AUSTRIA V. REYES (Institution based on false cause) No.

No. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code,
the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must
31 SCRA 754
be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must
FACTS: appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution
if he had known the falsity of the cause. The decedent’s will does not state in a specific
Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate, ante
or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. Absent such we look at
mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present
other considerations. The decedent’s disposition of the free portion of her estate,
petitioners, who are nephews and nieces of Basilia. The will was subsequently allowed
which largely favored the respondents, compared with the relatively small devise of
with the bulk of her estate designated for respondents, all of whom were Basilia’s
land which the decedent left for her blood relatives, shows a perceptible inclination on
legally adopted children. The petitioners, claiming to be the nearest of kin of Basilia,
her part to give the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to
assert that the respondents had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in
give to them. Excluding the respondents from the inheritance, considering that
accordance with law, thereby making them mere strangers to the decedent and
petitioner nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by virtue of
without any right to succeed as heirs. Petitioners argue that this circumstance should
intestacy, would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.
have left the whole estate of Basilia open to intestacy with petitioners being the
compulsory heirs. Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces
an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as
It is alleged by petitioners that the language used imply that Basilia was deceived into
was done in this case. Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator
believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the
should be allowed to prevail. Granted that a probate court has found, by final
respondents as the latter’s legitime, with the inference that respondents would not
judgment, that the decedent possessed testamentary capacity and her last will was
have instituted the respondents as heirs had the fact of spurious adoption been known
executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, it follows that giving
to her. The petitioners inferred that from the use of the terms, “sapilitang
full expression to her will must be in order.
tagapagmana” (compulsory heirs) and “sapilitang mana” (legitime), the impelling
reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix’s belief that
under the law she could not do otherwise. Thus Article 850 of the Civil Code applies
whereby, “the statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be
considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not
have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.”

ISSUE:

W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in barring the petitioners
nephews and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the
decedent in her will.

HELD:
NUGUID VS. NUGUID (Preterition) On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different
from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat,
17 SCRA 449 (1966)
“shall annul the institution of heir”. This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there
are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
FACTS: ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall
Petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario also “annul the institution of heirs”, put only “insofar as it may prejudice the person
Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed disinherited”, which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. Better stated
that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the
annexed be issued to her. disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate
father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the
probate of her will. Ground therefor is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios
Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of
the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in
consequence the institution is void.

RTC ruled the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of
the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid” and dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether there is preterition

HELD:

Yes. Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned,
they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.” Disinheritance, in
turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the
legitime for a cause authorized by law. The will here does not explicitly disinherit the
testatrix’s parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will
rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced
heirs suffer from preterition.
IRIS MORALES vs. ANA MARIA OLONDRIZ, ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired.

ALEJANDRO MORENO OLONDRIZ, ISABEL ROSA OLONDRIZ and FRANCISCO Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a
JAVIER, MARIA OLONDRIZ
compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy.
G.R. No. 198994 February 3, 2016
During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to present
FACTS
evidence that Francisco received donations inter vivos and advances on his legitime
Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. died on June 9, 2003. Believing that the decedent
from the decedent. However, Morales did not appear during the hearing dates,
died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition with the Las Piñas RTC for the
effectively waiving her right to present evidence on the issue. We cannot fault the
partition of the decedent's estate and the appointment of a special administrator on
RTC for reaching the reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.
July 4, 2003. On July 11, 2003, the RTC appointed Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as

special administrator. However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate petition

with the RTC alleging that the decedent left a will dated July 23, 1991. Morales

prayed for the probate of the will and for hex appointment as special administratrix.

Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an

illegitimate son of the decedent.

ISSUE

Whether or not there was no preterition because Francisco received a house

and lot inter vivos as an advance on his legitime.

RULING

Yes. The decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir,

legatee, or devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir

in the direct line. Unless Morales could show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the

will leads to the conclusion of his preterition. Under the Civil Code, the preterition of

a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises
REYES V. BARRETTO-DATU, 19 SCRA 85 (1967) property). Hence, thisaction for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.5.Milagros
then moved to declare the project of partitionsubmitted in the proceedings
DOCTRINE: Preterition is the omission of one, some or all compulsory heirs in the direct
for the settlement of theestate of Bibiano to be null and void ab initio because
line, whether living at the time of the death of the testator, or born subsequent thereto.
theDistributee, SaludBarretto, was not a daughter of the Sps.The nullity of the project
Among other things, Reyes holds that omission from the inheritance, as an element of
was based on Art. 1081 of theCivil Code of 1889 which provided that :“A partition in
preterition, must be a total omission, such that if a compulsory heir in the direct line
which a person was believed to be an heir, withoutbeing so, has been been included,
received something from the testator under the terms of the will, such heir cannot be
shall be null and void.”The Court ordered the plaintiff to return the properties received
considered preterited.
under the project of partition.
FACTS: Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they
ISSUE: WON the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void abinitio and
acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and
that Salud did not acquire title thereto
Bulacan.1.When BibianoBarretto died on February 18, 1936, in the Cityof Manila, he
left his share of these properties in a willto SaludBarretto (Salud), mother of plaintiff's HELD: NO1.SaludBarretto admittedly had been instituted as an heir inthe late
wards, andLucia Milagros Barretto (Milagros) and a small portion aslegacies to his two BibianoBarretto's last will and testament togetherwith defendant Milagros; hence, the
sisters Rosa Barretto and FelisaBarrettoand his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of the partition had betweenthem could not be one such had with a party who was believedto
fishpondsituated in barrio San Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned, be an heir without really being one, and was not null andvoid under said article. The
however, was reserved for his widow, MariaGerard. In the meantime, Maria legal precept (Article 1081)does not speak of children, or descendants, but
Gerardo was appointedadministratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a project ofheirs(without distinction between forced, voluntary orintestate ones), and the
ofpartition, which was signed by her in her own behalf and asguardian of the minor fact that Salud happened not to bea daughter of the testator does not preclude her
Milagros Barretto. Said project ofpartition was approved by the Court of First Instance being oneof the heirs expressly named in his testament; forBibianoBarretto
ofManila. The distribution of the estate and the delivery ofthe shares of the heirs was at liberty to assign the free portion of
followed. As a consequence,SaludBarretto took immediate possession of her share
his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share (½)assigned to Salud
andsecured the cancellation of the original certificates oftitle and the issuance of new
impinged on the legitime of Milagros,Salud did not for that reason cease to be
titles in her own name.2.Maria Gerardo died and upon her death, it was discoveredthat
a testamentary heir of BibianoBarretto.2.Where the testator allotted in his will to his
she executed two will. In the first will, sheinstituted Salud and Milagros as
legitimate daughter a share less than her legitime, such circumstancewould not
her heirs. In the secondwill, she revoked the same and left all her properties infavour
invalidate the institution of a stranger as anheir, since there was no preterition or total
of Milagros alone. The later will was allowed andthe first rejected.
omission of the forced heir.3.Where a partition was made between two persons
3.In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes,husband of the instituted as heirs in the will, and one of them was found out later notto be the
deceasedSalud, as guardian of the children,it was determined by the lower court that testator’s daughter, while the other was really his daughter, it cannot be said that the
Salud was not achild of Maria Gerardo and her husband, Bibiano. Thisruling partition was avoid compromise on the civil status of the person who wasnot the
was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed thesame.4.Having thus lost this testator’s daughter. At the time of the partition, the civil status of that person was not
fight for a share in the estate ofMaria Gerardo as a legitimate heir of Maria being questioned.There can be no compromise on a matter that was not anissue.
Gerardo,plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate ofthe deceased While the law outlaws a compromise over civilstatus, it does not forbid
BibianoBarretto, which was given in usufruct tohis widow Maria Gerardo (fishpond a settlement by the partiesregarding the share that should correspond to the
claimantto the hereditary estate.4.A project of partition is merely a proposal
for thedistribution of the hereditary estate, which the court mayaccept or reject. It is
the court alone that makes thedistribution of the estate and determines the
personsentitled thereto. It is the final judicial decree ofdistribution that vests
title in the distributees. If thedecree was erroneous, it should have been corrected by
anopportune appeal; but once it had become final, its bindingeffect is like that of any
other judgment in rem, unlessproperly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
Wherethe court has validly issued a decree of distribution andthe same has become
final, the validity or invalidity of theproject of partition becomes irrelevant.5.A
distribution in the decedent’s will, made according to hiswill should be respected.
The fact that one of thedistributees was a minor (Milagros) at the time the
courtissued the decree of distribution does not imply that thecourt had no
jurisdiction to enter the decree ofdistribution. The proceeding for the
settlement of adecedent’s estate is a proceeding in rem. It is binding onthe
distributee who was represented by her mother asguardian.6.Where in a
partition between two instituted heirs, one ofthem did not know that she was not really
the child of the

testator, it cannot be said that she defrauded the otherheir who was the testator’s
daughter. At any rate, reliefon the ground of fraud must be obtained within 4 years
fromits discovery. When Milagros was 16 years old in 1939, whenthe fraud was
allegedly perpetrated and she became of age in1944, and became award of the fraud
in 1946, her action in1956 to set aside the partition was clearly barred.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD CHRISTENSEN, successional rights and the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions, shall be
deceased, ADOLFO AZNAR vs. MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN and MARIA
HELEN CHRISTENSEN regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,

G.R. No. L-24365 June 30, 1966 whatever may be nature of the property and regardless of the country where said

FACTS property may be found.

Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the state of The laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for

California but was domiciled in the Philippines at the time of his death. He executed residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason

his last will and testament in Manila in 1951, which in substance provided for the demands that we should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens

partition of his estate by payment of P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia who he residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled

claimed was not in any way related to him, while the rest of the estate will be abroad.

transferred Maria Lucy Christensen, who he claimed was his only daughter. The validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen child, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of

Christensen Garcia insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.

natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen based on a prior Supreme Court

decision on the matter. It was claimed that the Philippine law should govern the

estate of the deceased and that the distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it

denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one half of

the estate of the deceased.

ISSUE

Whether or not the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions of the will

of the deceased should be governed by the laws of the Philippines.

RULING

Yes. Art. 16 of the Civil code of the Philippines provides that the amount of
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the
Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON
nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing was written. No legacies
FACTS
and devisees having been provided in the will, the whole property of the deceased
Constantitno, herein petitioner, filed for probate of the will of his deceased
has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters.
brother Nemesio and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary

on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will bequeathing all his shares from

the conjugal property to his brother Segundo Acain. However, since Segundo

predeceased Nemesio, the former’s children are claiming to be heir, with Constantino

as the petitioner. The spouse and adopted child of the decedent opposed the probate

of will because of preterition. RTC dismissed the petition of the wife. CA reversed and

the probate thus was dismissed.

ISSUE

Is there preterition warranting annulment of the instituted heirs?

RULING

Preterition consists in the omission of the forced heirs because they are not

mentioned there in, or trough mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are

expressly disinherited. As for the widow there is no preterit ion because she is not in

the direct line. However, the same cannot be said for the adopted child whose legal

adoption has not been questioned by the petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted

person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and

makes the adopted person a legal heir hence, this is a clear case of preterition.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate RULING The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court held that for what
Instance of Iloilo) vs. THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO G.R. Nos. L- would be presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court however emphasized
27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974 that Texas law at the time of Linnie’s death is the law applicable (and not said law at
FACTS any other time).

In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In
May 1957, while she was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died. In her
will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie
however also stated in her will that should her husband later die, said estate shall be
turned over to her brother and sister. In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he
was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of Charles filed a motion before
the probate court (there was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie) so that a certain
Avelina Magno may be appointed as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the
trusted employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that
Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in
the meantime, he’d like to have Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio
Escolin approved the motion. Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for
probate was filed for the said will. Since said will basically covers the same estate,
Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition. Eventually, the
probate of Charles’ will was granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the
estate. Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the
property to Linnie’s brother and sister and since that is her will, the same must be
respected. Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an
alien testator); that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed
by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless
of the presence of legitimes (Charles’ share in the estate). PCIB argued that the law of
Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled outside
Texas at the time of her death (applying the renvoi doctrine).

ISSUE Whether or not Texas Law should apply.

G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982 RULING

FACTS Yes. The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the
estate in full ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his 311
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the
while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And
provided for substitutions. Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate
December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any
probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.) It is the one-third usufruct over the free
Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an portion which the appellants question and justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo
inventory of the estate as follows: On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides for a
project of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who
parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is
the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share
propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator's
widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda. intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the to favor Wanda. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is
provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the hereby ordered distributed as follows: One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her
widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with legitime; One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez
respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution
survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez. The distribution herein
invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as to costs.
the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a
usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an
alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the
proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building
between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to
give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of
partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have
appealed to this Court.