UNITED STATES Vs.

AH CHONG

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal
Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or
muchacho.

No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of
the building,

The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and the occupants, as a measure
of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of
reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had retired for the night, was
suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the room. being pushed open by
someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief,
leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you."

At the moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed
against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted
by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar

Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the
intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as
defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his
personal protection.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under
the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room,
despite defendant's warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascual suggests itself, unless it be
that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frighten
him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah
Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of
simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio
mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.

At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto,
but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his
lawful right of self defense.
RULING:

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at the bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal below alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who
forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was an imminent peril,
both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising
hid legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have
been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have
been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts,
or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believed
threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the
defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and he is bail bond exonerated, with the
costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.

Q: Explain why the Supreme Court ruled that Ah Chong is not criminally liable.

A: In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to
negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e. g.,
in larceny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes and misdemeanors generally some degree of
criminal intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases
where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal
negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily
committing a crime or misdemeanor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him,
even though it be different from that which he intended to commit.
Ivler vs. San Pedro (2010)

Facts:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, Jason Ivler was charged before the MeTC, with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries
sustained by Evangeline L. Ponce and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponce’s vehicle.

On 7 September 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.The RTC dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by Ivler in connection with the decision of the MeTC. Hence, this petition.

Ivler adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless
imprudence. He argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal
Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. He submits
that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical
injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies
(e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for
the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to
Determine the Penalty

The two charges against Ivler, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that “reckless imprudence” is not a crime in
itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad
to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised
Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere
question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Were criminal negligence but a modality in
the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the
mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one
actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in
proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful
offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, Revised Penal
Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional
[medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter
could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a
whole class, or series, of crime. (See  Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga)

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same Quasi-
Offense

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a
means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s
unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365. These cases uniformly barred
the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause .

Imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes
thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is
single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. (See
People vs. Buan)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

 Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two
categories:

(a) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation
light felonies); and

(b) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural
tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing  not an act defined as a felony but “the mental attitude
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,”  a single mental attitude regardless of
the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more
consequences.

Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a
quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an
offense which is a necessary means for committing another.
Hence, prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or
severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under
Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under
Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.

If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of
Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting
acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of
quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a
lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

RULING:

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection
of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the
beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects
qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If
it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula
of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all
resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the
distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365,
befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

Q: Is culpa a mode of committing a felony or a felony in itself?

A: YES. Culpa is just a mode of committing a felony.