of consequentialism. Hedonistic consequentialism gives an affirmative answer to the question, while non-hedonistic consequentialism gives a negative answer to it. On the other hand, responding to the second question gives rise to the general distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral types of consequentialism. Agent-relative consequentialism gives an affirmative answer to the question, while agent-neutral consequentialism gives a negative answer to it. Let us, in what follows, elaborate on these distinctions. Hedonism and Non-Hedonism Hedonistic consequentialism, simply referred to as hedonism, believes that pleasure is the only intrinsic good, and its opposite, pain, the only intrinsic bad or evil. As Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) (2000, Chap. I, I), who strongly supports this view, remarks: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.” The term “hedonism” was derived from the Greek word “hedone,” whose ordinary meaning is pleasure. Following most consequentialists, supporters of hedonism equate pleasure with happiness. John Stuart Mill (1808-1873) (2004, 196), for instance, writes: “By ‘happiness, is intended plegaare, and the absence of pain; by ‘unhappiness,’ pain, and the privation of pleasure.” Hedonism advances the thesis that the pleasure and pain that an action brings about are‘the primary standards for judging the morality of this action. Specifically, it regards an action to be morally good if and only if it maximizes pleasure ot results in the greatest pleasurable consequences, while it is morally bad if otherwise. Hedonists, to justify their claim, argue that we cannot escape from the standards of pleasure and pain in evaluating our actions. Even when we try to, we will allegedly end up using such standards. As Bentham (2000, Chap. I, 1, referring to pleasures and pains, explains: “They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.” We can try using standards other than the standards of pleasure and pain, but, according to Bentham, the moment we ask what makes these other standards worthy of being used, we will allegedly end up saying that it is because using them will lead to pleasure and avoid pain. Some consequentialists, however, are not in agreement with Bentham on this point. One argument has it that the mere fact that it is meaningful to ask whether pleasure is good means that pleasure cannot be equated with the good (this is the so-called open- question argument attributed to G.E. Moore). If good were defined as, or were taken to be equivalent to pleasure, then asking “whether pleasure is good” would be the same as asking “whether pleasure is pleasure” or “whether good is good,” which would be meaningless or trivial. But since it is meaningful to say that pleasure is good, the good, hence, cannot be defined as pleasure. Another argument states that what is actually desired is not necessarily desirable (understood as what should be desired). This is a response to the claim of Mill (see Denise, et al. 1996, 202-203) that the proof for the inherent desirability of pleasure is that people actually desire it. It is indeed true that people actually desire pleasure, but this does not necessarily make pleasure desirable (meaning, as worthy of being desired). There are moments where the action that gives us pleasure is not the desirable thing to do. The implication is that while pleasure is actually desired, it is not necessarily an inherent good since, in certain cases, it may not be desirable.saying that a moral consideration is the one that is fundamental, it means that the (oral goodness of an action is independent of the other moral considerations. Thus, for consequentialism, if an action is morally good because it leads to the right consequences, it is so regardless of the rules that it may follow or violate and of the character traits that its agent may have. Furthermore, it also means that this moral consideration is what ultimately explains the moral relevance of the other considerations. Thus, for consequentialism, good rules are those when followed will result in good consequences; and good character traits _are those when acquired or cultivated will lead to the performance of actions that will result in good consequences. For deontology and virtue ethics, things, of course, will be different as will be discussed in subsequent chapters where their details will be spelled out. At this point, the aim is to simply introduce consequentialism by showing what makes it different from the other ethical theories. Intrinsic and Instrumental Good The good consequence that consequentialism regards as the basis for the moral goodness of an act is not just any kind of good or desirable consequence; but one that is good in itself or desirable for its own sake. Philosophers usually refer to this kind of good as intrinsic good. Consequentialism, as explained by JJ.C. Smart (1978, 240), is “a theory according to which rightness or wrongness of an act is determined solely by the intrinsic goodness or badness of its various consequences.” It is not enough that the consequences are good for the actions that cause them to be morally good; they should be intrinsically good. The intrinsic good is desired for its own sake, not in eae to achieve something else that is also desired. The intrinsic good is contrasted with the/nstrumental good, referring to the kind of good which is desired for the sake of something else. An instrumental good is desired because it serves as a means to achieve a further good, either a further instrumental good or an intrinsic good, A standard example of an intrinsic good is happiness (which most consequentialists equate with pleasure). Happiness is regarded as intrinsically good because one desires it for itself, that is, one desires to be happy just to be happy (or just to experience it). In contrast, the things one desires in order to be happy, like a successful career, good relationships, health, fame, wealth, and being able to help people and to contribute to social development, among others, are all instrumental goods for they are desired because they serve as means to achieve happiness. In being good in itself, the intrinsic ae js not derive its goodness from another good. In this regard, the intrinsic good is also called nherent good. In contrast, the instrumental good, in not being good in itself, derives its goodness from another good; and for this reason, is also called gfrived good. Furthermore, the intrinsic good, being good in itself is always good whatever is theondition of its occurrence. It remains desirable even if nobody actually desires it. For this reason, the intrinsic good is also called unconditional good, An contrast, the instrumental good is good only under certain conditions, generally when it serves as a means to achieve a further good; and for this reason, is also called conditional good. Now, if something is intrinsicall good, 1rfoffows that our moral duty is to maximize it; that is, to increase it to its highest or greatest possible degree. If we take happiness as an intrinsic good, then our moral duty, according to consequentialism, is to maximizepleasure, namely power, generally understood as having contzol over things. In this regu, Nietzsche 5eF 231) remarks: “What is good?—All Se ravens the tech ren ng OF pote, Weaking. the will to power, power itself in man. What is Gad?—All that proceeds from weakna,, tis happiness?—The feeling that power increases—that a resistance 1S overcome.” p, will to power, Nietasche means the will to overcome the challenges of life which tend , weaken our determination to live. Consequently, for Nietzsche, all other things that y, call good, including pleasure or happiness, are good only in so to power, far as they enhance our yi fundamental value for humans, such enable us to attain power or to enhance our will to power. As Nietzsche (1987, 221) writes “Not necessity, not desire—no, the love of power is the demon of men. Let them have everything—health, food, a place to live, entertain ment—they are and remain unhappy ang low-spirited: for the demon waits and waits and will be satisfied. Take everything from them and satisfy this, and they are almost happy—as happy as men and demons can be” In sum, with regard to Nietzsche's concept of power, Nietzsche's ethical theory represents the exclusive form of agent-relative non-hedonism for the following reasons, First, Nietzsche's view about power falls under consequentialism since it judges the value of actions in terms of its consequence of enhancing the will to power. Second, it is an exclusive form of non-hedonism, since it rejects pleasure as the intrinsic good. And third, it is agent-relative, since the power that is relevant in determining the value of one’s actions is one's own power or will to power. As an ethical theory, its moral principle can thus be put as follows: an action is morally good if it leads to consequences that enhance the agent’s will to power; while ic is morally bad if otherwise—or if it leads to consequences that weaken the agent's will to power. ieee ee eee C. Utilitarianism Utilitarianism is the most influential form of consequentialism, such that some authors equate (though inaccurately) consequentialism with utilitarianism. To have a bettt understanding of this ethical theory, we shall elaborate on its basic elements and examine its various forms. Being an agent-neutral form of consequentialism, the specific versions of utilitarianism that we shall cover serve as representative ethical theories for agent-neuttd consequentialism. Basic Elements of Utilitarianism Following Richard Hare (2009, 85-90), what utilitarianism claims about morality best understood by examining its three main elements: consequentialism, welfarism, 3 aggregationism. First, utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory for it determines the morality of an action based on the kind of consequences that the action has or results it Second, utilitarianism is a welfarist theory because the consequences that it considers © be morally relevant are those that affect the welfare (or well-being) of persons. Welfare“Arist Hedonistic é Se Passive Agent-Relative (Epicurus) Consequentialism Non-Hedonistic Varieties of Quantitative Consequentialism (Bentham) Hedonist Mill Agent-Neutral tom Exclusive: Preference Non- (Hare, Singer) Hedonistic | Inclusive: Pluralistic (Moore) Consequentialism/ Utilitarianismreferred to as active hedonism; while that of Epicurus, for preferring the passive pleasures, as passive hedonism (ibid.). ~ fat co the reasons for their respective preference? Aristippus came earlier than Epicurus; and unlike Epicurus whose writings we have access to, we only know of the ideas of Aristippus from commentaries of philosophers, which include Epicurus himself. We can surmise that Aristippus’s preference for the activespleasures has something to do with the fact that life is short and uncertain. For it is only in light of this fact that “the most intense sensual pleasure of the moment” (Denise et al., 1996, 49) becomes preferable to the other kind. It is lif’s uncertainty that gives rise to the sense of urgency to exhaust pleasures that one can possibly enjoy while still alive. In other words, why sacrifice pleasures that you can now enjoy for the sake of some greater pleasures in the future when we are not sure whether we will still be alive in the fucure? But while Aristippus promotes the maximization of our immediate pleasures, he also says that it is important that we are in control of our pleasures, not them controlling us. This is because “excess of pleasure leads to pain and that the limitation of desires is a condition of their saiafacion” (Macinryre, 1998, 65), ~~ Epicurus, on the other hand, explains that “[e]xperience shows us that the desire for life filled with intense pleasures will be frustrated, because there are not enough of them in the ordinary course of events” (Denise et al., 1996, 49). Meaning, a life of active pleasures is less sustainable than a life of passive pleasures, as the gratification of desires is more difficult to sustain than the absence of pain. Now, as mental tranquility is a pleasure of great value for Epicurus, he offers ways to properly deal with certain things that threaten to disrupt it. Epicurus highlights our worry about how God or the gods will punish us for our misdeeds and about our death. r The possibility that we will be punished by God or the gods for our Bpeuree actions in this or the next life and that we will someday die creates anxiety that disturbs our mind. With regard to divine punishments, Epicurus states that it is useless to worry about them since we will never know how God or the gods think anyway. How the divine mind works is something beyond our comprehension. Epicurus likewise considers it pointless to worry about or to fear our death, This is for the obvious fact that while we are still alive we are not yet dead, and when we are already dead we no longer exist. In Epicurus’ own words: “So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more” (quoted in Denise etal. 1996, 56). For agent-relative non-hedonism, a good representative of the exclusive form is the ethical theory espoused by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) (see Hales, 1995). It should be noted, however, that Nietzsche’ ethical theory is not entirely consequentialist for it also contains elements of virtue ethics, as it also inspires us to develop our character to its noblest level (see Welshon, 1992—A person at this level vaWchargtr development aero 2 an tibermensch by Nietzsche, which is typically translated as overman or superman). \n any case, Nietzsche believes that there is something more fundamental thangood is an impartial principle which aims to maximize the aggregate good (usually in the form of promoting the greatest happiness among the persons involved). Based on this impartial principle, che action whose consequences produce the greatest possible good, or maximize the aggregate good, is the morally correct one, regardless of who happens to be the recipient of this good. Suppose, for instance, Mario has three options X, Y, and Z. If Mario does X, it will give pleasure only to himself: If he does Y, it will give pleasure only to Juan. Ifhe does Z, it will give pleasure to both Lito and Bong. Immediately, agent-relative consequentialism will tell us that Mario should do X. But agent-neutral consequentialism will tell us that Mario should do whichever action will bring about the greatest pleasure, regardless of whose pleasure it is—his, Juan's, or Lito and Bong's. Complex Forms and Representatives ‘We have seen that consequentialism has two general divisions: the division between hedonistic and _non-hedonistic consequentialism, and the division between agent- relative and agent-neutral consequentialism. Now, these two general divisions combine to form four complex forms of consequentialism. Making the agent-neutral-agent- relative division as the one qualifying the hedonistic-non-hedonistic division, we have the following four combinations: Agent-Neutral Agent-Relative Consequentialism Consequentialism Hedonism Non-Hedonism eee 3. Agent-Relative || 4. Agent-Neutral Non-Hedonism |} Non-Hedonism 2. Agent-Neutral Hedonism 1. Agent-Relative Hedonism Accordingly, the consequentialist definition of the morally good act has the following variations: 1. Agent-Relative Hedonism — an action is morally good if it gives maximum pleasure to its agent; while it is morally bad if otherwise. 2. Agent-Neutral Hedonism — an action is morally good if it results in the maximum overall pleasure of all the persons involved in the action (or in the greatest happiness of the greatest number of persons); while it is morally bad if otherwise. 3. Agent-Relative Non-hedonism — an action is morally good if it gives maximum benefits to its agent; while it is morally bad if otherwise. 4, Agent-Neutral Non-hedonism ~ an action is morally good if it results in the maximum overall benefits for all the persons involved in the action (or in the greatest good of the greatest number of persons); while it is morally bad if otherwise. Note: In variations 3 and 4, “benefits” refer to positive consequences which may or may not include the experience of pleasure,is a compromise between deontology and utilitarianism, or a way of accommodating deontology into the utilitarian perspective, in order to prevent the possibility that applications of the utilitarian standard will lead to absurd situations. Complex Forms of Utilitarianism ‘We have seen that utilitarianism has two general divisions: the division between hedonistic and non-hedonistic utilitarianism, and the division between act and rule utilitarianism. Now, these two general divisions are combined to form four complex forms of utilitarianism. Using the act-rule division to qualify the hedonistic-non-hedonistic division, we have the following four combinations: Rule Utilitarianism Act Utilitarianism Hedonistic Non-Hedonistic Utilitarianism Utilitarianism 1. Act Hedonistic] |2. Rule Hedonistic] |3. Act Non-Hedonistic] | 4. Rule Non-Hedonistic Utilitarianism Utilitarianism Utilitarianism Utilitarianism ‘Accordingly, the utilitarian definition of the morally good act has the following variations: 1. Act Hedonistic Utilitarianism — an action is morally good if it maximizes aggregate happiness, while it is morally bad if otherwise. This version of consequentialism is sometimes referred to as classical utilitarianism. 2. Rule Hedonistic Utilitarianism — an action is morally good if it follows a rule which when generally conformed to will maximize aggregate happiness, while it is morally bad if otherwise. 3. Act Non-Hedonistic Utilitarianism — an action is morally good if it maximizes aggregate welfare, while it is morally bad if otherwise. 4. Rule Non-Hedonistic Utilitarianism — an action is morally good if it follows a rule which generally conformed to will maximize aggregate welfare; while it is morally bad if otherwise. Note: In variations 3 and 4, “welfare” refers to anything that benefits persons or improves the quality of their life which may or may not include the experience of pleasure. Despite the differences among its various forms, utilitarianism remains highly influential. Aside from being impartial, it generally provides a practical way of resolving disagreements, so much so that it usually serves as a framework for decision making in the areas of economics, business, politics, and others. Specifically, it serves as the foundation of most strategic decision-making methods that include cost-benefit analysis, cost- effectiveness analysis, subjective expected analysis, and quality-adjusted life years analysis.: , some scholars also point to its limitati Like the Se neds aggregate good would sometimes ie t hes been ee Woltions of rights. Proponents of the utilitarian ethical theory, hove aS a way of accounting for the value of justice and rights that coheres 4: Fal he moral principle. Generally, they maintain that these other moral conc, (justice and rights) only have instrumental or derived value; thus they are valuable only ig so far as they lead to the maximization of the aggregate welfare. Summary . A Consequentialism is an ethical theory which contends that what matters in determin; the moral worth of an action is the kind of consequences that the action le: consequences are those that lead to the experience of an intrinsic good. An intrinsic good, such as happiness, is one that is good in itself or desirable for its own sake. It contrast with an instrumental good, which is a good that serves as a means to attain a further good. Consequentialism comes in various forms which can be understood as ways of responding to two questions concerning the intrinsic good: whether pleasure is the only intrinsic good and whether the agent's intrinsic good is the only one that morally matters, Accordingly, hedonistic consequentialism tegards pleasure as the only intrinsic good, while non-hedonistic consequentialism regards it as neither an intrinsic good nor the only intrinsic good. On the other hand, agent-relative consequentialism regards only agent- related consequences as morally relevant, while agent-neutral consequentialism regards the Consequences to all affected persons as morally relevant. These classi form complex forms of consequentialism, Utilitarianism embodies the agent-neutral form of consequentialism, whose mor Principle is the maximization of the aggregate good. In addition to having hedonistic and non-hedonistic versions, utilitarianism also has act and tule versions, Its hedonistic version is either quantitative, when bodily and mental pleasures are treated as the same in mor value, or qualitative, when mental pleasures are regarded as having a higher moral value than bodily pleasures. Its non-hedonistic version is tepresented by preference utilitarianism. which regards preference-satisfaction as the intrinsic good, and pluralistic utilitarianism. which accepts a number of intrinsic goods. Act utilitarian; Principle to actions, whereas rule utilitarianism apy These classifications likewise combine to form coi The following table provides an overview of ads to, Such fications combine to ism applies the utilitarian mot! plies it to the rules governing actions. mplex forms of utilitarianism. the varieties of | consequentialism:5 f persons who will benefit from an Bs. eS fe Sit mbers game in terms - 1 in Ualiesinia vcdon of which action maximizes aggregate ier? rin the Person, It Se “se calelation happens to show that one person's we fare far ex, : involved. thers’ in combination, then the action that promotes this person's welfare is the Moral, others’ in \ Pin nary lak per 8 M2104, 198) i, his own happiness and that of others, uti itarianism req 88 sti erie ara dislare cece and beneiolcat spoctata:” The wellar'ofall affcomst iene copia qual consideration in the process of determining the net total of welfare Of these persons. By “equal consideration,” it is meant that everyone is treated the same in terms of their experience of pleasure and pain; that is, nobody's experience of | pleasure and pain has a special value just because of his/her identity as a person. This implies that the agent of the act is not in a privileged position. If the action that has the higher net total of welfare happens to be the one not beneficial to the agent, then the agent has the moral duty to sactifice his/her own personal welfare to promote the morally correct course of. action. Hedonistic and Non-Hedonistic Utilitarianism There are two general divisions in utilitarianism: the first is between hedonistic and. non. hedonistic utilitarianism; the second is between actand rule utilitarianism. In this section, we shall focus on the first general division, which arises from the question of what constitutes the intrinsic good that ought to be maximized. Under each of these two general types o utilitarianism (hedonistic and non-hedonistic types) are specific forms arising from further considerations. Hedonistic Forms of Utilitarianism Hedonistic utilitarianism, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the Teverse of happiness. By happiness is intended Pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the Privation of pleasure. Pleasure, and freedom from pain, things desirable as ends; and all desirable things either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, the promotion of pleasure and the preventio! are the only are desirable or as means to in of pain.here generally means whatever that benefits the persons affected by an action or improves the quality of their life. As Hare (2009, 85) explains: “We may define ‘welfare’ as the ‘obtaining to a high or at least reasonable degree of a quality of life which on the whole a person wants or prefers to have.” What welfare specifically refers to, however, varies among proponents of utilitarianism. For some, it means the experience of pleasure and/or beauty, or the attainment of knowledge; but for some, itis. the fulfilment of desires or satisfaction of preferences. Third, utilitarianism is an aggregationist theory since the welfare that it considers to be morally relevant is the maximum aggregate or sum total of welfare of all affected persons. This feature of utilitarianism follows naturally from its being an agent- neutral form of consequentialism, in which, as Mill (2004, 197-98) states, the “standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether;” “not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned.” Accordingly, the morally good act is the one that produces the maximum aggregate or the greatest sum total of welfare of all affected persons. But how does one determine which action produces the maximum aggregate welfare of all affected persons? Let us assume in our explanation, for purposes of convenience, that by welfare we mean the experience of pleasure. Thus, we have the following steps. First, we get the sum total of pleasures that an action brings to all affected persons. Second, we get the sum total of pains that the same action brings to the same persons. Third, we subtract the sum total of pains from the sum total of pleasures. What we get here is the net sum total of pleasures that the action brings to all affected persons. We do the same to the alternative action or actions. Afterwards, we compare the net sum total of pleasures produced by the first action with the net sum total of pleasures produced by the alternative action or actions. Consequently, the action that produces the greatest net sum total of pleasures constitutes the morally good action. For purposes of illustration, suppose we are choosing between two courses of action, X and Y, which affect persons A, B, and C. Again, for the purpose of convenience in explanation, let us suppose that we can talk of pleasures and pains in terms of units. Suppose then that action X will give persons A, B, and C 5 units of pleasure each, but 2 units of pain each; whereas action Y will give each of them 6 units of pleasure, but 2 units of pain each, For action X, the coral number of units of pleasure for all three persons is 15, while the total number of units of pain is 6. If we subtract 6 from 15, we get the net total number of units of pleasure for action X, which is 9. For action Y, the total number of units of pleasure for all three persons is 18, while the total number of units of pain is 6. If we subcract 6 from 18, we get the net total number of units of pleasure for action Y, which is 12. Now, since the net total number of units of pleasure for action Y (which is 12) is greater than that for action X (which is 9), it follows that action Y is the morally good action—as it is the one that maximizes aggregate pleasure. If we understand welfare as happiness, the greatest net total of welfare is what would be meant by the popular formulation of the utilitarian moral standard as “the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people” (also known as the “greatest happiness principle”). This formulation, however, is prone to misinterpretation. It seems to suggest something similar to the majority rule where the action that favors the majority is deemed the right one.In consideration of the rule that it follows violates, an action is judged to be morally 9, if it follows a good rule or does not conform to bad rule, and morally bad if it follows a bad rule 7 violates a good rule. A good rule may be understog} in various ways. It may mean a rule that is rational 9, reasonable, that is willed by God or that conforms to His will, that respects human or moral tights, o, | that conforms to the natural order of tings 7h way of judging the morality of an action is wita at & work when people say, for instance, that abortion is Ten commandments from the Bible morally wrong because it violates the moral law thar states that we ought not to kill, either as stated in the Ten Commandments or as required by the moral right to life. And in consideration of the character (or character traits) of the person who performs an action, an action is judged to be morally good if the said action is something that a person of good character, usually called a virtuous person, would do, and morally bad if otherwise (that is, if it is something that a vicious person would do). his way of judging the morality of an action is what is at work when people ae instance, that an act of cowardice is morally wrong because cowardice is not a character trait of a virtuous person (or that such an act is not something that a virtuous person would do), or that not helping a person in great need is morally wrong because we need to be compassionate to our fellow persons, since having compassion for our fellow persons is a trait of a virtuous person. Most people consider all three aspects of an action in judging the morality of actions in varying times and situations. There may be cases where all three aspects occur in compatible ways, like when the action resulting in good consequences happens to follow a good rule and be done by a virtuous person, or the action done by a virtuous person happens to result in good consequences and follow a good rule. Undeniably, however, there are cases where a conflict arises among these moral considerations, in which, fot instance, the action that results in good consequences violates a good rule or the action done by a virtuous person does not result in good consequences. The act of telling the truth, for instance, conforms to a moral rule that states that we should nor tell a lie and \ce to the goodness of the character trait of being honest. As there are cases ds act leads to good consequences, there are also cases where it does not. cases of conflict among the three, one is inevitably faced with the question of ich among the various moral considerations is fundamental, and thus should prevail over the others. The different answers, along with their supporting arguments, given (0 this question by philosophers have given tise to the three (normative) ethical theories of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. Accordingly, as a response to the said question, consequentialism claims that it should be the consequences of actions, deontology claims that it should be the rules that actions follow or violate, and virtue ethics claims that it should be the character of the agent or the person performing such actions.| rc 2 Intensity 2 4 [Dusios [4 Certainty, 2 Propinguity | "~ 5 2 Fecundity 2 ; Purity 2 a pe [TOTAL 2 2 jon that is morally good is action X for the pleasure it produces has a tory o He, eran ‘hat of action Y. Now ifwe are dealing with actions that will re ak hedonistic utilitarianism claims that the action that produces the least amount of ao ane rally god action. Ie corresponds tothe ation that produces the pain that hi lowest total value in the hedonistic calculus. While the criteria in the hedonistic calculus are expressed in terms of pleasures, they equally apply to pains. While pleasures have positive values, pains have negative ones. Meaning, between two actions that produce pleasures, the one that produces the greater pleasure has the higher moral value and thus should be preferred; but between two actions that produce pains, the one that produces the lesser value ofpain has the higher moral value and thus should be preferred. When the alternative action have both pleasures and pains as consequences, we subtract the total value of pain from the total value of pleasure to get the net total value of pleasure of each alternative action. The action that has the greater net total value of pleasure is the morally good choice. Mill, on the other hand, develops his own version of utilitarianism, what we have called qualitative utilitarianism, in the course of answering certain objections to utilitarianism. Let us examine how Mill responds to three of such objections. The first objection stares that utilitarianism allegedly endorses a “swinish doctrine,” for in taking pleasure and pain as the only intrinsic good and evil, respectively, it in effect puts the value of human pleasures and pains on the same level as the value of animal pleasures and pains. Since both humans and animals are capable of experiencing pleasures and pains, making pleasure and pain a8 the fundamental bases of moral values is allegedly tantamount to saying that in terms of moral values, humans are no different from animals, Mill answers this, following Epicirus by pointing to a difference between mental and bodily pleasures or between intellect and physical pleasures. According to Mill, s rationality (the capacity for intelligence and free choice) is a higher faculty than sentience (the capacity for sensory experiences) the pleasures of rationality (the mental pleasures) are higher in quality than the pleasure of sentience (the bodily pleasures) (Mill 2004, 197-98). To emphasize chis point, Mil (2004, 197) famously remarks that “Ic is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a Pi satisfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.” Meaning, some pains ¢ humans are better than the pleasures of animals, or some pains of humans who use the! reason are better than the pleasures of humans who do not. Mill, consequently, reject Bentham’s view that the pleasures derived from playing a board game and from reading Poetry are qualitatively the same.fail i oe objection states that utilitarianism is bound to il be here iso objective way by which we can decide on which type of pleasure is superior or more valuable than other types. Mill responds that an objective way to settle this issue is provided by the competent judges on the relative values of pleasures. These competent judges are those who have experienced the entire spectrum of pleasures. Mill (ibid.) explains: “From the verdict of competent judges, there can be no appeal. There is no other tribunal, even on the question of quantity. What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced?” In other words, the competent judge who can objectively say which between pleasure A and pleasure B is the superior pleasure is the person who has experienced both pleasures. The third objection states that utilitarianism cannot account for the moral goodness of acts of martyrdom or self-sacrifice. If pleasure is the basis of moral goodness, how can acts that renounce one’s pleasures (as in the case of martyrdom) be morally good? Mill answers that this objection misinterprets utilitarianism to be a doctrine that gives priority to the pleasures of the person who does the action. Based on our classification of the types of consequentialism, this objection, in effect, mistakes utilitarianism as an agent-relative or egoistic type of consequentialism. Utilitarianism, Mill clarifies, is after the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people, which will sometimes require individuals to sacrifice their own personal happiness. Furthermore, Mill notes that self- sactifice (say giving up one’s life to save another) is not always morally good; it is only so when it promotes the greatest happiness principle (say the person being saved will be able to do greater things than the saving person). Mill (2004, 197-98) explains: “The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, is wasted.” Jobn Stuart Mill Non-Hedonistic Forms of Utilitarianism Non-hedonistic utilitarianism, being a form of non-hedonistic consequentialism, rejects the view that pleasure and pain are the only intrinsic good and bad, respectively. Following non- hedonistic consequentialism, this rejection also comes in two ways. The first claims that pleasure is nor the intrinsic good, but something else. The second claims that while pleasure is an intrinsic good, there are other intrinsic good as well. We may refer to the kind of utilitarianism that rejects hedonism in the first way as exclusive non-hedonistic utilitarianism; and that which rejects hedonism in the second way as inclusive non-hedonistic wcilitarianism. The most influential representative of exclusive non-hedonistic utilitarianism is the kind of utilitarianism called preference utilitarianism (also called satisfaction utilitarianism); while a of the inclusive non-hedonistic utilitarianism is the kind of utilitarianism called pluralistic jlitarianis led ideal utilitarianism). : ain claims thar what should be maximized is not the experience i is its most of pleasure, but the satisfaction of preferences (desires or interests). Two of its méis consideration, the morally good action, for consequentialism, maxi: tapi Inicio Sa Ic is not enough, therefore, that we st a ee id through our actions; rather, we should strive to attain the Breates seve we PE? ouch our actidnk:cThis trasslanes into the following situations cn ee ee an aot that resis Ingood chnsetucnoes Gabtch Promote an intrny ood) and another that results in bad consequences (which doesnot promote an intin a rod) the morally good action is the former action. Second, between tWo contlictin, o jons thar both Tenult in. good consequiénces'but in varying degrees, good consequences are greater is the morally good act. Third, between both sulin bad consequences but in varying depres, the one whose bad consequenas lesser is the morally good act. Fourth, between two actions both leading to a combination of good and bad consequences, the one with the greater net total of good consequences, or with the maximum aggregate good consequences, is the morally good act. To get th, aggregate good consequences of each alternative action, we add all its good ‘consequences and all its bad consequences, and then subtract the total bad consequences from the total good consequences. the action Whose two actions that B. Varieties of Consequentialism While all consequent ts agree that our moral duty is to maximize an intrinsic good through the consequences of our actio ns, they, however, do not agree on certain aspects about the intrinsic good. For instance, for purposes of illustration, we spoke of happiness as an example of an intrinsic good. While many consequentialists, as our later discussion will show, indeed recognize happiness as an intrinsic good, there are also some who do not. Furthermore, it may be assumed that the happiness that matters in one’s actione is solely one’s own. Consequentialists have varying views on this. Their disagreements on these points and related ones have given rise to the different versions of consequentialism. For an orderly presentation of these variants of consequentialism, we shall explain them in terms of how they deal with two central questions concerning the intrinsic good. The first question is, “Is pleasure (or happiness) the only intrinsic good?” (The correlate of this question is, “Is pain the only intrinsic bad or evil?”) In saying that pleasure is the only intrinsic good, we imply that all other things that can possibly be regarded as good are only instrumentally good; that is, they are good only in so far as they serve as means to achieve Pleasure. The second question is, “Is the agent’s own intrinsic good the only one that morally matters?” The extended version of this question is, “Is the agent's intrinsic good the only one that is morally relevant in judging the morality of his/her actions?” In saying that the agent's own intrinsic good is the only one that morally matters, we imply thar the Possible intrinsic goods of other people are not a relevant factor in the moral evaluation of the person's action. If we again take pleasure-to-be an intrinsic good, this means that the agent’s own pleasure is the only one that morally matters. The possible pleasures (or pains) of other people are not morally relevant in evaluating the person's actions. The differences among the various kinds of consequentialism can be presented a5 different ways of responding to the two questions, Accordingly, responding to the first question gives rise to the general distinction between hedonistic and non-hedonistic types5 imi te good, then it is morally good, Vi ee spaniel vhether the rule rel . . w Sr llonte of each version of utilitarianism usually points to certain Weakness of fas lanj of exher version. Followers ofule utilitarianism usually cite the absurdity of at ute, 2 in certain cases, such as the following one. Suppose an act utilitarian seeks the Service a plumber for a certain fee, which the plumber successfully performs. Before Paying _ plumber, the act utilitarian will first consider whether there is an alternative use of. money supposed to be given to the plumber as. payment for his services that will Promo, a greater aggregate good, say giving it to charitable institutions or to the victims Br calamity. If there is such an alternative use of the money, then not Paying the plum} ‘ and instead using the money for said alternative purposes is the morally Preferable action Rule utilitarians resolve this absurdity by considering the rule “honor one’s contract eth another,” which the act of not paying the plumber for his services clearly violates, Th argue that since the said rule is optimific, for it brings stability to social relations, amon others, then it is morally good to conform to this rule, So, the morally correct option f° the person who hires the plumber, from the viewpoint of rule utilitarianism, should beto honor his/her contract with the plumber by paying him for his services, Followers of act utilitarianism, on the other hand, claim that rule utilitarianism has the danger of resulting into “rule worship” (an argument usually made against deontology as well) wherein a rule is being followed for the sake of following it even if it will not ead to the best consequences. Consider the situation called the “desert island Promise” as narrated by Smart (2004, 207): Thave promised a dying man ona desert island, from which subsequently aloneam rescued, togivehis hoard ofgold tothe South Australian Jockey Club. On my return! giveitto the Royal Adelaide Hospital, which badly needsit fora new X-ray machine. Could anybody deny that I had done rightly without being open to the charge of heartlessness? (Remember that the promise was known only to me, andso my action will not weaken the general confidence in the social institution of promising.) Think of the persons dying of painful tumors who could have been saved by the desert island gold! In this situation, for the person to still keep his promise to the dying man, given the surrounding circumstances (the person to whom the promise was made is already dead, nobody else knows about the promise, and breaking the promise will be done in order to save sick persons from dying), is, from the viewpoint of act utilitarianism, a form of rule worship. We earlier noted that consequentialism differs from deontological ethics in that the ones that matter in making moral judgments for consequentialism are the come actions, whereas for deontology are the rules that actions follow or violate. In making 1 morally relevant, does this not make rule utilitarianism a form of deontological ed a Since the goodness of a rule in rule utilitarianism is still defined in consequentialist per rule rains eel widely asfed aa form of consequentialist ethic theory. than as a form of deontological ethics. Some, however, maintain that rule utilitariThese four complex forms of consequentialism are represented in various ways iy the history of philosophy. In this section, we shall examine some representative views f,, the two agent-relative forms of consequentialism, i.e.» agent-relative hedonism and agent. relative non-hedonism. We shall examine some of the representanve ae or the tw, agent-neutral forms, i.e., agent-neutral hedonism and agent-neutral ae Sapo the next section, where we shall focus on the best expression of agent-neutral consequentialism, namely utilitarianism. . ; For agent-elative hedonism, two good representative ethical case tho advanced by the two ancient Greek philosophers namely Ariseippus ( s a BC) ra Epi i i f Aristippus s referred to as Cyrenaicism (o, picurus (341-270 BC). The ethical theory of Aristippus iS OT me Dn “Gyrenaic Hedoni i icurus is simply refert Srenaic Hedonism), while thas of Epica i simply eee 1° et al., 1996, 48-49). Aristippus and Epicurus are B that pleasure and pai the only ones that have inane valu: pleasure being Te ony intrinsic good, and pain being the only intrinsic evil. Tn addition, they both believe tha s pring to the agent are the only ones that are morally in sum, they both subscribe to the view tha pleasure to the agent, and it is morally bad relevant in judging the morality of the action. I an action is morally good if it brings maximum if otherwise. / ; ; ‘Aristippus and Epicurus both believe that what gives mora worth to an action is not just any kind of pleasures; it has 10 aie ee for these two Greek philosophers, involves choosing the right kind of pleasures 0 desire. They, however, differ on what these pleasures are. During their time, pleasures were divided into two general kinds based on the contrasting relations of the duration and intensity of pleasures. Thus, the first kind refers to the momentary, but more intense pleasures; while the second kind refers to the long ail fasting, but less intense pleasures. Aristippus goes for the fis wpe kind, while Epicurus goes for the second one. Aristippus promotes sensory pleasures (the pleasures that can be immediately gratified), as they are greaily intense though short-lived. On the other hand, Epicurts promotes freedom from pain in the mind (gained through cultivating mental tranquility) and the body (gained through developing a healthy body), as these are long-lasting pleasures, though their intensity may not be as intense as sensory pleasures. As Epicutus claims, happiness is. gained not through “a constant succession of intense sensu?! pleasures” but through “the state of serenity,” which characterizes “freedom from trouble in the mind and pain in the body” (ibid., 49). Pleasures are also classified as active and passive. Active pleasures refer to the pleasu'* one experiences when specific wants or desires are gratified; while passive pleasures refer 0 eS one experiences 5 Mtal oF odity-are-absent. This diiso® correlates to the earlier one, in that active pleasures are momentary but mot tense, phil passive pleasures are less intense but long-lasting. Consequently, the kind ism that Aristippus advances, for preferting the active pleasures, has also bee?include, among others, beauty, knowledge, power, and healthy social relationships like friendship. These goods are desirable in themselves, regardless of whether or not pleasure is derived ftom having them. Pluralistic utilitarianism, accordingly, advances the view that an action is morally good if it maximizes any of these intrinsic goods. ‘Two cases often used to illustrate how certain things can be desirable, yet independent of pleasure are as follows (see J. J. C. Smart, 1978, 245-246). The first concerns the right attitude towards a person in misery. In this case, to feel sorrow, not gladness, is the desirable or ideal sentiment expressed for a person in misery. To derive or show pleasure or enjoyment from the other person’s misery is obviously inappropriate. The second concerns Moore's point that beauty is desirable, yet independent of the pleasure one derives from contemplating it. According to Moore, we naturally would still prefer “a world of natural beauty over an ugly world even though there were in each case no conscious beings 10 contemplate it” (Smart, 1978, 246). Meaning, ifthere are two possible worlds, one contains beautiful landscapes, while the other contains ugly landscapes, we naturally would say that the one with beautiful landscapes is better than the world with ugly ones, even though in both worlds there are no beings capable of deriving pleasure or displeasure from seeing the landscapes. This point, according to Moore, only proves that the desirability of beauty is independent of the pleasure that may be derived from perceiving beautiful things. Act and Rule Utilitarianism Aside from its hedonistic and non-hedonistic forms, another general division in utilitarianism is between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. This division arises from the question as to which the utilitarian principle of maximizing aggregate good or welfare should be applied to determine the morality of an act—the act itself or the rule that governs the act. According to act utilitarianism, the utilitarian principle should be applied to the act itself; while according to rule utilitarianism, it should be applied to the rule governing the act (see Brandt, 2004). A tule can be good in various ways. From a deontological viewpoint, a rule is good if it conforms to some higher law such as the will of God, a natural law, or the law of reason (this shall be discussed in the next chapter). From a utilitarian viewpoint, however, a rule is good if following it produces the maximum aggregate good or welfare. Following some philosophers (Smart, 2004, 206), let us conveniently refer to a good rule in this utilitarian sense as an optimific rule. An optimific rule, thus, is a rule which when generally followed (or conformed to) produces the maximum aggregate good. Thus, to determine whether action X (say the act of breaking a promise) is morally good or bad, act utilitarianism asks, does performing action X maximize aggregate good? If it does, then it is morally good; if not, then it is morally bad. On the other hand, rule utilitarianism asks, does action X follow an optimific rule (say the rule “Thou shall not lie”)? If it does, then it is morally good; if not, then it is morally bad. It will be observed thar the morality of the act in consideration, whether it is morally good or bad, will sometimes vary in these two versions of utilitarianism. For rule utilitarianism, even if the act maximizes aggregate good but follows a non-optimific rule, then it is morally bad. Act utilitarianism, on the other hand, does not care about the rules that an act may follow or‘ections to hedonism, another version of consequentialism, eal tialism or simply non-hedonism, emerged. Non-hedonism te si hedonism, but maintains the general view ate Ronin ti Its ee Fedor is ways, thereby giving rise to the two versions 0 at onism. The * nari es the view of hedonism that pleasure is an intrinsic good. We shall ha verjonofnon-hedonism exclusive nonsbedonism in consideration of the fact that ex i. ae from the list of intrinsic goods. The second version of non-hedonism ejects th hen of hedonism that pleasure is the only intrinsic good, We shall call this version of, on, hedonism inclusive non-hedonism in consideration of the fact that it includes pleasure ey the list of intrinsic goods. A further clarification of non-hedonism’s rejection of hedonism is as follows. Hedonism, claims that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. This claim, on closer inspection, is actually a combination of two more specific claims: the first is that pleasure is an intrinsic Bo0d,; the second is that pleasure is the only intrinsic good there is. When non-hedonism rejects the general claim of hedonism, it rejects either one of hedonism’s two-component claims, Exclusive non-hedonism rejects the component claim that pleasure is an intrinsic 00d, For this kind of non-hedonism, the intrinsic good is something else which some believe to be power or desire-satisfaction, among others. On the other hand, inclusive non-hedonism rejects the component claim that pleasure is the only intrinsic good there is. For this kind of non-hedonism, aside from pleasure, there are other intrinsic goods which include knowledge, power, beauty, freedom, desire-satisfaction, and healthy relationships, among others. In light of some obj non-hedonistic conseque” Agent Relativity and Neutrality Among the possible consequences of a given action, there are those that are agent-relate, They are the consequences that directly concern or affect the welfare (or well-being) of the agent or the person who performs the action. On the other hand, there are also those that are non-agent-related, referring to consequences that do not directly concern or affect the welfare of the agent, but instead directly concern or affect the welfare of other persons. Agent-relative consequentialism (also known as egoistic consequentialism) claims that the only consequences that morally matter (or that are morally relevant in judging the morality of an action) are the agent-related ones; whereas agent-neutral consequentialism (also known as impartial consequentialism) claims that both agent-related and non-agent-related consequences morally matter. If we take happiness as the intrinsic good, agent-relative consequentialism would only consider the happiness brought by an action to its agent in judging the morality of his/her action. In contrast, agent-neutral consequentialism would consider the happiness of all persons affected by an action (including the agents own) in judging the morality of this action. While agent-relative consequentialism gives moti! Priority to the agent of an action, agent-neutral consequentialism is impartial to whoever is or are affected by an action. sai For agent-neutral consequentialism, none among the persons affected by an ei is morally privileged or has moral priority. Everyone gets equal consideration wally determining the morality of the act. Given this, what then decides which action is motUNIT > ETHICAL THEORIES CHAPTER 3 Consequentialism T" chapter examines the ethical theory called consequentialism. It explains the major points of consequentialism, and systematically presents its different versions. ‘This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part introduces consequentialism as an ethical theory, and shows what is distinct about consequentialism as an ethical theory through examining its differences from the other equally influential ethical theories and its concept of the good. The second part is a general survey of the different versions of consequentialism and shows how they have been represented in the history of philosophy. The third part, which focuses on the theory’s most influential version, namely wtilizarianism, explains the fundamental tenets of utilitarianism and the differences among its various forms. A, Understanding Consequentialism Consequentialism is one of the influential ethical theories. Its general claim is that the consequences of an action are the ones that ultimately matter in judging whether the action is morally good or bad. The morality of an action, according to this ethical theory, is solely determined by the kind of consequences that the performance of the action leads to, To better understand what is unique about this claim, let us examine how it differs from the claims of the two other equally influential ethical theories, namely deontology and virtue ethics. In addition, let us clarify a concept critical in the understanding of its claim: the concept of the intrinsic good. Not all consequences are deemed morally relevant by consequentialism—only those that involve an intrinsic good. A Theory of Ethics There are three aspects of an action that are generally regarded as relevant when evaluating its morality: its consequences, the rules that it follows or violates, and the character of its agent. In consideration of its consequences, an action is judged to be morally good when it results to something good or desirable, and morally bad if otherwise. Good or desirable consequences may mean various things. They may refer to consequences that bring about pleasurable experiences or prevent painful experiences, fulfil desires’or satisfy preferences, promote well-being, or improve the quality of life of persons. This way of judging the morality of an action is what is at work when people contend,.for instance, that death penalty should be legalized for it will deter crime, or that we should take care of the natural environment to prevent the extinction of the human species.While being both hedonistic and utilitarian, their ethical views, however, have important differences. Bentham’s version of hedonistic utilitarianism emphasizes the quantitative differences among types of pleasures; and for this reason, may be called quantitative hedonistic utilitarianism ot, for short, quantitative utilitarianism. On the other hand, Mill’s version emphasizes the qualitative differences among types of pleasures and for this reason may be called qualitative hedonistic utilitarianism ot, for short, qualitative utilitarianism. More specifically, for quantitative utilitarianism, there is no significant difference between physical and mental pleasures; while for qualitative utilitarianism, there is. For instance, for Bentham there is no significant difference between the pleasure one derives from playing a simple children’s game (Bentham gives the game of pushpin as an example) and the pleasure one derives from reading a poem; but for Mill there is. To quantitatively calculate which among alternative pleasures ought to be preferred, Bentham comes up with a set of criteria called the calculus of felicity or hedonistic calculus. As listed below, these criteria are intended to serve as a guide for measuring the quantity of pleasures that actions may produce. 1, Intensity — The more intense the experience of pleasure, the greater the value of the pleasure. 2. Duration — The longer the experience of pleasure, the greater the value of the pleasure. 3. Certainty — The greater the probability that the desired pleasure will be experienced, the greater the value of the pleasure. 4, Propinquity (or remoteness) — The shorter the temporal distance between an act and the pleasure that it will produce, the greater the value of the pleasure. 5. Fecundity (the chance a sensation will be followed by sensations of the same kind: pleasures, if it is be pleasure; pains, if it is be pain) - The higher the probability an experience of pleasure will be followed by further experiences of pleasure, the greater the value of the pleasure. 6. Purity (the chance a sensation will not be followed by sensations of the opposite kind: pains, if it is be pleasure; pleasures, if it is be pain) - The higher the probability that the experience of pleasure will not be followed by an experience of pain, the greater the value of the pleasure. 7. Extent (the number of persons affected by the sensation) — The higher the number of persons to experience the pleasure, the greater the value of the pleasure. Hedonistic utilitarianism claims that the action that produces the greatest amount of pleasure is the morally correct action. The greatest amount of pleasure, for Bentham, is determined quantitatively by means of the hedonistic calculus. If action X results in an experience of pleasure that has a greater intensity or duration than that of action Y, action X is the morally correct action. If both actions involve more criteria, then we need to calculate which action will produce the greater amount of pleasures based on these criteria. Thus, suppose actions X and Y will produce pleasures of different kinds in varying degrees which can be measured by the criteria of the hedonistic calculus in the following way (for purposes of illustration, let us suppose we can assign numerical values to each of the criteria in the calculus).i Hare (1919-2002) and Peter Singer (1946--), P, prominent proponent a Ri ee of pleasure is not the ce good, but i : utilitarianism rues ces, The desire to experience pleasure and to be free from pain i satisfaction of pre! a 7 decide to satisfy. But there are other preferences that have noth a preference that ea such as those a person may decide to satisfy himself hess to do wich erie experience or by undergoing a painful experience. This wa by foregoing a a ‘on some occasions, would prefer to suffer just to have their Preferen, why rc cS ently, preference utilitarianism contends that an action is morally 9 eek ti greatest satisfaction of preferences for the greatest number of Persons. while itis morally bad if otherwise. eu ‘Wlodek Rabinowicz (2009, 185-187) provides, in what follows, a good illustration for how moral reasoning works for preference utilitarianism: Suppose I have agreed to meet John and Mary, two of my students, at the department today. We haven't fixed any definite time for the meeting but the secretary phones me at home with the message that the students have already arrived and are waiting. Since the weather is beautiful, I would much prefer to go by bike to the office rather than to drive, The students, on the other hand, dislike waiting: They would prefer that I arrive as soon as possible. So, our preferences are in conflict. The preference-utilitarian solution would prescribe the action that best satisfies the aggregated preferences of the persons involved. The issue i decided by balancing: My preference for going by bike is weighed in proportion to its strength against the students’ opposing preferences. Suppose that each of the latter is weaker than my own but that together they weigh more. Under these circumstances, 1 ought to abstain from going by bike and take the car instead. For purposes of explanation, let us assign numeral units for the strength of the Preferences involved. Suppose the strength of the professor's preference is 4, while that of John’ is 3 and of Mary’ is 2. Ifthe conflict were just between the professor's preference and the preference of any one of his students, then the professor's preference should be satisfied, But in the case presented, the professor's preference conflicts with the preferencs of both students, whose total strength is greater than his; and so, his students preferences are the ones that should be satisfied. ‘To weigh the relative strengths of the preferences involved in a given situation (2 Process called preference balancing), Hare (1981) suggests that we put ourselves in the shoes of the other persons whose preferences conflict with outs. In this way, these preferences and the ensuing conflict have somehow become our own. Consequently, deciding on this conflict somehow becomes a personal decision—as if one is deciding on a conflict berweet one's own preferences. In the previous example, this means that the professor, in order ‘0 assess the relative strength of his own preference against his students’ preferences, should put himself in the shoes of his students. ; Pluralistic utilitarianism, on the other hand, believes that there isa plurality of inci Boods. Two of its widely recognized proponents are Hastings Rashdall (1858-1924) and G.E, Moore (1873-1958). Aside from pleasure, the other intrinsic goods usually identifiinclude, among others, beauty, knowledge, power, and healthy social relationships like friendship. These goods are desirable in themselves, regardless of whether or not pleasure is derived from having them. Pluralistic utilitarianism, accordingly, advances the view that an action is morally good if it maximizes any of these intrinsic goods. ‘Two cases often used to illustrate how certain things can be desirable, yet independent of pleasure are as follows (see J. J. C. Smart, 1978, 245-246). The first concerns the right attitude towards a person in misery. In this case, to feel sorrow, not gladness, is the desirable or ideal sentiment expressed for a person in misery. To derive or show pleasure or enjoyment from the other person's misery is obviously inappropriate. The second concerns Moore's point that beauty is desirable, yet independent of the pleasure one derives from contemplating it. According to Moore, we naturally would still prefer “a world of natural beauty over an ugly world even though there were in each case no conscious beings to contemplate it” (Smart, 1978, 246). Meaning, if there are two possible worlds, one contains beautiful landscapes, while the other contains ugly landscapes, we naturally would say that the one with beautiful landscapes is better than the world with ugly ones, even though in both worlds there are no beings capable of deriving pleasure or displeasure from seeing the landscapes. This point, according to Moore, only proves that the desirability of beauty is independent of the pleasure that may be derived from perceiving beautiful things. Act and Rule Utilitarianism Aside from its hedonistic and non-hedonistic forms, another general division in utilitarianism is between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. This division arises from the question as to which the utilitarian principle of maximizing aggregate good or welfare should be applied to determine the morality of an act—the act itself or the rule that governs the act. According to act utilitarianism, the utilitarian principle should be applied to the act itself; while according to rule utilitarianism, it should be applied to the rule governing the act (see Brandt, 2004). Arrule can be good in various ways. From a deontological viewpoint, a rule is good if it conforms to some higher law such as the will of God, a natural law, or the law of reason (this shall be discussed in the next chapter). From a utilitarian viewpoint, however, a rule is good if following it produces the maximum aggregate good or welfare. Following some philosophers (Smart, 2004, 206), let us conveniently refer to a good rule in this utilitarian sense as an optimific rule. An optimific rule, thus, is a rule which when generally followed (or conformed to) produces the maximum aggregate good, Thus, to determine whether action X (say the act of breaking a promise) is morally good or bad, act utilitarianism asks, does performing action X maximize aggregate good? If it does, then it is morally good; if not, then it is morally bad. On the other hand, rule utilitarianism asks, does action X follow an optimific rule (say the rule “Thou shall not lie”)? If it does, then it is morally good; if not, then it is morally bad. It will be observed that the morality of the act in consideration, whether it is morally good or bad, will sometimes vary in these two versions of utilitarianism. For rule utilitarianism, even if the act maximizes aggregate good but follows a non-optimific rule, then it is morally bad. Act utilitarianism, on the other hand, does not care about the rules that an act may follow orEthics: Beek ice cand Issues fe cannot but encounter moral questions and issues in our life, since the actions that we do afé-bound to affect ourselves and other people either positively or negatively. We inevitably face choices that may benefit or harm other people. Our actions may promote the welfare of other people, just as they may infringe on their rights and violate cheir dignity. Everyone of us at one time or another has experienced asking about what the morally right thing to do is, or more generally about what things should be valued. Some of our moral questions may be straightforwardly practical (Should we take away a scholarship grant from an underprivileged student due to a low grade she incurred? Is it right to deceive a friend to spare him from a certain risk?) or more abstract (What is the ultimate good? What is justice? Is morality relative?) Some moral questions we have may concern Gur own actions (Should I reveal the truth? Should I give to this charity?) or deal with the actions of others (Was it morally permissible for the President to make those remarks? Should the government legalize divorce?) These questions, which vary in kinds, are the concerns of a particular branch of philosophy called ethics. This philosophical discipline basically deals with humanity's inquiries about right conduct, the good life, moral values, and other related issues. As rational beings, we are capable of acting freely rather than merely driven by instinct. Our actions are preceded by an understanding of the value of such acts, their consequence, and their rightness or wrongness. And because of our rationality, we are inclined to think about and try to understand the basis of what we believe in, or what we should pursue in life. We do not want to simply depend on what authorities say or what social conventions and norms prescribe as right and wrong. As Socrates once said, “The unexamined life is not worth living,” In the same spirit of this classical statement, it can also be said that the morally examined life is truly worth living. It is, indeed, worthwhile to engage in ethics for it provides us with the opportunity to look into the reasons and justifications behind our own actions and the actions of others, the bases and principles of our decision-making, and the goals of our moral life in order to find clearer answers to the various moral issues and problems that we encounter in life.We can see here that determining the rightness or wrongness of imposing the death penalty does not lie only on establishing certain facts but deciding what moral standards or principles to follow—pursuing the greater good or respecting the human rights of individuals. One accepts a moral claim not by looking at the facts alone. One agrees or disagrees with a moral claim on the basis of the moral standard he/she follows or believes in. Such distinction of factual and moral statements suggests that factual statements are easier to settle than moral statements, since the basis of the latter (for being true or false) is objective. That is, if there is a disagreement becween two people whether the rate of criminality had gone down this year compared to last year, or whether a drug can cure a particular disease, the results of scientific research can clearly determine who is correct and who is mistaken. However, it is said that disagreements on moral claims—whether we should allow homosexual marriage or not, whether euthanasia is permissible or not—are more difficult, if not impossible, to settle or to be given any final resolution. It is for this reason that moral claims are said to be relative and their acceptability lies on one’s personal opinion or cultural beliefs. Although this question of whether moral claims are relative or not will be extensively discussed in a later section of this chapter, it is worth mentioning at this point that it is a mistake to think that moral statements are always difficult to justify, and their acceptability is always subjective to the individual. The claim “It is morally wrong to torture a person for fun” or the assertion “It is morally right to give aid to typhoon victims” is not difficult to justify. It is also incorrect to think that issues dealing with factual claims are always easy to resolve or uncontroversial, Certain factual statements like “Humans evolved from primitive primates,” “Imposing the death penalty will deter murder” and “Aliens from other planets have visited the earth” are controversial and their truth (or falsity) is not easy to establish. Therefore, we cannot distinguish moral and factual statements in terms of the degree of difficulty disagreements about them can be resolved. What is clear, however, is the basis by which we determine the acceptability of these statements—for factual statements we appeal to empirical data through research and observation; for moral statements, like other normative statements, we appeal to norms and standards. Moral Statements and Moral Standards After distinguishing moral from factual statements, it is now easier to understand the difference of moral statements from other normative statements. We have seen earlier that aside from moral statements, there are other statements that are normative, that is, those that are justified and accepted based on standards rather than facts. However, the standards used to justify normative statements are not moral standards. The standards of etiquette by which we judge manners as good or bad, the standards of law by which we judge an action to be legally right or wrong, the standards of language by which we judge what is gfammatically right and wrong, the standards of aesthetics by which we judge good and bad art, and the athletic standards by which we judge how well a basketball or a football game is being played—these standards are not moral standards. So how can we distinguish moral standards from non-moral standards? Addressing this question can shedpower within a particular clan has been proposed in the Philippine Congress several times already, but has not gotten the nod of the legislators. It can be surmised that enacting such law will be detrimental to the interests of those political personalities in the Congress. Morality and Religion Despite their difference, morality is often identified with religion. In various societies around the world, religion has so much influenced the moral life of the people so as to be scen as indistinguishable from morality. A Christian forgiving those who offended him/ her mindful of Christ’s commandment of love; a Jew preparing and consuming food based on the law of Kosher; a Muslim giving alms to the needy according to the fourth pillar of Islam—these moral practices of most of humanity throughout the ages are testaments to how morality has become identified with conformity to God’s command. Indeed, religion, like law, is related to morality. But unlike law which is often based on morality, religion is generally perceived to be the basis of morality. People tend to think chac what is right can be derived from religious beliefs and teachings. Because this line ‘of thinking is anchored on the idea that God is the source of goodness, living a moral life, then, is achieved by adhering to God’ will, while acting immorally is basically disobeying God. But should morality be based on religion? This question was asked in as early as Plato's the Eushyphro, in which Socrates asks the pious Euthyphro, “Do the gods love goodness because it is good, or is it good because the gods love it?” Following the point of question raised by Socrates, we want to know whether God commands what is good because it is good, or whether the good is good because God commands it. Although religion gives moral basis and direction to people, thinking that morality depends on religion raise some problems. First, the moral directives given by the world’s great religions are general and imprecise. People encounter moral dilemmas in particular situations or contexts that demand specific moral precept. For example, Christianity teaches its believers “Thou shalt not kill.” However, even with such directive, chere remains a disagreement among Christians whether imposing death penalty is morally justified, or whether legalizing abortion is morally permissible, or whether administering euthanasia to a patient in an irreversible vegetative state is morally right. These moral situations cannot be resolved by a general moral admonition not to kill. There are certain specific issues and factors that must be considered which have a lot of weight in determining whether an act is good or bad. The Bible fails to give unambiguous answers to specific moral problems humanity confronts. What do religions say regarding more complex yet specific moral issues of today’s world such as artificial reproduction, genetic engineering or the use of animals in research? We will remain inquiring what God expects us to do. Second, can we really be certain what God wants us to do? We know that there ate different religions the world over. These religions may vary in terms of their moral doctrines and practices. There are cases when they have conflicting answers to certain moral questions. If one depends on the moral teachings of the religion he/she belongs to, how can he/she deal with the moral beliefs of people from other religions especiallywhen they conflict with his/her own moral belicfs? There should be a basis of that transcends religious boundaries, lest we fail to carry our an objective rations) discussion with peaple from other religions. " Third, as rational beings we are doing ov judgment of right and wrong on what our religion dictates. We ought not to think” reason anymore if morality is dependent on the teachings of the Church, We merely jay" to know what our religion says about a certain moral issue and conform to it. But ay leading a rational life if this is how we view morality? What is our faculty of reason fog This point becomes more pronounced when we find ourselves in certain times when What we believe to be right (or wrong) does not conform ( the church stand on the issue, In the past, the Catholic Chureh’s stand on the persecution of heretics, the Crusade Movement and the Inquisition have been questioned even by i relationship and artificial contraception May not find support (© a Although we are not saying that the Church's teachings on these matters are unsound or wrong, it is important to understand that an authentic sense of morality must not merely rely on religion. Indeed, religion can guide us in ma life, but morality should transcend religion. Ultimately mere adherence to religion. D. The Issue of Ethical Relativism moral beliefs and prac cople ids them, How the individual was brought up exposed to contribute to his/her mont selves a disservice if we simply ba ep own members. Its view on homosexugl king moral judgment and leading a moral t is a matter of reason rather than re greatly ‘As mentioned in the previous section, the influenced by the environment that surroun and the social and cultural elements that the person was understanding and judgment of what is right and wrong. Give! hat is right varies from one person to another conclude that morality is relative, that is, wl cetrom one culture to another? Or is morality objective, that is, what is right is based on «universal principle chat applies co all people regardless of culture, religion, or ideology? This one major meta-ethical issue in philosophy which this section will address. “The view which holds that all moral principles are valid relative to a particular society or individual, is called echical relativism. Wis to be distinguished! from ethical skepticism —which aims thar there are no valid moral principles at all (or at least we cannot know whether there are any)—and from ethical objectiviom which asserts that there are universally valid moral principles binding on all people. According to the relativist perspective, the rightness or wrongness of an act depends on the moral norms of society or the moral inclinations of the inate and no oe standard exists by which differing rules or inclinations can be judged. So, what aa mo! yee fora Chinese society may be morally wrong in an American society, just as what is morally ri i fc Sa ee right for Pedro might be morally wrong for Juan. t ription, we can infer that there are two forms of ethical relativism: cultural ethical relativism and individual ethical relativis i Sevan ciblal condoctondliacta ical relativism. According to the former, also jalism, the rightness or wrongnes: a i ee ess of an action di ds on society's norms. Accordi 5 See e = chee se ee ing the ae also known as ethical subjectivism, the rightness ction lies on ividual’s i i“ the individual’s own commitments. Of the two, in such phenomena, can welight to how different moral statements are from other normative statements, as Well ag how distinct morality is from etiquette, law, and religion, : Ethicists have identified a number of characteristics that speak of the Nature of mo, standards. Although cach of these characteristics may not be unique to moral stand, if taken ogether, they can distinguish moral standards from non-moral Standards, Fine moral standards deal with matters that we think can seriously harm or benefit humae beings. The conventional moral norms against cheating, lying, and killing deal a actions that can gravely hurt people. Whether human dignity is tespected or degraded mek cnn are safe or dangerous, and produc ate beneficial or deinen health are matters thar affect human well-being. The standards that Bovern our conduc : these areas are moral standards. tin Second, moral standards have universal validity, They apply to all who are in th relevantly similar situation. If it is morally wrong for a Person A to do act X, then fi wrong to do X for anyone relevantly similar to P. This characteristic is exemplified i. the moral rule: “Do not do unto others what you would not have them do unto yo rs If we believe that killing a person is morally wrong, then we expect that people in pel places follow the same belief, regardless of their culture or religion, In comparison, atber standards are only valid to a particular group governed by such standards. The ae eit fasting at certain times is observed in some religions but not to other religions or to non- believers. Etiquettes such as not wearing red in a funeral or taking off your shoes when entering a house are practiced in some cultures but not to others, Third, moral standards are generally thought to have a particularly overriding importance, that is, people feel they should prevail over other values. A violation of the moral rule against killing or stealing is more important than a violation of the rules of etiquette or of grammar. Similarly, a moral judgment weighs more than an aesthetic judgment. Moral claims are also more important than claims pertaining to law. Thus, laws are questioned when they are thought to be unjust or are contrary to moral standards. Moreover, legislators determine what laws to enact on the basis of certain moral principles such as common good, respect for human dignity, fairness, and justice. This point will be elaborated more in the next section when we discuss morality and law, Fourth, moral standards are not established by the decisions of authoritarian bodies, nor are they solely determined by appealing to consensus or tradition. While laws and legal standards are established by the authority of the legislature, cligious beliefs and practi are taught by the Church fathers and scholars, rules of etiquette emanate from tradition us, moral standards, however, are not established by a particular authority. eS, alidi of moral standards lies on the adequacy of reasons that support or Tastee te So logan hescreaensaealgliteewiaket cen valid. jst ofa by chose charscoetsic of moral eandseds let eo how, in particular, mofality differs from law, etiquette, and religion. These three are often identified with morality, since these are also institutions and customs that lay down certain norms that Gerve as our basis in determining what we ought to do and nov de,Nature of Moral Statements ‘To better understand ethics’ normative character as a study of morality, itis important to understand the nature of claims that pertain ro morality which we will label moral statements, Such clarification is important in understanding how these statements should be justified or how they should be evaluated as acceptable or unacceptable. This will also shed light on the difference of morality from law, etiquette, and religion. Moral Statements as Normative Statements Moral statements are categorized as normative statements rather than factual statements. A normative statement expresses a value judgment, a kind of judgment thar claims chat something ought to be the case as distinct from a factual judgment that claims that something és the case. As such, when one makes a normative statement, he/she presents an evaluative account of how things should be rather than what things are. Thus, we assess the correctness of normative statements by looking at certain criteria, standards or norms instead of focusing on empirical data. However, as can be seen in the examples below, aside from moral statements, there are various kinds of normative statements that have their cortesponding basis of assessment: Dae’ ead | You ought to return the excess change to | Moral standard iB | the cashier. i _ | There should be unity, balance, and Aesthetic standard contrast in your painting. | — — 7 You ought to use the preposition “in” Grammatical standard rather than “on.” : _ cis illegal to make a U-turn there, Legal standard LS Cover your mouth when you laugh. Standard of etiquette As mentioned above, since a factual statement expresses a claim that something is the case, its claim can be empirically assessed as true or false based on either research, observation, or experiment. For example: erect eos ‘The Philippine Independence day was | Historical research | declared on June 12, 1946, _ | Some tribes in India practice cannibalism. | Observati ement ‘The cause of the fish kill in the river is | Scientific research | pollution from agricultural biotoxir A blue litmus paper will turn ted when | Experiment dipped in an acid solution.i cerned with ¢ Normative ethics, tackled in the second part of the ay i a a Ni = me al standards to determine right from wrong conduct. It involve eae a norms or rules that can serve as basis of the kind of actions, on eandseds choad ie ify hate should pursue, Theories proposed to answer what = 5 comes * human action usually fall into the broad ees ofan actin ) hb virtue ethics. These repre: i a : judging an action’s moral rightness (or ee as jonseruencs, the rule it follows (or violates), and the character of the person ane me - The thitd area of ethics is applied ethics, which is the abe a : ‘i nuit nn ite Is thrusts to examine the particular issues in both the ee ae ni - ae stileentien mi Moral judgment. Focusing on the more practical concerns o nai Fs to determine the moral permissbility of specific actions and practices. By using the conceprual tools of metacthics and normative ethics, applied ethics attempts to analyze, clarify, and shed light on various ethical issues with the goal of guiding our moral judgment, Some issues in applied ethics pertain to public policy and the professions. In recent decades, new specializations in applied ethics have arisen in diverse fields: business, medicine, environmental policies, haw, and the media. Other isues focus on personal concerns in everyday life, such as those pertaining to life, health, sex, and relationship, Before we delve into the basic concerns of metaethics in this chapter, it is important to note that there is another study of morality known as descriptive ethis, however, chi i not considered an area of moral philosophy. Descriptive ethics endeavors t People think about right and wrong, how they behave, As such, it incorporates rescarches from the fic and history as part of the process of understa or believe in. But it is not considered a philos to establish what should be the case—what should regulate human acts, how we should v to establish whar the case is, It attempts to © present to us what or how they reason about ethics. ds of anthropology, psychology, sociology, nding the moral norms that people follow ‘ophical study of ethics since it does not aim People ought to do, what moral standards iew morality. Rather, descriptive ethics aims describe or explain the world rather than ow people in fact live, Like anthropology, sociology it Se the set of moral belicf defensibility of moral ju igments,Normative statements differ from factual statements in the way they are justified confirmed, or assessed. We appeal to certain standards when we deal with normative statements. On the other hand, we appeal to the results of research, experiment, of observation when we deal with factual statements. It can be noticed on the above examples that normative statements are of various kinds, not only those pertaining to morality. Some pertain to the standards of visual arts, grammar, law, etiquette, religion, etc. We will elaborate on the distinction of moral statements from these other normative statements in the next section. Here, we will focus mainly on the normative nature of moral claims, Since a moral statement is a normative statement rather than a factual one, it cannot be justified by merely appealing to facts, empirical evidences, or data. Although providing facts may be significant in justifying a moral claim, this remains insufficient. Consider the following argument: According to a study of ten countries that enforce the death penalty, the rate of criminality in these countries went down after it has been enforced. Therefore, it is morally right to enforce the death penalty. ‘The premise supporting the above moral claim is a statement of fact. This statement is established by gathering statistical data to arrive at a factual claim. However, to make a moral conclusion that imposing the death penalty is right needs more than merely providing a factual statement or information. There is a need to connect the factual statement with the moral conclusion by supplying certain moral standards or principles such as “An ac right if it promotes the greater good of the people.” Thus, the moral argument should be: Imposing the death penalty will lower the rate of eriminality in our society and thus will be beneficial to the greater nusmber of people. ‘An act is right if it promotes the greater good of the greater number: Therefore, imposing the death penalty is right The moral principle (second statement) added as a premise in the argument is not factual by nature. It was not derived from appealing to research or experiment. But without citing this moral standard, the fact that death penalty has brought down the rate of criminality in countries that have imposed it, cannot suffice to justify that death penalty should be imposed This poine can be explained more by stating that though some people may also accept or agree with the fact that death penalty can reduce the rate of criminality in our society, they still hold that it is morally wrong to impose the death penalty as they believe that the right to life of a human being is sacted and inviolable. Thus, despite the greater good to society that the imposition of death penalty may People expressing their stand on the issue of death penalty bring about, others would. still regard it as morally unacceptable.the wider principle of showing respect to people. In Islamic societies, stand; -jlarly her chest. Thus, some ss call for a woman to cover her body, partic d neck and falls below the level ofthe men cs ul wear hijab ot a scarf that covers the head an me .o follow this practice believe that j deny it to cover the upper chest area, Muslims Ichough there is nothing immoral ral for a women's dignity and promate modesty: AI Muslim woman to wear sleeveless blouse of skimpy clothes, appearing in such an ou fe q fit in a Muslim community may well be so offensive that it is morally insensitive or scandal, ‘Ous, Morality and Law Like etiquette, law also regulates human conduct, which is why it is often confused wi k, deceive another person, or take what is a ‘ot morality. We ought not to exploit the weaky al i ours because these acts are morally and legally wronB- The mofal imperative not to kill. der or homicide, person coincides with the legal imperative not (0 commit mut Fa moraiy, however, are different. Braking he Jaw is not always an immoral ay, just as following the law is not necessarily doing what is morally right. Lec us take an example rq illustrate this point. Suppose your mother suffered a hear attack and she needed to be brought nd rushed her to the hospital driving to the hospital immediately. You took her in your car al : at a speed of 100 kph, Although you are prohibited by law to drive at more than 60 kph on that road, it does not seem morally right for you tO follow the law and drive ar chat speed limit knowing that doing so will jeopardize the life of your mother. Driving the car at that speed may break the law, but is morally right. Tt can also be said that an acti abortion may be legal in a particular country, to commit an abortion remains an issues thus, or demonstration urging the state (0 respect the right to li Janet Napoles, the alleged mastermind behind the Priorit Fund (PDAF) scams, repeatedly invoked the right © self-incrimination, chus evading the questions and being ium on what he knew about the politicians who were involved in corruption. It may be legal to remain silent rather than to tell che crutch, but such act jeopardizes truth and justice, and thus is morally questionable. In those cases, it is clear that certain actions may be in accordance to the law, but not morally right. Despite their differences, how are law and morality related to each other? We can say that in many cases; laws are based on morality. We determine what laws to adopt or enact on the basis of certain mora nip RA 9211 or the Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003 which prohibits people from smoking in public places is based on the moral principle of the greater good for the greater number, Since law is derived from morali I id to equate what is lawful with what is moral. To a significant degree, | v codst Pe saa moral ideals and values. But we should not see what is lawful 7 vi i oe el for as pointed our by Shaw (2002), “law cannot cover the wi se what is moral as identical for up conduct, and in many situations tis 00 bl ide rai of yosihe indi juidance” (p- 6) Laws may be enacted, amended junt an instrument to provide moral vested interests, and may not really be beneficial ‘oi eon by legislators to protect their May the Ant-Poiicl Dynasy bill which aime co aera tee ove the concentration of political ‘on that is legal can be morally wrong. For instance, bur the question whether it is morally right some of its citizens may stage a protest fe of the unborn. Or when ty Development AssistanceGiven this understanding of what morality is, how does ethics differ from morality? Although sometimes used to refer to one’s set of moral beliefs and practices, strictly speaking, ethics is the discipline that examines the moral standards of an individual or a society. In a sense, ethics is a study of morality. It looks into the soundness, reasonableness, and appropriateness of the moral standards a person ora society espouses. It is one thing to accept or adopt a set of moral standards, it is another thing to reflect on and examine these standards. Thus, a person engages in ethics when he/she reflects on the moral standards he/she has imbibed from his/her family, church, and friends, and asks: “Are these standards reasonable? Are these practices morally permissible? Are we justified to do this or that?” As mentioned above, morality begins to form in childhood, which is a time when we usually unquestioningly and mechanically accept what is taught co us with regard to what is right and wrong. Thus, it is important that, as we mature in reason, we subject our moral beliefs and practices to a reflective analysis, We ought to question those moral standards that we simply acquired in the past without any critical inquiry. We need to espouse only those standards which are supported by good reasons, It is here where the enterprise of ethics comes in. Just as what other philosophical disciplines do, it invites us to exercise self-awareness and self-criticism with regard to our own fundamental views and beliefs about morality. In guiding us in evaluating our own moral beliefs and standards, ethics aims to shed light on the basic questions such as what is right conduct, what principles should govern our moral decision-making, and what basically is a good life. Ethics is not limited to particular moral actions and practices, but it concerns itself with the whole of moral ideals and behaviors. Areas of Ethics Asa branch of philosophy that examines and reflects about morality, ethics is usually categorized into three general subject areas: metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. Metaethics, also known as analytic ethics, looks into the nature, meaning, scope, and foundations of moral values and discourses. The term “meta” means afier or Leyond; and, thus, metaethics involves an abstract and detached way of thinking philosophically about morality. It attempts to shed light on the basic ideas, concepts, and assumptions that underlie our moral beliefs and judgments. If the other two areas focus directly on the question what is moral, metaethics focuses on the more fundamental question what morality itself is in the first place. For this reason, metaethics is also occasionally referred to as “second-order” moral theorizing, to distinguish it from the “first-order” level of normative theory. The first part of this book is devoted to metaethics as it inquires about fundamental queries on morality—What is the nature of moral claims? How is morality distinct from other normative standards? Is morality objective or relative? Who have moral rights? What does it mean to be morally accountable? Metaethical positions respond to these questions by examining the basic meanings, ideas and connotations involved in moral discourse. They shed light on issues pertaining to the status of moral beliefs and judgments, the conditions of moral personhood and accountability, and other concepts that lie underneath the subject of morality.we raised earlier against equating morality with religion, We do not live up to our status as a rational being if what is right or wrong simply depends on one’s social or cultural norms, Moreover, moral progress will also be compromised if we follow the thesis of ethical relativism. If the rightness or wrongness of actions is judged solely on the basis of a culture’s norms, how then can members of that society criticize these an Fog norms on moral grounds? How can they Affican shaves processing sugar cane on the Caribbean argue that the existing norms should be ‘hand of bhipanila changed? We know that certain social changes are needed for the betterment of society as we acknowledge certain inadequacies in our moral traditions. For society to achieve moral progress, it has to be self-critical and put its own social norms into question. In many societies, the soundness of practices and laws that discriminate against women, such as honor killing or child marriages must be challenged. This can only be done if social norms themselves can be subjected to critical scrutiny, rather than regarded as the ultimate basis of morality. Our ability to question our social norms has made us overcome the inhuman practices of slavery in pre-Civil War United States, apartheid in South Africa, and the unfair denial of Right ro Suffrage for women in the Philippines. The third point raised against ethical relativism, and perhaps the strongest argument to refute it lies on the assertion that despite the fact that some moral beliefs and practices vary among cultures, there are stil universal moral standards that exist. Though people have different cultures, customs, traditions, religions, and ideologies, they still have something in common emanating from their shared humanity. Respect for life, pursuit for truth and justice, desire for peace, to cite some, are values that all human persons, no matter how primitive or sophisticated their culrure or civilization is, would recognize and acknowledge as worth pursuing, Imagine what it would be like for a society to place no value at all on truth telling; communication would be extremely difficult. How could any group or tribe survive if there is no regard to the preciousness of life or no prohibition on murder? Suppose society does not refrain people from killing others. No one will fel safe in such society and eventually, such society will collapse. In relation to this, critics of relativism claim that indeed, societies may differ in their cultural practices, but the fundamental moral principles underlying these practices do not. Consider the Buddhist practice of refraining from eating the meat of animals. Ie seems their moral values differ from non-Buddhist people. Buc itis important to look into the reason why they do not consume animals. Suppose it is because they believe that after death the souls of humans inhabic the bodies of animals so that ic is possible thar their loved ones may be in those animals. Can we say their moral values are different from those of non-Buddhists? No. The difference lies in their religious beliefs, not in their moral values. Everyone, Buddhist and non-Buddhist, believes that it is wrong to eat our lovedgiven to support the theory as expressed in such arguments known as dependency argument, diversity argument, and toleration argument. However, the theory has been rejected based on the following points: the fallacy of inferring relativism from the fact of diversity, the negative implications of the theory on the validity of moral judgment and the idea of moral progress, and the claim that universal moral standards exist. [Review Questions yeep 1, Distinguish ethics from morality. Identify and differentiate the three general subject areas in ethics. How does ethics differ from other studies about morality? Define ethical relativism and discuss three arguments that support this theory. Identify and explain the points raised against ethical relativism. Discussion Questions Think of moral beliefs that you have held on from childhood but come to question when you grew older. What were the sources of these belicfs? Whar made you question these beliefs as you mature in life? Cite specific socio-political issues in our sociery today. Which among these would you consider as moral issues? Explain. Should our lavs be always founded in morality or only to a certain extent? Exphin. Does morality vary from one culture to another? Should it be based on the social or cultural norm of the society? Defend your answer. Consider certain practices that are accepted in one religion, but rejected in another. Is the difference a matter of religious belief or of moral principle? Explain.cultural ethical relativism has been considered the more acceptable and reasonable version and it will be the main focus of this section. But let us briefly say something about individual ethical relativism, and why it has gained little support. Individual ethical relativism holds that the basis of what is morally right or wrong ultimately lies on the person's own standard, and there is no objective standard outside the individual's perspective by which his/her moral belief or standard can be judged. According to this view, a moral judgment or claim merely implies an attitude, opinion, preference or feeling held by someone. Although social and cultural factors can come to play in the formation of one's personal attitudes and preferences, what the theory recognizes is that they constitute the individual’s notion of what is morally right and wrong, In the end, the individual is left with a personal standard of morality. In individual ethical relativism, an act is morally right or wrong depending on the approval ot disapproval of the person of interest. In this line of thought, deceiving customers to gain profit from a business may be morally right for one but morally wrong for another. But objectively, it is neither right nor wrong, It is different from one individual to another. In a way, this form of relativism follows the view of Protagoras, expressed in his famous statement “man is the measure of all things,” which holds that there are as many distinct scales of good and evil as there are subjects in the world. Though individual ethical relativism stands on basic arguments that also support cultural ethical relativism, the former encounters strong resistance from different camps, even from cultural relativists themselves, due to its radical stance on the subjectivism of morality. Often, those who oppose this view would say thar treating moral judgments like taste or aesthetic judgments which are relative to the individual renders morality a useless concept, since little or no interpersonal criticism or judgment is possible. Suppose you heard a news of a policeman killing a suspected teenage drug-user, and were repulsed by such act. Following individual ethical relativism, you cannot condemn the officer if his ethical belief is that it is permissible to kill people who have become dependent on illegal drugs to solve the drug problem in our society. In the same way, we are not in a position to judge Adolf Hitler's obsession to annihilate the Jews as morally wrong. In fact, on the basis of ethical subjectivism, Hitler could be considered as moral as Gandhi, so long as each lived by his own standards. Each individual person is the measure of moral judgment. But such view is difficult for a rational mind to accept since it contradicts the very concept of morality it is supposed to characterize. Morality has to do with resolving interpersonal dispute or conflict among individuals in order to promote the good life. It aims to prevent a Hobbesian state of nacure wherein life is “solitary, nasty, poor, brutish and short.” However, in individual ethical relativism morality cannot do this for there is no interpersonal basis by which to judge whether an act is morally good or bad, right or wrong. Conventionalism is different from subjectivism since it recognizes the social nature of morality. Although it rejects the existence of universal moral principles, it claims that there are valid moral principles justified by virtue of their cultural acceptance. The rightness cor wrongness of an act is based on the cultural or social norms of the people in which it is done and judged. The Muslim's practice of polygamy, for instance, should be judgedFrom the fact of moral diversity, the relativists derive the Dependency Argument which lies on the view that moral beliefs are true or valid only relative to certain groups. An individual's culcural norms, of which religious traditions are a part of, affect his/her views of right and wrong. Hence, one’s moral beliefs are basically products of his/her particular social environment. According to Pojman (1999, 29), “morality does not exist on a vacuum; rather, what is considered morally right or wrong must be seen in a context, depending on the goals, wants, beliefs, history, and environment of the society in question.” The point here is that we cannot see things from an independent, noncultural view point. We are simply culturally- determined creatures, This line of reasoning leads to the assertion that all knowledge and understanding are relative, Harris, however, clarifies that there are two versions of such assertion. In its strongest version, this position claims that all truth, even in the natural sciences, is relative to the culture and conceptual framework within which it is expressed. In some cultures, magic occupies the place that science occupies in our society. Strong relativists would claim that we cannot say that science is right and magic wrong: rather, each is appropriate to, and to be judged only in terms of, the culture in which it is situated, The moderate version of relativism makes a slighdy more modest claim. It says that the meaning of human behavior is always relative to the culture in which it occurs. Eating dog is part of the culture of the people of Sagada, a town in the Philippines’ Mountain Province, and is widely practiced in the country’s Cordillera region. However, other societies—even within the Philippines—consider killing dogs as cruelty to animals and is, thus, morally wrong, In most societies, killing cows is acceptable, but in India such act is a sacrilege. The meaning of the act is different, depending on the sociery. Consequently, the relativist argues, the moral dimension of our actions is similarly dependent on cultural context for meaning, Morality is basically just the set of common nules, habits, and customs that have earned social approval over time. Every morality depends on a level of social acceptance, Cultural ethical relativism is also justified by the view that acknowledging the differences among various societies in terms of their moral beliefs and practices leads to respect, social harmony, and peaceful co-existence among the different cultural, religious, and social groups. This is what is known as the soleration argument. According to this reasoning, relativism may be the right way of looking at morality since it offers the promise of tolerance and understanding, attitudes that most of us value highly. Early anthropology was absolutist, measuring the entire world in terms of its own standards and generally finding the rest of the world lacking. Thus, anchropologisis in the past would often refer to the peoples they studied as “barbarians” or “primitive societies.” But as time went on, the discipline made progress as it moved towards a more relativistic stance recognizing that societies different from one’s own are not necessarily primitive or inferior. Each society is to be judged in terms of its own standards, rather than in terms of other people's ethnocentric expectations. Given the many forms of conflicts among various cultures, religions, and ideologies today that often result to violence and oppression, the tolerant, non-judgmental attitude of respecting and recognizing the validity of cultural beliefs other than one’s own has become more relevant. Anthropologist Ruth Benedict states this idea forcefully at the end of her influential work Patterns of Culture, when she expresses her hope thar, on the basisWhat distinguishes this meta. only within their own religious beliefs and norms: hig f morality does nor simply lie gy a view from subjectivism, however, is that the basis 0 vity ¢ ON the individual’s moral belief or inclination, but goes beyond it. The moral standards lig ce the social norms of the people. Thus, even if the person els peony believe the abortion may be done in cases of rape ot incest, the act may sti I be morally Wrong if i, does not conform with the social standards in which the act is done. Given the socig, agreement principle it holds, it provides an incersubjecive bass of huding Moral actions which makes it overcome the objections raised against ethical subjectivism. In the sectj ion, A ionalism and the a ‘i we will look closely into the strengths of ethical conventionalism and’ the arguments thar justify this theory. The Attractions of Ethical Relativism People are drawn to cultural ethical relativism three main arguments to support this particula! the Dependency Argument, and the Toleration Argument. rp, The Diversity Argument is premised on the factual or simp cin = moral beliefs and moral rules vary from culture to culture. Anthropologi have obs ved a range of practices considered morally acceptable in some societies, but con emned in others. As mentioned above, Muslim societies practice polygamy, while the Christia consider ir wrong, Some cultures accept homosexual union, while other cultures condemn it. Abortion is permissible in some countries, but is not a ceptable in other countries, Itis interesting to note certain practices of the Eskimo people: Eskimo customs allow infanticide which is condemnable to cultures; they also leave old people for several reasons. We will focus on the doctrine, namely the Diversity Argumen, most who are too feeble to contribute to the family out in the snow to die. But to many anthropologists, there is nothing particularly surprising about the Eskimos. Given their observation of various societies around the world, they have been accustomed to the idea that conceptions of right and wrong. differ from culture to culture. What is good east of the river may be bad west of the river, These different practices illustrate the diversity of moral beliefs in various cultures; even in the same culture moral views and practices vary over time. In the Philippines, Filipino women were not allowed to vote in national elections before, but today it is wrong to deny them of the right to suffrage. In the United States, slavery is now viewed as immoral whereas just over a hundred years ago, it was not. Societies over the world have greatly altered their moral views on various matters such as abortion, same-sex marriage, euthanasia, and seul aret For the relativists, the only adequate way to explain the differences of moral beliefs and practices across culture and is relative. across time is to accept that morality