Robert M. Morgan & Shelby D.

Hunt

The Commitment-Trust Theory

of Relationship Marketing
Relationship marketing-establishing, developing, and maintaining successful relational exchanges-constitutes a
major shift in marketing theory and practice. After conceptualizing relationship marketing and discussing its ten
forms, the authors (1) theorize that successful relationship marketing requires relationship commitment and trust, (2)
model relationship commitment and trust as key mediating variables, (3) test this key mediating variable model
using data from automobile tire retailers, and (4) compare their model with a rival that does not allow relationship
commitment and trust to function as mediating variables. Given the favorable test results for the key mediating
variable model, suggestions for further explicating and testing it are offered.

The cooperative aspect of economic behavior has forecasts the rise of "true marketing companies"
been relatively neglected. Economists speak of
competitive theory, of pure and perfect competition. within networks of functionally specialized
There is no corresponding development of organizations whose interrelationships, being
cooperative theory, of pure and perfect cooperation norm driven, are ''held together and coordinated
(Alderson 1965, p. 239).
by market driven focal organizations" by means of
One of the most salient factors in the effectiveness of "norms of sharing and commitment based on
our present complex social organization is the trust.'' These global dynamics have resulted in the
willingness of one or more individuals in a social unit
to trust others. The efficiency, adjustment, and even
somewhat paradoxical nature of relationship
survival of any social group depends upon the marketing: To be an effective competitor (in the
presence or absence of such trust (Rotter 1967, p. global economy) requires one to be a trusted
651).
cooperator (in some network). As McKinsey & Co.

T he past decade has witnessed the inception

of a major directional change in both
marketing theory and practice. Considered by
strategists put it (Bleeke and Ernst 1993, p. 1),
"For most global businesses, the days of flat-out,
predatory competition are over. ... In place of
Webster (1992, p. 1) to represent a "fundamental predation, many multinational companies are
reshaping of the field" and by others to be a learning that they must collaborate to compete."
genuine paradigm shift (Kotler 1991; Parvatiyar, Business ethicists also stress that competition
Sheth, and Whittington 1992), the tum is toward requires cooperation (Solomon 1992, p. 26):
relationship marketing, a concept that
encompasses relational contracting (MacNeil However competitive a particular industry may be, it
always rests on a foundation of shared interests and
1980), relational marketing (Dwyer, Schurr, and mutually agreed-upon rules of conduct, and the
Oh competition takes place not in a jungle but in a
society that it presumably both serves and depends
1987), working partnerships (Anderson and Narus upon. Business life, unlike life in the mythological
jungle, is first of all fundamentally cooperative. It is
1990), symbiotic marketing (Varadarajan and only with the bounds of mutually shared concerns
Rajaratnam 1986), strategic alliances (Day 1990), that competition is possible. And quite the contrary
co-marketing alliances (Bucklin and Sengupta to the 'everyone for himself metaphor, business
almost always involves large cooperative and
1993 ), and internal marketing (Arndt 1983; Berry mutually trusting groups, not only corporations
and Parasuraman 1991). Relationship marketing is themselves but networks of suppliers, service people,
part of the developing ''network paradigm,'' which customers, and investors. (Emphasis in original.)
recognizes that global competition occurs We explore the nature of relationship
increasingly between networks of firms (Thorelli marketing and two key characteristics posited to
1986, p. 47). Indeed, Achrol (1991, p. 78, 89)

1
be associated with the effective cooperation that is customers, as particularly recommended in the services
required for relationship marketing success. First, marketing area (Berry 1983); (7) relational exchanges
we examine the nature of relationship marketing of working partnerships, as in channels of distribution
and suggest how this construct should be (Anderson and Narus
conceptualized. Second, we theorize that 1990); (8) exchanges involving functional departments
successful relationship marketing requires (Ruekert and Walker 1987); (9) exchanges between a
relationship commitment and trust. Third, we firm and its employees, as in internal marketing (Arndt
model them as key mediating variables. Fourth, 1983; Berry and Parasuraman 1991); and (10) within-
we test this key mediating variable model using firm relational exchanges involving such business units
data from automobile tire retailers. Finally, we as subsidiaries, divisions, or strategic business units
compare our model with a rival that does not (Porter 1987).
allow relationship commitment and trust to Though adequately conceptualizing relationship
function as mediating variables. marketing requires a definition that accommodates all
forms of relational exchanges, extant definitions cover
The Nature of Relationship some kinds but not others. For example, in the services
marketing area, Berry (1983, p. 25) states,
Marketing ''Relationship marketing is attracting, maintaining and-
Understanding relationship marketing requires in multi-service organizationsenhancing customer
distinguishing between the discrete transaction, which relationships" and Berry and Parasuraman (1991, p.
has a "distinct beginning, short duration, and sharp 133) propose that "relationship marketing concerns
ending by performance," and relational exchange, attracting, developing, and retaining customer
which "traces to previous agreements [and] ... is longer relationships." In industrial marketing, Jackson (1985,
in duration, reflecting an ongoing process" (Dwyer, p. 2) refers to relationship marketing as ''marketing
Schurr, and Oh 1987, p. 13). Categorized with oriented toward strong, lasting relationships with
reference to a focal firm and its relational exchanges in individual accounts." Paul (1988) adopts Jackson's
supplier, lateral, buyer, and internal partnerships, view in the health care marketing area, as does O'Neal
Figure 1 shows ten discrete forms of relationship (1989) in his discus-
marketing: (1) the partnering involved in relational
exchanges between manufacturers and their goods'
suppliers, as in "just-in-time" procurement and "total The Commitment-Trust Theory/
quality management" (Frazier, Spekman, and O'Neal

E3-
1988; O'Neal 1989); (2) relational exchanges involving
service providers, as between advertising or marketing
research agencies and their respective clients
(Beltramini and Pitta 1991; Moorman, Zaltman, and +
Deshpande 1992); (3) strategic alliances between firms
and their competitors, as in technology alliances
(Nueno and Oosterveld 1988); co-marketing alliances

(Bucklin and Sengupta 1993); and global strategic

alliances (Ohmae 1989); (4) alliances between a firm
and nonprofit organizations, as in public purpose
partnerships (Steckel and Simons 1992); (5)
partnerships for joint research and <level- sions of "JIT procurement." Doyle and Roth (1992, p.
59) indicate that ''the goal of relationship selling is to
Buyer Partnerships earn the position of preferred supplier by developing
trust in key accounts over a period of time.'' Definitions
similar to the preceding can be found in the areas of
opment, as between firms and local, state, or national
bank marketing, advertising, and business strategy
governments (Comer, O'Keefe, and Chilenskas 1980);
(Beltramini and Pitta 1991; Prince 1989; Spekman and
(6) longterm exchanges between firms and ultimate
Johnston 1986). Conspicuously missing from all extant

2
definitions of relationship marketing is the specific Our theory implies what we label the key mediating
recognition that many instances of relationship variable (KMV) model of relationship marketing
marketing do not have a "customer" as one of the (Figure 2), which focuses on one party in the relational
exchange participants. Strictly speaking, in strategic exchange and that party's relationship commitment and
alliances between competitors, partnerships between trust. Because we hypothesize that relationship
firms and government in public-purpose partnerships, commitment and trust are key
and internal marketing, there are neither "buyers,"
"sellers," "customers," nor "key accounts"-only constructs, we position them as mediating variables
partners exchanging resources. Therefore, to cover all between five important antecedents (i.e., relationship
forms of relational exchange and focus on the process termination costs, relationship benefits, shared values,
of relationship marketing, as stressed by Dwyer, communication, and opportunistic behavior) and five
Schurr, and Oh (1987), we propose the following: outcomes (i.e., acquiescence, propensity to leave,
Relationship marketing refers to all marketing activities cooperation, functional conflict, and decision-making
directed toward establishing, developing, and uncertainty).
maintaining successful relational exchanges. Relationship Commitment
Drawing on the conceptualizations of commitment in
The Commitment-Trust Theory social exchange (Cook and Emerson 1978), marriage
Drawing on the political economy paradigm, Thorelli (Thompson and Spanier 1983 ), and organizations
(1986, p. 38) maintains, "Power is the central concept (Meyer and Allen 1984), we define relationship
in network analysis" because its "mere existence" can commitment as an exchange partner believing that an
"condition others.'' In contrast, keeping in mind that ongoing relationship with another is so important as to
roughly onethird of such ventures as strategic alliances warrant maximum efforts at maintaining it; that is, the
are outright fail- committed party believes the relationship is worth
working on to ensure that it endures indefinitely. Our
definition corresponds almost exactly with that
/Journal of Marketing, July 1994 developed by Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande
ures (Sherman 1992), we argue that what should be (1992, p. 316): "Commitment to the relationship is
central to understanding relationship marketing is defined as an enduring desire to maintain a valued
whatever distinguishes productive, effective, relational relationship." Their "valued relationship" corresponds
exchanges from those that are unproductive and with our belief that relationship commitment exists
ineffective-that is, whatever produces relationship only when the relationship is considered important.
marketing successes instead of failures. Though there Similarly, their ''enduring desire to maintain"
are no doubt many contextual factors that contribute to corresponds with our view that a committed partner
the success or failure of specific relationship marketing wants the relationship to endure indefinitely and is
efforts, we theorize that the presence of relationship willing to work at maintaining it.
commitment and trust is central to successful
relationship marketing, not power and its ability to We propose that relationship commitment is central
''condition others.'' Commitment and trust are ''key'' to relationship marketing. Though fairly new in
because they encourage marketers to (1) work at discussions of interorganizational relationships,
preserving relationship investments by cooperating commitment long has been central in the social
with exchange partners, (2) resist attractive short-term exchange literature (Blau 1964; Thibaut and Kelley
alternatives in favor of the expected long-term benefits 1959). Cook and Emerson (1978, p. 728) characterize
of staying with existing partners, and (3) view commitment as ''a variable we believe to be central in
potentially high-risk actions as being prudent because distinguishing social from economic exchange.'' More
of the belief that their partners will not act specifically, in the marriage literature, McDonald
opportunistically. Therefore, when both commitment (1981, p. 836) concludes, ''Clearly, the major
and trustnot just one or the other-are present, they differentiation of these exchange relationship types ...
produce outcomes that promote efficiency, is the mutual social trust and the resultant commitment
productivity, and effectiveness. In short, commitment on the part of the individuals to establish and maintain
and trust lead directly to cooperative behaviors that are exchange relationships.''
conducive to relationship marketing success.

3
 Commitment also is viewed as critical in the Trust
literatures of organizational and buyer behavior. We conceptualize trust as existing when one party has
Organizational commitment-one type of relationship confidence in an exchange partner's reliability and
commitment that is critical to the firm in its internal integrity. Again, our definition parallels that of
relationships-is among the oldest (Becker 1960) and Moorman, Deshpande, and Zaltman (1993, p. 82):
most studied (Reichers 1985) variables in "Trust is defined as a willingness to rely on an
organizational behavior theory. In this context, exchange partner in whom one has confidence." Both
commitment is seen as central because it not only leads definitions draw on Rotter's (1967, p. 651) classic view
to such important outcomes as decreased turnover that trust is "a generalized expectancy held by an
(Porter et al. 1974), higher motivation (Farrell and individual that the word of another ... can be relied on.''
Rusbult 1981), and increased organizational citizenship Both definitions also highlight the importance of
behaviors (Williams and Anderson 1991 ), but it also confidence. The literature on trust suggests that
results from such things that can be influenced by the confidence on the part of the trusting party results from
firm as recruiting and training practices (Caldwell, the firm belief that the trustworthy party is reliable and
Chatman, and O'Reilly 1990), job equity (Williams and has high integrity, which are associated with such
Hazer 1986), and organizational support (Eisenberger, qualities as consistent, competent, honest, fair,
Fasolo, and Davis-LaMastro 1990). responsible, helpful, and benevolent (Altman and
Taylor 1973; Dwyer and LaGace 1986; Larzelere and
In the services relationship marketing area, Berry and
Huston 1980; Rotter 1971). Anderson and Narus (1990,
Parasuraman (1991, p. 139) maintain that
p. 45) focus on the perceived outcomes of trust when
"Relationships are built on the foundation of mutual
they define it as "the firm's belief that another company
commitment.'' Similarly, the process through which
will perform actions that will result in positive
consumers become loyal to specific brands has been
outcomes for the firm as well as not take unexpected
widely discussed. Initially, loyalty was viewed as
actions that result in negative outcomes.'' Indeed, we
simply repeat buying. However, as the field of
would expect such outcomes from a partner on whose
consumer behavior matured, researchers came to
integrity one can rely confidently.
realize that ''repurchase is not sufficient evidence of
brand loyalty" (Newman and Werbel 1973, p. 404) and Absent from our definition of trust is the behavioral
that such measures as purchase patterns included much intention of "willingness" incorporated by Moorman,
''spurious loyalty" (Day 1970). As brand attitude Deshpande, and Zaltman. They argue that this
becomes central to the repurchase decision in relational behavioral intention is a critical facet of trust's
exchange, brand loyalty becomes increasingly similar conceptualization because ''if one believes that a
to our conceptualization of commitment. In fact, Assael partner is trustworthy without being willing to rely on
(1987, p. 665) defines brand loyalty as "commitment to that partner, trust is limited" (p. 315). We argue that
a certain brand" arising from certain positive attitudes. willingness to act is implicit in the conceptualization of
Manufacturers see brand loyalty as key to superior trust and, therefore, one could not label a trading
performance and make efforts to build it through partner as "trustworthy" if one were not willing to take
providing superior benefits, promoting the firm's values actions that otherwise would entail risk. More simply,
(e.g, "green marketing," corporate philanthropy), and genuine confidence that a partner can rely on another
establishing an image as a trustworthy manufacturer. indeed will imply the behavioral intention to rely. If
one is confident, then
A common theme emerges from the various
literatures on relationships: Parties identify
commitment among exchange partners as key to The Commitment-Trust Theory/
achieving valuable outcomes for themselves, and they one would be willing; if one is not willing, then
endeavor to develop and maintain this precious one is not genuinely confident. We believe that,
attribute in their relationships. Therefore, we theorize though it certainly would be appropriate to have
that commitment is central to all the relational items incorporating "stated willingness' ' in a
exchanges between the firm and its various partners in
measure of trust, willingness is unnecessary or
Figure
redundant in its definition. Thus, just as
1. behavioral intention is best viewed as an outcome
of attitude and not as part of its definition

4
(Fishbein and Ajzen 1975), "willingness to rely" Trust Influences Relationship Commitment
should be viewed as an outcome (or, alternatively, Trust is so important to relational exchange that
a potential indicator) of trust and not as a part of Spekman (1988, p. 79) postulates it to be "the
how one defines it. cornerstone of the strategic partnership.'' Why?
Because relationships characterized by trust are so
Like commitment, trust also has been studied highly valued that parties will desire to commit
widely in the social exchange literature (Fox themselves to such relationships (Hrebiniak
1974; Scanzoni 1979) and others. For example, in 1974). Indeed, because commitment entails
organizational behavior, the study of ''norms of vulnerability, parties will seek only trustworthy
trust'' is considered a characteristic distinguishing partners. Social exchange theory explains this
management theory from organizational causal relationship through the principle of
economics (Barney 1990; Donaldson 1990a). In generalized reciprocity, which holds that ''mistrust
communications, a key construct has been source breeds mistrust and as such would also serve to
credibility, originally defined by Hovland, Janis, decrease commitment in the relationship and shift
and Kelley (1953) as trust of the speaker by the the transaction to one of more direct short-term
listener. In services marketing, Berry and exchanges" (McDonald 1981, p. 834). Therefore,
Parasuraman (1991, p. 144) find that "customer- we posit, as does Achrol (1991), that trust is a
company relationships require trust." Indeed, they major determinant of relationship commitment.
contend (p. 107), "Effective services marketing Corroborat-
depends on the management of trust because the
customer typically must buy a service before
experiencing it.'' In strategic alliances, Sherman I Journal of Marketing, July 1994
(1992, p. 78) concludes that "the biggest ing our hypothesis, Moorman, Zaltman, and
stumbling block to the success of alliances is the Deshpande (1992) find that trust by marketing
lack of trust.'' In retailing, Berry (1993, p. 1) research users in their research providers
stresses that "trust is the basis for loyalty." In significantly affected user commitment to the
automobile marketing, Saturn stresses research relationship.
"partnerships in which everyone shared risks and Precursors of Relationship Commitment and Trust
rewards,'' which emphasizes "win-win role Drawing on two decades of theory and empirical
playing games stressing mutual trust" (Advertising research on commitment in organization behavior
Age 1992, p. 13), and competing with Japanese (see reviews by Reichers 1986; Mathieu and Zajac
automakers, says Ford Motor Company, requires 1990) and the recently developing commitment
relationships with its suppliers in which "there's a and trust literature in marketing, we identify five
spirit of trust" (Business Week 1992, p. 27). In major precursors of relationship commitment and
buyer-seller bargaining situations, Schurr and trust. Specifically, as shown in Figure 2, we posit
Ozanne ( 1985) find trust to be central to the that (1) relationship termination costs and
process of achieving cooperative problem solving relationship benefits directly influence
and constructive dialogue. As in the commitment, (2) shared values directly influence
organizational context mentioned previously, they both commitment and trust, and (3)
also find trust to lead to higher levels of loyalty communication and opportunistic behavior
(i.e., commitment) to the bargaining partner. directly influence trust (and, through trust,
Finally, trust is viewed as central in studies indirectly influence commitment).
conducted by the Industrial Marketing and
Purchasing Group (Ford 1990 and Hakansson Relationship termination costs. A common
1982). Therefore, we theorize that trust is central assumption in the relationship marketing literature
to all relational exchanges in Figure 1. is that a terminated party will seek an alternative
relationship and have "switching costs," which
lead to dependence (Heide and John 1988;

5
Jackson 1985). Such costs are exacerbated by establishing, developing, and maintaining
idiosyncratic investments, that is, investments that relationships with such partners. Malcolm
are difficult to switch to another relationship Baldrige Award winner Motorola recognizes the
(Heide and John 1988). Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh ''two-way street" characteristic of relational
(1987, p. 14) propose that "the buyer's anticipation exchange and conducts quarterly confidential
of high switching costs gives rise to the buyer's surveys of major suppliers to track its own
interest in maintaining a quality relationship." performance at providing benefits to its exchange
However, it is certainly possible that no ''switch'' partners (Moody 1992). Therefore, we posit that
would occur after the relationship dissolves. For firms that receive superior benefits from their
example, a terminated distributor or retailer might partnership-relative to other options-on such
decide (willingly or unwillingly) to discontinue dimensions as product profitability, customer
carrying an entire line of merchandise. Even satisfaction, and product performance, will be
though no alternative relationship is established committed to the relationship.
(and no switch is made), there nevertheless will be
Shared values. Shared values, the only concept
costs incurred from termination. Termination
that we posit as being a direct precursor of both
costs are, therefore, all expected losses from
relationship commitment and trust, is the extent to
termination and result from the perceived lack of
which partners have beliefs in common about
comparable potential alternative partners,
what behaviors, goals, and policies are important
relationship dissolution expenses, and/or
or unimportant, appropriate or inappropriate, and
substantial switching costs. These expected
right or wrong. For example, Heide and John's
termination costs lead to an ongoing relationship
(1992) "norms," because they refer to "appropriate
being viewed as important, thus generating
actions," are shared values. Similarly, Dwyer,
commitment to the relationship. The "expected" in
Schurr, and Oh (1987, p. 21) theorize that shared
our conceptualization emphasizes that many
values contribute to the development of
business relationships are characterized by great
commitment and trust.
uncertainty. Indeed, facing termination costs that
are actually very high, a partner may be blissfully Values are fundamental to definitions of
unaware of this fact and not be committed to the organizational culture (Enz 1988; Weiner 1988).
trading partner. Conversely, facing total costs that Schein (1990, p. 111) holds that we can
are actually very low, a partner unfoundedly may "distinguish three fundamental levels at which
fear being terminated and be committed. Thus, it culture manifests itself: (a) observable artifacts,
is the expectation of total costs that produces (b) values, and (c) basic underlying assumptions."
commitment. Values reflect culture when they are widely and
strongly held (Schein 1990; Weiner 1988).
Relationship benefits. Competition-particularly
Because it provides what many believe to be the
in the global marketplace-requires that firms
best measure of person-organization fit in
continually seek out products, processes, and
employment settings (Caldwell and O'Reilly 1990;
technologies that add value to their own offerings.
Chatman 1991), shared values has become a
Relationship marketing theory suggests that
variable of great interest to organizational
partner selection may be a critical element in
researchers, especially in the organizational
competitive strategy. As Webster (1991, p. 28)
commitment literature (Chatman 1991). Kelman's
notes for industrial marketers, "the firm's
(1961) seminal work hypothesized that people's
procurement strategy may be the most important
attitudes and behaviors result from (1) rewards or
ingredient in its ability to deliver superior value to
punishments, or "compliance"; (2) the desire to be
its customers" (emphasis in original). Because
associated with another person or group, or
partners that deliver superior benefits will be
"identification"; or (3) having the same values as
highly valued, firms will commit themselves to
another person or group, or ''internalization."

6
Hence, the organizational commitment literature analysis literature is defined as ''self-interest
often distinguishes between two kinds of seeking with guile'' (Williamson 1975, p. 6). As
commitment: (1) that brought about by a person such, "the essence of opportunistic behavior is
sharing, identifying with, or internalizing the deceit-oriented violation of implicit or explicit
values of the organization and (2) that brought promises about one's appropriate or required role
about by a cognitive evaluation of the behavior" (John 1984, p. 279). Because
instrumental worth of a continued relationship opportunistic behavior in organization economics
with the organization, that is, by adding up the ''is assumed in the fundamental axioms, rather
gains and losses, pluses and minuses, or rewards than treated contingently ... this is guilt by axiom"
and punishments. Consistent with the (Donaldson 1990b, p. 373). Even though guileful,
organizational behavior literature, we posit that self-interest maximization is axiomatic in
when exchange partners share values, they indeed transaction cost analysis, empirical research
will be more committed to their relationships, but indicates that human behavior may not be so
our definition of commitment is neutral to whether Machiavellian after all, especially not behavior in
it is brought about by instrumental or long-run relationships (Bonoma 1976; John 1984).
identification/internalization factors. As originally suggested by Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh
(1987), incorporating trust in models of
Communication. A major precursor of trust is
distribution channel relationships provides a
communication, which ''can be defined broadly as
unique vantage point for treating opportunism as
the formal as well as informal sharing of
an explanatory variable. Accordingly, we posit
meaningful and timely information between
that when a party believes that a partner engages
firms" (Anderson and Narus 1990, p. 44).
in opportunistic behavior, such perceptions will
Communication, especially timely communication
lead to decreased trust. Rather than positing a
(Moorman, Deshpande, and Zaltman 1993),
direct effect from opportunistic behavior to
fosters trust by assisting in resolving disputes and
relationship commitment, we postulate that such
aligning perceptions and expectations (Etgar
behavior results in decreased relationship
1979). Anderson and Narus (1990) note that past
commitment because partners believe they can no
communication is an antecedent of trust, but ''In
longer trust their partners.
subsequent periods ... this accumulation of trust
leads to better communication" (p. 45). Because Outcomes of Relationship Commitment and Trust
we, like Anderson and Narus, test our model at a Although, as components of the relationship
specific point in time, we posit that a partner's development process, relationship commitment
perception that past communications from another and trust are, per se, highly desirable "qualitative
party have been frequent and of high quality-that outcomes" (Mohr and Nevin 1990), we posit five
is, relevant, timely, and reliable-this will result in additional qualitative outcomes. First,
greater trust. Although "communication can be acquiescence and propensity to leave directly flow
described as the glue that holds together a channel from relationship commitment. Second, functional
of distribution, ... empirical research on channel conflict and uncertainty are the direct results of
communication is sparse" (Mohr and Nevin 1990, trust. Third, and most importantly, we propose
p. 36). Nonetheless, Anderson and Narus (1990) that cooperation arises directly from both
find that, from both the manufacturer's and relationship commitment and trust. We theorize
distributor's perspectives, past communication was that these outcomes, especially the crucial factor
positively related to trust. Anderson and Weitz of cooperation, promote relationship marketing
(1989) also find that communication was success. Because we model and test these
positively related to trust in channels. outcomes at a single point in time, we refer to the
partner's perceptions about these future outcomes
Opportunistic behavior. The concept of when commitment and trust are present.
opportunistic behavior from the transaction cost

7
 Acquiescence and propensity to leave. Harking back to the paradox of relationship
Drawing on the organizational behavior literature marketing, effective cooperation within a network
(Steers 1977), we define acquiescence as the promotes effective competition among networks.
degree to which a partner accepts or adheres to Therefore, cooperation promotes relationship
marketing success. Because conflictual behaviors can
another's specific requests or policies, and we
coexist temporally with cooperative actions,
posit
cooperation is not simply the absence of conflict
(Frazier 1983). For example, partners can have ongoing
The Commitment-Trust Theory I disputes about goals but continue to cooperate because
that relationship commitment positively influences both parties' relationship termination costs are high.
acquiescence, whereas trust influences acquiescence Nor is cooperation the same thing as acquiescence.
only through relationship commitment. Conceptually, Cooperation is proactive; acquiescence is reactive.
acquiescence parallels the performance outcome of Passively agreeing to advertise a partner's product is
compliance, as discussed by Kumar, Stem, and Achrol acquiescence; proactively suggesting better
(1992). Propensity to leave is the perceived likelihood advertisements is cooperation.
that a partner will terminate the relationship in the
Cooperation is the only outcome posited to be
(reasonably) near future (Bluedom 1982). We posit that
influenced directly by both relationship commitment
the strong negative relationship between organizational
and trust. A partner committed to the relationship will
commitment and propensity to leave the organization
cooperate with another member because of a desire to
(Mathieu and Zajac 1990) also will hold at the
make the relationship work. Both theory and empirical
interorganizational level. Just as excessive employee
evidence indicate that trust also leads to cooperation.
turnover is costly for employers, partnership instability
Deutsch's (1960) findings, using prisoner's dilemma
is costly. Therefore, ''stability'' is a desirable
experiments, suggest that the initiation of cooperation
performance outcome (Kumar, Stern, and Achrol 1992)
requires trust, and Pruitt (1981) suggests that a party
that we posit can be achieved through fostering
will undertake high-risk, coordinated behaviors if trust
commitment.
exists. Similarly, Anderson and Narus
Cooperation. Cooperation, from the Latin co, (1990, p. 45) state, "Once trust is established, firms
meaning learn
"together," and operari, "to work," refers to situations
in which parties work together to achieve mutual goals
(Anderson and Narus 1990). Even though coordination, /Journal of Marketing, July 1994
which implies cooperation, has been known to be that coordinated, joint efforts will lead to outcomes that
essential in such areas as channels of distribution for exceed what the firm would achieve if it acted solely in
decades, the marketing literature on relationships has its own best interests."
focused disproportionately on power and conflict as
focal constructs. For example, Stem and El-Ansary Functional conflict. There always will be
(1992, p. 312) point out that a "central theme" of disagreements or "conflict" in relational exchanges
channels of distribution theory and research is that (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987). The hostility and
''interorganizational coordination is required within a bitterness resulting from disagreements not being
marketing channel." But they go on to maintain that it resolved amicably can lead to such pathological
is the exercise of power that is crucial for much consequences as relationship dissolution. However,
coordination: when disputes are resolved amicably, such
disagreements can be referred to as "functional
"Power generally must be used in a marketing channel conflict," because they prevent stagnation, stimulate
to ... gain cooperation and induce satisfactory role interest and curiosity, and provide a ''medium through
performance." Why the focus on power? Because, as which problems can be aired and solutions arrived at"
the epigraph quote from Alderson reminds us, (Deutsch 1969, p. 19). Functional conflict, therefore,
marketers have long noted the absence of a theory that may increase productivity in relationship marketing
explains cooperation. The commitment-trust theory and be viewed as ''just another part of doing business"
contributes to that longsought goal. (Anderson and Narus 1990, p. 45). Several works
either propose or find that communication and past

8
cooperative behaviors lead to the perception that which have been associated with important outcomes
conflict is functional (Anderson and Narus 1990; in past research-influence their outcomes only through
Deutsch 1969). However, we posit that it is trust that the key mediating variables of relationship
leads a partner to perceive that future conflictual commitment and trust. Because our extremely
episodes will be functional. Past cooperation and parsimonious model permits no direct path from any of
communication, we propose, result in increased the five variables to any outcome, it implies a central
functionality of conflict as a result of increasing trust. nomological status for relationship commitment and
trust. A nonparsimonious rival view that is equally
Decision-making uncertainty. Uncertainty in extreme would be one positing only direct paths from
decision making refers to the extent to which a partner each of the precursors to the outcomes, thereby making
(1) has enough information to make key decisions, (2) relationship commitment and trust nomologically
can predict the consequences of those decisions, and similar to the five antecedents. The rival model (see
(3) has confidence in those decisions (Achrol and Stem Figure 3), therefore, allows no indirect effects; in other
1988). We posit that trust decreases a partner's words, relationship commitment and trust are not
decision-making uncertainty because the trusting allowed to mediate any of the relationships. Although
partner has confidence that the trustworthy party can be no one has theorized the rival model, it is implied by
relied on. the numerous discussions and empirical studies that
Hypotheses
consider relationship termination costs, relationship
benefits, shared values, communication, and
Stated in formal fashion, our study tests 13 hypotheses:
opportunistic behavior to be "independent variables"
Hi: There is a positive relationship between relationship directly influencing outcomes. Examples include
termination costs and relationship commitment.
communication and cooperation (Assael 1969);
H2: There is a positive relationship between relationship
benefits and relationship commitment. opportunism and uncertainty (Williamson 1985, p. 58);
H3: There is a positive relationship between shared values communication and relationship "continuity," which
and relationship commitment. conceptually parallels "propensity to leave" (Anderson
H4: There is a positive relationship between shared values and Weitz 1989); shared values leading to decreased
and trust.
H5: There is a positive relationship between propensity to leave (Chatman 1991); and relationship
communication and trust. termination costs leading to cooperation and/or
H6: There is a negative relationship between opportunistic decreased propensity to leave (Schermerhorn 1975;
behavior and trust. Skinner, Gassenheimer, and Kelley 1992; Spekman and
H7: There is a positive relationship between relationship
commitment and acquiescence.
Salmond 1992).
H8: There is a negative relationship between relationship
commitment and propensity to leave.
H9: There is a positive relationship between relationship
commitment and cooperation. Method
H10: There is a positive relationship between trust and
relationship commitment. Research Design
Hu: There is a positive relationship between trust and As the research setting, we used a national sample of
cooperation. independent automobile tire retailers. Although this
H12: There is a positive relationship between trust and
functional conflict. industry has elements of vertical integration, it still has
independent dealers. Because most tire retailers carry a
H13: There is a negative relationship between trust and small number of tire lines, their relationships with
uncertainty. suppliers are potentially important enough for the
research issues to be meaningful. Restricting the
A Rival Model sample to this somewhat homogeneous population
An emerging consensus in structural equations minimized extraneous sources of variation (a plus), and
modeling is that researchers should compare rival the relatively large number of producers and extreme
models, not just test a proposed model (Bollen and competitive pressures due to overcapacity at the time
Long 1992). What, then, would be a rival model? Note
that our model posits that relationship termination
costs, relationship benefits, shared values, The Commitment-Trust Theory/
communication, and opportunistic behavior-all of of research increased the likelihood of there being
large variance to be explained (a large plus).

9
 Preliminary investigation. The study began by overall sample size of 204 and response rate of
exploratory field work that included soliciting the 14.6% (20411394)1. Though sample
assistance of local chapters of the National Tire generalizability is a common concern in social
Dealers and Retreaders Association (NTDRA). In- science research, especially when response rates
depth, on-site interviews with officers of nine tire are small, it is important to note that at this point
retailers in a medium-sized Southwestern city we are providing an initial test of a theoretical
explored issues related to tire manufacturer/dealer model in a particular context. The important
relationships. From these interviews (and the issues here are (1) whether our sample is an
literature review discussed previously), a draft appropriate context for testing our theory and (2)
questionnaire was constructed and pretested on whether our sample of respondents has variance to
site with the same nine tire retailers. Respondents be explained. Because we are not attempting to
were encouraged to identify unclear items, generalize an established model to a new
comment on the importance of the research issues, population or project a descriptive statistic from a
and suggest changes. After making the required sample to some larger population, the possibility
modifications, the local NTDRA chapter assisted of nonresponse bias is a nonissue in research such
in mailing questionnaires to a regional sample of as ours (Hunt 1990).
tire retailers to determine if respondents
Sample characteristics. Our sampling method
could/would complete the questionnaire in the
succeeded in providing respondents who varied
absence of a researcher. No problems were
greatly on personal and firm characteristics.
presented during this stage, and the final draft of
Respondents varied widely in age ($; 35 years of
the questionnaire was developed.
age, 13.3%; 36-45 years of age,
Data Collection
29.1 %; 46-55 years of age, 31.6%; 2:: 56 years of
Data were collected using a self-administered
questionnaire sent to member firms of the age, 26%; x = 48 years of age, s.d. = 10.8),
NTDRA in two phases. During the first, multiple education ($; high school diploma, 15.3%; some
copies of questionnaires were mailed to the college, 34.0%; college degree, 38.6%; and
presidents of the seven largest U.S. chapters of graduate work, 12.2% ), and years of business
NTDRA, all of whom had agreed to participate. experience($; 10 years, 6.6%; 11-20 years, 26.5%;
We expected that, like Goolsby and Hunt (1992), 21-30 years, 33.7%; and > 30 years, 33.1 %; =
using local chapters of the trade association would
26.5 years, s.d. = 10.2), though the sample was
yield a higher response rate than a mass mailing.
made up almost entirely of males (98.4% ). The
Association presidents distributed a total of 341
firms represented in the sample varied in size, as
packets of questionnaires, introductory letters, and
measured by annual sales ($; $500,000, 11.3%;
business reply envelopes to members at their
$500,001-$1 million, 29.0%; $1-$2 million,
monthly chapter meetings. After members
26.9%; $2-$5 million, 19.4%; and> $5 million,
returned only 49 (14.37% ), it was decided that a
13.4%; x= $2.8 million,
mass mailing not only would allow for direct
researcher control over questionnaire distribution s.d. = $4.4 million) or employees (< 10, 38.2%; 10-
but also would be as effective as the continued use 19, 26.6%; 20-49, 23.1 %; and 2:: 50, 12.0%).
of local chapters. In phase two, therefore, 1000 Finally, the average respondent purchased 54%
packets were mailed to independent NTDRA (range= 10-100%, s.d. = 24.2) of their tire
members (new tire dealers only) chosen at random
1 This includes the nine responses acquired during the initial
from the most recent membership directory-after pretest with the nine local retailers interviewed, as well as the 17
excluding all those in metropolitan areas (out of a sample of 44, for a 38.6% response rate) responses
received after the mail pretest to the regional sample.
previously surveyed. Returned questionnaires
totaled 129, for a response rate of 12.9% and an
I Journal of Marketing, July 1994

10
inventory from the supplier they identified as their believed their major supplier would agree with
"major supplier." statements regarding the corporate ethical values
in Hunt,
Measures
All measures were analyzed for validity and
reliability following the guidelines offered by Wood, and Chonko (1989). Shared values then were
Anderson and Gerbing (1988) and JOreskog and calculated as the difference between the two responses
Sorbom (1989). The resulting measurement model subtracted from 7 (to make high numbers indicate high
shared values). Items reflecting ethical values were
x2c406) was 588.33 (p = .000). Appendix A contains chosen because such values are thought to be
measure characteristics and sample measurement foundational in relational ex changes (Gundlach and
items. Here, we briefly discuss the origin of the Murphy 1993) and because Hunt, Wood, and Chonko
measures used. (1989, p. 86) find shared ethical values to be ''a
significant and substantive predictor of organizational
Focal constructs. Given our conceptualization commitment" in marketing.
of relationship commitment, it was essential that
its measure should capture both the importance of Consequences of relationship commitment and trust.
the relationship to respondents and their beliefs To measure cooperation, we adapted the scale
developed by Brown (1979). No scales exist for
about working to maintain the relationship.
measuring the buyer's perception of future
Though no scale existed at the inception of our
acquiescence to the supplier's policies. Because
study for measuring commitment to an measures of self-reported intentions to perform specific
interorganizational relationship, eight items in the behaviors (e.g., voting for a given candidate)
organizational commitment scales of Meyer and commonly employ single items, a single item measure
Allen (1984) and Mowday, Steers, and Porter was used for intended acquiescent behavior. The
(1979) reflected our definition. These eight were propensity to leave measure was adapted from
modified to reflect relationship, rather than Bluedom's (1982) measure of employees' propensity to
organizational, commitment. Because the Dyadic leave the organization. We developed a two-item scale
Trust Scale of Larzelere and Huston ( 1980) taps that measures perceptions of future functional conflict.
The uncertainty measure was adapted from Achrol and
the major facets of trust, that is, reliability,
Stem's (1988) scales for adequacy of available
integrity, and confidence, its nine items were
information (UINFO) and the degree of confidence of
adapted to measure interorganizational trust. the decision maker when making these decisions (UCO
Antecedents of relationship commitment and NF).
trust. Several of the items in the Meyer and Allen
(1984) continuance commitment scale focus on Results
employment termination costs at the Table 1 shows means, standard deviations,
organizational level. We modified nine of its intercorrelations, variances, and covariances for the
items to measure relationship termination costs. summates of all research variables. Note that the
standard deviations for the 11 scales range from 1.018
To measure relative relationship benefits, we
to 1.814 (mean= 1.401), indicating a substantial
adapted items from two scales used by Anderson
amount of variance in the responses. Most importantly,
and Narus (1990) that measure "outcomes given standard deviations for the seven endogenous variables
comparison levels" and "comparison levels given indicated high variance to be explained (mean = 1.647).
alternatives.'' Communication was measured using Of the 12 scales' means, 5 are within one-half scale
a scale developed by Anderson, Lodish, and Weitz point (and 9 within one scale point) of 4, the center of
(1987). The opportunistic behavior scale was the scales. This absence of skewness, when combined
derived from John (1984 ). For shared values, we with the standard deviations, suggests that our sample
used Enz' s (1988) twostaged procedure. That is, contained both effective and ineffective relationships,
we asked respondents (1) the degree to which they at least on the qualitative dimensions studied.
would agree and (2) the degree to which they The correlations in Table 1 provide an initial test of the

11
13 hypotheses. All 13 of the hypothesized relationships
are supported at the p < .01 level. The absolute values
of the correlations range from .279 to .759, the average
being .476. For a much stronger test of the hypotheses,
we now test the proposed model using LISREL,
thereby holding constant all 43 nonspecified structural
relationships and accounting for measurement error.

Testing the KMV Model

The KMV model was tested using LISREL VII and the
covariance matrix shown in Table 1. Each single-
indicant loading was fixed at .950 for the formative
measure summates and at each scale's coefficient alpha
for reflective measure summates. The exogenous
constructs were allowed to correlate by freeing the <I>
matrix. The results, shown in Table 2, indicate support
(p < .01) for 12 of the 13 hypothesized paths of the
model, and 24 of 27 indirect paths. The proposed
structural model's comparative fit index, CFI (Bentler
1990), of .890 indicates a good fit, especially for a
model with such a large number of constructs. Overall,
the KMV model performs well.

Building relationship commitment and trust. With the

exception of relationship benefits ~ relationship
commitment, all hypothesized paths from the
antecedents to relationship commitment and trust were
supported. Furthermore, the squared multiple
correlations (SMCs) for the structural equations for
relationship commitment and trust were high. Over half
of the variance (SMC = .552) in relationship
commitment was explained by the direct effects of
relationship termination costs, shared values, and trust,
and the indirect effects of shared values,
communication, and opportunistic behavior. For trust,
even more of the variance was explained (SMC= .743)
by the direct effects of shared values, communication,
and opportunistic behavior.

Outcomes of developing relationship commitment and

trust. All the paths leading to the five outcomes were
significant at the p < .001 level. The standardized
estimates for the six hypothesized paths ranged
from .252 to .561 (mean

= .442), suggesting that relationship commitment and

trust

The Commitment-Trust Theory I

12
 TABLE 2 Analysis of
Competing Structural Models
Proposed Model Rival Model
Path Estimate Path Estimate

Direct Effects Direct Effects

Relationship termination costs ~ Relationship commitment
.367c Relationship termination costs ~ Acquiescence
.242b
Relationship benefits ~ Relationship commitment
-.006 Relationship termination costs ~
Propensity to leave .004
Shared Values~ Relationship commitment
.189b Relationship termination costs ~
Cooperation -.209b
Shared Values ~ Trust .192c Relationship benefits ~
Acquiescence .029
Communications ~ Trust .184b Relationship
benefits ~ Propensity to leave -.213b
Opportunistic behavior~ Trust -.618c Relationship benefits ~
Cooperation .193b Relationship commitment~ Acquiescence
.561c Shared values ~ Acquiescence .15oa Relationship
commitment ~ Propensity to leave -.55oc Shared values ~
Propensity to leave .132
Relationship commitment ~ Cooperation .252c
Shared values ~ Cooperation -.029
Trust~ Relationship commitment .531c
Shared values ~ Functional conflict .037
Trust ~ Cooperation .507c Shared values ~ Uncertainty
-.031
Trust ~ Functional conflict .448c Communication
~ Acquiescence .102
Trust~ Uncertainty -.331c Communication
~ Propensity to leave .104
Indirect Effectsd Communication ~ Cooperation .069
Relationship termination costs ~ Acquiescence .206C
Communication ~ Functional conflict
.262b
Relationship termination costs ~ Propensity to leave
-.202C Communication ~ Uncertainty
-.047
Relationship termination costs ~ Cooperation .093b
Opportunistic behavior ~ Acquiescence .007
Shared values ~ Relationship commitment .102C
Opportunistic behavior ~ Propensity to leave .143
Shared values ~ Acquiescence .163C Opportunistic behavior ~
Cooperation -.273a Shared values ~ Propensity to leave -.160C
Opportunistic behavior ~ Functional conflict .133
Shared values ~ Cooperation .171C Opportunistic
behavior ~ Uncertainty .400b
Shared values ~ Functional conflict .086b
Relationship commitment ~ Acquiescence .165
Shared values ~ Uncertainty -.064b Relationship
commitment ~ Propensity to leave -.438C
Communication ~ Relationship commitment .097b
Relationship commitment ~ Cooperation
.338C
Communication ~ Acquiescence .055b Trust ~
Acquiescence .246B
Communication ~ Propensity to leave -.054b Trust ~ Propensity
to leave -.100 Communication ~ Cooperation .118b Trust ~
Cooperation .096
Communication ~ Functional conflict .082b Trust
~ Functional conflict .371B Communication ~ Uncertainty
-.061b Trust ~ Uncertainty .070
O
p
p
o
r
t
u
n
i
s
t
i
c

13
b
e
h
a
v
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o
r

R
e
l
a
t
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s
h
i
p

c
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i
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m
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-
.
3
2
7
C

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b
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14
-
.
1
8
4
C

Opportunistic behavior ~ Propensity to leave .180C

O
p
p
o
r
t
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n
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t
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c

b
e
h
a
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-
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3
9
6
C

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15
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
a
l

c
o
n
f
l
i
c
t

-
.
2
7
7
C

Opportunistic behavior ~ Uncertainty .204C

Trust ~ Acquiescence .299C
Trust ~ Propensity to leave -.292C
Trust ~ Cooperation .134b
X2(43) = 140.26 GFI = .892 CFI = .890 PNFI = .555 X2(16)
= 52.64 GFI = .957 CFI = .959 PNFI = .228 ap < .05
bp< .01
Cp< .001
dOnly those indirect effects that were significant at the p < .05
level or better are shown
n =204 model with its rival
on the following
have considerable criteria: (1) overall fit
influence on of the model-implied
variables that are covariance matrix to
theorized to be the sample
important for covariance matrix, as
relationship measured by CFI; (2)
marketing success. percentage of the
Indeed, the model models' hypothesized
explains a substantial parameters that are
amount of the statistically
variance of each significant; (3) ability
outcome, as the to explain the
SMCs reveal: variance in the
acquiescence= .315, outcomes of interest,
propensity to leave as measured by
= .302, cooperation = squared multiple
.481, functional correlations of the
conflict= .201, and focal and outcome
uncertainty= .109. variables; and (4)
The total coefficient parsimony, as
of determination for measured by the par-
the structural
equations is .810.
I
Testing the Rival simonious normed fit
Model index (PNFI) (James,
We compare (see Mulaik, and Brett
Table 2) the proposed 1982).

16
 Though the CFI models (13 versus 29
for the rival model is paths). Because CFI
slightly higher (CFI = does not account for
.959 versus .890), parsimony differences,
we compare the two
only 11 of 29
models using PNFI.
(37.9%) of its Because PNFI is
hypothesized paths informed by both the
are supported at the p goodness of fit of the
< .05 level (including model and its
only 7 of 29 (24.1 %) parsimony, one
supported at p < .01). commonly finds that
goodness of fit indices
In contrast, 12 of 13
in the .90s translate to
hypothesized paths parsimonious fit
(92.3%) in the KMV indices less than .60
model are supported (Mulaik et al. 1989).
at the p < .01 level. The KMV model's
Importantly, 9 of the PNFI of .555 exceeds
11 significant direct the rival's .228.
effects in the rival are Although no
guidelines exist for
significant direct or
determining what is a
indirect effects in the significant difference
KMV model (the in PNFI values, we
exceptions are note that to
relationship benefits ~ accomplish a 7.8%
propensity to leave improvement in CFI
and relationship (from .890 to .959),
benefits~ cooperation). one sacrifices 41.1 %
Moreover, little, if in PNFI (from .555
to .228). Such a
any, additional
sacrifice, it would
explanatory power is seem, is too great.
gained from the Stated conversely, we
additional 16 paths. accomplish a great
The rival's SMCs are improvement in
acquiescence = .395, parsimony (from 29
propensity to paths to 13 paths) by
leave= .352, sacrificing only 7.8%
in CFI-a sacrifice
cooperation= .561,
seemingly worth
functional making for the sake of
conflict= .235, and parsimony.
uncertainty = .153.
The largest increment
to SMC was .080 (for Discussion
acquiescence) and the We first address the
significance of
mean increment
conceptualizing
only .058. relationship
commitment and trust
The total coefficient of
as mediators of
determination for the
important relational
rival is actually less
variables. Then we
than that of the KMV
discuss directions for
model (.805
further research.
versus .810).
As is obvious Relationship
from Figures 2 and 3 , Commitment and
there is a great Trust as Key
difference in Mediating
parsimony between Constructs
the KMV and rival

17
In relationship nonparsimonious (29
marketing, what are paths), but equally
the roles of extreme (no indirect
commitment and paths are allowed).
trust? Are relationship Although customary
commitment and trust goodness of fit
just two more measures show
''independent'' acceptable fit for both
variables that models, parsimony
influence outcomes or clearly favors the key
are they somehow mediating variable
central to relationship view. Even though the
marketing success? rival has over twice
Theorizing that the paths (29 versus
commitment and trust 13), the extra 16 paths
are key variables that from the
mediate successful "independent"
relationship variables explain only
marketing, we develop a marginal amount of
a causal model additional variance.
containing 13 Examining the paths
hypotheses that we not supported in the
test in the context of rival also suggests that
automobile tire the KMV model best
relationships. represents reality.
Correlation analysis Surprisingly, not a
supported all 13 single antecedent in
hypotheses and the rival is
structural equation significantly related to
modeling, a more more than two
powerful test, supports outcomes--even
12 of the 13 though all these
hypotheses. Not only antecedent variables
do our hypothesized have been widely
antecedents explain recognized as
over half the variance important in exchange
in relationship relationships. The
commitment and trust, KMV model explains
they also explain a this surprising finding
substantial amount of by showing that the
the variances in five antecedents do affect
outcomes, including these outcomes
almost half of the significantly, but only
variance of the crucial through the key
variable, cooperation. mediating variables of
If cooperative relationship
relationships are commitment and trust.
required for Indeed, all 18 of the
relationship marketing indirect effects of the
success, our results antecedents on the
suggest that outcomes are
commitment and trust supported (p < .01).
are, indeed, key. Finally, when
Recognizing that corrected for
our model is both parsimony, the overall
parsimonious (13 fit of the rival model is
paths) and extreme less than half that of
(only indirect paths the KMV model.
are allowed from the Philosophically,
five exogenous to the parsimony is a
five outcome characteristic of
variables), we theories that science
compare it with a rival has cherished since at
that is
18
least the 14th century, p. 25) puts it, "the end
when William of objective of
Ockham developed organizations involved
the principle now in an
known as [interorganizational
Ockham's razor. relationship] is the
Philosophers of attainment of goals
science long have that are unachievable
argued that the by organizations
objective of science is independently." In the
not only to explain, rival model, only
predict, and relationship benefits
understand the world and opportunistic
in which we live, but behavior were found
to do so in as efficient to affect cooperation
a manner as possible. significantly. In the
Lambert and Brittan KMV model,
(1970, p. 69), discuss however, all
the reasons that antecedents (except
parsimony, or relationship benefits)
"simplicity," has been were found to affect
so important in cooperation
science: "Certainly of significantly, and
two hypotheses similar results were
equally satisfactory in found for the other
other respects, we important outcomes as
habitually choose the well. These findings
simpler. Reasons are imply that relationship
not hard to find. The commitment and trust
simpler hypothesis is are not only important
usually the more variables in marketing
elegant, more relationships, as
convenient to work proposed by other
with, more easily researchers (Achrol
understood, 1991; Becker 1960;
remembered, and Dwyer, Schurr, and
communicated." The Oh 1987), but also are
emphasis on key mediating
parsimony in the variables in these
structural equations relationships.
modeling literature is Identifying
fully in accord with commitment and trust
philosophy of science as key mediating
(Bentler and Mooijaart variables is critical to
1989). Therefore, if the study and
the job of marketing management of
science is, whenever relationship
possible, to explain marketing. To the
marketing phenomena researcher, if
parsimoniously, our relationship
results clearly support commitment and trust
the theory that were merely two more
commitment and trust independent
are key mediating antecedents of
variables that important relationship
contribute to outcomes, failing to
relationship marketing include their effects in
success. studies of relationship
Relationship marketing processes
marketing success, in simply would result in
all its contexts, less variance
requires cooperative explained among the
behaviors. Indeed, as outcomes. However,
Van de Ven (1976, as key mediating
19
variables, failing to commitment.
include their effects in Further research
such studies would
result in flawed
could explore types
conclusions regarding of termination costs
not only the direct other than the
impact of relationship economic costs
commitment and trust
studied here.
on important
outcomes, but the Noneconomic
impact of other costs, including the
antecedents as well. loss of ''social
To the manager, satisfaction from
understanding of the
process of making the association"
relationships work is (Dwyer, Schurr, and
su- Oh 1987, p. 14), as
well as such
The sociopsychological
Commitment- costs as worry,
Trust Theory/ aggravation, and
perior to perceived loss of
developing simply reputation or
a "laundry list" of "face," also could
antecedents of contribute to the
important development of
outcomes-and our relationship
results imply that commitment. The
commitment and hypothesized effect
trust are key to of relationship
understanding the benefits on
relationship relationship
development commitment was
process. unsupported-even
though the simple
Directions for
correlation (r =
Further Research
Alternative .316) was positive
approaches to and significant.
construct (Such surprising
measurement. findings as this
Although our show the value of
measures structural equations
performed well, it modeling.) One
is certainly possible possible
that better (or at measurementrelate
least different) d explanation for
measures could be this finding is that
constructed for relationship
several of the benefits were
constructs. For measured as an
example, evaluation of the
relationship supplier on the
termination costs facets of gross
appear to increase profit, customer
relationship satisfaction, and
20
product example, relating to
performance. In the product quality,
future, researchers promotion tactics,
could address other or customer
potential benefits. service-also could
Note that we further the
measure development of
relationship commitment and
benefits in a trust in relational
comparative sense, exchanges. For
that is, benefits of example,
the supplier researchers could
compared with focus on the
those of a likely "norms"
alternative supplier. investigated by
Perhaps many Heide and John
respondents lacked (1992).
information as to
Finally, less
the characteristics
than 11 % of the
of alternative
variance in
suppliers, or they
uncertainty was
had a tendency to
explained by our
focus on the
model-the lowest
absolute level of
for any outcome.
benefits, not the
Given the wide
relative benefits. It
range of
is worth noting that
idiosyncratic
the variance in
environmental
relationship
factors that
benefits was one of
undoubtedly affect
the smallest of all
each respondent's
studied variables
uncertainty, such
(s.d. = 1.097). In
low explained
the future,
variance is
researchers could
unsurprising.
try measuring
However, it is also
satisfaction with
possible that the
absolute levels of
types of decisions
benefits.
that the measure
By measuring addressed-that is,
shared values in adequacy of
terms of shared information and
ethical values, they confidence in
contributed decisions for
significantly to the promotion efforts
development of and inventory-may
both relationship not be as heavily
commitment and influenced by trust
trust. However, in the trading
other types of partner as are
shared values-for others. In the

21
future, researchers that opportunistic
could explore other behavior also may
facets of the influence one or
business, such as more outcomes
the provision of directly. Indeed, the
warranty service, LISREL
investment in modification
relationship- indices suggest
specific assets, or paths from
searching for opportunistic
alternative trading behavior to
partners. For cooperation and
example, we would uncertainty.
expect that Therefore, we urge
marketers who trust researchers to
their trading evaluate an
partners should "extended" KMV
model that allows
I for both direct and
feel more sure-that indirect paths from
is, less uncertain- opportunistic
about excluding behavior to these
potential alternate variables.
suppliers from Our results
consideration. indicate that trust
Further influences the way
developing the KMV in which
model. Although disagreements and
our tests of the two arguments are
competing models perceived by
suggest that the exchange partners.
KMV model better When trust is
conceptualizes the present, parties will
roles of view such conflict
commitment and as functional.
trust, allowing for Therefore, they can
direct effects for discuss problems
some antecedents is openly because
suggested. Of the they do not fear
five antecedents malevolent actions
studied, by their partners.
opportunistic Both the
behavior displayed modification
the largest effects, indices for the
both direct and proposed model
indirect. The sizes and the results of
of the rival model's the rival model
direct paths from suggest that
opportunistic communication
behavior to the also can lead
outcomes suggest directly to conflict

22
being perceived as all forms of
functional commitment
(independent of the (Williams and
indirect path Hazer 1986)-which
through trust). This may explain our
"dual path" positive (simple)
possibility would correlation of
lend support to benefits to
Mohr and Nevin's commitment.
(1990) view that However, one also
effective would expect
communication is strong associations
crucial for between global
obtaining high satisfaction and our
performance. other exogenous
Further research variables (e.g.,
investigating the communication).
extended KMV Therefore, there
model should may be a global
determine whether satisfaction ''halo
this "dual path" effect'' that results
holds elsewhere. in the apparent
relationship
Our test failed
between benefits
to support a path
and commitment
from relationship
disappearing when
benefits to
all exogenous
relationship
variables are
commitment.
included in the
Although this
analysis.
failure may be
Researchers may
related to the
need to include this
measurement issues
halo effect
previously
explicitly in their
discussed,
models.
structural
explanations also Interestingly,
may exist. One though our results
would expect that indicate that both
the level of benefits commitment and
received from the trust are important
relationship would for achieving
be related strongly cooperation, the
to both satisfaction parameter values
with those benefits suggest that trust
and satisfaction has the strongest
with the overall effect. Our measure
relationship. Global of cooperation
satisfaction included
customarily shows cooperation across
a strong five different facets
relationship with of the business.

23
Would this finding
hold for other
forms of
cooperation?
Furthermore, what
forms of
cooperation are
most conducive to
success? The
organizational
behavior literature
highlights the role
of organizational
citizenship
behaviors in
success (Organ
1988). Are there
specific network
citizenship
behaviors that
contrib-

24
FIGURE 4
An Extended KMV Model of Relationship Marketing
ute to relationship whereas the exercise of
marketing success? These coercive power yields
questions warrant further compliance because firms
research. are compelled to do so,
firms committed to the
Among the important relationship acquiesce
outcomes we study here is because they want to do so.
acquiescence. Why do Long-run relationship
firms acquiesce to or success, we argue, is more
comply with the desires of likely to be associated with
others? Marketing's the absence of the exercise
traditional answer has been of coercive power and the
that compliance results presence of commitment
from the exercise (or one's and trust. The preceding
fear of the exercise) of notwithstanding, the
power, which, since Hunt commitment-trust theory of
and Nevin (1974), relationship marketing does
customarily has been not deny the importance of
divided into two types, understanding power. Just
coercive and noncoercive. as medical science should
However, to many understand both sickness
academics, as well as to and health, marketing
most practitioners, the term science should understand
power implies, or at least both functional and
strongly connotes, coercion, dysfunctional relationships.
that is, "do this or else!" If Just as the KMV model
one does not have the incorporates opportunistic
ability to force compliance, behavior and its
then one may be said to dysfunctional
have some degree of consequences, so also can
influence, but not genuine an extended KMV model
power. For these academics incorporate power.
and practitioners,
noncoercive power is at best Everyone acknowledges
a non sequitur and at worst that power-here implying
an oxymoron. In this vein, the ability to compel
Young and Wilkinson compliance-indeed can
(1989, p. 109) argue that result from dependence.
marketing's emphasis on Furthermore, dependence
power and conflict as key varies directly with the
concepts for studying value received from a
channels has "distorted the partner and inversely with
understanding of how the availability of
channels functioned. The alternative trading partners
emphasis was on sick rather (Cook and Emerson 1978).
than healthy relationships." In our terms, feelings of
dependence can result from
Instead of acquiescence relationship benefits and
resulting from the exercise relationship termination
of power, as in sick costs. We also acknowledge
relationships, our results that the exercise of power
support the view that in (based on dependence) in
"healthy" relationships specific episodes can lead
partners acquiesce because to a partner's acquiescence.
of their commitment to the However, the continuing
relationship. In short, exercise of power to gain
The 25
acquiescence also destroys here could benefit from
trust and commitment, being tested in a
which decreases longitudinal design.
cooperation and inhibits
long-term success. As Second, the context
previous research supports of our study, automobile
(Lusch 1976), the use of tire retailers, limits its
power also will result in potential generalizability.
conflict (of the On average, respondents
dysfunctional kind). In
in our sample purchased
summary, as shown in the
extended KMV model
roughly half (54%) of
(Figure 4), we hypothesize their tire inventory from
that power (1) results from the supplier they
relationship termina- identified as their "major
supplier." Certainly,
some firms in other
Commitment-Trust
Theory I industries would
tion costs and purchase more of their
relationship benefits, (2) inventories from their
positively affects major suppliers (e.g.,
acquiescence and franchising operations
conflict, and (3) such as automobile
negatively affects dealerships), and firms
relationship commitment offering a broader
and trust. The negative assortment of goods or
effect on relationship services (e.g., mass
commitment and trust merchandisers,
over the long term will supermarkets) would
decrease cooperation and purchase much less from
diminish overall a single supplier. Perhaps
relationship success. in industries in which the
Power, then, like percentage of retailers'
opportunistic behavior, total purchases from
helps us to understand single suppliers differs
relationship marketing markedly from the range
failures. If marketing in our sample, the
science should tum structure of relationships
toward explaining might be different.
relationship marketing Therefore, not only
success-and we believe it would strict replication
should-power cannot be using automobile tire
the central construct. retailers be useful, but
extending the study to
Limitations other partnerships is
The first limitation is the definitely required.
cross-sectional design Because we theorize that
employed. In any model commitment and trust are
in which causality is key mediating variables
suggested, longitudinal in all ten forms of
studies provide for relationship marketing,
stronger inferences. testing our baseline
Thus, the model model in such areas as
developed and tested
The 26
 strategic alliances, total establishing, developing,
quality management and maintaining
efforts, public-purpose successful relational
partnerships, and exchanges. With regard
"internal marketing" to any firm, there are ten
programs is required. forms of relationship
Our reading of the marketing, which can be
literature in all forms of grouped into the
relationship marketing relational exchanges
leads us to believe that involving suppliers,
the commitment-trust lateral organizations,
theory underlying the customers, or one's own
KMV model should employees or business
apply for all relational units. The need for
exchanges-but only relationship marketing
further empirical work stems from the changing
can confirm or dynamics of the global
disconfirm this. marketplace and the
changing requirements
Conclusion for competitive success.
We explore the nature of Somewhat paradoxically,
relationship marketing, to be an effective
its conceptualization, competitor in today's
forms, and requisites for global marketplace
success. Relationship requires one to be an
marketing, we propose, effective cooperator in
refers to all marketing some network of
activities directed toward
APPENDIX A
Measures
Constructs Sample Items
Relationship benefits' If you could not buy your stock from your present major supplier, you would likely be pur-
(4 items) chasing
from some other
major supplier
(we'll call this the
"alternate
supplier"). Please
compare your
major supplier
with this alternate
supplier
concerning the
following items:
(anchors: Present
supplier is much
better/Present
supplier is much
worse) 1. Gross
profit provided
by a product line
common to both
suppliers.
2. Product performance provided by a product line common to both suppliers.

Relationship termination costsr (anchors: Strongly agree/Strongly disagree)

(5 items) reliabilityd
= .895 a= .893
VEE= .634
1 = .790
The 27

I
organizations. If being an exchange partners. Such
effective cooperator in actions will enable firms
some network is a and their networks to
prerequisite to being a enjoy sustainable
successful competitor, competitive advantages
what are the requisites over their rivals and their
for being a successful networks in the global
cooperator? The marketplace. Our initial
commitment-trust theory test of the KMV model
maintains that those of relationship
networks characterized commitment and trust in
by relationship the context of a channel
commitment and trust of distribution has been
engender cooperation (in encouraging. However,
addition to acquiescence, much more work must be
a reduced tendency to done. Our theory and the
leave the network, the model need further
belief that conflict will explication, replication,
be functional, and extension, application,
reduced uncertainty). All and critical evaluation.
these "qualitative We offer them to the
outcomes" contribute to marketing discipline and
overall network marketing practice for all
performance. If these purposes.
commitment and trust are
Constructs
key, how can such
Shared valuesr
characteristics be (5 items)
nurtured? We posit that reliability =
relationship commitment .871 ex=
.868
and trust develop when VEE= .577
firms attend to l = .756
relationships by (1)
providing resources, Communication I
opportunities, and (4 items)
benefits that are superior
to the offerings of
Opportunistic behavior!
alternative partners; (2) (3 items)
maintaining high
standards of corporate
values and allying
oneself with exchange Relationship
commitmentr (7
partners having similar items) reliability
values; (3) = .895 ex= .895
communicating valuable VEE= .626 l = .736
information, including Trustr (7
expectations, market items)
intelligence, and reliability
evaluations of the = .949
partner's performance; ex= .947
VEE= .729
and (4) avoiding
l = .849
malevolently taking
advantage of their Acquiescence!

The 28
 (1 item) supplier (anchors: Strongly
agree/
Cooperation I Strongly disagree)
(5 items) 1. . .. alters the facts slightly.
2. . .. promises to do things
without actually doing
them later.
Propensity to leave!
(3 items) The relationship that my firm
has with my major supplier
(anchors: Strongly
agree/Strongly disagree)
1. . .. is something we are
Functional conflict! very committed to.
(2 items) 2. . .. is something my firm
intends to maintain
Uncertainty! indefinitely.
(10 items) aAll measures 3. . .. deserves our firm's
maximum effort to
maintain.
employ 7-point scales. bltem was
In our relationship, my
major supplier
reverse-scored. (anchors: Strongly
agree/Strongly
disagree) 1. . .. cannot
APPEN be trusted at times.
DIX A 2. . .. can be counted on to do
Contin what is right.
ued 3. . .. has high integrity.
Sample Items
Please indicate the degree to (anchors: Strongly
which you believe that (1) disagree/Strongly agree)
your supplier would agree 1. In the future, my firm will
with the following statements, likely comply with the
and (2) you would agree with policies that this supplier
the following statements: (two establishes for the
part question, anchors: marketing of its products
Strongly agree/Strongly by its distributors.
disagree)
1. To succeed in this How would you characterize
business, it is often the cooperation between you
necessary to compromise and your supplier regarding
one's ethics. the following activities?
(anchors: Not at all
2. If an employee is cooperativeNery cooperative)
discovered to have 1. Local/Regional Cooperative
engaged in unethical Advertising
behavior that results
primarily in personal gain 2. Inventory levels
(rather than corporate
What do you think are the
gain), he or she should be
chances of your firm
promptly reprimanded.
terminating this relationship ...
In our relationship, my (anchors: Very highNery low)
major supplier (a) ... within the next six
(anchors: Strongly months?
agree/Strongly (b) ... within the next one
disagree) 1. . .. keeps year?
us informed of new (c) ... within the next two
developments. years?
2. . .. communicates well his
expectations for our firm's (anchors: Strongly
performance. agree/Strongly disagree)
1. In the future, differences of
To accomplish his own opinion between my supplier
objectives, sometimes my and me will probably be
The 29
 viewed as "just a part of doing Modeling in Practice: A
business" and will likely result Review and Recommended
in benefits to both of us. To Two-Step Approach,"
what extent do you now have Psychological Bulletin,
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(b) is weighted twice the reverse-scored response. Item (c) is simply the reverse scored response.
dComposite reliability, Cronbach's a, variance extracted estimate, and average item loading.
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