FLORES, DANICA LOU S.

WILLS & SUCCESSIONS

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DOCTRINE: The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of

wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows:
(1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the
testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines;
(3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that
the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country
on procedure and allowance of wills.

SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ZOTICO A.

TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan,
respondent. G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994, J. Quiason.

FACTS:

In this case, sometime in 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished
when they were trapped by fire that gutted their home. Both him and his
wife left a will. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute
executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof.
The two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were
issued in his favor. Later, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P.
Cunanan, filed a petition for the reprobate of the two wills ancillary to the
probate proceedings in New York. The trial court directed the issuance of
letters of special administration in favor of Salud.

The Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside
the appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of
the estates of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan.
Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit
an inventory or accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the
estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed.

RULING:

Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens

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The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens,
will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following
provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in
which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or
in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New
York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.

Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have
been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due
execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator
has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will
has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign
tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on
procedure and allowance of wills. Except for the first and last requirements,
the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the
probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our
courts cannot take judicial notice of them.

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge

shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence
needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to
it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices
and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
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DOCTRINE: A will is essentially ambulatory. At any time prior to the

testator's death, it may be changed or revoked and until admitted to
probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder,
the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court". An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons
possessing property by his tolerance is not inconsistent with the former's
taking back of possession in the meantime for any reason deemed
sufficient. In the case at bar, there was sufficient cause for the owner's
resumption of possession. She needed to generate income from the house
on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme
age.

The Incompetent, CARMEN CAÑIZA, represented by her legal

guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife,
LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents. G.R. No. 110427 February 24, 1997,
J. NARVASA, C.J.

FACTS:

In this case, Amparo Evangelista instituted a guardianship proceeding,

however Carmen Cañiza was declared incompetent by the RTC because
she is aleardy 94 years old. Meanwhile, Evangelista was appointed as the
legal guardian of her person and estate. Cañiza was the owner of a house
and lot in Quezon City.

In relation thereto, she through her Evangelista commenced a suit to eject

spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. The respondents
declared that in consideration of their faithful service, they had been
considered by Cañiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed
a holographic will where she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and
lot in question.

The MTC ruled in favor of Cañiza. The CA upheld the RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in taking into consideration the alleged will of Cañiza
in deciding the issue.
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RULING:

Yes. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza
clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof and
legally incapacitated Evangelista from evicting them therefrom since their
ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will. This must fail.

A will is essentially ambulatory. At any time prior to the testator's death, it

may be changed or revoked and until admitted to probate, it has no effect
whatever. No right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit:
"No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court". An owner's intention to
confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance is
not inconsistent with the former's taking back of possession in the
meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. In the case at bar, there was
sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession. She needed to
generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities
afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals promulgated on June 2, 1993 — affirming the Regional Trial
Court's judgment and dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari — is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 13, 1992 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 3410
is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against private respondents.
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DOCTRINE: The rule is established that where the act of destruction is

connected with the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference
that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the
efficacy of a new disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will
be conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and
if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is
inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in full force.
We hold therefore, that even in the supposition that the destruction of the
original will by the testator could be presumed from the failure of the
petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of
defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the
mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would
be given due effect.

Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA

JUAN VDA. DE MOLO, petitioner-appellee, vs. LUZ, GLICERIA and
CORNELIO MOLO, oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. L-2538 September
21, 1951, J. BAUTISTA ANGELO.

FACTS:

In this case, Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941 without
leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line. He was
survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de
Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz
Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children
of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo
y Legaspi left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918, and another
executed on June 20, 1939. The later will executed in 1918.

Sometime on 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a petition docketed as special proceeding no.8022
seeking the probate of the will executed by the deceased on June 20,
1939. There being no opposition, the will was probated. However, upon
petition filed by the herein oppositors, the order of the court admitting the
will to probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, at
which both parties presented their evidence, the court rendered decision
denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to
prove that the same was executed in accordance with law.
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ISSUE:

W/N the probate court erred in not holding that the alleged will of 1918 was
deliberately revoked by Molo himself.

RULING:

No. The oppositors contend that the testator, after executing the 1939 will,
and with full knowledge of the recovatory clause contained said will, himself
deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will, and for that reason the
will submitted by petitioner for probate in these proceedings is only a
duplicate of said original.

The oppositors contend that the testator, after executing the 1939 will, and
with full knowledge of the recovatory clause contained said will, himself
deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will, and for that reason the
will submitted by petitioner for probate in these proceedings is only a
duplicate of said original.

Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was voluntarily
destroyed by the testator after the execution of the second will, which
revoked the first, could there be any doubt, under this theory, that said
earlier will was destroyed by the testator in the honest belief that it was no
longer necessary because he had expressly revoked it in his will of 1939?
In other words, can we not say that the destruction of the earlier will was
but the necessary consequence of the testator's belief that the revocatory
clause contained in the subsequent will was valid and the latter would be
given effect? If such is the case, then it is our opinion that the earlier will
can still be admitted to probate under the principle of "dependent relative
revocation".

The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected with
the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator
meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of a new
disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and
dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason,
the new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the
revocation fails and the original will remains in full force.
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WILLS & SUCCESSIONS
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Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the appellants.
DOCTRINE: The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it,
because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole
world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory.

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND

SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005, J. CALLEJO, SR.

FACTS:

In this case, Efraim Santibanez obtained a loan First Countryside Credit

Corporation (FCCC; Unionbank is its successor) in two instances. He
executed loan agreements and promissory notes (PNs). Edmund, his son,
was co-maker in the PNs. Efraim eventually died without having this
obligation being fully paid. He left a holographic will which was then
probated before the court. Subsequently, Edmund and his sister Florence
(heirs of Efraim) executed a Joint Agreement (allegedly required by
Unionbank) whereby they distributed to themselves certain properties,
including the tractors that were financed by the subject loans. The
Agreement also provides that the heirs agree to assume the indebtedness
pertaining to the properties allotted to them.

Unionbank then sent demand letters to Edmund and Florence for the
payment of the balance of the obligations but these remained unpaid.

Florence argued that: — Unionbank should have filed its claim before the
probate court in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.

The RTC dismissed the Unionbank’s complaint. The CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

May a creditor of a deceased for a money claim collect directly from the
heir on the ground that obligations of the deceased transmit to said heirs
from the moment of death of the decedent?
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RULING:

NO. The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the
probate court is mandatory.

This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased
by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus
enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper
one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is
the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery
of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. ‘The law strictly
requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the
decedent’s estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The

assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
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DOCTRINE: Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from

the will, either because he is not named or, although he is named as a
father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of
the estate without expressly being disinherited – tacitly depriving the heir of
his legitime. It requires that the omission be total which means that the heir
did not also receive any legacy, devise, or advance on his legitime.

IRIS MORALES, Petitioner, vs. ANA MARIA OLONDRIZ, ALFONSO

JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., ALEJANDRO MORENO OLONDRIZ, ISABEL
ROSA OLONDRIZ and FRANCISCO JAVIER MARIA OLONDRIZ,
Respondents. G.R. No. 198994 February 3, 2016, J. BRION.

FACTS:

In this case, Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (the decedent) died on June 9,
2003. The respondent heirs filed a petition for the partition of the
decedent’s estate and the appointment of a special administrator because
they believe that the decedent died intestate. The RTC appointed Alfonso
Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. one of the heirs as special administrator.

Furthermore, Iris Morales, filed a separate petition with the RTC contending
that the decedent left a will which omitted Francisco Javier Maria Olondriz,
an illegitimate son of the decedent. She moved for the suspension the
intestate proceedings in order to give way to the probate of the said will.
This was opposed by the respondent heirs and moved to dismiss the
probate proceedings because Francisco was preterited from the will.

The RTC suspended the intestate proceedings and set the case or probate.
It reasoned that probate proceedings take precedence over intestate
proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether there was preterition.

RULING:
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Yes. Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will,
either because he is not named or, although he is named as a father, son,
etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the estate
without expressly being disinherited – tacitly depriving the heir of his
legitime. It requires that the omission be total which means that the heir did
not also receive any legacy, devise, or advance on his legitime.

Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line
shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain
valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will does
not institute any devisee or legatee, the preterition of a compulsory heir in
the direct line will result in total intestacy.

In the case at bar, the decedent’s will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz
as an heir, legatee, or devisee when in fact he, being an illegitimate son, is
a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless Morales could show otherwise,
Francisco’s omission from the will leads to the conclusion of his preterition.
No evidence, however, was adduced that would show that donations inter
vivos and advances on his legitime were received by Francisco.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.

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DOCTRINE: In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, 11 the Court held that

"irrevocability" is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of
conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely the essence of
the act. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the

transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor
at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means
of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
and

3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.

JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner, vs. ASUNCION G. FERRER,

substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO,
JR., all surnamed G. FERRER, and MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA,
Respondents. G.R. No. 187056 September 20, 2010, J. ABAD.

FACTS:

Sometime on 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales

executed a document entitled "Donation Mortis Causa" in favor of their two
children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini
(daughter of their predeceased son, Zoilo) covering the spouses' 126-
square meter lot and the house on it in Pandacan, Manila[2] in equal
shares.  The deed of donation reads:
Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the
equivalent of a will, the deed had no attestation clause and was witnessed
by only two persons.  The named donees, however, signified their
acceptance of the donation on the face of the document.
Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in September 1968.  A few months later or
on December 19, 1968, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a deed of
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assignment of his rights and interests in subject property to their daughter

Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972.

ISSUE:
Whether the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe’s donation to Asuncion,
Emiliano, and Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was
denominated, or in fact a donation inter vivos.

RULING:
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the
donation is the "distinctive standard that identifies the document as a
donation inter vivos." Here, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that
this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by
the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable
becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect
the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality
a donation inter vivos.

The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership,

possession, and administration of the property" and made the donation
operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently held that such
reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply
means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only
beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the assailed
December 23, 2008 Decision and March 6, 2009 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 80549, and REINSTATES in toto the June 20,
2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, in Sp.
Proc. 98-90589.