WEEKLY EXERCISE

Exercise 1: Exercise on drafting a criminal appeal

1. Can a Revision petition be filed against the Impugned Judgement? Kindly explain briefly
the decisive factors between Appeal and Revision based on the grounds and facts applicable
in each case.

 Yes, a Revision Petition can be filed against an Impugned Judgement on the following
grounds:

The power to call for records of inferior criminal Courts is conferred on two kinds of Courts:
firstly, High Court and secondly Sessions Judge.

Further, the grounds on which the power can be exercised are two: One, where the finding,
sentence or order is illegal or improper, as observed in Nobin Kristo Mookerjee v. Russick
Lall Laha, (1884) ILR 10 Cal 268 & Maniklal Acharjee v. State of Assam, 1988 CrLJ NOC
54 (Gau) and secondly, where the proceedings are irregular. However, as per Charanjit
Singh v. G. Kaur, 1900 CrLJ 1264 (P&H), where an order is amenable to revision, the order
of the revision court should be interfered with very sparingly and that too only for the
purpose envisaged u/s 482. Further, as per Kuldeep Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1989
CrLJ NOC 153 (MP), when the F.I.R. was properly lodged, and there was medical report
regarding the head injury and evidence was given about previous ill-will and of declaration
by the by the accused to the effect that the victim to be done to death and then there was an
order framing a charge, it was held that such an order could not be lightly interfered with in
revision. Further, in Vinod Kumar v. Mohrawati, 1990 CrLJ 2068 (All), where the High
Court or Sessions Judge has called for the record, it is open to either of them to ask the Chief
Judicial Magistrate himself or by any of the Magistrate subordinate to him to make further
inquiry into the case u/s 398: power to order inquiry. A Sessions Judge also has jurisdiction
to take addition evidence in revision.

Further, where the record has been called for by the Sessions Judge, he can order the accused
to be committed for trial, where it appears that the case is exclusively triable for the Court of
Session and that the accused is improperly discharged. The High Court, in dealing with a case
which has either been called for by itself or which has otherwise come to its knowledge, may
exercise any of the powers conferred on an Appellate Court and may enhance the sentence
u/s 401: High Court’s powers of revision.

Power of revisional or Appellate Court – Section 397 to 405 of The Code of Criminal
Code, 1973, deals with what is known as revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. The
revisional jurisdiction is derived from three sources: firstly, Ss. 349 to 401 of The Criminal
Procedure Code; secondly, Article 227 of the Constitution of India and lastly, the power to
issue the writ of Certiorari as per Mrs. Annie Besant v. The Government of Madras, (1916)
ILR 39 Mad 1164. It will be noticed that the operative section is section 401: High Court’s
power of revision. Further, as per Badrilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1986 CrLJ NOC 16
(MP), the scope of the revisional jurisdiction under the Code is limited and this jurisdiction is
also discretionary.

 Decisive factors between Appeal and Revision:

In Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), the provisions relating to appeal are contained in
Sections 372 to 394, while provisions relating to revision are contained in Sections 397 to
405.
Following major differences between the legal terms “Appeal” and “Revision”:

1. Appeal is generally a legal right of a party, but revision depends on the discretion
of the Court, due to which it cannot be claimed as a matter of right. In particular,
in criminal cases, at least one appeal is a substantive right conferred on accused by
the statute (and it is also considered a part of the fundamental right guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution), while the revision power is discretionary and
is not a matter of right.

2. In case of appeal, the appellant is heard by the court. But it is not necessary in the
case of a revision and the person filing the revision may not be formally heard.

3. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, the appeal lies to a superior court (which may
be any superior court as laid down in the relevant provisions), but the revision lies
only to the High Court or the Sessions Court (Section 399 of Cr.P.C.).

4. Appeal is required to be filed by a party to the proceedings, but revision can also
be exercised suo motu by the higher court having the power of revision.

5. Generally, revision is exercised against those orders which are not appealable.

6. Generally, appeal involves rehearing on question of law as well as on facts of the

case, whereas revision generally involves hearing only the question of law and this
is not considered a rehearing.

7. An appeal is considered to be a continuation of the original proceeding whereas

revision is not the continuation of the original proceeding.

 Case law:

In Lachhman Dass v. Santokh Singh, (1995) 4 SCC 201 in para-7, it was held by the
Honourable Supreme Court thus:

“...Precisely stated, an appeal is a continuation of a suit or proceedings wherein the entire

proceedings are again left open for consideration by the appellate authorities which has the
power to review the entire evidence subject, of course, to the prescribed statutory limitations.
But in the case of revision whatever powers the revisional authority may have, it has no
power to reassess and reappreciate the evidence unless the statute expressly confers on it that
power. That limitation is implicit in the concept of revision.”
In Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand, 1997 (SLT Soft) 1010., the Supreme Court
has held as under:

“It appears that the learned Single Judge has equated appellate powers with revisional
powers, and that the core difference between an appeal and a revision has been overlooked. It
is trite legal position that appellate jurisdiction is coextensive with original court’s
jurisdiction as for appraisal and appreciation of evidence and reaching findings on facts and
appellate court is free to reach its own conclusion on evidence untrammelled by any finding
entered by the trial court. Revisional powers on the other hand belong to supervisory
jurisdiction of a superior court. While exercising revisional powers the court has to confine to
the legality and propriety of the findings and also whether the subordinate court has kept
itself within the bounds of its jurisdiction including the question whether the court has failed
to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. Though the difference between the two jurisdictions is
subtle, it is quite real and has now become well recognised in legal provinces.”

In State of Kerala v. K.M. Charia Abdullah and Co, [1965] 1 SCR 601., the Hon’ble Court
has highlighted the difference between the two jurisdictions in the following words:

“There is an essential distinction between an appeal and a revision. The distinction is based
on the differences implicit in the said two expressions. An appeal is a continuation of the
proceedings; in effect the entire proceedings are before the appellate authority and it has
power to review the evidence subject to the statutory limitations prescribed. But in the case of
a revision, whatever powers the revisional authority may or may not have, it has not the
power to review the evidence unless the statute expressly confers on it that power.”

2. Would the procedure have been different if Mr. Bansal was acquitted instead of being
convicted?

The only difference in the procedure would depend on whether the Complainant/Victim
chooses to go with Criminal Revision or Criminal Appeal. Further, in case of acquittal,
procedure u/s 378: appeal in case of acquittal, would apply. Added, as per, Bibhuti Bhusan
Bit, (1890) 17 Cal 485 & Prag Dat, (1989) 20 All 459, the State Government has the same
right of appeal against an acquittal as a person convicted has of appealing against his
conviction and sentence, and there is no distinction between the mode of procedure and the
principles upon which both classes of appeals are to be decided.

Further, the law restricting the right of appeal against a judgement of acquittal prevents
personal vindictiveness from seeking to call in question judgements of acquittal by way of
appeal. The Government will interfere only where there is a grave miscarriage of Justice
(Deputy Legal Remembrancer v. Karuna Baistobi, (1894) ILR 22 Cal 164). Further, as per
Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 2000 SC 1823., an order which is clearly
unjustifiable would merit interference. The principle to be followed is that there should be
interference only when there are compelling and substantial reasons. Where the order is
clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference.

Lastly, as per Emperor v. Sakharam Nanaji, (1919) 21 Bom LR 1054., the power of appeal
is one that should be exercised sparingly by Government, yet the High Court may, in its
discretion, refuse to grant leave.
3. Kindly explain the limitation period applicable to both Criminal Appeal and Revision
along with supporting case laws.

Period of Limitation for Revision – As per, Article 131, of The Limitation Act, 1963., a
period of 90 days has been prescribed which runs from the date of the decree or order or
sentence sought to be revised.
“Article 131 (Original Article in the Bill – 130) —This Article sought to provide a uniform
period of limitation for the exercise of revisional powers under the two procedures of
limitation act however, in the opinion of the Committee the period of 30 days was too short
and was later increased to 90 days. This Article was amended accordingly.”
Case law –
According to the judgement of Sh. Salekh Chand v. Sh. Deepak Sharma, (2015) Criminal
Revision No. 10/2014., the Sessions Court held that the period of limitation shall commence
from the date of knowledge of the impugned order by the revisionist. (In this case the
revisionist got the knowledge on receipt of summons on 08.11.2013 and filed on 23.01.2014
while the date of impugned order was 16.08.2013.)
Period of Limitation for Appeal – The limitation period for filing appeal against conviction
in a criminal case depends on various factors. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) does
not lay down any limitation period for filing appeals, though it lays down limitation period
for taking cognizance of an offence. Limitation period for filing appeal against conviction in
a criminal case is laid down in the Limitation Act, 1963. Article 115 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act lays down the following relevant provisions in this regard –
Appeal from any other sentence or order (not being order of acquittal), when such appeal is
filed in any other court (i.e., other than High Court): For an appeal to be filed against any
other sentence or order (not being an order of acquittal), when such appeal is to be filed in
any other court (i.e., other than High Court), the limitation period is 30 days.
Case law –

According to the judgment of Paye Mosing v. Naba Bora and Ors., MANU/GH/0951/2015.,
the period of limitation for appeal against the orders other than of acquittal i.e., of 'any other
sentence' or 'any order' is governed by Article 115(b) of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.
Exercise 2: Exercise on Appeal and Revision and List of Documents:

INDEX
SR NO. SUBJECT PAGE NO.
1. MEMORANDUM OF PARTIES 6
2. A bona fide copy of the Impugned Judgement dated – 08 April,
th
8
2021 as passed by the Hon’ble Trial Court annexed and marked
as “Annexure – A1.”

3. A bona fide copy of the F.I.R. bearing No. 1122/2010 dated 23rd 8
March, 2010, filed by Mrs. Priya Bansal in Koramangala Police
Station, No.8/A, 20th Main Rd, 6th Block, Koramangala,
Bengaluru, Karnataka – 560095, annexed and marked as
“Annexure – A2.”

4. The brief facts leading to the filing of this present Appeal. 8

5. Sections under which the Appellants No. 1 to 4 were booked as 8

per the F.I.R. bearing No. 1122/2010 dated – 23rd March, 2010.

6. A bona fide copy of the statement recorded before the Hon’ble 8

JMFC u/s 164 of Cr.P.C. annexed and marked as “Annexure –
A3.”

7. A bona fide copy of the statement made by the Respondent No. 2 9

u/s 145 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, on 24th April, 2010,
during the course of the cross-examination by the Defence
Counsel, annexed and marked as “Annexure – A4.”

8. A bona fide copy of the statements made by the Respondents No. 9

1 to 4 u/s 313: Power to examine the accused, of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, on 29th April. 2010, during their
examination by the prosecutor, is annexed hereto and marked as
“Annexure – A5.”

9. GROUNDS 9
10. A Bona fide copy of all the receipts available/ expenditure made 10
during the course of the marriage is annexed hereto and marked
as “Annexure – A6.”

11. LEGAL SUBMISSION 12

12. PRAYER 14
13. AFFIDAVIT 16

MEMORANDUM OF PARTIES
Mr. Ramesh Bansal S/o Rajeev Bansal, Age 38 years, R/o – Advaitha Aksha Apartments, 1st
East Main Road AKSHA Boulevard No 148, Jakkasandra Extension, Koramangala,
Bengaluru, Karnataka – 560034 – Appellant No. 1;
Mr. Rajeev Bansal S/o late Raghuram Bansal, Age 68 years, R/o – Advaitha Aksha
Apartments, 1st East Main Road AKSHA Boulevard No 148, Jakkasandra Extension,
Koramangala, Bengaluru, Karnataka – 560034 – Appellant No. 2;
Mrs. Rupa Bansal W/o Rajeev Bansal, Age 64 years, R/o – Advaitha Aksha Apartments, 1st
East Main Road AKSHA Boulevard No 148, Jakkasandra Extension, Koramangala,
Bengaluru, Karnataka – 560034 – Appellant No. 3; and
Mr. Ravi Bansal S/o Rajeev Bansal, Age 35 years, R/o – Centreo Apartments, 14/2,
Kanakapura Rd, Raghuvanahalli, Bangalore City Municipal Corporation Layout, Bengaluru,
Karnataka – 560062 – Appellant No. 4.

VERSUS

State of Bengaluru – Respondent No. 1

[Through the concerned IO/Police Station]
Mrs. Priya Bansal W/o Ramesh Bansal, Age 37 years, R/o – Phoenix Kessaku Apartments,
No.1, Dr Rajkumar Rd, opp. Sheraton Hotel, Rajajinagar, Bengaluru, Karnataka – 560010
– Respondent No. 2

IN THE HON’BLE COURT OF SESSION,

 BENGALURU, KARNATAKA
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 258 OF 2021

IN THE MATTER OF:

MR. RAMESH BANSAL & ORS

(CURRENTLY IN JUDICIAL CUSTODY) – APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF BENGALURU – RESPONDENT NO. 1

[THROUGH THE CONCERENED IO/POLICE STATION]
MRS. PRIYA BANSAL – RESPONDENT NO. 2

F.I.R No. 1122/2010

U/Ss: 345A & 34 of The Indian Penal Code, 1860

&

U/Ss 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

P.S.: Koramangala Police Station,

No.8/A, 20th Main Rd,
6th Block, Koramangala,
Bengaluru, Karnataka – 560095

DATE: 29th April, 2021

PLACE: Bengaluru, Karnataka – 560095

APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTIONS

APPEAL UNDER SECTION 374(3)(A) OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE,
1973 AGAINST THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT DATED 08TH APRIL, 2021
RESPECTIVELY PASSED BY THE COURT OF HON’BLE JUDICIAL
MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS, DISTRICT & SESSIONS COURT, BENGALURU,
KARNATAKA – 560009.
IT IS HUMBLY SUBMITTED BEFORE THIS HON’BLE COURT –
 1. That, the Appellant prefers this present Appeal u/s 374(3)(a) of The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, against the judgement of the Trial Court, dated – 08th April, 2021
[hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Judgement”] Criminal Complaint No.
1323/2010 arising out of F.I.R. bearing No. 1122/2010, entitled “The State of
Karnataka v. Ramesh Bansal & Ors” passed by the Hon’ble Judicial Magistrate of
First Class, District & Sessions Court, Bengaluru, Karnataka – 560009 [hereinafter
referred to as the “JMFC”].
A bona fide copy of the Impugned Judgement dated – 08th April, 2021 as passed by the
Hon’ble Trial Court, is annexed hereto and marked as “Annexure – A1.”
A bona fide copy of the F.I.R. bearing No. 1122/2010 dated – 23 rd March 2010, filed by Mrs.
Priya Bansal in Koramangala Police Station, No.8/A, 20th Main Rd, 6th Block,
Koramangala, Bengaluru, Karnataka – 560095, is annexed hereto and marked as “Annexure
– A2.”

2. That, by means of the Impugned Judgement, the Appellants No. 1 to 4 have been
convicted by the Hon’ble Trial Court.

3. That, the brief facts leading to the filing of this present Appeal are as follows:

i) “My husband’s family has been harassing me for dowry since our marriage back
in 2008. Under their pressure, my father had spent Rs. 50 lakhs on our wedding
and further gave a car worth of Rs. 15 lakhs after two years. Even after all this,
their demands have not stopped and Ramesh has been harassing me to transfer
all the properties on my name to his ownership. Upon my refusal to do so, his
mother, father and brother have been continuously harassing me and verbally
abusing me. This reached a pinnacle when last week, Ramesh physically
assaulted me over these demands. Thus, I have been tortured mentally and
physically by Ramesh and his family for dowry.”

4. That, owing to the above-mentioned information given by Mrs. Priya Bansal, the
police registered the F.I.R. bearing No. 1122/2010, u/Ss. 498A &34 of The Indian
Penal Code, 1860, and Ss. 3 & 4 of The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

5. That, the Appellants No. 1 to 4 were arrested on the same day of the filing of the
F.I.R. dated – 23rd March, 2010, from the common residence of the Appellant No. 1
and Respondent No. 2.

6. That, on 26th March, 2010, the statement of the Respondent No. 2 was recorded before
the Hon’ble JMFC u/s 164 of The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
A bona fide copy of the statement recorded before the Hon’ble JMFC u/s 164 of Cr.P.C.,
dated – 26th March, 2010, is annexed hereto and marked as “Annexure – A3.”
7. That, on 24th April, 2010, the Respondent No. 2 when cross-examined u/s 145: Cross-
examination as to previous statements in writing., of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
by the Defence Counsel, made incoherent statements as provide earlier in her
statement made to the Hon’ble JMFC.
A bona fide copy of the statement made by the Respondent No. 2 u/s 145 of The Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, on 24th April, 2010, during the course of the cross-examination by the
Defence Counsel, is annexed hereto and marked as “Annexure – A4.”
8. That, on 29th April, 2010, the Appellants No. 1 to 4 were examined by the prosecuting
counsel, where all the Appellants provided consistent testimony to the question raised.
A bona fide copy of the statements made by the Respondents No. 1 to 4 u/s 313: Power to
examine the accused, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on 29 th April. 2010, during
their examination by the prosecutor, is annexed hereto and marked as “Annexure – A5.”

9. That, on 08th April, 2021, the Hon’ble Trial Court of the JMFC, wrongly convicted
the Appellants No. 1 to 4 on a misappreciation of evidence and incorrect applications
of principles of criminal jurisprudence.

10. That, aggrieved by Impugned Judgment dated 08th April, 2021 passed by the Hon’ble
Trial Court in 1323/2010, the Appellants No. 1 to 4 has preferred this present Appeal
before this Hon’ble Court u/s 374(3)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on
inter alia, the following grounds:
GROUNDS
1. That, the Hon’ble Trial Court has convicted the Appellants No. 1 to 4 only on the
basis of surmises, conjecture and misappreciation of evidence.

2. That, firstly, on 23rd March, 2010 the same day as the filing of the F.I.R. by the
Respondent No. 2, the Investigating Officer [hereinafter referred to as the “IO”]
wilfully failed to comply with the mandate of the Supreme Court as laid down in
Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2014 (3) ACR 2670 (SC) and several other direction
of law., for the reason that, when the IO arrested the Appellants No. 1 to 4, the IO and
his Subordinated officers making the arrests failed to provide the reasons for their
arrest and when the Appellants were taken to the concerned police station they were
straight away put into lockups and weren’t even allowed to make any phone calls,
which is a clear violation of the direction of law given under Ss. 50: Person arrested to
be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail & 50A: Obligation of person
making arrest to inform about the arrest., to a nominated person., of The Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, as well.

3. That, secondly, on 24th April, 2010, when the defence counsel was cross examining
the Respondent No. 2 on the statement made by her in the F.I.R., dated – 23 rd March,
2010, and the statement recorded in presence of the JMFC, dated – 26 th March, 2010,
the Respondent No. 2 provided incoherent statement to the questions raised by the
defence counsel which was nowhere consistent with the statements made in the
above-mentioned dates. Further, the JMFC failed to pronounce the Respondent No. 2
as a hostile witness and continued to rely on her testimony even she had lost her
credibility as a witness and lastly, was excused for the reason that, the Appellants
were intimidating her during her cross-examination.
 4. That, thirdly, in the F.I.R. dated – 23rd March, 2010, the information provided by the
Respondent No. 2 that, “My husband’s family has been harassing me for dowry
since our marriage back in 2008. Under their pressure, my father had spent Rs. 50
lakhs on our wedding and further gave a car worth of Rs. 15 lakhs after two years.
Even after all this, their demands have not stopped and Ramesh has been harassing
me to transfer all the properties on my name to his ownership.”, is completely
fictitious and provides half-truth, for the reason that:

a. one, the Appellant No. 1 being a reasonably successful entrepreneur made an

agreement with Respondent No. 2 and her family, that, both the families
would share the cost of the marriage because they didn’t want the burden to
fall in any one of the family.
A Bona fide copy of all the receipts available/ expenditure made during the course of the
marriage is annexed hereto and marked as “Annexure – A6.”
b. And two, the fifteen Lakh Rupees car which was given after two years of the
marriage of the Appellant No. 1 and Respondent No.2, was given to them as a
gift by the Respondent No. 2’s father out of sheer love. Further, the Appellant
No. 1 being a reasonably successful entrepreneur and having a few dozen
properties in his family provides for no reason for him to harass the
Respondent No. 2 for the above-mentioned reason.

c. And thirdly, that, “Upon my refusal to do so, his mother, father and brother
have been continuously harassing me and verbally abusing me.” is
completely fabricated for the reasons that, one, the mention of the brother-in-
law in the above-mentioned extract of the F.I.R. is false for the reason that, the
brother-in-law (Appellant No. 4) lives in a separate house in a separate
apartment society and works in an IT firm, which makes it highly improbable
for him to visit the Respondent No. 2’s just to mentally and verbally abuse her.

d. And two, the Appellants No. 2 and 3 (father-in-law and mother-in-law to the
Respondent No. 2 respectively) are a well-respected and law-abiding member
of the society and they have no history of any wrongful conduct filed against
them in anywhere in India or abroad and further they have shown nothing but
love to the Respondent No. 2. Further, it is to be noted, as per Kans Raj v.
State of Punjab, AIR 2000 SC 2324., the Appellants No. 2 to 4 were made
scapegoats in the F.I.R.

5. That, lastly, “This reached a pinnacle when last week, Ramesh physically assaulted
me over these demands. Thus, I have been tortured mentally and physically by
Ramesh and his family for dowry”, this last piece of information as provided by the
Respondent No. 2 is also fabricated because of the reason that, the nature of the work
that the Appellant No. 1 is involved in does not give him reasonable amount of time
to spend with the Respondent No. 2. Earlier in the marriage, the Appellant No. 1 and
the Respondent No. 2 spent a considerable amount of time together and with their
respective families. However, as time progressed the Appellant No. 1 started to shift
 his focus from the Respondent No. 2 to his work and because of this reason, the
Respondent No. 2 started to get annoyed with the Appellant No. 1, which as time
progressed gradually increased to bitter fights, which eventually led to the Respondent
No. 2 to filed the F.I.R. against the entire family as she thought that everyone was at
fault for the cause of her misery.

6. That, it is also to be noted that, the Respondent No. 2 has failed to corroborate the
statement and evidence provided by her during the course of the trial and most
importantly the Respondent No. 2 had also failed to bring forward any other
independent witnesses to support her cause. And finally, as per Puttalakshmi v. State
of Karnataka, 2018 SCC OnLine Kar 1820 & Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand,
(2010) 7 SCC 667 this vexatious case filed by the Respondent No. 2 led to the abuse
of the process of the Court.

7. That, it is also important to note that, as held in Sarwan Kumar v. State of H.P, 2000
CrLJ 4002 (SP), due to lack of evidence and witnesses, the prosecuting counsel also
failed to prove the ingredients of the alleged offence beyond reasonable doubt to form
the offence, as levelled against the Appellants No. 1 to 4.

8. That, finally the Hon’ble Trial Court of the JMFC in its Impugned Judgement, grossly
erred in passing the guilty verdict without assigning any reasonable cause as it shows
a clear case of non-application of mind. The Impugned Judgment neither sets out the
facts nor the submissions of the parties nor the findings nor the reasons as to why the
Appellants No. 1 to 4 were founds guilty and convicted of the alleged offences. The
casual approach of the Hon’ble Trial Court in deciding the case was unreasoned and
further shows influenced observations made in the said Impugned Judgement dated –
08th April, 2021.

9. That, the Appellants No. 1 to 4 crave leave to add, alter or modify any ground at a
later stage with the permission of this Hon'ble Court.

10. That, the Appellants No. 1 to 4 has no other efficacious remedy available except to
approach this Hon’ble Court for the interest of justice.

11. That, the Appellants No. 1 to 4 has not filed any similar Appeal before this Hon’ble
Court or any other Court seeking similar relief(s).

12. That, this present Appeal is well within limitation period, as the Impugned Judgement
passed by the passed by the Hon’ble Trial Court was received by the Appellants on,
26th April, 2021.

LEGAL SUBMISSION
1. As per Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2014 (3) ACR 2670 (SC)., it was held that,
under The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 41 – Power of police to arrest
without warrant – Police Officer has to record reasons in writing which led him to
conclude that the accused is liable to be arrested without warrant – Directions issued
to ensure that Police Officer do not arrest the accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do
not authorize detention of citizen, casually and mechanically.

2. The Supreme Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, AIR 2000 SC 2324., has
observed that, the in-laws of a deceased cannot be roped in only on the ground of
being the close relatives of the husband of the deceased. Some over act must be
attributed to them in the incident and the same should also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

3. As per Ram Saran Varshney v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2016 CrLJ 1251., it was held
that, the allegation was that the husband, parents-in-laws and sisters-in-laws were
involved in committing the offence. It was informed to the Court that the sisters are
married, and living independently in different places and they had no concern with the
relationship of the complainant and the other accused. In view of this and the fact that
they had visited the matrimonial house only on some occasions, the case against them
was quashed.

4. In Puttalakshmi v. State of Karnataka, 2018 SCC OnLine Kar 1820., the instant
criminal writ petition was filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
praying for quashing of FIR and charge-sheet filed against the petitioner and her son
by her daughter-in-law (complainant) for offences allegedly committed by them under
Sections 498 A and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3 and 4 of
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

a. The petitioner was not even residing with her son and complainant daughter-
in-law and so she could not have harassed the complainant. Complainant had
merely stated that cash and gold was given at the time of her marriage – the
same did not mean that it was given at petitioner’s behest. The Court also took
note of the forum chosen by the complainant remarking that while the
petitioner resided in a remote area of Andhra Pradesh, the case was filed
against her in Davanagere Women Police Station.

b. In view of the above and placing reliance on the dictum of Apex Court
in Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 667, the Court observed
that proceedings against the petitioner was nothing but abuse of process of the
court and continuance of the same would amount to failure of ends of justice.
Therefore, the petition was allowed and proceedings against the petitioner
were quashed.

5. As per Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT) of Delhi, (2008) 2 SCC 561., the Supreme
Court has observed that the section was introduce with the avowed object of
combating the menace of dowry deaths and harassment of a woman at the hands of
her in-laws. But the provision should not be allowed to be used as a device for
achieving oblique motives.
6. As per Suvetha v. State, (2009) 6 SCC 757., ingredients of section 498A of The
Indian Penal Code, 1860:
 a. The woman must be married;

b. She must be subjected to cruelty or harassment; and

c. Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by husband of the
woman or by the relative of her husband.

7. As per Sarwan Kumar v. State of H.P, 2000 CrLJ 4002 (SP)., it was held that, the
onus is on the prosecution to show the ingredients of the offence. In this case, while
ingredients were not proved, the explanation offered by the accused that his wife was
short tempered and was not happy due to poor financial conditions. Conviction was
set aside.

8. As per Rosamma Kurian v. State of Kerala, 2014 CrLJ 2666 (Ker)., The usual and
common domestic discord in any matrimonial home cannot amount to “cruelty”
within the meaning section 498A of The Indian Penal Code, 1860.

9. As per Jalam, Smt. Gouri Bai and Smt. Lalti Bai v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
through District Magistrate, 2014 CrLJ 360 (MP)., There are no specific particulars
regarding the time, place and manner of any beating, cruelty or harassment of the
deceased for demand of dowry and in these circumstances, it cannot be said that the
ingredients of an offence u/s 498A of The Indian Penal Code, 1860, were spelled out.

10. As per State of Karnataka v. H.S. Srinivasa, 1996 CrLJ 3103 (Kant)., the Court has
observed that, the expression cruelty postulates such a treatment as to cause
reasonable apprehension in the mind of the wife that her living with the husband will
be harmful and injurious to her life. To decide the question of cruelty the relevant
factor is the matrimonial relationship between husband and wife, their cultural and
temperamental state of life, state of health and their inter-action in daily life.

11. As per Shivanand Mallappa Koti v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2007 SC 2314., it was
held that, where a married woman was alleged to have been killed by burning, by her
husband and his brother because of non-fulfilment of dowry demand. Three letters
were produced to prove dowry demand. The High Court acquitted them from charges
under the Dowry Prohibition Act. The letters did not show any demand for dowry. It
was held that on the self-same evidence, the accused could not have been convicted
u/s 498A. this section does not specifically speak of a dowry demand. It speaks only
of unlawful demand for property and valuable article. There was no evidence for any
such demand also. The letters were also of a date three years prior to the occurrence.
Further, in M. Sirivaslu v. State of A.P, AIR 2007 SC 3146., it was observed that, no
evidence of any demand, in her letters indicate of any demand made. The victim could
have committed suicide by herself or for other reasons. No conviction of husband and
his mother.

12. As per Sanjay Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2013 CrLJ 668 (Chh)., it was held
that, though evidence reflects that there used to be some quarrel between the deceased
and the accused, yet there is no evidence on record that the accused used to subject
her to harassment or cruelty such as causing grace injury or danger to her life or limb.
Accused is entitled to be acquitted.
 13. As per Annupurnabal v. State of M.P, 1999 CrLj 2696 (MP)., it was held that, the
remarks passed by the mother-in-law that the daughter-in-law was not beautiful were
held to be not sufficient to drive anybody to suicide. There was no evidence of curtly
or deprivation.

14. As per Killer Thiayagu v. State, AIR 2017 SC 612., section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 recognizes the principle of vicarious liability in criminal jurisprudence. A
bare reading of this section shows that the section could be dissected as follows:

a. Criminal act is done by several persons;

b. Such act is done in furtherance of the common intention of all;

c. Each of such person is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done
by him alone; and

d. But it is not necessary that all such person should be named and identified
before the liability u/s 34 of Penal Code can be invoked.

15. As per Nagesar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2014 CrLJ 2948., it was held that, it is a
well settled law that mere presence or association with other members is not per se
sufficient to hold each of them criminally liable for the offences committed by the
members, unless there is sufficient evidence on record to show that one such member
also intends to or knows the likelihood of commission of such offending act.

16. As per Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216., it was held by a three-
Judge bench of the Supreme Court that, to attract the applicability of s 34 of the Penal
Code the prosecution is under an obligation to establish that there existed a common
intention which requires a pre-arranged plan because before a man can be vicariously
convicted for the criminal act of another, the act must have been done in furtherance if
the common intention of all. The Court had in mind the ultimate act done in
furtherance of the common intention.

PRAYER
In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court
may be pleased –
1. To set aside the impugned Judgement dated 08th April, 2021, entitled “The State of
Karnataka v. Ramesh Bansal & Ors”, passed by the Hon’ble Trial Court of JMFC,
Bengaluru, Karnataka, and acquit the Appellants No. 1 to 4, who are currently serving
rigorous imprisonment of two years in “Bangalore Central Jail, Parappana Agrahara,
Bangalore, Karnataka, India.”

2. To grant the Appellants No. 1 to 4, immediate bail on personal bail bonds.

3. To direct the Respondents No. 1 and 2 to provide the Appellants No. 1 to 4 pecuniary
damages, in the amount of 10,000,00 Rupees (Ten Lakh Rupees only) each and to
write and deliver individual written letters of apology for the mental and physical
 humiliation and trauma suffered during the course of the trial and time spent in
judicial custody.

4. To take disciplinary action against the Respondent No. 1 for their wilful failure to
comply with the mandatory direction of the law and to take stern action against the
Respondent No. 2 for initiating a vexatious proceeding against the Appellants No. 1 to
4.

5. To pass any/ necessary interim relief before the principal order takes its effect.

6. To pass such other order/ orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper as per
the circumstances of this present Appeal.
7. Pass any other order in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.

For this act of kindness, the applicant as in duty bound shall forever humbly pray.

PLACE: Bengaluru – Karnataka Akash Deep

Bandhe
Sr. Advocate

DATED: 29th April, 2021 COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT

 IN THE HON’BLE COURT OF SESSION,
BENGALURU, KARNATAKA
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 258 OF 2021

IN THE MATTER OF:

MR. RAMESH BANSAL & ORS
(CURRENTLY IN JUDICIAL CUSTODY) – APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF BENGALURU – RESPONDENT NO. 1

[THROUGH THE CONCERENED IO/POLICE STATION]
MRS. PRIYA BANSAL – RESPONDENT NO. 2
AFFIDAVIT

I, Ramesh Bansal, S/o Rajeev Bansal, aged 38 years, R/o – Advaitha Aksha Apartments, 1 st
East main Road AKSHA Boulevard No 148, Jakkasandra Extension, Koramangala,
Bengaluru, Karnataka – 560034, do hereby state on oath as under:

1. That, this is the first Criminal Appeal of the Appellant before this Hon’ble Court. No
other application of the nature is pending either before this Hon’ble Court or any other
Court.

2. That, I am the Appellant No. 1 in the Criminal Appeal and as such I am fully
conversant with the facts of the case.

3. That, the statement of facts in the above-mentioned application are true to my

personal knowledge.

4. That, I have retained Mr. Akash Deep Bandhe, Advocate as my counsel to move and
argue the Criminal Appeal before this Hon’ble Court on my behalf.
DEPONENT

VERIFICATION

I, Ramesh Bansal, the deponent, do hereby verify that the contents of the affidavit from paras
1 to 4 are true to my personal knowledge.

Verified and signed on this 29th day of April, 2021 at Bengaluru, Karnataka.
DEPONENT
 AFFIDAVIT

I, Rajeev Bansal, S/o late Raghuram Bansal, aged 68 years, R/o – Advaitha Aksha
Apartments, 1st East main Road AKSHA Boulevard No 148, Jakkasandra Extension,
Koramangala, Bengaluru, Karnataka – 560034, do hereby state on oath as under:

1. That, this is the first Criminal Appeal of the Appellant before this Hon’ble Court. No
other application of the nature is pending either before this Hon’ble Court or any other
Court.

2. That, I am the Appellant No. 2 in the Criminal Appeal and as such I am fully
conversant with the facts of the case.

3. That, the statement of facts in the above-mentioned application are true to my

personal knowledge.

4. That, I have retained Mr. Akash Deep Bandhe, Advocate as my counsel to move and
argue the Criminal Appeal before this Hon’ble Court on my behalf.
DEPONENT

VERIFICATION

I, Rajeev Bansal, the deponent, do hereby verify that the contents of the affidavit from paras
1 to 4 are true to my personal knowledge.

Verified and signed on this 29th day of April, 2021 at Bengaluru, Karnataka.
DEPONENT
AFFIDAVIT

I, Rupa Bansal, W/o Rajeev Bansal, aged 64 years, R/o – Advaitha Aksha Apartments, 1 st
East main Road AKSHA Boulevard No 148, Jakkasandra Extension, Koramangala,
Bengaluru, Karnataka – 560034, do hereby state on oath as under:

1. That, this is the first Criminal Appeal of the Appellant before this Hon’ble Court. No
other application of the nature is pending either before this Hon’ble Court or any other
Court.

2. That, I am the Appellant No. 3 in the Criminal Appeal and as such I am fully
conversant with the facts of the case.

3. That, the statement of facts in the above-mentioned application are true to my

personal knowledge.

4. That, I have retained Mr. Akash Deep Bandhe, Advocate as my counsel to move and
argue the Criminal Appeal before this Hon’ble Court on my behalf.
DEPONENT

VERIFICATION
I, Rupa Bansal, the deponent, do hereby verify that the contents of the affidavit from paras 1
to 4 are true to my personal knowledge.

Verified and signed on this 29th day of April, 2021 at Bengaluru, Karnataka.
DEPONENT
AFFIDAVIT

I, Ravi Bansal, S/o Rajeev Bansal, aged 35 years, R/o – Centreo Apartments, 14/2,
Kanakapura Rd, Raghuvanahalli, Bangalore City, Municipal Corporation Layout
Koramangala, Bengaluru, Karnataka – 560062, do hereby state on oath as under:

1. That, this is the first Criminal Appeal of the Appellant before this Hon’ble Court. No
other application of the nature is pending either before this Hon’ble Court or any other
Court.

2. That, I am the Appellant No. 4 in the Criminal Appeal and as such I am fully
conversant with the facts of the case.

3. That, the statement of facts in the above-mentioned application are true to my

personal knowledge.

4. That, I have retained Mr. Akash Deep Bandhe, Advocate as my counsel to move and
argue the Criminal Appeal before this Hon’ble Court on my behalf.
DEPONENT

VERIFICATION

I, Ravi Bansal, the deponent, do hereby verify that the contents of the affidavit from paras 1
to 4 are true to my personal knowledge.

Verified and signed on this 29th day of April, 2021 at Bengaluru, Karnataka.
DEPONENT