190. People of the Philippines vs. Dicto Arpa; et al.; G.R. No. L-26798; 25 April 1969.

192. People of the Philippines vs. Roger Racal; G.R. No. 224886; 4 September 2008.

193. People of the Philippines vs. Leo Barriga, et al.; G.R. No. 178545; 29 September 2008.

194. People of the Philippines vs. Joemarie Jalbonan; G.R. No. 180281; 1 July 2013.

195. People of the Philippines vs. Diosdado Camat, et al.; G.R. No. 188612; 30 July 2012.

196. People of the Philippines vs. Canuto Bernal; G.R. No. L-44988; 31 October 1936.

(Yao)People vs. Bernal, GR No. 44988, 31 October 1936

Appellee:
People of the Philippines
Appellant:
Canuto Bernal
FACTS
1. Accused Canuto Bernal took without consent three game-cocks belonging to Elias Piamonte. It was
established that the accused had been thrice convicted of the crime of theft before the commission of the
present crime.
2. The trial court found accused guilty as charged and sentenced to 4 months and 1 day of
arresto
mayor, with an additional penalty of 7 years for being a habitual delinquent.
ISSUES
1. W/N Should the aggravating circumstance of recidivism be taken into account in fixing the
penalty independently from the penalty provided for being a habitual delinquent? (YES.
Recidivism taken into account independently with HD.)
HELD
1. Recidivism is committed by a person who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been
previously convicted by final judgement of another crime embraced in the same title of the code.
2. The SC holds that it is wrong to assume that recidivism is twice taken into account when the
accused is declared a habitual delinquent.
3. Recidivism as an aggravating circumstance modifying the criminal liability is not an inherent or
integral element of habitual delinquency, which the RPC considers as extraordinary and special
aggravating circumstance.
4. Recidivism as viewed as an aggravating circumstance, is not a factor or element which is
necessarily forms an integral part of habitual delinquency. Therefore, recidivism may exist
independently from habitual delinquency in case a person is a habitual delinquent. In the case at
bar, the penalty of recidivism should also be taken into account independently from the fact that
the accused is also penalized for being a habitual delinquent.
DECISION
Judgement is modified. Guilty of Theft and sentenced to 6 months and 1 day of
prision
correcional
, and to an additional penalty of 3 years.
CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION
Abad Santos, J.
Concurs that the accused is guilty of theft. Dissents that the penalty for recidivism should be considered
independently from the penalty of habitual delinquency. The aggravating circumstance of recidivism
should not be taken into consideration in the imposition of penalty prescribed by law for the crime of
which the appellant has been found guilty.
5.
People vs. DiosdadoCamat, GR 188612, 30 July 2012 (Illegal
possession-proof)
Facts:
Between 3:00 o’clock and 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, the victims (the
hidalgos and others), were in front of the yard Anastacio Hidalgo seated and talking
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Special Penal Laws
to each other when gunfire coming from the back of and directed at the group of
Aurelio suddenly erupted. After shooting their victims, accused and their
companions left the place going westward. Aurelio recalled that prior to the
shooting incident; one of the accused hacked the house of Juanito Hidalgo, Aurelio’s
brother, with a bolo, and had the hacking incident blottered at the barangay.
The
trial court found Camat guilty of two counts of the crime of Murder with the Use of
Unlicensed Firearm and four counts of Attempted Murder.
On the other hand, the
trial court
found Dulay guilty of two counts of Murder with the Use of Unlicensed
Firearm and one count of Frustrated Murder.
Issue:
Whether
the use of unlicensed firearm was not duly proven by the
prosecution?
Ruling:
Yes. The
Court found that the use of unlicensed firearm was not duly proven
by the prosecution. The evidence indicates that none of the firearms used in the
massacre were ever recovered and presented in the trial court. Nevertheless, there
is jurisprudence which states that the existence of the
firearm can be
established by testimony, even without the presentation of the
firearm.
The testimony of the prosecution witnesses had established that appellant
Camat used a long firearm of unknown make and caliber to shoot his victims but
that would still be insufficient to attribute to his felonious act the qualifying
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm in light of jurisprudence which asserts
that in order for the same to be considered, adequate
proof, such as written or
testimonial evidence, must be presented showing that the appellant was
not a licensed firearm holder.
There was no such proof in the case at bar.
56.
Ernesto Cuenco vs. People; GR L-27586, 26 June 1970, 33 SCRA
522 (Animus Possidendi)
Facts:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that the CFI of
Manila, convicting appellant Ernesto Cuenca, who at the time of arrest of arrest on
January 3, 1963 was on duty at the Philippine Savings Bank as a special watchman
and security guard of the Bataan Veterans Security Agency to which the firearm,
and Ithaca .45 pistol, of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and seven rounds
of ammunition and sentencing him to imprisonment for one year and to pay the
costs. Appellant's main argument for defense was that in his employment with the
above-mentioned security agency made him to believe that the license to possess
the firearm in question was with the owner of the agency,
Jose Forbes.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals convicted appellant herein, despite his
protests of good faith, upon the ground that the crime of illegal possession of a
firearm and ammunition is not
malum in se
, but
malum prohibitum
and that it,
accordingly, requires neither malice nor evil purpose or intent. It should be noted,
however, that the Bataan Veterans Security Agency is duly licensed to operate as
such. Consequently, it may legally engage the service of competent persons to
discharge the duties of special watchmen and security guards, and provide them, as
such, with the corresponding firearms and ammunitions. The agency is thus
supposed to obtain the license necessary therefor. Had it done so, there would be
no question about the absence of any criminal liability on the part of appellant
herein for the possession of the firearm and ammunition in question, even though
the license were not in his name, but in that of the agency or its owner and
operator, Jose Forbes.
Issue:
Whether
appellant
is guilty of the crime charged owing to the failure of
Jose
Forbes
to comply with his duty to obtain such license, before he got said firearm
and ammunition and delivered the same to his employee.
Ruling:
NO. The reason is that
appellant was entitled to assume that his
employer had the requisite license to possess said firearm and
ammunition and to turn them over to him while he was on duty as one of
the regular security guards
of the Bataan Veterans Security Agency, the same
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being a duly licensed security agency. As such, those dealing with it, either as
clients or as employees thereof, are entitled to presume, in the absence of indicia to
the contrary — and there were none in the present case — that it has complied with
pertinent laws, rules and regulations.
What is more, Jose Forbes had told
appellant that the firearm and ammunition in question were duly licensed,
and, as an employee of the agency, appellant could not be expected to
demand from his employer proof of the veracity of the latter's assertion
before relying thereon

7
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REYNALDO BARRIGA
G.R. NO.
178545
September 29, 2008
Facts:
On March 10, 1995, appellant Reynaldo Barriga and an old man went to see Helen, the common-
law wife and fiancee of the victim Eduardo Villabrille, at her house, seemingly to inquire about a
lot for sale owned by a certain Miss Rosal. After talking with Miss Rosal, appellant asked Helen
for the location of Eduardo's house, to which she answered the first house with color yellow.
On March 20, 1995, a witness saw appellant going over the fence of her house and peeping
through the jalousie window to spy on Eduardo, who was then watching television in her house.
On March 23, 1995, Eduardo, riding on his bicycle, proceeded to his mother's house to pasture
his cows and water his newly planted mangoes. After a while, Helen heard four successive
gunshots coming from the direction of the house of Eduardo's uncle. She hurriedly went out and
saw Eduardo being chased by three persons armed with short firearms. Helen recognized one of
the pursuers as Leo Barriga (Leo), the brother of appellant, for they used to play together in his
house during their school days. She saw Eduardo jump over a fence and fall on the ground. Then
Leo approached Eduardo, poked a gun at his head, and fired. She heard Leo tell his companions
that Eduardo was already dead. Appellant picked up the three assailants in his motorcycle.
Eduardo died the next day.
The trial court found appellant guilty of the crime of murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the RTC. The appellate court, however, held that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was not clearly established. But it found that evident premeditation attended the killing
of Eduardo.
Issue:
Whether the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior
strength, and with the aid of armed men attended the commission of the crime.
Held:
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery was not clearly established since none of the witnesses
saw how the shooting was started. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present and seen by
the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars are known as to how the
killing began, its perpetration with treachery cannot merely be supposed.
Abuse of superior strength cannot likewise be appreciated for it was not alleged in the
information. Even if alleged, it cannot qualify the killing of Eduardo. This aggravating
circumstance necessitates the showing of the relative disparity in physical characteristics, usually
translating into the age, gender, the physical size and the strength of the aggressor and the victim.
There is no proof that assailants utilized any notorious inequality to their advantage. In other
words, mere superiority in number is not enough to constitute superior strength.
However, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the qualifying
circumstance of the commission of the crime with the aid of armed men. The information alleged
that the accused were armed with short firearms. There is ample evidence on record establishing
the presence of this circumstance. Under paragraph 1, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the
aid of armed men qualifies a killing to murder. Since treachery was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the qualifying circumstance of killing with the aid of armed men could not be
absorbed in treachery.
Judgment is affirmed with modifications.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGER RACAL
G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017 
PERALTA, J.:
Facts: In an Information, Racal was charged with the crime of murder when the said
accused, armed with a knife, with treachery, unexpectedly, attack and use personal
violence upon the person of one Jose Francisco by stabbing the latter, at his body,
thereby inflicting a fatal wound and as a consequence of which he died. The
prosecution established that while the “trisikad” drivers were waiting for passengers,
Racal told the group of drivers not to trust Francisco because he is a traitor. Francisco
asked Racal why the latter called him a traitor. Without warning, Racal approached
Francisco and stabbed him several times with a knife, hitting him in the chest and other
parts of his body.
Racal did not deny having stabbed Francisco but he raised the defense of insanity
contending that he has a predisposition to snap into an episode where he loses his
reason and thereby acts outside his conscious control.
Issue: Whether or not the defense of insanity may be validly invoked.
Ruling: No, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. In the eyes of the
law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act. The accused must be deprived of reason and act without the least discernment
because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of
freedom of the will.
In the present case, the separate psychiatric evaluations of appellant were taken three
and four years after the crime was committed. An inquiry into the mental state of an
accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony
is committed. On his part, Dr. Gerong testified that he found appellant to have
“diminished capacity to discern what was wrong or right at the time of the commission of
the crime.” “Diminished capacity” is not the same as “complete deprivation of
intelligence or discernment.”
The Court, however, appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness as would
diminish the exercise of willpower of appellant without, however, depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts, pursuant to Article 13, paragraphs 9 and 10 of the RPC.
Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that
every person is of sound mind and that all acts are voluntary.
Gist: Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant, Roger Racal,
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed, with modification, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City finding herein appellant guilty of
the crime of murder.
PEOPLE VS. ARPA
Mishing Alaba 2 years ago
Avg. Rating:

Summary:
Dicto Arpa and Maalum Arpa fired shots to scare the passengers of the banca, and as a result,
all the passengers jumped. The trial court said it was committed on the occasion of
conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.

Doctrine:
The aggravating circumstance of "on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake,
epidemic or other calamity or misfortune" refers to when, in the midst of a great calamity,
instead of lending aid to the afflicted adds to their suffering by taking advantage of their
misfortune to despoil them.

Facts:
Dicto Arpa and Maalum Arpa boarded a motor banca bound for Talicud Island, Davao. The
motor banca developed engine trouble in the middle of the sea. Then, Dicto fired his revolver
to scare the passengers of the banca, hitting one passenger. They took and carried away the
motor banca. As a result, all the passengers of the motor banca jumped. Alfonso, Bernardo
Villegas and Lourdes all surnamed Villegas drowned and died. The trial court convicted the
accused of Robbery with Triple Homicide. The trial court appreciated the aggravating
circumstance  of "on the occasion of conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other
calamity or misfortune."

Issues Ratio:
Whether or not the crime was committed on the occasion of conflagration, shipwreck,
earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.

No, it was not committed in the above circumstances.

The reason for the provision of this aggravating circumstance "is found in the debased form of
criminality met in one who, in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the
afflicted adds to their suffering by taking advantage of their misfortune to despoil
them." Clearly, no such condition of great calamity or misfortune existed when the motor
banca developed engine trouble.

It should be added that there is nothing in the record whatever to indicate that the engine
trouble developed was a serious one such as to create confusion and apprehension on the part
of the passenger.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is modified: the accused are imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua  and ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo Villegas and Lourdes Villegas in the amount of P12,000.00 for
each of them, and Epimaco Mola in the sum of P2,100.00, and proportionately to pay the costs.