International Journal of Intelligence and

CounterIntelligence

ISSN: 0885-0607 (Print) 1521-0561 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ujic20

Is Intelligence Analysis an Art or a Science?

Stephen Marrin

To cite this article: Stephen Marrin (2012) Is Intelligence Analysis an Art or a Science?,
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 25:3, 529-545, DOI:
10.1080/08850607.2012.678690

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2012.678690

Published online: 13 Jun 2012.

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 International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 25: 529–545, 2012
Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0885-0607 print=1521-0561 online
DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2012.678690

STEPHEN MARRIN
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Is Intelligence Analysis an Art or

a Science?

A discussion, sometimes portrayed as a debate, has been taking place for

decades addressing the issue of whether intelligence analysis is an art or a
science. According to Robert Folker, this debate revolves around ‘‘the
question of whether intelligence analysis should be accepted as an art
(depending largely on subjective, intuitive judgment) or a science (depending
largely on structured, systematic analytic methods).’’1
The answer to this question has significant implications for the selection,
training, and career development of intelligence analysts, as well as
the actual methodologies of intelligence analysis. As Folker put it, ‘‘If
qualitative intelligence analysis is an art, then efforts to improve it should
focus on measuring the accuracy of one’s intuition, selecting those analysts
with the best track record, and educating them to become experts in a
given field. If, on the other hand, qualitative intelligence analysis is a
science, then analysts should be trained to select the appropriate method

Dr. Stephen Marrin is a Lecturer in Politics and History at the Centre for
Intelligence and Security Studies at Brunel University, London, England.
Previously, he was an analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency, and later
with the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Washington, D.C.
Prior to joining the Brunel Centre, he was Assistant Professor in the
Intelligence Studies Department at Mercyhurst College, Erie, Pennsylvania.
Holder of a Ph.D. from the University of Virginia, he is Program Chairman
of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association. A
prolific author on aspects of intelligence analysis and analytical theory, the
National Journal in 2004 profiled him as one of the ten leading experts on
the subject of intelligence reform.

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 530 STEPHEN MARRIN

for a given problem from a variety of scientific methodologies and exploit it

to guide them through the analytical process.’’2
In 2009 and again in 2010, this debate over the question of whether
intelligence analysis is an art or science was engaged through the e-mail list of
the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE).3 In total,
the discussion involved over thirty participants and well over fifty messages,
reflecting a wide range of perspectives on the issue. Insights gleaned from this
discussion about the nature of intelligence analysis can have implications for
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the future of practicing, teaching, and learning intelligence analysis.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AS A SCIENCE

An extensive literature addresses intelligence analysis in primarily social
scientific terms. This approach to doing intelligence analysis was
articulated as early as the 1940s, if not earlier. For example, in 1949,
Sherman Kent pointed out that ‘‘most of the subject matter of intelligence
falls in the field of the social sciences.’’ 4 Kent also referenced the
importance of developing hypotheses, and when addressing the estimative
process he stated that the accuracy of the analysts’ prognoses of the future
depend on advances in social science.5
These early references to the utility of social science to intelligence analysis
were followed up in 1957 by Washington Platt who, in much greater depth,
addressed the contributions that social science could make to intelligence
analysis. 6 As he observed in the context of intelligence analysis, ‘‘The
so-called scientific method means different things to different people, but
the basic features are much the same. These features are: collection of
data, formation of hypotheses, testing the hypotheses, and so arriving at
conclusions based on the foregoing which can be used as reliable sources
of prediction.’’7
Historically, many recommendations have been made to improve the
scientific methodology of intelligence analysis by increasing its rigor. In
1958, R. A. Random wrote an article in which he argued that ‘‘the only
sound practice of intelligence is that based on the scientific method as
specifically applied in the social sciences. . . . We must build up within the
intelligence community a knowledge of scientific method and the
techniques and principles of the policy sciences and must study their
application to intelligence problems. We must do this because it is the only
way to effect any fundamental improvement in professional intelligence
practice.’’ 8 These observations were followed up by more extensive
treatments of intelligence analysis as a science by many others, including
Klaus Knorr in 1964, Richards Heuer in 1978, and Isaac Ben-Israel in 1989.9
What can be inferred from this examination is that intelligence analysts use
an approximation of the scientific method derived from the social sciences to

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 IS INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AN ART OR A SCIENCE? 531

determine meaning from the facts embedded in raw intelligence. The scientific
method, like intelligence analysis, involves description, explanation, and
prediction. So, in all fields where the scientific method is applied,
methodologists tell practitioners to use good reliable data, and validate it if
possible. When describing the characteristics of things, they should decide if
the categories are nominal, ordinal, interval, or ratio, and derive inferences
accordingly. When explaining, account for as many independent variables
as possible; and rank-order them based on how much they affect the
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dependent variable. Alternative hypotheses about causation should be

tested against each other to find out which explains the greatest amount of
change in the dependent variable. Each of these steps applies just as much
to intelligence analysis as it does to the social sciences.
Modern proponents of intelligence analysis as a science, according to
Folker, ‘‘assert that science is a necessary tool to use when conducting
qualitative analysis. They argue that, although it is impossible to consider
every variable when conducting analysis, one can identify key variables
and weigh their importance. And although much may be unknown,
identifying what is known and analyzing it scientifically is an effective
approach . . . (because) scientific methods help analysts determine the
relevancy of information and form conclusions, a process that analysts do
not perform well on their own.’’10
Interestingly, despite this prevalent conception of intelligence analysis as a
form of social science, only two participants in the IAFIE discussion came
out strongly in favor of intelligence analysis as a science. David Carter, a
professor at Michigan State University, suggested that ‘‘science is a way of
thinking,’’ and that intelligence analysis used the scientific approach to
problem solving while ‘‘applying the rules of logic, conducting analysis of
competing hypothesis, using inductive and deductive reasoning, and
assessing validity and reliability of information.’’ 11 Continuing, he
explained, ‘‘Science prescribes rules to maximize accurate and objective
decision making. The art is how we apply those rules, which is strongly
based on experience and substantive knowledge of the issue or topic at
hand.’’ The other proponent of intelligence analysis as a science, Fulton
Wilcox, strongly argued that it was the scientific method that provided the
underlying method for intelligence analysis.12 He addressed the importance
of creating not just one but multiple hypotheses and the evolution of those
hypotheses in light of additional collection. As Wilcox said, in the end this
process provides the best mechanism for ‘‘knowing exactly what you think
you know (the validated hypotheses) and how you know it.’’

Drawbacks to the Conceptualization

But certain problems with the conceptualization of intelligence analysis as
a science concern the relative uncertainty of the analyst even after an

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 532 STEPHEN MARRIN

approximation of the scientific method is followed. Gary Berry, an

administrator for American Military University’s Intelligence Studies
program, suggested that intelligence analysis is not a science because it is
not replicable or repeatable in the same way as scientific experiments.13
Following the same methodology, different analysts can come to different
judgments from the same base of data perhaps due to its underlying
indeterminacy.
Two participants in the IAFIE discussion suggested this level of uncertainty
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may be due to fundamental problems with knowing and understanding in

international relations. Paul Cooke, a former intelligence analyst for the
Department of Defense and research associate at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies, pointed out: ‘‘Intelligence is not a science if a
science is defined by the regular and ritualistic practice of the scientific
method to develop, refine, and prove=disprove hypothesis under conditions
that are controllable and repeatable. None of these circumstances apply to
intelligence analysis primarily because the circumstances or environment are
never under control, the experiments are never repeatable, there can be no
true experiment, and often there is no use made of hypotheses or attempts
to prove or disprove hypotheses.’’14 In addition, Michael Bennett, a former
instructor at the Coast Guard Academy, quoted Jerome Clauser who has
suggested that ‘‘Not only are the effects of certain variables unpredictable,
but there may also be little agreement as to what constitutes the causal or
contributing factors in the first place. It is because of this basic inability to
establish causes rigorously that intelligence is (and probably always will be)
referred to as an art or a craft rather than a science.’’15
To some extent this reflects the limitations of the social sciences writ large; a
subject that has also been addressed in the intelligence literature. For example,
in 1949, Sherman Kent observed that ‘‘the social sciences have by no means yet
attained the precision of the natural sciences’’ and ‘‘may never do so.’’16 Or, as
Klaus Knorr observed in a 1964 discussion about relative certainty in
intelligence analysis, ‘‘Achievement in the social sciences may be considered
deplorably low when compared with some of the natural sciences.’’17 Their
observations were later reinforced through Ben-Israel’s 1989 conclusion that
intelligence analysis was frequently not accurate, in part due to ‘‘the
underdevelopment of ‘intelligence science’ (which) like most branches of
social sciences, is at a pre-scientific stage, or at a very primitive stage of
science.’’18 Ben-Israel held that ‘‘the exactitude of intelligence predictions
will grow as intelligence science improves. But . . . it will never reach total
precision. This is a cornerstone of our system: intelligence, like science, deals
with hypotheses, and their very nature is their fallibility. Errors, therefore,
can never be avoided, no matter what method is used.’’19
But intelligence analysis may be even more uncertain than other forms of
social science due to (1) externally imposed and frequently short deadlines

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 IS INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AN ART OR A SCIENCE? 533

which necessitate analysis prior to the acquisition of sufficient information,

(2) an inability to control the variables under study, (3) an unknown data
quality due to imperfections in the collection process, (4) the possibility of
deception, (5) an emphasis on prediction, and (6) a focus on utility for the
decisionmaker. 20,21 Perhaps the most difficult methodological hurdle to
overcome is the reality that intelligence analysts deal with information that
is essentially a biased sample acquired opportunistically rather than
according to some master research design, with frequently no way to
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determine how representative that sample is relative to the broader

population.
In the end, the process of intelligence analysis has significant limitations
that prevent many practitioners from wholeheartedly supporting the
‘‘intelligence analysis as science’’ perspective in the debate.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AS AN ART

The alternative position in the debate is that intelligence analysis is an art.
According to Robert Folker, some people argue that rather than the
scientist’s structured method, ‘‘qualitative intelligence analysis is an art
because it is an intuitive process based on instinct, education, and
experience.’’22 Or, as Paul Cooke put it, ‘‘Art is the creative and imaginative
thinking required to manipulate information in a way that reveals new
information or new perspective.’’23
Most participants in the IAFIE discussion argued that intelligence analysis
was more of an art than a science. Taking the strongest stand in defense of
intelligence analysis as an art, Mark M. Lowenthal, a former Assistant
Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, said that
‘‘Intelligence is not and never will be a science and anyone who tries to
promote it will be doing our profession a grave disservice. . . . If we start
equating intelligence to a science the unrealistic expectations will only go
up. Intelligence is an art. It is an intellectual activity. An art.’’24
Lowenthal’s position was probably derived from a previously articulated
concern that intelligence analysts are held to an unrealistic standard of
perfect accuracy.25 Robert Wysocki reinforced this point when he said that
treating intelligence analysis ‘‘as a science or creating the mindset that it is
science will only serve to create misunderstandings and more unrealistic
expectations’’ on the part of consumers and decisionmakers.26 He went on
to say, ‘‘It is difficult enough without consumers . . . thinking that by simply
applying a few tools, a few rules, and connecting a few databases we
should be able to identify every threat.’’
But others also argued that intelligence analysis was more of an art than a
science due to skill in pattern recognition acquired from experience. Former
CIA analyst Cynthia Storer suggested that ‘‘the art or magic of good

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 534 STEPHEN MARRIN

intelligence analysis’’ involves ‘‘pattern recognition and pattern matching’’ to

obtain insight from a large amount of fragmented data within a short
amount of time.27 David Terrell, an intelligence analyst with BAE Systems,
added that this ability to recognize patterns was derived from experience ‘‘in
which the analyst compares known data entities and their interrelationships
to various mental paradigms in an attempt to classify the current
situation.’’28 So perhaps experience becomes the foundation of the analytic
art. Mixing the art and the science, Richards Heuer suggested that if this
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kind of pattern recognition and matching has something to do with

imagination, then perhaps such imaginative abilities can be improved
through the use of structured analytic techniques that rely on imagination.29
The participants in the discussion also addressed the extent to which the
imaginative or creative aspects of the analytic skillset can be taught. Storer
suggested that while some aspects of pattern recognition can be taught
‘‘there seems to be a talent for it that some people possess and others do
not.’’30 Heuer used the word ‘‘feel’’ to describe this very same talent, and
suggested that while ‘‘one may not be able to teach ‘‘feel,’’ . . . one can teach
analysts to recognize when they are using their feel (i.e., making
assumptions that fill the inevitable gaps in their knowledge), and teach
them techniques . . . that rely on their feel and give them practice in using it.’’31
Along these lines of feel and practice, some have used jazz music as a
metaphor for intelligence analysis. As Michael McClellan put it, ‘‘All of us
who have taught, trained, mentored students and professionals have noted
those who have command of the subject as though reading from the text
but lack the feel. Analysis as art is feel and this I fear cannot be taught, but
instead must emerge from the person.’’32 Like McClellan, Arthur Katona
also compared intelligence analysis to the playing of jazz, suggesting that
individual creativity in analysis is just as important as it is in music.33 But
individual creativity can be supported and facilitated by the coordinated
actions of many individuals acting collaboratively and collectively in the
production of both music (especially jazz, as per Katona’s core thesis) and
intelligence analysis.34
Another interesting parallel between music and intelligence analysis has to
do with the importance of the audience or consumer, and how they perceive
the quality of the performance, product, or message. As was asked during
the IAFIE discussion: ‘‘If even a part of intelligence analysis is an ‘art,’ who
decides if it is good art?’’35 The answer, according to Tom Binkley, is that
‘‘the consumer is the only one who can determine the artistic value of the
intelligence.’’ 36 This observation is quite interesting since it shifts the
evaluative emphasis away from analytic accuracy and towards consumer
appreciation; a shift that is generally interpreted as fraught with peril.37
Kathrine Graham headed into deeper waters of philosophy, suggesting
that great insight about intelligence analysis can be derived from the

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 IS INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AN ART OR A SCIENCE? 535

perception of ‘‘art as contemplation of truth.’’ She also saw insight in the

following quote from historian Will Durant: ‘‘Art is greater than science
because the later proceeds by laborious accumulation and cautious
reasoning, while the former reaches its goal at once by intuition and
presentation; science can get along with talent, but art requires genius.’’38
This differentiation between science as methodological talent and art as
genius may have applicability in the intelligence analysis domain as well.
But much depends on how the analytic process is envisioned. Those who
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emphasized the importance of embracing the scientific method over

intuition strongly argued that reliance on intuition is exceedingly
inappropriate for an intelligence analyst. As R. A. Random put it in 1958,
if analysts rejected the scientific method in favor of intuition they would be
rejecting ‘‘rationality and scientific principle as a basis for practice and
substitute intuitive guesses and unanalyzed conjectures.’’39 Others, however,
believe that intelligence analysis has something to do with understanding
the nature of reality or the nature of truth. If so, then perhaps the artist or
philosopher may have some role. As Kathrine Graham suggested, Ayn
Rand’s articulation of the nature of art might have something to contribute
to the discussion about the fundamental underpinnings of intelligence
analysis:

Art is a selective re-creation of reality according to an artist’s metaphysical

value-judgments. Man’s profound need of art lies in the fact that his
cognitive faculty is conceptual, that is, that he acquires knowledge by
means of abstractions, and needs the power to bring his widest
metaphysical abstractions into his immediate, perceptual awareness. Art
fulfills this need: by means of a selective re-creation, it concretizes man’s
fundamental view of himself and of existence. It tells man, in effect,
which aspects of his experience are to be regarded as essential,
significant, important. In this sense, art teaches man how to use his
consciousness. It conditions or stylizes man’s consciousness by
conveying to him a certain way of looking at existence.40

But Fulton Wilcox, an advocate for the intelligence analysis as a science

approach, challenged the notion that these concepts lie in the domain of
art rather than science. As he put it, art is seemingly being used

as an error term in the equation intelligence analysis ¼ science þart,

suggesting that if the analyst isn’t doing ‘‘science’’ he or she must be
doing ‘‘art.’’ For that ‘‘error term’’ to capture all the not-science in
intelligence analysis, one has to take a rather broad position on the
elusive question ‘‘what is art’’. . . . It is also not clear that ‘‘analytic
methodology’’ itself is ‘‘science’’ as opposed to being ritual. If the
methodology has not been scientifically validated, it is perhaps a useful
how-to ‘‘standard’’ and saves time in getting past the basics, but is not

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science. The vital question . . . is ‘‘what enables an analyst to punch above

his=her methodological=training weight?’’ That is, what makes a ‘‘star’’
rather than an ‘‘OK’’ analyst?41

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AS BOTH OR NEITHER

Instead of picking a side, several participants suggested that both perspectives
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had validity. They ultimately agreed with Robert Folker, who concluded that
intelligence analysis is both an art and a science. As he put it, ‘‘The fallacy in
the art or science debate may be the either=or proposition. If qualitative
intelligence analysis is not exclusively an art or a science, then it may best
be considered a combination of both intuitive and scientific method.’’42
Perhaps, as Josh Kerbel later argued, an alloy of the art and science is
required.43
A number of participants in the IAFIE discussion reflected this position.
As Tom Binkley said, ‘‘Where is it written that it must be mutually
exclusive, one or the other? Truly good intelligence work must be a
product of the logical analysis (science), married to the intuition and
experience of the analyst (science and art), and then delivered in a
meaningful, timely and concise manner that can be understood and acted
upon by the consumer (no higher art form exists!).’’44 Or as Joseph Pesce
put it, ‘‘As a practicing scientist with experience in both worlds, I can state
categorically that intelligence analysis is definitely a science, but there’s
‘art’ to it too (whatever ‘art’ means). Of course, there’s ‘art’ to science as
well.’’45
These observations are consistent with Isaac Ben-Israel’s suggestion that
‘‘the dichotomy between scientist and artist (or poet) is a misleading
pseudo-dichotomy (which) usually stems from excessive respect for
science.’’46 Ben-Israel then quoted Albert Einstein as saying ‘‘there is no
logical path leading to these . . . laws. They can only be reached by intuition,
based upon something like an intellectual love of the objects of experience.’’
From this, Ben-Israel concluded that the intelligence analyst ‘‘must have
creative imagination, . . . a critical mind . . . and scientific integrity.’’ In other
words, intelligence analysis is a combination of art and science.
The application of the art and the science become combined in the real
world of the practicing analyst. As David Terrell suggested, an intelligence
analyst is like a landscape painter in that ‘‘to become a landscape painter,
one must certainly learn the techniques—but then one must go out and
view the world in every light, in every direction, and in every variety of
terrain. In like manner, the intelligence artist must, after learning the
science’’ then apply that science to understand, explain, and forecast in a
wide variety of situations.47

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 IS INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AN ART OR A SCIENCE? 537

This notion of combining science and art was extended by Jeff Corkill,
who suggested that
there is a need for artistry in intelligence in keeping with what Donald
Schon has called professional artistry which he introduced as a
construct to explain the higher level competence of skilled professionals
working in the murky complexity of real world problems where theory
did not always provide the appropriate answer. Subsequently, scholars
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across a range of disciplines have adapted and utilised the concept of

professional artistry to formulate constructs . . . to examine higher level
competence in real world professional scenarios across a range of
disciplines including education, health and management.48

Continuing with the theme of combining art and science in real world
applications, numerous participants in the discussion embraced medicine as
a model for how to integrate both art and science into a single
professional discipline. This has been suggested multiple times in the
intelligence literature, and came up in the IAFIE discussion as well.49 As
David Carter pointed out:
The physician applies the rules of scientific analysis—typically deductive
reasoning—when making a diagnosis. This diagnosis and the application
of reasoning is based on the physician’s knowledge of medicine, anatomy
and physiology. Physicians with more experience use art in their
diagnosis by adding their experiential knowledge to give clarity to the
diagnosis by being able to distinguish ‘‘classic symptoms’’ of a
condition versus anomalous symptoms that suggest a different
condition. I might add we also see this extensively in epidemiology
which is a ‘‘first cousin’’ of strategic intelligence analysis.50

He went on to say: ‘‘The scientific method applies the same to the social,
economic, behavioral and political sciences (where there are fewer ‘facts’)
as it does to the physical sciences. Whether we are trying to understand a
threat from a disease or a threat from a foreign power, the scientific
method is the process we use to develop knowledge on which to base
operational decisions.’’ Interestingly, while Carter emphasized the scientific
method that underlies medicine, Mark Lowenthal emphasized the art. As
he put it: ‘‘Medicine is also an art—it is based on science but how it is
practiced is an art.’’51
Other professions also have insights to provide for the melding of art and
science. Peter Butterfield observed that methods in both medicine and legal
proceedings can provide insight to intelligence analysis. As he put it,
In both cases . . . the foundation of the discipline is science. In medicine,
science is used to collect and report findings of fact which are collated
by physicians and used to draw inferences that lead to diagnoses.

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 538 STEPHEN MARRIN

Similarly in legal matters, science is often used to collect and produce

findings from which inferences of the existence of fact (conduct or
intent) are determined—particularly where the fact is not readily
observable. . . . [M]aybe an appropriate explication of the intelligence
‘‘paradigm’’ is that science plays a significant role in the collection and
findings of fact, however analysis is an art form attributable to
a human ability that can’t be replicated by science, but possibly
understood by the use of science, for example, cognitive science, and
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philosophy . . . logic and epistemology.52

Some Dissent
In contrast to those who suggested that intelligence analysis was both an art
and a science, Richards Heuer suggested that it might in fact be neither. Heuer
claimed the debate itself was ‘‘fruitless’’ because although he learned about art
and science, he did not learn anything new about intelligence analysis.
According to Heuer, ‘‘The range of activities that fall under the rubric of
intelligence analysis spans the entire range of human cognition, and it is
meaningless to try to divide this into just two categories, art and science, or
to say that intelligence analysis is only one or the other.’’53 He continued:
In order to have a debate the debaters had to define both art and science in
ways that had little meaning to the average reader. The scientists
themselves have been debating about what science is. My personal view
is that intelligence analysis along with many other intellectual endeavors
does not match the common sense understanding of either art or
science. Who says all intellectual activity must be divided into one or
the other of these categories?54

As Heuer said, ‘‘We can all agree that effective intelligence analysis requires
both a scientific element and a creative element,’’ but ‘‘whether intelligence
analysis is considered an art or a science, or neither of these, is entirely
dependent upon how one defines art and science.’’55
Agreeing with Heuer, Paul Cooke wrote:
A discussion of science versus art has no potential to advance our
thinking about the world of intelligence analysis—or even to describe
the nature of intelligence analysis. . . . Instead we ought to, in my
opinion, abandon this debate and instead focus on what we know to
be true: that intelligence analysis is multi-disciplinary and pulls
elements of analytic methods and knowledge from a wide set of fields
of knowledge. These fields of knowledge range from the true sciences
to the true arts. . . . The more we talk about an art versus science split
within intelligence analysis the more we tend to create the impression
that such a debate is relevant and meaningful to those who practice or
study intelligence analysis. Perhaps it would be better to approach the

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 IS INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AN ART OR A SCIENCE? 539

topic from the point of view of melding science and art and by integrating
both we are drawing on the strengths of each.56

This position takes a middle ground in the discussion, not debating whether
intelligence analysis is an art or a science, but locating it either equidistant
between science and art or outside the bounds of either.
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LESSONS FROM THE DEBATE

In the end, the IAFIE debate over intelligence analysis as an art or a science
went unresolved. While the literature seems to portray intelligence analysis as
more of a science than an art, more participants argued that intelligence
analysis was an art rather than a science. Yet, most participants seemed to
agree that it was either both or neither.
The debate did, however, attract both attention and interest from a wide
variety of IAFIE members, thus demonstrating the significance of this
question for practitioners, teachers, and students of intelligence. Perhaps
the debate itself had some intrinsic value. Joseph Pesce commented: ‘‘It
doesn’t really matter whether we call it a science or an art. However, I do
think there is a psychological component to whatever flavor one gives the
field, and I think that component shouldn’t be underestimated. In this
sense, perhaps solely, there is a reason to place a label or take a ‘side.’’’57
Another reason the debate drew so much attention is its obvious relevance
for the practice of intelligence analysis. To produce exceptional analysis and
exceptional analysts, should the emphasis be on the structured methodology
associated with science or the intuitive imagination associated with art?
The answer has great significance for the selection, training, and career
development of analysts. As Todd Bacastow, a professor at Penn State
University, put it: ‘‘If intelligence analysis . . . is an inborn art, then efforts
to improve analytic results should focus on finding those individuals with
the best innate qualities and educating them to become experts. If analysis
is largely a science, then analysts can and should be educated in a variety
of analytic methodologies.’’58
Many of the recent efforts to improve intelligence analysis have been
oriented toward improving the science, or perhaps the methodology, of
analysis. This includes Rob Johnston’s taxonomy of intelligence analysis
variables,59 Timothy Smith’s suggestion to develop a ‘‘formal
interdisciplinary science of intelligence’’ by creating ‘‘knowledge factories’’
explicitly using scientific methodology to produce all-source finished
intelligence, 60 and the kinds of modeling and forecasting methodologies
profiled by Stanley Feder.61 In addition, researching the utility of analytic
methods against each other to determine their relative accuracy and
reliability in different situations would also be a positive step.62 Other recent

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efforts to improve the science of analysis include the evaluation of best

practices from academic social sciences, with their employment of the
scientific method, ethos of objectivity and independence, and pursuit of rigor.63
In contrast, fewer efforts have been oriented toward improving the art of
intelligence analysis. Some ideas for improving the art of analysis consisting
of either imagination or empathy have been proposed, but the literature is
quite limited.64 Even though the conceptualization of intelligence analysis
as an art resonated with many participants’ experiences, none could identify
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any credible scholarship that took this perspective.65 As Lisa Krizan said, if
intelligence analysis is an art
then where are the literature and examples? Many books criticize past
intelligence ‘‘failures’’ for either lacking rigor (science?) or lacking
imagination (art?). We have many books recommending structured
analytic techniques. We have many books recommending improved
strategic thinking and coordinated activities. Where are the success
stories and recommendations at the analytic level for applying thinking
and techniques that are at the ‘‘art’’ end of the spectrum? We say we
operate in both realms. But can we recognize when we’re doing it, and
teach it in a replicable way?66

If the answer to these questions is ‘‘no,’’ then both practitioners and scholars
are presented with an opportunity to develop a research agenda that advances
the ability to understand, explain, and improve the art of analysis.

Combining Assets and Talents

Improving intelligence analysis by combining both the art and the science can
be accomplished by combining both artists and scientists on analytic teams.67
In this way, it is possible for each individual to specialize in his or her area
of strength rather than requiring for everyone to be exceptional in both art
and science. For example, analysts who demonstrate an ability to apply
structured analytic techniques in a rigorous and useful way could specialize
in the science of analysis, while analysts who prefer the more imaginative or
empathetic approaches could specialize in those as well. Each of these
respective strengths could then be optimized through the use of analytic
teams built on the premise that greater knowledge can be produced through
the collaboration of complementary skill sets. Effective analytic teams can
improve analysis by integrating different kinds of knowledge and
perspectives into a product that is greater than the sum of its parts.

A Tool in Teaching Analysis

In addition to implications for improving practice, however, some utility is
evident in using the art versus science debate in the teaching of intelligence

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 IS INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AN ART OR A SCIENCE? 541

analysis precisely because it facilitates learning. While this discussion may not
provide students with complete knowledge about the practice of intelligence
analysis, it does provide them with a way to conceptualize the analytic
process through an art versus science framework. The dichotomy grabs the
attention of the students, provides them with contrasting points of view
and positions to evaluate. Invariably, some students take different
positions from others, thereby leading to a good discussion as they work
their way through the nuances of the issues in debate-like format. In my
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experience, students generally take the ‘‘intelligence analysis is both an art

and a science’’ position but disagree as to whether or not a great analyst
also had to be a great artist. Some say yes, some say no. To some degree,
this difference in interpretation is probably the result of different
conceptions of what the ratio should be between structured methodology
and unstructured insight and creativity, with some assuming more of a role
for structure and others for assuming more of a role for the unstructured.
Inevitably, the debate will continue as there is value in the conceptualization
of intelligence analysis as art or science. As it does so, participants in the
debate, both scholars and practitioners, will hopefully find ways to improve
intelligence analysis along the lines of its scientific rigor, imaginative art,
and developing mechanisms for combining them effectively.

REFERENCES
1
Robert D. Folker, Jr., ‘‘Intelligence Analysis in Theater Joint Intelligence
Centers: An Experiment in Applying Structured Methods,’’ Occasional Paper
Number Seven, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, Joint Military
Intelligence College, Washington, D.C., January 2000, p. 6.
2
Ibid., p. 6.
3
The IAFIE e-mail list was created in 2006 as a means to facilitate communication
between members.
4
Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1951, 2nd printing), p. 175.
5
Ibid., pp. 60–61.
6
Washington Platt, Strategic Intelligence Production: Basic Principles (New York:
Praeger, 1957, pp. 132–181, see Chapter 5, ‘‘Help From the Social Sciences.’’
7
Ibid., p. 75.
8
R. A. Random, ‘‘Intelligence as a Science,’’ Studies in Intelligence, No. 2, Spring
1958, pp. 75–79, at p. 78.
9
Klaus E. Knorr, ‘‘Foreign Intelligence and the Social Sciences,’’ Research
Monograph No. 17, Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1 June 1964, p. 11; Richards
J. Heuer, Jr., ‘‘Adapting Academic Methods and Models to Governmental Needs,’’
in Quantitative Approaches to Political Intelligence: The CIA Experience, Richards

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 542 STEPHEN MARRIN

J. Heuer, Jr., ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 1–10; Isaac Ben-Israel,
‘‘Philosophy and Methodology of Intelligence: The Logic of Estimate Process,’’
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 4, No. 4, October 1989, pp. 660–718.
10
Robert D. Folker, Jr., ‘‘Intelligence Analysis in Theater Joint Intelligence
Centers,’’ pp. 9–10.
11
David Carter, IAFIE List E-mail, 26 March 2010.
12
Fulton Wilcox, IAFIE List E-mail, 10 March 2009.
13
Gary Berry, IAFIE List E-mail, 9 March 2009.
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14
Paul Cooke, IAFIE List E-mail, 9 March 2009.
15
Michael Bennett, IAFIE List E-mail, 7 March 2009. Reference is to Jerome
Clauser, An Introduction to Intelligence Research and Analysis, revised and
edited by Jan Goldman (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2008), pp. 83–84.
16
Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, pp. 60–61.
17
Klaus E. Knorr, ‘‘Foreign Intelligence and the Social Sciences,’’ p. 14.
18
Isaac Ben-Israel, ‘‘Philosophy and Methodology of Intelligence,’’ p. 694.
19
Ibid.
20
Jerome K. Clauser and Sandra M. Weir, Intelligence Research and Methodology (State
College, PA: HRB Singer, 1976), pp. 37–46. The same observations are made in
Robert Jervis., ‘‘What’s Wrong With the Intelligence Process?’’ International
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1986), 28–41, at p. 29.
21
Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Adapting Academic Methods and Models to Government
Needs, p. 4.
22
Robert D. Folker, Jr., ‘‘Intelligence Analysis in Theater Joint Intelligence
Centers,’’ pp. 5–7. A problem with Folker’s definition is that it equates
intuition with lack of structure, which is not necessarily the case. He has since
acknowledged that intuition can be structured in ways that are not visible to
outside observers, suggesting that the ‘‘real difference between the two basic
analytic processes is that intuition is an invisible analytic process, and the
structured approach is a visible process.’’ Robert Folker, E-mail, 15 June 2007.
Folker goes on to say that if this distinction is correct, then a comparison
between ‘‘intuitive’’ (or invisible) and ‘‘visible’’ analytic approaches is more
appropriate than that between structured methods and intuition.
23
Paul Cooke, IAFIE List E-mail, 10 March 2009.
24
Mark Lowenthal, IAFIE List E-mail, 26 March 2010.
25
Mark M. Lowenthal, ‘‘Towards a Reasonable Standard for Analysis: How Right,
How Often on Which Issues?’’ Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 23, No. 3,
June 2008, pp. 303–315.
26
Robert Wysocki, IAFIE List E-mail, 26 March 2010.
27
Cynthia Storer, IAFIE List E-mail, 26 March 2010. Similar points about the art
of analysis resulting from a ‘‘cognitive leap that is not attributable to any process
or method’’ were previously made by Mitchell Mobus, a research analyst at
Battelle, in an IAFIE List E-mail on 10 March 2009.
28
David Terrell, IAFIE List E-mail, 10 March 2009.

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 IS INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AN ART OR A SCIENCE? 543

29
Richards J. Heuer, Jr., IAFIE List E-mail, 10 March 2009, referencing Richards J.
Heuer, Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques for
Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010).
30
Cynthia Storer, IAFIE List E-mail, 26 March 2010.
31
Richards J. Heuer, Jr., IAFIE List E-mail, 10 March 2009.
32
Michael McClellan, IAFIE List E-mail, 10 March 2009.
33
Arthur Katona, ‘‘What Can Jazz Contribute to Intelligence Analysis?’’ Paper
Presented at the Community of Interest on the Practice and Organization of
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Intelligence, Global Futures Forum, Ottawa (Canada) Roundtable, 23–24

February 2009.
34
For more on the art of intelligence analysis and how it plays out in terms of
analytic teams, see Chapters 4 and 5 in Stephen Marrin, Improving Intelligence
Analysis: Bridging the Gap between Scholarship and Practice (New York:
Routledge, 2011).
35
Stephen Marrin, IAFIE List E-mail, 9 March 2009.
36
Tom Binkley, IAFIE List E-mail, 10 March 2009.
37
Stephen Marrin, ‘‘Evaluating the Quality of Intelligence Analysis: By What (Mis)
Measure?’’ Intelligence and National Security, forthcoming 2012.
38
Kathrine Graham, IAFIE List E-mail, 8 March 2009. She cites the Will Durant
quotation as Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1961), pp. 253–254.
39
R. A. Random, ‘‘Intelligence as a Science,’’ pp. 77–78.
40
Kathrine Graham, IAFIE List E-mail, 8 March 2009, citing Ayn Rand’s The
Romantic Manifesto: A Philosophy of Literature (New York: World Publishing
Company, 1969), reproduced in part at http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/art.html
41
Fulton Wilcox, IAFIE List E-mail, 8 March 2009.
42
Robert D. Folker, Jr., ‘‘Intelligence Analysis in Theater Joint Intelligence
Centers,’’ p. 13.
43
Josh Kerbel, ‘‘Lost for Words: The Intelligence Community’s Struggle to Find Its
Voice,’’ Parameters, Vol. 38, No. 2, Summer 2008, pp. 102–112, at p. 105.
44
Tom Binkley, IAFIE List E-mail, 10 March 2009.
45
Joseph Pesce, IAFIE List E-mail, 26 March 2010.
46
Isaac Ben-Israel, ‘‘Philosophy and Methodology of Intelligence,’’ pp. 713–714.
47
David Terrell, IAFIE List E-mail, 10 March 2009.
48
Jeff Corkill, IAFIE List E-mail, 26 March 2010. Reference to Donald Shon is to
D. A. Schon, ‘‘The crisis of Professional Knowledge and the Pursuit of an
Epistemology of Practice,’’ Journal of Interprofessional Care, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp.
49–63. For more on Corkill’s take on professional artistry for the intelligence
analyst, see Jeff Corkill, ‘‘Professional Intelligence Judgment Artistry,’’
Proceedings of the First Australian Security and Intelligence Conference, Edith
Cowan University, December 2008, pp. 17–26.
49
Stephen Marrin and Jonathan Clemente,‘‘Improving Intelligence Analysis by
Looking to the Medical Profession,’’ International Journal of Intelligence and

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 544 STEPHEN MARRIN

CounterIntelligence, Vol. 18, No. 4, Winter 2005–2006, pp. 707–729; and Stephen
Marrin and Jonathan Clemente,‘‘Modeling an Intelligence Analysis Profession on
Medicine,’’ International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 19,
No. 4, Winter 2006–2007, pp. 642–665; Josh Kerbel, ‘‘Lost for Words: The
Intelligence Community’s Struggle to Find Its Voice,’’ pp. 106–107.
50
David Carter, IAFIE List E-mail, 26 March 2010.
51
Mark Lowenthal, IAFIE List E-mail, 26 March 2010.
52
Peter Butterfield, IAFIE List E-mail, 26 March 2010
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53
Richards Heuer, IAFIE List E-mail, 7 March 2009, quoting from Richards J.
Heuer, Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques for
Intelligence Analysis, Chapter 2.
54
Richards J. Heuer, Jr., IAFIE List E-mail, 7 March 2009.
55
Richards J. Heuer, Jr., IAFIE List E-mail, 10 March 2009.
56
Paul Cooke, IAFIE List E-mail, 9 March 2009.
57
Joseph Pesce, IAFIE List E-mail, 26 March 2010.
58
Todd Bacastow, IAFIE List E-mail, 10 March 2009.
59
Rob Johnston, ‘‘Developing a Taxonomy of Intelligence Analysis Variables,’’
Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2003, pp. 61–71.
60
Timothy J. Smith, ‘‘Predictive Warning: Teams, Networks, and Scientific
Method,’’ in Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations, Roger
Z. George and James B. Bruce, eds. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University
Press, 2008, pp. 266–280.
61
Stanley A. Feder, ‘‘Forecasting for Policy Making in the Post-Cold War Period,’’
Annual Reviews: Political Science, No. 5, 2002, pp. 111–125; Stanley A. Feder,
‘‘FACTIONS and Policon: New Ways to Analyze Politics,’’ in Inside CIA’s
Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency’s Internal Journal, 1955–1992,
H. Bradford Westerfield, ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995).
62
Steven Rieber and Neil Thomason, ‘‘Creation of a National Institute for Analytic
Methods,’’ Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 49, No. 4, 2005, pp. 71–77.
63
See the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Behavioral and Social
Science Research to Improve Intelligence Analysis for National Security, at
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/bbcss/DNI.html
64
See sections on improving analytic art through imagination and empathy in
Stephen Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap Between
Scholarship and Practice, pp. 47–52. Parts of this discussion were previously
published as Stephen Marrin, ‘‘Adding Value to the Intelligence Product,’’
Handbook of Intelligence Studies, Loch K. Johnson, ed. (New York: Routledge,
2006), pp. 199–210.
65
While David Brooks has written about the art of analysis, his portrayal of the
analytic process is so far removed from the reality of working intelligence
analysts that it has been strongly countered in multiple published articles. For
Brooks’s portrayal of intelligence analysis as an art, see David Brooks, ‘‘The
CIA: Method and Madness,’’ The New York Times, 3 February 2004, p. A 23;

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 IS INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AN ART OR A SCIENCE? 545

also see David Brooks, ‘‘The Elephantiasis of Reason,’’ The Atlantic Monthly,
Vol. 29, No. 1, January–February 2003, pp. 34–35. For criticisms of Brooks’s
interpretation, see Stephen Marrin, ‘‘Adding Value to the Intelligence
Product,’’ at pp. 202–203; also Josh Kerbel, ‘‘Lost for Words,’’ p. 104.
66
Lisa Krizan, IAFIE List E-mail, 10 March 2009.
67
For more on the value of analytic teams in intelligence analysis, see Richards J.
Heuer, Jr., ‘‘Small Group Processes for Intelligence Analysis,’’ Working paper,
pp. 1–38; and J. Richard Hackman and Michael O’Connor, ‘‘What Makes for
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a Great Analytic Team? Individual versus Team Approaches to Intelligence

Analysis,’’ Intelligence Science Board Task Force Report, sponsored by the
Office of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 2005, pp. 1–17.

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