G.R. No.

L-26737             July 31, 1969 (CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE)

LAURA CORPUS, and the minors RICARDO, TERESITA and CORAZON, all surnamed
MARCIA and represented by their mother LAURA CORPUS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELARDO PAJE and THE VICTORY LINER TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., defendants-
appellees.

FACTS:

A Victory Liner bus driven by RESPONDENT-Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia,
resulting in MARCIA’s death and in physical injuries to two other persons.

An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje in CFI Pampanga.

The heirs of Clemente Marcia reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for damages.

The trial court found the driver guilty but the CA reversed the decision and ruled that it was purely an
accident.

Marcia's heirs then instituted the separate civil action for damages based on reckless imprudence
against Felardo Paje and Victory Liner Co.

The CFI Rizal dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs' action was based upon a quasi-
delict and that it had prescribed. The matter was elevated to the SC

ISSUE: Whether the CFI Rizal erred in dismissing the reserved independent civil action?

HELD: The Court affirmed the dismissal; and discussed the action first based on Rule 111 Section 3
(Presently Rule 111 Section 2) of the Rules of Court: (civil liability ex delicto)

The acquittal of the Defendant in the criminal action on the ground that the crime of reckless
imprudence did not exist and that the collision was a case of pure accident, is a bar to the civil
action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the same
criminal negligence of which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal action.

Legal Basis: (Last paragraph of presently Sec 2, Rule 111: The extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist)

(MAIN LEARNING POINT) Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not one of the three
crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of an independent
civil action, that is, of an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, which shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence.

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
 Although in a 1957 case, of Dyogi, vs. Yatco,), the Court held that the term "physical injuries"
in article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide, it is to be borne in mind that the charge
against Felardo Paje-VICTORY LINER DRIVER was for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, and not for homicide and physical injuries.

(The Court in Madeja v. Caro, Japzon, decided 1983, called out Corpuz v. Paje in holding
that reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code
Saying that it is not authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and
four of them merely concurred in the result.)

(Justice Aquino in Madeja, concurring: “because it was concurred in by only five Justices”.

The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act (Reckless imprudence), not the result
thereof (e.g.homicide and physical injuries)

The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty; it does
not qualify the substance of the offense. (meaning the consequence itself, and its’ gravity, is
not an element of the crime)

It is, therefore, clear that the charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide/physical
injuries but for reckless imprudence, that is, criminal negligence resulting in homicide (death
of Clemente Marcia) and double physical injuries suffered by two other persons.

As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in
Article 33 of the Civil Code, there is no independent civil action for damages that may be
instituted in connection with said offense.

Hence, homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the
general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil
liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved 2 his
right to institute a separate civil action. (General Rule),

In the language of the Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec. 3) the extinction of the criminal action
by acquittal of the defendant on the ground that the criminal act charged against him did not
exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil action for damages based upon the same
act. (Civil liability ex-delicto)

(2) Assuming, arguendo, that the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia was
based upon a quasi-delict, 3 the trial court's finding for prescription is correct as 4 years has
already lapsed.

The Court decided to affirm the DISMISSAL of the civil case and held in favor of defendants.
Commentary by J.Capistrano:

The civil action for damages against Felardo Paje was prematurely instituted in view of Rule 111,
Section 3, (rule on civil liability ex delicto and not for 2176)

Justice Capistrano critized the then Section 2 of Rule 111 which says:

Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the
right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

J. Capistrano opined that : Section 2 of Rule 111 should be amended so as to read as follows:

Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party before or after the criminal action is instituted. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. Notice shall be given in the criminal action of the institution of the civil action or of the
intention to institute the same. (almost identical as the present Section 3 of Rule 111)