Howell Donaldson Motion
Howell Donaldson Motion
v.
undersigned attorneys, pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.151(a), and moves for Consolidation of the
four offenses charged in the Indictment filed against him and for a single trial thereon, and as
purposes of these rules, 2 or more offenses are related offenses if they are triable in the same
court and are based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more connected acts or transactions.
more offenses are improperly charged in a single indictment or information, the defendant shall
have a right to a severance of the charges on timely motion. (2)(A) provides that the court
nevertheless shall grant a severance of charges on motion of the state or of a defendant before
trial on a showing that the severance is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the
defendant’s guilt or innocence of each offense. Since severance is a right enjoyed by the
Defendant, this right can also be waived by the Defendant if severance is no longer going to
promote a fair determination of the Defendant’s guilt or innocence as to each offense. See
Shutte v. Thompson, 82 U.S. 151, 159 (1873) (“A party may waive any provision, either of a
contract or of a statute, intended for his benefit.”); United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196,
beneficial provisions of federal statutes, procedural and evidentiary rules, and even fundamental
constitutional protections.)
3. The state charged Howell Donaldson with four counts of First-Degree Murder in a
single Indictment. On June 1, 2020, Mr. Donaldson moved to sever the four offenses in order to
obtain a fair jury determination of his guilt or innocence as to each offense. The state opposed
the defense’s motion for severance arguing that these offenses constituted a “crime spree”, the
offenses were linked in a significant way and by a meaningful relationship, and that these
offenses were inextricably intertwined. This Court entered orders (1) severing the four counts
and (2) prohibiting the state from introducing “similar fact” evidence of the three additional
homicides at each of the four trials. The state filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the
Second District Court of Appeal, in which the state complained that “the order materially harms
the state by forcing it to try four different murder trials without each jury panel knowing about
the other three connected murders that occurred.” (State’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari pg. 4,
11,46). In addition to arguing that the crimes were sufficiently similar as to be admissible under
a “modus operandi” Williams Rule theory, the state also argued the “ballistics evidence clearly
linking Donaldson to the murders” as a basis for admissibility of all four homicides at each of the
four trials. (State’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari pg. 21, 2).
4. The Second District Court of Appeal disagreed with the state’s contention that the
theory. State v. Donaldson, 336 So.3d 825, 828-829 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2022). It was the state’s
alternative theory that the ballistics evidence established that Donaldson’s firearm was used in
each of the four murders which persuaded the Second District Court of Appeal that the crimes
were sufficiently linked as to make them cross-admissible. Id. at 829-830. On that basis only,
5. As recognized in State v. Conde, 743 So.2d 78 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1999), the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision in Crossley v. State, 596 So.2d 447, 449-450 (Fla. 1992), is the
“seminal case” on the subject of joinder and consolidation. The Supreme Court stated: “The
justifications for the consolidation of charges are convenience and the preservation of the court’s
valuable resources. However, practicality and efficiency cannot outweigh the Defendant’s right
to a fair trial.” Citing to State v. Vasquez, 419 So.2d 1088 (Fla. 1982). In Vasquez, the Florida
Supreme Court also observed that “the objective of fairly determining a defendant’s innocence or
guilt should have priority over other relevant considerations such as expense, efficiency, and
convenience.” Id. at 1091. See also Garcia v. State, 568 So.3d 896, 898 (Fla. 1990) (The
6. Based on the District Court of Appeal’s ruling allowing evidence that Mr.
Donaldson’s firearm was used in each of the four murders, making evidence of each murder
relevant to his identity to warrant admission under section 90.404(2), Mr. Donaldson is
requesting that the trial court re-consolidate the four counts of murder and have one trial in this
case. Now that the state is no longer required to prove Mr. Donaldson’s guilt or innocence in
four separate trials without each jury panel knowing about the other three connected murders, the
underlying reason for severance no longer exists. The purpose for requesting a severance in this
case was to promote a fair determination of guilt or innocence as to each charged offense by
protecting against mutual contamination of the jury’s consideration of each distinct charge. In
light of the Second District Court of Appeal’s ruling that the ballistics evidence that Mr.
Donaldson’s gun was used in each of the four murders sufficiently connected the offenses for
purposes of admissibility, then the logical conclusion is that the ballistics evidence also
7. The case of State v. Conde, 743 So.3d 78 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1999) is distinguishable
from our case and is therefore, not binding on this Court. (See Mazzara v. State, 51 So.2d 480,
484 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)). In Conde, the defendant was accused of committing six murders by
strangulation. All six murders were similar in that they occurred during a four-month period,
approximately two to three weeks apart, each victim was a prostitute who worked within a
limited area, was killed by strangulation late at night and each had engaged in sexual relations
with the defendant. Id. at 80. Additionally, the murders were similar in that each body was
found within a small radius of the defendant’s home, each in the vicinity of the Tamiami Trail
area, each was re-dressed and face down in a posed position. Id. Evidence of fibers, tire, DNA
and semen were found on the bodies. The defendant moved to sever the counts and the State
conceded. Upon a ruling that the trial court would admit the State’s Williams rule evidence of
the first five murders into the trial of the sixth murder, the defendant moved to re-consolidate.
The State objected and the trial court granted the consolidation. The State filed a Writ of
Certiorari and the Third District Court of Appeal quashed the order consolidating the offenses
However, Conde involved “similar fact” evidence or “modus operandi” evidence, while
in the instant case, the Second District Court of Appeal expressly rejected the state’s contention
that the crimes were uniquely similar so as to be admissible on that basis. Instead, the appellate
court determined that the “connection alone” established by the ballistics evidence that
Donaldson’s firearm was used in all four murders is all that is necessary to show relevance. See
State v. Donaldson, 336 So.3d at 830. Modus operandi evidence, as in Conde, allows the trier
of fact to infer from the similarities between the crimes that the same person committed both, or
all of the crimes. On the other hand, ballistics evidence establishing that the same gun was used
See Pomeranz v. State, 703 So.2d 465, 469-470 (Fla. 1997); State v. Hicks, 258 So.3d 1039,
8. As this trial court correctly stated in its order granting severance in the instant
case, Conde contained more similarities between the victims and offenses than do the separate
offenses in this case. (See trial court order pg. 7). Similar fact evidence under Williams relies on
the premise that the cases are so unique or similar, that the same person must have committed all
of the crimes. That is not the case here. As the Second District Court of Appeal stated in
Donaldson, “This is not a typical scenario involving modus operandi where the only evidence
that the defendant committed the charged crime is its similarity to another crime of which the
defendant has already been independently established as the perpetrator. In such a scenario,
the similarity of the established crime to the charged crime must indicate a manner or method of
commission peculiar enough to suggest they were probably not committed by different people.
The fatal shootings of which Donaldson is accused occurred in somewhat close temporal and
geographic proximity to one another, and the victims all seemed similarly random insofar as
there is no known affiliation with the accused. But these pedestrian similarities are a round peg
ill-suited to the square hold of the modus operandi test, which requires unusually similar
characteristics that pervade the compared factual situations and have some special character
that indicates the same individual carried out the crimes. Here, while the State did advance a
modus operandi theory, it also advanced an alternative theory that did not rely on establishment
of a modus operandi and, as such, did not require the similarity showing necessary for a modus
operandi theory. The theory is that evidence points to Donaldson as the perpetrator-not
because he committed each homicide in similar fashion-but because they were all committed
with his firearm…Here, as in the Third District’s Williams case, the fact that the same gun was
9. As the Second District Court of Appeal pointed out, the instant case is analogous to
Williams v. State, 992 So.2d 330, 333 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2008) in which the Third District
distinguished identity supported by a modus operandi theory and involved the exclusion of
evidence of two additional armed robberies which the defendant had committed. There, the trial
court erred when it applied the similarity requirement, reserved for determining the admissibility
of collateral crime evidence, where the State seeks to prove identity through modus operandi,
common plan, or scheme. The court held that the State was not seeking to prove identity by
modus operandi but instead sought to prove identity based on evidence that the same gun was
used in all three robberies. Id. “Because the gun used in all three robberies was shown to be
the same one, the only inquiry for the trial court to make was whether such evidence of collateral
crimes, which included both physical evidence and eyewitness testimony, was relevant to the
issue of the perpetrator’s identity—not whether the evidence revealed uniquely similar factual
situations.” Id. See also Fernandez v. State, 722 So.2d 879, 880 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1998)
(evidence of prior shooting was relevant to issues of identity and motive where same gun was
used in prior shooting and charged crime.); Parker v. State, 456 So.2d 436, 442 (Fla. 1984)
admission was relevant to prove identification as perpetrator of charged crime where bullets
from both crimes were linked by ballistics evidence.); State v. Hicks, 258 So.3d 1039, 1047
(La.App. 5 Cir. 2018) (The counts were not mis-joined as the shootings were of the same or
similar character and the two incidents were linked in that the same 9-mm firearm was used at
both incidents.); People v. Read, 572 N.Y.S. 2d 259, 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (Finding no
error in refusing to sever counts because although no gun was recovered, the firearms examiner
had been seen with a gun from which the bullet casings could have come, and the individuals
a fair determination of Mr. Donaldson’s guilt or innocence at to each charge. The state should
have no standing to argue to the contrary, since (1) the state chose to charge the four homicides
in a single indictment; (2) it vehemently opposed the motion for severance; (3) it asserted that the
ballistics evidence “clearly linked” Donaldson to the murders (State’s Petition for Certiorari pg.
21). If the ballistics evidence connects the four homicides sufficiently to make them cross-
11. Additionally, because the State is seeking the death penalty in this case, re-
consolidation is also necessary in light of the fact that the statutory aggravators, as well as all of
the mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of this trial would apply to all four of the
murders and the jury would be given specific instructions as to the death of each victim and an
opportunity to render four separate sentencing verdicts. See Rolling v. State, 695 So.2d 278,
WHEREFORE, the Defendant requests that Counts One, Two, Three and Four of the
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing motion has been furnished to SCOTT
the State Attorney of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, on this 6th day of October, 2022.
Respectfully submitted,
LAW OFFICE OF JULIANNE M. HOLT
PUBLIC DEFENDER