SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS

Consolacion Florention de Crisologo v. Dr. Manuel Singson

Facts: The case was an action for partition commenced by the spouses Consolacion
Florentino and Francisco Crisologo against Manuel Singson in connection with a
residential lot. The complaint alleged that Singson owned one half of said property
and that Consolacion Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the provisions of
the duly probated last will of Doña Leona Singson, the original owner.

Defendant’s defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a mere usufructuary of,
and not owner of one half of the property in question, therefore, she was not
entitled to demand partition.

The lower court rendered judgment that the plaintiff is a co-owner. Defendant
Singson appealed. 

Issue: Whether the testamentary disposition provided for what is called sustitucion
vulgar (Appointment of second, third and even further heirs, legatees, rather than
the first instituted in the case that this missing does not make the succession) or for a
sustitucion fideicomisaria (to whom a trust is destined).

Held:
The Court believed that the is controlled by the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code
in force in the Philippines prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code, which
provided that:
"ART. 774. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or
heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish or
should be unable to accept the inheritance. 

In accordance with the said provision, the testator may not only designate the heirs
who will succeed him upon his death, but also provide for substitutes in the event
that said heirs do not accept or are in no position to accept the inheritance or
legacies, or die ahead of him. 

It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under consideration provides for a
substitution of the heir named therein in this manner: that upon the death of
Consolacion Florentino — whether this occurs before or after that of the testatrix —
the property bequeathed to her shall be delivered ("se dara") or shall belong in equal
parts to the testatrix’s three brothers, or their forced heirs should anyone of them
die ahead of Consolacion Florentino.

If this clause created what is known as sustitusion vulgar, the necessary result would
be that Consolacion Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix, became the owner of
one undivided half of the property, but if it provided for a sustitusion fideicomisaria,
she would have acquired nothing more than usufructuary rights over the same half.
In the former case, she would undoubtedly be entitled to partition, but not in the
latter.

In the light of the foregoing, the Court believe, and so hold, that the last will of the
deceased Dña. Leona Singson established a mere sustitución vulgar, the substitution
of Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take
place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the
testatrix. 

Carmen G. De Perez, Trustee of the Estate of Alcantara v. Gachitorena

Facts: In the case, the amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with
the association known as La Urbana, as the final payment of the liquidated credit of
the late Ana Maria Alcantara, whose heiress is said plaintiff, against the late Andres
Garchitorena, represented by his son, Mariano Garchitorena.

Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Alcantara,

husband of the plaintiff, Carmen de Perez, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of
execution, levied an attachment on said amount deposited with La Urbana.

The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the
decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction. The defendants
contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress, and pray for the
dissolution of the injunction.

The court held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's children as
fideicommissary heirs and granted a final writ of injunction.

Issue: Whether or not the amount deposited with La Urbana is the property of the
children of the plaintiff as Fideicommissary Heirs

Held: The will certainly provides for a substitution of heirs, and of the three cases
that might give rise to a simple substitution (art. 774, Civil Code), only the death of
the instituted heiress before the testatrix would in the instant case give place to such
substitution, inasmuch as nothing is said of the waiver of inheritance, or incapacity
to accept it. As a matter of fact, clause XI provides for the administration of the
estate in case the heiress instituted should die after the testatrix and while the
substitute heirs are still under age. And it is evident that, considering the nature of
simple substitution by the heir's death before the testator, and the fact that by
clause XI in connection with clause X, the substitution is ordered where the heiress
instituted dies after the testatrix, this cannot be a case of simple substitution. 
The existence of a substitution in the will is not and cannot be denied, and since it
cannot be a simple substitution in the light of the considerations stated in the clause,
the court has to determine whether let the case is a fideicommissary substitution. 

In clause IX, the testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her sole and universal heiress.
Although the said clause provides nothing explicit about substitution, it does not
contain anything in conflict with the idea of fideicommissary substitution. The fact
that the plaintiff was instituted the sole and universal heiress does not prevent her
children from receiving, upon her death and in conformity with the express desire
of the testatrix, the latter's hereditary estate, as provided in the clauses which
cannot be disregarded. In fact the enjoyment of the inheritance is in conformity with
the idea of fideicommissary substitution, by virtue of which the heir instituted
receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although at the same time he preserves it in
order to pass it on the second heir. The fideicommissary substitution, as held,
requires three things: 

1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate. 

2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a third person
the whole or a part of the estate. 

3. A second heir. 

The foregoing leads to the conclusion that all the requisites of a fideicommissary
substitution are present in the case, to wit: 

1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the
plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate, according to
clause IX of the will. 

2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third
person the whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is imposed in clause X
which provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's)
surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to dispose of the
estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course in case she dies intestate, said
clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress instituted, but also
provides for the disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix. 

3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are referred to
as such second heirs both in clause X and in clause XI.

Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the beginning, which
is on deposit with the association known as La Urbana in the plaintiff's name, is a
part, does not belong to her nor can it be subject to the execution of the judgment
against Joaquin Perez, who is not one of the fideicommissary heirs. 

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant, Mariano
Garchitorena. So ordered.

CONDITIONAL TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS AND TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS

WITH A TERM

Morente v. Dela Santa, G.R. No. L-3891, Dec. 19, 1907

The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:

1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my
husband, Gumersindo de la Santa. 

2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he
shall not marry anyone; should my said husband have children by anyone, he shall
not convey any portion of the property left by me, except the one-third part thereof
and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his
children should he have any. 

3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is

located, which is one of the properties belonging to me.

Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the
death of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition
relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo Morente, where she asked that the
legacy to him above-mentioned be annulled.

In its judgment the court denied the petition. I

Issue: Whether or not the husband forfeited his legacy by reason of the second
marriage

Held: It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband
shall not leave her sisters. It is provided in the third clause that he must continue to
live in a certain building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry
again. To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply
with them he shall lose the legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. It is
nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the testatrix's sisters, or does not
continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the will he shall forfeit the property
given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if he marries again
he shall incur such a loss. But it is expressly provided that if one event does happen
the disposition of the property contained in the first clause of the will shall be
changed. It is said that if he has children by anyone, two-thirds of that property shall
pass to Vicente, the brother of the testatrix. 

To construe the will with reference to all the clauses contained therein, and with
reference to such surrounding circumstances as duly appear in the case, and after
such consideration, the Court can not say that it was the intention of the testatrix
that if her husband married again he should forfeit the legacy above mentioned. In
other words, there being no express condition attached to that legacy in reference
to the second marriage, we can not say that any condition can be implied from the
context of the will.
LEGITIME

Mendoza v. Policarpio, G.R. No. 176422, Mar. 20, 2013

The Facts

The properties subject in the instant case are three

parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan: (1) Lot

1681-B, with an area of 7,749 square meters; 2 (2) Lot

1684, with an area of 5,667 sq m; 3 and (3) Lot No. 1646-

B, with an area of 880 sq m.4 Lot Nos. 1681-B and 1684

are presently in the name of respondent Julia Delos

Santos5 (respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other hand,

is also in the name of respondent but co-owned by

Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property

from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.

Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido)

and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Placido and Dominga

had four children: Antonio, Exequiel, married to Leonor,

Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners Maria, Deogracias,

Dionisia, Adoracion, Marcela and Ricardo are the children

of Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes, Elvira and

Fortunato, on the other hand, are Valentin's children.

Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of Placido

and Dominga's properties that were subject of an oral

partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After

Exequiel's death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor and

only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonor's death, her share

went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and

without issue. They claimed that after Gregoria's death,

respondent, who is Leonor's sister, adjudicated unto

herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of

Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the

properties should have been reserved by respondent in

their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying

Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.

Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve

the properties as these did not originate from petitioners'

familial line and were not originally owned by Placido and

Dominga. According to respondent, the properties were

bought by Exequiel and Antonio from a certain Alfonso

Ramos in 1931. It appears, however, that it was only

Exequiel who was in possession of the properties. 6 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan,

Branch 6, found merit in petitioners' claim and granted

their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva

Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance. In its

Decision dated November 4, 2002, the RTC disposed as

follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing judgment is

hereby rendered: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia

Policarpio) to reconvey the three (3) parcels of

land subject of this action in the name of the

plaintiffs enumerated in the complaint including

intervenor Maria Cecilia M. Mendoza except one-

half of the property described in the old title,

TCT No. T-124852(M) which belongs to

Victorina Pantaleon; cralawlibrary

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to

cancel the titles in the name of Julia Policarpio,

TCT No. T-149033(M), T-183631(M) and T-

 149035(M) and reconvey the same to the

enumerated plaintiffs; and

3. No pronouncement as to claims for attorney's

fees and damages and costs.

SO ORDERED.7 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set

aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint filed

by petitioners. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision

dated November 16, 2006 provides: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 4, 2002

Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 6, Third Judicial

Region, Malolos, Bulacan, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92

is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the Plaintiffs-

Appellants.

SO ORDERED.8 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA

denied the same per Resolution9 dated January 17, 2007.

In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners

failed to establish that Placido and Dominga owned the

properties in dispute.10 The CA also ruled that even

assuming that Placido and Dominga previously owned the

properties, it still cannot be subject to reserva troncal as

neither Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga nor did

Gregoria predecease Exequiel.11 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Now before the Court, petitioners argue that: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.

THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE

NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS

THEY DO FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF THE

PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.

B.

THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS

DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT

 PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON

RESERVA TRONCAL.12 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the CA,

contending that it is sufficient that the properties came

from the paternal line of Gregoria for it to be subject to

reserva troncal. They also claim the properties in

representation of their own predecessors, Antonio and

Valentin, who were the brothers of Exequiel.13 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Ruling of the Court

This petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45

of the Rules of Court. The general rule in this regard is

that it should raise only questions of law. There are,

however, admitted exceptions to this rule, one of which is

when the CA's findings are contrary to those of the trial

court.14 This being the case in the petition at hand, the

Court must now look into the differing findings and

conclusion of the RTC and the CA on the two issues that

arise one, whether the properties in dispute are

reservable properties and two, whether petitioners are

entitled to a reservation of these properties.

Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal

The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891

of the Civil Code: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant

any property which the latter may have acquired by

gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or

sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have

acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives

who are within the third degree and belong to the line

from which said property came. (Emphasis ours)

There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva

troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous title,

whether by inheritance or donation, from an

ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the

prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law

from the prepositus to the other ascendant or reservor,

also called the reservista. The third and last transmission

is from the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios

who must be relatives within the third degree from which

the property came.15 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The lineal character of the

reservable property is reckoned

from the ascendant from whom the

prepositus received the property by

gratuitous title

Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article

891 on reserva troncal is not applicable.

-----

The fallacy in the CA's resolution is that it proceeded from

the erroneous premise that Placido is the ascendant

contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil Code. From

thence, it sought to trace the origin of the subject

properties back to Placido and Dominga, determine

whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and whether

Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.

The persons involved in reserva troncal are: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from

whom the property was received by the

descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title; cralawlibrary

 (2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus)

who received the property; cralawlibrary

(3) The reservor (reservista), the other

ascendant who obtained the property from the

prepositus by operation of law; and

(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within

the third degree from the prepositus and who

belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the

property came and for whom the property

should be reserved by the reservor.16 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the

properties should be reckoned only from Exequiel's as he

is the ascendant from where the first transmission

occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties

in dispute. The law does not go farther than such

ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal

character of the property.17 It was also immaterial for the

CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido

and Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.

What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties

and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in

dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is

the descendant who received the properties from Exequiel

by gratuitous title.

Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property

should have been acquired by the descendant or

prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative

title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title

when the recipient does not give anything in return.18 At

risk of being repetitious, what was clearly established in

this case is that the properties in dispute were owned by

Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria

(descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as

inheritance.

Ascendants, descendants and

collateral relatives under Article

964 of the Civil Code

Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the

property should be an ascendant (also known as the

reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia,

however, is not Gregoria's ascendant; rather, she is

Gregoria's collateral relative.

Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of

degrees among ascendants and descendants, and those

who are not ascendants and descendants but come from a

common ancestor, viz: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be

either direct or collateral. A direct line is that constituted

by the series of degrees among ascendants and

descendants.

A collateral line is that constituted by the series of

degrees among persons who are not ascendants and

descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.

(Emphasis and italics ours)

Gregoria's ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and

Leonor, her grandparents, great-grandparents and so on.

On the other hand, Gregoria's descendants, if she had

one, would be her children, grandchildren and great-

grandchildren. Not being Gregoria's ascendants, both

petitioners and Julia, therefore, are her collateral

relatives. In determining the collateral line of relationship,

ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent

to the relative from whom the computation is made. In

the case of Julia's collateral relationship with Gregoria,

ascent is to be made from Gregoria to her mother Leonor

(one line/degree), then to the common ancestor, that is,

Julia and Leonor's parents (second line/degree), and then

descent to Julia, her aunt (third line/degree). Thus, Julia

is Gregoria's collateral relative within the third degree and

not her ascendant.

First cousins of the

descendant/prepositus are fourth

degree relatives and cannot be

considered reservees/reservatarios

Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered

reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within

the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties

came. The person from whom the degree should be

reckoned is the descendant/prepositus?the one at the end

of the line from which the property came and upon whom

the property last revolved by descent. 19 It is Gregoria in

this case. Petitioners are Gregoria's fourth degree

relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the

prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not

reservees or reservatarios.20 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

They cannot even claim representation of their

predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a

personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the

third degree from whom the reservable properties came.

The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews

and nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to

represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are

the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within

the third degree.21 In Florentino v. Florentino,22 the Court

stated: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate

succession, when there are relatives of the descendant

within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative,

called reservatario, over the property which the reservista

(person holding it subject to reservation) should return to

him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of

representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming

same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not

among the relatives within the third degree belong to the

line from which such property came, inasmuch as the

right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 now Article

891 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive

benefit of the designated persons who are the relatives,

within the third degree, of the person from whom the

reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the

fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be

considered as reservatarios, since the law does not

recognize them as such.

x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the

part of reservatarios who are within the third degree

mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the

deceased person from whom the reservable property

came. x x x.23 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)

The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that

the properties are reservable in character, petitioners

cannot benefit from reserva troncal. First, because Julia,

who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other

ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil

Code and second, because petitioners are not Gregoria's

relatives within the third degree. Hence, the CA's

disposition that the complaint filed with the RTC should be

dismissed, only on this point, is correct. If at all, what

should apply in the distribution of Gregoria's estate are

Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code, which provide: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,

illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral

relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased

in accordance with the following articles.

Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters,

nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral

relatives shall succeed to the estate.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or

preference among them by reason of relationship by the

whole blood.

Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to

determine the proper distribution of Gregoria's estate at

this point as the cause of action relied upon by petitioners

in their complaint filed with the RTC is based solely on

reserva troncal. Further, any determination would

necessarily entail reception of evidence on Gregoria's

entire estate and the heirs entitled thereto, which is best

accomplished in an action filed specifically for that

purpose.

A reservista acquires ownership of

the reservable property until the

reservation takes place or is

extinguished

Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable

error in the RTC's disposition of the case. In upholding the

right of petitioners over the properties, the RTC ordered

the reconveyance of the properties to petitioners and the

transfer of the titles in their names. What the RTC should

have done, assuming for argument's sake that reserva

troncal is applicable, is have the reservable nature of the

property registered on respondent's titles. In fact,

respondent, as reservista, has the duty to reserve and to

annotate the reservable character of the property on the

title.24 In reserva troncal, the reservista who inherits from

a prepositus, whether by the latter's wish or by operation

of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title

perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the

attributes of ownership belong to him exclusively. 25 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the

reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition

that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased

the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the

reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the

reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and

conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's

rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at

the time of the death of the reservor but become

indefeasible when the reservees predecease the

reservor.26(Citations omitted)

It is when the reservation takes place or is

extinguished,27 that a reservatario becomes, by operation

of law, the owner of the reservable property. 28 In any

event, the foregoing discussion does not detract from the

fact that petitioners are not entitled to a reservation of the

properties in dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

November 16, 2006 and Resolution dated January 17,

2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694

insofar as it dismissed the Third Amended Complaint in

Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are AFFIRMED. This Decision is

without prejudice to any civil action that the heirs of

Gregoria

Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for

the determination of ownership of the properties in

question.

SO ORDERED.