MH Rakes vs.

Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company | GR No 1719 |

Rakes is one of eight black laborers employed with Atlantic. He was at work
transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the
malecon in Manila. Rakes claims that a one-hand car was used to transport iron
rails, a claim which was refuted by Atlantic when it showed that there were
actually two one-hand cars immediately following one another.

The workers piled seven rails (560lbs/each) lengthwise. The ends of the rails lay
upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but it was not secured at the
sides, making it unguarded if it will slip off. The men were either in the rear, sides
or front of the car. The accident occurred when, at a certain spot near the water's
edge, the track sagged, the tire broke, the car was upset and the rails slid off and
caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg.

Issue: Whether the accident happened through the negligence of the defendant.

Held:

Yes, the accident happened through the negligence of the defendant. In order to
charge the defendant with negligence, it was necessary to show a breach of duty
on its part in failing either to properly secure the load on iron to vehicles
transporting it, or to skillfully build the tramway or to maintain it in proper condition,
or to vigilantly inspect and repair the roadway as soon as the depression in it
became visible. It is upon the failure of the defendant to repair the weakened
track, after notice of its condition, that the judge below based his judgment.

Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence
not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter 11 of Title XVI.
Section 1902 of that chapter reads: A person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the
damage so done. SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the
persons for whom they should be responsible. Owners or directors of an
establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or
in the performance of their duties.

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damages. As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it
may be sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer
penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His
obligation therefore is one "not punished by the law " and falls under civil rather
than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We should be
reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific
codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these
articles of effect, would shut out litigants their will from the civil courts, would make
the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the
proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules
of proof prevailing in criminal actions.

Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required
that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose
prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right. His
liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to the
passengers out of the contract for passage.
while that to that injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself. We
are with reference to such obligations, that culpa, or negligence, may be
understood in two difference senses; either as culpa, substantive and
independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation between two
persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as an incident in the
performance of an obligation; or as already existed, which can not be presumed to
exist without the other, and which increases the liability arising from the already
exiting obligation.

Of these two species of culpa the first one mentioned, existing by itself, may be
also considered as a real source of an independent obligation, and it is logical to
presume that
the reference contained in article 1093 is limited thereto and that it does not
extend to those provisions relating to the other species of culpa. These two
species of negligence may be somewhat inexactly described as contractual and
extra-contractual, the latter being the culpa aquiliana of the Roman law and not
entailing so strict an obligation as the former.

This contractual obligation, implied from the relation and perhaps so inherent in its
nature to be invariable by the parties, binds the employer to provide safe
appliances for the use of the employee, thus closely corresponding to English and
American Law. On these principles it was the duty of the defendant to build and to
maintain its track in reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its workingmen
from unnecessary danger. It is plain that in one respect or the other it
failed in its duty, otherwise the accident could not have occurred; consequently the
negligence of the defendant is established.

Issue: Whether the injury resulted to the plaintiff as a risk incident to his
employment and, as such, one assumed by him

Held:

No, it is not. The occurrence was due to the failure to repair the track or to duly
inspect it for the employee is not presumed to have stipulated that the employer
might neglect his legal duty. Nor may it be excused upon the ground that the
negligence leading to the accident was that of a fellow-servant of the injured man.
It is not apparent to us that the intervention of a third person can relieve the
defendant from the performance of its duty nor impose upon the plaintiff the
consequences of an act or omission not his own. Sua cuique culpa nocet. This
doctrine, known as "the fellow-servant, rule," we are not disposed to introduce into
our jurisprudence. Adopted in England by Lord Abinger in the case of Prescott vs.
Fowler in 1837, it has since been effectually abrogated by "the Employers' Liability
Acts" and the "Compensation Law." The American States which applied it appear
to be gradually getting rid of it; for instance, the New York State legislature of 1906
did away with it in respect to railroad companies, and had in hand a scheme for its
total abolition. It has never found place in the civil law of continental Europe.

What are the extent of plaintiff's negligence and the legal effect that should
be given to it Two particulars of plaintiff's carelessness: First. That having
noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and Second. That he
walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards,
either before or behind it. As to the first point, the depression in the track night
indicate either a serious or a rival difficulty. There is nothing in the evidence to
show that the plaintiff did or could see the displaced timber underneath the
sleeper. The claim that he must have done so is a conclusion drawn from what is
assumed to have been a probable condition of things not before us, rather than a
fair inference from the testimony. While the method of construction may have
been known to the men who had helped build the road, it was otherwise with the
plaintiff who had worked at this job less than two days.

A man may easily walk along a railway without perceiving a displacement of the
underlying timbers. The foreman testified that he knew the state of the track on the
day of the accident and that it was then in good condition, and one Danridge , a
witness for the defendant, working on the same job, swore that he never noticed
the depression in the track and never saw any bad place in it. The sagging of the
track this plaintiff did perceive, but that was reported in his hearing to the foreman
who neither promised nor refused to repair it. His lack of caution in continuing at
his work after noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature
as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe American rule.
On this point we accept the conclusion of the trial judge who found as facts that
"the plaintiff did not know the cause of the one rail being lower than then other"
and "it does not appear in this case that the plaintiff knew before the accident
occurred that the stringers and rails joined in the same place."

In respect of the second charge of negligence against the plaintiff, the judgment
below is not so specific. While the judge remarks that the evidence does not justify
the finding that the car was pulled by means of a rope attached to the front end or
to the rails upon it, and further that the circumstances in evidence make it clear
that the persons necessary to operate the car could not walk upon the plank
between the rails and that, therefore, it was necessary for the employees moving it
to get hold upon it as best they could, there is no specific finding upon the
instruction given by the defendant to its employees to walk only upon the planks,
nor upon the necessity of the plaintiff putting himself upon the ties at the side in
order to get hold upon the car.

Therefore the findings of the judge below leave the conduct of the plaintiff in
walking along the side of the loaded car, upon the open ties, over the
depressed track, free to our inquiry. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear
that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly
directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the
workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to
all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that
he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this
contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the
defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being made known to the
workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger
contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its
primary cause.

This conclusion presents sharply the question, What effect is to be given such
an act of contributory negligence? Does it defeat a recovery, according to the
American rule, or is it to be taken only in reduction of damages? Doctrine of
comparative negligence: "allowing a recovery by a plaintiff whose own act
contributed to his injury, provided his negligence was slight as compared
with that of the defendant, and some others have accepted the theory of
proportional damages, reducing the award to a plaintiff in proportion to his
responsibility for the accident, yet the overwhelming weight of adjudication
establishes the principle in American jurisprudence that any negligence, however
slight, on the part of the person injured which is one of the causes proximately
contributing to his injury, bars his recovery." Difficulty seems to be
apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered
immediate causes of the accident.

The test is simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the injury,
between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident,
and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the
failure to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages —
that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the
act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute,
although it was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the
crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of
duty, the last would have been one of the determining causes of the event or
accident, for which he would have been responsible.

Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining