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Risk Assessment of Subsea Pipeline due to Installation and Operation of

Single Point Mooring (SPM)
To cite this article: D R Aldara et al 2020 IOP Conf. Ser.: Earth Environ. Sci. 557 012031

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Maritime Safety International Conference IOP Publishing
IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 557 (2020) 012031 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/557/1/012031

Risk Assessment of Subsea Pipeline due to Installation and

Operation of Single Point Mooring (SPM)

D R Aldara1*, K B Artana1, and I M Ariana1

1
Department of Marine Engineering, Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember,
Surabaya, Indonesia

*Email: destarifkyaldara@gmail.com

Abstract. Offshore exploration facilities located in remote areas require high investment and
high operational cost, the assets are classified as vital assets for the companies. The careful
study and examination is therefore required to ensure that the risk of the facility is acceptable.
Offshore exploration used subsea pipelines that has several risks if the accident occurs. Based
on historical data, most of subsea pipelines failures are caused by third party factors (dropped
anchor, dragged anchor, and ship sinking). This paper examines risk assessment of subsea
pipelines due to installation and operation of SPM is assessed used DNVGL RP F107 standard
and numerical simulations. Frequency is assessed by using Bayesian Network methods.
Whereas the consequences were assessed by using calculations on the DNVGL RP F107
standard and FEM simulation. The results of frequency and consequences are mapped within a
risk matrix according to DNVGL RP F107. Based on the calculation, the frequency of all types
of vessels is less than 10-5 (rank 1). While the lowest consequence was rank 3 with a
dent/diameter is 12.32% and the highest was rank 5 (>20%) which can damage the subsea
pipelines. The risk matrix shows that the risk level are in acceptable and ALARP condition.
Acceptable obtained by frequency in rank 1 and the consequence in rank 3 and 4. While
ALARP obtained by frequence rank 1 and consequence rank 5. Although it is not mandatory
for mitigation, it is recommended to provide the subsea pipeline with external protection. Rock
dumping is recommended as external protection for subsea pipelines due to the good ability to
protect the subsea pipelines and it has lower cost compared to concrete mattress.

1. Introduction
Energy is a primary need in social and economic development of every country [1]. The Indonesian
government still relies on oil and gas as the main energy source [2], where is the oil and gas industry
in contributing 42% of Non-Tax State Revenue in 2018 [3]. Exploration of oil and gas resources is
therefore to be continuously carried out to meet the energy demands. At present, the upstream oil and
gas industry in Indonesia has begun to shift from old onshore wells to offshore exploration where 70%
of the potential oil and gas reserves are in those areas [4]. Offshore exploration located in remote areas
requires high investment and operations cost, the assets are classified as vital assets for the companies
[5].
Offshore exploration is inseparable from the use of subsea pipeline as transportation to deliver
products. In addition, subsea pipeline should have an integrity that able to operate safely and be ably
to withstand the workload during its lifecycle [6]. However, the subsea pipeline has several risks that
can endanger the environment if the accident occurs [7]. In addition, the company will also bear
financial losses due to cessation of production, cleaning up the oil and gas spills, victims'
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IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 557 (2020) 012031 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/557/1/012031

compensation costs, and repair of facilities [8, 9]. Subsea pipelines have been a special concern since
the 80s when there were accidents on subsea pipelines although the impact of these events has not
been deeply evaluated [10]. Historical and literature review of subsea pipeline failures and incidents
shows that the accident can be caused by several factors such as third parties damage, corrosion, and
operational errors [11, 12]. The third parties damage became the biggest contributor to the failure of
the subsea pipeline, which was 38%, then followed by corrosion by 36%.
Common factors of third party damage that can affect the subsea pipeline include: fishing activities,
commercial anchoring activities (i.e. emergency anchoring, dragged anchors, dropped containers, and
ship sinking), and construction vessel activities [8]. If an accident occurs in the pipeline under the last
in the production area, it will cause damage to the pipe and cause impacts such as deflection and
rupture. Approximately 11 incidents caused by ship anchors were recorded by the Health and Safety
Executive (HSE) and Pipeline and Riser Loss of Containment (PARLOC) on 25,000 km of subsea
pipelines in 1991-2001 [13]. The careful study and examination is therefore required to ensure that the
risk of the facility is acceptable [14].
One of oil and gas company utilizes a subsea pipeline to distribute oil and gas. Gas products are
channelled to onshore facilities using subsea pipelines, while oil products are channelled from
platforms to onshore facilities using Floating Storage and Offloading units (FSO). Due to subsea
pipeline maintenance that used to distribute oil from the platform to the FSO, a temporary Single Point
Mooring (SPM) will be installed to accommodate crude oil production from a platform. This paper
examines risk assessment of subsea pipelines due to the installation and operation of Single Point
Mooring (SPM) based on DNVGL RP F107 standard. Frequency is assessed by using Bayesian
Network methods. Whereas the consequences were assessed by using calculations on the DNVGL RP
F107 standard and Finite Element Method (FEM).

2. Methods
Risk is a parameter to determine the safety level of a system in which risk has two important
parameters namely frequency and consequences. If the frequency and consequences of a hazard are
high, it can be concluded that the hazard has a high-risk level [11]. In offshore exploration using
subsea pipelines proven to be safe and reliable in distributing oil and gas. However, some risk factors
might cause subsea pipeline failure, where external factors are the highest contributor in the subsea
pipeline failure [12].
Risk assessment applied as a methodology on this paper which consisted of several processes:
• Hazard Identification
• Frequency Assessment
• Consequency Assessment
• Risk Assessment and Mitigation

2.1. Hazard Identification

Hazard identification carried to find out what are the possible hazards that can cause failure to the
subsea pipeline during installation and operation period of Single Point Mooring (SPM). Possible
hazards that can cause failures to the subsea pipeline are identified based on activities in the area [15].
By considering the location of installation and operation, the SPM will be installed near the platform
with a depth of sea about 54 meters and it is above the subsea pipeline that can be seen in Figure 1.
The hazard identification for subsea pipeline is divided into two conditions:
1. SPM Installation: Some AHTS are operated during SPM installation. In addition, one tanker is
moored to SPM as a temporary oil storage facility.
2. SPM operations: Some tugboats and shuttle tankers are operated during the operational
process of SPM. In addition, the activity of ship traffic around the SPM is considered because
it is feared that it will affect the subsea pipeline.
The number of ship traffic based on Automatic Identification System (AIS) data near the single point
mooring (SPM) installation area can be seen in Table 1.

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IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 557 (2020) 012031 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/557/1/012031

Figure 1. Single Point Mooring Layout

Table 1. Number of Ship Traffic

Type of Vessel Number of Vessel
Passenger 5432
Cargo 11703
Tanker 7677
Container 9854
Tug 1262

2.2. Frequency Assessment

Frequency is a potentially unwanted event that is expressed as an event per unit of time, usually
expressed per year. Frequencies can be obtained through historical data, frequency modelling, expert
judgement, and others. Some methods of modelling the frequency of hazards are Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Markov Chain, Bayesian Network, and others. FTA and ETA are
conventional methods that are effectively proven for frequency modelling of failure in a piping
system. ETA and FTA analysis are limited to modelling simple static systems compared to other
modelling methods that can capture the variation of risk [16].
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is commonly used to determine the frequency in subsea pipeline
frequency assessment. Event Tree Analysis (ETA) method used by Artana (2009) to calculate the
hazards frequency of anchor drop by using joint probability concept where the probability of dropped
anchor hit the pipeline is a combination of the probability of ship in Critical Anchor Damage Zone
(CADZ), combined with the probability of the ship dropped anchor and the probability of which group
the anchor dropped [7]. ETA method is also used to calculate the frequency of threatening hazards
during the hot-tapping installation process [17] and used to calculating the probability of a dragged
anchor [18].
Mulyadi (2013), used the Bayesian Network method used to identify and calculate the frequency of
dragging anchor hazards in subsea pipelines [13] and also used for frequency modelling in ship
sinking [19]. The Bayesian Network method was also applied by Sulaiman and Tan, (2014) for
frequency modelling of dropped anchor and also calculate the impact of the subsea pipeline due to
dropped anchor [12]. Bayesian Network method can be used widely in the subsea pipeline risk
assessment because the Bayesian Network has a more flexible structure compared to Event Tree
Analysis or Fault Tree Analysis [20]. This paper uses Bayesian Network methods to model the
frequency assessment. The result of frequency assessment is classified into the DNVGL RP F107 as
shown in Table 2.

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Maritime Safety International Conference IOP Publishing
IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 557 (2020) 012031 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/557/1/012031

2.3. Consequency Assessment

The consequences are the effects when the accident occurred which is stated as an effect per event.
The consequences can be assessed in several aspects, such as social, financial, environmental, and
others. This paper will be comparing the calculation method and the Finite Element Method (FEM) for
consequence assessment. The external factors impact to the subsea pipeline is mostly denting and in
certain condition can cause rupture [15]. The result of consequency assessment is classified into the
DNVGL RP F107 as shown in Table 3. Dent prediction model according to DNVGL RP F107
standard can be seen in Figure 2, dent absorbed energy is given in equation 1, and impact resistance of
concrete coating is given in equation 2.

Table 2. Annual Failure Frequency Ranking

Category Description Annual Frequency
1 (Low) Likelihood of event considered negligible. <10-5
2 Event rarely expected to occur. 10-4>10-5
Unlikely for a single pipeline, but may happen once a year given a large number of
3 (Medium) 10-3>10-4
pipelines.
Event individually may be expected to occur during the lifetime of the pipeline.
4 10-2>10-3
(Typically a 100 year storm)
5 (High) Event individually may be expected to occur more than once during lifetime. >10-2

Table 3. Consequency Ranking

Dent/Diameter (%) Damage Description
<5 Minor damage
5-10 Major damage, Leakage anticipated
10-15 Major damage, Leakage, and rupture anticipated
15-20 Major damage, Leakage, and rupture anticipated
>20 Rupture.

(1)
Where:
mp : plastic moment capacity of the wall
D : steel outer diameter.
T : wall thickness (nominal)
δ : pipe deformation, dent depth
σy : yield stress

Figure 2. Dent Prediction Model

(2)
Where:
Y : Crushing Strength
b x h : Area of Impacting Object
x0 : Concrete Coating Thickness
The traffic of vessel can cause several accident such as dropped anchor, dragged anchor, and ship
sinking. The impact of damage can be calculate by comparing the kinetic energy of dropped object

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IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 557 (2020) 012031 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/557/1/012031

and the energy needed to make a dent the subsea pipeline [21]. The impact energy of dropped anchor
is given in equation 3.
(3)
Where:
m : Mass of the object (kg)
g : Gravitation acceleration (9.81 m/s2)
V : Volume of the object (m3)
ρwater : Density of water (1025 kg/m3)
CD : Drag-coefficient of the object
A : Projected area of the object in the flow-direction (m2)
vT : Terminal velocity through the water (m/s).
The effective impact energy of dropped anchor is given in equation 4.
(4)
Where:
m : Mass of the object (kg)
ma : Added mass (kg)
:
vt : terminal velocity (m/s)
Ca : Added mass coefficient
Based on DNVGL RP F107, drag and added mass coefficient shown in Table 4. The initial value of
1.0 is recommended for drag coefficient that used for consequency calculation according to DNVGL
RP F107 standard.

Table 4. Drag and Added Mass Coefficient

Category Description CD Ca
1,2,3 Slender Shape 0.7 – 1.5 0.1 – 1.0
4,5,6,7 Box Shaped 1.2 – 1.3 0.6 – 1.5
All Misc. Shaped (spherical to complex) 0.6 – 2.0 1.0 – 2.0

Consequence analysis of dragged anchor is done by using Autopipe software simulation. The drag
force of the anchor depends on the thrust generated by the ship where the drag anchor will deliver
kinetic energy to the subsea pipeline [22]. The simulation on Autopipe software is done by applying
force to the subsea pipeline according to the maximum breaking load of the ship's anchor chain.
Ship sinking is one of the hazard that also be calculate into consideration the underwater pipeline is
an important asset. Damage to the subsea pipeline due to the sinking ship is a complex system and
involves a number of specific variables related to the hull, subsea pipeline and interactions on the
seabed [17,23]. Therefore, for consequence analysis of ship sinking, the model is simplified, where the
ship is considered to be sinking slowly in a horizontal position as shown in Figure 3. Another
assumption is that the density of the ship's steel plate is 7850 kg/m3. Ship deadweight tonnage (DWT)
is used in the calculation and estimation of the weight immersed in water.

Figure 3. Ship Sinking Modelling

2.4. Risk Assessment and Mitigation

DNVGL RP F107 was adopted as a standard for risk assessment of this paper. Risk assessment is done
by classified the frequency and consecuency into the risk matrix. Figure 4 is the risk matrix according

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IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 557 (2020) 012031 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/557/1/012031

to DNVGL RP F107 standard. The risk matrix consists of 5x5 matrix to determine risk level according
to the frequency and consequency ranking [15].
Risk mitigation is carried out to minimize the risk of hazard if risk level is not acceptable. Cost-
Benefit Analysis method used to select the best method to minimize the risk due to the hazard. The
costs and benefits of a mitigation method are calculated and compared so as to get the right
mitigaation steps with low costs and high benefits. Installation of concrete mattress and rock dumping
are possible method to mitigate the risk due to hazard to subsea pipeline.
Consequence Ranking
1 2 3 4 5
Very Low Low Moderate High Major
Frequent
5
Probable
4
Frequency Ranking

Occasional
3
Remote
2

Acceptable
Improbable

ALARP Region
1

Not Acceptable

Figure 4. Risk Matrix

3. Results

3.1. Hazard Identification

Based on activity and traffic analysis on the area of SPM installation and operation, the possible
hazard that can cause failures to the subsea pipeline ade dropped anchor, dragged anchod, and ship
sinking. From the possible hazard to subsea pipeline is then breaks down into hazard compatibility
matrix as shown on Table 5.

Table 5. Hazard Compatibility Matrix

During Installation
Hazard
Type of Vessel
Dropped Anchor Dragged Anchor Ship Sinking
AHTS v v -
Storage Tanker v v -
During Operation
Vessel used for SPM's Operation
Tugboat v v v
Shuttle Tanker v v v
Vessel Traffic around SPM
Passenger v v v
Cargo v v v
Tanker v v v
Container v v v
Tug v v v

3.2. Frequency Assessment

The hazard frequency is calculated to classify the frequency level. This paper evaluated the frequency
level by using Bayesian Network. Based on the identification of hazards, the following are possible
hazards that can affect the subsea pipeline during installation and operation of SPM:
1. Dropped Anchor: Frequency assessment on dropped anchors is based on the probability of the
ship dropped anchor on the Critical Anchor Damage Zone (CADZ), the vessel in CADZ, the
annual frequency of the ship passing CADZ, and in a state of loss of control that is influenced by
several factors: weather, human performance, engine failure, or steering system failure. The

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IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 557 (2020) 012031 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/557/1/012031

frequency assessment of dropped anchors is carried out at the SPM Installation and Operation
condition. Bayesian Network of dropped anchors can be seen in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Bayesian Network of Dropped Anchor Figure 6. Bayesian Network of Dragged Anchor

2. Dragged Anchor: Frequency assessment on dragged anchors is based on the probability of the
ship dropped anchor on the Critical Anchor Dragged Zone (CADRZ), the vessel in CADRZ, the
annual frequency of the ship passing CADRZ, and in a state of loss of control that is influenced
by several factors: weather, human performance, engine failure, or steering system failure. The
frequency assessment of dragged anchors is carried out at the SPM Installation and Operation
condition. Bayesian Network of dropped anchors can be seen in Figure 6.
3. Ship Sinking: Frequency assessment on ship sinking is based on the probability of the annual
frequency of the ship passing Critical Sinking Zone (CSZ), vessel in cross area, collision in
cross area, hull damage due to collision, and in a state of loss of control that is influenced by
several factors: weather, human performance, engine failure, or steering system failure. The
frequency assessment of ship sinking is carried out at the SPM Installation and Operation
condition. Bayesian Network of dropped anchors can be seen in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Bayesian Network of Ship Sinking

The result of frequency assessment is then classified into the frequency ranking according to
DNVGL RP F107 standard as seen on Table 6.

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IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 557 (2020) 012031 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/557/1/012031

Table 6. Summary of Frequency Assessment

Frequency Ranking
Installation of SPM Operation of SPM
Threat Description Vessel Speed (knot) Vessel Speed (knot)
0.25 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.75
Dropped Anchor
Passenger N/A N/A N/A 1 1 1
Cargo N/A N/A N/A 1 1 1
Tanker 1 1 1 1 1 1
Container N/A N/A N/A 1 1 1
Tug 1 1 1 1 1 1
Dragged Anchor
Passenger N/A N/A N/A 1 1 1
Cargo N/A N/A N/A 1 1 1
Tanker 1 1 1 1 1 1
Container N/A N/A N/A 1 1 1
Tug 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ship Sinking
Passenger N/A N/A N/A 1 1 1
Cargo N/A N/A N/A 1 1 1
Tanker N/A N/A N/A 1 1 1
Container N/A N/A N/A 1 1 1
Tug N/A N/A N/A 1 1 1

3.3. Consequency Assessment

The hazard based on the hazard identification to subsea pipeline due to installation and
operation of Single Point Mooring (SPM) are dropped anchor, dragged anchor, and ship
sinking. This paper considers the material properties of API5L X52. Table 7 shown the
material properties and simulation consideration used in this paper. While table 8 shown the
range of dent per diameter according to the impact energy calculation on DNVGL RP F107
Standard.

Table 7. Subsea Pipeline Properties Table 8. Range of Impact Energy

Property Value Unit Impact Energy
Dent/Diameter (%)
API 5L Steel Pipe Only
Material Grade -
X52 <5 < 5.47 kJ
Outter Diameter 406.4 mm 5-10 5.47 - 15.48 kJ
Wall Thickness 12.7 mm 10-15 15.48 - 28.44 kJ
Density 7850 Kg/m3 15-20 28.44 - 43.79 kJ
Young’s Modulus 2.1E+11 Pa >20 > 43.79 kJ
Poisson’s Ratio 0.30 Pa
Sea Surface Heigh 54 m
Sea Water Density 1025 Kg/m3

3.3.1. Dropped Anchor

The consequency ranking obtained by classified the total energy absorbed by the subsea pipeline.
Referring to DNVGL RP F107, the total energy includes energy that can be absorbed by the subsea
pipeline and the energy that can be absorbed by pipe protection systems such as Concrete Coating,
Polymer Coating, Gravel Dump, and other protection systems [15]. Table 9 is the summary of impact
energy calculation and ranking consequence ranking of each type of ship for ship sinking.

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IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 557 (2020) 012031 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/557/1/012031

Table 9. Summary of Dropped Anchor

Impact Energy
Type of Vessel Concrete Absorbed Energy (kJ) Dent (mm) Persentase Rank
(kJ)
Passenger 14.95 46.157 64.61 15.90% 4
Cargo 16.258 119.036 159.35 39.21% 5
Tanker 17.884 171.500 226.64 55.77% 5
Container 16.258 107.450 144.02 35.44% 5
Tug 12.334 32.549 50.07 12.32% 3

In addition to using calculations based on DNVGL RP F107 standards, this paper also evaluates the
impact of the dropped anchor by using Finite Element Method (FEM). Anchor and subsea pipeline
modelled in 3 dimensions to be simulated by using FEM software as shown in Figure 8. The
simulation considered the material and environmental condition as shown in Table 10. FEM
simulation is able to visualize the impact of the dropped anchor to the subsea pipeline as shown in
Figure 9.

Figure 8. 3D Modelling of Anchor and Subsea Pipeline

Figure 9. FEM Simulation Result

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Maritime Safety International Conference IOP Publishing
IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 557 (2020) 012031 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/557/1/012031

Table 10. Summary of the simulation results with FEM software shown in Table
FEM
Type of Vessel Total Impact Dent/Diamete
Dent (mm) Rank
(kJ) r
Passenger 45.853 58.036 14.28% 3
Cargo 107.31 141.71 34.87% 5
Tanker 161.54 210.88 47.56% 5
Container 96.559 122.52 30.15% 5
Tug 33.221 44.33 10.91% 3

Figure 11 is a comparison of the results of the impact energy due to dropped anchor between
DNVGL RP F107 and FEM. Based on the graph, there are differences in the results between
calculations and FEM simulations. The smallest difference in the impact energy value is in the
Passenger vessel, where the calculation result is 46.16 kJ and the simulation result is 45,853 kJ so the
difference between the calculation and FEM simulation is 0.303 kJ. While the largest difference in
value on a cargo vessel, where the impact energy value on the calculation is 119.04 kJ and FEM
simulation results are 107.31 kJ with the difference between the two is 11.72 kJ.

Figure 10. Impact Energy Comparison

The dent comparison of the results of DNVGL RP F107 standard calculations and FEM simulation
can be seen in Figure 12. Based on these graphs, it can be seen that there is a dent value difference that
occurs in the subsea pipeline. The smallest dent value difference in the Tug vessel, which based on the
calculation results has a dent value of 50.07 mm and the FEM simulation result is 44.33 mm so that it
has a value difference of 5.74 mm. While the largest difference in value occurs in ships with the type
of Container, where the dent value in the calculation is 144.01 mm and the results of FEM simulation
are 122.52 mm so that it has a value difference of 21.49 mm. The difference between the DNVGL RP
F107 standard calculation and FEM simulation is likely to occur due to the different of approaches on
the two methods, where the DNVGL RP F107 standard is based on modelling on the knife hit the
object while FEM simulation is done by dividing the shape of the object into a net mesh for numerical
calculations.

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IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 557 (2020) 012031 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/557/1/012031

Figure 11. Dent Comparison

3.3.2. Dragged Anchor

Consequences Analysis of dragged anchor is done by stress analysis and displacement using Autopipe
software. Stress and displacement analysis is done by entering the value of external force produced by
each ship. This external force is taken from the breaking load of the anchor chain as shown in Table
11.
Table 11. Maximum Breaking Load of Anchor Chain
Type of Vessel Anchor Chain Diameter (mm) Breaking Load (kN)
Passenger 42 703
Cargo 62 1470
Tanker 58 1290
Container 56 1220
Tug 40 640

Figure 12 and Figure 13 are examples of stress and displacements analysis using Autopipe software
for passenger-type vessels. From the stress analysis can be seen that the allowable stress on the pipe is
151.68 N / mm2, however, the stress value generated as a result of a given external force is 365 N /
mm2 where the value exceeds the value of the allowable stress and cause displacement of 92.94 mm.
All references should be numbered in square brackets in the text and listed in the References section in
the order they appear in the text.

Figure 12. Stress Analysis Result

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IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 557 (2020) 012031 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/557/1/012031

Figure 13. Displacements Analysis Result

Summary of stress and displacements analysis, and the consequency ranking for dragged anchor
according to DNVGL RP F107 shown in Table 12.
Table 12. Summary of Dragged Anchor Simulation
Stress Allowable Total Displacements Displacement/Diameter
Type of Vessel Rank
(N/mm2) (N/mm2) (mm) (%)
Passenger 572.08 151.68 139.31 34% 5
Cargo 1085.94 151.68 291.3 72% 5
Tanker 957.79 151.68 255.63 63% 5
Container 903.79 151.68 241.76 60% 5
Tug 481.18 151.68 126.83 31% 5

3.3.3. Ship Sinking

Kinetic energy of ship sinkingis calculated to do a consequency analysis. From these calculations, the
result will be classified into DNVGL RP F107 Standard. Table 13 is the summary of impact energy
calculation and ranking consequence ranking of each type of ship for ship sinking. Based on Table 10,
the consequence ranking ship sinking is on 5 for all types of vessels. It is means that there will be
rupture of the pipeline when the ship sinking hit the subsea pipeline.
Table 13. Summary of Ship Sinking
Impact Energy
Type of Vessel Absorbed Energy (kJ) Dent/Diameter Rank
(kJ)
Passenger 1,083.87 7,308.93 > 20% 5
Cargo 1,083.87 222,253.92 > 20% 5
Tanker 1,083.87 810,240.47 > 20% 5
Container 1,083.87 241,586.42 > 20% 5
Tug 1,083.87 19,184.43 > 20% 5

3.4. Risk Assessment and Mitigation

The results of frequency and consequency assessment is then mapped within a 5x5 risk matrix
according to DNVGL RP F107. Table 14 shown the summary of risk level of hazards during
installation and operation of Single Point Mooring (SPM). According to risk level on Table 14, risk
level in acceptable and ALARP regions. These regions mean that the risk still acceptable and no
further mitigation requires. Although it is not mandatory for mitigation, it is recommended to provide
the subsea pipeline with external protection. Concrete mattress or rock dumping was proposed as
external protection on this paper. Concrete mattress or rock dumping as shown on Figure 14 and
Figure 15 was proposed as external protection on this paper. According to FEM simulation, either
concrete mattress or rock dumping was able to protect the subsea pipeline. Based on cost analysis to
install external protection for 2514 meter of subsea pipeline, Concrete mattress need Rp.

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Maritime Safety International Conference IOP Publishing
IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 557 (2020) 012031 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/557/1/012031

3,212,851,249.15 for material and installation cost of Rp. 4,991,622,921.83. While rock dumping
need Rp. 976,671,169.00 for material and installation cost of Rp 3,876,510,294.00.

Table 14. Summary of Risk Level

Installation of SPM Operation of SPM
Threat Description Vessel Speed (knot) Vessel Speed (knot)
0.25 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.75
Dropped Anchor
Passenger N/A N/A N/A (1,4) (1,4) (1,4)
Cargo N/A N/A N/A (1,5) (1,5) (1,5)
Tanker (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5)
Container N/A N/A N/A (1,5) (1,5) (1,5)
Tug (1,3) (1,3) (1,3) (1,3) (1,3) (1,3)
Dragged Anchor
Passenger N/A N/A N/A (1,5) (1,5) (1,5)
Cargo N/A N/A N/A (1,5) (1,5) (1,5)
Tanker (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5)
Container N/A N/A N/A (1,5) (1,5) (1,5)
Tug (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5)
Ship Sinking
Passenger N/A N/A N/A (1,5) (1,5) (1,5)
Cargo N/A N/A N/A (1,5) (1,5) (1,5)
Tanker N/A N/A N/A (1,5) (1,5) (1,5)
Container N/A N/A N/A (1,5) (1,5) (1,5)
Tug N/A N/A N/A (1,5) (1,5) (1,5)

Figure 14. Concrete Mattress Figure 15. Rock Dumping

4. Conclusions
During the Single Point Mooring (SPM) installation, there are such potential hazard to the subsea
pipeline such as dropped anchors and dragged anchors. Whereas, during the SPM operation there are
potential risks such as dropped anchors, dragged anchors, and ship sinking.
The risk to subsea pipeline due to dropped anchor during SPM installation for Tug vessel is
acceptable and tankers is on ALARP condition. The risk to subsea pipeline due to dropped anchor at
the SPM operation for Tug and Passenger is acceptable, while the cargo , tankers , and containers are
in ALARP condition. The risk to subsea pipeline due to dragged anchor and ship sinking for all types
of ship are in ALARP condition.
Based on the Finite Element Method (FEM) simulation, the concrete coating has cracked due to
dropped anchors on all types of vessels. While subsea pipeline dent due to dropped anchor of
passenger ships, tugs, cargo, tankers, and containers are 58,036 mm, 44.33 mm, 141.71 mm, 193.27
mm, 122.52 mm.
There is an ALARP category on the hazard due dropped anchors, dragged anchors and ship
sinking where the risk mitigation is not mandatory on acceptable and ALARP condition. Although it is

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Maritime Safety International Conference IOP Publishing
IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 557 (2020) 012031 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/557/1/012031

not mandatory for mitigation, it is still recommended to equip the underwater pipeline with external
protection such as rock dumping and concrete mattress. In terms of costs and benefits rock dumping is
proposed as external protection for subsea pipeline because it has a good ability to protect the subsea
pipeline pipeline from collisions and has a lower material and installation cost compared to concrete
mattresses, which is Rp. 3,876,510,294 for 2,514 meter of subea pipeline.

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