122  THE ART OF MILITARY COERCION

training of Afghan police forces. One particular point of criticism was the
restriction that police forces trained by the Dutch were not allowed to
carry out combat operations except for self defense. This was the result of
a compromise in Parliament where left-wing politicians rejected Dutch
involvement with combat operations.
As noted above, decision making, by definition, is based on subjective
considerations. This may lead to the perception that decision making is
irrational or leads to great operational risks. Working through focal points
or taking success factors into consideration can improve this state of affairs.
However, even this does not automatically result in success, because this
approach is mechanical and based on the exact sciences.
A bad strategy could result in the prolongation of the conflict or defeat.
Long-lasting interventions are accompanied by great political and military
risks. If an intervention takes too much time, the credibility and reliability
of the policymakers will be reduced and public and political support for
further measures will erode. Operational planners at NATO predicted that
Operation Allied Force would last five days; in the end it became 78. In
this period, support for the air campaign crumbled to such an extent in
countries such as Germany and Italy that NATO feared for the collapse of
the coalition. The strategy of Operation Allied Force, based on the idea of a
phased air campaign with gradual escalation, was simply wrong. It left the
initiative to the opponent, allowing the Serbs to kill more Albanians during
the war than before. A successful strategy provides a clear link between
political objectives and military means.

Two strategies of coercion

To decide on the right strategy, f irst must be understood from which

strategies can be chosen. The difference between coercive diplomacy and
military coercion is the weight and emphasis accorded to diplomacy and
military force in efforts to coerce the opponent. Although seemingly trivial,
these strategies are entirely distinct, and opting for one entails very dif-
ferent consequences for the actions of the coercer. In coercive diplomacy,
economic sanctions and the threat or limited use of military force are used
to add weight to diplomatic activities. The military power instrument is
used as a deterrent or a punishment; either by threatening its use, or by
its limited employment but always by being subordinate to the diplomatic
effort. In coercive diplomacy, the military instrument is complemented with
other power instruments, and achieving military success is of secondary
The Strategic Efficacy of Power Instruments 123

concern. A strategy of coercive diplomacy is built around a deterrent threat

to use force, economic sanctions, political isolation, and inducements. If
the adversary does not comply, measures to punish the opponent with
military means should be the next step. If coercive diplomacy fails or has
been rendered obsolete, the coercer may have no other choice but to turn
to a strategy of military coercion. Here, the instrument of military power
is assigned priority, and preference is given to achieving military success,
possibly necessitating intensive use thereof. Diplomacy moves to the back-
ground, or diplomatic channels are closed altogether. Military coercion is
a strategy that uses the armed forces as a stick to exact political objectives.
It is an integral component of the dynamic of coercion.
Successful military coercion or coercive diplomacy requires a dynamic
approach, based on creativity, flexibility in the methods to achieve the
objectives and knowledge of the dynamics of coercion. In addition, an un-
derstanding of the power instruments themselves is required. The strategy
should take threats, possibilities, perceptions, and improbabilities into
account. It must be a reflection of the expected dynamic resulting from the
interaction between the actors involved. The balance between costs and
benefits for both coercer and opponent determines the dynamic and guides
the choice of strategy. The opponent is only willing to change his behavior
if the costs of complying with the demands of the coercer are lower than
the costs of resistance. This implies that the coercer must not only have
an understanding of his own costs and benefits, but also of those of the
opponent. Carl von Clausewitz formulated it as follows: “If our opponent
is to be made to comply with our will, we must place him in a situation
which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice which we demand.”34
There must be a clear link between political objectives and means used.
Political isolation and sanctions are useful instruments for a strategy of
coercive diplomacy. When used in isolation, however, sanctions are predomi-
nantly used to express a political signal of discord and to demonstrate to the
domestic constituency that “something” is being done. For that reason, the
objectives that are to be achieved through an exclusive reliance on sanctions
should never be ambitious. To be effective, sanctions should be part of a
broader strategy in which diplomacy, sanctions, rewards, and military force
are complementary and mutually reinforcing. The threat of or use of limited
military means may help to enforce sanctions by carrying out an embargo
or a blockade. There must, however, be a willingness to escalate, and for the
opponent, this must be clear. This requires the coercer to speak with one

34 C. von Clausewitz, On War (London: Penguin Books 1968), p. 104.

124  THE ART OF MILITARY COERCION

voice and follow a consistent course and do so persistently. This may require
escalation to a strategy of military coercion. In that event, diplomacy plays
a subordinate role at best; military means should be employed decisively to
achieve the political goals. Credible escalation dominance thereby becomes
a prerequisite for success.
The choice of coercion strategy informs the way in which the military
is used. Several possible applications of military force exist ranging from
punishment to decapitation and from control to attrition. Their choice deter-
mines how the opponent is targeted and is dependent on whether military
coercion or coercive diplomacy takes place and the type of opponent the
coercer is confronting.
Thirteen of the twenty-eight cases studies listed in the appendix were
deemed successful in meeting the declared political objectives. In some
cases, including Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011), politicians declared victory,
but this claim cannot be sustained if one measures the outcome of both
NATO operations against the objectives set. In both cases, NATO was unable
to quickly end humanitarian suffering, while more people were killed dur-
ing the military operations than in the months preceding the intervention.
Some authors measure success differently. James Dobbins and Laurel Miller
measured progress in 20 post-conflict nation-building missions conducted
by NATO, the UN, and ad hoc coalitions.35 They used the Freedom House
Index, data from the International Monetary Fund, and the UN’s Human
Development Index. Dobbins and Lauren concluded that sixteen of these
societies achieved peace in 2012, and that all but two saw improvements in
democratization, but they did not establish a direct link between the data
and the interventions. In cases where no intervention took place, such as
Rwanda, a similar development happened. In other words, using successful
examples of state building as a justification for interventions should be
rejected on empirical grounds.

In twelve of the thirteen successful cases listed in the appendix, use was
made of military coercion, six of which started out as interventions of
coercive diplomacy but later changed to instances of military coercion.
Only two cases of coercive diplomacy were successful, Operation Deliberate
Force in Bosnia and Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. Regarding the
military strategy used, in all cases of successful military coercion (the threat
of) the physical control of territory with ground forces was instrumental

35 James Dobbins and Laurel Miller, “Overcoming obstacles to peace”, Survival, February-March
2013, pp. 103-120.
The Strategic Efficacy of Power Instruments 125

to success. In Operation Allied Force no actual use was made of elements

of control. However, in this case, the threat of physical control of territory
is widely considered to have contributed to Milosevic’s collapse. Control as
a military strategy seems essential for successful coercion, however, it is
not a guarantee. For instance, the two Chechen wars failed because Russia
incompetently applied doctrine and the tactics of control and attrition. In
ten of the fifteen unsuccessful cases, there was a mismatch between means
and objectives.
Another conclusion is that asymmetry in interests is to the advantage of
the party which interests are more at stake. During Operation Continued
Hope in Somalia and Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, no real interests were
at stake for the coercer. As such, in its military strategies, it was reluctant
to apply force decisively, and both operations failed.
In conclusion, to be successful, the coercer should be willing to employ
force decisively; this is motivated by the interests at stake. When opting for
military coercion, the military strategy should contain significant elements
of control, and limited objectives are a prerequisite for balancing military
means and political ends.
In choosing for military coercion or coercive diplomacy, policymak-
ers need to be aware of three generic mechanisms that, when combined,
determine the strategic efficacy of power instruments. Derived from the
twenty-eight case studies listed in the appendix, these mechanisms apply
to both coercer and opponent. They are intentionally broadly formulated,
as they relate both to the preparation of regime-change operations as well
as relatively easy and risk-free peacekeeping operations. Finally, these
mechanisms can be applied to activities facing non-state actors, as the
struggle against militias and terrorist organizations also demands a solid
balance between means and objectives and costs and benefits.

Coercive mechanism 1: The intensity with which the coercer is prepared

to use power instruments is proportional to the interests at stake.

The case studies reveal that the interests of the coercer (ICoercer in Fig. 3.1) are
directly related to the intensity with which the coercer is prepared to use
his power instruments (in Fig. 1 identified by the letter p). The interests at
stake for the coercer (or coercers) are translated into a willingness to use
military force – the ultimate power broker in coercion – and a willingness to
incur costs in the process. If the interests at stake are high or vital, a coercer
will be more inclined to turn to military means, display greater resolve, and
accept higher costs. These costs are generally defined in terms of financial
126  THE ART OF MILITARY COERCION

capital, and material and human costs. If the interests at stake are low or
non-vital, the willingness to use force will be low and there will be a limited
ability to absorb friendly casualties and other costs. In that case, the coercer
will generally turn to diplomatic or economic power instruments, which
are relatively risk free. The intensity with which power instruments are
employed by the coercer is thereby a product of the willingness to use force
and the willingness to incur costs. Schematically this can be captured in
the following coercion equation:

ICoercer = p:
the intensity with which power instruments are used is related to the interests
at stake and;

ICoercer = F + C:
the interests at stake determine the coercer’s willingness to use force (F) and
incur costs (C).

Therefore: p = F + C:
The willingness to use power instruments is determined by the willingness to
use force and incur costs.

Figure 3.1 demonstrates this mechanism by plotting several interventions

by Western states. For the United States, the threat posed by the Taliban
regime in 2001 was considered a vital interest. The 9/11 attacks shook the
United States, which then mobilized significant military resources to re-
move the Taliban from power and ensure that Afghanistan would no longer
be a terrorist sanctuary. At the other end of the scale, we find operation
Continued Hope in Somalia in 1993, where the United States withdrew its
forces following the loss of eighteen Rangers. No vital interests were at stake
and the United States was not willing to incur the human cost. A similar
dynamic has been at play in recent years regarding a possible Western
intervention in the humanitarian crisis in the region of Darfur in Sudan.
While human rights are violated, they are not perceived to constitute
a threat to vital interests warranting a decisive employment of power
instruments.
The Strategic Efficacy of Power Instruments 127

Figure 3.1 Assessment of Coercion Function and several interventions

by Western states (see appendix)

ICoercer = p curve
+
Iraqi Freedom
Enduring Freedom
Desert Storm
1st Chechen War
2nd Chechen War
Intensity to use power instruments / use of force (p)

2nd Lebanon War

Iraqi Stabilization Cast lead, Grapes
of Wrath, Pillar of
Desert Fox Defense
Allied Force
Serval US/Philippines
Amber Fox Libya ISAF

Warden El Dorado Canyon

Uphold Democracy Deliberate Force
Paliser
Northern/ Infinite Reach
Southern Watch
Deny Flight and Sharpguard
Continued
Just Cause
Hope
Operation Turquoise

Interest of Coercer (I) +

The coercion function also helps understand the behavior of states

during or prior to coalition operations. In the run-up to Operation Iraqi
Freedom, the United States requested the support of the Netherlands for
its intervention in Iraq. The Netherlands however, was only willing to
support operation Iraqi Freedom politically, not militarily. The interests
at stake for the US government were dissimilar to the interests at stake
for the Dutch government. The Iraqi regime was not seen by the Dutch
as threatening its interests to a similar degree. The Netherlands did not
perceive the Iraqi regime as constituting a vital security threat warranting
the mobilization of substantial military resources. The Dutch and US
governments had a different appreciation regarding the use of power
instruments and, subsequently, this resulted in different behavior. Coali-
tion operations are an effort to deal with interest differentials among allies.
This impacts the overall willingness to apply power instruments decisively.
During operation Allied Force, political negotiation among allies took place
throughout the military operation. Allies had differing interests at stake
and therefore had their own separate position on the coercion function.
Political motivations, combined with military-operational necessities,
128  THE ART OF MILITARY COERCION

prescribe a preference for coalition operations; however,they may jeopard-

ize effective coercion.
Effective coercion demands a willingness to employ power instruments
decisively. Escalation dominance is a necessity intervening states must be
willing to adhere to, but this will only occur when the interests at stake are
sufficiently high and, in the case of coalition operations, when interests are
defined similarly. When vital interests are threatened and the coercer is
willing to apply power instruments decisively, usually the interests at stake
are related to the security or survival of the state. However, for Western
states, these interests are seldom at risk. Governments will not be willing
to pay a high price to coerce others. In the model, p will be small or close
to zero. Consequently, political leaders may choose to “do something”;
because for domestic political reasons the political price of doing nothing
could be too high. This clearly is a dilemma. The chance that what they’ve
done will be successful is low, because the opponent will not be impressed
by the coercive measures. If force is not applied decisively, the role of
inducements becomes important. Alexander George and William Simons
have argued that inducements, combined with more traditional forms of
coercion, make resolution of a conflict more likely.36 The most commonly
used inducement is economic aid or the lifting of sanctions as a reward
for compliance.
During the conflict, the perception of interests at stake may change,
resulting in a new cost-benefit calculus for the coercer. This could occur
in case of a half-hearted or unsuccessful intervention. Lack of success
could lead to a situation where the credibility of the coercer is at risk; the
interests thereby increase. This occurred during the months preceding the
war on Kosovo. Economic sanctions were put in place (p was low, because
the interests at stake were low), yet they had little effect. NATO warned
Milosevic numerous times before commencing operation Allied Force. But
Milosevic did not comply. If this situation had continued, NATO would
have suffered loss of face. This was considered unacceptable. The interests
at stake increased, influencing the intensity with which power instruments
were willing to be used. The Alliance started the war, and then-British
Prime Minister Blair put the credibility of the alliance forward as one of
the reasons for the intervention. “Just as I believe there was no alternative
to military action [in Kosovo], now it has started I am convinced there is
no alternative to continuing until we succeed. On its 50th birthday, NATO

36 George and Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, pp. 28-29.

The Strategic Efficacy of Power Instruments 129

must prevail,” Tony Blair said on April 24, 1999. 37 As interests had increased,
so had the intensity with which power instruments were used, and NATO
shifted to a strategy of military coercion. During the operation, as Milosevic
defied NATO by not complying with the demands it had set, interests at
stake further increased for the alliance. NATO’s credibility was put at risk.
As losing was no option, towards the end of the intervention, decision
makers in a number of countries were willing to execute a “ground option.”38
From Allied Force we have learned that during an intervention that starts
out with initially no vital risks at stake, not losing could become a vital
interest itself. The objective of the intervention is redefined, resulting in
an escalation of the conflict. This phenomenon is called entrapment: the
policymaker becomes a prisoner of his own decisions. He cannot retreat,
because this will lead to loss of face and affect his credibility. Interests at
stake increase, having their effect on the willingness to use force and to
incur costs, leading to a greater intensity in the use of power instruments.
This situation can occur when the opponent’s motivation, opportunities to
resist and willingness to take blows is underestimated or misunderstood.
Therefore the second essential coercive mechanism focuses on the opponent.

Coercive mechanism 2: The opponent attempts to confront costs

following from the intervention that are directly proportional to his
interests at stake.

For the opponent, the same calculus holds as for the coercer. The interests
at stake are the determinants for his motivation, in this case, for resist-
ing the coercer. Economic sanctions can threaten his economic safety, a
military intervention his territorial integrity, and a combination of both can
undermine the political and social stability in his territory and compromise
his regime. In the ultimate case, an intervention can threaten the life of
the opponent.
For the opponent, the interests at stake translate into a willingness to
incur costs as well.39

37 Prime Minister Tony Blair, “Doctrine of the International Community”, address at the
Economic Club, Chicago (IL), April 24, 1999.
38 See, for instance: D. Priest, “Kosovo Land Threat May Have Won the War”, Washington Post,
September 19, 1999.
39 This is a variant to Robert Pape’s model presented in Bombing to Win which reads:
“R + Bp(B) – Cp(C), where: R = value of resistance, B = potential benefits, p(B) = probability of
attaining benefits by continued resistance, C = potential costs of resistance, p (C)= probability
of suffering costs,” p. 16.
130  THE ART OF MILITARY COERCION

If a government feels that its continuation or existence is threatened, it

will be inclined to accept higher costs than if the objective of the interven-
tion of the coercer is limited. 40 An intervention intent on “regime change”
is, for instance, directly targeted at the government itself and leaves little
room for maneuver. The reaction of the opponent is likely to be a “nothing to
lose” strategy. This is especially the case when dictators or autocratic leaders
are concerned. Such a strategy can only be pursued when the interests
involved for the coercer are high, so that he is willing to use force decisively
and pursue regime change vigorously or when the target is substantially
weaker and has lost control over the state’s power instruments, such as was
the case with Noriega in Panama and Cedras in Haiti.

The appendix shows that interests at stake for the opponent have gener-
ally been larger than for the coercer creating asymmetries of interest and
yielding insights into the course of action pursued by both sides. The low
level of interest the US accorded to al-Qaeda in 1998 helps understand why
Infinite Reach was limited to a risk-free salvo of cruise missiles. During the
regime change operation Iraqi Freedom and the counterterrorist operation
Enduring Freedom the interests at stake for the United States were closely
aligned with those of the opponent and led to a dedicated effort involving
substantial military forces. Figure 3.1 illustrates why the United States
withdrew its troops following the incident in 1993 with Task Force Ranger
in Somalia (limited interests at stake), and why it accepted significant
casualties and costs during Desert Storm (significant interests at stake).
Also, it is indicative of the problems the United States was encountering
in Iraq in the stabilization phase following the regime change in 2003. The
interests at stake in Iraq were perceived as lower than during Operation
Allied Force in 1999. This is a reason why the US government was facing
strong domestic pressure to withdraw from Iraq; the willingness to incur
costs had been surpassed.
It should not be surprising that the interests at stake for the opponent
mostly outweigh those of the coercer. The opponent oftentimes has much
more to lose. If vital interests are at stake for the opponent, but not for the
coercer, the opponent is willing to make larger sacrifices than the coercer,
which diminishes the likelihood of quick success. An intervention will
then, in the most advantageous case, proceed tediously, and in the worst

40 See also Jeffrey Record, “The Limits and Temptations of America’s Conventional Military
Primacy”, Survival, vol. 97, no. 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 36-37.
The Strategic Efficacy of Power Instruments 131

case, fail. 41 When there are asymmetries of interest in favor of the op-
ponent, the coercer should be aware that the opponent will be willing to
employ his power instruments with greater intensity and tenacity than the
coercer. Ignoring the opponent’s interests is dangerous when the opponent’s
tactics are ignored as well. The failed humanitarian intervention in Somalia
provides an excellent example. Unfortunately, in most interventions, there
is an asymmetry of interests. If there are no vital interests at stake for the
coercer, caution is advised.
The key is to accurately assess the interests of the opponent. The logic
of coercion ensures that the calculus of the coercer and the opponent are
intimately connected. They are locked together in a dynamic. The coercer
shapes his action based on the perceived interests at stake. For the coercer,
the interests at stake – caused by the opponent’s actions – are the starting
point. The coercer perceives the world around him and identifies threats
to his interests. These affect his willingness to incur costs and determine
the intensity with which he is willing to use power instruments to defend
or promote those interests. The opponent’s willingness to incur costs is
dependent on his interests at stake, which are derived from the course of
action the coercer adopts. The logic of action and reaction ensues. If the
opponent feels that vital interests are threatened he will be willing to accept
a higher cost and will be more resilient. The interest and cost calculus of
the opponent is dependent on the action taken by the coercer. This is an
aspect that has been little understood by policymakers. Instead, Western
leaders rarely take the interests of the opponent into account or only do so
marginally. The first explanation for this is a lack of empathy, generally for
domestic political purposes. There is an almost uncontrollable tendency to
demonize the opponent, often to obtain public support for an intervention.
Yet this blinds decision makers to the strategic options of the opponent.
Furthermore, there is a widespread sense of moral superiority. Interventions
are often portrayed as battles between good and evil or as a new mission
civilisatrice; the means and resources of the 21st century are employed to
act against institutions of “medieval barbarism.” Prior to the first Gulf War,
one way President George H.W. Bush justified military action was on the
basis that Saddam was worse than Hitler: “This morning, right now, over
three hundred innocent Americans – civilians – are held against their will
in Iraq. Many of them are reportedly staked out as human shields near pos-

41 Exceptions are the interventions in Haiti and Panama, where military operations removed
leaders that had become isolated and were unable to mount significant opposition against US
coercion.
132  THE ART OF MILITARY COERCION

sible military targets, something that even Adolf Hitler didn’t do.”42 During
the war on Kosovo, Milosevic was demonized by Western politicians and
commentators, charged with genocide and indicted by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for crimes against humanity. 43
Similarly, with respect to the NATO operation in Afghanistan, Secretary
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer spoke about NATO not being “in the same
moral category” as the Taliban. 44 By advocating moral superiority, the
organization runs the risk of underestimating the opponent.
Secondly, the cultural context in which coercion occurs is often ne-
glected. This applies to understanding the interests of the opponent as well
as his ensuing behavior. Assuming irrationality because he does not behave
conform to Western assumptions of rationality is a recipe for disaster. 45 Arab
ethics, for instance, revolve around self-esteem and mutual respect. The
concepts of “honor” and “pride” are of crucial importance. After the arrest
of Saddam Hussein, many Iraqis protested against pictures of their former
leader undergoing dental examinations, because this left him with no honor.
In the West this was met with unbelief and instead the examination was an
opportunity to bring the “Butcher of Baghdad” back to human proportions.46
This defamation fueled Baathist loyalist anger against the coalition. Simi-
larly, actions by coalition forces in Afghanistan that offend the traditions or
culture of the local population are likely to be counterproductive. Cultural
intelligence is a necessity for successful coercion.
Sometimes, however, perceptions of the interests on both sides are
correct. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy had judged
his opponent Khrushchev correctly. For the Americans, there were vital
interests at stake and US armed forces were militarily superior in the region.
For Khrushchev, there were reasons to believe that Kennedy would indeed
use these assets. Kennedy estimated that his opponent would retreat when

42 President George H.W. Bush, Remarks at a Republican Fundraiser in Burlingon, MA,

November 1, 1990.
43 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, case IT-99-37, May 22, 1999.
44 J. de Hoop Scheffer, Joint press availability with President George W. Bush, Crawford (TX),
May 21, 2007.
45 Kenneth Pollack, for instance, in The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (New
York: Random House, 2002), concluded that Saddam Hussein was irrational or a “serial miscal-
culator” and therefore could not be deterred, necessitating an intervention.
46 In the media, Saddam Hussein was frequently referred to as “the Butcher of Baghdad” or the
“‘Baghdad Butcher”. See: The Daily Mirror, “Our Boys Blast the Butcher from Baghdad”, December
18, 1998; The Observer, “From a Tikrit Boy to the Butcher of Baghdad”, December 13, 2006.
The Strategic Efficacy of Power Instruments 133

the risks became too high, because for the Soviet Union no vital interests
were at stake. 47
The final and perhaps most important explanation is the conventional
military might of the West and particularly the United States’ role as the
world’s only military superpower. With unmatched military capabilities,
it seems futile for opponents to resist US demands, and objectives appear
easily attainable. With relatively weak opponents, the United States could
even afford to ignore the economic and military power of others and simply
issue demands. If these demands are not met, the US could take measures
with horrendous consequences for its opponents, resulting in a new world
order based on American military primacy, 48 or so the reasoning goes. This,
however, fails to take account of the willingness on both sides to incur
costs and to use force. In short, the assumption that interventions in all
circumstances will succeed due to overmatching conventional military
power ignores the logic of coercion. The US could make demands of any
state, but is it able and willing to follow up on these demands if military
coercion is required? As the next section will demonstrate, this fails to take
asymmetric warfare into account.

Coercive mechanism 3: Asymmetry in interests or military capabilities

lead to asymmetrical reactions.

This brings us to the role of military capability as it translates into coercive

power. A key factor essential to understanding coercion is the relationship
between the coercer’s capabilities and those of the opponent. By operating
asymmetrically, opponents are able to discount the advantage of Western
militaries partially or entirely. Asymmetric reactions offset the advantage
of superior conventional capabilities by increasing the impact of power
instruments. In the event that vital interests are at stake for the opponent,
its full military response will be mobilized to obtain the maximum effect of
its power instruments. However, given the military superiority of the West,
targets of coercion are unlikely to respond by fielding conventional forces.
They would be immediately crushed. Instead, the adversary will exploit
asymmetries in the coercer’s willingness to incur costs by confronting him

47 Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile
Crisis (New York: Longman, 1999, 2nd ed.).
48 See, for instance: “Excerpts from the Pentagon’s Plans: Prevent the Re-emergence of a New
Rival”, The New York Times, March 8, 1992, and The White House, “National Security Strategy of
the United States”, Washington, D.C.: 2002.
134  THE ART OF MILITARY COERCION

non-conventionally. 49 In so doing, he is increasing the effect of his power

instruments. The Fedayeen of Saddam Hussein during Iraqi Freedom are
an example. Although the United States’ armed forces were very capable
in dealing with the Iraqi Republican Guard, the surgical guerilla-style at-
tacks on supply routes by the Saddam Fedayeen, a loosely organized group
of combatants that functioned more like guerillas than soldiers, proved
more troubling. By operating non-conventionally, they started to level the
playing field. If the Fedayeen had been organized into regular divisions and
confronted the US in the open, like the Iraqi Republican Guard, it would
not have stood a chance. The insurgency in Iraq that followed the phase of
military coercion is an illustration of an asymmetrical confrontation, one
where the United States has substantial difficulty in achieving even limited
success. The greater willingness to incur costs by the opponent is reflected
by the number of insurgents that are killed opposed to coalition forces,
yet they still persist. Asymmetries in interests and capabilities lead to a
leveled playing field by spawning non-conventional responses to coercion.
Non-state actors such as terrorist organizations and guerilla movements
use these asymmetries as the basis of their strategy.50
To be successful in achieving an asymmetric response and to upgrade
the efficacy of its military capabilities, the opponent must try to deny the
coercer his strategic objectives by targeting weak spots and affect the
coercer’s willingness to incur costs. In itself, this is not a new concept; it
is the classic strategy of the guerilla warrior and the terrorist. Those weak
spots of the West are the following:
–– zero tolerance to friendly casualties if no or limited interests are at stake;
–– the short time horizons of Western policymakers and the desire to reach
quick solutions;
–– a preference for the use of airpower and conventional maneuver warfare;
–– the wish to minimize collateral damage;
–– the necessity to abide by the law of war and other internationally ac-
cepted norms;
–– the desire to keep a coalition together;
–– an emphasis on technological solutions;
–– a conceptual division between the military and the civilian realm;

49 See, for instance: Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature
and Arts Publishing House, 1999).
50 See also Col. T.X. Hammes, USMC, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul:
Zenith Press, 2004).
The Strategic Efficacy of Power Instruments 135

–– the tendency to be very confident of one’s own capabilities while under-

estimating the opponent’s motivations and opportunities of resistance;
–– the economic and social vulnerability of open Western societies;
–– intensive media coverage.

An effective opponent will design his response on the basis of these char-
acteristics and, in addition to conventional responses, he has a number of
asymmetric strategies of countercoercion available. From the case studies
we have derived the following. The first strategy is based on countering
American conventional military superiority on the battlefield and increasing
the number of victims amongst the intervening forces. Western forces are
vulnerable against irregular opponents who employ non-conventional com-
bat tactics. Neither the Americans in Vietnam and Somalia, nor the Russians
in Afghanistan and Chechnya could withstand guerrillas and insurgents
using terror and hit-and-run actions. After NATO started enforcing a no-fly
zone above Bosnia in April 1993, the Serbs reacted by holding UNPROFOR
peacekeepers hostage, who were thereafter used as human shields. Hostage
taking can be extremely effective, especially if the coercer’s populace does
not wholeheartedly support the intervention. Similarly, the opponent can
draw the coercer into a battle which he is not prepared to fight, like an urban
counterinsurgency or operations in dense or mountainous terrain. Tradition-
ally, Western forces are trained and equipped for mechanized, conventional
performance against a regular opponent. Hand-to-hand combat in demanding
counterinsurgency and counterterror operations does not fit this framework.
In the conventional combat phase of Iraqi Freedom, 140 Americans died; in
the subsequent counterinsurgency phase this number increased to 4,488
killed and 32,222 wounded. The Western way of warfare relies on the use
of air power to support ground forces or reach strategic objectives. Deploy-
ing a sophisticated air defense system constitutes a significant obstacle to
Western planners. Also operating in small, mobile units makes fighting with
airpower for the coercer difficult. Furthermore, ground forces are generally
concentrated at specific points of debarkation and forward operating bases
upon deployment. By mining harbors or deploying theater ballistic or cruise
missiles adversaries can create “anti-access” or “area-denial” environments
troubling an intervention or deterring it all together. The threat of CBRN
attacks on military forces also fits within this category.51 Unconventional
capabilities can thereby weaken Western conventional military strength.

51 For more on the Western way of warfare and operations in these contested zones, see Barry
Posen, “Command of the Commons”, International Security, vol. 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5-46.
136  THE ART OF MILITARY COERCION

The second strategy is aimed at increasing the suffering of one’s own

population, either by increasing the likelihood of collateral damage or of
spreading death and destruction among the civilian population through
other means. It is based on the premise that Western coercers make a strict
distinction between combatants and noncombatants, or civilians, and
that by increasing the suffering of the own population, the opponent can
question the legality of the intervention and its employed means. Auto-
cratic leaders appear to be very capable in this: Saddam Hussein passed
the consequences of the sanctions, to the horror of the West, on to the Iraqi
population. Subsequently, the international community cried for a revision
of the Iraq sanction regime. Saddam, as well as Milosevic, placed military
installations in highly populated areas, or introduced “human shields”
so that the population might become the victim of aerial bombings.52
Oftentimes this meant that the installations were not targeted altogether.
The third strategy is directed at the population of the coercer himself.
This strategy implies terrorism in those countries participating in the
intervention. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
on September 11, 2001, also fall in this category. The problem lies in the
perception among Western populations and policymakers that war only
takes place on the battlefield, and thus the further the geographic distance
from the battlefield the safer one is. Instead, opponents can try to move the
battlefield from their territory to that of the coercer.
The fourth strategy is that of partial passivity. This strategy was also
put into practice by Milosevic. NATO’s calculations indicated that when
Milosevic would use his air force and air defenses, he would be defeated
within a few days. But Milosevic hid his fighter planes and merely used
them once in a while. Air defenses were also only periodically operated.
The result was that during the entire air campaign, threats to NATO air-
planes persisted, because the opponent retained the capability to come
into action.53 NATO could not obtain complete air supremacy and had to
bomb from 15,000 feet. This visibly delayed the air campaign and increased
the chances of collateral damage or errors. A strategy of partial passivity
could also imply that the opponent does not resist an intervention with
land forces if he is convinced that he cannot win. Instead, the adversary

52 See, for instance: Richard Norton-Taylor, “Air strikes hampered by human shields”, The
Guardian, Tuesday, May 18, 1999.
53 This situation was further exacerbated through Milosevic’s extensive use of decoys. Joseph
Fitchett, “But Generals Say Air War achieved Alliance’s Goal: NATO Misjudged Bombing Dam-
age”, International Herald Tribune, June 23, 1999.
The Strategic Efficacy of Power Instruments 137

could try to fight the coercer as an insurgency during the stabilization and
reconstruction phase. The situation in Iraq following the toppling of Saddam
Hussein is reminiscent of this.
The fifth strategy the opponent can choose is horizontal escalation.
In reaction to an intervention, the struggle can be pursued on a different
front. During the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein launched missiles at Tel
Aviv and threatened to initiate a second front against Turkey. It took the
Alliance a lot of effort to keep the Israelis at bay, as an Israeli intervention
in Iraq would potentially have broken the coalition. During the Kosovo
War, Milosevic seemed willing to mobilize the Bosnian Serbs. The result
was that the strategic reserve of SFOR was brought into the highest state
of alert. Even information warfare – hackers that try to disrupt or disable
the computer systems of the coercer – can be seen as a form of horizontal
escalation.
The last strategy embodies denying the coercer the use of vital infrastruc-
ture, raw materials, and other strategic assets. Scorched earth tactics are
the most likely method. This is what Saddam Hussein did in 1991 and – to
lesser success – in 2003. He attempted to make the military victory of the
allies a severe economic and ecological loss by setting oil wells on fire.
A consequence of these strategies is the ability of the opponent to prolong
the conflict. Western states want short interventions. Colonel Hammes
observed that: “The United States wants to fight short, well-defined wars.
We went into Vietnam, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq convinced
we could ‘clean it up’ quickly. In each conflict, our leaders told the people
we would be out in a year or so. They felt this was important to convince
the American people to go to war.”54
Through these asymmetric strategies, the opponent is increasing the
effectiveness of his power instruments. By employing these strategies,
the opponent attempts to make the coercer pay a high price for achieving
his political objectives. It is thereby testing the coercer to see how far the
coercer is willing to go to reach those objectives.
The opponent’s countercoercion is therefore not directed at achieving a
military victory, but rather to avoid a defeat, and undermining the willing-
ness of the coercer to continue. When the opponent avoids a defeat, he has
effectively won. The Chinese authors of “Unrestricted Warfare” were correct
in stating that the unquestionable military superiority of Western power
leads to no other options except asymmetric reactions. This requires shifts

54 Col. T.X. Hammes, USMC, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul: Zenith
Press, 2004), p. 221.
138  THE ART OF MILITARY COERCION

in thought by Western leaders, who appear driven by the idea that superior
economic and military force is key to success in interventions. Thinking in
the West about asymmetric warfare has progressed since past interventions,
and some have even come to encapsulate asymmetric countercoercion
strategies as a new generation of warfare. 55 Yet, without a strategy, it is a type
of warfare to which Western policymakers have little response. Superior
force and differences in interests trigger asymmetric reactions. Only when
vital interests are at stake are Western intervening powers able to muster
the will to sustain operations to confront asymmetric countercoercion.

Applications of military force in coercion strategies

Now to turn to the question how military force can be applied by the coercer.
The coercer’s strategy needs to take account of the expected reaction of the
opponent and be able to counter it. In any coercion strategy using military
force, a coercer must have a clear definition of the opponent and understand
what the opponent values. And he must decide what he is willing to put at
risk to reach the objective. There are a limited number of options for the use
of military force in strategies of coercive diplomacy or military coercion.
First of all, it may have the direct effect of creating civil unrest, forcing the
opponent government to concede, or triggering popular revolt – resulting
in the establishment of a new government that is willing to steer a different
course. Traditionally, sanctions are aimed at the population. Military force
can be as well. This is the core of Schelling’s reasoning; a slow increase of
pressure by envisaging the prospect of further and increased damage to
civilian targets. This is termed a risk strategy. Coercion focused on risk is a
watered-down version of punishment, whereby a population is punished
for the actions of its government. The rationale of targeting the popula-
tion finds its roots in the concepts of early theoreticians concerning the
deployment of air power. Giulio Douhet is the archetypical punishment
strategist.56 He firmly believed that large-scale bombings of cities and
economic infrastructure would induce enough pain and fear among the
populace that the government would make concessions. Pape, however,
argued that there is no historical evidence to prove that these campaigns
have ever led to capitulation, the collapse of a regime, or the stagnation

55 Ibid.
56 See G. Douhet, The Command of the Air (Washington, D.C.: US War Department, 1921).