G.R. No.

180314               April 16, 2009

NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, Petitioner, 
vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered
it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of
the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely
connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of
committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers. (U.S. v. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453;
People v. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People v. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People v. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338;
People v. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253). 

In line with the above ruling, and considering that it was the accused who took advantage and
profited in the use of the falsified Employees Clearance in question, the presumption is inevitable
that she is the material author of the falsification. And despite full opportunity, she was not able to
rebut such presumption by failing to show that it was another person who forged or falsified the
signature of Laura Pangilan or that at least another person and not she alone, had the reason or
motive to commit the forgery or falsification, or was or could have been benefited by such
falsification/forgery.60

The circumstances enumerated by the Sandiganbayan, as against the denials of petitioner, convince
us to apply the rule that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession
of, and who has used, a forged document, is the forger and, therefore, guilty of falsification.61 The
effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to
overcome the prima facie case created, which, if no contrary proof is offered, will thereby prevail.62 A
prima facie case of falsification having been established, petitioner should have presented clear and
convincing evidence to overcome such burden. This, she failed to do.

Petitioner assails the weight given by the Sandiganbayan to the testimonies of the two Pangilans
when they failed to report the alleged falsification to the police or alert the Office of the Regional
Governor of said falsification, or tried to stop petitioner from getting her salaries. 

We do not agree with the petitioner. It is a settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as
well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect.63 The determination of the credibility of witnesses is the domain of the trial court, as it is in the
best position to observe the witnesses’ demeanor.64 The Sandiganbayan has given full probative
value to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. So have we. We find no reason to depart from
such a rule.

Aware that the prosecution failed to present the original from which the photocopy of petitioner’s
Employees Clearance was supposed to have been obtained, she maintains that the Sandiganbayan
should have doubted the authenticity and probative value of the photocopy of the Employees
Clearance. 
The Sandiganbayan correctly admitted in evidence the photocopy of the Employees Clearance. We
agree when it ruled:

Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. The purpose of
the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the best evidence if the prevention of fraud,
because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it and presents inferior or
secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the latter evidence is withheld from the court
and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose and
defeat. Hence, as long as the original evidence can be had, the Court should not receive in evidence
that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that
the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. Such photocopies must be
disregarded, being inadmissible evidence and barren of probative weight.

G.R. No. 177235               July 7, 2014

SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA, Petitioner,  vs.

AURORA MENDOZA FERMIN, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

With regard to the issue on forgery, the general rule is, the same cannot be presumed and must be
proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence; the burden of proof of which lies on the party
alleging forgery.  The best evidence of a forged signature in the instrument is the instrument itself
43

reflecting the alleged forged signature.  The fact of forgery can only be established by comparison
44

between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose
signature is theorized upon to have been forged. 45

In supporting her argument that the signature on the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale was forged,
respondentpresented an expert handwriting witness, Noel Cruz, who testified thatthe questioned
signatures of Leonardo vis-à-visthe sample signatures of the latter submitted by respondent were
not written by one and the same person.  This conclusion was bolstered by respondent’s other
46

witness,Teresita Rosales, who testified that when she requested Leonardo to sign a marriage
contract, as mayor of their town, she personally witnessed that it was petitioner who signed the
same by forging the signature of Leonardo.  According to Rosales,petitioner even boasted to her
47

that she has been the one signing documents for Leonardo on account of the latter’s failing
eyesight.48

The foregoing, however, was disregarded by the RTC on the ground that such general observations
could not overcome the positive declaration of petitioner that Leonardo indeed signed the questioned
documents on the place and date written. With this, the RTC maintained that there was no forgery
and upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Upon an assiduous examination of the records of this case, we find basis to sustain the reversal of
the CA, upon its independent examination of the assailed signatures, and hereby adopt its
observations thereon, to wit:

We, however, after examining the supposed signatures of Leonardo and comparing them with his
accepted standard, conclude that the questioned signatures were forgeries. A scrutiny of the
comparison charts of the NBI handwriting expertwitness and the PNP handwriting expert witness,
consisting of the enlarged photographs of the questioned signatures of Leonardo and the specimen
signatures submitted by the parties, would reveal that there are marked differences between
Leonardo’s signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale vis-à-vis the specimen signatures submitted by
the parties. As seen in the enlarged photographs of both parties, the mosttelling differences between
the questioned signatures and all the specimen signatures offered in evidence, including the
specimen signatures offered in evidence by Serconsision, is in the initial and predominant letter
which appears to be a letter "O". Significantly, the manner of execution of all the standard specimen
signatures of Leonardo, reveal that the person who signed the same used free rapid continuous
execution or strokes in forming the letter "O" which is indicative of the signatory’s fluidity in
movement. In the questioned signatures, the initial and predominant letter was apparently written in
a hesitating slow drawn stroke indicating that the person, who executed the same as hesitant when
the signatures were made. In short, we find that all specimen signaturessubmitted in evidence by the
parties were written gracefully whereas the questioned signatures were written awkwardly. As such,
the samples and the questioned signatures in the instant case were written by two different
persons.49

While we recognize that the technical nature of the procedure in examining forged documents calls
for handwriting experts,  resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable, because a
50

finding of forgery does not depend entirely on their testimonies.  Judges must also exercise
51

independent judgment in determining the authenticity or genuineness of the signatures in question,

and not rely merely on the testimonies of handwriting experts.  The doctrine in Heirs of Severa P.
52

Gregorio v. Court of Appeals,  is instructive, to wit:

53

Due to the technicality of the procedure involved in the examination of forged documents, the
expertise of questioned document examiners is usually helpful. However, resort to questioned
document examiners is not mandatory and whileprobably useful, they are not indispensable in
examining or comparing handwriting. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony
of handwriting experts. Although such testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent
judgment on the issue ofauthenticity of the signatures under scrutiny. The judge cannot rely on the
mere testimony of the handwriting expert. In the case of Gamido vs. Court of Appeals(citing the case
of Alcon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 833), the Court held that the authenticity of
signatures

"... is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum
physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The
opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less
compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue."

A judge must therefore conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive
at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity and this cannot be done without the original copy
being produced in court.54

When the dissimilarity between the genuine and false specimens of writing is visible to the naked
eye and would not ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer, resort to
technical rules is no longer necessary and the instrument may bestricken off for being spurious.  In
55
other words, when so established and is conspicuously evident from its appearance, the opinion of
handwriting experts on the forged document is no longer necessary. 56

More so when, as in this case, the forgery was testified to and thus established by evidence other
than the writing itself, as correctly observed by the CA, thus:

Strongly indicative also of the forged signatures of Leonardo and the fictitious character of the
Deedof Absolute Sale is not only the physical manifestation of imitation in the signature of Leonardo,
but also the questionable circumstances under which the Deed of Absolute Sale was prepared and
the actuations of the defendants-appellees after its execution. Firstly, Serconsision admitted that she
still occupied the property long after the alleged sale infavor of Eduardo took place. This admission
of Serconsision substantiates the testimony of witness Teresita Rosales, that Serconsision still
occupied the subject property, continued to collect the rentals from the tenants and that she never
informed the tenants that the property was already sold to Eduardo. Secondly, the inventory
prepared by Serconsision for the probate court on March 8, 1989 clearly listed the subject property
as part ofthe properties of the late Leonardo. Lastly, there is an apparent lack of interest on the part
of Eduardo to protect his rights over the property, assuming that he had any. As aptly pointed out by
Aurora in her brief, Eduardo never appeared in court, much less testify thereto to protect his alleged
interest.
57

Contrary to the RTC’s view, the positive declaration of petitioner that Leonardo affixed the assailed
signatures in her presence cannot be taken as gospel truth, as it is self-serving and biased at best.
Petitioner’s interest on the sale of the property contained in the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale is
glaring, and it is only logical that she would foster the due execution and genuineness of the
questioned documentsif only to enforce the same between the parties, as well as against third
persons.

More, the conclusion of the RTC thatno direct and credible testimony of witnesses as to matters
within their personal observation was present in the instant case is belied by respondent’stestimony
that she is familiar with the signature of her father because she was his private secretary during the
period of 1972 to 1981, when her fatherwas still the mayor of San Pascual, Batangas. Considering
the proximity of respondent to Leonardo and her personal knowledge of the latter’s signatures, her
conclusion that the signatures appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale did not fit that of the genuine
signature of her father is sound and reliable.

Indeed, the foregoing testimonial and circumstantial evidence cast doubt on the integrity,
genuineness, and veracity of the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale and impels this Court to tilt the
scale in favor of respondent. Although there is no direct evidence to prove forgery, preponderance of
evidence indubitably favors the respondent. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weightof the credible evidence."  It is evidence
58

which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.
59

We cannot likewise uphold the validity of the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale on the basis that it
was notarized by one Atty. Julian Tubig, and, therefore, carries with it the presumption of regularity.
Time and again, we have ruled that "while it is truethat a notarized document carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and has in its favor the presumption of
regularity, this presumption, however, is not absolute."  It may be rebutted by clear and convincing
60

evidence to the contrary.61

For one, it is undisputed that there are two (2) versions of the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale, as
admitted by petitioner, that were allegedly executed for taxation purposes.  Such is certainly not in
62

accordance with the normal scheme of things. Executing different adaptations of a conveying
document involving the same parties and property invites questions, not only asto the due execution
and genuineness thereof but also with respect to the trueintent of the parties in the provisions
contained therein. In addition, the records show that one of the deeds is allegedly notarized by Atty.
Julian Tubig for the City of Pasay (superimposed by word "Manila"). In fact, upon cross-examination
by respondent’s counsel, petitioner testified to this, to wit:

Atty. Balita:

The witness testified that Tubig isa Notary Public of Pasay City and the property was transferred by
virtue of the document executed before Tubig?

Atty. Viovicente:

That’s misleading, Your Honor. The document would speak for itself. This was signed in Manila. He
was speaking to the other document.

Atty. Balita:

It’s not. She said thatthe property was transferred by virtue of the document executed before Tubig
and then you insist that this document was in Manila?

Atty. Viovicente:

Yes, the documents would speak for itself. The acknowledgment states.

Atty. Balita:

This is manila then interposition Pasay.

Atty. Viovicente:

This is the same document which they attached in their complaint, Your Honor as Annex "B." 63

Taking into account the foregoing defects, as well as the testimony of respondent and her expert
witnesses (had it been properly appreciated), is sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity
attached to public documents and to meet the stringentrequirements to prove forgery. The necessity
of a public documentfor contracts which transmit or extinguish real rights over immovable property,
as mandated by Article 1358 of the Civil Code, is only for convenience; it is not essential for validity
or enforceability.  The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long
64

as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular.  A defective notarization will strip the
65

document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument.  Consequently, when there is
66

a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally
attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such
document is preponderance of evidence.  Here, preponderance of evidence heavily tilts in favor of
67

respondent.
Being a forgery, the Deed of Absolute Sale conveyed nothing in favor of Eduardo C. Sanchez, as
claimed by petitioner. The necessary consequence of which was succinctly stated by the CA in the
following wise:

Having ruled that the signatures of Leonardo in the Deed of Absolute Sale were forgeries, then it
follows that such document should be annulled for lack of consent on the part of Leonardo. Notably,
the subject property was part of the conjugal property of the Spouses Leonardo and Serconsision
Mendoza, this can be gleaned from TCT No. 48946 wherein it states that the sameis owned by
"Leonardo G. Mendoza & Serconsision R. Mendoza, both of legal age." Besides, Aurora has not
adduced any proof to substantiate her allegation that Serconsision was just the common-law wife of
her father.

As Leonardo and Serconsision were married sometime in 1985, the applicable provision governing
the property relations of the spouses is Article 172 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which states
that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent. In Felipe vs. Heirs
of Maximo Aldon, a case decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court had the
occasion to rule that the sale of a land belonging to the conjugal partnership made by the wife
without the consent of the husband is voidable. The Supreme Court further ruled that the view that
the disposal by the wife of their conjugal property without the husband’s consent is voidable is
supported by Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that contracts entered by the husband
without the consent of the wife when such consent is required are annullable at her instance during
the marriage and withinten years from the transaction questioned. In the present case, the fictitious
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 22, 1986, one month after or specifically on
November 25, 1986, Leonardo died. Auroraas one of the heirs and the duly appointed administratrix
of Leonardo’s estate, had the right therefore to seek for the annulment of the Deed of Sale asit
deprived her and the other legal heirs of Leonardo of their hereditary rights. Consequently, TCT No.
52593 in the name of Eduardo must be cancelled. Defendantappellees’ unauthorized and
fictitioustransaction cannotbe invoked as a source of right.
68

G.R. No. 200013               January 14, 2015

BETTY GEPULLE-GARBO, represented by Attorney-in-Fact, MINDA G. ROSALES (now

represented by her new Attorney-in-Fact, GARY LLOYD G. ROSALES), Petitioner, 
vs.
SPOUSES VICTOREY ANTONIO GARABATO and JOSEPHINE S. GARABATO, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

In any event, Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is the duty
of a party to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence
required by law.28

As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.  One who alleges forgery has the
29
burden to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight
or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.  The fact of forgery can only be
30

established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine
signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have been forged. 31

In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission, United Presbyterian Church, USA,  the Court32

identified and explained the factors involved in the examination and comparison of handwritings:

x x x [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general
characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards
spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may
be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of
the former’s authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit
of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that
must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the
paper where the questioned signature is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and
the kind of pen and/or paper used, play an important role on the general appearance of the
signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct
or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a questioned handwriting, much weight
should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between that questioned
handwriting and an authentic one. 33

The opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court, the expert’s function
being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion.  This principle
34

holds true especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which
can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of
the currently existing ones.  A finding of forgery does not dependentirely on the testimonies of
35

handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned
signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. 36

Here, both the RTC and CA found that Albacea did not explain the manner of examination of the
specimen signatures in reaching his conclusion. Albacea did not point out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which
would ordinarily escape notice or detection by an untrained observer.

The Court also aptly ruled that courts are not bound by expert testimonies especially that the
examination was upon the initiative of Nick and Betty and they had complete control on what
documents and specimens to be examined by the NBI. Betty, in coming before us, had the onus of
showing that the signatures were forged. She fell short of demonstrating that her case fell within the
limited exceptions for disturbing conclusiveness of factual findings of lower courts. The petitioner
having not shown any reason for us to disturb the ruling of the courts a quo, we are constrained to
affirm the decision of the CA.

G.R. No. 179448               June 26, 2013

CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Forgery duly established.

"Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by the signing of another’s name with intent to
defraud."27 It can be established by comparing the alleged false signature with the authentic or
genuine one. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of government
handwriting experts whose opinions do not mandatorily bind the courts. A trial judge is not precluded
but is even authorized by law28 to conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature
in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.

In this case, the finding of forgery on the signature of Romeo Tan (Tan) appearing in the promissory
notes and cashier’s checks was not anchored solely on the result of the examination conducted by
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner. The trial court also made an
independent examination of the questioned signatures and after analyzing the same, reached the
conclusion that the signatures of Tan appearing in the promissory notes are different from his
genuine signatures appearing in his Deposit Account Information and Specimen Signature Cards on
file with the bank. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the above findings of the RTC which was
affirmed by the CA. A rule of long standing in this jurisdiction is that findings of a trial court, when
affirmed by the CA, are accorded great weight and respect. Absent any reason to deviate from the
said findings, as in this case, the same should be deemed conclusive and binding to this Court.

No suppression of evidence on the part of the prosecution.

Petitioner claims that the prosecution should have presented Tan in court to shed light on the matter.
His non-presentation created the presumption that his testimony if given would be adverse to the
case of the prosecution. Petitioner thus contends that the prosecution suppressed its own evidence.

Such contention is likewise untenable. The prosecution has the prerogative to choose the evidence
or the witnesses it wishes to present. It has the discretion as to how it should present its
case.29 Moreover, the presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where
the evidence was at the disposal of both the defense and the prosecution.30 In the present case, if
petitioner believes that Tan is the principal witness who could exculpate him from liability by
establishing that it was Tan and not him who signed the subject documents, the most prudent thing
to do is to utilize him as his witness. Anyway, petitioner has the right to have compulsory process to
secure Tan’s attendance during the trial pursuant to Article III, Section 14(2)31 of the Constitution.
The records show, however, that petitioner did not invoke such right. In view of these, no
suppression of evidence can be attributed to the prosecution.

Elements of falsification of commercial documents established.

Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) refers to falsification by a private individual or a public officer or employee, who
did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private or commercial document. The
elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the
offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the
RPC;33 and, (3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.
All the above-mentioned elements were established in this case. First, petitioner is a private
individual. Second, the acts of falsification consisted in petitioner’s (1) counterfeiting or imitating the
handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to appear that the same is true and genuine in all
respects; and (2) causing it to appear that Tan has participated in an act or proceeding when he did
not in fact so participate. Third, the falsification was committed in promissory notes and checks
which are commercial documents. Commercial documents are, in general, documents or
instruments which are "used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions."34Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions while a check is a means of payment
used in business in lieu of money for convenience in business transactions. A cashier’s check
necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person whose name and signature appear
thereon to encash the check and withdraw the amount indicated therein.35