Satbir Singh v State of Haryana

Dated – 28th May, 2021

Court – The Supreme Court of India

The evil of dowry is unshakeable in the society. The evil of dowry also give rise to more
vicious evil of dowry death. The parliament in order to curbed the menace of dowry death,
inserted section 304B that deals with dowry death and but the phrase 'soon before her
death' in this section creates a loophole. Nevertheless, the burden of proof lies on the
accused. Since burden of proof in on accused thus it creates more responsibility on courts to
confirm that the principle of Audi Alteram Partem is followed by courts. The court in this
case clarify the term' soon before' and also gave guidelines to be followed by the trial courts
while recording the statement of accused.
the bench of Justice NV Ramana, and Justice Aniruddha Bose, has held that Courts should
use their discretion to determine if the period between the cruelty or harassment and the
death of the victim would come within the term “soon before” as the factum of cruelty or
harassment differs from case to case.

“When the legislature used the words, “soon before” they did not mean “immediately
before”. Rather, they left its determination in the hands of the courts.”

Facts of the case

1. The accused (appellant no. 1) was married to the deceased on 1st July 1994. After
around one year on 31st July 1995 at 4:00 pm, the father of the deceased heard the
news that his daughter (deceased) was admitted to the hospital.

2. When father and his son reached the hospital, they got to know that his daughter
died due to severe injuries. According to the doctor, there were traces of Kerosene
which were found on the body of the deceased. 85% of the body was damaged due
to burn injuries. According to the witnesses, the deceased was the victim of
harassment and cruelty related to dowry.

3. The Deceased had disclosed to her brother, within a month after her marriage that
the accused, husband and mother-in-law, used to physically harass her on the
account of bringing insufficient dowry. Furthermore, the accused persons had made
 a specific demand of a scooter. Pursuant to this disclosure, she was brought back to
her paternal house.

4. Only a month prior to her death, the deceased had returned to her matrimonial
house. However, the accused still used to harass the deceased for dowry. The
aforesaid fact was revealed by the deceased to her father, when she had come to
visit him.

5. Just a week before the death, on the occasion of Teej festival, another brother of the
deceased had visited her while she was in her matrimonial home. The deceased had
reiterated her plight to her

6. On 31.07.1995, the father of the deceased was informed by some villagers that his
daughter has been admitted in the hospital. Upon reaching, the father discovered
that the deceased succumbed to burn injuries.

7. The appellants were convicted by the Trial Court in December, 1997 for the offences
under Sections 304¬B and 306, IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for seven years for the offence punishable under Section 304-B, IPC
and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years for the offence punishable
under Section 306, IPC.

8. The accused then appealed to the High Court, but the case was dismissed on 6th
November 2008. The Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the conviction granted
by the trial court.

9. Further, this appeal was presented before the Supreme Court of India by the
Accused – Satbir Singh.

Issues

The court held that basically only two questions arise before this court.
1. Whether the Trial Court, and the High Court, was correct in convicting the accused
on the charge under Section 304B, IPC?

2. Whether the Trial Court, and the High Court, was correct in convicting the accused
on the charge under Section 306, IPC?
Appellant’s Arguments

The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants made the

following submissions—

1. The possibility that the fire was accidental has not been ruled out in
the case.
2. The prosecution has failed to prove that there was a demand for
dowry.
3. Even if it assumed that there was a demand for dowry, it has not
been proved by the prosecution that the demand was made
proximate to the death of the deceased.

Respondent’s Arguments

Following submissions were made by the learned counsel appearing on the

behalf of respondent-state—

1. The appellants had failed to show any material which would merit
the interference of the Supreme Court in the concurrent findings of
the courts below.
2. It was emphasized that the deceased victim died in suspicious
circumstances within almost one year of marriage.
3. The witnesses have stated the specific instances of demand for
dowry with consistency.

Related Provisions

Section 304B of The Indian Penal Code, 1860

304B. Dowry death. —
(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise
than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that
soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or har-assment by her husband or any
relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall
be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her
death. Explanation. —For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same
meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961

Section 113B of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872

113B. Presumption as to dowry death. —

When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it
is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to
cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall
presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation. —For the purposes of
this section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in section 304B, of the Indian
Penal Code.

Section 113A of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872

113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman. —
When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by
her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide
within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such
relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard
to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her
husband or by such relative of her husband.

Section 306 of The Indian Penal Code, 1860

306. Abetment of suicide. —
If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years,
and shall also be liable to fine.
Supreme Court’s Observation

Charges under 304B of IPC, 1860

 When the legislature used the words, “soon before” they did not mean “immediately
before”. Rather, they left its determination in the hands of the courts. The factum of
cruelty or harassment differs from case to case. Even the spectrum of cruelty is quite
varied, as it can range from physical, verbal or even emotional. This list is certainly
not exhaustive. Therefore, Courts should use their discretion to determine if the
period between the cruelty or harassment and the death of the victim would come
within the term “soon before”.

 When the prosecution shows that ‘soon before her death such woman has been
subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry’, a presumption of causation arises against the accused under
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. Thereafter, the accused has to rebut this
statutory presumption.

 Further, Section 304-B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing
death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental, as was done earlier. The reason for
such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than
under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.
However, the Section 304-B, IPC endeavours to also address those situations
wherein murders or suicide are masqueraded as accidents.

 “Therefore, if all the other ingredients of Section 304¬B IPC are fulfilled, any death
whether caused by burns or by bodily injury or occurring otherwise than under
normal circumstances shall, as per the legislative mandate, be called a “dowry
death” and the woman’s husband or his relative “shall be deemed to have caused
her death” unless proved otherwise.”

 In this regard, the Supreme Court observed that “The circumstances proves that
there existed a live and proximate link between the instances of demand of dowry
and the death of the deceased.”

 The court noticed that since the ingredients of Section 304¬B, IPC stood satisfied, the
presumption under 113¬B, Evidence Act operated against the appellants, who are
deemed to have caused the offence specified under Section 304-B of IPC. The
burden therefore shifted on the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption, who in
turn, failed to make out a case for acquittal.
Charges under section 306 of IPC, 1860

 The Apex court while interpreting section 306 of IPC,1860 said that the prosecution
needs to first establish that a suicide has been committed. Secondly, the prosecution
must also prove that the person who is said to have abetted the commission of
suicide, has played an active role in the same.

 With respect to this latter requirement, Section 113¬A, Evidence Act creates a
presumption against the husband and/or his relative with respect to the abetment of
suicide of a married woman, under certain conditions. Not going into the other
conditions, a perusal of the provision indicates that such presumption shall be
attracted only if the factum of suicide has been established by the prosecution first.

 While relating the provisions of sec 306 with the facts of this case, court observed
that there is no evidence on record to support the same.

 The reasoning given by the trail court while holding the appellant under sec 306 of
IPC, 1860 - “Further, there is no direct evidence having been adduced by the
prosecution the (sic) any of the accused caused death by sprinkling kerosene on the
body of the deceased, the only possibility is that Meena Kumari put an end to her life
by sprinkling kerosene on her body.”

 So, in this regard, the Supreme Court observed that Trail court decision of charging
the appellant under Section 306 pf IPC, 1860 is not justified.

Judgement

1. Supreme Court held that the prosecution was able to prove that the death was due
burn injuries, which occurred approximately one year of completion of marriage,
with regard to dowry demand, there were many instances where deceased disclosed
the physical harassment that were faced by her for dowry. The court explains the
true import of soon before under section 304B and held that it is on discretion of
court. Thus, the court upheld the conviction of accused under section 304B of IPC.

2. The court referred to the case of Major Singh v State of Punjab in which the main
ingredients of the case was burn injuries and the harassment within 7 years of
marriage which clearly stated the requirements of section 304B.
3. The court also referred to the case of Bansi Lal v State of Haryana where it was held
that if the cruelty or harassment has been mentioned soon before the death then it
can be considered as dowry death.

4. With regard to conviction under section 306 of IPC the prosecution must prove that
the deceased committed suicide. The prosecution was not able to adduce sufficient
evidence that the deceased committed suicide. Thus, the conviction of accused
under section 306 was set aside.