or carrying
away. It only requires possession and complete control
even if not taken away.

IX
1. What are the elements of trafficking in persons? What
will convert it into the crime of qualified trafficking?

The elements of tra cking in persons can be derived from

its de nition, thus:

(1) The act of “recruitment, transportation, transfer or

harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders.”

(2) The means used which include “threat or use of force,

or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,

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abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the

vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or bene ts to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another; and

(3) The purpose of tra cking which is exploitation which

includes “exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.”
(Leocadio, G.R. No. 237697, July 15, 2020)

2. What are the four punishable acts of trafficking?

There are four punishable acts under the law against trafficking in person:
(1) Acts ofTrafficking in Persons under Section 4; (2) Acts that Promote
Trafficking in Persons under Section 5; (3) Violation of the Confidentiality
Rule under Section 7 in relation to Section 10(d); and (4) Use of Trafficked
Persons under Section 11. (People v. Sayo and Roxas, G.R. No. 227704,
April 10, 2019)

People v. Sayo and Roxas, G.R. No. 227704, April 10, 2019 modified the
ruling of the lower court which convicted Roxas was convicted of Qualified
Trafficking of Persons, under Section 5(a) in relation to Section 6 of RA
9208 in connection with minors AAA and BBB and as to CCC, who was of
legal age at the time of the offense, of Trafficking in Persons under Section
5(a) of RA 9208.
The SC held that the court a quo committed serious error in convicting
Roxas for Qualified Trafficking of Persons and Trafficking in Persons as the
offenses proscribed under Section 5 of RA 9208 are properly denominated
as Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons.
Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 and Acts that Promote Trafficking in
Persons under Section 5 of RA 9208 are separate and distinct offenses
with their own corresponding penalties. Section 6 provides for qualifying
circumstances of Trafficking in Persons under Section 4, which when
alleged and proved, will merit the imposition of the maximum penalty.
Section 4 of RA 9208 refers to those acts which directly involve trafficking
in persons, such as recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring, receiving,

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 buying, offering, selling, or trading persons to engage in prostitution,

pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary
servitude, or debt bondage. While Section 5 refers to those acts that
promote or facilitate any of the aforementioned predicate acts of Trafficking
in Persons.
The RTC found that Roxas violated Section 5(a) of RA 9208 for knowingly
leasing a room for the purpose of prostitution. The RTC and the CA thus
committed serious error as the proper denomination of the offense is Acts
that Promote Trafficking in Persons under Section 5(a). In this regard, it
should be noted that the offenses punished under Section 5 cannot be
qualified by Section 6 as what the latter seeks to qualify is the act of
trafficking and not the promotion of trafficking. To be sure, this was clarified
in the amendatory law, RA 10364 or the Expanded Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2012 where Section 6 was amended accordingly:
SEC. 9. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – Violations of Section 4 of this
Act shall be considered as qualified trafficking:
"x x x

As can be gleaned from the above amendment, only violations of Section 4

on Trafficking in Persons can be qualified. Section 5 on Acts that Promote
Trafficking in Persons, being separate and distinct offenses, cannot be
qualified as the law does not expressly provide therefor. The clarificatory
amendment, being beneficial to the accused, must be applied in his favor.
The denomination of his conviction is corrected to Acts that Promote
Trafficking in Persons under Section 5(a) of RA 9208.
Confidentiality rule
The fourth kind of punishable acts is the violation of the right of offender. R.A. 10643 amended
this section by deleting the offender as beneficiary of the protection afforded to victim of
confidentiality. For, there is no reason why accused’s identity should be veiled just like accused in
other crimes are identified to the public.

Pursuant to Section 6, Hirang committed QT, for it was in

a large scale and his four victims were under 18. It was
his habitual trade; entrapment is an acceptable means to
capture him. Tra cking in Persons as a Prostitute is
analogous to seduction, abduction, rape, or other

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lascivious acts. Award of moral damages and exemplary

damages is also justi ed. (People v. Hirang, G.R. No.
223528, January 11, 2017)

Recruitment and transportation (RT) punished under

Section 3(a), R.A. 9208 may be “with or without the
victim’s consent or knowledge.” Thus, it is of no moment
that Aguirre obtained the consent of the victims who were
below 18 on the date the crime was committed. They
were “children” within the purview of Section 3(b).

Section 3(a) says that when the victim is a minor, the RT

need not involve threat or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or
of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or the giving or receiving of payments or bene ts
to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given out of his
or her own free will.

It may be asked, if the offender of the special law is a minor, will

Article 68 of the RPC apply as to lower the penalty on the minor?
The answer depends on the nomenclature of penalties used in the
special law. Thus, People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20,
2011 said — cases in the past held that, in imposing the penalty for
offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating
circumstances under the RPC cannot and should not be applied. A
review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals
that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved
provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished
thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with
reference to those in the RPC. Since the penalties then provided by
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the special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum,
medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible
to consider the modifying circumstances whose main function is to
determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in
Article 64 of the Code.

This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that
the provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees
could not be given supplementary application to special laws, since
the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated
in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The
suppletory effect of the RPC to special laws, as provided in Article
10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or
physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against,
such supplementary application.

The situation, however, is different where although the offense

is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special law, the
penalty therefor is actually taken from the RPC in its technical
nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and
legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code.
When the law, as in this case, involved speaks of prision
correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would
consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.

In People v. Dadang, G.R. No. 242880, January 22, 2020,

offender was convicted for Illegal Possession of .5449 gram of shabu,
and Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. To conform with
Section 1 of the ISL, the SC modified the penalty imposed. For the
possession of shabu, the SC imposed an indeterminate sentence of
12 years and 1 day, as minimum, to 14 years, as maximum; for the

possession of paraphernalia, the modified penalty was 6 months and

1 day, as minimum, to 2 years, as maximum.

People v. Obias, G.R. No. 2221, March 25, 2019, through the
concurring opinion of Justice Peralta explained that the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law should still apply if the penalty consists of a
range, as provided for under the second sentence of Section 1 of Act No. 4103,
as amended by R.A. No, 4203 and R.A. No. 4225, “the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum xed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than
the minimum term prescribed by the same.”
It is clear that if the imposable penalty consists of a range of 20 years
and 1 day to life imprisonment, like in this case, the Court should impose a
minimum term not less than the minimum of the penalty, which is 20 years and
1 day, and a maximum term not higher than life imprisonment. Thus, imposing
an indeterminate sentence of 20 years and 1 day, as minimum, to life
imprisonment, as maximum, would appear to be compliant with the above-
quoted provision.
However, by imposing such an indeterminate sentence, the accused,
after serving the minimum term of 20 years and 1 day, will not be entitled to be
released on parole because he will still serve the maximum term of life
imprisonment. Besides, if the penalty of life imprisonment is imposed, the ISL
is no longer applicable because Section 2 of Act No. 4l03, as amended,
expressly provides that it shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses
punished with life imprisonment.
Imposing a maximum term of life imprisonment upon the accused will
not be consistent with the objectives of the ISL which is "to uplift and redeem
valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation
of personal liberty and economic usefulness"of the accused since he may be
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 exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and
his physical, mental, and moral record.
It will not be good for the person who may have already been reformed and
rehabilitated while serving sentence in a correctional institution and deprived of the
bene ts of the ISL. That is why in Argoncillo v. CA, G.R. No. 118816, July 10,
1998, where the penalty for violation of P.D. 7049 is 20 years to life
imprisonment, the Court imposed a penalty of 20 years to 25 years because any
period in excess of 20 years is within the range of the penalty. This penalty has a
legal basis because the minimum term (20 years) is not less than the minimum
penalty provided for by law, and the maximum term (25 years) is not higher than
the maximum penalty of life imprisonment, and the penalty imposed is within the
range of the penalty provided for by law. In accordance with the doctrine laid down
in Argoncillo, the ponencia correctly imposed a minimum term of not less than 20
years and 1 day, and a maximum term not higher than life imprisonment, like thirty
30 years of imprisonment for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section
11(2) of the Dangerous Drugs Law.
This will give effect to the very purpose of the ISL because when the penalty of
life imprisonment is no longer imposed as a maximum term, then the accused, after
serving 20 years or even less, taking into account his good conduct time allowance,
may be already released on parole under the supervision of a parole of cer
pursuant to Section 6 of said law.
It is only when the illegal possession under Section 11, R.A. 9165 is committed in
the presence of two or more persons or in a social gathering that the maximum
penalty of life imprisonment may be imposed pursuant to Section 13, R.A. 9165. It
is only then that the ISL is no longer applicable.

Relative to the prohibition for drug to apply for probation under Section 24
of R.A. 9165, it is only after the trial court arrives at a judgment of
conviction can the provisions of the Probation Law apply. Section 9 thereof,
which lists the disqualified offenders, also highlights that the
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 disqualifications pertain to the nature of the convictions meted out to the
prospective applicant.
Section 24 disqualifies any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing
from the privilege granted by the Probation Law.
It is clear from both Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 and the provisions of
the Probation Law that in applying for probation, what is essential is not the
offense charged but the offense to which the accused is ultimately found
guilty of.
Upon acceptance of a plea bargain, the accused is actually found guilty of
the lesser offense subject of the plea. According to jurisprudence, "[p]lea
bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject
to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a
lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
Thus, regardless of what the original charge was in the Information, the
judgment would be for the lesser offense to which the accused pled guilty.
This means that the penalty to be meted out, as well as all the attendant
accessory penalties, and other consequences under the law, including
eligibility for probation and parole, would be based on such lesser offense.
Necessarily, even if Pascua was originally charged with violation of Section
5, Article II of RA 9165, he was ultimately convicted of the lower offense of
violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law. Since the foregoing
effectively removed Pascua's case from the coverage of Section 24, Article
II of RA 9165, he should, at the very least, be allowed to apply for
probation.
This ruling is limited to the deletion of the RTC's pronouncement that
Pascua is "ineligible to apply for probation", thereby allowing him to file
such application. If he files for the same, the grant or denial thereof will
then lie in the sound discretion of the RTC after due consideration of the
criteria laid down in the Probation Law, e.g., Section 8 thereof. (Pascua v.
People, G.R. No. 250578, September 07, 2020)

Jadewell Parking v. Lidua, Sr., G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013

The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the

 prescription period of the commission of the offense of violation of a city

ordinance and not a municipal ordinance.

With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the
only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of
special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any
other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other
distinction. Act No. 3326 as amended does apply.
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following
should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged;
(2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the
prescriptive period was interrupted.
With regard to the period of prescription, it is two months for the offense
charged under City Ordinance. The offense was committed on May 7, 2003
and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same day.
These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription
period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure which covers, among others, violations of municipal or
city ordinances. Section 11 of the Rules provides that the filing of criminal
cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by
information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in
Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information,
except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.

As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of

an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is
involved in an ordinance. (Zaldivia v. Reyes, supra.)
Under its Section 9, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in
court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation." This provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case
shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not
the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means
that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the
case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the Act 3326 which says that the
period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof
are "judicial proceedings."

 At any rate, if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure

and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former
should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act
3326 and Rule 110, the latter must again yield because the Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the
Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.
When the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then files
the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription
period.
People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012, categorically stated
that Zaldivia is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned.
Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well.
However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws
but not to ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in
the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure.
When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the
Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It
continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to
file the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the
Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary
investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of
the violation of the ordinance did not alter the two-month period within
which to file the Information.

People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012

Act 3326 as amended, is the law applicable to BP 22 cases for it is a
special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than 30 days
but not more than 1 year or by a fine for its violation. It therefore prescribes
in four years in accordance with Act 3326.
The filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the
court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the
merits. This ruling was broadened in the case of Francisco v. CA when it
held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s Office also suspends
the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.

There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those
covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of
prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia is not controlling in special laws.
Jurisprudence holds that in cases involving special laws, the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the
period of prescription.

In SEC v. Interport Resources Corporation, the Court even ruled that

investigations conducted by the SEC for violations of the Revised
Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the
prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.

In fact, Panaguiton, Jr. v. DOJ which is in all fours with the instant case,
categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor
effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been
charged under BP 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep
on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to
suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their
control, like the accused’s delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of
the investigating agencies.

What are the elements of falsification under Article 172?

Article 172(1): (i) that the offender is a private individual; (ii) that he
committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171; and (iii)
that the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial
document. (Villamar v. People, G.R. No. 178652, December 8, 2010)
Article 172(2): 1) the offender is a private individual; 2) the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171; 3) the
falsification was committed in a private document; and 4) there is damage
or intent to cause damage to a third person. (Tan v. Matsuura, G.R. No.
179003, January 13, 2013)
Article 172, last paragraph, using a falsified document in any transaction
(other than as evidence in a judicial proceeding):
(a) Offender knew that a document was falsified by another person;
(b) The false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivision
Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172;
(c) He used such document (not in judicial proceedings); and

(d) The use of the false document caused damage to another or at least it
was used with intent to cause such damage.

Can falsification be committed by culpa?

Yes, upon a finding that the accused committed the falsification without
maliciously perverting the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some
person. (Sevilla v. People, G.R. No. 194390, August 13, 2014)
SS firmly believed that his CSC eligibility based on his having passed the
Regional Cultural Community Officer (Unassembled) Examination and
educational attainment were sufficient to qualify him for a permanent
position. He should only be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification.
However, per Article 172, there can be no falsification of private document
by culpa because of the element of intent to cause damage. But, there is
falsification of public, official and commercial document by culpa since
intent to cause damage is not an element. (Samson v. CA, 103 Phil. 277;
People v. Reyes, January 20, 1978)