SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS, NAMELY, SAMSON S.

ALCANTARA,
AND VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, PETITIONERS, VS. ALFREDO S. LIM, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, RESPONDENT. [G.R. No.
187916] JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, MA. LOURDES M.
ISIP-GARCIA, RAFAEL P. BORROMEO JOCELYN DAWIS-ASUNCION, MINORS
MARIAN REGINA B. TARAN, MACAILA RICCI B. TARAN, RICHARD KENNETH B.
TARAN, REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY THEIR PARENTS RICHARD AND
MARITES TARAN, MINORS CZARINA ALYSANDRA C. RAMOS, CEZARAH
ADRIANNA C. RAMOS, AND CRISTEN AIDAN C. RAMOS REPRESENTED AND
JOINED BY THEIR MOTHER DONNA C. RAMOS, MINORS JAZMIN SYLLITA T. VILA
AND ANTONIO T. CRUZ IV, REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY THEIR MOTHER
MAUREEN C. TOLENTINO, PETITIONERS, VS. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE
MAYOR FRANCISCO DOMAGOSO, COUNCILORS ARLENE W. KOA, MOISES T. LIM,
JESUS FAJARDO LOUISITO N. CHUA, VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, JOHN MARVIN
C. NIETO, ROLANDO M. VALERIANO, RAYMUNDO R. YUPANGCO, EDWARD VP
MACEDA, RODERICK D. VALBUENA, JOSEFINA M. SISCAR, SALVADOR PHILLIP
H. LACUNA, LUCIANO M. VELOSO, CARLO V. LOPEZ, ERNESTO F. RIVERA,[1]
DANILO VICTOR H. LACUNA, JR., ERNESTO G. ISIP, HONEY H. LACUNA-PANGAN,
ERNESTO M. DIONISO, JR. AND ERICK IAN O. NIEVA, RESPONDENTS. CHEVRON
PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION AND PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, INTERVENORS.

2015-03-10 | G.R. No. 187836

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

In the Decision [ 2 ] promulgated on 25 November 2014, this Court declared Ordinance No. 8187

UNCONSTITUTIONAL and INVALID with respect to the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals. The

following timelines were set for the relocation and transfer of the terminals:

[T]he intervenors Chevron Philippines, Inc., Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, and Petron

Corporation shall, within a non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days, submit to the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 39, Manila an updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule, which relocation

shall be completed not later than six (6) months from the date the required documents are submitted.

The presiding judge of Branch 39 shall monitor the strict enforcement of this Decision.[3]

Now before us are the following submissions of the intervenor oil companies, to wit:

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 (1) Motion for Reconsideration[4] of the Decision dated 25 November 2014 filed by intervenor Pilipinas

Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell);

(2) Motion for Clarification[5] filed by intervenor Chevron Philippines, Inc. (Chevron); and

(3) Manifestation of Understanding of the Dispositive Portion of the Decision of 15 December 2014[6]

(the correct date of promulgation is 25 November 2014) filed by intervenor Petron Corporation (Petron).

Shell seeks reconsideration of the Decision based on the following grounds:

1.Erroneous reliance on the factual pronouncements in G.R. No. 156052 entitled “Social Justice

Society v. Atienza,” which, it argues, were completely unsupported by competent evidence;

2.Adoption of “imagined fears, causes, surmises and conjectures interposed by the petitioners,” which

it also raises as totally unsupported by evidence because the petitions, which involve factual issues,

were wrongfully filed with this Court;

3.Conclusion that there is no substantial difference between the conditions in 2001 and the present

setup with respect to the oil depots operations; and

4.Failure to dismiss the petitions despite the enactment of Ordinance No. 8187, which, it maintains, has

rendered the cases moot and academic.[7]

The Motion for Reconsideration must be denied.

It bears stressing that these cases were called in session several times to give the members of the Court time

to study and present their respective positions. Before the Decision was finally promulgated, the Court had

thoroughly deliberated on the arguments of the parties, including the basic issues herein raised – the rationale

for upholding the position of the Court in G.R. No. 156052, on one hand, and the safety measures adopted by

the intervenors, including the alleged “imagined fears, causes, surmises and conjectures interposed by the

petitioners,” on the other; the argument of whether or not the petition should have been filed with the trial

court or at least referred to the Court of Appeals to receive evidence; and the issue on whether or not the

enactment of Ordinance No. 8283 has rendered the instant petitions moot and academic. And for failure to

reconcile diverse views on several issues, a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion was written.

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The grounds relied on being mere reiterations of the issues already passed upon by the Court, there is no

need to “cut and paste” pertinent portions of the Decision or re-write the ponencia in accordance with the

outline of the instant motion.

As succinctly put by then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge

Velasco[8] on the effect and disposition of a motion for reconsideration:

The filing of a motion for reconsideration, authorized by Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, does not impose on the

Court the obligation to deal individually and specifically with the grounds relied upon therefor, in much the

same way that the Court does in its judgment or final order as regards the issues raised and submitted for

decision. This would be a useless formality or ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons

already set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the movant; and it

would be a needless act, too, with respect to issues raised for the first time, these being, as above stated,

deemed waived because not asserted at the first opportunity. It suffices for the Court to deal generally and

summarily with the motion for reconsideration, and merely state a legal ground for its denial (Sec. 14, Art. VIII,

Constitution); i.e., the motion contains merely a reiteration or rehash of arguments already submitted to and

pronounced without merit by the Court in its judgment, or the basic issues have already been passed upon, or

the motion discloses no substantial argument or cogent reason to warrant reconsideration or modification of

the judgment or final order; or the arguments in the motion are too unsubstantial to require consideration, etc.[9]

II

Chevron, in its Motion for Clarification,[10] manifests that it has already ceased using the Pandacan terminals

since June 2014. However, the Pandacan Depot Services, Inc. (PDSI), an incorporated joint venture of

Chevron, Petron and Shell, and of which Chevron continues to be a shareholder, still maintains the operations

through Petron and Shell. Thus:

2. At the outset, CHEVRON respectfully manifests that it has already completed the relocation of its depot

and terminal operations from the Pandacan area, as it ceased using the Pandacan terminals for its fuel and

lubricants operations last June 2014. CHEVRON currently has zero volume of lubricants and fuel products for

commercial use stored at the Pandacan terminals and the supply requirements of its customers are being

withdrawn from the other supply facilities available to CHEVRON.

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3. While CHEVRON has ceased using the Pandacan terminals, it continues to be a shareholder as well as

hold a governance role in Pandacan Depot Services Inc. (“PDSI”), the operator of the Pandacan terminals for

fuels products operations. PDSI is an incorporated joint venture established pursuant to the joint venture

agreements between CHEVRON, Petron and PSPC. Notwithstanding CHEVRON’s ceasing to use the facility,

Petron and PSPC continue to use the Pandacan terminals for their own commercial fuel and lubricant

operation. This joint venture continues to exist until terminated and dissolved by the mutual agreement of

CHEVRON, Petron, and PSP or as provided for in the agreements of the parties.[11]

With the withdrawal of its products from the Pandacan terminals yet with the continued operation of the PDSI,

Chevron now pleads that this Court review and clarify a portion of the Decision concerning what it

understands as an unqualified statement that “all oil depots, in general, even those outside of Pandacan,

have no place in any densely populated area.”[12] The exact wordings in the Decision sought to be clarified

read:

Even assuming that the respondents and intervenors were correct, the very nature of the depots where

millions of liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products [are stored], regardless of whether or not the

composition may cause explosions, has no place in a densely populated area. Surely, any untoward incident

in the oil depots, be it related to terrorism of whatever origin or otherwise, would definitely cause not only

destruction to properties within and among the neighboring communities but certainly mass deaths and

injuries.[13]

Stressing that a judgment should be confined to the lis mota of the case, Chevron posits that the paragraph

sought to be clarified was a sweeping and categorical pronouncement sans factual basis or evidence against

all oil depots inasmuch as the prevailing circumstances, types of products stored or the safety measures in

place vary from one depot to another. If such is left as is, it claims that it would be tantamount to interference

with the policy making of the political departments of the government.

We differ.

There are overwhelming reasons stated in the Decision to support the Court’s pronouncement that the very

nature of depots has no place in a densely populated area, among others, the very history of the Pandacan

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terminals where flames spread over the entire City of Manila when fuel storage dumps were set on fire in

December 1941[14] and the other incident of explosion,[15] which were both considered in G.R. No. 156052.

Indeed, the bases of the assailed paragraph were confined to the lis mota of these cases, and no other

depots were considered. But would the situation be different if, given the same composition of flammable and

volatile products, the depots are placed in another densely populated area?

The answer was well explained in the Decision. Thus:

For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one point or another, no matter how remote it

is as perceived by one or some, we cannot allow the right to life to be dependent on the unlikelihood of an

event. Statistics and theories of probability have no place in situations where the very life of not just an

individual but of residents of big neighborhoods is at stake.[16]

Moreover, the Decision should be taken as a whole and considered in its entirety. The Decision is clear – it is

the City’s Ordinance No. 8187 that has been declared unconstitutional and invalid insofar as the continued

stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals is concerned.

For the same reasons, the allegation of encroachment on the policy making power of the political departments

of the government is bereft of merit.

The prayer that the submission of an updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule, including the

period for relocation, be deferred until after the Motion is resolved with finality is denied. The compliance

period prescribed in the Decision shall remain.

III

In its Manifestation of Understanding of the Dispositive Portion of the Decision of 15 December 2014,[17] (the

correct date of promulgation is 25 November 2014) Petron seeks to clarify whether the dispositive portion

thereof on the submission of “updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule” within forty-five (45) days

is limited to the operation itself and does not include the removal of the facilities. It ratiocinates that it is the

operation, and not the presence of the facilities, that runs contrary to Ordinance No. 8119 (Manila

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Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006).[18]

Petron should have cited Ordinance No. 8027, the ordinance ordered to be enforced in G.R. No. 156052,

instead of Ordinance No. 8119.

To recall, the Court, in G.R. No. 156052, ruled that Ordinance No. 8027 was not impliedly repealed by

Ordinance No. 8119. It explained:

x x x The repealing clause of Ordinance No. 8119 cannot be taken to indicate the legislative intent to repeal

all prior inconsistent laws on the subject matter, including Ordinance No. 8027, a special enactment, since the

aforequoted minutes (an official record of the discussions in the Sanggunian) actually indicated the clear

intent to preserve the provisions of Ordinance No. 8027.

To summarize, the conflict between the two ordinances is more apparent than real. The two ordinances can

be reconciled. Ordinance No. 8027 is applicable to the area particularly described therein whereas Ordinance

No. 8119 is applicable to the entire City of Manila.[19]

At first blush, the clause “cease and desist” appears to specifically refer only to the operations, considering

that Sec. 3 of Ordinance No. 8027 provides for a period of six (6) months from the date of its effectivity “within

which to cease and desist from the operations of businesses.”[20]

However, in the Decision dated 7 March 2007 in G.R. No. 156052, the Court granted the petition[21] which

sought the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 and the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil

companies. By so granting the petition, it necessarily follows that the relocation and transfer it ordered

contemplates the complete removal of the facilities.

These cases being a mere sequel to the earlier petition, we so hold that the relocation and transfer

contemplated therein include the removal of the facilities, especially so when the city plans on building

commercial establishments to replace the Pandacan terminals and provide a source of employment for

displaced employees. Accordingly, the comprehensive plan to be submitted within forty-five (45) days from

receipt of the Decision shall also include the removal of the facilities.

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On the matter of the enforcement of the assailed Decision in these cases, Petron further posits that its first

theory, that is, that the removal of the facilities is excluded from the comprehensive plan to be submitted to

the Regional Trial Court, would be in accord with its “Manifestation” dated 30 November 2010, which it

emphasized, the Court noted in the Decision and quoted as follows:

2. Without prejudice to its position in the instant case as elucidated in its Memorandum, Petron files this

Manifestation to inform this Honorable Court that in accordance with its agreement with and to honor its

commitment to the City of Manila, Petron has decided to cease operation of its petroleum product

storage facilities in Pandacan, Manila within five (5) years or not later than January 2016 for the

following reasons, x x x.[22] (Emphasis in the Manifestation of Understanding x x x)

Let Petron be reminded that the Court did not, by noting its “Manifestation” dated 30 November 2010, consent

to consider January 2016 as a separate deadline for compliance with our Decision, which, to repeat, includes

the removal of facilities after cessation of operations. The timelines prescribed in the assailed Decision shall

be observed to the letter.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to:

1. DENY Shell’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 November 2014;

2. DENY the prayers in the Motion for Clarification of Chevron that: a) the wordings “the very nature of

the depots where millions of liter[s] of highly flammable and highly volatile products x x x [have] no

place in a densely populated area” be removed from the Decision dated 25 November 2014; and b) the

submission of an updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule, including the period for

relocation, be deferred until after the Motion is resolved with finality;

3. CLARIFY that the relocation and transfer necessarily include the complete removal of the facilities

from the Pandacan terminals and should be made part of the required comprehensive plan and

relocation schedule; and

4. REMIND Petron that the Court did not, by noting its “Manifestation” dated 30 November 2010,

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 consent to consider January 2016 as a separate deadline for compliance with our Decision, which, to

repeat, includes the removal of facilities after cessation of operations. The timelines prescribed in the

assailed Decision shall be observed to the letter.

In anticipation of further attempts to delay the enforcement of this Court’s Decision dated 25 November

2014, the parties to these cases are hereby REMINDED of the pronouncements in Ortigas and Co. Ltd.

Partnership v. Judge Velasco[23] on the import of the denial of a motion for reconsideration. Thus:

The denial of a motion for reconsideration signifies that the grounds relied upon have been found, upon due

deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of sufficient weight to warrant a modification of the judgment or

final order. It means not only that the grounds relied upon are lacking in merit but also that any other, not so

raised, is deemed waived and may no longer be set up in a subsequent motion or application to overturn the

judgment; and this is true, whatever may be the title given to such motion or application, whether it be

“second motion for reconsideration” or “motion for clarification” or “plea for due process” or “prayer

for a second look,” or “motion to defer, or set aside, entry of judgment,” or x x x, etc..[24] (Emphasis

supplied)

This Resolution is final. Under pain of contempt, no further pleadings, motions or papers in the guise of the

above-enumerated submissions shall, thus, be entertained in these cases.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., I agree with J. Leonen.

Velasco Jr., , Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza, Reyes, and

Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Carpio, J., no part.

Brion, J., no part.

Leonen, J., see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.

Jardeleza, J., no part.

________________________________

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[1]
In a Resolution dated 21 July 2009, the Court granted the motion to drop respondent Ernesto Rivera as a

party-respondent on the ground that he actually voted against the enactment of the assailed ordinance. Rollo

in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, (no proper pagination, should be pp. 148-149).

[2]
Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. VI, pp. 3147-3210.

[3]
Id. at 3208-3209.

[4]
Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. XI, pp. 5789-5924.

[5]
Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. XVI, pp. 8929-8939.

[6]
Id. at 8921-8928.

[7]
Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. XI, pp. 5798-5801.; Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 25

November 2014.

[8]
324 Phil. 483 (1996).

[9]
Id. at 491-492.

[10]
Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. XVI, pp. 8929-8939.

[11]
Id. at 8930.

[12]
Id. at 8930; Motion for Clarification filed on 5 January 2015.

[13]
Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. VI, p. 3202.

[14]
In the Resolution dated 13 February 2008 in G.R. No. 156052, the Court also revisited the history of the

Pandacan terminals. It wrote:

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x x x. The U.S. Army burned unused petroleum, causing a frightening conflagration. Historian Nick Joaquin

recounted the events as follows:

After the USAFFE evacuated the City late in December 1941, all army fuel storage dumps were set on fire.

The flames spread, enveloping the City in smoke, setting even the rivers ablaze, endangering bridges and all

riverside buildings. … For one week longer, the “open city” blazed—a cloud of smoke by day, a pillar of fire by

night. (Social Justice Society, et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., 568 Phil. 658, 674 [2008])

[15]
Id.

[16]
Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. VI, p. 3203.

[17]
Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. XVI, pp. 8921-8928.

[18]
Id. at 8922.

[19]
Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., supra note 14 at 698.

[20]
Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 76; Ordinance No. 8027.

[21]
Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr., 526 Phil. 485, 490 (2007).

The Decision reads:

Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor

Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the

terminals of the oil companies. (Emphasis supplied)

[22]
Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. XVI, pp. 8922-8923; Manifestation of Understanding of the Dispositive

Portion of the Decision of 15 December 2014.

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[23]
Supra note 7.

[24]
Id. at 492.

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