RULE 65

Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (1a)

Rule 46, Section 3, 3rd paragraph: xxx "The petitioner shall also
submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not
theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must
state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other
tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.”

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist
from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and
a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
(2a)

Section 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to
be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (3a)

Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.

If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board,
an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or
with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the
petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law
or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition
shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

Source: A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC December 4, 2007; AMENDMENTS TO RULES 41, 45, 58
AND 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT; December 4, 2007.

Section 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. — When the petition filed relates to the acts or
omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the
petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents with such public respondent or
respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall
be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in
behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded
in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and not
against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
impleaded as public respondent or respondents.

Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public
respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein.
If the case is elevated to a higher court by either party, the public respondents shall be included
therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed by the court, they shall
not appear or participate in the proceedings therein. (5a)

Section 6. Order to comment. — If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify such
process, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent or respondents to comment on the
petition within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof. Such order shall be served on the
respondents in such manner as the court may direct together with a copy of the petition and any
annexes thereto.

In petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provisions of
section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed. Before giving due course thereto, the court may require the
respondents to file their comment to, and not a motion to dismiss, the petition. Thereafter, the court
may require the filing of a reply and such other responsive or other pleadings as it may deem
necessary and proper. (6a)

Sec. 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. – The court in which the petition is filed may issue
orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The
petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case, unless a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining the public respondent from further
proceeding with the case.

The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a
petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the
principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.

Sec. 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. – After the comment or other pleadings required by the
court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court may hear the case or require
the parties to submit memoranda. If, after such hearing or filing of memoranda or upon the expiration
of the period for filing, the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall render
judgment for such relief to which the petitioner is entitled.

However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against the
petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions under Rules 139
and 139-B of the Rules of Court.

The Court may impose motu proprio, based on res ipsa loquitur, other disciplinary sanctions or
measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.

Source: A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC December 4, 2007; AMENDMENTS TO RULES 41, 45, 58
AND 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT; December 4, 2007.

Section 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. — A certified copy of the judgment
rendered in accordance with the last preceding section shall be served upon the court, quasi-judicial
agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person concerned in such manner as the court may
direct, and disobedience thereto shall be punished as contempt. An execution may issue for any
damages or costs awarded in accordance with section 1 of Rule 39. (9a)

COSTS:

Mam 3 copies po kinukuha tapos ang babayaran daw po kung walang tro 5530 kung meron po
5830 po. Until 4 po sila nagrereceive mam pero mas gsuto po nila mas agahan raw po.

RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE TO SUPPORT MOTEX OF 15 DAYS:

G.R. Nos. 182382-83               February 24, 2010

JAIME S. DOMDOM, Petitioner, 
vs.
HON. THIRD AND FIFTH DIVISIONS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for
extension, unlike in the previous formulation, does not make the filing of such pleading absolutely
prohibited. If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to
state that "no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted." Absent such a prohibition,
motions for extension are allowed, subject to the Court’s sound discretion. The present petition may
thus be allowed, having been filed within the extension sought and, at all events, given its merits.

G.R. No. 187984               November 15, 2010

FRANCISCO A. LABAO, Petitioner, 
vs.
LOLITO N. FLORES, AMADO A. DAGUISONAN, PEPE M. CANTAR, JULIO G. PAGENTE,
JESUS E. ARENA, CRISPIN A. NAVALES, OSCAR M. VENTE, ARTEMIO B. ARAGON, ARNOLD
M. CANTAR, ALBERTO T. CUADERO, RASMI E. RONQUILLO, PEDRO R. GABUTAN, ELPEDIO
E. MENTANG,* WILFREDO R. MIÑOSA,**RODERICK P. NAMBATAC, MARCIAL D. RIVERA,
SANDE E. CASTIL,*** CRISOSTOMO B. ESIC, and AMBROSIO M. CANTAR,**** Respondents.

Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,13 certiorari should be instituted
within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be
assailed.14 The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.15

Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the
litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of, our
judicial system.16 While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary
periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are
necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.17The timeliness of filing a
pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with.18

Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all rules, they are required to be
followed.1avvphi1

However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate
with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party
by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence
of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7)
a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances
attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance
of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the
attendant circumstances.19Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply
with the rules. 1avvphi1
G.R. No. 189191               February 29, 2012

Mid-Islands Power Generation Corporation, Petitioner, 

vs.
Court of Appeals, Power One Corporation, Islands Grid Network Philippines, Inc., David Tan,
and Manuel Lauron,* Respondents.

Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that the
22 

deletion of the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC did not, ipso facto, make
the filing of a motion for extension to file a Rule 65 petition absolutely prohibited. We held in
Domdom that if absolute proscription were intended, the deleted portion could have just
simply been reworded to specifically prohibit an extension of time to file such petition. Thus,
because of the lack of an express prohibition, we held that motions for extension may be
allowed, subject to this Court’s sound discretion, and only under exceptional and meritorious
cases.

Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC in
order to serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. Thus, in Tan v. Ballena, we
pronounced:

It is a well-settled principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
1âwphi1

frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. In deciding a case, the
appellate court has the discretion whether or not to dismiss the same, which discretion must be
exercised soundly and in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, taking into account the
circumstances of the case. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse
a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than
dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression
of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of
justice. (Citations omitted.)
23 

The present Petition involves one of those exceptional cases in which relaxing the procedural rules
would serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. It concerns the operations and
management of the Calapan Diesel Power Plant – a power-generating facility that supplies electricity
to Oriental Mindoro. It was alleged that the dispute between the parties had already resulted in a
reduced generation of power, which was supposedly producing electricity at less than 50% of its
capacity. A TRO had already been issued previously, as there was an impending brownout in the
entire province of Oriental Mindoro. Consequently, in order to protect strong public interest, this
Court deems it appropriate and justifiable to relax the amendment of Section 4, Rule 65 under A.M.
No. 07-7-12-SC, concerning the reglementary period for the filing of a Rule 65 petition. Considering
that the imminent power crisis is an exceptional and meritorious circumstance, the parties herein
should be allowed to litigate the issues on the merits. Furthermore, we find no significant prejudice to
the substantive rights of the litigants as respondent was able to file the Petition before the CA within
the 15-day extension it asked for. We therefore find no grave abuse of discretion attributable to the
CA when it granted respondent Power One’s Motion for Extension to file its Petition for Certiorari.
As a final note, we convey our strong disapproval over the failure of Power One’s lawyers to file the
Petition within the reglementary period. The amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC were meant to
be implemented strictly, with a view in mind that the 60-day period to file is a reasonable and
sufficient time to prepare a Rule 65 petition. Workload and resignation of the lawyer handling the
case are insufficient reasons to justify the relaxation of the procedural rules. He should not
have left his client with this very critical piece of work hanging in midair. Were it not for the
exceptional nature of the case and the strong public interest involved herein, we would have
overturned the approval by the CA of the Motion to extend the period to file a Rule 65 Petition.

Aside from the mounting workload of the OMB, the prosecution

must also establish that the issues are so complex and the evidence so
voluminous, which render the delay inevitable. In this case, the
prosecution neither alleged nor proved any of these circumstances. The
oft-recognized principle of institutional delay is not a blanket authority for
the OMB's non-observance of the periods fixed for preliminary
investigation. The Court's ruling in Javier v. Sandiganbayan 85 is instructive:
|||  (Perez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 245862, [November 3, 2020])

he grant of petitioner's motion for

extension and subsequent motion to admit
will serve the higher interest of substantial
justice.
In its assailed resolutions, the Court of Appeals stressed that the
filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari was already
deleted when A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC further amended Section 4 of Rule
65. 11 While recognizing the exceptions laid down in Domdom v.
Sandiganbayan, 12 the Court of Appeals did not find "pressure of work" as
sufficient justification to apply Domdom here. Nor did it consider counsel's
"failing health" as a justification considering that this reason was belatedly
cited only after the petition had already been denied.  SDAaTC

In Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 13 the Court

clarified that while a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty
(60) days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for
reconsideration, the period may be extended subject to the court's sound
discretion. For this purpose, one should be able to provide a reasonable
or meritorious explanation for his or her failure to comply with the sixty-
day period.
Here, petitioner stated that her counsel needed additional time to
file the petition as he was also burdened with other equally important
cases. Petitioner also mentioned, albeit belatedly, her counsel's failing
health, old age, and frequent long trips from San Pedro, Laguna to
Quezon City which had taken a toll on his health.
On several occasions, the Court had ruled that heavy workload is
relative and often self-serving, and that standing alone, it is not a
sufficient reason to deviate from the sixty-day rule. 14 We have oft
reminded lawyers to handle only as many cases as they can efficiently
handle because it is not enough that they are qualified to handle legal
matters, for they are also required to prepare adequately and give the
appropriate attention to their legal works. 15 As for the alleged failing
health and old age of petitioner's counsel, the Court of Appeals correctly
opined that the invocation of these grounds in support of the motion for
extension appears to be a mere afterthought. 
This notwithstanding, however, when strict application of the rules
would result in irreparable damage, if not grave injustice to a litigant, as in
this case, the Court is compelled to relax the rules in the higher interest of
substantial justice. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 16 we decreed:
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set
forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and
chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice
have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously
guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities
take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other
way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language
of Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the
situation." x x x (Emphasis supplied)
 We, thus, relaxed the technical rules in Tanenglian v.
Lorenzo 17 when, in the broader interest of justice, we gave due course to
the appeal, albeit, it was a wrong remedy and filed beyond the
reglementary period, viz.:
We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the
extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules,
allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical
infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we
dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the
force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases
where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there
always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a
grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always
tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement
of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given
the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.
(Emphasis supplied)
Here, precluding petitioner from pursuing her appellate remedy
based on a mere technicality will most probably cause her to perpetually
and irreparably lose her 1,552 square meter property as a result of what
she calls an erroneous, nay, unjust implementation of the writ of
possession not on the property of the bank, but hers.
Verily, therefore, the Court resolves to grant petitioner's motion for
a one-time extension of fifteen (15) days and admit the petition
for certiorari she had already filed on July 19, 2016.  acE

  (Mascariñas v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 228138, [August 27,
|||

2020])

In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc.  22  we had the occasion to
settle the seeming conflict on various jurisprudence touching upon the issue
of whether the period for filing a petition for certiorari may be extended. In
said case we stated that the general rule, as laid down in Laguna Metts
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,  23  is that a petition for certiorari must be filed
strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a
motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment
introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC 24 where no provision for the filing of a
motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the
original Section 4 of Rule 65 25 which allowed the filing of such a motion but
only for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days. 26 Under
exceptional cases, however, and as held in Domdom v. Third and Fifth
Divisions of the Sandiganbayan,  27  the 60-day period may be extended subject
to the court's sound discretion. In Domdom, we stated that the deletion of the
provisions in Rule 65 pertaining to extension of time did not make the filing
of such pleading absolutely prohibited. "If such were the intention, the
deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that 'no
extension of time to file the petition shall be granted.' Absent such a
prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject to the court's sound
discretion." 28
Then in Labao v. Flores,  29  we laid down some of the exceptions to the
strict application of the 60-day period rule, thus:
[T]here are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such
as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant
from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with
the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the
default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5)
the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and
equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of
substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues
involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided
by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort
on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable
or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the
rules. 
AcICHD
 In this case, counting 60 days from her counsel's receipt of the June 29,
2009 NLRC Resolution on July 8, 2009, private respondent had until
September 7, 2009 to file her petition or a motion for extension, as
September 6, 2009, the last day for filing such pleading, fell on a Sunday.
However, the motion was filed only on September 8, 2009. 30 It is a
fundamental rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time must
be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended;
otherwise, the same is of no effect since there would no longer be any period
to extend, and the assailed judgment or order will have become final and
executory. 31
Additionally, as cited earlier in Labao, there should be an effort on the
part of the litigant invoking liberality to satisfactorily explain why he or she
was unable to abide by the rules. 32 Here, the reason offered for availing of
the motion for extension is the heavy workload of private respondent's
counsel, which is hardly a compelling or meritorious reason as enunciated
in Labao. Time and again, we have held that the excuse of "[h]eavy workload
is relative and often self-serving. Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason
to deviate from the 60-day rule." 33 Thus, private respondent's motion for
extension should have been denied outright.
Notably, the CA's November 20, 2009 Resolution refrained from ruling
on the timeliness of private respondent's motion for extension. Instead, it
directly ruled on the Petition for Certiorari as seen by its statement "[t]he
Court . . . resolved to NOTE the petition for certiorari . . ., albeit the same was
filed fifteen (15) days late." To our mind, the foregoing pronouncement is an
indirect acknowledgment on the part of the CA that the motion for extension
was indeed filed late. Yet it opted to still entertain and "note" the Petition
for Certiorari, justifying its action as being "in the interest of justice."
We do not approve of the CA's ruling on the matter because, as the
motion for extension should have been denied outright, it necessarily follows
that the Petition for Certiorariis, in the words of petitioners, a "mere scrap of
paper with no remedial value whatsoever." 
In Negros Slashers, Inc. v. Teng,  34  which likewise dealt with the late filing
of a petition for certiorari, we recognized that although procedural rules
ought to be strictly enforced by courts in order to impart stability in the legal
system, we have, nonetheless, relaxed the rigid application of the rules of
procedure in several cases to afford the parties the opportunity to fully
ventilate their cases on the merits. This is because the ends of justice would
be better served if the parties were given the chance to argue their causes
and defenses. We are likewise constantly reminded that the general objective
of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the opposing claims
of the competing parties and always be guided by the principle that
procedure must not hinder but, rather, promote the administration of
justice. Concomitant thereto:
Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even
the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both
the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to
due process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal
construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of
substantial justice and equity. . . . 35

  (Thenamaris Philippines, Inc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 191215, [February 3,

|||

2014], 725 PHIL 590-605)

Following this rule, the Court has relaxed the 60-day requirement in
the following instances: when the assailed decision was contradictory to
the evidence presented; 21 in a motion for consolidation of several
criminal cases, when the relief sought would be more in keeping with law
and equity, and to facilitate a speedy trial, considering that there was
substantial identity in the informations filed and the witnesses to be
presented; 22 where paramount public interest necessitated that the
dispute involving the operation of a major power plant be resolved on the
merits; 23 where the case involved the expropriation of private property to
build a major highway and no undue prejudice or delay will be caused to
either party in admitting the petition; 24 and when the appellate court had
already granted an extension but later reversed itself. 25 Furthermore,
in Castells, et al. v. Saudi Arabian Airlines, 26 the Court enumerated the
following instances when the period to file a petition for certiorari may be
extended:
 (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant
from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with
the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the
default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and
equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of
substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues
involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided
by all the attendant circumstances. 27 (Citation omitted and
underscoring ours)  ATICcS

Given the law, the Court recapitulates the material facts. The
assailed CIAC order was issued on December 6, 2013. FDIP's motion for
reconsideration was filed on December 27, 2013. The CIAC reiterated the
denial in its Declaration dated January 27, 2014. FDIP filed its Motion for
Additional Time to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA on February 10,
2014; and its petition for certiorari was dated February 19, 2014.
The pleadings, evidence, and arguments on record make a
meritorious case for granting FDIP's motion for additional time to file its
petition for certiorari.
At this point, it must be emphasized that FDIP's petition
for certiorari is directed at the Order dated December 6, 2013 of the CIAC,
which denied FDIP's motion for alias writ of execution. FDIP sought an
alias writ of execution after it discovered that the FEIP shares it bought on
auction were worthless. FEPI faults FDIP for filing both a motion for
reconsideration and a petition for certiorari against the CIAC Order dated
December 6, 2013. The parties devote most of their pleadings to these
two core issues. Regarding the merits of the issuance of the alias writ of
execution, FDIP asserts that it is entitled to such relief because the auction
sale where it bought the FEIP shares should be considered void; while FEPI
argues that FDIP is bound by the principle of caveat emptor and should
 have therefore conducted due diligence before buying the FEIP shares.
Regarding the alleged procedural fault committed by FDIP, it argues that
the filing of its motion for reconsideration of the CIAC Order dated
December 6, 2013 was unintentional. According to FDIP, the motion was
filed by its former counsel who was under the impression that it was still
engaged by FDIP when in fact, FDIP had already engaged another law firm
to prosecute the case. FEIP counters that such explanation is
unacceptable, since FDIP's former counsel did not file a withdrawal of
appearance; while its current counsel did not enter its appearance in
substitution of the former counsel. Furthermore, despite its position that
a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under the CIAC
rules, FDIP did not withdraw its motion for reconsideration of the CIAC
Order dated December 6, 2013 even after it filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA.
The foregoing questions involve mixed issues of fact and law which
are best litigated by the CA. The fact remains that up to now, FDIP has not
collected a single centavo of the 13 million-peso award that was rendered
in its favor almost 20 years ago. On the other hand, FEPI has been
successfully evading its legal obligation for almost 20 years by the simple
expedient of a denial of a motion for additional time to file a petition
for certiorari. There is no showing that FEPI will be prejudiced or unjustly
deprived of any benefit if FDIP's motion is granted. To settle the matter
once and for all, substantial justice dictates that the issues raised by the
parties before this Court be litigated in the proper forum — the CA. This
pronouncement in Bacarra v. NLRC 28 is apropos: 
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford
every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. This is in line with the time-honored principle that
cases should be decided only after giving all the parties the chance
to argue their causes and defenses. For, it is far better to dispose of
a case on the merits which is a primordial end rather than on a
technicality, if it be the case that may result in
injustice. 29(Underscoring ours)
  (Fluor Daniel, Inc.-Philippines v. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 212895,
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[November 27, 2019])