Virgel Dave Japos vs.

First Agrarian Reform Multipurpose Cooperative (FARMCOOP)

G.R. No. 208000; July 26, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This petition for review on Certiorari assails the CA decision setting aside the resolution of
the NLRC which, in turn, reversed the LA ruling that petitioner Virgel Dave Japos was legally
terminated by respondent First Agrarian Reform Multipurpose Cooperative (FARMCOOP)
Respondent employed petitioner as a gardener. Respondent requires that for employees
who want to be absent from work, they must seek previous approval from his/her supervisor and
an employee is subject to discharge if he or she incurs six or more absences without permission
within one employment year. Petitioner received a memorandum ordering him to explain his June
22-28, 2005 unauthorized absences because it appeared that it is his 6th offense during his
employment. Petitioner submitted a Medical Certificate (MC), however, it did not provide date when
it was issued and the date when the petitioner was absent. Respondent issued a Notice of
Termination informing the petitioner that his employment will be terminated. Thus, petitioner filed
a complaint against respondent before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal.
Respondent claimed that the MC submitted by the petitioner, which stated that petitioner
was diagnosed and treated for respiratory tract infection, could not be given credence because it
conflicted with petitioner's own claim that he was sick with influenza. On the other hand, petitioner
contended that it would be absurd under FARMCOOP's rules and policies to require an employee
to submit a Personnel Leave Authority prior to contracting illness when it could not be known or
planned precisely when he might get sick.
ISSUE:
Was the dismissal of the petitioner invalid for failure to provide medical certificate with
regular information?
RULING:
No, the dismissal of the petitioner was valid.
In the case of Filflex Industrial & Manufacturing Corp. vs. NLRC, the Supreme Court ruled
that if the medical certificate fails to refer to the specific period of the employee's absence, then
such absences are not supported by competent proof and hence, unjustified.
In the case at bar, the medical certificate did not indicate the period within which he was
examined by the physician and the period he was to rest due to his illness. It fails to refer to the
specific period of his absences. It should likewise be emphasized that in the absence of credible
evidence indicating that he was indeed sick before the date stated in the medical certificate, his
alleged sickness ought not be considered as an excuse for his excessive absences without leave.
One may argue that in order to uphold the rights of labor, this Court must simply accept the medical
certificate as proof that indeed, petitioner became ill, but this cannot be done without lowering the
standards required for the presentation of proof in courts and even in administrative bodies such
as the labor tribunals. Without these relevant pieces of information, it cannot be reliably concluded
that indeed, petitioner was ill on June 22-28, 2005.
Therefore, the petitioner was not illegally dismissed.
124 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEES IS A PREROGATIVE BELONGING TO
MANAGEMENT
Maria De Leon Transportation, Inc., represented by Ma. Victoria D. Ronquillo vs. Daniel M.
Macuray
G.R. No. 214940; June 6, 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of CA that respondent Daniel
Macuray (Macuray) has been illegally dismissed by petitioner Maria De Leon Transporation, Inc.
Petitioner is a company engaged in paid public transportation. Respondent Macuray was
employed as a bus driver of petitioner. He was assigned to the Laoag-Manila route. Sometime in
2009, he was not assigned to a bus for no apparent reason. For a period of one month, he
continually returned to follow up his bus assignment. Then, finally, the dispatcher informed him
that he was already considered AWOL (absent without leave). He followed up his status for about
six months, but to no avail. He considered himself illegally dismissed. Aggrieved, he filed a
complaint against petitioner.
Macuray claimed that he was illegally dismissed after his 18 years of service to the
petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that respondent was hired on commission basis,
on a “no work, no pay” and “per travel, per trip” basis, and contrary to Macuray’s claim of illegal
dismissal, he simply stopped reporting to work and that he left his post to work for his family’s
trucking business. The LA dismissed the case for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC modified the
decision by awarding financial assistance to Macuray. On Appeal, the CA declared Macurray to
have been illegally dismissed.
ISSUE:
Was Macuray constructively dismissed in view of his alleged abandonment of work?
RULING:
No, Macuray was not constructively dismissed.
There is no truth to the allegation that Macuray was dismissed, actually or constructively.
He claims that the dispatcher informed him that he was AWOL; however, a mere bus dispatcher
does not possess the power to fire him from work. Dismissal of employees is a prerogative
belonging to management. At any rate, even assuming that respondent was indeed told by
respondent's bus dispatcher that he was AWOL, this was not tantamount to dismissal, actual or
constructive. An ordinary bus dispatcher has no power to dismiss an employee; in a typical bus
company, a driver might even be of more significance than an ordinary dispatcher. Moreover, the
fact that respondent made no sincere effort to meet with the management of the bus company
gives credence to petitioner's allegation that he was never fired from work.
As to his alleged abandonment of work, petitioner admitted that it sanctioned the practice
of allowing its drivers to take breaks from work as some form of sabbatical or vacation. Macuray
simply availed of this company practice. It appears that when he did this, he was already
approaching retirement age, and when he filed the labor case, he was already 60.
Since Macuray was not dismissed from work, petitioner may not be held liable for the
former’s monetary claims, except those that were owing to him by way of unpaid
salary/commission, and retirement benefits, which are due to him.
| 125COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
MANAGEMENT HAS THE PREROGATIVE TO TRANSFER AN EMPLOYEE FROM
ONE
COMPANY TO ANOTHER THROUGH A CORPORATE SPIN-OFF
Marksman & Co, Inc. vs. Rodil Sta. Rita
G.R. No. 194765; April 23, 2018
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
Marsman & Company, Inc. (Marsman) seeking the annulment of the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA found Marsman guilty of illegal dismissal.
Marsman hired respondent Rodil Sta. Rita (Sta. Rita) as a warehouseman when it was still
engaged in the business of distribution and sale of pharmaceutical and consumer products.
Marsman thereafter purchased Metro Drug, now Consumer Products Distribution Services, Inc.
(CPDSI) which at that time, was engaged in a similar business. Marsman then entered into a MOA
with Marsman Employees Union (MEU), its bargaining representative. The MOA transferred all of
Marsman’s employees together with their respective employment contracts and the attendant
employment obligation to CPDSI. Due to redundancy, Sta. Rita was dismissed.
Aggrieved, Sta. Rita filed a complaint against Marsman in the NLRC for illegal dismissal
and damages. Marsman filed a motion to dismiss on the premise that the LA had no jurisdiction
over the complaint for illegal dismissal because Marsman is not Sta. Rita's employer, but CPDSI
due to the transfer of employees in the MOA. Sta. Rita's contended that he did not sign the MOA,
hence, his employment remained with Marsman.
ISSUE:
Is Sta. Rita still considered an employee of Marsman even when Marsman already
transferred and integrated its employees with CPDSI by virtue of the MOA?
RULING:
No. Sta. Rita is no longer Marsman’s employee but that of CPDSI. Hence, the LA no longer
has jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal complaint against Marsman due to the absence of
employer-employee relationship.
This Court has consistently recognized and upheld the prerogative of management to
transfer an employee from one office to another within the business establishment, provided there
is no demotion in rank or a diminution of salary, benefits and other privileges. Analogously, the
Court has upheld the transfer/absorption of employees from one company to another, as
successor-employer, as long as the transferor was not in bad faith and the employees absorbed
by a successor-employer enjoy the continuity of their employment status and their rights and
privileges with their former employer.
The integration and transfer of employees was a necessary consequence of the business
transition or corporate reorganization that Marsman and CPDSI have undertaken, which had the
characteristics of a corporate spin-off. A proviso in the MOA limited Marsman's function into that
of a holding company and transformed CPDSI as its main operating company. The spin-off and
the attendant transfer of employees are legitimate business interests of Marsman. Sta. Rita's
contention that the absence of his signature on the MOA meant that his employment remained
with Marsman is merely an allegation that cannot prevail over Marsman's evident intention to
transfer its employees.
To assert that Marsman remained as Sta. Rita's employer even after the corporate spin
off disregards the separate personality of Marsman and CPDSI. The Memorandum of Agreement
effectively transferred Marsman's employees to CPDSI.
126 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
REASONABLE CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE CLAIM ASSERTED AND
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS NECESSARY IN MONEY CLAIMS
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines
GR. No. 200088; February 26, 2018
Martires, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the CA
decision which affirmed with modification the decisions of the NLRC and LA dismissing petitioner’s
claims for damages against respondents.
This case arose from a labor dispute between petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) and
respondent Airline Pilots’ Association of the Philippines (ALPAP), a duly registered labor
organization and exclusive bargaining agent of all commercial pilots of PAL. Sometime in 1998,
ALPAP staged a strike. A return-to-work order was issued by the SOLE, but ALPAP defied the
same and went on with their strike. Consequently, SOLE declared their strike illegal. In 2003, PAL
filed before the LA a complaint for damages against ALPAP.
PAL alleged that due to the illegal strike staged by ALPAP, its operation was crippled
resulting in several losses from ticket refunds, extraordinary expenses to cope with the shutdown
situation, and lost income. The LA and NLRC dismissed the complaint for damages on the ground
that they had no jurisdiction to resolve the same. It was opined that the reliefs prayed for by PAL
should have been ventilated before regular courts.
ISSUE:
Was it proper for labor tribunals to assume jurisdiction over PAL’s claims against the
ALPALP for damages as a result of the latter’s illegal strike?
RULING:
Yes, the assumption of jurisdiction by the labor tribunals was proper.
Under Article 217 (now Article 224) of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 9 of R.A.
No. 6715, the LA and the NLRC have jurisdiction to resolve cases involving claims for damages
arising from employer-employee relationship. It is settled, however, that not every controversy or
money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa falls within the jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter. Intrinsically, civil disputes, although involving the claim of an employer against its
employees, are cognizable by regular courts.
A money claim by a worker against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter only if there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the claim
asserted and employee-employer relations. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims
can the claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations.
In this case, PAL’s claim for damages has reasonable connection with its employer
employee relationship with ALPAP as the claimed damages arose from the illegal strike and acts
committed during the same which were in turn closely related and intertwined with the respondents'
allegations of unfair labor practices against PAL.
Hence, labor tribunals have jurisdiction over PAL’s claims for damages against ALPAP.
| 127COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
APPELLATE COURTS HAVE THE POWER TO SCRUTINIZE NLRC DECISIONS
EVEN
THOUGH THE LAW GIVES NO EXPLICIT PROVISION FOR APPEALS
Angelito Gabriel vs. Petron Corporation, Alfred Trio and Ferdinando Enriquez
G.R. No. 194575; April 11, 2018
Martires, J.
FACTS:
This case involves a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the CA
decision denying the motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari against the NLRC decision
which reversed the decision of the LA and dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner Angelito
Gabriel (Gabriel).
Petitioner Gabriel was hired as Maintenance Technician by respondent Petron Corporation
(Petron). He later rose from the ranks and became a Quality Management Systems (QMS)
Coordinator. However, this change of position did not give him any increase in salary or any
additional benefits.
After suffering a series of harassment acts from the private respondents, Gabriel claimed
that he was constructively dismissed. Hence, he filed a complaint against Petron. On their part,
Petron explained that Gabriel’s assignment was not a promotion, but was a result of company
reorganization. The LA then ruled in favor of Gabriel. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision
and dismissed the complaint. Due to time and distance constraint, Gabriel, having three (3) days
left before the expiration of the sixty (60)-day period to file a petition for certiorari, filed a motion for
extension. The CA denied the same saying no extensions are allowed.
ISSUE:
Does the filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 45 before the SC include the
determination of the merits of the NLRC decision?
RULING:
No, the remedy of petition for review on certiorari is only limited to the CA denial of the
motion for extension.
Under our present labor laws, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the
NLRC. In fact, under Article 229 of the Labor Code, all decisions of the NLRC shall be final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties. Nevertheless, appellate
courts - including the SC – still have an underlying power to scrutinize decisions of the NLRC on
questions of law even though the law gives no explicit right to appeal. Simply said, even if there is
no direct appeal from the NLRC decision, the aggrieved party still has a legal remedy.
In St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, the Supreme Court laid down the proper recourse
should the aggrieved party seek judicial review of the NLRC decision, to wit: “…the special civil
action of certiorari was and still the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. […]
All such petitions should henceforth initially be filed in the CA in strict observance of the doctrine
on hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.”
Therefore, in reviewing labor cases through a petition for review on certiorari, the SC are
solely confronted with whether the CA correctly determined the presence or absence of grave
abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, and not whether the NLRC decision on the
merits of the case was correct.
128 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
WRITS OF EXECUTION MAY BE ASSAILED WHEN THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE
IN
THE SITUATION OF THE PARTIES MAKING EXECUTION INEQUITABLE OR
UNJUST
Crispin S, Frondozo, et. al. vs. Manila Electric Company
G.R. No. 178379; August 22, 2017
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
The is a petition for review on Certiorari which stemmed from a certified case to the NLRC
which ruled that the subject strike conducted was illegal but ordered the reinstatement of
petitioners.
The Acting DOLE Secretary certified the issues of the strike conducted by petitioners
Crispin Frondozo, et.al., employees of respondent Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration. While the case was pending, petitioners were dismissed by
MERALCO for committing unlawful acts and violence during the strike. Thereafter, another strike
was again staged on the ground of union busting. The issues of the second strike were again
certified to the NLRC. The NLRC ruled that the strike was illegal but ordered the reinstatement of
petitioners because their participation in the commission of illegal acts in the strike were not
proved. The NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment, stating that the NLRC Order became final and
executory. Labor Arbiter Veneranda C. Guerrero issued a Writ of Execution directing the
reinstatement of the respondents.
Later, the CA’s Special Second division ruled in favor of MERALCO. On 27 January 2004,
the CA’s Fourteenth Division ruled in favor of petitioners. Petitioners then filed a petition before the
SC questioning the CA Special Second Division’s ruling, while respondent also filed a petition
before the SC questioning the CA Fourteenth Division’s decision. Both petitions were denied, and
such denial attained finality. Respondent also filed a motion for a writ of preliminary injunction
against the writ of execution issued by the LA on the basis of the CA decision in its favor. The
NLRC granted the motion due to difficulty in proceeding with the execution given the conflicting
decisions of the Court of Appeals' Special Second Division and the Court of Appeals' Fourteenth
Division.
ISSUE:
Was it proper for the NLRC to issue a writ of preliminary injunction in view of the conflicting
decisions by the different divisions of the CA?
RULING:
Yes, it was proper for the NLRC to issue a writ of preliminary injunction.
There are instances when writs of execution may be assailed. They are: (1) the writ of
execution varies the judgment. (2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making
execution inequitable or unjust, (3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt
from execution, (4) it appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the
court;(5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough; or (6) it appears that the writ of execution
has been improvidently issued, or issued without authority.
The situation in this case is analogous to a change in the situation of the parties making
execution unjust or inequitable in view of the conflicting decisions of the CA divisions, both of which
have attained finality. MERALCO's refusal to reinstate petitioners and to pay their backwages is
justified by the 30 May 2003 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480. On the other hand, petitioners'
insistence on the execution of judgment is anchored on the 27 January 2004 Decision of the Court
of Appeals' Fourteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 72509.
Therefore, it was proper for the NLRC to issue a writ of preliminary injunction in view of the
conflicting decisions of the CA.
| 129COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI MAY BE FILED DIRECTLY WITH THE COURT OF
APPEALS IF IT SATISFACTORILY SHOWED THAT THE NRLC GRAVELY ABUSED
THE
DISCRETION CONFERRED UPON IT
Jolo’s Kiddie Carts/Fun4kids/Marlo U.Cabili vs. Evelyn A. Caballa and Anthony M. Bautista
G.R. No.230682; November 29, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari seeking to reverse the CA decision which denied
the petition due to petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC prior to
the filing of a petition for certiorari before the CA.
Respondents Evelyn Caballa (Caballa) and Anthony Bautista (Bautista) were hired by
petitioner Jolo’s Kiddie Carts as staff members in the latter’s business which has several stalls in
SM Bacoor and SM Rosario. They were paid a daily salary of P330 for a 6-day work week from
9:45 in the morning until 9:00 in the evening. They claimed that they were never paid the monetary
value of their unused service incentive leaves, 13th month pay, overtime pay and premium pay.
They also alleged that when the petitioners found out that they inquired from DOLE about the
minimum wage, they were prohibited from reporting to work.
Caballa and Bautista filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries, 13th
month pay, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay and separation pay and other money claims
against petitioner Jolo’s Kiddie Carts before the NLRC. Jolo’s Kiddie Carts denied such allegation
and maintained that they were the ones who abandoned their work. LA ruled in favor of
respondents, and accordingly, ordered petitioners to pay the respondents. NLRC set aside LA
ruling finding no illegal dismissal and ordered the petitioners to reinstate Caballa and Bautista.
Dissatisfied, petitioners directly filed a petition for certioari before the CA, without moving for
reconsideration before the NLRC. CA denied said petition.
ISSUE:
Was the CA correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari before it due to the non-filling of
a prior motion for reconsideration before the NLRC?
RULING:
No, the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it due to the non-filling
of a prior motion for reconsideration before the NLRC.
Court procedure dictates that the case be remanded to the CA for a resolution on the
merits. However, as stated in Sy-Vargas v. The Estate of Rolando Ogsos, Sr., when there is
already enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits may be had, the court may
dispense with the procedure of remand in order to prevent further delays. Moreover, it must be
stressed that to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioners must
satisfactorily show that the court gravely abused the discretion conferred to it.
Verily, the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it based on the
aforesaid technical ground, as petitioners were justified in pursuing a direct recourse to the CA
even without first moving for reconsideration before the NLRC.
130 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FROM THE DECISION OF THE NLRC, THE CA
IS
ONLY TASKED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE MATERIAL FACTS OF THE
CASE
Agnes Coeli Bugaoisan vs. Owi Group Manila
G.R. No. 226208; February 7, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to partially annul, reverse,
and set aside the decision of the CA which modified the decision of the NLRC and denied petitioner
Agnes Coeli Bugaoisan's (Agnes) partial motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner was employed as a chef in Australia through respondent OWI Group Manila,
Inc. (OWI). Due to the extensive work that was given to her, she suffered from Bilateral CTS and
was declared unfit to work for several days. She was also advised to undergo surgery. Petitioner
filed a compensation claim with the Worker's Compensation and Injury Management of Australia
to seek compensation while she was still unfit for work or reimbursement of her medical expenses,
but her application was denied.
Thereafter, the petitioner decided to tender her resignation letter and left for the Philippines.
She filed a complaint for constructive illegal dismissal and payment of salary for the unexpired
portion of her 2-year employment contract, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees
against respondents OWI, Morris Corporation (Morris) and Marlene D. Alejandrino before the
NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that the petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment.
On appeal, the NLRC sustained the findings of the LA. Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the NLRC's decision and resolution. The CA then
issued its assailed Decision partially granting the petition where the CA went beyond the issues of
the case in ruling that the employment contract was only for 1 year thus reducing petitioner’s award
of salary. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err when it went beyond the issues of the case and the assigned errors raised
by respondents when it filed the certiorari petition under Rule 65?
RULING:
Yes, the CA erred in going beyond the issues of the case and the assigned errors raised
by the respondent.
As stated in Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, et al., a writ of certiorari may be issued only for
the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior
court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.
Applying this to the case at bench, the supervisory jurisdiction of the CA under Rule 65
was confined only to the determination of whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in deciding the issues brought before it on appeal. Clearly, the appellate court found no
grave abuse of discretion committed by the NLRC as enunciated in the dispositive portion of its
assailed decision.
Hence, there being no grave abuse of discretion, the CA erred when it went beyond the
issues and errors raised by the respondent.
| 131COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR'S DECISION MUST BE APPEALED WITHIN 10 DAYS
FROM
RECEIPT OF DECISION
NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc. vs. Gener G. Dabu
G.R. No. 225142; September 13, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the CA decision
which dismissed the appeal of petitioner NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc. (NYK) from the ruling of
the National Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB) Panel of Arbitrators granting the claim for
disability compensation of respondent Gener G. Dabu (Dabu). NYK is a local manning agent acting
for and in behalf of its foreign principal NYK Ship Management Pte. Ltd. Singapore. NYK hired
Dabu to work as oiler on board the vessel M/V Hojin.
During his employment, Dabu had palpitations, pains all over the body, numbness of hands
and legs, lack of sleep and nervousness. Upon repatriation, he was immediately referred to a
company-designated physician who diagnosed him with diabetes mellitus which was not work
related. Unconvinced, Dabu consulted other physicians who declared that he was permanently
unfit to resume work as a seaman and that his illness was considered work-aggravated/related.
After attempts to settle failed, Dabu filed a notice to arbitrate with the NCMB. The Panel of
Arbitrators rendered a decision granting the claim. NYK received a copy of the decision on
February 9, 2015 and filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 on February 24, 2015.
CA dismissed the appeal for being filed out of time.
NYK invoked Section 4 of Rule 43 which provides that the period to appeal to the CA is 15
days from receipt of the decision. It argued that this 15-day period should apply. Dabu, on the other
hand, maintained that that the petition should be dismissed for being filed out of time beyond the
10-day reglementary period under Art. 262-A of the Labor Code.
ISSUE:
Is the 15-day period to file an appeal applicable?
RULING:
No, the 15-day reglementary period to file an appeal is not applicable.
Art. 262-A of the Labor Code provides that the award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator
or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. Likewise, Section 6, Rule VII of the
NCMB Procedural Guidelines in the conduct of voluntary arbitration proceedings provides that
awards or decisions of voluntary arbitrator become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of copies of the award or decision by the parties. Despite Rule 43 providing for a 15-
day period to appeal, the Court ruled that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision must be appealed
before the CA within 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision.
In this case, petitioner received the PVA decision on February 9, 2015, and filed the petition
for review 15 days after receipt thereof, i.e., on February 24, 2015. Clearly, the decision of the
voluntary arbitrator had become final and executory after 10 days from receipt thereof.
As the PVA decision is already final and executory when petitioner filed the petition with the CA,
the CA correctly dismissed the petition since it has no more appellate jurisdiction to review the
decision.
132 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
SUPREME COURT SITTING EN BANC IS NOT AN APPELLATE COURT VIS-A-VIS
ITS
DIVISIONS, AND IT EXERCISES NO APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER THE
LATTER
Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. vs. Alcaide
G.R. No. 167952 (Resolution); July 5, 2017
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
For consideration of the Court is an Omnibus Motion filed by petitioner Gonzalo Puyat &
Sons, Inc. praying that the resolution dated October 19, 2016 be set aside and reconsidered and
that the decision dated February 1, 2005 of the Court of Appeals be reinstated or, in the alternative,
its Motion for Reconsideration be referred to the Supreme Court En Banc.
Petitioner is the registered owner of fourteen (14) parcels of land. The Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage over the subject landholding informing
petitioner that the subject properties were being considered for distribution under the government’s
agrarian reform program.
Petitioner then filed a petition before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), wherein it
argued that the properties were classified as industrial, thus, exempt from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). As an answer, the respondents countered that
the classification of the land as industrial did not make it exempt from coverage of the CARP and
that the subject lands are planted with palay.
DAR Secretary Hernani A. Braganza issued an Order in favor of the respondent declaring
that the subject properties are agricultural land thus, falling within the coverage of the CARP. The
DAR further dismissed their motion for reconsideration. Unfazed, the petitioner filed an appeal to
the Office of the President (OP) which ruled in his favor, setting aside the DAR Order and lifting
the Notice of Coverage. Such decision by the OP was reversed by the CA when the respondents
sought recourse. Hence, petitioner filed the present motion praying that its motion for
reconsideration be referred to the Supreme Court En Banc.
ISSUE:
Should the petitioner's prayer to refer the case to the Court's En Banc be granted?
RULING:
No. The Court found no cogent reason to grant petitioner's prayer to refer the case to the
Court's En Banc,
In Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court already
ruled that the Supreme Court sitting En Banc is not an appellate court vis-a-vis its Divisions, and
it exercises no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. Each division of the Court is considered not a
body inferior to the Court en banc, and sits veritably as the Court en banc itself. It bears to stress
further that a resolution of the Division denying a party's motion for referral to the Court en banc of
any Division case, shall be final and not appealable to the Court en banc.
Hence, the omnibus motion praying that the case be referred to the Supreme Court En
Banc should be denied.
| 133COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
FOR TENANCY RELATIONS TO EXIST, THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF (1)
CONSENT;
AND (2) SHARING AND/OR PAYMENT OF LEASE RENTALS, MUST BE PRESENT
Primitivo Macalanda, Jr. vs. Atty. Roque A. Acosta
G.R. No. 197718; September 6, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
In this petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner assailed the CA’s Decision,
which affirmed the DARAB’s decision declaring him not a bona fide tenant of the land owned by
respondent and which directed him and all persons under him to vacate the land.
In Atty. Roque Acosta’s (respondent) complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), he prayed for a judgment ordering Primitivo Macalanda Jr
(petitioner), who is respondent’s caretaker and not a tenant under agrarian laws, to vacate the land
and to account and pay for the fruits of the land illegally withheld from and due to respondent. In
his defense, petitioner alleged that he is a tenant of the subject land with the respondent
recognizing him, as evidenced by a deed of agreement (DOA) which shows in the signature portion
that petitioner is a "tenant/caretaker". The Provincial Adjudicator (PA) dismissed the complaint for
prematurity. Upon appeal, the DARAB reversed the PA and declared that petitioner is not a bona
fide tenant of the subject land.
Petitioner filed the instant petition insisting that he is a tenant of respondent, as evidenced
by DOA. He alleged that his occupation and cultivation of the subject land for a period of 17 years
is with the consent of respondent.
ISSUE:
Is the DOA sufficient to prove the existence of tenancy relationship?
RULING:
No. The DOA is not sufficient to prove the existence of tenancy relationship.
For tenancy relationship to exist, the following elements must be shown to concur: (1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and, (6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. All
these elements must be proved by substantial evidence. Unless a person has established his
status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure or to be covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. Crucial for the creation of
tenancy relations would be the existence of two of the essential elements, namely, consent and
sharing and/or payment of lease rentals.
In the present case, petitioner miserably failed to prove the existence of such tenancy
relationship. The essential element of consent is not sufficiently established because its alleged
proof – the DOA, does not categorically constitute him as de jure tenant of the subject land. In fact,
in the signature portion of the deed, it referred to petitioner as a "tenant/caretaker" of the subject
land, thus, the DOA is ambiguous as to whether petitioner is a tenant or a caretaker. Further, the
essential element of sharing of harvest was also not sufficiently established. Petitioner failed to
show any evidence that there is sharing of harvest between him and the respondent. In his petition
for review before the CA, petitioner alleged that he has continuously cultivated and occupied the
subject lot for a period of 17 years. On this note, common sense dictates that if petitioner is indeed
a de jure tenant, he should fully know his arrangement with the respondent as to the sharing of
harvest. However, petitioner, failed to prove such arrangement.
For failing to prove with substantial evidence the existence of tenancy relationship,
petitioner, not being a tenant under agrarian laws, should vacate the land of respondent.
134 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
IN DETERMINING JUST COMPENSATION, COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER THE
FACTORS ENUMERATED IN SECTION 17 OF R.A. NO. 6657, AS AMENDED
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Rural Bank of Hermosa (Bataan), Inc.
G.R. No. 181953; July 25, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
In this petition for review on Certiorari, petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) assails
the CA’s decision which affirmed the RTC’s decision fixing the just compensation for the
respondent’s agricultural land acquired by the government at P30.00 per sq. m.
Respondent is the registered owner of two parcels of agricultural land. Respondent
voluntarily offered to sell the same to the government under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). LBP valued the subject land at ₱28,282.09 using the formula under Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No. 17, Series of 1989, as amended, i.e., LV =
(CNI x .70) + (MV x .30), but respondent rejected the said valuation, prompting the LBP to deposit
the said amount in the latter's name.
The Office of the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision adopting the LBP's
valuation. Hence, respondent filed before the RTC, a petition seeking the determination of just
compensation. RTC found the LBP's valuation as too low and unrealistic while considering not only
the testimony of the parties' respective witnesses, but also the nature of the land's use and its
assessed value based on the tax declarations. On appeal, CA upheld RTC’s valuation holding that
administrative orders are mere guidelines used by the LBP that are not binding on the courts.
ISSUE:
May the CA completely disregard the DAR formula for the determination of just
compensation?
RULING:
No, the CA erred in upholding the RTC’s valuation and in completely disregarding the DAR
formula.
In determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and price at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was
deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines or when the Certificates of Land Ownership Awards are issued in favor
of the farmer-beneficiaries. Further, courts should consider the factors in Section 17 of R.A. No.
6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700, as translated into the applicable DAR
formula. However, if the RTC finds that a strict application of the relevant DAR formulas is not
warranted, it may depart therefrom upon a reasoned explanation. The factors enumerated are as
follows: (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like properties, (c) the nature
and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom, (d) the owner's sworn valuation, (e) the
tax declarations, (j) the assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property,
and (h) the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on
the said land, if any.
Here, the CA merely upheld the just compensation fixed by the RTC which considered only
the nature of the land's use, and its assessed value based on the tax declarations without a
showing, however, that the other factors under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended, were
taken into account or otherwise found to be inapplicable, and completely disregarded the pertinent
DAR formula contrary to what the law requires.
On this score alone, the CA clearly erred in sustaining the RTC's valuation as having been
made in disregard of Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended.
| 135COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
A LAND HAVING BEEN ACQUIRED IN A VALID SALE PURSUANT TO P.D. 27
COULD
NO LONGER BE THE SUBJECT OF EMANCIPATION PATENTS
Alfonso Digan, Tilabdo Buelta, Bernardo Mariano, Santiago Acquidan, Fernando Agnno,
Johnny Orie and Felimon Gaceta (deceased) rep. by his wife Lolita Gaceta vs. Noemi Malines
G.R. No.183004; December 6, 2017
Martires, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari that seeks to set aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Arbitration Board (DARAB).
Modesta Paris (Paris), owner of three registered parcels of land which were placed under
the coverage of Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to P.D. 27, sold to respondent Noemi
Malines (Malines) and Jones Melecio (Melecio) one of her six lots. Petitioners, who were identified
by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as among those qualified as farmer – beneficiaries
of the landholdings of Paris gave their consent to said sale. However, Emancipation Patents (EP)
covering the same land was issued in favor of the petitioners which led to the cancellation of the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of Malines and Melecio by the Register of Deeds (RD).
Malines and Melacio filed a petition for the cancellation of the EPs contending that the sale
of the land was with the consent of the petitioners and they were not informed of the taking of the
land. Petitioners on the other hand assailed the validity of the sale of the subject land. Provincial
Adjudicator (PA) dismissed the petition. The PA disqualified petitioners from being beneficiaries of
the DAR’s OLT for failure to pay their amortizations. The DARAB central office affirmed the PA’s
decision stating that there was no violation of the right to due process when no notice of coverage
of the subject land was served to Malines and Melacio since at that time, the place is under
ownership of Paris. The CA ruled that the subject land is exempt from OLT coverage because it is
part of their retained areas.
ISSUE:
Was the sale to the respondents of the land under the coverage of OLT valid?
RULING:
Yes, the sale of the subject land under the coverage of the OLT is valid.
To protect the rights of tenants-farmers, P.D. 27 decreed that titles to land acquired
pursuant to it or the land reform program shall not be transferrable except by hereditary succession
or to the Government in accordance with its provisions and other pertinent laws and regulations.
However, not all conveyances involving tenanted rice and corn lands are prohibited. DAR issued
several memorandum circulars which recognized the validity of direct sale between the landowner
and the tenant-beneficiary under a direct payment scheme and at liberal terms and subject to
conditions. Said circulars also prohibit transfer of ownership except to actual tenant-farmers/tillers
The transfer of the subject land from Paris to Malines and Melacio would have been void
had not the petitioners admitted in their answer that Malines and Melecio were qualified
beneficiaries. Consequently, the subject land, having been acquired in a valid sale pursuant to
P.D. 27, could no longer be bound by separate EPs in favor of other persons.
Thus, the EPs of the petitioners, which covers land already conveyed to qualified farmer
beneficiaries through a valid sale, have been irregularly issued and must be declared null and void.
136 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
FISHPONDS ARE NO LONGER CONSIDERED AS AGRICULTURAL LANDS;
DISPUTES
ARISING FROM THE SAME NOW FALL WITHIN THE JURISCTION OF REGULAR
COURTS
Magdalena C. Dillena vs. Mariano Alcaraz, Bernardo Alcaraz, Joselito Alcaraz and Amor
Alcaraz Sta. Maria
G.R. No.204045; December 14, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari which seeks to set aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) which reversed the decision rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Salud Crespo instituted Catalino Dillena (Catalino) as tenant of the subject landholding
(fishpond). When one Ana Alcaraz (Ana) purchased the land, the latter recognized Catalino’s
tenancy over the same. When Catalino died, petitioner’s husband Narciso Dillena (Narciso)
succeeded to the former’s tenancy rights. When Ana died, said landholding was inherited by the
respondents who also recognized Narciso’s tenancy rights. Narciso continued to pay rent and
introduced improvements on the land. However, after Narciso died, they informed petitioner about
their intention to increase rental and that petitioner must vacate the land.
This prompted petitioner Magdalena Dillena to file a petition with the PARAD praying that
she be declared a de jure tenant. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss contending that the lease
already expired and as a civil case it must be cognizable by the regular courts. PARAD ruled that
fishponds remained agricultural lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) and that the dispute is an agrarian controversy, therefore, petitioner is not a lessee but a
legitimate tenant and enjoys security of tenure pursuant to her tenurial arrangement with
respondents. DARAB affirmed the decision of PARAD ruling that as tenant, he has acquired a
vested right over the subject fishpond which has become fixed and established and is no longer
open for doubt or controversy. DARAB also ruled that since jurisdiction was already assumed by
PARAD, the same may not be denied. CA set aside the decision and ruled in favor of the
respondents.
ISSUE:
Are fishponds agricultural lands subject to the jurisdiction of DARAB/PARAD?
RULING:
No, the court agreed with the CA that the case is beyond the jurisdiction of DARAB and
PARAD.
By virtue of RA 7881 (CARL), private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn
farms and fishponds were exempted from the coverage of the CARL. When petitioner filed the
complaint with the PARAD, RA 7881 was already in effect, therefore the subject landholding which
remained undistributed under and was not subjected to the CARP ceased to be covered by the
CARL. Consequently, the PARAD and the DARAB had no authority to take cognizance of the case
since their jurisdiction is limited to agrarian disputes. It also nullifies petitioner’s claim that a tenurial
arrangement, which is governed by RA 3844, exists between her and the respondents.
Thus, since petitioner and Narciso did not apply to become beneficiaries in the
landholdings and chose instead to remain in the fishponds, they cannot claim protection
specifically under the CARL and other agrarian laws, as the landholding ceased to be covered
under said laws.