CRIMINAL LAW I REVIEWER

I. Nature and Definition

1. Ient v. Tullett Prebon, G.R. No. 189158, 11 January 2017
Rule of Lenity – Applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal
statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. It calls for the
adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused. There should first be an
ambiguity before you use this rule. If the law is clear, it is not necessary to apply this rule.

II. Characteristics of Criminal Law

A. General (Art. 2, RPC)
2. Minucher v. Scalzo, G.R. No. 142396, 11 February 2003
Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the Philippines is
a signatory, grants him absolute immunity from suit, describing his functions as an agent of the
United States Drugs Enforcement Agency.

The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or
nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to the
heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs.
Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative
staff and the technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the
diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the
mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations provides for immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless,
with an understanding that the same be restrictively applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under
the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and
criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or
members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from all
others. It might bear stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective states in
concerns of commerce and navigation and perform certain administrative and notarial duties,
such as the issuance of passports and visas, authentication of documents, and administration of
oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded
diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of representing their
states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a
diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of
diplomatic nature.
Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an Assistant Attaché of the
United States diplomatic mission and was accredited as such by the Philippine Government. …
Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main
function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in
the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home
government. These officials are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic
mission, nor are they normally designated as having diplomatic rank.

However, respondent Arthur Scalzo was acquitted for the reason that he was entitled to the
defense of state immunity from suit, not diplomatic immunity.

3. Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865, 28 January 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) who was
criminally charged before the MeTC with two counts of grave oral defamation for allegedly
uttering defamatory words against fellow ABD worker Joyce Cabal.
The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the DFA stating that
petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the
country.

The MeTC dismissed the petition. On appeal, the RTC set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered
the issuance of the warrant of arrest against petitioner. Thus, petitioner elevated the case to
Supreme Court, arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner covered by the said immunity granted by the Agreement?

HELD:
NO. Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our
laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
… It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming
petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except
in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. As already mentioned
above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.

4. Del Socorro v. Van Wilesem, G.R. No. 193707, 10 December 2014

Petitioner and respondent who is a foreign national were once married. However, their marriage
relations eventually turned sour and a divorce decree was later obtained in Holland. When
respondent failed to fulfill his promise to provide monthly support to their son, petitioner filed a
case against respondent for violation of R.A. 9262 or the VAWC Law regarding the latter’s
unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.

The lower court dismissed the petition, ruling that the respondent is not subject to our national
law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to give support to his child.
Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his
child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give
support to his child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a
parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima facie case
exists against the accused herein.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law;
and

2. Whether a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

HELD:
I. NO. Petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from
respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle
of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the
provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy,
the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with
respect to family rights and duties.
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, he is subject to the laws of his
country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as
the consequences of his failure to do so.

This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
altogether. In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his
favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the
same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards
the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

II. YES. Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the
child is considered an act of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength
in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14
of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those
of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this
score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his
child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents
of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense
charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was
acquired upon his arrest.

5. Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, 10 August 2006

FACTS:
More than 300 soldiers and officers of the AFP aimed to destabilize the government by
disarming the security guards at Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue,
Makati City and planted explosive devices around the building. When peace negotiations
between the Government and the rebelling party were successful, 31 soldiers of the AFP were
charged with the crime of coup d’etat under Article 134-A of the RPC and of several provisions
of the Articles of War under Commonwealth Act No. 408 in the military tribunal.
The RTC declared that "all charges before the court martial against the accused not service-
connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat."

Consequently, petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in that the
offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the
Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat, the military
tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.

On the other hand, respondent counters that R.A. No. 7055 specifies which offenses covered by
the Articles of War are service-connected and therefore triable by the court martial. As the
charge against petitioners is violation of Article 96 which, under R.A. No. 7055 is a service-
connected offense, then it falls under the jurisdiction of the court martial.

ISSUE:
Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the petitioners’ violation of the Articles of War?

HELD:
NO. The offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is
expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the
charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to
defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused
dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on
their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-
connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same – dismissal from the
service – imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character,
evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent
standard of military discipline.
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is ‘absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged
crime of coup d’etat.’ Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law
and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different
statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction
over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over
service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of
absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.
B. Territorial (Art. 2, RPC)
6. People v. Tulin, G.R. No. 111709, 30 August 2001

FACTS:
“M/T Tabangao,” a cargo vessel loaded with fuel was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near
Silonay Island when it was suddenly boarded by seven fully armed pirates who detained the crew
and took complete control of the vessel. The vessel was then forced to sail and anchored about
10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore’s shoreline where another vessel called “Navi Pride”
received the cargo under the supervision of Cheong San Hiong, one of the respondents in this
case.

Respondents were arrested and charged with qualified piracy for violating Presidential Decree
No. 532 and were convicted as principals of the crime charged, except for respondent Hiong who
was convicted as an accomplice. Appealing his conviction, respondent counters that the lower
court did not acquire jurisdiction over him since the crime was committed outside Philippine
waters.

ISSUE:
Can the accused Cheong San Hiong be tried for the crime of piracy which was committed
outside of Philippine waters?

HELD:
YES. The attack on and seizure of the vessel and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters,
although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-
loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct
supervision. Although P.D. No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its
cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo
is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine
waters. Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such,
it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law.

C. Prospective (Article 21 and 22, RPC)

ART. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. – No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not
prescribed by law prior to its commission.
Reason for the provision: An act or omission cannot be punished by the State if at the time it was
committed there was no law prohibiting it, because a law cannot be rationally obeyed unless it is first
shown, and a man cannot be expected to obey an order that has not been given.

ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
A habitual delinquent is one who, within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last
conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa, or falsification,
he is found guilty of any said crimes a third time or oftener.

7. People vs. Lol-lo, G.R. No. 17958 27 February 1922

FACTS;
A boat of Dutch possession arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies.
There, the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros then
attacked the people on the boat and violated the women. The respondents were one of the Moros that
attacked the boat and were subsequently arrested and charged with the crime of piracy. It was argued that
the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.

ISSUE:
Do Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the respondents which committed piracy outside of the
Philippines?

HELD:
YES. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but
against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may
be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no
territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was
committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war,
are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

III. Sources of Criminal Law

A. Revised Penal Code
The RPC is the primary source of criminal law which took effect on January 1932. It is divided
into three parts:
 1. Principles affecting criminal liability;
2. Penalties which include civil and criminal liability;
3. Felonies defined by different titles.
B. Special Penal Laws
SPLs are referred to as an act that is wrong because it is prohibited. No criminal intent is needed
in order to find a person liable for crimes punished under SPLs. As long as the act is committed,
then it is punishable as a crime under law.
V. Construction and interpretation
A. Liberally in favor of the accused
B. Spanish text of the RPC prevails over the English text
18. People v. Abilong, G.R. No. L-1960, 26 November 1948
FACTS:
Respondent Florentino Abilong was charged with evasion of service of sentence. He appealed
from his conviction in that the lower court erred in imposing a penalty under article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code, which does not cover evasion of service of "destierro."
Respondent contends that a person evading a sentence of destierro is not criminally liable, for
the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons who are imprisoned in a penal institution
and completely deprived of their liberty. He bases his contention on the word "imprisonment"
used in the English text of said article.

ISSUE:
Should the English text/translation of the RPC prevail over the Spanish text?

HELD:
NO. Inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the
Spanish text governs. It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong
or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text.

C. Retroactive application when favorable to the accused

19. Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, 5 December 2017
FACTS:
Petitioner was a Supervising Fiscal Clerk in the DOTC CAR, by virtue of which she was
designated as cashier, disbursement and collection office. When she failed to reasonably explain
the whereabouts of the money remittance amounting to ₱11,300.00 supposed to be deposited to
the LBP, the COA filed a complaint against her for malversation of public funds under the RPC.
The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner appealed to the CA, which
affirmed her conviction but modified the penalty imposed from 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months, and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum.

Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court that the case be reopened for further reception of
evidence,

ISSUE:
Should the case be reopened?

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court called for the reopening of the case in order to modify the penalty
imposed by said court. The recent passage of R.A. No. 10951 which reduced the penalty of
Article 217, Malversation of Public Funds as charged herein is an example of such exceptional
circumstance, whether the penalty was amended to prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation docs not
exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000.00).

Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, We have here a novel situation wherein the
judgment convicting the accused, petitioner herein, has already become final and executory
and yet the penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage of said law.
Because of this, not only must petitioner's sentence be modified respecting the settled rule on
the retroactive effectivity of laws, the sentencing being favorable to the accused, she may even
apply for probation, as long as she does not possess any ground for disqualification, in view of
recent legislation on probation, or R.A. No. 10707 entitled An Act Amending Presidential
Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976," As Amended.

D. Prescribed but undeserved penalties (Art. 5, RPC)

20. People v. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, 29 November 1950
FACTS:
Respondent was found guilty of the crime of parricide when he stabbed his wife at the back with
a bolo which resulted in her death not long after. The blow sent the wife toppling down the stairs
to the ground, immediately followed by her husband who, taking her up in his arms, carried her
up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. Said act was
said to have been caused by jealousy because of the accused’s suspicions that his wife and his
half-brother were having illicit relations.

The presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances were found in respondent’s case, namely,
"suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or
communication with his fellow beings," or such illness "as would diminish the exercise of his
will power", pertaining to his feeblemindedness, and that of passion and obfuscation.

ISSUE:
Given the fact that respondent merely acted in a fit of rage and jealousy, should respondent’s
sentence in the crime of parricide be lowered?

HELD:
NO. While the law provides that when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied, the
Court cited several jurisprudence regarding the application of such to rule to the crime of
parricide, that notwithstanding the numerous mitigating circumstances found to exist, inasmuch
as the penalty for parricide as fixed by article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is composed of two
indivisible penalties, namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of article 63 of the said
Code must be applied.

In the case at bar, the Court ruled that appellant was guilty of parricide and applied the
appropriate penalty. However, believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this
case should be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce
the penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive
clemency in the manner he sees fit, applying Article 5 of the RPC.

E. Suppletory application of RPC to Special Penal Laws (Art. 10, RPC)

21. Ladonga v. People, G.R. No. 141066, 17 February 2005

FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted by the RTC for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner contends that the lower court erred in finding her criminally
liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg.
22 which is a special law.
The CA affirmed the conviction of petitioner and held that the provisions of the penal code were
made applicable to special penal laws under jurisprudence and Article 10 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides that its provisions shall be supplementary to special laws unless the latter
provide the contrary. Moreover, said law does not provide any prohibition regarding the
applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the RPC.

ISSUE:
Is conspiracy applicable in violations of B.P. Blg. 22 by invoking Article 10 of the RPC?

HELD:
Article 10 of the RPC is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the
future are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while
the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are
contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.

The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling
with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental
rule of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones. Lex
specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could have
been eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and
purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to
special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.

B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the
RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of
the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.

Petitioner was, however, acquitted since the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed
any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy or failed to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

22. People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994

FACTS:
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged with a violation of R.A. No. 6425,
as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging
that he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in
consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination,
were found positive for marijuana.
Considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at bar, the penalty of
prision correccional is consequently indicated by said law.

ISSUE:
In determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here to be taken from the penalty of prision
correccional, can the presence or absence of mitigating, aggravating or other circumstances
modifying criminal liability be taken into account?

HELD:
YES. We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty
for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under
the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as
applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws
involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and
which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code.
Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the
minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider the
aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the
penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.

The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of
the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a
prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.

The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly
punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal
Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal
effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law
involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would
consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from
the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being
no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Davide, Jr.:

An offense is  punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its definition and the penalty therefor
are found in the said Code, and it is deemed punished by a special law if its definition and the
penalty therefor are found in the special law. That the latter imports or borrows from the Revised
Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties does not make an offense in the special law punished
by or punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite simple. It is still the special
law that defines the offense and imposes a penalty therefor, although it adopts the Code's
nomenclature of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a penalty found in the
Revised Penal Code can by no means make an offense thereunder an offense "punished or
punishable" by the Revised Penal Code./

Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659 had adopted the penalties
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code in drug cases, offenses related to drugs should now be
considered as punished under the Revised Penal Code. If that were so, then we are also bound,
ineluctably, to declare that such offenses are mala in se and to apply the Articles of the Revised
Penal Code regarding the stages of a felony (Article 6), the nature of participation (Article 16),
accessory penalties (Articles 40-45), application of penalties to principals, accomplices, and
accessories (Article 46 et seq.), complex crimes (Article 48), and graduation of penalties (Article
61), among others. We cannot do otherwise without being drawn to an inconsistent posture
which is extremely hard to justify.

MODULE 2: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

I. Felony, defined (Art. 3, RPC)

Article 3. Definitions. - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).

Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

II. Elements of criminal liability

A. Physical element (Actus reus)

a. Act

b. Omission

1. People v. Sylvestre and Atienza, G.R. No. 35748, 14 December 1931

FACTS:

Respondents in this case were having illicit relations, respondent Sylvestre being the married
party. When the husband of respondent Sylvestre filed a complaint for adutltery, respondents
urged him to withdraw the complaint, binding themselves to discontinue cohabitation, and
promising not to live again in the barrio of Masocol.

However, the cohabitation of respondents continued in the house of one Nicolas de la Cruz.
Thereafter, respondent Atienza told Nicolas de la Cruz to take their furniture of the house
because he was going to burn it in order to have his revenge to the people of Masocol who
instigated the charge of adultery against him. A total of 48 houses were destroyed, and
respondents were convicted with the crime of arson, with respondent Sylvestre as an accomplice
for she listened to her co-defendant's threat without raising a protest, and did not give the alarm
when the latter set fire to the house.

ISSUE:

Can respondent Sylvestre guilty of being an accomplice to the crime of arson committed by her
co-defendant, Martin Atienza?

HELD:

NO. The complicity which is penalized requires a certain degree of cooperation, whether moral,
through advice, encouragement, or agreement, or material, through external acts. In the case of
the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation,
and none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while
they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they
encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give
the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.

Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the
alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required
by article 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed
passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent. Therefore, respondent Sylvestre was
acquitted.

2. People v. Talingdan, G.R. No. L-32126, 6 July 1978

FACTS:

Respondents, all armed with long firearms and acting in conspiracy with each other, gunned
down Bernardo Bagabag, husband of respondent Teresa Domogma in retaliation to Bernardo
when he confronted respondents Teresa and Nemesis Talingdan having illicit relations.

They were actually seen committing the offense by Bernardo and Teresa’s daughter, Corazon.
She was the one who prepared the food and was watching her father nearby. Although only
Talingdan and Tobias continued firing at her father after they had climbed the stairs of the
"batalan", it was Bides who threatened her that he would kill her if she called for help. Berras
did not fire any shot then. But even before the four appellants went up the "batalan", they
already fired shots from downstairs.

ISSUE:

HELD:

Respondents are guilty of murder qualified by treachery and that they committed the said offense
in conspiracy with each other, with the presence of two aggravating circumstances, namely,
evident premeditation and in the dwelling of the offended party.

In these premises, the crime committed by the male appellants being murder, qualified by
treachery, and attended by the generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
that the offense was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the Court has no alternative
under the law but to impose upon them the capital penalty. However, as to appellant Teresa, she
is hereby found guilty only as an accessory to the same murder.

Coming now to the particular case of appellant Teresa Domogma, as to whom the Solicitor
General has submitted a recommendation of acquittal, We find that she is not as wholly innocent
in law as she appears to the Counsel of the People. It is contended that there is no evidence
proving that she actually joined in the conspiracy to kill her husband because there is no showing
of “actual cooperation" on her part with her co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to his
death. If at all, what is apparent, it is claimed, is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval"
thereof on her part, which it is argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a
conspirator per People vs. Mahlon, 99 Phil. 1068. We do not see it exactly that way.