INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC & TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH VOLUME 9, ISSUE 01, JANUARY 2020 ISĀ©SN 2277-8616

Impact of Female Director on Firm Performance in

Emerging Economy
Shubhanker Yadav, Dr. Anindita Chakraborty
Abstract: This study examines the impact of female director on the firm market based financial performance of listed Indian firms in an econometric
modelling approach. Using a firm year unit of analysis, a sample of 60 BSE listed companies across various industries has been studied over a period of
twelve financial years, namely FY 2006–2007 to FY 2017–2018. Using panel data analysis, the percentage of female directors on corporate board is
taken as the independent variable and firm performance measured by two market based financial performance indicator Q (Tobin's Q) and Mv/Ev
(Market Value to Enterprise value, as the dependent variables. The primary results of the study using panel least squares (PLS) and random effects
(RE) estimation models point towards a positive and significant correlation between the percentage of female directors and Tobin q. However, results
are found to be more strong when Mv/Ev been used as firm financial performance. The findings of the study indicate that the number of companies with
no female directors is reducing across the 12 years of study. It may be due to the external pressure created by the new corporate governance code
2013, also, the number of companies with one or more, number of female directors been seen as increasing during the period of study. Still, very few
companies can be seen keeping one-third of the director as female director; this could be due to the non-availability of a female director.

Index Terms: BSE, Corporate Governance, Female Director, Financial Performance, Indian Listed Firm, Panel data econometrics, Companies
Act 2013.
——————————  ——————————

1. INTRODUCTION economy tend to have high inflation, However in Indian

This research paper comes at a time when the board's political economy final reports of company contain assets on historical
debate is gaining momentum to promote female directors on cost method and not replacement cost method, as in the case
the board. Listed companies in India now have to comply with of USA. Hence researcher of this study came up with new tool
the requirement to name at least one female to their boards. In Mv/Ev (replacement of Tobin q), which can be better used in
this context, whether the impact of a female director on boards an emerging economy for the studies. This study includes both
on firm performance becomes an important research issue, market-based financial performance q (Tobin's q) and Mv/Ev
something that has yielded mixed results in a global context. (Market value to Enterprise value, to show the variation in the
Examining this link requires an empirical investigation in the result. This study used a sample of 60 listed non-financial
Indian context, in which the existing literature provides little companies of Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) India from 2007
insight into the subject. Internal or external to the organization to 2018. Estimated results indicate that the female director has
or gender diversity (Pearce and Zahra 1991). This study is a positive impact on firm performance Q but found to be
attempting to understand the inter-linkage between the female significantly positive and with better r-square in the context of
director and firm performance and it is hoped that the Indian Market value to Enterprise value.
boards will provide useful insights into whether a business
case exists for women. In the backdrop of unique business 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
practices, institutional infrastructure, and traditionally male- The role of board of directors is a widely studied topic (Larcker
dominated society, Existing literature holds very few studies on and Tayan 2011), and role of female director among board of
this subject and is rare to find in an emerging economy like director emerges as an essential element in this framework
India and to the best of the author's knowledge; this is one of (Francoeur et al. 2008) with research into the role of women
few papers related to women director and their impact on on boards gaining currency (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009;
firm's performance in the Indian context. Q ratio (Tobin q) is Adams and Ferreira 2009). Boards form an essential element
calculated by the market value of the company divided by in the internal discipline of corporate governance mechanisms.
company’s asset replacement cost; it can be interpreted that q The OECD defines corporate governance as a system that
expresses the relationship between company’s extrinsic value assigns rights and responsibilities to various participants, such
and its intrinsic value; thus, it is a mean for estimating whether as board members, managers, and investors, and prescribes
a particular company is undervalued or overvalued (Kaldor rules/procedures for corporate decision-making (OECD 2004).
1966). Though Tobin q has been used widely in studies for The theory of the organization provides the theoretical basis
countries with a well developed and regulated stock market, it for integrating governance in the role of boards. Based on this
may not be appropriate to use it in the Indian context. Reason view, the question of corporate governance starts with the
been market value of company is highly volatile because of division of ownership and control, creating a conflict of interest
great variation temporarily in risk and liquidity, and for between the owner and manager. Proper oversight of
replacement cost of asset cannot be found as emerging managers is, therefore, supported, either through
management or investor control (Fama and Jensen 1983).
———————————————— The primary duty of the board of directors is to take into
 Shubhanker Yadav currently pursuing PhD degree program in
Corporate Finance in IM-BHU, Varanasi, India, PH-9935590759. E-
consideration shareholders' interest and stakeholder interest
mail:Shubhanker141@gmail.com while making business decisions, thus increasing shareholder
 Dr. Anindita Chakraborty is currently working as Assistant Professor value and firm value (Yadav and Chakraborty 2016).
at IM-BHU, Varanasi, India. E-mail: Empirically, studies have shown that the more female director
aninditachakraborty19@gmail.com on board leads to better monitoring of managers. Hence,
higher women's presence at the corporate board increases
board independence. (Carter et al. N.K. Sanan 2007).
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According to Stanwick and Stanwick (2010), when the board

Gender diversity
Female director
Farell & Hench
of directors are made more accountable for their decision and
work, it improves the financial performance of companies. The

1000 Firm
specific issue of the relationship between the presence of

No link
added
women on the board and firm performance has produced

2005
USA
inconclusive results (Carter et al. 2003). Pearce and Zahra
(1991), their work on whether and how boards with female

performance
financial firm
directors differ from a board with only male members, posits
that a representation of diverse interests, including the number

Financial

Negative
Bolren &

203 non
Norway

Female
director
of females, is an essential characteristic of an effective board.

Strom

2007
Research establishes that women director representation on
boards bring varied perspectives to decision making
(Campbell and Mınguez-Vera 2008; Smith et al. 2006). As

financial firm
Cambell &
Bilimoria (2000) suggests, women directors enhance the

Positive
Female
director
Tobin q
boardroom discussions given that fact they possess better

68 non
Spain

2008
Vera
listening skills and are more sensitive towards others. This
increased quality of board room interaction improves decision
making, which leads to improved firm performance (Catalyst

Characteristi

Characteristi
2004). Erhardt et al. (2003) found the presence of female

Adam and

Negative
1939 US
Ferreira
directors at corporate boards influence positively to firm

Board
2009
accounting performance for a giant firm in a developed

USA

Firm
firm

cs

cs
economy. However, there are studies which find existing
opinions on the effect of a female director on corporate boards

Gul, Srinidhi

firms

Stock prices
on firm performance as being different and lacking obscurity
(Dobbin and Jung 2011). Studies conducted over a long

diversity

Positive
Gender
period find no relationship between the two (Farrell and

7597
2011
USA
&Ng

year
Hersch 2005; Bonn et al. 2004). Studies that show a positive
relationship suffer from the problem of endogeneity i.e.,
endogeneity refers to those factors which are not known but

Performanc
Norwegian

Women’s
have an effect on female director and firm performance. Farrell
Alharand

Negative
public ltd
Norway
Dittnar

and Hersch (2005) conclude that women on the board result in

2012

Firm

ratio
firm
248
neither creation nor destruction of value. Some studies find

e
that the presence of women on the corporate board has
adverse impacts on the board's decision-making process

Dependent Variable
(Bohren and Strom 2007; Adams and Ferreira 2009) due to Sample Size

Independent
Variable
increased conflict and lack of cohesion. Table 1 shows
Country
Author

Result
Year

summarised studies that have documented positive, negative

or no relationship between female directors and firm
performance. Studies mentioned above use data from
developed economies. India, with its background of a
traditionally male-dominated society, provides a unique setting Source-Sanan 2016
to examine board gender issues. India, with its history of a
male-dominated society, provides a unique environment to
3 OBJECTIVE
discuss gender diversity issues in the corporate board on the
To examine the impact of female director on the firm
table.
performance
Table1. Relationship between female director and firm
performance studies 4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Firm performance

Data Collection and Period of Study

Women director

The effect of presence of women director on the performance

Erhardt et al.

of BSE 500 listed companies in India been examined, using

the period of a 12-year study (2007-2018). The data will be
112 firm

Positive

analyzed using the following performance indicator, i.e., Q

2003
USA

(Tobin q) and Mv/Ev (Market value to enterprise value. After

going through a detailed study for sample selection from BSE
500 listed companies, excluding financial and banking
Women director

companies and also companies whose data were unavailable.

Performance
Smith et al.

Final population shrink to 304 companies. Finally, sample

2500 firm
Denmark

Positive

selection was made by random selection with the help of

2005

Firm

SPSS.20, 60 companies been taken from the pool of 304

companies The Women director served as the base of this
study; this study will use Women director as independent
variables (Women director - Percentage of female director on
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the company board). Two dependent variable (Tobin q and However with 60 percent of companies have now given place
Market value to enterprise value, and lastly five control to female position on its corporate board; this changes been
variables .i.e. Firm Size – Natural log value of total assets, seen due to changes in companies act 2013, where it is now
Firm Age – Number of year since incorporation, Financial mandatory for companies to place at least one female director
Leverage- Liabilities to book value, Operating Performance- in the board of directors. Most of the companies in India have,
Net profit to Total Income and Cash flow. The cash flows will on average, 11 directors with some exceptions where the
be ‘log’ on its amount before taken for analysis to minimize the number of directors is equal to 26 or more. A total of 720 firm-
cash flow volatility among each focussed and diversified year observations have been included in the sample for the
company. The descriptive analysis will determine the estimation of results. In the sample, Tobin q mean value is 2.3
maximum, minimum, standard deviation, and means on while the maximum is 11.01, and the minimum is 0.29. While
focussed companies’ performance. The following is the market value to enterprise value mean value is 0.68 and a
regression models constructed for the study: maximum 4.38 and minimum -3.64. The firm's age has been
Performance = β0 + β1FD +βFA + β3FS + β4LV + β5OP + taken as a log value of age where it found to be mean 1.58,
β6CF which indicates on average age of firm for the sample is 38
years, maximum age and minimum age being 115 years and
Panel Data Analysis 07years. Firm size has been calculated as a log of total
Panel data analysis describes the individual variable assets, average firm size Rs 24547 million. Leverage has
behaviour both across the time and across other variables. been calculated by Liabilities to book value, where the
Panel data has three approaches for its estimation i.e., Pooled researcher found average financial Leverage found across the
regression model, fixed effect model, and the random variable company is 0.54, maximum was 2.16, and the minimum was -
model. The fixed-effect model analyzes the impact of the 0.44, Leverage of -0.44 indicates that this firm has invested
variable that varies over time; all time-invariant characteristics their extra fund in other companies. Average operating
are unique to individuals and should not be correlated with performance was found to be 0.11, a maximum of 3.83 and a
other individual characteristics. In the random effect model, minimum -0.35. Cash flow in this sample study found to
the variation across individuals is assumed to be random and be0.19 average and maximum 0.94 and minimum 0.00. The
uncorrelated with predictor or independent variables, which presence of female directors at the corporate board was
are included in the regression model. Female director as measured by the percentage of women directors. The
independent variables will be examined using the Hausman percentage of women directors was calculated by the number
test; this test is applied for the purpose of identifying the of women directors divided by board size. For the given
relationship between the predictor variable and outcome sample across years of study, the average percentage of
variable within the sample companies is fixed or random. If p- women directors was 7.11 %. The maximum percentage of
value is less than 0.05 significance values, then the model will women directors was 33.33%, while there were boards with no
be a fixed-effect model, while p-value greater than 0.05 women directors across the period of study. This is in line with
significance value, then the model will be random variable that study indicated by the Catalyst Survey of 2011 (5.3 %).
model. Ordinary least square (OLS-PLS) has been used in The highest percentage of women directors was 30.7 % while
analysing the panel data regression analysis and explained there also exist boards with no women directors.
the variation in dependent variable (Q and Mv/Ev) caused due
to variation in predictor variable (female director, firm age firm Correlation Matrix
size, leverage operating performance and cash flow), in other
word OLS-PLS estimate the relationship between the Table 3 Correlation table (2007-2018)
dependent variables and independent variable or predictor
variables.
S. No.

5 RESULT AND ANALYSIS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Table-2: Descriptive Result (2007-2018)

Mean Median Max Min SD 1
1.0000

FD% 7.11 7.69 33.33 0.00 6.91

FD%
FD-Dicoto 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.49
FA 1.58 1.58 2.06 0.85 0.24
FS 10.39 10.29 16.55 5.55 1.45 2
FD-
0.7963

1.0000

LV 0.54 0.55 2.16 -0.44 0.26

Dicot
OP 0.11 0.08 3.83 -0.35 0.17 o
CF 0.19 0.17 0.94 0.00 0.11
3
M_MV_EV 0.68 0.74 4.38 -3.64 0.35
0.0216
0.0114

1.0000

M_Q 2.30 1.72 11.01 0.29 1.75

FA

Researcher Calculation
The above table shows that the ratio of average female
directors' presence in sample companies is 7% percent.
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4 Table 4 Panel data Analysis- Q (2007-2018)

0.0667

0.1411

0.3556

1.0000
FS Model 1 Model 2
Q Q
Variable
(PLS) (PLS-RE)
5
-0.0120 C -0.0535 -0.6145

-0.0279

-0.2000
0.0016

1.0000
CF FD 0.0259* 0.0171*

FA 0.3699 0.0266*
6
FS 0.0518 0.1859*
-0.1088

-0.1037

-0.0009

-0.1432
0.2593

1.0000
LV LV 0.0858 0.4132

OP -0.0909 -0.2133
7 CF 6.4255* 4.7113*
-0.0014

-0.0765

-0.2880
0.0290

0.0152

0.2793

1.0000

OP R-squared 0.1829 0.1200

Adjusted R sq 0.1655 0.1050

8 Durbin-Watson
0.4900 1.0700
stat
-0.2309

-0.4595
0.0668

0.0901

0.0328

0.2974

0.2684

1.0000

M_M F-statistic 10.5070 6.6200

V_EV
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000
9 Hausman Test 0.1829 0.2838
-0.0445

-0.0512
0.0931

0.1164

0.0604

0.3832

0.1089

0.3958

1.0000

M_Q
*5% level of significance
(Researcher Calculation)
Researcher Calculation
Table 4 Collinearity diagnostics

(Researcher Calculation) Variable VIF 1/VIF

A preliminary check to test for multicollinearity among FD 3.3694 0.2968
independent variables is done by assessing the correlation
between the firm performance and independent variables, FA 3.4453 0.2902
taken one at a time. Going by Table 3, independent variables
FS 1.1621 0.8605
in the study are weakly correlated; none of them being more
than 0.8. Hence, the problem of multicollinearity does not LV 1.3366 0.7481
exist. A second check is done by using the variance inflation
OP 1.1300 0.8850
factor (VIF) according to which collinearity is considered a
problem when VIF exceeds 10 (Neter et al. 1983). The VIF CF 1.2008 0.8327
table (Table 4) also confirms the results of the correlation
matrix, found to be below 10, and tolerances are below 1. This
indicates that all predictor variables are highly independent Table 4 reports regressions of firm performance on female
and not affected or influenced by other predictor variables. director presence on corporate boards. Panel least squares
regression estimates are presented in Model 1. Results
RESULT OF REGRESSION showed Panel least squares (PLS) coefficient estimate of the
percentage of women directors is statistically significant and
positive at 5 % level of significance, with adjusted r-square
16.55%, which indicates that predictor variable explains the
variations of the dependent variable around 16.55%. Further,
to address the concern that the percentage of women
directors and financial performance are jointly determined by
unobservable firm-specific variables, the random-effects
model (RE) is employed. The RE method allows controlling of
omitted variables in a panel data set (Wintoki and Yang 2007).
Model 2 presents estimates once random effects are added.
Results indicated that the coefficient estimate of the
percentage of women directors remains statistically significant

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and positive at 5 % level, thus robust to firm random effects. that the coefficient estimate of the percentage of women
The economic significance of this result is that 1 % rise in the directors remains statistically significant and positive at 5 %
percentage of women directors increases Tobin q by 1.7 % by level, with adjusted r-square 18.65%, thus robust to firm
the RE method with adjusted r-square 10.50%. Coefficient random effects. The economic significance of this result is that
estimates of age proxied by log (age), size proxied by log 1 % rise in the percentage of women directors increases
(assets) and cash flow proxied log (cash amount) are also Mv/Ev by 1.02 % by the RE method. Coefficient estimates of
significant at 5 %, positive for both PLS and RE models. This age proxied by log (age), size proxied by log (assets) and
implies that firms would perform better, but not much cash flow proxied log (cash amount) are also significant at 5
difference can be expected. There is no other variable that is %, positive for both PLS and RE models. This implies that
significant. However prior to this stationary test in data been firms would perform better, but not much difference can be
checked through augmented dickey fuller-test (ADF-test) expected. There is no other variable that is significant. To
which choose between the PLS and RE methods, F test statistic with
To choose between the PLS and RE methods, F test statistic Mv/Ev as the dependent variable exceeds corresponding
with Tobin’s q as the dependent variable exceeds critical value at 5 % level, suggesting that pooled OLS be
corresponding critical value at 5 % level suggesting that rejected. In order to decide between FE and random effects
pooled OLS be rejected. In order to decide between FE and model, results of the Hausman test support random-effects
random effects model, results of the Hausman test support regression than random effects regression. Estimates of the
random effects regression than random effects regression. random effects model are depicted in Model 4.
Estimates of random effects model are depicted in Model 2.
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Table-5 Panel Data Analysis- Mv/Ev (2007-2018) In this paper, we analyzed the effect of female directors on
firm performance measuring factors like Tobin-q and Mv/Ev
Model 3 Model 4 (Market value to Enterprise value). The finding of this study
Mv/Ev Mv/Ev found to be consistent with previous literatures that if females
Variable
(PLS) (PLS-RE) are working as a director in the board of director in the firm, it
C 0.8753* 0.9021* will give the positive sign to the investors and leads the firm
performance toward growth, the fact that they possess better-
FD 0.0220* 0.0102* listening skills and are more sensitive towards others. As
Catalyst (2004), Erhardt et al. (2003) proved that the presence
FA 0.1103* 0.1140* of female directors at the corporate board shows improved
quality of board room interaction and improved decision
FS -0.0271* -0.0261*
making, which leads to improved firm performance. The
LV -0.5142* -0.5281* second finding is the number of companies with one woman
director is increasing over the period of the study, while the
OP 0.1795* 0.1815* number of companies with no women director still exist to 40
percent, over the 12 years of study. This finding provides
CF 0.6583* 0.5248* useful guidance to corporations as scarcity in the labour
supply market for women is a plausible explanation for the
R-squared 0.2946 0.2034
number of women directors not increasing at a higher pace
Adjusted R sq 0.2795 0.1865
over the years. The third finding of the study is that market
measurement of financial performance tool Mv/Ev gave better
Durbin-Watson stat 0.2795 2.2080 results than Tobin q, which was developed for developed
economy. Hence, this study provides literature with new tool
F-statistic 10.5070 6.6200 Mv/Ev to be used as replacement of Tobin q in emerging
economy research studies context. One of the few limitations
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 of the study is that it covers only presence of women director
on corporate board, however, relatives or husband of women’s
Hausman Test 0.1829 0.2838
director on corporate board should also be explored,
education levels, specific skill and experience should be also
*5% level of significance taken into consideration that they bring to the table. In reality,
these parameters may play an important role.
(Researcher Calculation)
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